In developing economies, philanthropic CSR is seen as an important source of funding for development expenditures. The firms, at the same time, are also known for lobbying with the government for favorable policy outcomes. The paper theoretically models a lobbying game over a policy space between the firms and the NGOs and predicts its effect on the CSR outcomes. The NGOs in the developing economies battling the firms are thought both as a check on socially harmful business practices of the firms and as a drag on smooth business operation (and economic development). The government often tries to regulate the activities of the NGOs in this pretext. The paper considers the effect of such regulation on both the extensive and intensive margin of CSR activities by the firms and derives the conditions under which the CSR contribution rises. The paper also considers the impact when the CSR contribution as a percentage of profit is made mandatory for the firms.
About the speaker
Dr. Vivekananda Mukherjee is currently Professor of Economics at Department of Economics, Jadavpur University. His research is concentrated around the institutional issues in Public Economics.
Venue: Conference room (0.16 & 0.17)
Date: 08 November 2018
Time: 12:00 - 13:00