Deterrence, Peer-Effect and Legitimacy in Anti-Corruption Policymaking: An Experimental Analysis
Amadou Boly, African Development Bank
In our lab experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make independent decisions regarding embezzlement. Official B observes Official A’s decision before making his/her own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. Facing an honest official A reduces embezzlement by Official B, suggesting a peer-effect. Deterrence also matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement. Crucially, deterrence is more effective in curbing embezzlement when chosen by an honest Official A compared to a corrupt A at almost all detection levels. Such a “legitimacy” effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies can fail to curb corruption in countries with perceived corrupt government.
About the speaker
Amadou Boly is a Principal Research Economist at the African Development Bank (Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire); after having worked as a Research Fellow at UNU-WIDER (Helsinki, Finland) and as Associate Industrial Development Officer at UNIDO (Vienna, Austria). He hold a PhD in economics from the University of Montreal (Canada), a MSc in International Business from the University of Groningen (Netherlands) and a BSc in Economics and Management from the University of Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). His research interests are in Development and Experimental Economics. He has published in journals such as Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Experimental Economics, International Economic Review or World Development.
Venue: Conference room
Date: 13 October 2016
Time: 12:00 - 13:00 CEST
