Prof. Tomaso Duso, DIW Berlin and DICE, Heinrich-Heine University
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy
instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely
involve robust deterrence in the European context, as they lead to fewer merger notifications in
subsequent years. Furthermore, preventions, phase-2 remedies, and phase-1 withdrawals do not
yield substantial deterrence. While the EC’s 2004 policy reforms also do not yield additional
deterrence, the deterrence effects involved with phase-1 remedies work best in highconcentration
industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by
the EC to define a low-competition industry.
About the speaker
https://sites.google.com/site/tomasoduso/home
Venue: Conference Rooom
Date: 20 November 2014
Time: 12:30 - 13:30
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