CONFLICTING DEMANDS IN ETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES
Ethnopolitical Contention and Identity Values in Europe
CONFLICTING DEMANDS IN ETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES: ETHNOPOLITICAL CONTENTION AND IDENTITY VALUES IN EUROPE

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1. Introduction
1.1 Why Studying Ethnopolitical Contention?

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars working in the field of ethnic conflicts have documented the increase in ethnic mobilization worldwide (Horowitz 2000; Olzak 1998; Brass 1991). Empirical evidence also reveals that ethnicity and conflict-based movements are increasingly interrelated globally (Gurr 1993a). As a result, the interest in this subject grew at such a rate that would not be an understatement to say that ethnicity and ethnic mobilization became two of the most researched areas in the field of comparative politics of the last decades.

The existing literature abounds in explanations regarding the causes forcing ethnic movements to evolve in one way or another. In its most intense form, the ethno-nationalist conflict produces violence, destruction, and the disintegration of the state-based structures. A large body of theoretical and empirical work deals with this critical force of ethnic mobilization (see among others, Toft 2003; Horowitz 2000; Fearon and Laitin 1999; Tarrow 1991; Zulaika 1988; Snyder 1978; Gurr 1970). At the same time, more peaceful forms of ethnic contention have been only remotely mentioned in the existing literature (see e.g. Olzak 1998; Cebotari 2010a; Lee 1993; Browning 1984; Lipsky 1970). As a compromise, a limited stream of scholar-work tried to combine the analysis of both violent and peaceful contention (Saxton and Benson 2006; Gurr 1989; DeNardo 1985).

Hitherto, the existing literature is more inclined toward distinguishing between the violent aggression and the non-violent part of ethnic contention (Olzak 1998; Olzak 1992; Tilly 1978). Violent conflicts occur mainly as premeditated actions, being preponderantly motivated by ongoing racial, religious, linguistic, identity, and many other perceived hatreds. They are mostly regarded as the by-product of group interactions, having as main purpose the division of power (Tilly 1978, 172). The range of violent mobilization can vary from political banditry up to terrorist actions and perpetuated civil wars.

Protest mobilization instead, is seen as less violent in its nature, with actions resulting from demands and grievances, mainly directed toward the governing authority. Although less violent, this façade of ethnic movements can still disrupt the central authority of the state through various actions of disorder. Examples of ethnopolitical protest vary from symbolic actions such as petitions or editing posters up to large scale rallies and mass demonstrations.
Given the observed differences in the temperament of ethnic contention, violent rebellion and protest mobilization must be approached precisely and separately. The main difference between the two ways of conflict manifestation is the final target to be achieved. Violent rebellion has well defined goals to be reached such as secession, autonomy, separation, or additional territorial and political claims. These targets are ambitions and with lasting effects, as the case of violent movements in Northern Ireland, the Basque country, Chechnya, Kosovo, or Transnistria in Moldova. Comparatively, protest mobilization is seen more as a socio-political movement characterized by spontaneity, moderate claims, and limited violent aggression. In most cases, violent rebellion is more active in those countries where the basic rights and freedoms are less respected by the ruling authority (Marshal and Gurr 2003; Snyder 1999). In general, it is believed that democracies are more successful in reinforcing the necessary means and instruments to peacefully manage the consensus between ethnic diversity and political governance in cultural diverse societies (Saideman and Ayres 2000; Guibernau 1999; Gurr 1993b).

During the last two decades, there is evidence showing that violent conflict has sharply declined while peaceful contention has flourished worldwide (Gurr 2000). Especially in Europe, the convergence towards democratization of the newly emerged democracies has resulted in a pragmatic choice for mobilization given by the official protesting channels rather than violent rebelling actions. In general, more open regimes are less likely to rely on oppression in containing ethnic diversity which can be seen as a reliable choice for restraining the “cycle of violence” (Tarrow 1994).

Peaceful mobilization was also encouraged by an increased attention towards policies of integration and assimilation which targeted ethnic minorities in the recent decades. The process of accommodating ethnic diversity is especially visible in Western Europe, where it is believed that the border between integration and assimilation has almost disappeared (Modood 2005). Accommodating ethnic diversity is a natural step in building a cohesive national identity. For centuries, the main goal of any state wishing to last for long was to reach and preserve the loyalty of its citizens. One way of achieving this goal was to create a proper framework, rich in symbolism and pride, accessible to all ethnic communities in the country. If successful, this process would spur feelings of national attachment and restrain the interethnic animosities within the society.

Following this line of reasoning, one might successfully argue that ethnopolitical protest is becoming more an option, while violent contention is becoming more an exception in the overall mobilization preferences among European ethnic communities. In this thesis, peaceful mobilization is generically called
ethnopolitical contention. It is a slightly adapted notion from the common term “contention politics”, which according to Sidney Tarrow (1996, 874) means “collective activity on the part of claimants – or those who claim to represent them – relying at least in part on non-institutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state”. The term “ethnopolitical contention” reinforces the moderate sense of “contention politics” by focusing on the theoretical mix linking ethnic diversity and ethnopolitical participation. In other words, it concerns those ethnically relevant political actions which are directed against the state authority for the defense of specific rights and interests in connection to a particular ethnic group. This generic term is an umbrella for the more familiar idioms such as protest, social movements, ethnic and political actions. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (1996, 17), each of these individual terms represent just a specific track of the scholarly terrain with explicit causal mechanisms driving their activation statuses.

1.2 Objectives

The analysis conducted in this thesis has several goals. First, care must be taken in approaching different levels of contention. Although there is a clear distinction between peaceful and violent unrest, most studies fail to consider the within-level variation of ethnic dissent, measured at different intensity levels. As part of the first objective, this thesis conducts four comparative analyses to answer the following research questions:

*Ethnopolitical contention in Europe*: who are those mobilized and why are certain groups more prone to peaceful mobilization? What are the protest dynamics in Europe and how do they evolve over time? To what extent do various actions of ethnopolitical contention differ with respect to their theoretical and empirical outcomes?

Irrespective of the type of conflict, there are four main sets of conditions influencing the desire to protest: grievances and deprivation (Fox 1999; Gurr and Moore 1997; Lindström and Moore 1995; Korpi 1974; Gurr 1970), resources and the mobilisation environment (Horowitz 2000; Brady and Verba 1995; Scott 1990; Hechter 1987; Tilly 1978), political and socio-demographic determinants (; Inglehart 2002; Lichbach 1997; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 1996), and values of identity (Keating 2007; Tilley and Heath 2007; Smith and Kim 2006; Hjerm 1998; Brubaker

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1 This thesis considers Europe in its geographical sense. Please refer to Table A.1 and Table B.1 in the Appendix for a sample-split and country-split overviews employed in the overall analysis.
The impact of these factual conditions on ethnopoli
tical contention is commonly acknowledged. However, the desire to protest at different intensity levels remains largely unexplored. In other words, all ethnopoli
tical movements have similar triggering causes and yet, the weight of the substitution effect (Herring and Esman 2003; Moore 2000), providing motivation for the protest dynamics, is still an open query for research. This gap in the literature provides disrupt in understanding the true dynamics of ethnic contention. In the context of this analysis, one posted assumption regards ethnopoli
tical contention as a nonlinear phenomenon, where different conflict intensities are influenced by different causal factors. In this thesis, the complexity of the protest choices are integrated in a time varying theoretical model and tested empirically with a complex mix-methods research design.

The second goal of this book is to bridge ethnopoli
tical contention with national identity feelings in a way that has not been done before. Thus, this objective zooms and explores the values of identity as they relate to ethnic diversity in Europe.

How and to what extent do values of identity define the pattern of contention in cultural-diverse societies?

Much literature has tried to explain the sources and the impact which ethnic-based identities have on various forms of conflict (Keating 2007; Guibernau 2006; Toft 2003; Calhoun 1991; Smith 1991). Traditionally, ethnic identity is regarded in its primordial structure, attached to a specific ethnic unit and modeled by long-lasting primal characteristics. At the same time, little attention has been given to those identity settings which are structured around feelings of national unity in a cultural-diverse environment.

Thus, this thesis, tries to capture the relation between national pride feelings and the intensity to which ethnopoli
tical contention is manifesting among different ethnic communities in Europe. National pride can be seen as encompassing feelings of both patriotic and nationalistic nature (Druckman 1994; Feshbach 1991). These particular values are highly unpredictable because they are based on emotions and are continuingly defining themselves. In specific circumstances, individuals perceive their attachment with the nation in a very impulsive way, which in turn triggers a disproportionate response in terms of mobilization actions. This study argues that feelings of national pride pose a more dynamic challenge to group contention rather than the traditional way of looking at ethnic group identity. Despite their assumed relationship, the interconnection between values of national pride and ethnic contention has received little consideration in the existing research.
Overall, the approach adopted in this thesis does differ from the current scholar work and brings innovation in several ways. First, ethnopolitical contention is analyzed by considering the target population at two levels. So far, the existing literature has hardly managed to analyze ethnopolitical contention, with both ethnic minority and majority populations present in a counterfactual perspective. Even though recent efforts have been made in dealing with this drawback (see Cederman, Girardin, et al. 2006), the comparative angle encompassing the minority-majority spectrum is still very weak in the existing research. Besides, this thesis further divides ethnic minority groups into two comparable categories: those which are being “at risk” for discrimination and those which are not. The fundament for this partition is provided by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project which sets up the conceptual framework under which most of the disadvantaged ethnic communities are represented.

The inclusive split between ethnic minority and majority groups brings the conducted analysis at a whole new level in terms of its comparative configuration. The counterintuitive nature of the tested arguments is that ethnopolitical contention is very likely to be approached differently by the disadvantaged and privileged minorities, on the one hand, and by the majority populations on the other. It is important that such analysis is conducted with counterfactual thoughts since a complex phenomenon like ethnic contention is more likely to produce alternatives given the diversity of the sample. Thus, the counterfactual approach of this thesis will be focused at two levels: first, between the two analyzed minority samples (“at risk” vs. not “at risk” minorities) and between the minority sample and the majority groups.

Second, the timeframe of this analysis is also set to capture the dynamics of ethnopolitical contention over a period of intense political change in Europe. More exactly, the period of this analysis extends over 14 years (1990-2004). It is the period and place where for the last two decades, the geopolitical and socio-economic transformations were the most intense in the world (Guerin, Petry, at al. 2004; Schnapper 2002). These changes include the dissolution of the communist ideological pole in Europe, followed by a resurrection of many ethnic cleavages in most of the former communist societies. Thus, the starting point of this analysis (1990) tries to capture the dynamics in ethnic contention triggered by these political and ideological changes.

Third, two different but complementary data sources are employed to capture the dynamics of ethnopolitical contention in Europe. The first one comes from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. It empirically covers those actions of unrest that have been solely documented at the group-level. One major advantage of this data
is its time-series structure, which prompts us to consider a temporal perspective in the analysis of ethnic group mobilization.

However, the MAR data has two contextual limitations: one related to its sampling structure (only minorities “at risk”), and the other associated with its coding framework (the information is coded solely at the group level). Although valuable in assessing the group-level dynamics, the MAR conceptual framework does not account for those variations which occur at the individual-level. In other words, while analyzing ethnic contention in MAR, one is unable to control for those specific variations in feelings and beliefs which occur at the individual level. Or, it is commonly assumed that nationalistic sentiments are usually based on emotions and sentiments (Bar-Tal 1993), which are hardly measurably at the group level. To overcome these technical drawbacks, the European Values Survey (EVS) is employed, which brings the conducted analysis at another analytical level. Through EVS, the existing data will be coded at both individual and group levels, to provide the necessary individual-level measurements for assessing the protest dynamics in a sample that includes both ethnic minority and majority populations.

Finally, the most important contribution of this thesis resides in its mix-method research design, used to cross-test the posted assumptions at two different empirical levels. Motivated by the nature of the employed data and the way the conceptual argument of the thesis is structured, this study applies a standard discrete choice modeling technique as the ground method for the analysis. Since the configuration of ethnic contention is considered at different intensity levels, an ordinal probit model with applied marginal effects explores the specific connecting patterns linking ethnic communities with particular dynamics of unrest.

In general, the quantitative part in this thesis was set to capture the variation in protest intensity in connection to the analyzed ethnic diversity. Most of the existing research conceptualizes contentions politics in a linear way. By doing so, one can assume that all levels of contention are the same, a reason which is highly questionable. Any type of ethnopolitical contention varies in intensity in the same way as there are different reasons which push both individuals and groups to become mobilised. It is this particular variation between different intensity levels which this study aims to capture. Similar modelling techniques were tested in a few previous empirical studies which proved their meaningfulness (see Saxton and Benson 2006; Finkel 1987; Muller 1979).

The second methodological design employs a fuzzy set technique from the Configurational Comparative Analysis (CCA), to study which theoretical-based conditions are necessary and sufficient to shape the consistency of the ethnopolitical contention. The fuzzy-set models comprehensively combine the
characteristics of both quantitative and qualitative analysis and are used to explore the complexity of the ethnopolitical contention in the analyzed sample of ethnic minorities in Europe. The main reason justifying the choice of this complementary technique is given by the observed limitations in the use of the conventional regression models. The quantitative side of any study cannot fully grasp the intricacy with which every analyzed case contributes to the explanatory side of the mobilization phenomenon. The obtained empirical connections of the classical quantitative models draw correlations at a general level which reflects mainly those cases which are better represented in the overall sample. This means that specific, smaller causal particularities are left aside which results in the complete exclusion of the outlier cases from the analytical part of any quantitative study. Besides, the conventional quantitative techniques can be run only in the presence of a significant number of cases which also inhibit an extensive empirical analysis with smaller sampled units.

Instead, the fuzzy-set technique is designed to work with small and medium sized samples while fully exploring the richness of the existing data. This method integrates both quantitative and qualitative features by combining the assets of the conventional interval variables and those set theoretic distinctions which are available to the researcher in the context of the conducted analysis. One powerful characteristic of the fuzzy-set method is its axiomatic approach allowing both the outcome and conditions to have an intermediary placement of their values (partial membership scores) in a fuzzy interval between 0 (fully out) and 1 (fully in). The final result is a comprehensive understanding of ethnopolitical contention both in terms of necessity and sufficiency - two ground pillars of the fuzzy-set technique.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework and the main tendencies in the study of ethnic conflict as they are placed in the current academic debate. The aim of this chapter is to distil a conceptual framework from the existing literature which would enhance the understanding of ethnopolitical contention as a diverse and dynamic phenomenon. The model is applied to the case of Europe to test for its practical use.

Chapter 3 employs a quantitative perspective in measuring the protest dynamics among a sample of minorities “at risk” in Europe. The starting point for this analysis follows the ongoing shift in the intensity of ethnic contention in Europe: from violent rebellion to peaceful protest (Gurr 2000, xiii). According to the same
scholar work, the peak in ethnic conflict was achieved at the beginning of the 1990s, when ethnic violence started dropping. Even if the general ratio of ethnic movements diminished per se in the past two decades, did the intensity of ethnopoliitical contention decrease as well? And if there are changes in protest intensity, what is the magnitude of the transition rates over time? Moreover, considering that there are significant changes in protest actions over time, does the previous status in protest influence the current protest mobilization? As such, this chapter moves beyond analyzing the mere conflict profile towards an empirical investigation of protest dynamics in Europe.

Chapter 4 adopts a more inclusive view over ethnopoliitical contention by involving both ethnic minority and majority groups in a counterfactual comparison. The prevailing groups in the country are generally thought to influence, to a larger extent, the mobilization patterns of those minority groups with whom they interact regularly (Gillion 2006). Therefore, the inclusion of both minority and majority groups in the analysis of ethnic contention seems imperative for the quality of the addressed empirical connections. The goal of chapter 4 is to integrate and analyse specific structural determinants fundamental to the rise of political activism. Do minority and majority populations mobilize alike? Are their mobilization paths similar across time? To what extent different protest actions respond to similar socio-political stimuli among the analysed ethnic communities? The European Values Survey (EVS) is employed as the empirical baseline for testing these questions. A major share in explaining ethnic contention is taken by a handful of political and socio-demographic factors settled to capture specific causal links pressuring individuals to become mobilized in one way or another.

Chapter 5 approaches the outcomes of ethnic contention from a different empirical angle. It adopts a configurational comparative analysis approach, in the form of fuzzy-set technique, to study which theoretically set conditions are necessary and sufficient to shape the consistency of ethnopoliitical protest. The analyzed conditions are: democracy, political discrimination, territorial concentration, ethnic fractionalization and the degree of national pride among members of an ethnic community. The core question is how these factors account for the status of necessity and sufficiency in relation with the strength of ethno-communal mobilization or on opposite, with its absence.

Chapter 6 explores the perceived feelings of national pride in connection to both ethnic minority and majority populations in Europe. This section is built around the idea that ethnic diversity can be considered harmonious only when both minority and majority groups are bounded together by a common sense of national unity. Especially in Europe, identity and ethnicity have traditionally played a complementary role in defining each other. In order to capture the diversity in
national pride feelings, several questions are employed in the context of this chapter. First and foremost, do ethnic minority groups share similar national pride values as the majority populations in Europe? Does the status “at risk” for discrimination matter when appealing to national pride? Are national pride feelings constant across time among minority and majority groups? While answering these questions, chapter 6 is structured to assess the intensity of national pride at each level of its manifestation. In doing so, a set of expounding conditions will be employed for measuring the relationship between various social, economic and demographic factors and the hierarchical value of national pride feelings.

Chapter 7 resumes the main findings of this thesis. Apart from underlying the main results, this section also addresses some general discussion points which can be considered for future research.
2. Theoretical Groundwork in Analyzing Ethnic Contention
2.1 Introduction

What is the current status in the study of ethnic contention? Who are those mobilized and who are those more prone for mobilization? Is the universe of ethnic movements fragmented with different explanatory paths, or are all conflicting actions alike and hence linear? The idea is that ethnic communities have different interests and preferences toward mobilization. Some groups are more politically active and have sufficient power to mobilize more intensely. Inversely, there are ethnic communities with limited resources for being engaged in consistent forms of protest. The inequity in forms and opportunities makes ethnic contention very diverse in temperament and consistency. Naturally, this leads to more questions to be answered: Which factors are the most relevant in determining different forms and different intensities of the ethnopolitical contention? Does ethnic contention reflect all the preferences and values in a multiethnic society? Are the disadvantaged represented in the structure of the mobilized groups?

These normative concerns can be analyzed in many ways. The issue of ethnopolitical contention in Europe is related to the successes and the failures of ethnic groups to cope with ethnicity, religion, grievances, territory, greed, power, identity, in confronting the institutional authority of the corresponding host-nation. There will be always a mix of factors and preconditions added together which will increase the likelihood that conflict and interethic tensions are activated by individuals or ethnic groups. This makes the analysis of ethnic contention in Europe very diverse and challenging. It means grasping first the ethno-political face of contention but also comprehending how it fits the European context.

In this thesis, ethnopolitical contention takes the form of political activism such as protest, political mobilisation, or social movements. One characteristic of these actions is their peaceful character, with non-planned violence occurring only sporadically in the process of mobilisation. Sidney Tarrow (1996, 874) argues that the main characteristic of ethnic contention is its reliance, “at least in part, on non-institutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state”. However, the existing forms of interaction consistently vary in their intensity and their ways of manifestation. One group may choose to symbolically protest via direct political channels while others go in riots and mass demonstrations. With caution, the study of contentious politics should cluster ethnic movements according to their intensity levels and analyse them accordingly. The history of studying ethnopolitical
contention, from collective behavior and relative deprivation (Gurr 1996; 1970), to resource mobilization and political process (Lichbach 1997; McAdam et al. 1996; Tilly 1978), fails to consider ethnic mobilisation in its intricate structure.

In other words, what can account for the diversity of ethnopoltical contention encountered among ethnic communities? This question remains widely unanswered. Moreover, in the context of the constant increase in ethnic contention, the need for targeting ethnic mobilisation in its smallest details becomes imperative. This chapter intends to answer this question by building an integrated model of contentious politics which accounts for the variation in the levels of protest among European ethnic communities since 1990.

The analytical focus of this thesis is on both ethnic group communities and individual based activities of ethnopoltical character. At the group level, much of the existing literature on ethnic contention has mainly focused on macro-level political and institutional explanations (see for instance Gurr 1970; Gurr 1996; Fearon 2003; Fearon 1999; Fox 2003; Horowitz 2000; Keating 2001; Olzak 1998). At the individual level, conflict contention is seen as a political action analysed as a function of economic, political and socio-demographic structural conditions (Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1987). The desired model adopted in this study, seeks to combine lines of thoughts from the existing theoretical streams which considers ethnopoltical contention as a conjunction of institutional, political, economic, and socio-demographic structural conditions. While the institutional factors provide the challenge for mobilisation, the economic conditions deliver the resources for reaching various levels of protest. In the same way, the political environment activates the framework, while the socio-demographic conditions model feelings of identity and supply the motivation needed for the ethnopoltical action.

Within each of these structural conditions, there are many factors viewed as preconditions for ethnic contention. A specific factor is regarded as precondition when it exists or is established before the actual mobilization occurs. In other words, a precondition should relate with the ethnic contention in a causal direction and not emerge from protest mobilization. All preconditions are part of the classical theoretical settings which in this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, are placed into realist, primordialist, liberal and constructivist frameworks. Each of the analysed preconditions contains valuable contributions and inclusive explanatory links for the analysis of ethnic contention. It is however a major challenge to fully cover all existing preconditions for each theoretical stream. In line with the scope of this analysis, only the most pertinent preconditions are presented in this chapter. Depending on the scope of each coming chapter, more theoretical based
preconditions will be introduced and tested in relation to the specific facets of ethnopolitical contention.

The structure of this chapter has the following outline. The first section presents the main tendencies in the study of ethnic conflict as they are placed in the current academic debate. The theoretical argument, on which the empirical framework of this thesis is based, is presented in the second section. Then, several explanatory preconditions proving relevance for the argument of this thesis are introduced. The last section concludes this chapter.

2.2 Trends in Ethnopolitical Mobilisation Since 1989

In the last decades, ethnopolitical contention has been constantly in the attention of scholars. It is perceived as a collective action activated by a set of factors and legitimized by the existing values and feelings among ethnic communities. An increasing number of European ethnic groups have amplified their mobilisation status in recent years. This trend however went in parallel with a shift in ethnopolitical actions, from violent rebellion to protest (Gurr 2000, xvi). This trend proved to be visible in both old and new democracies in Europe. Especially, in the former communist countries, the increasing democratic standards resulted in additional support for accommodating rights and ethnic demands for the minority groups.

In the literature, there are three types of contradictory opinions over the future of ethnic mobilisation since the end of the Cold War (Fox 2003). The starting point can be seen in Samuel Huntington’s seminal work over the “clash of civilisations” (Huntington 1996a). He differentiates the development of conflict into two parts: before and after the end of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the conflict evolved in the classical realist way, being motivated by the constant competition between democracy and communism. However, according to Huntington, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the poles of conflict and in the future most clashes will be initiated between and across civilizations\(^2\). A common perception in academia is that the upcoming ethnic tensions will increase within and between cultures. Many inter-ethnic tensions which previously have been eclipsed by the West-Soviet rivalry have been unleashed worldwide. This means that conflict became awake with more ethnic conflicts predicted to appear in the

\(^2\) Following Huntington’s thesis, eight civilizations can be identified at the end of the 20th century. They are as follow: Western, Slavic Orthodox, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American and African.
near future. Among scholars, the assumption was that Western world alone will not be able to compete in imposing its democratic values worldwide and will start succumbing by providing more conflict (Huntington 1996b, 38; Fox 2001, 296). This apocalyptic view poses little hope for the emergence of peaceful mobilization and focuses extensively on the impending violent contention.

A more moderate line of thought stipulates that the nature of the ethnic conflict will not change significantly (Kirkpatrick, Weeks et al. 1993; Walt 1997, 178; Fox 2003, 57) because nationalism is still a potent factor to influence ethnic contention both inside and between the nations. In this sense Eric Hobsbawm (1990) has predicted that “nationalism will decline [only] with the decline of the nation-state”. In an empirical study looking for causality between various indicators and conflict, Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000) have found that the classical realist and liberal indicators have still a consistent share in explaining the emergence of conflict. Therefore, there are consistent voices in academia which claim that Huntington’s thesis has little applicability worldwide (Pfaff 1997, 95) and that we should not expect much change in the nature of conflict in the near future.

Another considerable cluster of scholars pragmatically argue that ethnic mobilisation will decline in a world which tends to be increasingly globalized and more interdependent (Ahari 1997; Ikenberry 1997, 162-163; Gurr 2000; Fox 2003, 57). In the contemporary world, the tendency is to create trans-national organizations which develop effective practices for conflict management. The international cooperation provides stability and edifying links which cross-border cultural animosities. This particular argument was tested empirically by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2002) in a comprehensive comparative study which involves cultural and social values in both Western and Muslim societies. By using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), they found that Islamic nations have similar democratic ideals as Western countries. Analogous conclusions have been found by other scholars as well (see for instance Midlarsky 1998). This evidence sustains that not differences between cultural traits influence the way conflicting events evolve but rather perceptions occurring from misjudgements of subjective acuities. One of the skewed reasons for conflict revolve around ‘security dilemmas’, where misperceptions toward others increase the interethnic tensions and flame the conflict (Ikenberry 1997, 162).

After the fall of the communist bloc, most of the Eastern European states have embraced democratic standards in running their daily politics. This argument supports the idea that there should be a decrease in violent conflicts while peaceful mobilisation would eventually gain terrain and flourish. By now, the empirical evidence shows that in the last two decades, ethnic mobilisation has decreased Europe-wide, both in terms of ethnopoliitical protest and violent rebellion (Gurr
2000). However, the engagement in protest is still a reliable choice given its peaceful character. Until now, the existing research regarding ethnopolitical protest among European ethnic groups is limited. It is usually the violent side of ethnic mobilisation that gets widespread attention in the research. Yet, with the apparent shift in mobilization preferences, protest actions must be explored as one of the main choices for ethnic unrest.

It is important to note that the state of ethnopolitical mobilisation can be integrated in a variety of theoretical debates. The three contradictory predictions highlighted above make us aware of how much divergence in opinions exist in relation to the overall status on conflict mobilisation. Given that no academic stream provides a straightforward reason for ethnic mobilisation in Europe, I proceed to introduce an integrated theoretical model which can account for the variety of the mobilized actions of protest.

### 2.3 Theoretical Foundations

Ethnic contention is a powerful and diverse phenomenon. Dealing with conflict diversity has proved challenging both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. This section intends to produce a conceptual model of contention-based conditions which can account for the variation in the levels of ethnopolitical protest in Europe. This conceptual model intends to bring together the theoretical and empirical reasoning used for conducting this thesis. The goal is to produce a sound alternative for the study of ethnic contention which would interlink theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence for a time-varying phenomenon. The ambition is to have a model which conceptualizes the theoretical aspects of studying ethnopolitical contention across several methodological designs.

Whether the target is on violent or non-violent conflict, there is an array of five sets of fundamental conditions spurring mobilisation feelings. According to Gregory Saxton and Michelle Benson (2006: 138), the components driving the direction and speed of ethnic contention are: the availability of resources, the posted grievances, feelings of identity, the organisational mobilisation, and the political opportunity structures. The way these combinations of factual conditions interrelate, determines the changes between different levels and forms of ethnic contention.

The existing literature approaches these factual conditions from many angles. One strand of literature concentrates on the ability of ethnic communities to enter the mobilization spiral (Tilly 1978). Others authors underline both the cultural markers
and the primordial links unique to each ethnic group, as important sources for mobilisation (Anderson 1991; Brass 1991; Calhoun 1993; Zulaika 1988; Horowitz 2004). The powerful incentives towards contention politics have also been considered in conjunction with feelings of identity (Guibernau 2006; Connor 1993; Keating 2001; Smith 1991). A more group-centric perspective over the ethnic conflict is coming with the seminal work of Tedd Gurr (2000; 1970). Building around the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, the main suppositions for the activation of ethnic contention is coming from various forms of political, cultural, institutional, and economic deprivation policies. The role of the state repression (Horowitz 2000; Moore 2000) and the interethnic internal competition for resources (Brady, Verba et al. 1995; Nagel 1984; Olzak 1992) have also been associated with the escalation of ethnic contention.

In recent decades, extensive research has focused on explaining how political and institutional settings impact protest movements, especially those seen as socio-political actions. Also called “political opportunity structures” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 1996; Lichbach 1997), this stream of research stipulates that ethnic contention is highly influenced by the existing political environment, composed of governmental organisations, public institutions, political regimes, claim-making groups, alliances etc. In the good rational choice tradition, the political and the state structures play a significant role in the tactical choices which push the desire of individuals and groups alike, toward mobilisation (Lichbach 1987; Moore 2000). The interconnection between the opportunity structures condition the political behaviour, which in turn impacts the emerging patterns of contention.

This literature offers a great contribution to the analysis of the conditions which make ethnopartisanal contention such a powerful phenomenon. Yet, the existing studies suffer from substantial shortcomings in terms of their predictive utility. More specifically, the overall focus in the literature is not oriented toward understanding and predicting the magnitude of ethnic contention within national communities. Despite the extensive written expertise for designing the map of the nationalist activity, only hardly one can use the existing knowledge to predict specific conceptual associations at different levels of conflict mobilisation. More specifically, the structure of the existing theory cannot provide consistent explanations of why, ceteris paribus, ethnic contention is present at a certain level in any specific community and not at another. Moreover, there is no systematic research which can clarify to what extent a certain group favours one level of contention and why is it willing to keep this level in time. To a certain extent, this directionality has been obscured by weak theoretical and empirical models which did not account for the within variation, at different levels of ethnopartisanal
contention\(^3\). This particular shortcoming has been amplified by the absence of reliable data but also by the heavy dependence of the existing research on the simplistic, unidirectional OLS and MLE regression techniques which approach ethnic contention as a linear phenomenon.

As result, there is a need for a theoretical and empirical approach which would bridge the gap in the study of different levels of ethnic contention. This means that the explanatory power in the study of conflict mobilisation should be based on a consolidated model on social movements and the classical conflict processes which would be able to predict the utility of ethnic mobilization at all intensity levels. A perfect line of reasoning would be that the grievance and the deprivation (Gurr 1970; Fox 1999; Korpi 1974; Mughan 1979), the capacity to become mobilised at the group-level (Barth 1969; Hechter 1987; Horowitz 2000; Scott 1990; Tilly 1978;), the political structural determinants (Inglehart 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 1996; Lichbach 1997), and the identity values of the literature on nationalism (Brubaker 1996; Hjerm 1998; Keating 2007; Smith and Kim 2006; Tilley and Heath 2007; Stern 1995), all share an important part in generating ethnic contention. This integrated structure should be applied for each level of ethnic dissent as far as the hierarchical structure of conflict manifestation is holding explanatory power.

The underlined approach intends to address two main shortcomings in the existing literature. First, attention will be given to within connectors linking different levels of ethnopolitical contention. This yields a greater understanding of the hierarchical nature of the conflict manifestation. Different protest levels are seen as by-products of similar sets of factors. It is precisely the conjunction of organisational mobilisation, socio-political environment, and various opportunity structures that impact, rotate, and differentiate between different choices for dissent. Subsequently, the combination of conditions influencing the desire to protest are further transformed in time, making ethnic communities move up and down the mobilisation scale. In a perfect integrated model, the fusion between different causal conditions and the time dynamics, become crucial in conditioning the mobilization behavior of ethnic communities.

This conceptual model is also generically thought to comprise the mobilization paths of both ethnic minority and majority groups. Although the existing research find it problematic to analyze minority and majority communities comparatively, this study emphasizes the need of a counterfactual approach which would

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\(^3\) The "within variation" means focusing on different levels of peaceful contention and not targeting violent and peaceful levels of conflict. The differences and similarities in the study of peaceful protest and violent rebellion have been approached, among others, in Gurr (1989); DeNardo (1985); Saxton and Benson (2006); Snyder (2000).
consider the entire scale of ethnic diversity in any mobilized environment. Despite
timid steps in this direction (see Cederman, Girardin et al. 2006; Gillion 2006), the
existing literature fails to approach the ethnopolitical contention from both sides of
the ethnic diversity spectrum. Consistent with the motivational nature of protest
mobilization, the same set of structural conditions is expected to affect both ethnic
minority and majority groups, albeit in relatively different causal directions. For
this reason, ethnic minority and majority groups will have separate, yet
comparable empirical models. Only by separating minority-majority nexus can the
models test the different motivational impact of the ethnic diversity on the
different levels of conflict mobilization.

Figure 2.1, graphically displays the integrated theoretical reason applied in this
thesis. For ethnopolitical contention, the applied model differentiates between four
levels of dissent: no contention, low, medium, and high intensity ethnopolitical
actions. On the whole, a consistent number of structural preconditions will be
included across four streams of contentious politics: grievances and deprivation,
resources and the mobilisation environment, political and socio-demographic
determinants, and the values of identity. In the model explaining ethnic
contention, each of the explanatory factors is part of the “substitution effect”,
meaning that ethnic groups substitute one condition for another while going up in
the mobilization process (Moore 2000; Herring and Esman 2003). Every mobilized
entity tries to maximize its goals given the existent constraints. This means that
ethnic groups tend to believe that the legitimacy of being mobilized, coming from
identity, discrimination, grievances and other similar conditions, is more
important, and can substitute for the desire of not being mobilized or being
mobilized at lower intensity levels. In this context, the desire to achieve the best
possible goals is given by stronger means of protest. At the same time, going into
more intense contention should be motivated by strong preconditions which can
substitute for the costs and the discomfort coming with higher levels of unrest.

Figure 2.1 reflects the circular impact of different causal conditions on different
levels of ethnic contention as part of the substitution effect. Each level of ethnic
contention (no contention, low, medium, and high intensity contention) is a
rational choice given by a set of existent conditions at any point in time. This
means that the decision to enter higher or lower levels of mobilisation would be
given by the degree of substitution of the most viable conditions for any ethnic
community. Each of these conditions contains a series of conceptual preconditions
which are in direct contact with the targeted communities. In order to optimize the
goals of their actions, ethnic groups will evaluate the substitution effect of any
present condition (or precondition) and decide the optimal way of going into
protest for achieving their desired outcomes. In doing so, ethnic groups would
chose between the four quadrants (Figure 2.1) with all existing preconditions and
decide their mobilisation level according to the best substitution scenario at that time. Future decisions might be influenced by changes in the nature of conditions which would further impact the level of the group mobilisation.

Figure 2.1 An Integrated Model of Ethnopolitical Contention

In empirical terms, the impact of the substitution effect for each level of ethnic contention is estimated using the ordinal probit technique with applied marginal effects. In an empirical system estimated via marginal effects, each intensity level of ethnic contention becomes the dependent variable on its own. In the process of empirical modelling, the same set of structural indicators rotate and impact on each intensity level, seen as distinct dependent variable. Thus, the employed empirical framework is able to assess whether or not the same set of determinants affects the intensity of ethnic contention from potentially different causal directions. Part of the analysis will also integrate features of time dynamics which will allow us to innovatively explore the changing paths in the intensity levels of ethnic mobilisation across time.
In the next subsection, a number of indicators from the four connecting streams (Figure 2.1) will be further presented as theoretical based preconditions in relation to ethnopolitical unrest. In order to better understand the theoretical choice behind each precondition, all described factors are presented in one of the following theoretical flows: realism, liberalism, primordialism and constructivism. All described precondition are not mutually exclusive in the sense that one precondition might adopt and go along several theoretical lines of reasoning. The cross-linking character of the analysed preconditions comes from an embedded value rooted in the traditional discourse of many of the classical theoretical streams.

2.4 Reasons for Mobilization: Realist Preconditions

Before going any deeper, there is a need to mention again that the research on ethnic mobilisation is voluminous but fragmented. The theoretical literature on ethnic contention has included a large amount of case studies. This thesis is committed to link theory and practice by providing empirical causality and comparative evidence in the European context.

The realist preconditions respond to stimuli related to territorial, military and strategic security reasons. For the realist school (Carr 1946; Morgenthau and Thompson 1986), the conflict evolving from a permanent anarchical condition is an endemic reality. The basic concepts which guide the politics within and between nations are the interests based on the power structure. The conflict within society cannot be eliminated but the power balance and the equilibrium maintenance between two conflicting parties can be controlled and reduced. The nature of the realist concepts is that conflict cannot be avoided and a society with a permanent harmony is a utopia. Many factors can be observed in the realist settings to influence the desire to mobilize. For the argument of this thesis, two main circumstances must be underlined – the territorial consistency and the “security dilemma”.

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4 Please note that each of the four theoretical flows (realism, liberalism, primordialism and constructivism) is not equivalent with the four streams of preconditions mentioned in Figure 2.1. Although interlinked, the classical theoretical debates mentioned in section 2.4 integrate only several of the preconditions summing the four streams in Figure 2.1. The described preconditions in section 2.4 have been integrated under a classical theoretical debate for the purpose of simplification of the overall argument.
2.4.1 Territory as a Cause for Mobilization

One important factor in the realist doctrine is related to territory. The study of territorial politics has seen a significant development in the last decades, with learning and fertilization cross-bordering different social science disciplines (Keating 2008, 75). The geographical condition plays an important role when considering the access to markets or natural resources. One can argue that both states and ethnic groups strive towards controlling larger populations and wider territories, seen among the most desired resources in the world politics (Hobsbawm 1990, 30).

Unsurprisingly, since the beginning of the 20th century there was a constant necessity to explain the role of geography in the emergence of conflict. Frederik Ratzel ([1901] 1966) articulated the idea of “Lebensraum” - a living space essential for each ethnic community to survive as a cultural entity, where all the nation’s choices are made according to rational capabilities. These ideas were further developed by Rudolf Kjellén (1917), who has drafted a more consistent state organic theory, called geopolitics.

There is also a more recent approach linking the territorial grievances with conflict. Monica Toft (2003; 1996) has revealed that geographical factor is successfully influencing ethnic contention. Especially the territorial density with distinct ethnic groups heightens violent mobilization. Furthermore, the empirical studies conducted with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data has confirmed Toft’s theory (see for instance Fearon and Laitin 1999; Gurr 2000; 75).

Keeping in mind the geographical compound as an explanation for conflict, one must accept that territory has served as a longstanding reason for fights among states, ethnic groups, and individuals alike. Given its powerful connection with conflict, it is further expected to be an explanation for the proximity of protest mobilization as well. The intensity of ethnopoliitical mobilization however, will depend on the ability of the nation-state to moderate its realist hegemony and secure cooperation at the regional level. In this respect Kupchan (1998, 42) has underlined that “securing peace within [ethnically based] regions is an essential step forward securing peace globally”.

In Europe, ethnic diversity is closely interlinked with the idea of territory and regionalization (Keating 2008; Keating 1988). Apart from its economic reasons, regionalization was meant to decrease ethnic tensions and territorial cleavages. So far, Europe is regarded as the area where the regionalist idea had and still has the
most proper incentives to develop. The progressive arguments such as neighborhood, enlargement and devolution policies are at the core of European politics. They provide sufficient reasons to moderate ethnic grievances while at the same time limiting the strong monopoly of the nation state.

2.4.2 Security Dilemma

While territorial grievances are necessary for individuals or groups to get actively mobilised, the collective behaviour is the next indispensable factor in the conflict equation. There are many situations when mobilisation is activated by a ‘security dilemma’, a relatively new theory in the interdisciplinary agenda. It denotes the anarchical side of the world politics and describes ethnic mobilisation as a psychological fear.

The fear towards the others, being it a group, tribe, community, or a nation has been in the mind of mankind throughout the history. People are often tempted to control and exercise their power inside and outside their own territory for reasons related to security, expansion, or wealth. The “security dilemma” appears when in the process of increasing your own security, the safety of others is jeopardized (Jervis 1978, 169). This argument has prompted a major debate in the realist doctrine and is still today one of the main lines of thoughts in the political theory (Hertz 1950; Jervis 1978; Posen 1993; Spiegel and Wehling 1995; Glasser 1997). Ethnic groups tend to preventively increase their power, in order to defend themselves against the perceived threat from others. The neighbouring groups however, might sense these actions as a warning and start becoming mobilised as well in defence from what it seems to be an incoming aggressive action. The process of distrust and misperception goes up as a spiral, with insecurity usually prompting the involved actors to become more and more mobilised.

After the end of the Cold War, the security dilemma was the reason for the inter-ethnic clashes in the Balkans, the Basque country, Moldova, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Northern Ireland, the Baltic States and many other ethnically diverse environments. During transitions, there is a sense of ‘emerging anarchy’ (Posen 1993), which creates feelings of insecurity and increased mobilisation. In addition, the period of weak statehood and transitional chaos generates an institutional vulnerability which can be exploited by ethnic groups to achieve gains in terms of power and influence. Given its volatility, this study considers security dilemma more as a triggering circumstance for the status of being mobilised. Given its
exacerbating nature, one must understand the reasons behind security dilemma and possible consequences for the ethnopolitical conflict.

2.5 Reasons for Mobilization: Liberal Preconditions

The desire for ethnopolitical contention is generally linked with the internal structure of the state that guides the applicability of the socio-economic policies and supports the good functionality of the governing bodies. The adoption of liberal policies such as the opening of markets and the increasing welfare support can be equally beneficial or unfavourable toward certain groups within the state. This creates discontent with the government policies and prompts individuals and ethnic groups to protest against the perceived disadvantages and the abusing authority. Therefore, the liberal preconditions, such as the level of democratic development and the degree of economic inequality, create a substantial power for the aspiration towards ethnic mobilisation.

Generally, an equitable scenario for ethnic diversity is achieved when two main criteria are fulfilled: first, liberalisation, which is the freedom for public contestation, and second, inclusiveness or the right to extensively participate in the political and the social life of the country (Dahl 1972; Dahl 1989). Normally, there are limited cases when both conditions are fulfilled with a satisfactory diligence. An uneven practice in any of these factual segments can be a major source for political and ethnic discontent. In a country with an advanced democratic system, there can be still political institutions which are not opened to some parts of the population. There are examples of states which guarantee freedoms and liberties for their minority groups but inhibit extensive political and social participation by grounding them to isolation and marginalization (as it is the case of Gypsies in Eastern Europe). The lack of participation in social or political structures of the country will sooner or later result in rallies, boycotts or mass demonstrations in an effort to change the existing discriminatory settings.

2.5.1 Democracy and Democratization

The perception of democracy involves the existence of significant liberties and freedoms which make the individual self-expression to be manifested as an inalienable human right. Keeping this in mind, the basic principle of the liberal democracy is to give all people the opportunity to engage in all kind of civic
practices while exerting their influence over the ruling process. In theory, democratic institutions must guarantee and facilitate the access for all individuals to extensive participatory rates and yet, the way these practices are implemented is far from ideal (Dahl 1972; Hadenius and Teorell 2005, 89).

The manner in which ethnic participation is manifesting differs in democratic, autocratic and transitional environments. One set of accepted thoughts is that strong democracies are better at handling ethnic strife and, consequently, are less likely to experience violent conflict. Thus, the democratic environment, can be seen as the proper system encouraging peaceful protest actions. In open societies, ethnic mobilization happens without any pressure from the ruling authority and pushes for solutions in line with the well established practices in the system. Democracies have also an extensive set of instruments which allow them to efficiently manage ethnic pluralism (Gurr 1993b; Guibernau 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). At the same time, democratic institutions are designed in the way to copy with major ethnic cleavages by sharing the power and rearranging coalitions at the political level (Liiphart 1977).

At the level of interpersonal values, scholars have foreseen a decline in strong ethnopolitical participation, especially in post-industrial democracies (Habermas 1973; Pharr and Putnam 2000). The reason for this certainty comes with the decline in nationalistic feelings and implicitly the decrease of civic participation in many representative democracies (Putnam and Goss 2002). There is however a constant number of European states which struggle in their transition toward democracy. It can be seen as the proper environment for exacerbating the nationalistic attitudes and increasing the level of violent mobilisation. Here, rebellion is still very much an option among a number of actively mobilized minority groups. As a rule, ethnic strife keeps being low in intensity as long as individuals or ethnic groups have a feeling that their demands are likely to be peacefully fulfilled. Violence occurs only when the existing mechanisms fail in providing satisfactory outcomes, or it is believed that the existing means will not be able to efficiently solve the raised grievances. (Gurr 1993a; Gurr 1993b; Fox 2003).

Once the active mobilization has started, it is perpetuated in time as far as the alleged inequalities persist. On the other hand, a democracy is structured as such, that when conflict escalates over a certain limit, there is a constant pressure within society to find means to moderate it (Arreguin-Toft 2001, 105). This is when protest starts being accepted as a reliable mechanism for mobilization. In most democracies, there is an established framework of rules and regulations which make both ethnic groups and individuals capable to accomplish most of their demands through official channels of protest rather than violence. Besides, authorities are more open to negotiate with those appealing to solve their
grievances through official peaceful channels rather than eccentric violent rebellion.

So far, research has shown that democratization encourages pluralism and boosts the accommodation of ethnic diversity (Gurr 2000, 159). There are also a small number of scholars who argue that democracies are the constant supporters for ethnopolitical dissensions by providing tools and the potential incentives for political actions to manifest (Snyder 1999, 33-36; Horowitz 2000). However, this argument should be placed into the particular background of each analyzed case. During the democratization process, ethnic unrest is amplified, mainly due to weak policy options available for responding to the incoming ethnic challenges. Moreover, in the time of the democratic transition, ethnic mobilisation sees an increasing resurgence due to the rearrangement of the governing processes and the side effects resulting from them. The change in the country’s status quo is inherently linked with the political disorder and institutional instability (Fuller 1995, 149-151). When democratic standards become weak, or the “political pie is divided anew” (Fox 2003, 55), the whole structure based on power relations is transformed, exacerbating ethnic grievances. This reality makes Donald Horowitz (2000) believe that the transitional chaos is the proper environment for ethnic groups to start mobilising and obtain their desired outcomes. However, ethnic grievances widely vary in intensity: the higher ethnic demands are, the fewer resources the state has to comply with the posted claims, and consequently, the more active the conflict desire will be (Fox 1999; Gurr 2000; Fox 2003). Therefore, democratisation can be placed among one of the powerful “dynamics” boosting ethnopolitical activism (Gurr 2000, 176).

On the other hand, some of the primordial features fuelling ethnic feelings can still be present and be activated in a democratic environment as well. Religion, historical abhorrence, racial disparities, territorial claims, all continue to stimulate the conflicting action in the advanced democratic surroundings. This is a challenging process, which can endanger the existing democratic settings by stimulating, perpetuating and eventually producing more ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Pfaffenerberger 1991; Kaufman 1996). Given the widespread ethnic diversity in many western European countries, a number of polity mechanisms have been constantly reinforced in order to reduce violence and channel ethnic disputes toward reconciliation. Similarly, with the new wave of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, many discrimination practices and cultural restrictions started being lifted up at an encouraging rate. The effects are visible in the empirics: since the end of the Cold War, the choice for low intensity conflict has been preponderantly visible in the mobilization options among ethnic minorities all across Europe (Gurr 2000; Cebotari 2010).
However, the preference for ethnopolitical protest in different democratic environments is still lacking a consistent evaluation in terms of its time variation and the intensity prospects. Considering all possible conditions linking democracy with ethnic mobilisation, one might expect various compelling results when analysing ethnopolitical contention in the European context. In one sense, democracy is useful to be controlled for because of the ethnically based grievances which are easier to be expressed in the well established democratic environments. At the same time, less democratic settings prompt individuals to mobilise more often while claiming their rights and freedoms.

### 2.5.2 Economic Inequality

Any form of inequality is supposedly linked with an increased desire for mobilisation. The discrepancies at the economic level are more visible since they underline the gap of poverty and social exclusion among individuals and groups alike. When the ethnicity factor is involved, the status of inequality poses even a more challenging debate. Members of many minority communities are extensively disadvantaged in terms of their economic and political based status which usually precedes the denial of consistent and equal interethnic treatment. The tangency between ethnicity and inequality decreases the overall confidence in the national interethnic unity which in turn creates the necessary potential for revolts, protest, and violence.

From ancient times, the status of inequality was acknowledged to be one of the main causes for protest. Aristotle in his seminal work “The Politics” has mentioned that disadvantaged individuals “revolt in order to become more equal, and [those] equal that they may become superior” (Snyder 1978, 502). Depending on the nature of the economic deprivation, the generated discontent is believed to be materialized more often in ethnopolitical violence (Sigelman and Simpson 1977). When considering ethnicity, economic deprivation has proved to marginalize certain groups and to create problematic efforts to assimilate individuals into the nation (Hechter 1975). Group poverty is seen as a longstanding characteristic which, once acquired, is perpetuated over time (Gurr 2000). Economic deprivation tends to be chronic because of substantial efforts required to correct for the vicious circle of poverty.

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5 Quoted from Sigelman and Simpson (1977, 106).
The status of inequality leaves people less educated, unsecured in their job opportunities and finally stigmatised.

This practice can comprise the entire ethnic communities which in some cases overpass the borders of a single state. The status of severe poverty among the Gypsy minority in Eastern Europe reveals how inequality and stigma for some ethnic groups might be easily consolidated at the supranational level. The practice of continuous economic deprivation is further believed to be conductive towards a process called by Hechter (1975, 9) the “internal colonialism” – where the uneven treatment among groups force those most disadvantaged to be relegated to economic dependency. This process creates dysfunctions between national structures and ethnic belonging, which finally contributes towards ethnopolitical mobilisation.

Any form of deprivation should always be considered in the contextual environment in which it is generated. There is a large number of factors which model the status of inequality and can be tested for the related causality in various ethnic environments (e.g. stereotypes, (post-) colonialist behaviour, poverty, intolerance conduct etc.). Within the empirical models of this research, economic inequality will be tested in the form of income inequality. The relevance of this indicator is twofold. First, it captures the severity of economic deprivation in relation to others in the country and second, it measures the severity of economic inequality across individuals in society. Because data on economic inequality across ethnic lines is seldom available, this study relies on classical income indicators as the most reliable source for measuring economic deprivation.

2.6 Reasons for Mobilization: Primordial Preconditions

One of the most comprehensive ways of looking at ethnic mobilisation is to employ a primordialist explanation over conflict. In line with the primordialist thinking, there is a set of traditions and beliefs which root ethnic communities back to the primordial features of their historical heritage. Steven Grosby (1994, 168) emphasizes that “ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and actions towards primordial objects such as biological features”. Donald Horowitz (2000, 57) also indicates that consistent primordial traditions and beliefs contribute toward the idea of kinship among members of an ethnic
community which in turn make individuals to think in terms of “family resemblances”.

These sets of inveterate and long-standing characteristics help individuals to be aware of their ethnic belonging. Given the strong feelings involved, ethnic mobilisation can be easily achieved by exploiting the primordial roots of the ethnic affiliation. This is because the primordial side of ethnic belonging is “given rather than chosen, immutable rather than malleable, and inevitable productive of conflict” (Horowitz 2004, 72-73). The primordialist settings promote only those characteristics which are important for the entire ethnic community and neglect those characteristics which solely promote individual distinctiveness. By focusing on the general ethnic principles such as the group identity, religion and different cultural practices, ethnic communities tend to become stronger and when needed, to mobilise easier for the defence and preservation of their primordial roots.

Scholars have argued that the longstanding primordial practices (e.g. religion, language, culture) are the main driving factors in defining ethnic communities but the differences between these practices lead to the escalation of the ethnic conflict (Smith 1986; Huntington 1996a; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This particular aspect adds a certain degree of complexity for the domestic inter-ethnic relations. Mobilisation is seen by many ethnic groups as a reliable tool for keeping their primordial traits for posterity. The goal of perpetuating ethnic values in the future represents the greatest force of nationalism and from this perspective group mobilization is seen as a legitimate tool for preserving and carrying on primordial standards for the coming generations.

2.6.1 Religion

In the context of primordialism, religion occupies a distinct position. Religious belonging is seen as a cultural and historical legacy coming with a strong primordial consciousness. Each religious community sees its spirituality as a proof of a distinct primordial continuity which appears as part of the natural and historical order (Kohn 1967 [1944]; van den Berghe 1978; Pearson 1993). The inter-group relations are thus modelled by taking into account memories of past religious connections within the larger community. Once acquired by the individual or the group, religion becomes immutable for further questioning and is regarded as part of the group ethnic distinctiveness.
Many extensive debates have evolved in the literature whether or not religion influences ethnic mobilisation. A common agreement is that religion seems to be part of the cultural legitimization of conflict. Samuel Huntington (1996a) underlines the cultural feature of religion and its role in the emergence of conflict. In his thesis describing the “clash of civilizations”, it is mentioned that the borders separating different religious communities will renter most of the future forms of conflict. Scholars have further acknowledged, from an empirical perspective, the link between religion and ethnic mobilisation (Henderson 1997; Fox 2002; Fox 2003). Particularly Henderson (1997) has found that religion does not encourage peaceful mobilisation but does increase the probability of violence when there is a convergence of several religious denominations in the same geographical area.

Across history, religion has also proved to encourage violence, extremism and interethic prejudices. A wide body of literature has studied the individual and the mass behaviour in connection to religion. The overall conclusion is that, if challenged, the religious faith does not hesitate to integrate aggression and intolerant attitudes toward those perceived as “others” (Wald 1987; Rapoport 1991; Zitrin 1998). Religion is still an important cultural marker in many societies which justify and legitimize the power of the state in relation to conflict (Kokosalakis 1985). Religion can also define the group identity and legitimize any actions taken by individuals or bigger communities in connection to their ethnic and national interests (Little 1991). Religion is also seen as an important cause leading towards discrimination and the grievance formation which in turn, serves as a mobilising incentive for engaging in conflict (Fox 2000, 423).

The primordial feature of religion is legitimized by the longstanding cultural practices inside the community. Individuals are glued together by a sense of “common language, history, religion, institutions and by subjective self-identification of people” (Huntington 1993, 24). These primordial factors make people distinctive in the nature and the way they are socially organized. Ted Gurr (1993a) further emphasizes that not the presence of religion but rather the perception of religiosity (sometime combined with other factors) is central to the group belonging. Since perceptions are the baseline for religious identification, the impact of religion on ethnic strife can be volatile and vary over time. This aspect moves the debate at the level of interpersonal beliefs where religion is perceived as a value in itself which models groups’ identities and their mobilisation behaviour.

Traditionally, religion has been seen as a major ethical value (Dogan 1999, 77), which in many cases succeeded to impose itself at the core of ethnic group identity. In Europe, there are cases where religion is the sole factor individualizing ethnic belonging. Among others, it is the case of Muslims in Bosnia, Turks in Bulgaria, or Catholics in Northern Ireland. Within these communities, the ethnic status is
irreversibly linked with the main religious practice accepted and promoted by the group members. In many other cases, religion is perceived as the main cultural marker defining the dominant population. The Catholicism in Poland and Italy, Orthodoxy in Serbia and Greece, Muslim tradition in Kosovo and Bosnia, all served as enduring defending barriers against external cultural threats. In most of these countries, religion alone was viewed as a sufficient motivator legitimizing the actions of mobilisation when the religious integrity of that community was in danger. Rarely in history, did a single primordial practice succeed to produce so many powerful feelings as did religion in the modern European history.

With the end of the Cold War, religion was predicted to play a more consistent role in the emergence of conflicts worldwide (Huntington 1996). However, empirical research has shown that religious cleavages are not a significant source for ethnopolitical conflict nowadays (Gurr 1994, 357). It is reasonable arguing that the disappearance of the communist ideological pole in Europe has lifted up the atheist pressure and increased the religious activism in the region. On the other hand, the democratic standards which all European countries are committed to, provide little options for correlating religion with violence. This aspect is further analysed by some theoretical strains which place religion, democracy, and conflict under a more general explanatory spectrum. More specifically, scholars have pointed out the decreasing influence which modernization has on religion and conflict. Modernization (Almond 1960; Apter 1964) and secularization (Turner 1991) theories refer to the constant pressure exercised on religion and ethnicity by factors such as economic development, growing literacy rates, urbanization, or technological progress. All these factual conditions, inevitably impact on the way ethnicity and religion approach people’s feelings, especially those which influence individuals’ desire to mobilise. Development and prosperity are further believed to promote the Post-materialist attitudes (Inglehart 1981; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart 1999) which are known to decrease religious radicalism and its influence on individual behaviour.

By summing up the debate one can conclude that the interconnection between religion, ethnicity and conflict mobilisation can be analysed from various angles, by considering both the individual beliefs and the group-shared religious practices. Regardless of the cultural background of each analysed ethnic community, when it comes to mobilisation, religion proves to be one of the most powerful primordial feeling carving people’s behaviour. This allows room for analysing the complex structure that religion builds around the ethnic/national identity and its continuing connection to conflict mobilisation.
2.7 Reasons for Mobilization: Constructivist Preconditions

The *Constructivist preconditions* derive from the existing cultural heterogeneity which leads to the perception of belonging to a distinct group - “a peculiar bond among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group distinguishable from others” (Enloe 1973). A group of individuals has distinct sets of values, constructed as an integrated tie surrounding their identity. Each ethnic community tries to perceive its own sets of values as dominant and impose this perception on the others. At the same time, building up a solid ethnic consciousness is a long-lasting process. It is carried out across history, enriched and modelled by historical myths, until a distinct perception of themselves as an ethnic community is complete. Many influential political thinkers such as Mill, Renan and Durkheim relate to this idea by suggesting that a shared past is the most important bond in building up the nation. One edifying statement is made by John Stuart Mill in 1861 who emphasized that “…the strongest cause of a feeling of nationality is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation; pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past” (Mill 1998).

In this sense, constructivism advance may be one of the most complete set of ideas explaining the collective pattern of ethnic mobilization. Ethnicity is viewed by constructivists not as a primordial entity but rather as a social constructed variable modelling ethnic dynamics. According to Daniel Posner (2004, 2), ethnic groups are “social constructions with identifiable origins and histories of expansion and contraction, amalgamation and division.” At the next level, different ethnic communities come together in the process of the nation-formation. According to Benedict Anderson this process is perceived as an “imagined community” that is “both limited and sovereign”, where members of different groups keep in mind an image of their ethnic affinity (Anderson [1983] 1991, 15). This strong ethnic affinity and “limited imagining” make members of the group ready and kin to mobilize.

Ethnic groups constantly shape their mobilization goals in the changing context of political and historical processes but there are a set of social constructed instruments which boost the intensity and the direction of these movements. The general perception is that ethnic mobilisation is not the sole result of ethnicity, diversity, or the nation-building process but rather the expression of the institutional, political and economic deeds (Gurr 1970; Gurr 1989; Gurr 1993b; Skjølberg 2000). The intensity of conflict mobilisation is thus commonly modelled
by socio-constructed factors which are captured and exercised by the everyday
dynamics of ethnic diversity.

In general, the main strength of the constructivist theory is that it considers
mobilization as deriving from social and political related practices. This line of
thought relies on symbolism and constructed perceptions to achieve a greater
sense of belonging among all group members in the state. It is one of the main
desires to be achieved by any nation in the world. However, within each ethnic
community, all these constructed perceptions can also be used to influence ethnic
feelings for the purpose of obtaining a greater mobilizing power. At the same time,
the struggle for obtaining greater social and political influence might be
manipulated in the interest of particular ethnic fractions which can produce intra-
group divisions and consecutively, more conflict.

2.7.1 Discrimination

The practice of discrimination is one of the most visible forms of socially
constructed and maintained oppressions. Scholars have commonly acknowledged
the leading influence which various forms of mistreatment might have on the
desire to protest or rebel among ethnic minorities. In a speech made in 1919,
Woodrow Wilson was stating that “Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to
disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain
circumstances be meted out to minorities”\(^6\). Many ethnic communities have a long-
lasting status of discrimination and extensive work has been done in targeting the
chronic nature of prejudice against some segments of ethnic populations (see for
example Capotorti 1991; Gurr 1993a; Gurr 1993b; Lindström and Moore 1995; Gurr
1996; Fox 2000; Gurr 2000; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Gillion 2006).

The source of discrimination is based on the perceived perceptions, ranging from
historical stereotypes to cultural and biological features. The Gypsy population in
almost all East European countries are stigmatized and forced to live in closed
communities and in poor conditions. In the Baltic States, the Russian minority is
widely disadvantaged at the political level by being denied the citizenship rights to
large portions of its members. Until recently, the Kosovo Albanians have been
denied economic progress in their region due to religious and cultural differentials
as compared with the dominant Serbs. In Northern Ireland, religion is the main

\(^6\) Woodrow Wilson’s speech at the Peace Conference, May 31, 1919. Quoted in Hathaway
(2005, 81).
separator between the privileged protestant community and the disadvantaged catholic fraction. The Basque and Catalan populations in Spain have been heavily mistreated during the Franco regime and have been forbidden to officially use their own language in the public life. This is just a portion of discrimination practices which generate, keep and perpetuate interethnic animosities in Europe.

Unfortunately, up to nowadays, many of these ethnic groups are still considered “at risk” for discrimination in Europe (Gurr 1993a; Gurr 2000, 12). Members of the groups being “at risk” for discrimination are usually less educated, poorer and less politically organized than their counter-citizens. They are regarded in the society as taking advantage of the social assistance programs while contributing little back. All these perceptions translate into daily acts of discrimination which pushes the interethnic cohesion at its limits.

Discrimination is thus regarded as a longstanding dimension in both past and present times. Since almost all discriminatory practices are historically based, they are further perpetuated as part of the social practice. Also, the status of discrimination is embedded in the minds of people; both in those who discriminate and among those discriminated. The perceived inequity further deepens the resentments between individuals and affects the attainment of common national goals such as unity, cohesion and national pride. Moreover, individuals who feel discriminated are in the position of “nothing to lose” and tend to extensively engage in conflicting actions against their perceived aggressors - the state and the majority/dominant ethnic groups.

One of the most common forms of discrimination in many European countries is at the political level. Political discrimination has proved to undermine the legitimacy of the political system as well as the distribution of power resources inside the state (Korpi 1974; Mughan 1979; Wood 1981). Individuals who are not content with their political status and feel unrepresented at the central level might start questioning the legitimacy of the state institutions by engaging in extensive ethnopolitical actions. This process is boosted by some macro-level factors such as the regime transition, economic crises, political instability, natural disasters etc. Individuals and groups alike regard the troublesome times as the proper opportunity to raise various grievances and push for their implementation while being mobilised. Very often, ethnic mobilisation is thought to increase the bargaining pressure between the deprived individuals and the state authority (Lipsky 1970). In this sense, in times of crisis, those discriminated are better prepared and very determined to benefit more from the mobilisation process.
2.8 Reasons for Mobilization: National Versus Ethnic Identity

On 15th August 1912, Jules Destrée, a Belgian politician from the Socialist Party was writing a letter in the "Revue de Belgique" addressed to the Belgian king Albert I on a subject concerning “the separation of the Walloon and Flemish regions”. He was giving a trenchant reason: “In Belgium there are Walloon and Flemish people, there are no Belgians” (Destrée 1912, 744, 754). Several decades later, faced with the same persistent political conflict and the lack of national feelings among the two main ethnic communities, the Belgian prime-minister Gaston Eyskens (1961) reiterates Destrée’s quote by telling king Baudouin I – “there are no longer Belgians”. This is just one example of how compelling the national unity can be in a state portioned by bipolar identity feelings. The liberal thinker of the 19th century John Stuart Mill predicted to a certain extent the problematic situation that the ruling process in a multiethnic state could face - “institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist” (Mill 2001 [1861], 230).

However, the conflicting identities along ethnic lines can also be seen as a natural step in the development of the European nationalistic doctrine. Nowadays, ethnic politics are still widely dependent on the power of the nation-states. A solid state can be regarded as one which has a defined territorial structure in which it can monopolize and apply the legitimate use of its force (Weber 1947). The main goal of the modern nation state is to create a sense of unity widely shared by all its citizens. When common edifying bonds evolve across the territory of the state, being equally accepted and shared by the majority of its population, then the nation-state appears. Despite this logic, fully formed nations are more in our imagination rather than in reality (Rejai and Enloe 1969, 141). This is because ethnic identities are primarily perceived as primordial and even genetically based feelings (Gurr 1994, 348). These characteristics make them essentially and strongly attached to any human being. National identity on the other hand, is a constructivist value which needs to be constantly reinforced in order to attract people’s loyalty to the nation. Therefore, a nation can exist as a mental construct as far as it can sustain its legitimacy in people’s feelings.

In this context, a nation is composed by clusters of individuals linked together by a common sense of identity and loyalty to the nation-state (Patterson 1977, 68-69).
The strength of these feelings further reflects the cohesion among fellow citizens and the general attachment to the values of that national entity. According to John Stuart Mill (Mill 2001 [1861]), a strong nationality is built among a group of people only when “they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others”. Thus, individuals start feeling they belong to the nation only when they sense that national belonging is close to their primordial feelings which in many cases can be more than loyalty towards a larger social unit.

The literature usually refers to these loyal feelings as civic identity or attitudes of national pride. Jurgen Habermas (1990) gave a new theoretical insight to the modern understanding of the relationship between the nation and the civic identity. He introduced a new concept named the “constitutional patriotism” which refers not to the classical tangible understanding of the nation but rather to its “abstract processes and principles”, with which individuals feel secure and comfortable to live with. Additionally, he calls the old fashionable idea of “nation” the “emotion domain”, and prefers to separate the national identity concept from the civic participation. In this way, the patriotism is not related to a certain nationalistic idea of the nation-state but rather to a universal model of “legally constituted states” where individual values are respected and promoted. In exchange, the state institutions would receive people’s support, reflecting the comfort of being accommodated and integrated in that society.

In this thesis, the attachment with the nation is defined as national pride. Strong values of national pride create a sense of common belonging in a cultural diverse society. The force of national attachment is given by any socio-cultural trait which is commonly accepted by all ethnic groups as the link to national unity. The fellowfeelings keep a community together and produce sufficient fuel for mobilisation when internal or external factors endanger the integrity of the national unity. The power of national feelings will always be evident as long as the nation-state will exists as an actor in the international arena.

In many cases however, feelings of national pride come in contradiction with the primordial character of the ethnic identity. In Scotland, individuals have often a neutral perception of sharing the UK identity, while proudly advocating their Scottish identity. Being a Swiss has been for centuries a reason for pride among all ethnic communities within the confederation. Yet, the Swiss nation is built upon four ethnic communities which are secluded in autonomous cantons with limited interactions with nationals from outside their linguistic neighbourhood. In Ukraine, the perception of the national unity is different between the two Russian communities: it is lower in the Crimean peninsula and higher within the Eastern regions. The way the two groups perceive their ethnic identity varies widely as
well. The Crimean Russians are more confident in their Crimean distinctiveness while the other community tends to rely more on cultural links with the mainland Russia.

This diversity of identity feelings has been always at the core of the European politics. For that reason, national pride is directly perceived as a promoter of conflict, seen as “nothing but the positive half of the prejudice” (Figueiredo and Elkins 2002, 1). People are motivated by beliefs and are attached to emotional thinking which makes their behaviour prone to conflict mobilisation. Therefore, one can argue that national pride is part of the constructivist process where individuals of all ethnic backgrounds have access to. This baseline is also widely accessible to elites, and usually modelled by ideologies to sustain various parties or political leaders.

For ethnic minorities, strong feelings of national identity are realistic to be achieved only by overpassing specific primordial loyalties. This process is possible via assimilation and acculturation practices which focus on strategies of recognition and integration of ethnic communities. This is part of the nation-building process in which states are striving to secure as much support from its citizens as possible. The benefits are expected to be high for both parties. As John Stuart Mill has stated: “Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be... a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship...rather than to sulk on his own rocks” (Mill [1861] 1998, 395).

By promoting a nationwide solidarity, a sense of common belonging is set to be achieved in the society. Policies leading to the sense of togetherness should overpass the existing ethnic cleavages and must comprise as many nationals from all ethnic communities in the country.

This policy, at least in the consolidated European democracies, has proved efficient to the extent to which it reached the point where the borders between assimilation and integration have almost disappeared (Modood 2005, 2). This is however not the case for the Basques in Spain, the Corsicans in France, the South Tyroleans in Italy, the Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Kosovo Albanians, the Slavs in Moldova, among which the national identity project has failed in providing consistent incentives for strong feelings of national unity. This can be seen from their persistent tendencies to be mobilized in obtaining higher autonomy or even separation from the hosting state.
2.9 Conclusions

Conflict is inseparable from human nature. It can be regarded both as the constructive and the destructive face of humanity. Ethnic mobilisation in its peaceful pace consolidates governance institutions and regulates interethnic relations within the society. In its destructive form however, ethnic contention produces insecurity, disruption, and violence. Ethnic conflict thus, cannot be regarded as a linear phenomenon. Scholars have constantly underlined the need for distinguishing between violent and non-violent means of ethnic unrest (Gurr 1989; Olzak 1992; Tilly 1978; Saxton and Benson 2006). Yet, what this body of research misses to point is that conflicting actions consistently vary within each of the two poles of ethnic unrest.

In this chapter, a theoretical model was built to account for the variation in choices to protest at different intensity levels. Ethnic communities choose to mobilise when four streams of contentious politics coalesce: grievances and deprivation, resources and the mobilisation environment, political and socio-demographic determinants, and values of identity. Each of these conditions builds on a consistent set of factors, or preconditions, available to become part of the substitution effect in the mobilization equation. It is the exact combination of these preconditions which drive the desire of unrest at different intensity levels. In order to better account for the substitution effect, the time dynamics should engage in assessing the viability of each factor in achieving the best possible outcome for the mobilized community.

This chapter also presents a general overview with the most important preconditions engaged to test the theoretical settings of this thesis. The literature on the determinants of ethnic unrest is vast and increasing. This chapter acknowledges that the described theoretical preconditions are not mutually exclusive and represent only a limited, yet a crucial fraction of all possible indicators proved to have influenced the measurements of ethnic contention. Despite the powerful explanatory character, each presented indicator taken alone usually fails to sufficiently explain the emergence of ethnopolitical mobilization. This is why the described preconditions in this chapter are integrated in lines of reasoning which go along several theoretical logics, an approach which proved its relevance in the previous scholar work (Toft 1996, Habermas 1973).

Last but not least, additional emphasis has been placed on presenting the literature on national and ethnic identity. This linkage between national identity and the desire to protest will be further tested empirically in order to support the supposition that feelings of identity can be considered as a consistent catalyst for
the ethnic unrest in Europe (Anderson 1991; Cebotari 2010; Feshbach 1994; Viroli 1995; Walzer 1980). The European region is characterized by an increased degree of ethnic diversity which creates thriving conditions for nationalistic feelings. In other words, Europe’s diversity pressures a consistent number of ethnies to align their group senses under a hosting, nationwide umbrella. This in itself creates tensions and additional incentives for individuals to mobilize.
3. The Conflicting Path of Ethnic Diversity: 
Protesting Minorities in Europe
3.1 Introduction

Perhaps the most prominent issues of interest in social studies of the recent decades have been ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Generally, ethnic conflict poses a substantial risk to national stability worldwide, and Europe is not immune to this threat. With the relatively recent end of the cold war era, there was a domino effect of regime transitions of many if not all of the former European communist countries. Following this ideological change, many scholars have predicted that democratization, conflict and ethnicity will become an important focus of international politics. Various scenarios evolved of how ethnic conflict will be shaped: from “the clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996a) to the realist perception of “continuing unending nature of conflicts” (Haas 1990).

In such context, ethnopolitical contention is commonly believed to peacefully accommodate the challenging demands of ethnic diversity. The collapse of communism and the formation of the new democratic regimes in Europe opened a wide range of opportunities for ethnopolitical movements to manifest. According to Tedd Gurr, the peak in ethnic mobilization was achieved at the beginning of the 1990s, after which ethnic challenges continuously dropped (Gurr 2000, xvi). Moreover, in Europe, a general shift can be observed in ethnopolitical activism, from violent rebellion to peaceful protest, which mainly converged with the increasing democratic governance in the 1990s (Gurr 2000, xiii, see also Figure 3.1). It is further believed that the change towards peaceful mobilization is due to an increasing attention towards strategies of recognition and integration of ethnic minorities (Gurr 2000, xiv). Especially in Europe, these strategies have a longstanding value and have reached the point where the borders between assimilation and integration have almost disappeared (Modood 2005, 2).

Increasing attention should be therefore given to protesting actions, as being an important choice among ethnic groups to actively mobilize in Europe. I build on previous theoretical work that employs primordialist and constructivist ideas to

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7 The analysis in this chapter has benefited from the support of the Ernst Mach fellowship undertaken at the Centre for Strategic Development within the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna. My utmost gratitude goes to the project coordinator of the ENRI-East project (Dr. Alexander Chvorostov) and to the entire ENRI team in Vienna for the given support and ongoing appreciation.

8 Primordialism sees ethnic mobilization through the lens of groups’ primal features and their historical heritages. The primordial objects such as biological characteristics, religion,
consider those factual conditions under which ethnopolitical protest is more prone to manifest. Many engagements in protest or any other form of communal conflict result from an “ethnic security dilemma”—a concept and strategy reflecting the realist tradition of intergroup relations. Barry Posen (1993, 104) would argue that “the condition of anarchy makes security the first concern of states” and consequently, ethnic communities behave in the same manner as sovereign states in the international system. When two or more ethnic groups coalesce, each of the actors tries to maximize its own security in relation to its neighbouring communities. Any action taken by a communal group, however, automatically triggers reactions from the opposing group, which sees it as an affront to their own ethnic security. It could be a never-ending process empowered by the idea that “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure” (Posen 1993, 104).

**Figure 3.1 Patterns of Protest and Rebellion in Europe**

![Graph showing General Trends in Violent Rebellion and Ethnopolitical Protest (1991-2003)](image)

Source: MAR

language and territory are powerful factors productive of conflict. The primordialist incentives of conflict were treated in, among others (Horowitz 2000, 57; Horowitz 2004, 72–73; Grosby 1994, 168).

9 Constructivists consider mobilization as deriving from social and political practices, in which a set of social instruments bust the intensity and direction of ethnic movements. See also (Anderson 1991, 16; Posner 2005).

10 For a critical view of this concept see (Horowitz 2000, 95).
Keeping in mind all these factual conditions, I explicitly set the goal of empirically observing the particularities of ethnic-group mobilization defined as ethnocommunal protest. Supposing that the general ratio of protest movements diminished per se in the past two decades, would the intensity of protest decrease as well? And if there are changes in protest intensity, what is the magnitude of the transition rates over time? Moreover, considering that there are significant changes in protest actions over time, does the previous status in protest influence the current protest mobilization? There are no consistent studies, especially in Europe that might explain whether the decreasing trend in ethnic strife is caused by a process towards a permanent choice for “no mobilization” or is just caused by a relative and temporal decline in strife intensity among ethnic groups. Apart from looking at the changes in protest intensity across time, the question of which causal factors shape the consistency of ethnic mobilization will be addressed as well. In doing so, I attempt to observe the link between some group- and country-level indicators (such as religion, democracy, discrimination, geographical concentration ethnic fractionalization, etc.) and the growing strength of communal mobilization.

First, I will explain what ethnicity and ethnic group means in the context of this analysis. Second, I will define some of the key terms used in this study. Third, I will underline what indicators this study employed and what expectations can be predicted based on previous scholar work. Fourth, data characteristics, methodology and operationalization of variables will be explored. Fifth, in line with the established questions, the empirical results will be presented. Finally, my concluding remarks will summarize the content of this analysis.

3.2 Defining Key Terms: Ethnicity and Ethnic Mobilization

3.2.1 Defining Ethnicity

Ethnicity, as an analytical concept, emerged in the early 1960s, being widely theorized in social science. Precisely defining an ethnic group however is “frustratingly elusive” (Keating 2007, 607) and poses more challenges than one might expect. There is by far no consensus on this concept, and any definition from the literature is not by itself totally representative of a certain country or region. This defining pattern is even more challenging when it comes to targeting ethnic groups in Europe. Some European ethnicities can identify themselves with only one significant cultural difference, such as religion (e.g., Bosnian Serbs and
Muslim, or Catholics in Northern Ireland). Others build their ethnic distinctiveness on language or cultural and racial heritages (e.g., the Basques in Spain and France, Slavs in Moldova, Hungarians in Romania). Therefore, a standard definition of an ‘ethnic group’ based merely on general and shared cultural features is somehow deeply problematic (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 12).

I tend nonetheless to rely on the idea that the concept of ethnicity is mainly marked by the fact that an ethnic group is a distinct entity, shaped by a collective identity and, more important, by the recognition of others of its basic primordial conditions. Starting from these ideas, I identified two general definitions in the literature that come closer to my perception of an ethnic entity. The first one sees ethnic groups as cultural communities based on a common belief in a real or putative descent (Weber 1946; Smith 1991, 21; Cederman and Girardin 2005, 4). The second one follows Anthony Smith’s definition of what he calls an “ethnic community”: “a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity” (Smith 1995, 56-57).

A common feature of these definitions is to consider all ethnic groups as distinct constructivist, but especially primordialist entities with a set of different cultural values and identities that distinguish them from the majority group(s) in a country. States which have control over these ethnic minorities can be conceptualized as dominant units that maintain their domination by coercion (Stack 1986, 1-5; Smith 1995). Many minority groups choose a dynamic mobilization process in relation to the dominant majorities, at the communal but also at the national level, which is situational and very much prone to change in time (Gurr 1993a, 162). Consequently, ethnic activism should be seen as a result of these dynamic processes in which distinct ethnic communities would continuously want to reinforce their ethnic distinctiveness in opposition to their neighbouring group. I thus consider the idea of the ethnic security dilemma as being endemically embedded in a multiethnic society.

Even though there are a multitude of groups prone to be mobilized, I primarily focus on those ethnic minorities that are mostly at risk to be discriminated either in relation to the dominant group in the country or by the central ruling authority in the state. The criteria “at risk” to which certain groups are considered discriminated have been empirically established by Ted Gurr in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project and are explicitly posted in the “Data” section below.

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11 See (Horowitz 2000). Donald Horowitz distinguishes between the advanced and backward groups, each of which having different mobilization patterns and organizational behavior.
3.2.2 Defining Ethnic Mobilization

In contemporary intra-state politics, ethnic mobilization can take various forms. One can see mobilization as a range of events going from peaceful sporadic or sustained protest to more-violent confrontations, civil war or insurrections. Others, conversely, consider ethnic conflict an engagement in the political process. A group that is politically active has become mobilized, but it does not automatically mean that they will seek to protest or rebel. In both these scenarios, nevertheless, ethnicity has a significant role. Based on ethnic feelings or the group’s status of discrimination, conflict may ignite between two or more different national communities or between an ethnic group and the state ruling authority.

Much literature focuses on ethnic movements in terms of their extreme outcomes that are based on violent rebellion. Monica Toft considers that ethnic mobilization is strongly associated with the idea of sovereignty over a specific territory and thus ethnic disputes are often associated with violence (Toft 2003). Donald Horowitz (2000) also assumes that ethnic conflict is in general more violent than are ideological or political mobilizations. His opinion reflects the idea that ethnic conflicts are more emotional and thus more intense.

As previously mentioned however, there is empirical evidence of a shift in ethnic action, from violent conflict toward protest (Gurr 2000, xvi). In his recent studies, Jonathan Fox concluded that few of the ethnic conflicts in the democratic world have characteristics other than low-intensity conflict (Fox 2003). European ethnic minorities are especially open to non-violent conflicts because of several well-tested reasons in the academic literature. Peaceful characteristics of protest make it more prone to grab the attention of the decision-making authority. Similarly, ethnic groups will push less for collective violence as far as they are confident that their demands have a higher chance to be fulfilled through peaceful methods (Gurr 2000; Fox 2003).

There are a series of characteristics that can be tagged to protest mobilization. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998, 694) consider ethnopolitical protest a particularity of ethnic mobilization that is characterized by a racial or ethnic grievance directed at the government officials (state authority) or towards the community at large. There are two main features of protest movements that according to Lewis Killian represent the fundament of each mobilization: actions to promote or resist change and the mobilization resulting from the collective behaviour (Killian 1964, 430). In the course of this analysis, ethnopolitical protest includes activities by the members of an ethnic group or on behalf of an ethnic minority directed against the state
authority and explicitly organized to defend minority rights and interests. As a general characteristic, it excludes any threat or use of violent coercion.

### 3.3 Indicators and Expectations

While defining ethnic mobilization, this study focuses on ethnopolitical protest as its dependent indicator. MAR records information on protest actions by ethnic groups directed against the majority or the dominant group(s) who might also represent the ruling authority in the state. The base of the ethnopolitical protest is to assert and protect the general group interests (Gurr 1993b, 162). In doing so, the protesting actions may vary in range and intensity from verbal opposition and symbolic resistance to large-scale demonstrations.

A handful of control variables are also included in the analysis. They represent the causal linkage to the explanatory side of the empirical model. These indicators are listed below.

#### 3.3.1 Religion

Traditionally, religion has been found to be a strong predictor for the formation of grievances and conflict (Rapoport 1991; Fox 1998; Fox 1999; Djupe and Grant 2001; Fox 2003; Ayers and Hofstetter 2007). Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, scholars have pointed out that conflict will evolve more as a “clash of civilizations” rather than an inter-state or inter-ideological struggle (Huntington 1996a). However, much of the existing literature focuses solely on the effects of religion on violent conflict and limited scholar work has underlined the same causality on protest mobilisation. Europe can be seen as a meeting point of three main religious denominations which, according to Samuel Huntington, correspond to three competing ‘civilisations’ – Western Christianity, Orthodox, and Muslim. By taking the “Clash of Civilizations” theory as a starting point, I expect that protest mobilisation will constantly increase in intensity across the main religious denominations employed in this study.

#### 3.3.2 Political Discrimination

Any form of discrimination is logically linked to an increased desire for mobilization. The presence of political discrimination against an ethnic community
leads to dissatisfaction and grievance formation, which are likely to be transformed into a chain of mobilization events. Previous empirical studies have shown that ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when their political status is threatened by the ruling authority (Gurr 1993b; Gurr and Moore 1997). Ethnic groups, additionally, feel deprived and disadvantaged when their political representation is considerably lower than those of other groups in the country. In such cases they tend to blame the state for their status by regarding their deprivation as a constructivist act of political injustice (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 2000; Marshall and Gurr 2003). Politically discriminated minorities are thus more predisposed to enter into ethnic strife, and this relationship should be represented by a direct positive causality.

3.3.3 Geographical Concentration

When considering the ethnic security dilemma, Barry Posen stipulates that minorities in ethnically homogenous regions are more advantaged to start ethnic strikes against opposing groups (Posen 1993). The territorial configuration leading to the warfare events between Serbian, Croat and Muslim communities in Bosnia particularly underlines the security dilemma argument.

Steven Grosby further emphasizes that “ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as territorial location” (Grosby 1994, 43). In such a perspective, it is not surprising that geographical distribution of minority groups is seen as an important explanatory condition when observing ethnic mobilization. In a study using on MAR data, Ted Gurr (1993b, 179–180) found that geographical concentration had no relevant effect on protest mobilization. Monica Toft (2003; 1996) also conducted extensive research on how the geographical factor impacts violent ethnic mobilization. Her studies reveal the feasibility of this predictor: concentrated or “pocket” minorities are most likely to enter a violent strike while the dispersed, especially urban, minorities are the least predisposed to rebel. Also, most countries with more than two regionally compact minorities are more likely to be exposed to ethnic rebellion. Further studies, also based on MAR data, validate Toft’s findings and confirm the argument that regional dominating minorities have higher tendencies towards violent actions (Gurr 2000, 75; Fearon and Laitin 1999).

Even though the greatest amount of empirical work focuses exclusively on the emergence of interethnic violence, I consider territorial concentration as having an explanatory power for ethnopoltical protest as well. Geographically compressed minorities have better intergroup communication and a stronger shared identity and are therefore easier to mobilize for making their ethnic demands (Gurr 2000;
Gurr 1993b; Smith 1991; Saideman 2002). I, thus, expect that regionally packed minorities are organizationally better prepared to be actively mobilized at any level of the protest scale.

3.3.4 Intra-Group Fractional Conflict

Group fractional discrepancies are not an unusual reality in many of the European ethnic communities. Intra-group harmony poses more challenges when it comes to establishing a common and acceptable way to be mobilized. There always will be tendencies to mobilize group members in a certain way in order to maximize the interests of a particular elite section. These “ethnic entrepreneurs” (Kasfir 1979) act in a process of internal lure and coercion to increase their fractional interests in a disputed competition with others from within. It could be a long-standing action between fractional coexistence and conflict, continuously marked by communal internal divisions.

The capacity of different intra-group fractions to engage in a common mobilization pattern will depend on a circumstances shaped by the primordial sense of belonging or by a constructivist view for maximizing their chances for political and economic gains. David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1998, 7) noted: “In formulating political strategies, ethnic leaders anticipate the consequences of their within-group choices for relations with other groups and, in turn, incorporate the effects of their between-group choices into plans for dealing with their ethnic kin.” The presence of fractional conflict would therefore increase the intra-group dynamics, and thus the mobilization activism might be highly boosted. Hence, active protest would be a realist expectation for an internally divided ethnic minority.

3.3.5 Democracy Level

The literature constantly underlines the direct influence that democracy has on the intensity to which ethnic conflict is manifesting. The direction of causality, however, is still widely disputed among scholars. Many argue that strong democracies are better at handling ethnic strife and, consequently, are less likely to experience violent conflict. The argument is based on the fact that well-established democracies have the necessary instruments to manage pluralism peacefully (Gurr 1993b; Guibernau 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). A democratic environment may decrease violent conflict, but at the same time, peaceful protest might replace it and flourish. Others think the opposite and argue that democracies provide the tools but also the potential incentives for political actions to manifest (Snyder 1999;
Horowitz 2000). This scenario might result in a challenging process, which can endanger the democratic system by producing more ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Pfaffengerger 1991; Kaufman 1996).

It seems from the literature that the relationship between ethnic mobilization and democratization is more alleged rather than fully demonstrated. More contradictions of how ethnic conflict might evolve can be expected in those countries that face democratic transitions such as former Eastern European communist states. By any means, the supposition is that, with an increase in democratic standards, protest actions are more accommodated and thus more active.

### 3.3.6 Group Ethnic Distinctiveness

Taking the perennialist and primordialist logics, I believe that different ethnic groups tend to differentiate between each other based on a set of common customs and beliefs. Ethnic communities with distinct ethnic values are inclined to consider themselves as having different ethnic legacies than their neighbouring groups in the country. Under certain conditions, these dissimilarities may well lead to ethnic mobilization in defence of their distinctiveness. Ted Gurr tends to disagree with this logic by mentioning that “the greater a people’s dissimilarity from groups with which they interact regularly, the more salient their identity is likely to be” (Gurr 2000, 67-68). The literature is further divided over the causal mechanism that links ethnic distinctiveness to ethnic mobilization. Evidences were found that dissimilar ethnic groups disregard the balance of capabilities and have the same mobilization pattern as ethnically strong and distinct communities (Cetinyan 2002, 645). Gurr and Moore (1997), however, found a positive correlation between ethnic distinctiveness and ethnic strife, whereas Lindstrom and Moore (1995) obtained a strong negative impact on militant mobilization and no impact at all on open group mobilization. I would argue, though, that the decision to protest most likely results from strategic dilemmas. Depending on how much is at stake, it might be assumed that groups with strong ethnic distinctiveness will be more eager to engage in protest actions.

### 3.3.7 Ethnic Fractionalization

Ethnic diversity is seen in the literature as one of the main predictors for ethnic mobilization. Research suggests that ethnic diversity is the main generator of political instability and conflict (Gurr 1970; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Boswell
and Dixon 1990; Horowitz 2000), yet this causality is negated by some scholar work (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). One popular measure of ethnic diversity is a country’s ethnic fractionalization score. It reflects the degree to which all ethnic units divide the national population of a particular state.

There are several reasons that explain the need for this explanatory indicator. First of all, ethnic fractionalization is associated with a negative effect on the economic growth, especially in the less democratic countries (Alesina, Devleeschauwer et al. 2003). This in turn generates instability, which may lead to ethnic mobilization. Secondly, many scholars argued that plural societies are more exposed to the internal inter-ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 2000). This causality comes from a constant competition between groups, in which each actor demands rights and privileges, which can be seen as a struggle for resources and power. The conflicting actions further sustain ethnic divisions within the state and make inter-communal strife a probable phenomenon. In line with these assumptions, I expected that highly fractionalized societies would be more prone to protest actions.

3.3.8 Freedom of Assembly and Association

In a multiethnic society ethnic minorities rely on a means of association to promote their group interests. John Rawls (2005) argues that freedom of assembly and association is a basic liberty of any individual because it represents an extension of liberty of conscience. It is seen as a human right, by means of coming together and collectively expressing, promoting and defending group interests (McBride 2005, 18-20).

This indicator can be also considered as part of what Robert Dahl (1972) calls the liberalisation process: the condition which provides minority groups with the general rights and freedoms to openly manifest themselves. It goes together with the idea of inclusiveness, a process which allows previously excluded groups to take part and influence the social and political paths of the country in which they reside.

Considering ethnic mobilization, the freedom of assembly and association can be regarded as the right to protest at the group level. Thus, my assumption was that the denial of the right to collectively associate and defend community rights was to come with a certain degree of unrest.
3.4 Data, Methodology and Operationalization

3.4.1 Source of Data

I used data from two sources: MAR and the Quality of Government dataset (QoG). These data sources are widely employed in the scholar work and, thus, provide reliable indicators for my descriptive and empirical models. Their characteristics are summarized as follow:

MAR data is the most comprehensive set in the field that targets the most discriminated minority groups. The sampled population in MAR is composed of those communal ethnicities that are hurt by discriminatory treatment compared with other groups in the state. Group discrimination is regarded as the base for political mobilization for the promotion of their communal interests. This data records the minority “at risk” status in contrast with the majority group(s). Only those ethnic minorities are included in the dataset that have a more-inferior collective status than the relative condition of others in the country.

There are a series of critiques based on the selection of minorities “at risk”. One limitation can be raised, that MAR dataset only includes groups that are discriminated - i.e. groups with a high tendency to be dissatisfied with their political status. Put another way, it excludes other politically active groups that are currently not to be considered at risk - e.g. for Switzerland, the only groups listed are Jurassians (Swiss citizens living in the Canton of Jura) and foreign workers. On the other hand, the Romansh speaking minority, or for that matter the entire Italian and French speaking populations (outside of Jura), who are also in the minority, are not listed. The same sampling problem arises in the case of Walloon and Flemish communities in Belgium, Galicians in Spain or Sami minority in Scandinavia.

An ethnopoltical group is considered “at risk” when it fulfils one of the following two criteria:

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12 MAR data was computed by consulting various sources, including human rights reports, governmental and expert opinion, journalistic accounts, reports from the international organizations, etc. A substantial effort was made to control the coding bias and to minimize the subjective bias resulting from using many qualitative sources. For more information see [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscrmar](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscrmar).

1. The group “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society”

2. “Collectively mobilizes in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests”

Additionally, for each minority case that is included in the MAR data, two more operational guidelines are established. Endangered communal groups are counted only in those countries in which the population exceeds 500,000. Furthermore, the group itself should count at least 100,000 members or represent at least 1% of the total population of the country. To minimize the danger of the subjective mobilization bias, I excluded some initial groups from the dataset. I focused only on those “at risk” groups that have a longstanding historical presence in a specific country’s location. Thus, the recent migrant ethnic groups are not listed in my sample even though they comply with the criterion of “at risk” established by the MAR project. Examples of groups that were excluded from the analysis are foreign workers in Switzerland, British Afro-Caribbean, British Asians, Muslims (noncitizens) in France, etc. Finally, I came up with 55 disadvantaged ethnic minorities in 24 European countries (see Table A.1 in the Appendix A).

The QoG data\(^{14}\) was the second empirical base for my analysis. It is a compilation of different types of smaller datasets and was built on the basis of expert-coded indicators, aggregated individual-level survey data, international organizations’ expert data or different demographic, social and political measures. In general, QoG aims at performing research on the causes, impact, quality and nature of political governance. The indicators provided for my analysis were coded at the country level and provide reliable information close to the cases under analysis.

Finally, the timeframe of this analysis was set to capture the mobilization pattern experienced by European minorities after the termination of the cold war era. My sampled time, therefore, comprises the period between 1991 and 2003.

### 3.4.2 Operationalization

All variables included in the analysis are judgmental ordinal, dichotomous or composite variables. Some of them were re-coded to better fit the argument of this

\(^{14}\) This is a database coded by researchers at the Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University. For more information regarding this dataset see Jan Teorell, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein, “The Quality of Government Dataset”, The Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, version 15, May 2008, at [http://www.qog.pol.gu.se](http://www.qog.pol.gu.se).
study. In total, there are eight explanatory indicators to be employed in testing the emergence of protest mobilization. Their operationalization is detailed below.

Ethnopolitical protest: the dependent variable, ethnopolitical protest, is defined from the initial “Prot” indicator of the MAR dataset. To better include the protest indicator in the ordinal model, I further established four hierarchical values: no protest, low-intensity protest, medium-intensity protest and high-intensity protest. In this order, protest actions range from no protest, to verbal and symbolic actions, and up towards mass demonstration and riots. For a complete visualization of this hierarchy scale but also for all protest activities assigned to each value, see Table 3.1.

Former ideological regime: I included a dummy that cluster ethnic minorities into three distinct regional groups: Balkans, Former Soviet Eastern Europe, and Western European democracies. The reason behind the choice to split them is the former ideological environment in which “at risk” minorities originate their mobilization patterns.

Table 3.1 The Original and the Recoded Structure of the Dependent Variable: Ethnopolitical Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Values</th>
<th>Labels in the original MAR variable (PROT)</th>
<th>Recoded Protest Variable Employed in the Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No protest</td>
<td>No protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Verbal Opposition</td>
<td>Low-intensity protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Symbolic Resistance</td>
<td>Medium-intensity protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scattered acts of symbolic resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g., sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Small Demonstrations</td>
<td>High -intensity protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with &lt;10,000 people)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Medium Demonstrations</td>
<td>High -intensity protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with 10,001–100,000 people)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Large Demonstrations</td>
<td>High -intensity protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots with &gt;100,000 people)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAR
Group Religious denomination: I will use the “religs1” indicator from MAR which records the main religious denomination, at the group level, for each ethnic minority in the sample. Each of the analysed minority belongs to one of the three religious practices recorded: 1 – Eastern Orthodoxy, 2 – Western Christianity, and 3 – Muslim denomination.

Political discrimination: this is a dichotomous variable recording whether or not the group is politically discriminated. It builds on the former “poldis” indicator in the MAR dataset. The contained information registers the discrimination practices that vary from formal political inequities to restrictive and social exclusion actions. The range of political discrimination is, however, beyond the aim of this study. I am not directly interested in whether an ethnic group suffers from neglecting policies or from social exclusion mistreatments. The simple presence of any form of political intolerance confirms the discriminatory status of an ethnic minority, and thus it was coded as 1 (the presence of political discrimination).

Geographical concentration: this indicator measures to what extent an ethnic group forms a compact regional community or, the opposite, is dispersed across the country. It originates from the “groupcon” variable in the MAR dataset. Dispersed groups (coded here as 0) are widely scattered or primarily urban minorities. Compact groups (coded here as 1) are solid concentrated minorities that make up the majority population in a certain region within the state.

Intra-group tensions: this dichotomous indicator underlines the presence of factional conflict (coded as 1) inside the group. It was derived from the “intracon” indicator from the MAR data.

Level of democracy: the information measuring the annual democracy scores came from the combined Freedom House/Imputed Polity measure\textsuperscript{15} of democratic performance, calculated in terms of civil liberties and political rights. According to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), this index outperforms all rival indices of democracy in both reliability and validity. This index ranks the level of democracy on a scale from 0 to 10. A score of 10 indicates strong democracies, whereas a score of 0 indicates strong autocracies. The variable listed in the model considered countries scoring over 7.5 to be established democracies and countries with values below 4 to be non-democracies. The values in between were assigned to semi-democratic regimes.

\textsuperscript{15} For more information on the Freedom House/Imputed Polity data see http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Ethnic fractionalization: the indicator used in my analysis was Fearon’s index of ethnic fractionalization constructed from the CIA World Factbook combined with a measure of linguistic fractionalization. Employed from QoG data, it records the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country will belong to different ethnic groups (Fearon 2003, 208). Values range within the interval of 0, a perfectly homogenized society, and 1, a highly fragmented community.

Group ethnic distinctiveness: I measured ethnic group distinctiveness through the “Ethdifxx” index employed in MAR. It cumulates values related to language, customs, believes and race. I was interested in observing mobilization patterns among groups having strong cohesion relative to those with weak ethnic distinctiveness. The initial MAR indicator has values scaling from 0 (no cohesion) to 11 (very high cohesion). Establishing 5 as the breaking point, the sample was thus divided into groups having stronger ethnic distinctiveness and communities with weak such values.

Freedom of assembly and association: initially it was constructed in the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset and later cointegrated in the QoG dataset. I used the “cri_assn” indicator measuring the standards of freedom of assembly and association at the country level. The indicator employed in my model had three values: 1, freedoms that are severely restricted or denied completely; 2, freedoms that are limited for all citizens or severely restricted for some groups; and 3, freedoms unrestricted for all citizens.

3.4.3 Empirical Model

A typical estimation technique for the ordinal dependent variables is through discrete choice modelling via either ordered probit or logit. I chose this methodology for this study to better reflect the strength and limitations of the data. Discrete choice modelling provided me with the ability to explain variations in ethnic mobilization at each level of the protest intensity. This approach avoids treating the differences between protest levels as uniform, as it is in the case of a least-squares regression. The equation below estimates my raw model by pooling data.

\[ P_{it} = \beta_1 k_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (i = 1, \ldots, N; t = 2, \ldots, T), \]

---

where Pit is the dependent variable that records, for every year, the protest status of ethnic groups by means of an ordinal scale coded as 0 (for no protest), 1 (for low-intensity protest), 2 (for medium-intensity protest), and 3 (for high-intensity protest); \( k_i \) stands for those explanatory variables related to protest at the group-level \( i \) at time \( t \); \( x_{it} \) relates to several control variables at the country level, ethnic fractionalization, democracy level, freedom of association, which are assigned to the characteristics of the group \( i \) at time \( t \); \( e_{it} \) is equal to time and group specific error that is presumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the control variables.

In my specification, to circumvent the issues that arise because of the use of pooled data, I accounted for individual heterogeneity and inter-temporal dependency. First, I controlled for the group fixed effects by considering a procedure to “de-mean” the data as it was proposed by Yair Mundlack in 1978. This technique controlled for the fixed effects in the model by considering the within-group means of the regressors (Mundlack 1978). Second, I integrated in the final model the constructed lagged variables that count for the status of protest at \( t-1 \). The lagged variables of the dependent indicator, used as explanatory variables, are assumed to be independent of the error term as in the form of a “true state dependence” (Honore and Kyriazidou 2000). This might be a strong assumption and I acknowledge it as a possible limitation of the analysis.

Thus, we obtain:

(2) \[ Pit = \beta_1 k_i + \beta_2 x_{it} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (i=1, \ldots, N; t=2, \ldots, T_i) \] and

(3) \[ Pit = \beta_1 k_i + \beta_2 x_{it} + \beta_3 Pit_{t-1} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (i=1, \ldots, N; t=2, \ldots, T_i) \]

where \( Pit_{t-1} \) is the observed-group previous-year protest condition, which accounted for the time dependency in the sample; \( \alpha_i \) is a group-specific and time-invariant component that controlled for the systematic fixed effects associated with the data; \( \varepsilon_{it} \) is again the time- and group-specific error terms, which are considered to be exogenous, normally distributed, independent and uncorrelated across groups, years and with the Mundlack’s terms.

The ordered discrete choice model indicates only the general tendency of the coefficients applied to the hierarchical order of the dependent variable. To capture the true effects in the ordinal scaling, my model estimated the marginal effects of all variables employed in this study. My analysis was conducted in STATA, and thus, it calculated the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables by using the prediction associated with the previous ordinal probit estimation command. By calculating the marginal effects, I saw how per-unit change in the independent indicators affected the relative intensity of the ethnopolitical protest. Since, according to William Greene (2000, 876), the interpretation of the coefficients
of an ordered probit is quite unclear in the literature, I also interpreted the results in terms of the marginal effects.

### 3.5 Data Analysis: Patterns and Trends

#### 3.5.1 The Descriptive Path

Ethnic protest is one form of conflict for which many ethnic minorities go for in externalizing their dissatisfaction in relation to the dominant authority. The intensity of protest, however, might vary across time as the conflicting demands are tackled among the actors involved. This study acknowledges the fact that there are variations in protest levels across nations and different European regions. The aggregate protest trends presented in this subsection are intended to give an overall overview of the evolution of protest contention over the presented decade. Yet, regional disparities and their relationship with the dependent variable are present in the empirical findings of the subsection 3.5.3.

Figure 3.2 shows the overall trends in protest intensity over the observed 13 years. In general, the cumulative pattern of protest has a descendent slope. This means that the active ethnic strife declined within the 1991 and 2003 time span. It can be observed that there was a significant decreasing dip in ethnopartisanal activism at the end of the 1990s, more exactly between 1997 and 1999. A significant recovery followed just after that. The most affected patterns were across the medium- and high-level protest activities (sabotages, mass demonstrations and riots).

According to Ted Gurr (2000), just after the end of the Cold War, the number and intensity of communal conflict was at its peak, followed by a steady drop afterwards. He called this “the short peace” coming after a “long war”. A substantial credit for the de-escalation of ethnopartisanal mobilisation was given to governing elites and international organizations who prompted significant efforts to restrain conflict.

Indeed, less protest mobilization during that period followed some major conflict settlements all around Europe. There was increasing support, after 1995, for solving the inter-ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Georgia (in Adzharia, Ossetia and Abkhazia). The civil war in Bosnia ended in 1995 with the Dayton agreements, and in 1998, the Northern Irish republicans and the unionists agreed to a national compromise via the Good Friday accord. Shortly afterwards, in 1999, the IRA agreed for an unlimited suspension of its terrorist activity. At the
same time, in 1997 many Central and East European countries received invitations to join NATO. In parallel, there were signs for a clear EU membership for all these countries. This chain of events has created a more stable political environment and a period of a euphoric lull among disadvantaged minorities with weak possible motivations for high protesting actions.

**Figure 3.2** Cumulative Trend in Ethnopolitical Protest Over Years (1991-2003)\(^7\)

Apart from this opportunistic chain of events, it might be that protest preferences of ethnic groups shifted towards other levels of protest. There was indeed a consistently increasing path in low-intensity protest activities (public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation etc.), with values reaching almost two times higher in 2002 to 2003 than at the beginning of 1990s. At the same time, higher levels of protest steadily decreased in post-1990 Europe. Even though high and medium means of protest have weakened over time, they still have a persistent share in protest preferences among ethnic minorities (because almost 20% are still employed in mass protest in 2003). For a better understanding of this phenomenon, we might look into the dynamics of different mobilization levels and see how the protest transitions rates perform over time.

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\(^7\) The protest indicator contains 4 values: no protest, low, medium, and high intensity protest. The cumulative value presented in Figure 3.2 is a sum of low, medium, and high intensity scores. The score of no protest results thus from subtracting the cumulative score from 100% (e.g. in 1991 almost 20% of ethnic groups were in the no protest status; in 2003 more than 30% of groups were not involved in protest).
3.5.2 Protest Dynamics

Dynamics of ethnic mobilization show the degree to which groups choose to change their active mobilization status across a certain period of time. In accord with previous findings, there are also a number of interesting substantive results that can be seen in Table 3.2. At a first sight, the data show that 83% of inactive minorities (non-protesting) in 1991 remained in the same non-mobilization status up until 2003. It represents a remarkably stability in the passive protest mobilization over years. It also implies that many “at risk” minorities might lack clear incentives to highly mobilize and protest. This is supported by the fact that those groups that left the “non-protesting” status moved mainly into the low protest category. In fact, this particular protest intensity also had a steady trend across years. Around 65% of groups remained in low protest activities across the observed time period. This is, however, less surprising because the evidence presented in Figure 3.2 supports the stability and the increasing trend of the low-scale protest activities.

Table 3.2 Transition Rates of the Ethnopolitical Protest from 1991 to 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnopolitical Protest</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No protest</td>
<td>83.25</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Intensity</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>64.52</td>
<td>15.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Intensity</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>58.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Intensity</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>29.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, the mobilization status of highly and moderately mobilized minorities did not changed radically. Almost 55% of highly mobilized groups, and 59% of medium intensity protesters were in the same protest category in 2003 as they were initially in 1991. As a matter of fact, most of the ethnic groups who changed their protesting level went mostly in the proximity of their initial mobilization status. Almost one third of those groups engaged in high-intensity protest in 1991 decreased their mobilization pattern to the medium protest category instead of moving towards low intensity or no mobilization in 2003. In the same line, 22% of medium-level protesters moved towards the higher level of protest instead of going lower in their mobilization pattern.

Generally, we may conclude that the higher the initial protesting status, the greater probability that an ethnic group will decrease its protest actions across years. The decline in protest, however, is not a total change in protest intensity, because groups tend to choose similar actions of protest close to their initial protesting
status. Accordingly, the dynamic scale of protest is not represented by extreme transitions, which is somehow surprisingly given the important political changes and ideological transition of the decade analyzed. I believe that the utmost protest transitions require a substantial organizing effort that might be hard to achieve in such a relatively short period of time.

3.5.3 Empirical Findings—Marginal Effects

This section presents the empirical findings of the ordered probit models, calculated in terms of marginal effects.

Table 3.3 presents the results from equation 1, which assesses the protest intensity without exploiting the unobserved heterogeneity and longitudinal characteristics of the data. Within this model, almost all indicators appear to have a statistically significant effect on protest mobilization. Marginal effects indicate that ethnic minorities residing in Western European democracies have higher probability of engaging in low-intensity protest and have less keenness for mass protest.

The effects for political discrimination have positive and significant signs as the protest increases at the highest level. As expected, this form of discrimination displays high response in terms of high protest actions and less involvement in symbolic protest (public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.). The probability that disadvantaged minorities opted for mass demonstration and riots increased by 15 percentage points when political discrimination was present. These estimates suggest that the status of political discrimination comes with a higher desire for higher protest.

Religion seems to have limited effects on the outburst of protest mobilisation at any intensity level. At a first sight, the results show insignificant causality in the analysed sample. Yet, when controlling for fixed effects (Table 3.4), Muslim minorities seem to show a significant negative probability of engaging in stronger protest actions. In other words, the European Muslim communities protested less in the decade following the end of the Cold War. At the same time, ethnic minorities belonging to Western and Orthodox Christianity do not hold significant results and cannot provide any consistent explanation in connection to protest.
Table 3.3 Estimation Results for Ethnopolitical Protest: Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects (Equation 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Protest</th>
<th>Low-Intensity Protest</th>
<th>Medium-Intensity Protest</th>
<th>High-Intensity Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>−0.039</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Western Christianity</td>
<td>−0.066</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Muslim</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>−0.190***</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>−0.029***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical concentration</td>
<td>−0.179***</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>−0.021**</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-group fractional tensions</td>
<td>−0.230***</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>−0.072***</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
<td>−0.249***</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>−0.068***</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established democracy</td>
<td>−0.260***</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>−0.036***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>−0.278***</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>−0.045***</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic intergroup difference</td>
<td>0.091**</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited rights for association</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free rights for association</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>696</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.0918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SE=standard error. The marginal effects of the dummy variables show the discrete change from 0 to 1.

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

---

18 Here and in the tables to follow the adjusted R² is orientative, based on the raw regression model (before the marginal effects have been applied) and does not hold much explanatory power over the existing variance in an ordinal probit regression. This is because of the nature of the applied ordinal (categorical) dependent variable, which contains several levels, simultaneously targeted by the interactions with the independent variables. The output from the applied marginal effects does not reveal any value of R².
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.046*</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.077**</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Western Christianity</td>
<td>-0.0077</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td>-0.00132</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Muslim</td>
<td>0.0870*</td>
<td>0.0464</td>
<td>0.0107**</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>-0.0361*</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.0615**</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>-0.220***</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical concentration</td>
<td>-0.178***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-group fractional tensions</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
<td>-0.236***</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established democracy</td>
<td>-0.240***</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.092***</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.183***</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.262***</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>-0.044**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.204***</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic intergroup difference</td>
<td>0.085**</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.032**</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.069**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited rights for association</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free rights for association</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>696</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SE=standard error. The marginal effects of the dummy variables show the discrete change from 0 to 1.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Therefore, there are sufficient reasons to believe that Huntington’s theory over the “Clash of Civilizations” is not applicable for low intensity conflict. At least in Europe, religion has shown little evidence to influence ethnopoliical protest. The explanation stays in the nature of religious mobilisation. Most often, religion is linked to terrorism (Fox 2003, 56), or is a source of ideological conflict and political violence (Drake 1998). At the level of interpersonal beliefs, religion can be viewed as a substantial source for intolerant attitudes (Wald 1987, 268). Faith is thus, a powerful mobilizer for violence and hardly can be seen to influence the soft means of conflict in the same manner.

One of the most compelling challenge however, is that religious beliefs at the group level may not be seen as an accurate representation of feelings governing individuals’ desire for mobilisation. This is because many ethnic minorities in Europe share several religious beliefs inside their communities which certainly impact the direction and speed of their mobilisation choice. By taking religious denomination at the group level we might bias the assumption that individuals forming the same ethnic group might share different religious practices. The connection between different religious beliefs inside an ethnic community and their chosen protest level should serve as an important subject for further consideration.

There is also a strong positive relationship between the minorities’ territorial concentration and the outburst of high-intensity protest. Groups that are territorially concentrated are more likely to mobilize more intensely. As previously demonstrated, concentrated groups have higher community feelings and, consequently, have stronger incentives to take part in large protest actions. On the other hand, the consistency of the geographical factor had a significantly negative impact on the likelihood that an ethnic group would take part in low-intensity protest. We can logically conclude that ethnically dispersed minorities might be more comfortable engaging in symbolic forms of protest to disseminate their ethnic demands than would regionally compact groups.

Further on in the ordered probit analysis, I found that the effect of the intra-group factional tensions had a significant, positive and strong impact on the occurrence of large-scale demonstrations. Yet, the same indicator has a negative impact on the lowest level of protest. Divided groups are thus more prone to mobilize for higher forms of protest and not less. The reason behind this choice might be that strong protest actions are seen by group conflicting elites as the proper way of achieving the proposed factional outcomes.

Controlling for democracy level, the effects show that both countries in transition and established democracies have a higher probability of protesting at the higher
levels. Moreover, in these political environments, disadvantaged minorities appear to prefer medium and mass protest to softer strife activities. Previous research has found that heterogeneous democratic environments can produce intense ethnopolitical mobilisation, mainly because of their weak civic institutions (Snyder 2000). In addition, according to Horowitz (2000), many ethnic groups in democratizing countries, try to explore the transition institutional chaos into their own benefit, also by engaging in mass mobilization. In advanced democracies, large-scale protest might be also the only acceptable way for many ethnic minorities to achieve their desired group goals.

When comparing coefficients of democracy with that of regimes (former Soviet or Western Europe), there is a distinct causal pattern which reflect a compelling reality. While high democratic scores in both Eastern and Western Europe has a positive effect on medium and high protest levels, the democracies in Western Europe alone provide an accommodated framework for ethnic minorities to protest less. This means that protest is manifesting differently in different democracies across Europe. Western European democracies have a good record of assimilating and integrating ethnic minorities which is reflected in low tendencies for strong protest. At the same time, democratized countries in Eastern Europe still have gaps in accommodating ethnic demands which make minorities to protest more. There are still historical animosities coming from the recent predemocratic history which disturb interethic relations in many East European countries. Estonia and Latvia are two former Soviet republics which score high on the democracy scale. However, the interethnic relations between Russians and natives are much tensioned in these two Baltic countries. The lack of integration in their host societies makes Russian minority to be highly mobilised despite living in a successfully democratized country. Therefore, it is imperatively important that standards of democracy should always be correlated with each regional dimension tested.

Marginal coefficients, measuring the effect of ethnic fractionalization on minorities’ strife are positive and statistically significant for higher levels of protest. The estimates thus support the supposition that disadvantaged minorities in ethnically fractionalized societies are more prone to participate in mass protest. There was also a significant negative effect of strong ethnic distinctiveness on high levels of protest mobilization. These results were contrary to my expectation but in line with Ted Gurr’s (2000, 67-68) previous finding that protest is less intense among groups that are more distinct from the majority population in the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Protest</th>
<th>Low-Intensity Protest</th>
<th>Medium-Intensity Protest</th>
<th>High-Intensity Protest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Western Christianity</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.0517</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion - Muslim</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.0556</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>-0.131*</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical concentration</td>
<td>-0.074**</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-group fractional tensions</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
<td>-0.110**</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established democracy</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.230**</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.059**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic inter-group difference</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited rights for association</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free rights for association</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest at t-1: None</td>
<td>0.673***</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.054**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest at t-1: Low Intensity</td>
<td>0.191***</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest at t-1: High Intensity</td>
<td>-0.100***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>-0.037**</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SE = standard error. The marginal effects of the dummy variables show the discrete change from 0 to 1.

* I excluded the lag of medium-intensity protest in t-1 to avoid colinearity between it and other lag indicators.

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
As far as general rights for association were concerned, I found that the direction of causality was in line with my posted assumption. The effects highlight that the probability of engaging in high-level protest decrease in a country that allows for free civic liberties.

However, the above-described results were obtained without using the temporal characteristics of my dataset. Thus, they do not take the unobserved heterogeneity and time dependency into account, which implies that the coefficients obtained from equation 1 may be ambiguous. To see whether or not the described results were due to the influence of the unobserved heterogeneity or time dependency, I further employed two additional models specified in equations 2 and 3.

Table 3.4 presents the marginal effects of the model specified in equation 2. This model controlled for the systematic fixed effects associated with my data. After taking the unobserved heterogeneity into account, most of the determinants of ethnopolitical protest estimated by equation 1 kept their significance but also their previous direction of causality. Once fixed effects were considered, only the intergroup fractional tensions and freedom for assembly and association did not significantly influence the intensity of protest mobilization.

Table 3.5 further presents the marginal effects for each level of protest by considering both unobserved heterogeneity and time dependence in the data. After controlling for these factors, I found that some of the important determinants of protest that had been previously estimated in equation 1 lost their significance. This model underlines the importance of taking both the systematic unobserved effects and time dependency into account. From all indicators employed, political discrimination, geographical concentration, democracy level, and ethnic fractionalization kept their previous direction of causality at a significant level.

Further on, I found that time dependency was a very important and significant determinant of the current protest status. The results indicate that those ethnic groups that were previously at the “no protest” level were 67% more likely still be in the same passive protest level at the moment. This prediction again reinforces the idea that the latent version of protest tends to persist across time. At the same time, minorities that at $t-1$ were involved in mass demonstrations had a significant negative probability of being in no protest in $t$.

We previously saw that low-intensity protest had an increasing trend over all of the observed period. The longitudinal evidence shows that those minority groups that in $t-1$ had been employed in mass demonstration or no protest had a negative probability of being currently found in the low-intensity protest category. As a matter of fact, if these results are correlated with the ones from the no-protest
category but also from higher protest levels it can be concluded that the lowest form of protest is a rigid but also a transitory stage toward no protest. Those groups that were previously engaging in low protest activities had a 19 percentage points higher probability of stopping protesting in $t$ and at the same time were less likely to move toward higher forms of protest. The observed rigidity resulted from the fact that irrespective of any previous mobilization status, there was a negative impact on the current low level of protest. This inflexibility but also the downstream transitory status of the lowest form of protest might explain its increasing trend over time as seen in Figure 3.2.

Both medium and high levels of protest show an appreciable stability of their current protest level in relation to their previous intensity status. Groups engaged in mass protest at $t-1$ had a higher probability of keeping the same status in $t$ or decreasing their mobilization status to medium-intensity protest. Similarly, I found that if the previous protest status was of medium intensity, the current likelihood of being in mass protest increased by 6.8%. On the other hand, if the previous protest intensity was of no protest or of low-intensity protest, the probability of the current status being in high protest decreased by 26% and 7.8%, respectively. In line with the findings shown in Table 3.2, this implies that a change in protest intensity over time happens more progressively and less radically.

### 3.6 Conclusions

Claims about the way ethno-political challenges evolve are linked by filaments of assumptions that go back to the basic nature of conflict. In the context of this study, ethnopolitical protest was viewed as an effective tool in promoting ethnic demands and at the same time keeping inter-ethnic tensions at a relatively peaceful level. I tried, therefore, to underline certain patterns and trends governing the ethnopolitical protest since the end of the cold war in Europe. The central findings of this chapter confirm the expectations gathered by previous scholarly work: that the general trend in ethnic protest is a decreasing one. An important particularity, however, should be mentioned. Although the most-intense protest activities decreased, the low-level protest increased markedly across Europe. Empirical evidence also shows that this type of protest tends to have a slightly different explanatory pattern than do all other forms of protest. Given the growing preferences for this type of resistance among European disadvantaged minorities, further research is recommended to explore the consistency of this particular protest intensity.
When employing the protest dynamics, I found that those ethnic groups that originally stayed lowly mobilized were more prone to keep this initial condition over time. At the same time, a considerable proportion of highly mobilized groups did stay in the same protesting status over the years. Only less than half of the highly mobilized minorities chose to decrease their protest intensity to lower levels during the analyzed 13 years. Transitions, however, were mainly to the neighbouring levels of protest, and limited evidence could be found of extreme transitions. For this reason, the strength of protest mobilization must be approached as a long-term consistent phenomenon.

According to the statistical analysis, politically discriminated minorities protest at the highest levels. When taking the regional factor into account, “at risk” ethnicities in Western democracies engage less in mass protest than do groups in former communist countries. Against my expectations, religion denomination proves to have insignificant influence over protest mobilisation in Europe. Thus, I might conclude that Huntington’s theory cannot be hold consistent when analysing peaceful protest mobilisation in Europe. However, the way religion is coded at the group rather than individual level, might produce consistent bias while testing Huntington’s theory.

In line with my expectations, geographical concentration and intra-group frictions seems to be strong significant factors in predicting the appearance of ethnic protest. In the same context, both semi-democratic and strong democracies successfully accommodate high protesting actions. Alike, ethnic mobilization is more active in ethnically divided societies. Against my initial assumptions, minorities with strong feelings of their ethnic distinctiveness engaged more in low-intensity protest and less in mass demonstrations. By considering the rights for association, I found that their presence provides ethnic minorities with fewer incentives to engage in high-level protest.

One important disparity appears when comparing how ethnic mobilisation is influenced by democracy levels in one hand, and regional belonging to a democratic or transitional group of countries, on the other. High democracy scores reveal a positive causality with strong protest. At the same time the well-established democracies in Western Europe prove to better accommodate ethnic diversity. Results show that minorities protest less in the old European democracies than in former communist societies which reached a high level of democratization. This means that the democratic status achieved through the transition process is still lacking proper mechanisms to address ethnic diversity in a way which allow an extensive decrease in ethnic mobilisation over time.
This study also demonstrated the importance of considering the unobserved heterogeneity and time dependency that have not been explored as much in previous research on ethnic mobilization. I first estimated a fixed-effects model (equation 2), without employing the temporal characteristics of the data used. The results did not change radically nor did their significance or direction of causality. However, once both the unobserved heterogeneity and time dependency were considered (equation 3), only the political discrimination, geographical concentration, democracy level and ethnic fractionalization were significantly associated with protest mobilization.

Controlling for the protesting status at $t-1$, I found that the intensity of protest from the previous year had a significant influence on minorities’ current protest intensity. This influence, however, widely differed across different levels of protest. The current no protest status was highly and positively influenced by the prior no and low-intensity protest. On the contrary, current low-intensity status was negatively affected by any previous form of protest. On its extreme side, high-intensity protest was only positively affected by previous medium-level mobilization and negatively by other protest statuses. As in the case of the transition rates presented in Table 3.2, I conclude that the probability of radical changes in protest status over time is very slim. These results suggest that time dependency, either positively or negatively affecting protest intensity, will keep the same slowly moving pattern in the coming future.

This study indicates that the empirical analysis of peaceful mobilization can provide fruitful yet challenging results. Therefore, further efforts should be made in improving this research. Apart from some recommendations made in the text, more scholarly work is suggested to further attest the dynamic trend of ethnic protest. One recommendation is to generate quality empirical work on the impact of causal conditions on the probability to enter or exit protest mobilization. Last but not least, an empirical correlation should be made in longitudinally attesting both the peaceful (protest) and violent (rebellion) mobilization trends among at-risk minorities. In doing so, an effort should be made to finding data-proof solutions and incorporate in the analysis a wider range of ethnic groups, including the majority populations. This attempt will generate more-consistent comparative findings around the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization.
4.1 Introduction

One of the major critics of any research conducted with the Minorities at Risk data is that it integrates only those ethnic groups which are “at risk” for being disadvantaged by various discriminatory practices in the society. More precisely, a study using solely the MAR data cannot integrate the counterfactual reasoning: that is conducting an empirical testing which engages other minorities which are not “at risk” for discrimination or by using majority populations as a counterbracing factor in the analysis. Therefore, the sampling in MAR is vulnerable to the accusation of selection bias and there are many allegations in the literature that the MAR sample is not representative for all ethnic groups (see Fearon 2003; Christin and Hug 2004; Cederman, Girardin et al. 2006, 5).

To overpass this limitation, this study uses the European Values Survey (EVS), which is listing a more inclusive sample than the one provided by the MAR dataset. It contains both minority groups which are “at risk” and not “at risk” for discrimination but also the majority, or the dominant population in each analysed country.

Before going into the main body of the analysis, I would like to define the term of protest used in this section of the study. Many multiethnic societies undertake political actions by directly involving individuals for getting the attention of governmental bodies on a particular issue. This type of protest usually does not rely on a specific ethnic group as an intermediary but involve individuals across all ethnic lines (Martin 1994, 15). This approach is imperative for building or maintaining a democratic environment and if correctly applied, protest actions are seen as signals for politicians which inform the policy-makers of society’s needs (Verba and Nie 1972; Lohmann 1993).

The way these signals are delivered however, widely vary in consistency and shape. This analysis targets the so called unconventional protest activities such as petitions, boycotts, rallies, strikes, occupation of buildings and factories. All of

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19 This chapter has benefited from data access and technical support from the Integrated Research Infrastructure in Social Science (IRISS) at CEPS/INSTEAD in Differdange, Luxembourg. The conducted research at CEPS was supported by the 6th Framework Programme “Structuring the European Research Area - Research Infrastructures Action” of the European Community. My special regards goes to the IRISS research team (Dr. Philippe Van Kerm, Nicole Hégerlé and Paola Dumet) for their great support and hospitality.
them vary in their mobilisation intensity but all together aim to achieve immediate
goals and get the government’s attention on specific issues, on a short notice. These
practices differ from conventional political actions (e.g. voting,
membership/campaigning in a party or political organization), mainly because
they are sporadic, impulsive and exceeds the formal line of an officially permitted
political process.

However, the unconventional political actions as such, are included in the category
of ‘nonviolence’ since they are oriented to cause insignificant harm to humans or
political regime in which they activate. Moreover, the political actions targeted by
this study can be regarded as individual level disobedience since it is done in
public and aiming mainly to persuade the majority or to influence the
governmental outcomes (Zashin 1972, 110). Among those who have treated
extensively the unconventional political protest in their work are mainly scholars
focusing on American politics (Brady, Verba et al. 1995; Scholzman, Verba et al.
1995; Wong, Lien et al. 2005; Gillion 2006). By a matter of fact, the literature
underlines an important trend in the political activism - that during the last
decades the unconventional political actions have seen an increase in number of
participants (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002), while the conventional political
actions, on opposite, have decreased among the individuals’ preferences (Putnam
2000).

There can be identified one major limitation in the literature on protest activism.
The existing research focuses mostly on one protest action or approaches protest as
a linear political activity. By doing so, one can assume that all actions of protest are
the same, which is highly questionable. The protest scale varies in intensity in the
same way as there are different reasons which push individuals to be mobilised in
one way or another. In order to address this limitation, this analysis constructs its
empirical design by considering protest in its ascending order. This approach was
previously tested by some research work and highly proved its resonance (see for
instance Muller 1979; Finkel 1987).

At the same time, a consistent body of research has been focusing primarily on
social movements (rebellion and ethnopolitical protest) at the group level (Skocpol
1979; Gurr 1993b; Gurr 2000; Horowitz 2000). In the context of ethnic strife, it might
be thought that protest mobilisation at the group level may have different
background reasons than protest actions at the individual level. Minority elites,
often use the group-labelled protest to lobby and emphasize their opinion in those
sensitive areas which are more susceptible to discrimination practices. This
strategy guarantees higher impact and bigger chances for success for all members
of an ethnic community. By contrast, the use of unconventional channels of protest
by individuals shows mainly the personal concern over stringent issues, sometime
beyond the group’s ethnicity. These actions are intended to mobilise and unify individuals in a multiethnic society, irrespective of their ethnic lines. The individual choice to protest contributes to the idea of reinforcing the legitimacy in the nation and is taken as such in the context of this analysis.

In a first place, the sample and the employed data will be presented. After that, through the existing scholar work, the connection between protest and its explanatory factors will be assessed. This part will set the foundation for assumptions which will be further tested by the empirical models. Then, a short reference to the methodology will be made, followed by a discussion of the obtained results. Finally, the major findings will be summarised in the concluding section.

4.2 Data and Sample

The starting point in conducting this analysis is the European Values Survey data (EVS). It is a large-scale, cross-national survey program which provides information on beliefs, preferences, attitudes and values of the European citizens. It was specifically design to present how Europeans tend to think about ethnicity, religion, political actions and society as a whole.

The EVS is surveying data at the individual level. However, for the purpose of this analysis, I have clustered all individuals according to their personal ethnicity status. In doing so, I have used several delimiting criteria as follows: declared ethnicity (x051), language spoken at home (g016) and the region where the interview was conducted (x048). Those respondents which declared as having a particular ethnic status have been coded as such. Alternatively, I cross-checked those who declared as using their specific minority-majority languages at home.20 I applied the same coding criteria for clustering both minority and majority groups. Once all ethnic minorities have been identified, I used the Minority at Risk (MAR) criteria21 to partition my sample into those minorities which are categorized “at risk” for discrimination and those which are not.

20 Those respondents which declared as speaking more than one language at home have been dropped from the coding scheme.
21 Minorities at Risk project identifies those minority groups which are more prone to be disadvantaged in various countries. Several criteria are used to delimitate the sampling of these particular groups “at risk”. First, the group should collectively and systematically suffer from discriminatory policies as compared to other groups in the countries. Second,
In total, I came up with coding 76 ethnic groups, from which 23 majority groups\(^{22}\) and 54 ethnic minorities. According to the MAR sampling criteria, I have identified 30 minority groups classified “at risk” for discrimination and 24 groups not “at risk”. All these groups are included in Table B.1 in the Appendix B. The timeframe for analysis includes the last two extensive waves available in EVS which record the information from 1990 to 2004.

### 4.3 Operationalizing Protest Mobilization

The dependent variable employed in this study will be measuring the unconventional political actions, also known as protest. The explicit focus of this analysis is to target protest at different intensity levels. In order to integrate protest preferences in a hierarchical scale I have constructed an index in EVS which comprises the following protest activities (ascending order): signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes and occupying buildings or factories. For each of these actions, every respondent have been asked whether they have been, might be or never have been engaged in that particular protesting action. Being interested in coding the intensity of protest, I have used an adapted logic of specifications established by Muller (1979) and Finkel (1987). Instead of focusing exclusively on summing and weighting the responses to questions, I was considering mainly the hierarchical value of each of the protesting actions.

Table 4.1 summarize the coding scheme of the protest activities. The intensity scale which I intend to construct widely conforms to the conceptual dimension of unconventional protest behaviour underlined by Dalton (2005, 89). A minimum value of 0 was assigned to no intention of engagement in any of the 5 protest actions. The low intensity score have been given to individuals having done or having an intention to sign a petition and nothing more. A medium intensity score is assigned to respondents which have been or intend to be actively involved up to, and including the levels of joining boycotts or lawful demonstrations. Finally, a

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\(^{22}\) This study is based on a sampling pool of 21 European countries. There are however two sub-state entities which are recorded separately in the EVS: Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Northern Ireland within the Great Britain. I assign a majority population for each of this sub-state entity as well.
high intensity score is allocated to those respondents which report joining and supporting unofficial strikes or occupying building and factories.

Table 4.1 The Dependent Variable: Political Protest. Original and the Recoded Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Code and Name in EVS</th>
<th>Original category</th>
<th>Protest, recoded value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E029-Ocupaying buildings or factories</td>
<td>Have done</td>
<td>High intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E028-Joining unofficial strikes</td>
<td>Have done</td>
<td>Might do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E027-Attending lawful demonstrations</td>
<td>Have done</td>
<td>Medium intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E026-Joyning in Boycotts</td>
<td>Have done</td>
<td>Might do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E025-Signing a petition</td>
<td>Have done</td>
<td>Low Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E025, E026, E027, E028, E029</td>
<td>Never done</td>
<td>No Protest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question asked: ‘I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.’

Source: EVS

4.4 Theoretical links, Indicators and Expectations

Values make us what we are. They are deeply embedded in our culture, in our community and silently dictate how we must act and govern ourselves. Usually, individuals prefer to associate with people sharing similar layers of values within community. Religion, ethnicity, political preferences, age, gender, wealth - any of these represent a distinct value based on which people make distinctions and behave in consequence. It creates solidarity and coagulates individuals together for various actions ranging from family reunions to mass mobilisation. In its extreme scenery, people’s beliefs might represent the rampage for violence by producing harm to other communities with different sets of values. In order to decode various
settings governing mass behaviour, one must systematically analyse and identify patterns of causality leading individual and group behaviour. Following this reason, I am kin to observe what values, attitudes and socio-demographic factors can influence different levels of intrapersonal protest across ethnic lines.

A succinct review of the relevant literature will let us identify a handful of appropriate indicators and formulate several hypotheses. The existing scholar work on political mobilisation preponderantly focuses on normative and civic principles of political action, mainly in modern liberal democracies (see for example Verba, Nie et al. 1978; Almond and Verba 1989 [1963]; Dalton 2002; Norris 2002; Deutsch and Welzel 2004). Protest mobilisation, which is also known as “unconventional” political activity, has been also recognize to efficiently influence political system and sometime, even bring political change (Browning, Marshall et al. 1984; Gurr 1989).

At the same time, both conventional and unconventional political actions, prompt individuals to consider the norms and values of the state and their role in the regime settings. This in turn increases or decreases the overall satisfaction with the society by exacerbating feelings of participation or exclusion in the collective actions leading to policy outcomes. Political participation is thus contributing to the formation of the highest standards of attitudes which Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]) refer to as “the civic culture”. Various political actions are widely explained by the democracy theory which emphasizes the legitimacy side of protest mobilisation (Ginsberg 1982; Olsen 1982). The civic strife is seen in such context as a general belief of controlling and reinforcing the legitimacy of demands in a democratic environment. The level of awareness of the civic culture further legitimizes political actions and makes possible the decrease in violent mobilisation.

Overall, in order to account for the differences among individuals, members of ethnic groups, I use seven clusters of explanatory and control indicators to test for causality in relation to each level of the dependent variable.

4.4.1 Being “At Risk” for Discrimination

In a study over the unconventional political mobilisation done with the World Values Survey data, Daniel Gillion (2006) has concluded that ethnic majorities are more likely to engage in unconventional political behaviour than minority groups. This pattern in mobilisation is explained by the fact that minority groups are usually less integrated in the hosting societies and lacks assimilation and acculturation policies. In turn, these limitations inhibit their desire for political
action. Therefore, much literature focuses exclusively on those ethnic groups which are thought to be “at risk” for discrimination (see for instance Gurr 1970; Gurr 1993a; Gurr 1993b; Lindström and Moore 1995; Gurr and Moore 1997; Gurr 2000; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Fox 2002).

The general belief is that disadvantaged minorities are more prone to mobilisation due to the perceived discriminatory treatment which gives them a widespread stereotypical status in the society. Moreover, it is argued that the benefits resulting from protest activities are better exploited by the disadvantaged and powerless minorities (Lipsky 1970, 1157; Piven and Cloward 1977). However, by benefiting more from protest activities do not automatically mean that discriminated minorities will mobilise higher on the protest scale. I plan to test this assumption by including a counterfactual split among minority-majority groups. Apart from majority populations, I am using two distinct ethnic minority clusters, one including ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination and another one which is not “at risk”.23 The first group of minorities is supposed to be better integrated and assimilated in the national realm. Their mobilisation pattern therefore is expected to be similar with that of the majority populations.

4.4.2 National Pride

One major interest of my study is to find a specific causal link between feelings of pride in the nation and ethnic mobilisation. Traditionally, the interrelation between patriotism and nationalism has been tackled by sociologists or political psychologists (Feshbach 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Bar-Tal 1993; Druckman 1994; Schatz, Staub et al. 1999). The main question raised in the scholar work was whether the positive feelings in one’s nation lead automatically to negative feelings toward the others. It can be a stringent problem, especially when the nation is split across several ethnic lines.

The literature has constantly underlined the positive causality between feelings of patriotism and nationalism behaviour (Feshbach 1991). Kosterman and Feshbach

23 The condition “at risk” is taken from the classification made by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project developed by Ted Gurr at the University of Maryland. In order to comply with the “at risk” condition, each groups should satisfy at least the following two criteria: The group “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society”, and the group “collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests” and represent at least 1% of the total country population. For more information see Gurr (1993a), or access the project website http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
(1989; 271) define national patriotism as the “degree of pride in one’s nation”. At the same time national attachment has proved to be a very efficient measure for predicting political interest and civic participation (Huddy and Khatib 2007, 63). Because members of ethnic groups are involved in political actions mainly when they are dissatisfied with the social and national realm, I expect national pride to be negatively correlated with higher levels of protest. My supposition is that both minority and majority groups correlate their feelings of national pride with a certain level of satisfaction of how national standards are constructed and implemented. Therefore, the desire to protest will signal gaps in their feelings of national pride. A reverse side of this statement is also applicable. The EVS is coding feelings of national pride through the following question: “How proud are you to be [Country Nationality]?”. The recoded information comprises the following scale – not proud, quite proud, and very proud.

4.4.3 Democratic versus Transitional Environment

Protest mobilisation is also analysed by taking into account the broad political structure of the country (Tarrow 1991). A consolidated democracy is known to grant extensive rights to individuals, including various options to engage in extensive protest actions. Usually, democracies rely on tolerance when tackling inter-ethnic issues which in turn contributes to the efficient management of conflicts (Almond & Verba 1989 [1963]). At the same time, scholars believe that too much protest may endanger the democratic structure of the state by challenging its consolidation (Brady and Kaplan 2002). However, when democratic values are weak, or in a process of formation, the conflicting demands of ethnic groups often exacerbate the limits of peaceful mobilisation. In this context, the literature widely acknowledge the violence in protest mobilisation for bringing down the communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Schöpflin 1990; Tarrow 1991; Karklins and Petersen 1993).

At the level of interpersonal values, scholars have foresee a decline in political participation, especially in the post-industrial democracies (Habermas 1973; Pharr and Putnam 2000). The reason for this certainty comes with the democracy theories which predict that the role of citizens, and ultimately their civic participation, will weaken in the representative democracies (Putnam and Goss 2002). There are other studies however, which correlate the high intensity protest activities with post-modernist values (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979, 524). These authors envisage that mass-demonstrations and violent protest will become more widespread as time passes, especially in Western democracies.
Since the effect of democracy on protest mobilisation is widely disputed in the literature, it invites us to carefully consider this dimension in our model. Whether democracy standards will affect the protest desire widely depends on the contextual events happening in the recent history of the region. Change in political regime could be easily linked with the political contention but further intensity in protest might be explained by the development of the transition path toward democracy. To control for this aspect, I have constructed a dummy variable which records those clusters of individuals which are mobilised in the transition democracies versus consolidated democracies. For the transition democracies the sample is divided between former Soviet Eastern European countries and former communist satellites in South Eastern Europe. The reason of this split stays in violent means of mobilisation adopted by many minority groups in Balkans during the last two decades.

### 4.4.4 Religious Denomination

During the recent decades there has been a stunning increase in the study of religion as a political variable. Europe as a region is seen in itself as accommodating the main Christian denominations while its periphery marks the border between Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Samuel Huntington (1996), in his seminal work on the future of conflict, has predicted that groups will be mobilised within and against civilisations. His book identified eight leading civilisations, and most of them have religion as their primordial root. Religious beliefs are thus believed to play an increased role in individual’s choice for mobilisation.

The majority of people are religious (Peterson 1992, 123) which makes piety a factor in many actions involving individual behaviour. Previous research has positively associate religion with many forms of conflict, although it underlined mainly the international and ethnic sides of conflict mobilisation (see for instance Henderson 1997; Fox 1998; Fox 2002; Fox 2003). In the field of political participation however, scholars have found that religion is negatively linked with any form of mobilisation except for the case when political actions are the direct result of religious beliefs (Djupe and Grant 2001, 309; Ayers and Hofstetter 2007, 2). In many societies, religion contributes to increase civic skills and indirectly to influence political participation (Peterson 1992; Brady, Verba et al. 1995). Apparently, this holds true for those embracing the main religious denomination and less for individuals which are in a minority in terms of religious practices. Since there is no uniform opinion over the involvement of religion in protest mobilisation, I include

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24 These are: Western Christianity, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African.
the religious belief as a control factor for unconventional political actions. My interest is to observe whether minorities with similar religious denomination as majority groups tend to have similar protesting patterns.

4.4.5 Political Extremism

The extreme political preferences are expected to directly affect the intensity of protest actions. Certain feelings involved at the level of ideological beliefs make protest participation more dynamic among individuals and groups alike. Scholar work has shown that political preferences involve active national feelings and intense political participation (Sidanius, Feshbach et al. 1997). Yet, this dimension can be sensitive to personal characteristics such as education (Finkel 1987). However, it was observed that political extremists are more likely to be further radicalized and increase their violence while moderates prefer to keep their moderation in political actions (Koopmans 1993, 645). Therefore, I assume that individuals adopting more radical views will attempt to protest at a higher intensity. The indicator on radical political beliefs is coded on a three level scale, with the highest value revealing more right-wing preferences, a moderate score in between, and the lowest number accounting for leftist beliefs.

4.4.6 The Hierarchy of Needs: Post-Materialist Index

One stringent aspect in research of political mobilisation across ethnic lines is whether the individual actions are driven by materialist or post-materialist reasons. Starting from the Maslow’s hierarchy of human goals, scholars believe that people place specific preferences around their mobilisation goals (Inglehart 1971). Thus, when individuals enter protest actions and are driven by economic scarcity, their mobilisation priority should gravitate around materialistic needs. When these necessities are satisfied, individuals might mobilise being motivated by Post-materialist values such as ethnic rights, law and order, discrimination practices etc.

I am interested to test whether ethnic minorities enter more in high intensity protest actions when are motivated by materialist or post-materialist reasons. In other words, do individuals, members of an ethnic minority group, protest higher when are prompted by Post-materialist reasons? Previous research has proved the role of Post-materialist values in the consolidation of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe (Inglehart and Siemienka 1990). The effects of Post-materialist values on protest mobilisation has been previously tested on the level of entering
active protest but not considering the intensity of protest mobilisation and
certainly not including the ethnic factor (see for instance Guerin, Petry et al. 2004).
In general, it was proved that individuals adhering to Post-materialist values are
more ready to be actively mobilised worldwide (Inglehart 1981; Inglehart 1990; Lee
1993). For testing the influence of Post-materialism on different levels of protest, I
employ the so called "Inglehart Post-materialist index" included in EVS. It contains
3 coded values measuring the indexed declaration toward materialist, mixed, and
post-materialist preferences.

4.4.7 Socio-Demographic Indicators

In addition of including the macro-level measures and indicators at the level of
beliefs and attitudes, the empirical model will contain several control factors which
have been proved to have an impact on protest mobilisation. The socio-
demographic variables such as gender, age, education and income are very likely
to be correlated with protest participation and the failure to include them in the
model will result in disturbing causal inferences. All these indicators are
mentioned in previous research to have an impact on political action (Baker,
Dalton et al. 1981; Finkel 1987; Guerin, Petry et al. 2004). Particularly, the
expectation is that education\(^{25}\) and income\(^{26}\) would have a positive impact on
protest activities. On opposite, gender and age\(^{27}\) is believed to negatively affect
individual mobilisation. Younger people prove to be more socially mobile with a
high interest in active protesting actions. Similarly, scholars has pointed that male
population is generally more involved in protest activities as compared to women
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Lewis 1997, 461).

4.5 Methodology

Considering the hierarchical nature of the unconventional political actions, the
most recommended method to model the protest scale is through the discrete
choice modelling technique, via ordinal probit. This measurement is able to seize
the variations in protest change at each level of the protest scale. In order to
manage the individual heterogeneity which might appear as result of using the
pooled data, it is also desirable to control for the individual fixed effects in the
model. Therefore, I will employ a procedure to "de-mean" the data as it was used

\(^{25}\) Highest Education obtained – three values: low, medium and high education.

\(^{26}\) EVS centralized income level - three values: low, medium and high income

\(^{27}\) The scale of age is coded in three values: young (≥29), adults (30 – 49), seniors (50+).
before by Yair Mundlack (1978). It controls for the individual fixed effects by applying the within-group means of the regressors. The overall formula of our model can be displayed as follows:

\[ P_{it} = \beta_1 k_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it} \quad (i=1, \ldots, N) \]

where \( P_{it} \) is the dependent variable that records the protest status of individuals by means of an ordinal scale coded as 0 (for no protest), 1 (for low-intensity protest), 2 (for medium-intensity protest), and 3 (for high-intensity protest); \( k_{it} \) stands for those socio-demographic variables related to protest at individual level \( i \); \( \alpha_i \) is an individual-specific component that controlled for the systematic fixed effects associated with the data; \( x_{it} \) relates to those indicators measuring values and beliefs associated with individuals \( i \); \( \epsilon_{it} \) is equal to individual specific errors that are presumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.

The model resulting from the equation 1 presents only the general causality between coefficients and the dependent variable. It does not show the impact on each individual protest intensity level. In order to capture the true effects applicable at each scale of protest, I will estimate the marginal effects of the model presented in equation 1, by using the “mfx2” command in STATA 10. In doing so, I will observe how every change in the independent indicators impact on each intensity level in protest. According to William Greene (Greene 2000, 876), the correct interpretation of any ordinal probit regression should be done in terms of marginal effects. I will comply with this recommendation and will present the results as marginal effects for each protest dimension, in a hierarchical scale.

The model employed in this study will perform with weighted data. The purpose is to correct the weight-derived bias in the standard errors by using the “pweight” option in STATA 10 software.

4.6 Descriptive Findings: The Intensity of Protest in Time

The purpose of this analysis is to understand the mechanism and the process of political action by studying both minority and majority groups comparatively. The dynamics of protest involve actions at different intensity levels – from symbolic
activities in terms of signing petitions to mass scale protest actions such as demonstrations and riots. This study acknowledges the fact that protest is a volatile phenomenon, meaning it can change its trends over time. Several decades ago, scholars have predicted that protest will become more widespread, especially in the developed societies (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Inglehart 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). At the same time, scholars suggest that protest should be analysed by taking into account the broader political conjuncture in the environment where it emerges (Tarrow 1989; Tarrow 1991). Indeed, protest does not occur in a vacuum and tends to have a gradual increase or decrease over time. It also varies consistently across nations and regions. This section presents the general trends in protest at the aggregate level. It aims to reveal the overall consistency of protest across ethnic status and intensity levels in time. The empirical section (4.7) goes further into the analysis and integrates the regional based interactions in connection to various forms of protest actions.

In general, protest dynamics are sensitive to stringent problems which involve ideologies, economic crises, political or ethnic grievances, each of them being sufficient to reach higher levels of mass mobilisation. These triggering factors occur on a periodic basis (see Duyvendak 1992; Giugni 1992; Koopmans 1993) but my concern is not the cyclic baseline of protest but rather the extent to which a certain proportion of people engage in different protest activities at any point in time. Noticeably, protest dynamics are difficult to be grasped empirically due to the absence of extensive panel data on social movements. The European Values Survey is not immune to this limitation although it provides an extensive view over the general trends in protest intensities of the analysed period. Therefore, data in this analysis was structured to reflect ethnic diversity in protest by applying a comparative setting.

Figure 4.1 and 4.2 graphically display the overall trends in protest among ethnic minority and majority groups in Europe. Specifically, Figure 4.1 presents ethnic minorities which are classified “at risk” and not “at risk” for discrimination and their protest tendencies over the analysed two extensive waves. From1994 to 2004 the overall trend in protest is an ascending one, especially among majority groups and minorities which are not “at risk” for discrimination.

There are however significant discrepancies when looking in which particular political actions, people have invested time to mobilise. In plain sight, individuals which are not members of “at risk” communities mobilise higher than their discriminated counterparts. They also expose a distinctive trend of engaging in protest by sharply increasing their participation in high intensity political actions over time.
Figure 4.1 Trends in Protest among Ethnic Minorities “At Risk” and “Not At Risk” for Discrimination: 1994 – 2004

Source: EVS

Figure 4.2 Trends in Protest among Ethnic Majority Groups: 1994 - 2004

Source: EVS
Similarly, minorities which are exposed to discrimination practices have a slight increase in high intensity protest from one analysed wave to another. At the same time, majority groups have significantly increased their participation in protest irrespective of the analysed intensity levels (see Figure 4.2). The presented trends merely confirm previous findings which conditioned the majority status with higher levels of protest mobilisation (Gillon 2006).

Figure 4.1 clearly shows that within ethnic minority sample, those which are not the subject for discriminatory policies mobilise at higher rates and, more importantly, at higher intensity. Minorities which are considered “at risk” for discrimination slightly lay behind but prove a significant increase in high intensity protest over the decade. One might conclude that unofficial strikes and brutal occupation of buildings are two of the favourite actions adopted by minority groups to signal their ethnic or political unhappiness. The majority of chronically discriminated minorities in the sample are located in Balkans, Caucasus and former Soviet countries from Eastern Europe. The hardship of the transition process cumulated with the timid steps in accommodating ethnic minority’s rights might prompt a full scale representation in protest behaviour. The significant increase in high intensity protest actions among this group may well indicate the actual protest against the lack of proper framework for conventional self-expression.

On the other side, most of the risk-free minorities are placed in Western Europe, where the well established democratic practices guarantee the right to protest as an inalienable act of self-expression. Moreover, there is a widespread opinion among multiculturalists that within European democracies the longstanding acculturation process made the border between assimilation and integration to disappear (Modood 2005). This means that a large proportion of ethnic minorities are very well integrated in the nation and eager to exercise their fundamental right of political mobilisation. In turn this leads to high tendencies for active and intense protest mobilisation.

Another reason for the rise in high intensity political actions among ethnic minorities is in line with explanations provided by scholars working in the classical tradition of ethnic mobilisation. One of the most powerful, yet basic resource available to individuals in action is violence (Gurr 1970). In the effort to influence certain policies, violent protest might be used to compensate for the limited numbers of those mobilised or for the inadequate support from the elites or ethnic community (DeNardo 1985, 200). Scholars also agree that the determination in using high intensity protest is mainly oriented toward changing policies and less for causing human harm (Koopmans 1993, 653). According to this rationale, the persistence of high intensity protest among minority groups must be linked with a
substantial desire for institutional change and less oriented toward inter-ethnic clashes.

At the same time, there can be identified some broad factors which favour high intensity protest activities over low levels participation actions. The hardship of the transition process, the increase in ethnic mobilisation among many ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe and Balkans, the financial crisis triggered in 1998, the radical reforms imposed in many West and East European states - any can be seen to influence the desire for high protest mobilisation during the analyzed time period.

In analysing data in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, one outcome seems to appear more unexpectedly: in the overall representation, low intensity political actions (symbolic protest – petitions) seem to have limited access in the general preferences of all protesting individuals. Although on a constant ascending trend, low intensity protest among “at risk” minorities in EVS seems to be in discordance with the similar analysed ethnopolitical action in Minority at Risk data (see Figure 3.2). The discrepancies in protest of the two datasets reflect the two different approaches in conceptualizing mobilisation in empirical data. In MAR, ethnopolitical protest was coded at the group level while in EVS it was registered as a form of intra-personal mobilising value. When considering protest as an individual-driven value, it tends to be more active and more intense. At the group level however, ethnic behaviour tend to be more pragmatically and strategically placed, which might push for moderation of many extreme feelings inside an ethnic community.

**4.7 Empirical Findings**

Given the sensitivity surrounding the mobilisation status of many ethnic groups, this study tries to observe whether various socio-political conditions provide individuals with different ethnic affiliation with sufficient motivation to protest alike at all intensity levels. There is a commonly accepted view that ethnic minorities are less powerful and more prone to be discriminated in many societies. Exactly for these reasons, it is believed that disadvantaged groups are more likely to engage in protest activities in a continuous effort to increase the bargaining pressure on state authorities for solving their specific demands (Lipsky 1970, 1157).

The status of discrimination is primarily linked with stereotypical treatment assorted with consistent practices of repression which leads to higher desire for
ethnopolitical unrest among many ethnic minority groups. Therefore, it is expected that minorities “at risk” will have higher probabilities to protest when compared with other ethnic groups in the country. Linked with our assumptions, the results presented in Table 4.2 reveal contrasting probabilities. Disadvantaged minorities are more likely to engage in low intensity protest by signing petitions and other similar symbolic actions of dissent. They are however less likely to go higher in protest, namely for boycotts, unlawful demonstrations or violent protest. This means that disadvantaged minorities have a selective target of engaging in political mobilisation. In Europe, this target is fulfilled via symbolic protest and less by powerful protesting actions.

Although surprisingly at a first sight, these patterns have an explanation implying the institutional level. In an extensive research over the societal patterns of discrimination, Tedd Gurr (2000) has found that since 1990, there is a significant decline in the state-led discrimination against ethnic minorities worldwide. In Europe, this tendency was followed by a drop in repression policies as well, mainly resulting from the increase in democratization efforts among many former communist Eastern European countries. The empirical evidence presented in Table 4.2 confirms that with the amelioration in discrimination status, a decrease in the preferences to engage in strong political activism has followed. Previous research has underlined that the strongest decline in discrimination and cultural restrictions has happened in the newly democratized countries in Eastern Europe (Gurr 2000, 276-277). This process encouraged also policies of pluralism and accommodation among ethnic minorities which decreases the occurrence of communal unrest.

On the other side, it confirms that non-disadvantaged, or more accommodated minorities, are more prone to engage in more intense forms of protest as we have seen in the descriptive trends presented in Figure 4.1. The explanation for this disparity is threefold. First, the status of discrimination is mainly associated with lower rates of assimilation which provides inconsistent political capital needed for strong protesting actions. Second, deprived individuals will insist on rejecting those sets of values which are adopted by the majority, usually dominant population. Thus, the refusal to engage in intense political actions can be seen as a denial to openly participate in the civic life of a country which is dominated by those perceived as discriminating. Finally, evidence shows that political activism can be institutionalized and highly monopolized by specific, usually the majority groups in many societies (Gillion 2006, 18). Therefore, the access to high level protest can be institutionally permissible only for certain members of the nation and less for others.
Table 4.2. Political Action: Protest Intensities. Ordinal Probit Regression with Applied Marginal Effects and Mundlak terms (Fixed Effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Intensity Protest</th>
<th>Minority Groups</th>
<th>Majority Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'At risk' for discrimination (ref. 'Not at risk')</td>
<td>0.0155*** 0.00533</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>0.0377*** 0.00499 -0.0454 0.00491</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>0.0221*** 0.00553 0.0232*** 0.00351</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>0.0140*** 0.00314 0.0164*** 0.00136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>-0.0109** 0.00427 0.0258* 0.00155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50+) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>0.0426 0.00415 0.0183*** 0.00157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0247 0.00371 -0.0648*** 0.00157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0116** 0.00571 -0.0174*** 0.00219</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0356 0.00367 0.0346 0.00146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0880** 0.00404 -0.0341** 0.00164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relative national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>0.0120*** 0.00372 0.00029 0.00211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>0.0135*** 0.00375 0.0733*** 0.00214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>-0.026 0.00795 0.0159*** 0.00316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>0.0122* 0.00623 0.0210*** 0.00294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>0.00712 0.00653 0.00349 0.00377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>0.0849** 0.00401 0.0133*** 0.0018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>0.0992** 0.00402 0.0633*** 0.0019</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed materialist &amp; post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>-0.0706** 0.00318 -0.0910*** 0.00137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>-0.0167** 0.00656 -0.0223*** 0.00277</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium Intensity Protest</th>
<th>Minority Groups</th>
<th>Majority Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'At risk' for discrimination (ref. 'Not at risk')</td>
<td>-0.0988*** 0.0301</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>-0.0522*** 0.0111 0.0914 0.00732</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>-0.0355** 0.0138 -0.0179*** 0.0516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>-0.0129*** 0.00342 -0.0431*** 0.0115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>0.0859*** 0.00324 -0.00751 0.0516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50+) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>-0.00422 0.00439 -0.0122*** 0.00204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0229 0.00351 0.0186*** 0.0671</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0635*** 0.00209 -0.0401** 0.00176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0305 0.00292 -0.0093 0.0399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0646** 0.00262 0.0630** 0.0292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relative national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>-0.0126*** 0.00452 -0.0777 0.00576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>-0.0181*** 0.0069 -0.0183*** 0.0007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>0.0238 0.0721 -0.0612*** 0.0203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minority Groups</th>
<th>Majority Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>-0.0198</td>
<td>0.0163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>-0.0633</td>
<td>0.0568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>-0.0672**</td>
<td>0.0294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>-0.0140*</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed materialist &amp; post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>0.0668**</td>
<td>0.0317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>0.0475*</td>
<td>0.0275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Intensity Protest</th>
<th>Minority Groups</th>
<th>Majority Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk’ for discrimination (ref. ‘Not at risk’)</td>
<td>-0.0854***</td>
<td>0.0282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>-0.241***</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies (ref. other communist)</td>
<td>-0.140***</td>
<td>0.0382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>-0.0795***</td>
<td>0.0166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>0.0609***</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50+) (ref. young 19-29)</td>
<td>-0.0244</td>
<td>0.0239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0630**</td>
<td>0.0297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0201</td>
<td>0.0204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0490**</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A relative national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>-0.0698***</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong national pride (ref. not proud)</td>
<td>-0.0815***</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>-0.0765*</td>
<td>0.0441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (ref. protestant)</td>
<td>-0.0403</td>
<td>0.0368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>-0.0476**</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing (ref. left-wing)</td>
<td>-0.0602**</td>
<td>0.0261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed materialist &amp; post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>0.0403**</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist beliefs (ref. materialist)</td>
<td>0.0888***</td>
<td>0.0326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in italics

In an empirical study involving a worldwide sample from the 1990s, Ronald Inglehart and Gabriela Cattenberg (2002) have found that new democracies experience a decline in direct political action as compared to the well-established democracies. Their explanation extends around the so called “post-honeymoon” period effect, a stage when the real transitional problems appear, resulting in weak political participation rates. The authors have further predicted that overall
political actions will see an upward trajectory due to the maturation of the intersocietal relations as in the case of the old democracies (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, 314). The empirical results show that both ethnic minorities and majority groups in either Eastern or Western democracies protest less at the medium and high intensities and more at low intensity. I might conclude that up to 2004, Eastern Europe is still in a “post-honeymoon” phase in terms of political activism.

At the same time, crisis of democracy theories have constantly predicted the decline of political activism in Western democracies (Habermas 1973; Putnam and Goss 2002). The data shows that this is indeed the case by revealing a significant disengagement in strong political activism among all individuals, both minority and majority. The explanation of this drift is given by Putnam and Goss (2002, 4), both of whom seize a considerable erosion of some social and cultural preconditions at the level of democratic institutions in many post-industrial societies. The underperformance of major governing institutions is thus believed to negatively affect people’s desire for strong political activism. In another context, Inglehart and Catterberg (2002, 302) believe that demonstrations, boycotts and similar forms of strong protest start being seen as less unconventional and more as normal actions by many citizens in Western Europe. Therefore, individuals do not see these actions in their initial purpose anymore and appeal less to them in the process of their active mobilisation.

In previous studies on protest mobilisation, gender has been a variable of an outmost importance in predicting the protest engagement. However, the causality of gender has changed during the last decades, mainly because of the increased emancipation of women in relation to man in society (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Yet, men are proved to still keep a dominant presence in political activism (Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001). When placed in the context of our empirical model, the observed causality tends to confirm more the latest statement by showing that men indeed are more prone to engage in high intensity protest actions, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation.

At the same time, men do not completely monopolize political activism. Women are seen to be more likely to participate in low intensity protest activities, such as petitions, agitations and symbolic actions. Both patterns appear to be universal, embracing minority and majority populations alike. In contrast to other findings before, these results reflect upon the idea that women got their niche in the unconventional political activism. Men are traditionally more dynamic when it comes to political mobilisation and it is realistic finding higher and intense rates of protest actions among them. At the same time, women also show a kin interested to be actively mobilised by adding an effective balance in the overall protest mobility.
Age, education and the level of wealth are also considered to be the classical predictors of protest mobilisation. Younger age is usually believed to better accommodate progressive ideas and contribute to the change of the old-fashioned paradigms. Moreover, in time, younger cohorts have been observed to be better educated both in terms of civic and political skills. In line with human capital theory, more educated individuals are better positioned to increase their earnings and increase their wealth status. Therefore, individuals with such characteristics will place higher weights on self-expression and will be better prepared to lift their levels of political mobilisation. At the same time, previous research has shown that younger, better educated and more income secured people are very likely to accept Post-materialist values which are known to lead toward high levels of unconventional political mobilisation (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979, 524).

The obtained results generally support these assumptions. In particular, majority populations follow this mobilisation pattern, with older cohorts engaging significantly less in strong protesting actions. Among minority groups, the causality is less significant and shows only a positive mobilisation pattern of the adult cohort at higher levels of protest. In the same way, highly educated and income secured people are protesting more and at a higher intensity than less educated and poorer individuals. Both minority and majority groups hold the same causality pattern, yet for ethnic minorities the results are less robust.

Weak and undefined causality among minority groups might be explained by considering the discrimination factor, applicable in the case of many ethnic communities in the sample. In general, there are reasons to believe that many members of minority groups are denied civic engagements at many levels. It is the case of Gypsies in Eastern Europe, Kurds in Turkey, Catholic Irish in the United Kingdom or Kosovo Albanians, just to give few examples. Given the status of discrimination, individuals may lack organisational skills and material means for higher levels of protest. The interference of the discriminatory factor might thus obfuscate a clear pattern of causality among the socio-demographic factors.

In order to develop extensive civic ties, there should be an intense sense of proundness with the nation from which all individuals are part of. This feeling is a relevant measure of patriotism but also denote the degree to which minority groups feel integrated and accommodated in the host nation. This study builds on the supposition that both ethnic minority and majority groups having strong feelings of national pride will be less tempted to be involved in violent political actions. Based on findings in Table 4.2, I tend to accept this assumption. The results show that strong national pride is negatively correlated with the most intense actions of protest but positively associated with the symbolic protesting actions.
This causality holds true for all ethnic groups employed in this analysis. Yet, there should be one clarification in interpreting this causality. Feelings of national attachment contain a certain degree of ambivalence when correlated with the ethnic status. An accepted belief is that national pride can be interpreted in several ways, depending on the respondent’s perception over its sense.

In the literature, the sense of national pride is disputed in its conceptual meaning. Among others, Feshbach (1994, 281) sees national attachment as feelings of patriotism which is pride of national identification among people in the same country. It underlines the positive feelings which any individual has over the homeland and denotes the comfort with the set of adopted values in a country (DeFigueiredo and Elkins 2003, 178). At the same time, national pride can be interpreted as nationalism, a notion which contains more feelings of national superiority and the desire to dominate over other ethinies (Feshbach 1994, 281; Hurwitz and Peffley 1999). In the context of this analysis, there should be a careful interpretation of the two containing meanings of national pride. Ethnic minorities may perceive national pride more as feelings of patriotism, which denotes their comfort of living in the host country rather than fully identification with the nation. Majority populations, on opposite, might develop a tendency toward nationalist feelings when identifying with national pride. Either of these two values being true, the results seem to lead toward the same causal path. Members of both minority and majority groups with strong feelings of national pride tend to engage less in high intensity protest. However, there is an exception to this causality: individuals with strong feelings of national pride prove to be more actively involved in low intensity protest. Given the moderate nature of symbolic protest, this particular pattern is seen more as a manifestation of people’s civic duties (Almond and Verba 1989 [1963]), rather than protest in its full sense.

This analysis also evaluates the role of religion as a motivator for protest mobilisation. Religious belonging poses a compelling pressure over the individual’s identity which further marks their mobilisation behaviour. At one point in time, each religious denomination or as a matter of fact, some religious ideologies have proved to be linked with discrimination, violence and intolerant attitudes (Fein 1990, 49; Rapoport 1991; Fox 2003, 56). Recently, this was the case with the interethnic clashes in Balkans and Caucasus, where religion played an overwhelming role in spreading violence.

Starting with the dissolution of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe, there has been a revival of religious practices in many ex-communist countries. The resurgence of religious beliefs created the proper base for the emergence of the new identities which in some cases overlapped with the existing national identities (Kunovich 2003, 4). The most common examples are Catholics in Northern Ireland
and Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo, three ethnic communities which assimilated religion in their ethnic status. Coincidently or not, these are also communities with a recent background of inter-ethnic violence. Based on these connections, I might suppose that religion is a facilitator for conflict and that it can be also a powerful mobilising factor among individuals. This statement is also extensively supported by Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory, where religion is assumed to play an increasing role in any form of conflict nowadays.

The results reveal that majority groups, with Orthodox and Muslim beliefs, negatively correlate their religious denomination with the engaged status in protest. Only at the level of symbolic protest there can be seen a positive significant correlation between the religious affiliation of individuals and their desire for the weakest form of political activism. Among ethnic minorities, only Muslim individuals show similar patterns in protest. One can conclude that belonging to any religion cannot be considered as an obstacle in consolidating the moderate protesting behaviour among European nations. The results also sustain Inglehart’s (2002, 224-225) findings that Islamic beliefs do not encourage strong mobilisation feelings and thus are not a barrier in the emergence of democratic institutions across Europe.

In the analysed samples, the results involving Catholic denomination do not hold significant results although there are compact regional densities of Catholics in many European countries. In a previous study performed with the European Values Survey, Havasi (2005, 98) have concluded that respondents with Catholic denomination do not place a great emphasis on politics, and political related activities in general. On the other hand, Protestant populations though less religious, are more interested and involved in political activism. These statements seem to fit in the observed causality of our model.

With negative causality linking protest and the main religious denominations in Europe, there hardly can be found an argument which can connect faith with political activism. In this respect, Huntington’s theory does not apply for unconventional protesting actions, as stated in this study. Given the substantial religious diversity in Europe, there is a consistent evidence to stipulate that religion as a motivator for protest mobilisation (also seen as clash between civilizations) is an empirical documented contradiction.

In general, the mobilised individuals have strong political preferences leading their mobilisation choice. Some segments of the society are receptive to radical political views which tend to be accentuated by social change (Eatwell 1998; Eatwell 2000), anti-minority/immigrant sentiments (Gibson, McAllister et al. 2002), competition for resources between minority-majority (Olzak 1992; Gibson, McAllister et al. 2002).
and resentments or demand for change (Betz 1993). Any of the reasons invoked for mobilisation, I assumed that radical activists will protest at a higher intensity. The results show that both minority and majority right-wing and politically-moderate individuals are less likely to be involved in high intensity protest. The discrepant causality found in the model considers the mobilising character of individuals with the extreme political views. Right-wing protesters, have higher chances to adopt a non-conformist behaviour and engage more in organized violence and less in peaceful demonstration actions. They are also more prone to be the target of repressions and be further radicalized in their anti-systemic actions (Koopmans 1993, 645). As a matter of fact, the protesting actions analysed here, might be too mild for the mobilisation preferences of the radical right-wing followers. At the same time, the leftists are more supportive of mass-oriented protest, an idea which seems to comply with the results of this analysis.

Further in this analysis I am considering a factor which goes to the human nature in explaining the desire and choice for mobilisation. Half a century ago, Abraham Maslow (1943) has developed a theory which conceptualizes the hierarchy of human needs. In its graphical display is known as the Maslow’s pyramid, and sets up some ground rules for how people’s basic instincts are functioning. The vital physiological/material needs are at the bottom of human pyramid and are set to be satisfied by individuals with an outmost priority. Once their basic, material layer of needs is settled, people choose to focus on higher, post-materialist and psychological necessities such as self-esteem, morality, problem-solving, patriotism, ethnicity etc.

With the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe a general shift in the intergenerational values started to be visible, from the Materialist to the Post-materialist values. In Western Europe, the change toward Post-materialist values happened earlier during the 19th and 20th centuries and similar trend is expected in Eastern Europe as well (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, 303). According to these authors, the implications in terms of political participation are predicted to be visible over the coming decade(s). In line with the hierarchy of human needs, the intrinsic value of Materialists is to satisfy their basic physiological needs which leave them less room to engage in intense civic actions at either individual or group levels. At the same time, Post-materialists are content with their physiological needs and can focus their efforts to more secluded needs, linked with their personal, group or ethnic beliefs.

When empirically correlated with different levels of political actions, Post-materialist values show positive and significant signs as protest intensity increases. When correlated across minority-majority level, Post-materialist values widely keeps the same causality and show intense rates of participation in high intensity
protest - demonstrations, boycotts, unofficial strikes, occupying buildings and factories. On the other side, all ethnic groups having pure Materialist values are more prone to engage in lower, more symbolic protest actions.

The results widely support the Post-materialist theory although it cannot fully explain the limited involvement of citizens with Post-materialist values in low intensity political actions. One explanation however might consider the substantial physical effort needed to engage in high intensity protest. Usually, individuals with Post-materialist background need more physical resources to engage in high intensity political movements As such, more involvement in strong protest means less consideration for formal, and often less dynamic, symbolic dissent.

4.8 Conclusions

This analysis was structured to provide an analytical framework necessary for understanding the protest behaviour along ethnic lines. It also attempted to address one of the key limitations in ethnic mobilisation studies, by considering protesting minority and majority samples in a comparative view. The presented models have proved that protest mobilisation is a highly volatile phenomenon, especially when treated in conjunction with different protest scales and taking into account minority-majority divisions. The power of novelty in our analysis lies in this particular conceptualizing framework.

By drawing the final line, this analysis provides sufficient evidence to redefine some of the existing opinions over protest mobilisation in the current literature. Results have shown that overall, both minority and majority groups protest more at higher intensity levels. While majority populations have a more plain-arranged slope in each of protest actions over time, minorities choose to sharply increase their efforts in time, for higher, more intense forms of protest. More specifically, minorities which are not disadvantaged in the host society tend to protest more extensively and higher in intensity. Depending from which angle the explanation is approached, results might favour the idea that integrated and assimilated minorities tend to be more active in terms of political mobilisation. Minorities, considered to be “at risk” for discrimination, mobilize less but tend to increase their mobilisation efforts over the analysed decade.

A more revealing picture appears when examining the empirical results showing the probabilities of protesting at different intensity levels for both “at risk” and “not at risk” minorities. Those minorities which are perceived as disadvantaged
are more prone to enter in low intensity protest but less probable of being
mobilised at higher, more extreme levels. Several explanations might be used to
shed the light over this causality, mainly involving a multiculturalist view which
grants accommodated minorities more civic spirit for political actions as compared
to less assimilated ethnic groups.

The direct causality at each level of the protest mobilisation scale has been further
tested through a discrete choice technique via an ordinal probit model. The
marginal effects have revealed that when comparing ethnic minority and majority
groups there are no significant differences in explaining the causal path across
different levels of protest. Yet, when comparing the effects of the employed
measurements across different levels of protest, we have found that low intensity
actions (symbolic protest-petitions) have different explanatory patterns as
compared to stronger means of protest. In other words, individuals choose one
rationale when engaging in symbolic political actions and a completely different
motivator when going for higher, more extreme protest.

In general, empirical results have pointed that indeed, ethnopolitical protest is
decreasing all over Europe. These results reconfirm the crises of democracy
theories which link the erosion of the democratic institutional settings with the low
desire for high levels of political activism in Western Europe (Habermas 1973;
Putnam and Goss 2002). Similarly, the decline in powerful protest mobilisation in
Eastern Europe is attributed to the so called “post-honeymoon” effect, where the
problematic face of transition keeps ethnic populations reluctant in their desire for
strong mobilisation (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002).

In line with previously done research, men proved to keep their mobilisation
dynamics more active (Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001). At the same time, results
show that women are more actively involved in the less intense niche of political
activism. In doing so, women add an effective gender balance to the overall protest
mobility in Europe. By considering other socio-demographic controls it was
revealed that younger age, better education and more wealth are significantly
linked with more desire to protest at higher levels. These characteristics are also
very much characterized by post-materialist and cosmopolitan values which are
known to be conductive toward intense ethnopolitical activism (Barnes, Kaase et
al. 1979).

In this study national pride has been approached as a relevant measure for the idea
of interethnic cohesion. In an environment prone to ethnic diversity and
ethnopolitical mobilisation, there always was a need for a gluing feeling which
could close the gap between ethnic status, resulting stereotypes and possible
mobilisation reasons. Feeling proud in the nation can be seen as the biggest
achievement of any ruling authority because it encompasses feelings of both patriotic and nationalistic nature. The utility of using this measurement was proved highly significant in the context of this analysis: both minority and majority groups with strong feelings of national pride are less likely to be involved in powerful protest. At the same time, those who are very proud of their nation, are keener to engage in more moderate, symbolic protest activities. Thus, national pride can be regarded as both a mediator for the intensity of protest at its peak levels but also as a motivator for political activism in its emerging, attentive phase. Given the conclusive patterns of causality shown across the entire scale of protest, this indicator merits future closer scrutiny in connection to various forms of political activism.

Another argument tested in this study was based on the assumption that intensity to which ethnopolitical mobilisation is manifesting is more likely to evolve across religious lines. Advanced by Samuel Huntington (1996), the “Clash of Civilizations” theory could not be sustained by our results. The main religious beliefs are found to be negatively correlated with strong political activism across the entire studied sample. The discharge of Huntington’s theory reiterates the obtained conclusions in the previous chapter of this thesis: across Europe, religion plays a minor role in the outburst of powerful protest mobilisation. Therefore, the increase in political activism cannot be empirical linked with specific cultural rifts.

If religion cannot be hold responsible for the increase in the strength of protest, the extremist political views do influence the extent to which protest is manifesting. Against our initial suppositions, both minority and majority right-wing but also politically moderate supporters are less likely to embrace strong protesting actions. According to Koopmans (1993), the right-wing ideology is characterized by anti-systemic actions which put more weight on violence rather than political activism. On the other hand, left-wing ideology encourages mass protest as a mean of achieving the desired outcomes, an idea which is in accordance with the results of this analysis.

The desire to become mobilised is widely influenced by the overall societal needs in which individuals resides. Nowadays, it is believed that an intergeneration shift is on the way to be completed in Europe: from a social order driven by pure Materialistic needs toward a more advanced Post-materialist society (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). This means that the rationale governing people’s choice for mobilisation is more likely to be influenced by the existing Post-material settings as well. This is widely confirmed by the obtained results: irrespective of the ethnic status, individuals relying on Post-materialist settings are more likely to engage in more intense protesting actions.
Those people identifying themselves with pure Materialist needs became mobilised up to the level of symbolic protest and not more. The underlying principle behind these choices stays in different physical resources available to those with a Materialist and Post-materialist background. At the base of material needs stays individuals’ desire to fulfil their vital needs and little effort is spent for engaging in time and resource consuming activities such as mass-protest. On the other hand, the Post-materialist status allows enough energy and resources to be spent by individuals in fulfilling those ideals for which the strong sense of political activism is motivated upon.

In general, it was revealed that each level of protest contains specific rationale triggering its active status and there is a consistent bias of studying protest actions as a compressed, linear event. This observation raises the awareness of the importance of applying the correct method in studying the direction of causality in the context of a hierarchical scale in any form of ethnic mobilisation. This study would also be more complete if analysed in a temporal context. Time-series or longitudinal data would give a more inclusive view over individuals’ choices to migrate across different levels of protest. This is an important and regretful limitation linked with the existing data. However, this analytical drawback might be overpassed in the future, mostly with the incoming new waves in EVS, WVS, and other related data sources.
5. Protesting Ethnic Minorities in Europe: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis
5.1 Introduction

This chapter employs a technique from the configurational comparative analysis to study which theoretically set conditions are necessary and sufficient to shape the consistency of ethnopolitical protest. The analyzed conditions are the following: democracy level, political discrimination, geographical concentration, ethnic fractionalization and the degree of national pride among members of the minority group. The core question is how these factors account for the status of necessity and sufficiency in relation with the strength of ethno-communal mobilization or on opposite, with its absence.

The utility of using the fuzzy sets approach stays in the nature of the analyzed outcome but also in the characteristics of the employed measurements. Ethnopolitical protest is believed to be a very diverse and volatile phenomenon, an aspect which the conventional quantitative analysis cannot fully grasp. Instead, the fuzzy-sets technique can integrate both quantitative and qualitative features by perfectly combining the assets of conventional interval variables and characteristics of set theoretic distinctions which are available to the researcher in the context of the conducted study.

The final result is a comprehensive understanding of protest mobilization from the view of necessity and sufficiency - two ground pillars of the fuzzy sets technique. So far, there is no recorded study employing fuzzy sets measurements on the desire to protest among European ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination. While completing this study, evidences will be depicted in a dimension which cross-borders the traditional existing studies in the field of ethnopolitical mobilization.

The structure of this chapter follows the following outline: The first section presents the theoretical framework of all conditions employed in this study and what expectations can be predicted in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Data characteristics, fuzzy-sets methodology and operationalization will be explored in the second place. Third, in line with the established hypothesis, the results will be presented for both sides of the outcome. Finally, the study will be summed up by a concluding discussion.
5.2 Conditions and Causal Statements

While defining ethnic mobilization, this study focuses on *ethnopolitical protest* as its outcome. Originating from Minority at Risk data (MAR), it records information on protest actions by ethnic groups directed against the majority or the dominant group(s) which might also represent the ruling authority in the state (see also section III of this chapter). The base of the ethnopolitical protest is to assert and protect the group’s interests (Gurr 1993b: 162). In doing so, the protesting actions may vary in range and intensity from verbal opposition and symbolic resistance to large scale demonstrations. Five conditions are also included in the analysis. They represent the linkage to the explanatory side of the fuzzy-sets model. The employed conditions are listed below as follows:

5.2.1 Political Discrimination

Any form of discrimination is logically linked with an increased desire for mobilization. The presence of *political discrimination* against an ethnic community leads to dissatisfaction and grievance formation which are likely to be transformed into a chain of mobilization events. Previous empirical studies have shown that ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when their political status is threatened by the ruling authority (Gurr 1993b; Gurr and Moore 1997). Ethnic groups, additionally, feel deprived and disadvantaged when their political representation is considerable lower than those of other groups in the country. In such cases they tend to blame the state for their status by regarding their deprivation as a constructivist act of political injustice (Horowitz 2000; Gurr 1970; Marshall and Gurr 2003).

The practice of continuous discrimination is thus rationally linked with a possible threat for strong mobilization. The assumed relationship is that severe political discrimination poses a sufficient, yet not a necessary condition for the emergence of strong protest. The cause of sufficiency can be conceptualized in the following manner – *if* there are consistent political discrimination practices *then* ethnic groups mobilize in strong ethnopolitical protest. However, discrimination cannot sustain the cause for necessity that is; strong ethnopolitical protest occurs *only if* there is political discrimination. There is a straightforward reason why this is the case. In general, there are different modes to discriminate, and political disadvantages might influence only a marginal proportion of minority groups to become highly mobilized. When politically discriminated, ethnic groups might decide to go for powerful protest, or alternatively, might prefer avoiding it and not risking
deepening further inequities. Commonly, apart from discrimination practices, there should be a cumulative set of conditions which added together might balance the group desire toward high level protest.

5.2.2 Geographical Concentration

When considering the ethnic security dilemma, Barry Posen (1993) stipulates that minority groups in ethnically homogenous regions are more advantaged to start ethnic strikes against opposing populations. The territorial configuration leading to the warfare events between Serbian, Croat and Muslim communities in Bosnia, practically underlines the security dilemma argument. In Europe however, one must be careful when addressing territorial politics, since according to Keating (2008, 60), the politics of territory widely differ between West and East, mostly because of the way national state has evolve in the last half of the 20th century.

Steven Grosby (1994) further emphasizes that “ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as territorial location. In such perspective, it is not surprising that geographical distribution of minority groups is seen as an important explanatory condition when observing ethnic mobilization. In a study based on Minorities at Risk data, Ted Gurr (1993b: 179-180) has found that geographical concentration had no relevant effect on protest mobilization. Monica Toft (1996; 2003) also, conducted an extensive research on how the geographical factor impact on the inerethnic violence. Her studies reveal the feasibility of this predictor—concentrated or “pocket” minorities are most likely to enter violent strike while the dispersed, especially urban minorities are the least predisposed to rebel. Also, most countries with more than two regionally-compact minorities are more likely to be exposed for ethnic contention. Further studies, also based on Minority at Risk data, validate Toft’s findings and reconfirm the argument that regional dominating minorities have higher tendencies for violent actions (Gurr 2000: 75; Fearon and Laitin 1999).

Even though the greatest number of empirical work focuses exclusively on the emergence of inter-ethnic violence, this analysis is considering territorial concentration as having an explanatory power for ethnopolitical protest as well. Geographically compressed minorities have better intergroup communication and stronger group identity. It is therefore easier for them to become mobilized in accommodating their ethnic demands (Gurr 2000; Gurr 1993b; Smith 1991; Saideman 2002). Thus, an ethnic compact territory may be seen as a sufficient condition for the emergence of strong ethnic contention. The existing literature constantly underlines the fact that if a minority is concentrated in a certain territory
then strong ethnopolitical protest occurs more often. This condition makes sense given that mass protest can be materialized only in the presence of a substantial number of ethnically mobilized protesters. Ethnically compact territories have the potential for that activating quantity which can be exploited with minimum of efforts by the mobilizing elites.

In general, compact concentrated minorities have better initializing factors to become intensely mobilized. Given that condition, one might expect that geographical factor should also be a necessary condition for the emergence of ethnopolitical protest. The logic of necessity involving the geographical concentration might be expressed as follows: strong ethnopolitical protest emerge if and only if there are territorial compact concentrated minorities. In other words, the status of necessity implies that strong ethnopolitical protest cannot take place without ethnic groups being geographically packed in distinct territorial locations. This statement is based on the idea that in any circumstances, dense territorial minorities will raise constant grievances to the ruling authorities. Even if the logic of necessity is making sense for the emergence of strong protest, it cannot be regarded as a general applicable rule. Given certain circumstances, dispersed or urban minorities might be highly mobilized as well – as it is the case for Catholics in Northern Ireland or Russians in the Baltic States.

5.2.3 Democracy Level

The literature constantly underlines the direct influence which democracy has on the intensity to which ethnic conflict is manifesting. The way democracy impact on conflict, however, is still widely disputed among scholars. Many argue that strong democracies are better in handling ethnic strife and consequently, are less likely to experience violent conflict. The argument is based on the fact that well-established democracies have the necessarily instruments to manage pluralism peacefully (Gurr 1993b; Guibernau 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). As it was stated before, democracies are better off in handling ethnic demands which in turn decreases violent conflict. At the same time, peaceful protest might replace violent contention and flourish in democratic environments. Others, think the opposite and argue that democracies provide the tools but also the potential incentives for political actions to manifest (Horowitz 2000; Snyder 1999). It might be a challenging process which can endanger the democratic system by producing more ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Pfaffenberger 1991; Kaufman 1996).

In the literature, the relationship between ethnic mobilization and democratization is more alleged rather than fully demonstrated. Because of this ambiguous status, it is better to reject from the start any assumption of necessity for this particular
condition. Strong ethnopolitical protest regularly occurs in democratic, democratizing, and authoritarian states worldwide. Thus, the logical link of necessity “Y only if X” cannot hold full coverage for the condition of democracy.

However, for the reasons described above, peaceful protest may arise more often in advanced democracies which make this condition sufficient for the emergence of strong protest. However, more contradictions of how ethnic strife might evolve can be expected in those countries which face democratic transitions or who still have a certain amount of authoritarian rule in their daily politics. If the ruling authority lacks democratic will, then it will probably use repression to annihilate peaceful contention. Thus, there are reasons to believe that the materialization of protest is less an option for individuals in weak democratic environments.

### 5.2.4 Ethnic Fractionalization

Ethnic diversity is seen in the literature as one of the main predictors for ethnic mobilization. Research suggests that ethnic diversity is the main generator of political instability and conflict (Horowitz 2000; Gurr 1970; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Boswell and Dixon 1990), yet this statement is negated by some scholar work (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75). One popular measure of ethnic diversity is country’s ethnic fractionalization score. It reflects the degree to which all ethnic units divide the national population of a particular state.

There are several reasons that explain the need for this explanatory indicator. First of all, ethnic fractionalization is associated with a negative effect on the economic growth, especially in the less democratic countries (Alesina, Devleeschauwer et al. 2003). This in turn generates instability which may lead to ethnic mobilization. Secondly, many scholars argued that plural societies are more exposed to the internal inter-ethnic conflict (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Horowitz 2000). This connection comes from a constant competition between groups, where each actor demands rights and privileges which can be seen as a struggle for resources and power. The conflicting actions further sustain ethnic divisions within the state and make inter-communal strife a probable phenomenon.

Following the logical deduction from the literature, the assumed link is that highly fractionalized communities are more prone for strong protesting actions. Given this statement, the condition of ethnic fractionalization can serve as a sufficient cause for the emergence of ethnopolitical protest. Ceteris paribus, if a society is highly fractionalized across ethnic lines then protest can reach substantive strength. At the same time, a highly fractionalized ethnic community is hardly ever the sole cause for powerful mobilization, which makes the assumption of necessity less
plausible in the context of this analysis. A consistent number of European countries
are very diverse in their ethnic composition which force them to constantly come
up with considerable efforts for accommodating the demands of ethnic diversity.
This in turn reduces interethnic frictions and moderates the active incentives for
strong protest.

5.2.5 National Pride

National pride defines those feelings which boost the desire for interethnic
cohesion. This value is especially important when studying ethnic mobilization in
a highly heterogeneous ethnic environment. Many scholars have asked the
question whether the positive feelings in one’s nation do exacerbate the negative
feelings toward the others. A wide array of sociologists and political psychologists
have proved the link between feelings of national pride and the resulting
nationalist behavior (see for instance Feshbach 1987; Kosterman and Feshbach
1989; Feshbach 1991; Bar-Tal 1993; Druckman 1994; Schatz, Staub et al. 1999). One
of the main targets of building a cohesive nation is to give its citizens, irrespective
of their ethnic belonging, a reason to be proud of their carrying nationality. This
was, and it is still, one of the major desires of many nation-states because it gives a
cohesive value which can be shared across ethnic lines.

Exactly for these reasons, the positive feelings of patriotism are expected to
decrease the willingness for ethnopolitical mobilization. The presence of high
senses of national pride among ethnically diverse individuals denotes strength and
confidence in the national project which in turn decreases the desire for strong
protest actions. In this sense, strong (or weak) national pride attitudes can be
considered to fulfill the condition of sufficiency for the presence (or absence) of
mass protest.

This study also relies on the idea that conditions underlying individuals’ behavior
can be regarded as dominant in relation to other classical conditions for protest
mobilization. This is because people’s feelings and beliefs are highly boosted by
sporadic appearing events which greatly influence the intensity of protest within
specific ethnic communities. For that reason, one might assume that national pride
can be placed in the analysis of necessity and linked with ethnic contention.
Minority groups adopt strong feelings of national belonging only if there is a
constant support for accommodating their posted needs. It also means that all
other factors boosting the desire for strong mobilization are either absent or
overshadowed by strong pride values.
Typically, high feelings of national pride and those conditions flaming interethnic tensions are generally mutually exclusive in the context of ethnic mobilization. Given this rationale, the assumption is that the presence (or absence) of strong pride feelings will necessarily result in intense (less intense) protesting events.

5.3 Data, Methodology and Operationalization

5.3.1 Source of Data

This study will use data from three sources: Minorities at Risk (MAR), the Quality of Government dataset (QoG) and the European Values Survey (EVS). These data sources are widely employed in the scholar work and thus, provide reliable indicators for our descriptive and empirical models. Their characteristics are summarized as follow:

Minorities at Risk data (MAR) is the most comprehensive set in the field which targets the most discriminated minority groups. MAR is computed by consulting various sources, including human rights reports, governmental and expert opinion, journalistic accounts, reports from the international organizations etc. A substantial effort is made to control the coding bias and to minimize the subjective bias resulting from using many qualitative sources\(^{28}\).

The sampled population in MAR is composed by those communal ethnis which are hurt by discriminatory treatment compared to other groups in the state. Group discrimination is regarded as the base for political mobilisation for the promotion of their communal interests. This data records the minority “at risk” status in contrast with the majority group(s). Only those ethnic minorities are included in the dataset which have an inferior collective status than the relative condition of others in the country.

There are a series of critiques based on the selection of minorities “at risk”. One limitation can be raised, that MAR dataset only includes groups that are discriminated - i.e. groups with a high tendency to be dissatisfied with their political status. Put another way, it excludes other politically active groups that are currently not to be considered at risk - e.g. for Switzerland, the only groups listed are Jurassians (Swiss citizens living in the Canton of Jura) and foreign workers. On the other hand, the Romansh speaking minority, or for that matter the entire Italian

\(^{28}\) For more information see [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar).
and French speaking populations (outside of Jura), who are also in the minority, are not listed. The same sampling problem arises in the case of Walloon and Flemish communities in Belgium, Galicians in Spain or Sami minority in Scandinavia.

An ethnopolitical group is considered “at risk” when it fulfills one of the following two criteria:

1. The group “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society” and/or
2. “Collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.”

Additionally, for each minority case which is included in the MAR data, two more operational guidelines are established. Endangered communal groups are counted only in those countries in which the population exceeds 500,000. Furthermore, the group itself should count at least 100,000 members or to represent at least 1% from the total country population. In order to minimize the danger of the subjective mobilization bias, some initial groups from the dataset are excluded. This study focuses only on those groups “at risk” which have a longstanding historical presence in a specific country location. Thus, the recent migrant ethnic groups are not listed in our sample even though they comply with the criteria “at risk” established by the MAR project. Examples of groups which were excluded from the analysis are: foreign workers in Switzerland, British Afro-Caribbean, British Asians, Muslims in France etc. The final result is a population of 29 disadvantaged ethnic minorities in 16 European countries (see Table 5.1).

The Quality of Government data (QoG) is the second empirical base for our analysis. It is a compilation of different types of smaller datasets and was build on the basis of expert coded indicators, aggregated individual level survey data, international organizations’ expert data or different demographic, social and political measures. In general, QoG aims at performing research on the causes, impact, quality, and the nature of political governance. The indicators provided for our analysis are coded at the country level and provide reliable information close

30 This is a database coded by researchers at the Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg University. For more information regarding this dataset see Jan Teorell, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein, “The Quality of Government Dataset”, University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, version 15 May 2008. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
to the cases under analysis. Finally, the timeframe of this analysis is set in such way as to capture the mobilization pattern experienced by European minorities after the termination of the cold war era. Our sampled time therefore, comprise the period between 1991 and 2003.

The European Values Survey (EVS) is a dataset which is composed from the individual level surveys gathered from all around Europe. The information provided by this large scale survey project comprises data on personal values and attitudes in a unique and innovative setting. This survey data will help us to focus our attention of the impact of personal beliefs on the outburst of ethnic mobilization. It comprise information gathered in two extensive waves, from 1993 to 2004

The EVS data will provide this analysis with the indicator measuring the degree of national pride for each individual in the sample. The analyzed data comes at the individual level and is further coded in specific ethnic clusters. The following available criteria were used in the process of group-coding: declared ethnicity (x051), language spoken at home (g016) and the region where the interview was conducted (x048). In line with MAR guidelines, there are 29 ethnic groups identified in EVS which match the sample of minorities at risk in Europe. All ethnic groups engaged in this analysis can be visualized in Table 5.1 below.

### 5.3.2 Method: The Fuzzy-Set Technique

This study will employ a relatively new empirical technique in comparative social science, namely the fuzzy set approach. Starting with the seminal work of Charles Ragin (1987; 2000) this approach was set to transcend the borders between the case and variable oriented research in a manner which is superior to the traditional Boolean technique. Conventionally, the variable oriented approach seeks to identify empirical connections between certain meaningful indicators and make relevant conclusions in social science. Alternatively, the case oriented approach regards each specific case as different in the analysis and thus it remain chained in the reality of that particular investigation. The fuzzy-set approach however, sees all cases in a parsimonious way, by identifying and analyzing clusters of cases while at the same time accounting for the richness and specificity of each analyzed study (Rihoux 2008; Ragin 1987). This is particularly the case of this analysis, where the existing empirical data is modeled in a way to reflect the theoretical and qualitative substance of each employed condition. By using the qualitative anchors on empirical baseline, one can choose to refine the context separating the relevant and irrelevant variation among cases under analysis.
The core of the fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965; Zadeh 1968) conceptualizes this technique as being both qualitatively and quantitatively oriented. The mix of the two empirical fields is better seen in the way the calibration perceptions of set membership are set in defining the fuzzy set logic (Ragin 2008:89). One of the powerful characteristics of fuzzy sets is that it addresses the partial membership score by applying a consistent mathematical system which allows an intermediary placement on the interval between 0 (fully out) and 1 (fully in).\footnote{This numerical scaling should not be linked to an ordinal scale. The membership score does not rank the analysed cases hierarchically across each other but assign a relative degree of membership in relation to the two extreme part of the interval: 1 (full inclusion) and 0 (full exclusion).}

The fuzzy sets approach is suitable for this analysis since it captures the complexity of ethnic mobilization in a prudent way. The conditions employed in our study exhibit diverse information which is well grounded in the dataset and to a large extent cannot be fully dichotomized for a ‘crisp set’ analysis. It is vital for our research to be as precise as possible. Thus, in line with the calibration guidelines given by (Ragin 2008, 91), the fuzzy membership scores are constructed by closely considering the original empirical information in the mentioned datasets.

As presented in Table 5.1, apart from the outcome, there are 5 explanatory conditions to be employed in testing the emergence of protest mobilization. The outcome variable, \textit{ethnic protest} mobilization is defined from the initial “Prot” indicator of the MAR dataset. For a complete visualization of the original protest hierarchy see Table C.1 in the Appendix section. The score range from 0 to 5, with higher score resulting in a more intense and large protest mobilization. The initial scores were taken as a mean value of protest activities undertaken by every group in the analyzed period (1991-2003).

Starting from an initial score of 0 (no protest) the fuzzy membership is assigned progressively as the mean value of protest is getting higher. The cross-over point was established at a value of 1.5 (an average of verbal opposition and symbolic resistance). The initial scores of protest which were positioned higher than 1.5 were assigned a fuzzy membership above 0.5 (more in than out) while the initial protest values scoring below 1.5 are considered with scores below 0.5 (more out than in). The reason behind using this breakpoint is straightforward. The average score of 1.5 in protest means that over years ethnic groups rarely overpass the border of symbolic protest which is considered to be the softer and the least intense version of ethnopolitical strife. When the mean value of protest is higher than 1.5 over time, it indicates a clear pattern toward more intense versions of protest. Generally,
an average protest score of 3 or higher (mobilization for demonstrations) is considered to be high enough for a fuzzy membership of 1.

The five conditions employed in this study are used closely interrelated with the theory and previously done scholar work. All conditions are shortly presented below.

*Political discrimination* originates from the “poldis” indicator in the MAR dataset. The contained information registers the discrimination practices which vary from no discrimination (0) to restrictive and social exclusion actions (4) (see Table C.2 in the Appendix).

The fuzzy sets scores are established in order to capture the range of political discrimination over years, assigned to each ethnic minority. The fuzzy sets are created by dividing the scores in several levels, where the highest value (1) reflects the severe policies of social exclusion while the lowest score shows the absence of the discrimination treatment. The reference point is set at a value of political neglect with remedial policies (cut off point = 1). The reason behind this choice stays in the characteristics of the recorded discrimination policies. Up to the value of 1, the “poldis” indicator registers those discrimination practices which have some remedial policies to correct for the gained status of inequity. Above that threshold, all discrimination practices are beyond any remedial balance and therefore, are considered to be more severe.

The geographical dimension reflects one of the main primordialist incentives leading to ethnic conflict. Regional concentration is thus suitable to be an explanatory condition for protest mobilisation. It originates from the “groupcon” variable in the MAR dataset and measures the extent to which an ethnic group forms a compact regional community or on opposite, has an urban or countrywide dispersion (see Table C.3 in the Appendix).

The fuzzy scores are divided in 4 groups, one for each initial value of the “groupcon” variable. Thus, widely dispersed minorities have a membership score of 0; mainly urban groups have a partial membership score of 0.33; those which are majority in one region and otherwise dispersed have a score of 0.66, while compact concentrated minorities have a full membership of 1.
Table 5.1. The Raw Values and the Fuzzy-set Partial Membership Scores of the Outcome and Conditions

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115
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<td>6.91</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.85</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note to Table 5.1: Protest: the higher the score, the more powerful are the protest activities. Political discrimination: The higher the score, the more discriminated status of an ethnic group. Geographical concentration: Higher scores denote more compact territorial concentration. Democracy level: The higher the score, the more advanced the democratic standards of the country are. Ethnic fractionalization: Higher scores show highly fractionalized societies. National Pride: higher scores denote stronger pride values.

Level of democracy on the other hand has a multi-value structure which measures the democratic performance and the annual democracy scores calculated in terms of civil liberties and political rights. This condition comes from the combined Freedom House/Imputed Polity measure\(^{32}\) which according to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), outperforms all rival indices of democracy in both reliability and validity. This index ranks the level of democracy on a scale from 0 (strong autocracies) to 10 (strong democracies). The established fuzzy scores are established in accordance to the official recommendation provided by the Freedom House and POLITY guidelines. The democracy measurement is designed as such that a score above 7 indicates a country with strong democratic structures while a score below 4 define an autocratic environment. These recommendations were taking into account in setting up the fuzzy set membership scores: a value of 9.5 qualifies the democracy condition as “fully in = 1”, a value of 7 is set to be the cross-over point, while a score of 2 or less in the set qualifies the cases as “fully out = 0”.

Observing for ethnic diversity in a country, this study uses Fearon’s (2003) index of ethnic fractionalization constructed from the CIA World Factbook combined with a measure of linguistic fractionalization. Employed from QoG data, it records the

\(^{32}\) For more information and technicalities related to the Freedom House/Imputed Polity data see [http://www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a state will belong to different ethnic groups (Fearon 2003, 208). The original data scores range within the interval of 0—perfectly homogenized society (full non-membership) and 1—highly fragmented communities (full membership). In our sample, the highest degree of ethnic fractionalization is for Serbia & Montenegro (0.80), which can be seen as reaching the maximum range as ethnically fractionalized society in Europe. Considering this particularity, the fuzzy set coding allows cases with an ethnic fractionalization value of 0.80 to be integrated as 1 (fully in). Consequently, the reference cutoff point was set at 0.50.

The condition measuring *national pride* was taken from the European Values Survey and accounts for one’s attachment with the hosting nation. The national pride values are coded for each ethnic group present in our sample based on the responses given by individuals with those declared ethnicities. The initial pride indicator had four values ranging from “not at all proud” = 0 to “very proud” =3 (see Table C.4 in the Appendix). The cutoff membership score is assigned to an initial pride value of 1.5, which is a cross-border score between the negative and positive pride feelings. An overall mean score of 2.5 is regarded by the fuzzy scale as (fully in = 1) while a value of 1 as (fully out = 0).

The calibration measures for all conditions employed in this study can be viewed in Table C.5 in the Appendix section.

### 5.4 Results for Strong Ethnopolitical Protest

#### 5.4.1 Necessary Conditions for Ethnopolitical Protest

Fuzzy sets techniques allow us to have a larger variation in the analyzed context of protest actions than a dichotomized approach would account for. Overall, this study employs five causal conditions which are expected to reveal the conjectural and multicausal facets of ethnopolitical protest. Viewed from the lenses of necessity and sufficiency, the engaged conditions will cluster in combinations of solutions proving relevance in understanding the complexity of the analyzed outcome.

In QCA analysis, there are two types of conditions which might be relevant for explaining ethnopolitical protest. These are the *necessary* and *sufficient* conditions and are analyzed by means of a “sub-set principle”. When the outcome is proving to be a subset of a condition (the score of the condition is higher than the outcome:
Yi ≤ Xi), than the respective condition is a necessary one in order for outcome to occur. Inversely, when the condition is the subset of the outcome (its score is lower than the outcome: Yi ≥ Xi), than the condition is regarded as sufficient in the fuzzy-sets equation. The necessity principle implies that every time when ethnopolitical protest occurs, it should involve the presence of a relevant condition while vice versa is not always the case since a condition can be necessary without being always sufficient (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000). The sufficiency means that when ethnic protest occur, there can be a multiple conjunctural causation (Rihoux 2008; Ragin 1987), or in other words, a combination of different conditions which are present. Each condition in the combination could be equally sufficient for the outcome to be present.

According to Ragin (2008: 108) however, there hardly can be found scenarios where strictly necessary or sufficient conditions are present. An extensive analysis usually implies many diverse cases with assorted connections where the necessity and sufficiency cannot match perfectly the standard ideal pattern. The fuzzy logic is set up to copy with these situations by invoking the ‘quasi-necessity’ and ‘quasi-sufficiency’ (Ragin 2000). The quasiness of both necessary and sufficient conditions is taking into account by applying a consistency threshold (Pennings 2003: 555). The consistency threshold is set in concordance with benchmark proportions and reflects the total sums of fuzzy membership scores which are consistent with the relevant condition being tested. In general, it can vary according to the needs of each particular study. However, the lower the established benchmark the larger inconsistencies and applied penalties to the analyzed combinations. In our analysis, a benchmark of ‘0.8’ is specified, meaning that a certain combination is sufficient in the presence of 80% of the tested cases. According to Ragin (2008; 108) this benchmark represents an acceptable threshold for the consistency of a fuzzy-sets model.

The fuzzy set analysis uses FS/QCA 2.0 software in modeling the status of necessity and sufficiency. When considering the necessary conditions, the established cut-off consistency point is set at 0.80, meaning that a specific condition is almost always necessary for the outcome to occur. All conditions that prove to pass the established consistency test will be always part of the logical combinations underlying the formula of sufficiency.

From the 5 conditions tested, a strong territorial concentration proved to be a necessary condition for high levels of protesting actions (see Figure 5.1). This means that compact territorial location is a necessary condition for ethnic minorities to engage in strong ethnic protest. However, being concentrated in an ethnically compact geographical area does not ensure that a protest event will certainly occur. This particular condition makes sense since regional concentrated
minorities are more efficiently organized by the elites and thus more prone to be mobilized in high protesting actions. At the same time, the territorial concentration is not obligatory sufficient since strong ethnic mobilization is a complex process built upon other complementary conditional factors and can occur among dispersed minorities as well.

Both the necessary and sufficient conditions can be visualized in scatter plot figures which show the alignment of cases along the value of the outcome. For necessity, an ideal plotted figure would fit all analyzed cases in the lower part of the diagonal. On the contrary, the perfect application of sufficiency would integrate all cases above the diagonal.

Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of cases alongside two dimensions. The Y axis plots the outcome, in this case - strong protesting actions. The X axis aligns geographical compactness as necessary condition. The right-lower diagonal part shows that territorial concentration is indeed a quasi-necessary condition for the high scores of ethnopolitical protest.

**Figure 5.1** Compact Geographical Concentration as a Necessary Condition for Strong Protest Actions (Consistency = 0.80, Coverage = 0.64)

Note: LAZ – Lezgins in Azerbaijan, RLT – Russians in Latvia, IUK – Catholics in Northern Ireland, UK, HRO – Hungarians in Romania, RBG – Rroma in Bulgaria

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There are however several cases where the outcome scores are higher than the values of the established necessity. Five ethnic groups are especially discordant with the established condition of necessity (Yizi): Lezgins in Azerbaijan, Russians in Latvia, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Hungarians in Romania and Rroma in Bulgaria. These cases combine an urban or dispersed location with higher levels of ethnoplastic protest. The values plotted in the lower-triangular part of the figure represent those ethnic minorities which have their territorial concentration status always ahead compared with their protesting intensity. This particular trend however shows that geographical compactness is a quasi-necessary although not a sufficient condition for strong protesting activities.

The outlier-cases combine a dispersed territorial status with high levels of protest. With the exception of Catholics in Northern Ireland (which are traditionally urban and long-term actively mobilized), all these minorities are coming from the former communist East European block. Taking into account the aftermath of the Cold War era, one can suspect that the transition environment served as a boosting factor for the dispersed minority groups to enter the active mobilization status. According to Donald Horowitz (2000), many ethnic groups try to explore the transitional chaos into their own advantage by engaging in political mobilization in order to achieve more collective rights. Thus, the identified necessary condition negates Ted Gurr’s (1993b: 179-180) findings and reconfirms Monica Toft’s (1996, 2003) arguments that geographical compactness produce more ethnic unrest. However, this conclusion is a relative one, since as it can be seen from Figure 5.1, there are always exceptions which can easily make this statement less absolute.

5.4.2 Truth Table and Sufficient Conditions

Boolean algebra is used at the core of our fuzzy sets model to report and reach solutions about particular sets of conditions leading toward protest mobilization. This method applies logical thinking to determine the sufficient conditions for the analyzed outcome. An important step in fuzzy set analysis is to build a truth table which compresses all logical combination which might be used to explain the outcome. After assigning the fuzzy membership scores for both conditions and outcome, the analysis further proceeds with the minimization of data by using the Quine algorithm of the FS/QCA 2.0 software.

It is very important to utilize a truth table as the starting point for the analysis of sufficiency. Truth tables offer guidance for exploring the status of limited diversity and also help to properly visualize different subsets of the logical remainders and use them to reach efficient simplifying assumptions. A truth table is an essential measure for reducing complexity while offering a simplifying picture of the overall
gradation in the set membership. More exactly, it takes advantage of the fuzzy-set coding while showing a codified structure in terms of 0 and 1.

However, when the initial fuzzy-set scores are transformed into a truth table by the fsQCA software, the original variation of the data remains hidden in the truth table to be used for further analysis. When proceeding toward the minimization procedure, it will be this original fuzzy membership scores which will complete the analysis and will compute the solutions based on which the status of sufficiency will be assessed.

As shown in Table 5.2, the number of rows stipulates the total combinations of the 5 conditions in which at least one case (ethnic group) has an outcome value. At the same time, each column of the truth table underlines the obtained minimized value of each condition. A value of 1 represents a fuzzy membership score of 0.5 and above while a value of 0 indicates a fuzzy score below 0.5. To be complete, each row also includes a column showing the number of cases (ethnic groups) which are part of the listed configurations.

**Table 5.2 Distribution of Cases across Causal Combinations and Set-Theoretic Consistency of Causal Combination as Subsets of Strong Ethnopolitical Protest.**

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<tr>
<th>Political Discrimination</th>
<th>Democracy Level</th>
<th>Ethnic Fraction</th>
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<th>Geographical Concentration</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Protest (outcome)</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
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The consistency column gives a crucial measure for the next step in analyzing the status of sufficiency. The measure of consistency means that the minimum fuzzy score of the 5 conditions in each of the tested combination should be consistently lower than the membership score of the outcome. In our model, the consistency
score below 0.80 means that there is a considerable amount of irregularity in the combination of conditions of that particular row which cannot sustain the full membership of the outcome. Only those configurations with a consistency score of 0.80 and above are considered sufficient for the occurrence of strong protesting actions (outcome = 1).

From the truth table one can observe that there is a considerable gap between the consistency of 0.80 and 0.92. Since the discrepancy between the two consistency scores is substantial, the decision is taken to run separate minimizations procedures for the two consistency points. In doing so, one can observe the difference in analyzing configurations that are consistent subsets (0.80) but also those combinations which are very consistent subsets (0.92). When conducting the analysis with the two consistency thresholds, there will be three combinations of conditions which will change their configurational ‘contradictory’ status from one consistency level to another. These combinations of conditions are underlined by the 6th, 7th, and 8th rows of Table 5.2. The total number of cases changing their status between the two consistency thresholds is 5. The analysis based on the two consistency scores will provide additional weight to the overall analysis by allowing to directly specify the difference between the two analyzed thresholds.

The outcome is explained while considering different causal mixture of the selected conditions. Some combinations may not have an empirical coverage in the data (neither 0 nor 1) and thus are recorded as logical remainders. The final simplifying solution could take these logical remainders into account only if strongly theoretically justified. Therefore an advance caution is required when using combinations of conditions which are not empirically covered (Ragin 2000: 139).

5.4.3 The Truth Table Minimization at a Consistency Score of 0.80

There are several sets of causal conditions which may lead to high levels of ethnopolitical protest. The initial fuzzy membership is assigned by taking into account the minimum score in the selected combination of sets. Apart from the quasi-necessary condition of strong geographical concentration, there are several combinations of conditions which are highly sufficient for the occurrence of strong ethnic contention. First, the most parsimonious solution is considered for analysis. It is obtained as result of the truth table minimization at a consistency score of 0.80. The parsimonious solution allows the incorporation of logical remainders although, without evaluating their plausibility into the equation (Ragin 2008: 114).
Two combinations of conditions are obtained as part of the parsimonious solution. The two formulas are as follows:

**Formula 1**

**national pride**

(Consistency - 0.89, Coverage - 0.64)

Cases with strong membership (CRU, RLT, KAY, BS, AM, RUU, HY)

**Formula 2**

+ **DEMOCRACY * ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION**

(Consistency - 0.92, Coverage - 0.52)

Cases with strong membership (RLT, AM, SM, RM, REE, BS, CS)

The good practice in describing the solutions resulting from fuzzy-sets analysis is to evaluate the consistency and the coverage scores of the resulting formulas. The two parameters assess the fit of the obtained solutions which comprise those combinations of conditions which are consistent enough to be regarded as sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome. The consistency score of the first parsimonious solution is 0.89 which denotes a significant yet not a perfect match with the observed cases. The second formula shows an improved consistency score of 0.92. Since perfectly consistent set relations are hardly ever the case in a medium N sample (Ragin 2006: 292), it is reasonable to assume that this score represent a solid base for analysis.

Accordingly, the fit between the solution and the observations is shown by coverage. Charles Ragin (2003) define coverage as the extent to which the causal formula is empirically represented by a consistent amount of sums of fuzzy membership scores. In our case, the first parsimonious solution has a coverage score of 0.64 while the second formula has a coverage value of 0.52. A coverage value of 0.64 indicates that almost two-thirds of the membership scores in the outcome have been accounted for, by the first formula. Accordingly, the second solution covers only half of the sum of the membership scores. The coverage scores suggest that the causal solutions have a substantial yet still a limited inclusion of cases in the outcome membership.

Generally, these can be considered as acceptable scores in the coverage scheme. According to Ragin (2006: 292) when the result of the minimization process shows

---

33 Please note that in accordance with the Boolean techniques, uppercase characters indicates a positive value while the lowercase characters represents a negative sense of the tested conditions. In the same context ‘*’ indicates the meaning of ‘and’ while ‘+’ stands for logical condition ‘or’.
several combinations of conditions for the same outcome, the coverage for each causal combination may be small. Moreover, usually the degrees of consistency and coverage work against each other, where high consistency score may result in low coverage values (Ragin 2006: 299).

The first parsimonious solution shows that the absence of strong pride can alone be sufficient for causing strong protesting actions. Alternatively, the second formula indicates that a highly fractionalized society and advanced democracies seem to sufficiently influence the emergence of high level protest. The parsimonious solutions however, can be considered as incomplete since they exclude the explanatory power contained by logical remainders.

Thus, the relevant sufficient conditions are further reanalyzed by considering those logical remainders which are consistent with our substantive case selection knowledge. According to Ragin (2008: 119) this so called intermediate solution is preferred in an extensive fuzzy sets analysis to both complex and parsimonious solutions.

By using the ‘intermediate solution’, one major benefit is that it allows and justifies the incorporation of necessary conditions. The reason is that any logical condition which makes sense in the context of necessity can be incorporated for explaining the outcome. By considering only those remainders which are most plausible in relation to the established hypotheses, a more logical combination of conditions is obtained. In general, the intermediate formula is usually considered as having the most comprehensive explanatory power for the fuzzy set logic. The obtained intermediate solutions are presented as follows:

**Formula 3**

ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION * GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION * DEMOCRACY  
(Consistency 0.92, Coverage 0.46)  
Cases with strong membership (AM, SM, RM, REE, BS, CS)

**Formula 4**

DEMOCRACY * national pride * ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION  
(Consistency 0.97, Coverage 0.42)  
Cases with strong membership (KAY, RLT, AM, BS)

Both combinations of solutions have a substantial high consistency scores (0.92 and 0.97 respectively) with a general coverage propensity score of 0.46 and 0.42 respectively. Thus, the causal path of each term seems to have a fairly equal
amount of explanatory weight. There are also a number of shown cases which perfectly match with the membership sets represented by each formula. They are also numerically represented in the truth table in the column showing the number of cases consistent with the combination of conditions leading to an outcome of 1.

The two underlined intermediate solutions can be factored to form a more logical intermediate expression:

**Formula 5**

\[
\text{DEMOCRACY} \ast \text{ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION} \ast \\
\text{(national pride + GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION)}
\]

The scores showing weak ‘national pride values’ and ‘compact geographical location’ have a value added to the logical ‘or’ arrangement. Fuzzy sets analysis underlines the idea that (1) a highly fractionalized society and (2) an advanced democratic environment may lead to high levels of protest in combination with (3) either a compact geographical location or the negative patriotism feelings among members of an ethnic minority.

**Figure 5.2** Sufficient Conditions for Ethnopolitical Protest (Formula 5)

![Sufficient Conditions for Ethnopolitical Protest](image)

Note: RM – Rroma in Macedonia
Figure 5.2 further shows the plot of the combination of conditions which are sufficient for the emergence of strong ethnopolitical protest. The upper diagonal part accommodates those cases for which the combined conditions are sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome. There is one exception - Roma in Macedonia, which occupies a distant outlier position outside the sufficiency area. Its pooled values of sufficiency are higher than the outcome score and thus this case is not covered by the presented solution. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has undertaken major reforms during the 1990s which were intended to accommodate the ethnic diversity in the country. It included extensive political rights and governmental representation for all ethnic minorities, including Roma. These factual conditions at the political level correlated with the traditional weak desire for mobilization at the group level, makes this minority to overpass all conditions for sufficiency employed in this study.

5.4.4 The Truth Table Minimization at a Consistency Score of 0.92

From the plot of sufficiency presented in Figure 5.2, there is a clear pattern which shows that the obtained formula is highly relevant for assessing the emergence of strong ethnopolitical protest. However, an inspection of the consistency values presented in Table 5.2 shows that there is a significant gap between the reported consistency threshold of 0.80 and a possible cutoff point over 0.90. Usually, when considering the consistency thresholds one should take into account several influencing factors such as the total number of cases and the nature and quality of the evidence present in the sample (Ragin 2008, 118).

When the analyzed N is relatively large, as it is in our case, then a good practice is to establish a higher frequency threshold which will allow distinguishing among configurations that are very consistent subsets. Giving the nature of our data and the way consistency scores appear in the truth table, the choice of a higher consistency threshold, closer to 1.0, seems very appropriate. The following analysis will use a cutoff point for consistency established at 0.92 (see Table 5.2).

In the process of truth table minimization, if the consistency of the combination as a subset of the outcome is equal or above 0.92, it is coded as fully in (protest=1, the top 6 rows of Table 5.2), otherwise it is considered as contradictory (protest=0, the last 10 rows of Table 5.2).

The truth table is first minimized by allowing the inclusion of all logical remainders without testing for their plausibility. The obtained parsimonious
solution is identical with the one found in the previous analysis. For the sake of simplicity it is better to ignore the resulting parsimonious solution and focus exclusively on the obtained intermediate solutions. The intermediate formulas are computed by using the theoretical and substantive assumptions based on which the incorporation of the logical remainders is taking place. The following two intermediate solutions can be distinguished:

**Formula 6**

\[
\text{GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION} \times \text{national pride} \times \text{ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION}
\]

(Consistency - 0.95, Coverage - 0.44)

Cases with strong membership (KAY, HY, AM, BS)

**Formula 7**

\[
\text{DEMOCRACY} \times \text{national pride} \times \text{ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION}
\]

(Consistency - 0.97, Coverage - 0.42)

Cases with strong membership (RLT, AM, BS)

Given the nature and the size of our sample, each intermediate formula presented has a high consistency score and a reasonable coverage value. The two solutions can be factored to obtain a more inclusive formula, which is:

**Formula 8**

\[
\text{national pride} \times \text{ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION} \times (\text{DEMOCRACY} + \text{GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION})
\]

The minimization at high consistency scores usually produces more narrowly circumscribed solutions which supposedly, must result in a better fit of all cases in the sufficiency plot. The cutoff value of 0.92 for the fuzzy sets theoretic consistency, on which Formula 8 is based, provides the similar framework of conditions for the status of sufficiency as did Formula 5 in the previous minimization procedure. The only difference is the combination delimiting the fuzzy “and” from the fuzzy “or” when placing conditions in the sufficiency formula assessing the emergence of strong ethnopolitical protest. The factored intermediate solution stipulates that strong protest can emerge in the presence of the following combination of conditions: (1) weaker standards of national pride, (2) a highly ethnically fractionized society, and (3) either the group is mobilized in an established democracy or it is concentrated in a compact territorial location. The presented formula for sufficiency can be visualized in the Figure 5.3 below.
**Figure 5.3** Sufficient Conditions for Strong Ethnopolitical Protest (Formula 8)

![Figure 5.3 Sufficient Conditions for Strong Ethnopolitical Protest (Formula 8)](image)

Note: PBE – Poles in Belarus

The plotted intermediate formula shows an almost perfect fit for the sufficiency status ($Y_i \geq X_i$). From the picture there can be seen that a convincing majority of cases have a good inclusion in the upper triangular area of sufficiency. Only one case seems to make a trivial distinction from the line delimiting the sufficiency spot.

After summing up the two minimization procedures, four of the five employed conditions seem to be relevant for assessing the emergence of strong protesting actions. At the same time, none of individual conditions have a satisfactory explanatory power over the outcome. The result of this analysis can be seen as having a quasi clarifying power since it involves a causality pattern implied by four of the five explanatory conditions. However, in the context of our study, the obtained findings do confirm the expectations rose in the posted assumptions. Ethnic diversity has a strong causal link with the occurrence of strong protest which confirms the earlier findings from Horowitz (2000) and Gurr (1970) but are contrary with some other scholar studies (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The positive effects of ethnic fractionalization are amplified by an advanced democratic environment which is influential but not fully decisive for ethnopolitical strife. In this respect, the role played by stronger democracies in the
emergence of protest is sustained by Horowitz (2000) and Snyder (1999) while negated by scholars like Gurr (1993b) and Guibernau (1999). Apart from being a necessary condition, the geographical concentration has also proved to be a sufficient condition which in many cases leads to group mobilization. It thus reconfirms previous findings from Toft (1996, 2003) and Gurr (2000).

Finally, the low levels of patriotism hold an expected causality leading to high protest. The fuzzy sets analysis has proved that conditions at the level of individual beliefs can be sustainable and influential when analyzing the status of ethnic mobilization. This analysis shows that under specific circumstances, nations which fail in providing their citizens with a reason to be proud in their nationality may face higher levels of ethnic unrest.

Political discrimination was also expected to influence the active mobilization and yet, it is missing from the final solution. Discrimination is usually regarded as one of the main factors involving ethnic unrest. Giving its powerful base for mobilization, it is usually the case that discriminated minorities are inclined to go for violent rebellion and not less. This causality is suggested by Gurr (1993b) and Gurr and Moore (1997). Therefore, political discrimination can be of a more support in explaining violent mobilization and less useful when analyzing the active forms of peaceful protest.

5.5 Results for the Absence of Strong Ethnopolitical Protest

In a fuzzy sets analysis, a causal condition, or a set of causal condition may have different membership scores calculated for both the outcome and the negation of the outcome. This is why it is highly recommended to conduct the fuzzy sets analysis for the negation of protest separately from the other side of the outcome (Ragin 2008: 115). This specific characteristic of the fuzzy sets analysis is able to evaluate the causal asymmetry between the two faces of the outcome.

The analysis starts with the test of necessity for all conditions in relation with the absence of strong protesting actions. Since strictly necessary conditions are very rare in reality (Ragin 2000), a benchmark of 0.80 consistency rate is used to assign for the status of necessity. From the five conditions tested, the positive values of national pride and the absence of political discrimination proved to comply with the established consistency threshold.
A standardized scatter plot is employed to graphically examine the distribution of the 29 cases along the values of the necessary conditions and the outcome. With a consistency score of 0.92 and a coverage rate of 0.72, the strong values of national pride proves to be almost always necessary for the occurrence of no protesting actions (Figure 5.4). Similarly, the condition summarizing the absence of discrimination has a fair consistency score of 0.84 and coverage of 0.60. Logically, both conditions should be also part of the theoretical set summarizing further the patterns of sufficiency.

**Figure 5.4 Strong National Pride as a Necessary Condition for the Absence of Strong Ethnopolitical Protest (Consistency = 0.92, Coverage = 0.72)**

![Scatter plot showing the relationship between strong national pride and the absence of strong ethnopolitical protest.](image)

Note: RUU – Russians in Ukraine, RBE – Russians in Belarus

Strong national pride attitudes show a consistent match with the absence of strong ethnic mobilization. It is a condition measuring the interethnic harmony within society which proves to provide low incentives for ethnic strife. Also, it can represent those ethnic groups which have higher degrees of integration or assimilation in the host societies as stated by multiculturalists such as Tariq Modood (2005).

In the same way, a low degree of political discrimination seems to be a plausible condition for necessity because it limits the pressure of ethnic diversity which in turn weakens the conflicting demands of minority groups. However, the absence of discrimination does not automatically mean sufficiency for the frail protest because there can be easily imagined scenarios when stronger protesting events
may occur in the absence of discriminatory policies (see the distribution of outlier cases in Figure 5.5).

**Figure 5.5** No or Limited Political Discrimination as a Necessary Condition for the Absence of Strong Ethnopolitical Protest (Consistency = 0.84, Coverage = 0.60)

![Graph](image.png)

Note: RM – Roma in Macedonia, RBG – Roma in Bulgaria, GA – Greeks in Albania

It is however surprising that limited political discrimination fulfils the status of necessity for the absence of strong protest at the same time when strong political discrimination did not have any impact on the positive side of the outcome. This means that the absence of strong political discrimination have a more sizable impact on moderating ethnopolitical unrest than vice versa. Actually, the practice of discrimination only exacerbates the power of some latent conditions which pushes minority groups at the edge for mobilization. This statement is also supported by the condition of being “at risk” for discrimination which labels the status of all ethnic groups in the analyzed sample. It means that always, when a circumstance exacerbating the status of discrimination appears (e.g. political discrimination), the condition “at risk” becomes active and probably triggers some other factors which become visible in the mobilizing equation. Therefore, there will be constantly a clusters of factors which will results from the practice of discrimination which added together will influence the desire for protest. At the same time, no discrimination means few triggering motives for protest as it annihilates the counter effects resulting from the discrimination itself.
When having two conditions meeting the established criteria for necessity, both of them should be found later on in the final solution for sufficiency. More specifically, both necessary conditions should be connected in the sufficiency formula via the logical operator “and” (Goertz & Starr 2003, 6).

From the Figure 5.5, there can be observed that some cases have the membership value in the outcome higher than the score of necessity. In these particular instances, the rule of necessity is biased since the official employed formula (Yi≤Xi) cannot be empirically covered. These cases are presented in the upper triangular corner, and reveal limited protesting actions in the presence of political discrimination. It is worth observing that the status of necessity is particularly not respected by ethnic minorities in Balkans. Two of these cases are represented by Rroma in FYROM and Bulgaria – minorities which are traditionally discriminated and softly mobilized.

The identification of the necessary conditions prompts us to consider a handful of other factors which can explain the outcome from the perspective of sufficiency. The analysis presented below uses the same five causal conditions which have been employed in the model for active ethnopolitical protest. A first step toward the analysis of sufficiency is done by creating a truth table which reflects the distribution of cases across the causal combinations (see Table 5.3). Table 5.3 shows all possible causal combinations in relation to the outcome, covered by at least one empirical case. The causal combinations with no case-coverage (logical remainders) are not presented in Table 5.3 but are employed and further analyzed as possible counterfactual cases while producing the causal solutions for the status of sufficiency.

The column showing the degree of consistency is essential for conducting the minimization process and deriving the causal solutions. The degree of consistency presented alongside each row is the numerical display of the following statement: “membership in the combination of conditions in this row is a subset of membership in the outcome (the absence of strong protesting actions)” (Ragin 2008: 112). A cutoff consistency point of 0.92 is applied, meaning that those combinations of conditions having a consistency score above the threshold (the first 4 rows) can be considered as consistent subsets of membership in the outcome (the absence of strong protest = true) while the remaining causal combinations (the last 12 rows) indicates that those configurations are contradictory, mainly split between the outcome and its negation (the absence of strong protest = false).

The choice of a consistency threshold above 0.90 is motivated by the existing rigors of consistency levels within the fuzzy-set methodology. The literature (see Rihoux and Ragin 2008, Rihoux 2008, Ragin 2000) widely acknowledges the need of a high
consistency threshold for the purpose of more accurate results when it comes to the final combination of conditions. The utility of establishing high consistency thresholds were discussed but also revealed by the obtained results in section 5.4.4 and Figure 5.3 above.

Table 5.3 Distribution of Cases across Causal Combinations and Set-Theoretic Consistency of Causal Combination as Subsets for the Absence of Strong Protest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionaliz.</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
<th>Geographical Concentration</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Protest (outcome)</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, the obtained table is minimized to allow for the incorporation of logical remainders without testing for their plausibility in the obtained causal combination. This minimization leads to a delicate solution with little relevance for the interpretation of the obtained configurations. Since the incorporated logical remainders are not fully sustainable from the theoretical and empirical point of view, the parsimonious solution is considered to be “too parsimonious” (Ragin 2008: 117). Consequently, the target is to obtain a more consistent set of causal combinations, represented by the intermediate solution. In the process of deriving the intermediate solution, the model allows for the inclusion of only those logical remainders which are more plausible in the context of this analysis. One should keep in mind that instances of the outcome might be present in rows with low consistency as well. Therefore, by treating these cases as contradictory configurations and including them into the intermediate solution, we obtain a
more solid and complete set of formulas leading to the status of sufficiency for the outcome. For that reason, the interpretation of results should always consider those combinations resulting from the intermediate solution. The resulting formulas show that both parsimonious and intermediate solutions are represented by the same configuration of conditions, as follows:

Formula 9

\[
\text{NATIONAL PRIDE} \times \text{political discrimination} \times \text{democracy}
\]

(Consistency - 0.87, Coverage – 0.55)

Cases with strong membership (LAZ, MBH, RAZ, SBH, PBE, CBH, RGG, RBE, SMD)

The set theoretical consistency of this solution is 0.87 with a coverage score of 0.55. The degree of consistency reveals the accuracy of the solution while the coverage denotes the degree to which a particular combination of conditions accounts for the absence of strong protesting actions. The consistency score can be considered as relatively high, with the solution covering more than half of the total number of cases. The formula indicates a straightforward path toward the absence of strong protest, where both the necessary conditions are present: strong national pride feelings, the absence of political discrimination, and weak democratic standards.

The resulting formula reveals the conjunctural structure of our model. For the absence of strong protesting actions, ethnic groups must experience strong pride feelings with no political discrimination and additionally, living in an emerging democracy. As it was mentioned above in the description of the necessity, strong national pride and the absence of any form of discrimination practices are logically linked with low levels of group mobilization. This supposition is very much supported by the analysis of sufficiency as well.

An important aspect which this analysis underlines is that any of the tested conditions lead to the described outcome only in conjunction with each others. The influence of democracy values on ethnic mobilization is widely disputed in the literature. Depending on specific circumstances, weak democracies may inhibit the desire for powerful ethnic mobilization (see for instance Horowitz 2000; Snyder 1999). This reality is especially stringent in authoritarian regimes where any form of group mobilization is hard to be achieved. Considering our data, the described path of sufficiency is mainly represented by ethnic groups living in Central and Eastern European countries. The status of emerging democracies provides weak legal frameworks for many ethnic groups for being actively mobilized. Alternatively, in the aftermath of regimes transitions, many ethnic minorities
become violently mobilized which consequently reduce their score in peaceful protest.

The presented formula is graphically plotted in Figure 5.6. In order to meet the criteria for sufficiency \((X \leq Y)\), a high number of cases should be in the upper triangle side of the x-y plot. This means that those cases should have the membership in the outcome higher than the membership in the combination of conditions meeting the sufficiency criteria.

Figure 5.6 Sufficient Conditions for the Absence of Strong Ethnopolitical Protest (Formula 9)

Note: LAZ – Lezghins in Azerbaijan, SBH – Serbs in Bosnia,

As Figure 5.6 shows, a convincing majority of cases comply with the status of sufficiency, although few cases gravitate around the diagonal line splitting the quadrant. There are however, some instances visible in the plot, where the rule of sufficiency is not applicable. These cases are ethnic groups in transition countries (Serbs in Bosnia and Lezghins in Azerbaijan) with a consistent record of strong ethnic mobilization. These cases may be considered as outliers for the rule of sufficiency but the rigidity of their status in protest cannot be guaranteed in time. One can further speculate that ethnopolitical protest is a deeply volatile phenomenon, especially when correlated with the ethnic factor. Many minority groups may only temporary choose the status of protest mobilization across time. It is possible that with the advance of the democratization process in Eastern
Europe, many of the outlier groups plotted in Figure 5.6 will move their mobilization status up to the sufficiency area. Similarly, the absence of strong protest may equally signify the involvement in other types of interethnic mobilization, such as violent rebellion. Therefore, treating this aspect in future research is highly recommendable.

5.6 Conclusions

This study assessed the status of necessity and sufficiency for several conditions in relation to both the emergence and the absence of strong ethnopoli
tical protest. The fuzzy-set logic has been employed in testing the established assumptions. The results show that the conditions leading to strong ethnopoli
tical protest are quite different than those leading to its absence. The patterns of causality for the two poles of the outcome are straightforward. Minority groups choose to engage in extensive protest when the following conditions are present: (1) are mobilized in a democratic environment (2) live in a county with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization and (3) either have weak feelings of national pride or are ethnically concentrated in compact territorial locations.

On the other side of the outcome, the results have shown that the absence of strong protest is possible when (1) there are strong feelings of national pride among members of the group (2) there is no political discrimination and (3) the minority groups reside in emerging democracies.

The two concluding solutions are complementary with the analytical substance being analyzed. Strong protest is more present in the advanced democratic systems and more absent in the emerging democracies. Various degrees of national pride feelings do influence the willingness to protest as it was stipulated by the posted hypothesis. At the same time, political discrimination proved its meaning only in relation to the absence of strong ethnopoli
tical protest. According to the mobilization rationale, any practice leading to discrimination is more of a triggering condition for the “at risk” status. The absence of political discrimination has proved to reduce the conflicting demands among minorities “at risk” which in turn annihilate the influence of those conditions which are traditionally recognized to lead the desire for strong protest. These conditions - ethnic fractionalization together with compact geographical location, are sufficient and to a certain extent necessary, in the mobilization equation only when activated for pursuing strong protesting actions.
Generally, the obtained causal combinations support the established assumptions and strengthen the overall analysis on ethnopoltical protest. The results also widely demonstrate the utility of the fuzzy sets method for the investigation of causal complexity in the area of ethnic mobilization. The analysis of ethnopoltical protest has been assessed from the perspective of subset relation, that is, each case was investigated according to its consistency in the subset of the causal combinations being tested. The flexibility of choosing particular thresholds of consistency allows the mobility to assess the strength of the causal complexity at different levels.

This aspect was widely demonstrated while implementing two distinct consistency thresholds for the emergence of strong ethnopoltical protest: one for a truth table analysis of the configurations that are relatively consistent subsets (0.80) and another with configurations that are very consistent subsets (0.92). The obtained results were similar in terms of the intermediate solutions presented (Formula 5 & 8) which provide just an additional argument for the strength of the overall analysis. With regard to the analytical substance of the fuzzy-set analysis, this study widely supports the argument of using higher consistency thresholds, especially when employing a medium to large N into the analysis. The formula of sufficiency obtained from using very consistent subsets (0.92) has a better fit of all cases in the plotted diagram (Figure 5.2), as compared with the factored formula (Figure 5.3) resulting from the minimization of the truth table while using only relative consistent subsets (0.80).

However, the fuzzy sets analysis does not remain without ongoing problems. One of the main disadvantages when using the fuzzy-set technique is mainly linked with the temporal dimension. Since ethnic mobilization widely varies across time, the temporal variation in fuzzy-set models is not accounted for. Thus, the provided explanations should be strictly considered within the timeframe in which ethnic groups and their status in mobilization have been analyzed.

The main achievement of this study is nevertheless the identification of the causal conditions leading to necessity and sufficiency. Especially the assessment of sufficiency was very stringent in our fuzzy sets models, as it involves a very precise standard of connecting all analyzed cases in the appraisal of each combination of conditions. This particularity of fuzzy sets analysis would be hardly accomplished through conventional quantitative or qualitative analysis. Particularly, when it comes to the detection of the outlier cases, most of the conventional techniques would be less effective (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000).
These exceptions add a substantial value to the analysis of ethnic-group mobilization, since they provide incentives to rearrange older theoretical debates; a characteristic which the conventional quantitative correlations but also the classical case studies could not easily do.
6. Feelings of National Pride in Europe: Comparative Evidence between Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups
6.1 Introduction\textsuperscript{34, 35}

The international system is made from sovereign nation-states which are seen as legitimate entities structured around a dominant nationality and a leading state authority. Secure national states however do not only need legitimacy and power to enjoy stability, they also need a sense of national identity widely shared by most of its citizens. This idea was frequently underlined across scholar work (see for example Stern 1995; Sidanius, Feshbach et al. 1997; Dowley and Silver 2000).

In many European countries however, national identity has been always a highly contested concept (Keating 2001). In the last two decades there were constant community tensions resulting from distorted feelings of both national and ethnic identities. Since the dissolution of the communist pole in Eastern Europe, there has been a steady increase in the formation of new national boundaries. Here, the change in national borders has resulted in a constant effort for keeping the conflict between national loyalty and ethnic diversity at a reasonable peaceful level.

At the same time, the disintegration of the European communist bloc has lifted the existing ideological pressure and turned the attention of many Western European nations toward their internal self-identification problems. Across years, many European democracies have experienced problems with the way many ethnic minorities start perceiving their loyalty to the nation. In some countries, powerful movements have emerged, threatening national integrity and interethnic unity. Given the way feelings of national attachment interact with ethnic diversity, there is an ongoing need to additionally explore the interface between feelings of national loyalty and those values association with ethnic diversity.

\textsuperscript{34} This chapter has benefited from data access and technical support from the European Data Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (ZA-Eurolab) in Cologne, Germany. The conducted research at ZA-Eurolab was supported by the 6th Framework Programme “Structuring the European Research Area - Research Infrastructures Action” of the European Community. My special regards goes to ZA-Eurolab’s research team (Dr. Ingvill C. Mochmann and Martin Fritz) for their great support and hospitality.

\textsuperscript{35} Part of this analysis has been conducted in the framework of the ENRI-East project (Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union), coordinated by Dr. Alexander Chvorostov at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna. My utmost gratitude goes to the project coordinator and to the entire ENRI team in Vienna for the given support and ongoing appreciation.
A strong national belonging is relevant in the context of Benedict Anderson’s idea of an “imagined community” – a shared value of a common national affinity for all members of the nation. Within a multiethnic society, it gives a sense of harmony, where all members understand and trust each others. Especially, for many members of an ethnic minority group, living their daily life in a multi-ethnic community rise problems related to national belonging, acceptance and unity. Being surrounded by a dominant culture, ethnic minorities with different ethno-cultural background, pose questions related to psychological and socio-cultural accommodation of their group values in the national context (Ward 1996). The most vulnerable minorities are those who are, or perceive themselves as being discriminated in the country. The perception of group discrimination leads to tensions and weak satisfaction with the society they are living in. Instead of identifying themselves with the national-state, many discriminated minorities tight the cohesion around their own ethnic group and thus become inclusive in their behavior. By default, discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national cohesion which makes higher levels of national pride very unlikely.

Ethnic diversity can be considered harmonious only in the case when both minority and majority groups are bounded together by a common sense of national unity and cohesion. This is however hardly ever the case and widely depends on how successful the nation-states are in creating thriving interethnic links of shared purpose which are able to collapse all regional and group values into a single one, national-wide identity. States which fail to create this unifying project are more open to experience intergroup tensions and even to be at risk for ethnic secession.

It is argued in this chapter that a strong feeling of national pride is a relevant measure for the idea of interethnic cohesion. The investment in people’s attachment with the nation proves to have rational consequences for the development of an affective nationhood. This was the main target of any state aspiring to last for long. Therefore, one assumption is that states are actively involved in creating cohesive socializing policies for bridging national loyalty and ethnic diversity together, with a clear purpose of capturing as much diffuse support from as many citizens in the country.

Previous research has found that strong sentiments of national pride have a positive effect on state stability by making their citizens to be more involved in the nation (Evans and Kelly 2002, Smith and Jarkko 1998, Tilley and Heath 2007). Once the opinion of pride increases, the resulting feelings might turn to claims of superiority against “others” within the nation or against “others” outside the state (Brubaker 1996; Hjerm 1998). Since national pride is associated with both positive
and negative outcomes, the need to understand its distribution across ethnic groups seems legitimate.

National attachment can be very volatile, especially when subjective factors are involved in shaping people’s feelings toward the nation. Ethnicity and nationalism have been for centuries two of the traditional pillars supporting the modern nation-state (Dogan 1999, 77). Solid national identities have been formed from the interaction of these values which shaped the borders of Europe in many ways during the last century.

Conventionally, scholars have constantly stated that nationalism is important for democracy (Gellner 1983; Nodia 1994), even though some forms of nationalism seems to be exclusionary toward certain members of the nation (Kunovich 2003; 3). Moreover, many ethnic groups do not hesitate to rely on identity incentives to mobilize and engage in conflicts within and against other ethnic communities (Enloe 1980). A wide spectrum of conflicting events in Europe of the last two decades has proved that feelings of loyalty toward a nation can be a powerful instrument for interethnic and interreligious mobilisation.

This study empirically analyzes the extent to which national identity values have similar strength and resonance among ethnic minority and majority groups in 23 European countries. To make this analysis more comprehensive, a set of explanatory indicators are employed for modelling the level of national pride within different European nations. Several questions stay at the core of this analysis: Do ethnic minority groups share the same national pride values as the majority population in the country? Does the discrimination status matter? Do national pride feelings have a stable pattern across time among minority and majority groups? All these questions will be assessed in a comparative framework by using the European Values Survey (EVS) as our empirical pipeline. In doing so, a set of explanatory indicators will be employed in measuring the causality between various social, economic and demographic factors and the hierarchy of pride feelings.

Due to the relative recent availability of systematic data on values and beliefs, the dynamics of interpersonal feelings can now be tested empirically, beyond their theoretical framework. The main contribution of this chapter is set to provide valuable data-proof insights on the magnitude and resonance of the national identity feelings applied to the context of ethnic diversity. National pride feelings will be analyzed in their hierarchical way of manifestation. In doing so, this study will be able to assess the impact of a similar set of connecting conditions on each set of national pride feelings (in hierarchical order: negative, relative, and positive).
In the next section, some theoretical inputs related to ethnicity, identity, nationalism and other related concepts will be presented. After that, the target population, data and the operationalization framework will be defined. The descriptive figures and the empirical results will follow while the concluding remarks will resume this chapter.

6.2 Ethnicity, Identity, Nationalism and Related Concepts

6.2.1 Defining ethnicity and ethnic groups: Theory

Before going any further with the analysis, this section defines the meaning of an ethnic group and the sense of minority and majority status. Anthony Smith (1987) regards an ethnic group as being a community of individuals which are able to identify with each other based on a presumed or real common heritage. The ethnic legacy is mainly linked with primordial feelings and is supposedly associated with a group having a homeland and distinct cultural traits (Keating 2007; 607). Apart from the self-perceived ethnic uniqueness, there should be a general accepted recognition from other communities of a group’s distinctiveness (Eriksen 2001; 261).

Ethnicity is considered as being a relatively recent concept. It was used for the first time in David Riesman’s work in 1953 (see Glazer and Moynihan 1975; 1). This notion is seen as one of the most powerful and dynamic elements in the nationalism studies nowadays. It is generally understood as a belief in a putative descent which usually takes the form of a faith rooted in something which could be real or not (Conversi 2002; 2). Usually it is referred as a constructed reality, made from myths of a common ancestry. According to Connor (1997; 33) ethnicity as a perception stands at the core of identity formation since only rarely a feeling of ethnic belonging draws entirely its legitimacy from real facts.

Several theories might be identified in the literature which explicitly target ethnicity and ethnic groups. Amongst them, three approaches pose relevance in the context of our project, namely: primordialism, perennialism and constructivism.

Primordialism underlines the idea that ethnicity and ethnic groups are part of the natural and historical order (van den Berghe 1978; Pearson 1993). The roots of all ethnic communities reside in the far past and are linked by kinship and biological
features. Each ethnic population, having their own specific cultural distinctiveness (language, religion, race), is a proof of a primordial biological and historical continuity. According to Clifford Geertz the main facet of primordialism is that it sees ethnicity and identity as mainly assumed by all ethnic communities. Once ethnic identity is acquired it becomes immutable for further questioning both within group and by others (Geertz 1967).

The primordialist theory however, does not sufficiently explain the inter-group connections and the emergence of the multi-ethnic societies (Smith 1999; 13). Some scholars go even further and stipulate that ethnicity is less primordial but more embedded in the idea of how human nature perceives its experience of the world (Geertz 1967). The explanatory power of primordialism is nevertheless of a great relevance for our study since it shapes the understanding of group identity and ethnic belonging. Even so, there is a need to carefully distinguish between the supra-group primordial phenomena such as biological continuity and the in-group primordialist features like blood, language, religion, territory or general historical determinants. The first category is seen by theorists as very important since it provides reasons for ethnic continuity. The second, in-group features, are mainly important at the individual level, because it provides relevant reasons for people’s beliefs to anchor their ethnic identity. This chapter tends to focus more on the last approach and analyze those individual and group primordial characteristics which make people attached with the national values.

*Perrenialism* rejects the idea that ethnicity is part of the natural order but keeps the historical continuity as the rooting factor of group identity (Fishman 1980; Connor 1994). The main argument emerges around the perception of temporal change and holds that ethnic groups are not constant over time. They emerge, transform and vanish throughout the history. Ethnicity is therefore seen more as a political notion which is used to control and eventually manipulate the actions of members of the group. Donald Noel stipulates that exactly perennialist values stand on the roots and lead to ethnic stratification. Particularly, the fixed group characteristics such as religion, nationality, race etc., are taken into account in assigning certain social positions (Noel 1968).

Based on the perennialist argument, when several ethnic groups collide, it is a natural tendency to assign a stratification status, sometime discriminatory, to an ethnic community. A stratified multiethnic society is usually characterized by tensions and hostility which finally might lead to conflict (Lawrence and Hutchings 1996). In such context, there hardly can be a perfect sense of unity at the national level. It can be the case when ethnic groups are more prone to fight for their place in the process of ethnic stratification than focusing to acquire a common sense of national unity.
Constructivism sees ethnic groups as artificial constructed communities (Künstlich) which creates a strong belief in a shared community ("Gemeinschaft") (Weber [1922]1978; 389). Many ethnic groups claim a longstanding continuity and a strong credence in their ethnegenesis. Scholars have documented however that the majority of these beliefs and practices, which bounds ethnic communities over time, are of a recent invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] 1992).

The constructed nature of ethnic diversity was further stressed by Fredrik Barth who believes that ethnicity was continuously negotiated by both external ascriptions and internal self-determination (Barth 1969). The group identities are thus continuously constructed and modified according to particular ethnic needs. A specific national identity could decline over time but certainly, new, hybrid identities will take their place (Hall 1992).

6.2.2 Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups

Defining the border between a nation and its composing minority and majority groups have been a constant dilemma amongst modern scholars in the field of nationalism and identity. Many major thinkers across history saw a conflicting situation when two or more nationalities share the same state. John Stuart Mill made an explicit statement by referring to the idea that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” (Mill 1998; 428).

This study regards both minority and majority groups in the context of a unified society by assuming that all communities are part of the nation-building project. A standard definition of a minority group is given by the United Nation Committee for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities. Enunciated in 1985, this definition sees an ethnic minority as “a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim it is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law”36.

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This definition fits the European context and has to do with the political power and ruling process at the state level\textsuperscript{37}. However, during the analysis, a strong emphasis will be credited to the discrimination status of ethnic minorities. According to Louis Wirth a discriminated minority can be considered “a group of people who, on the grounds of their physical or cultural characteristics in comparison to others in the society, are subject to differentiating, unequal treatment and who regard themselves as [potential] subjects of collective discrimination” (Wirth 1945; 347).

Generally, discrimination is perceived as a danger for minority group identity. Thus, ethnically distinct individuals tend to resemble themselves more with their particular ethnic community and less with the broad society they are living in (Branscombe, Schmitt et al. 1999). By attaching the discriminatory tag to an ethnic minority, the individuals become aware of their status and tend to close their community for other members of the state. In time they disconnect from the unifying values of the nation and unless assimilation or accommodating policies are implemented, they prefer to stay marginalized and alienated in the society. The case of Gypsy minority in Eastern Europe stays as a relevant example of this phenomenon.

Ethnic diversity of any state is logically split between at least one ethnic minority and a corresponding ethnic majority. Very often the majority groups are associated with the dominant status which comprises different, usually higher, social hierarchy and more civic privileges (Wirth 1945). In the context of this study, an ethnic majority will be understood as a subset of a group which counts for more than half of the entire population. This proportion is usually referred also as a simple majority. The majority groups can be accommodating (inclusive) in relation to ethnic diversity or may choose to be exclusive toward other ethnic communities. Usually, the perceived actions of tolerance and inclusion attitudes, coming from the majority groups, are decisive to build cohesive policies and integrate ethnic minorities in the society. (Berry 2001, Vedder et al. 2006).

There can be cases however when majority population restrain the area of communication within their ethnic community and refuse the interaction with other ethnic groups. Exclusiveness is actually the main practice leading to discrimination within many societies worldwide. Further studies have shown that national pride is greater among the majority group and lower among ethnic minorities (Smith and Kim 2006; 4, Dowley and Silver 2000; 361). Since the majority

\textsuperscript{37} There are cases however, when the majority population within the state is not always in the position of the governing group, as it was till recently the case of Rwanda (Hutu vs. Tutsi), South Africa (Black vs. Whites) or even Kazakhstan (Kazakh vs. Russians).
groups have usually stronger numerical and cultural attachments with the nation, this statement can be logically conceived as a standard hypothesis.

6.2.3 Nationalism, Identity and Multiculturalism

The classical idea of nationalism, is viewed by Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990) or Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991) as closely interrelated with the notion of ethnicity and culminates with the formation of the nation-state. An ideal scenario is considered when a nation is mono-ethnic and its boundaries coincide with the borders of the state. This is however almost never the case. Nation-states usually include populations which are not part of the majority ethnic group. From one reason or another, these minorities often feel underrepresented, discriminated and even excluded from the general political, cultural or economical life of the nation. In such cases, there will be inevitable demands for social inclusion and actions toward autonomy or even complete separation from the state. The intensity of these actions is usually more persistent when the protesting minorities identify themselves with neighboring communities which have a state by their own. The main concern of a nation-state is therefore to give its citizens a feeling of common emotional unity which should pertain among both ethnic minority and majority groups. According to the existing literature, this process might be approached in one of the following two ways.

The first one sees the role of society and individual progress as essential in the formation of national identity (Habermas 1984; 75-110). In order for this process to be successful, it is necessary for all ethnic or national identities to be neglected and the legitimacy of the nation-state should be based upon political rights and individual freedoms of all its citizens. Being based on the universal principle of equality before the law, this process has, as its primary target, the political and social integration of all individuals in the structural life of the nation-state. Amongst others, Pye (1971), stipulates that the drawbacks resulting from ethnic diversity can be solved though “assimilation” or “accommodation” policies.

Assimilation means that all minorities should be fully integrated into the main population stream by giving them full citizen rights and making sure that all minorities’ descendents will be free of their own culture by the end of the assimilation process (Glazer 1997). The politics of assimilation was practically applied by many political regimes. Especially, the European nations have deliberately and intensely applied politics of assimilation in order to homogenize their populations. Charles Tilly (1992), Ernest Renan (1996), Anthony Smith (1991) and James Fearon (2003) have widely discussed the European assimilation policies and their activation reasons. An example of aggressive assimilation practices can
be seen also the “sovietization” process initiated by the Soviet Union and expected to lead to assimilation of its numerous ethnicities. By creating a soviet, supra-national identity, the ultimate goal was to achieve an ideological sense of belonging meant to replace the local, ethnic distinctiveness.

Accommodation, on the other hand, is a more recent and malleable political approach. It is mainly used by the European Union as a strategy to promote the democratic integration of its ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. This concept presupposes that ethnic communities should try to adjust with each others. The scope is to create a feeling of national unity where different ethnic groups are prone to bond together based on the common European cultural, economic and political linkages.

The second way to approach ethnic diversity is mainly supported by Will Kymlicka’s (2000) work. It is primarily favorable to the idea of recognizing ethnic diversity by giving extensive rights to those minorities living within the boundaries of the nation-state. Daniele Conversi (2002) also believes that a process of nation-building which is not sensitive to ethnic nuances, irreversible imply a parallel process of nation-destroying, especially among ethnic minorities. This neglect leads to widespread confusion across minority communities which start questioning the sense of civic consciousness and national loyalty (Conversi 2002: 3). In its successful scenario however, the identity formation leads to a process which Walker Connor (1994; 168) calls “ethnonationalism”. It reveals the idea of devotion which an ethnic minority, adopts in the context of national unity. The true value of ethnonationalism reflects thus the harmonious relationship and the national attachment between a minority group and the majority population.

### 6.3 Data and Sample

#### 6.3.1 Description of Data

The data used in this chapter comes from the European Values Survey (EVS). This database is an individual-level, multi-country, cross sectional and time series survey which comprises almost all European countries. The EVS registers information about individuals’ political values, social attitudes, behavior and beliefs. Each country participating in this survey designs its sample in a random manner by having a known inclusion probability of all persons eligible for the survey. The data was collected by means of face-to-face interviews in all targeted countries. Only individuals aged 15 and over are asked to be part of the sample. In
order to correct for possible distortions resulting from the applied sampling techniques in different European countries, a specific weighting variable will be used which was explicitly designed in EVS for this scope.

This analysis includes 23 European states\textsuperscript{38} which for the purpose of comparison will be divided in three clusters: Western European democracies, Former Soviet European countries and South Eastern/Balkan states. This split is motivated by the existing regional similarities in the way historical and socio-political events have shaped the existing national and ethnic values in each analyzed cluster of countries. For the reasons of sample consistency, the timeframe for analysis is set to integrate the last two extensive waves available in EVS – from 1994 to 1998 and from 1999 to 2004\textsuperscript{39}.

6.3.2 Sampled Population

In analyzing the target population, this study makes a distinction between ethnic minority and majority groups within all countries under analysis. Despite the fact that EVS is registered at the individual level, during the analysis all respondents are clustered in ethnic minority-majority groups. The following sorting variables were used to split between specific ethnic communities: Country of the respondent (EVS code – s003), ethnic group/declared ethnicity (EVS code – x051), language spoken at home (EVS code – g016) and the region where the interview was conducted (EVS code – x048). For example, respondents from Spain, interviewed in the Basque region and declaring the language spoken at home as being Basque, are assigned this particular ethnicity. Similarly, those respondents, interviewed in Georgia, and declared as having Russian as the only language spoken at home,\textsuperscript{40} are considered being part of the Russian minority. The majority groups were clustered based on the same selection procedures.

Clustering all individuals in specific ethnic groups is very important in the context of this study. So far, there is limited empirical data to comparatively assess how identity values change among individuals of specific ethnic groups in Europe. Apart from being short in empirical studies on identity feelings, the existing literature also misses to comparatively analyze the perceptions of national identity

\textsuperscript{38} A number of sub-state entities are also included in EVS. From them, we will use in our analysis two such sub-national territorial entities: Northern Ireland and Republic of Srpska.

\textsuperscript{39} Each country has defined their sample and conducted their surveys only one time within the extensive wave period.

\textsuperscript{40} There were an insignificant number of respondents having more than one language spoken at home. We excluded them from the analysis.
among individuals from both ethnic minority and majority communities. Previous studies have found that individuals are very reluctant in developing direct ties with the state and rely more on their ethno-group communities for fulfilling their civic duties (Smith and Jarkko 1998). This means that ethnic status, being it minority or majority, is also expected to influence the degree of civic feelings in a multiethnic society. Such reality strongly advocates for considering ethnic status in relation to national pride beliefs. From our knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically analyze national identity feelings by considering the polarity of ethnic diversity in such a large number of European countries.

To provide more room for comparison, we further split minority groups into two categories: ethnies “at risk” for discrimination and minorities “not at risk” of being disadvantaged. In identifying the discrimination status, this analysis makes use of the classification criteria available in the “Minorities at Risk” (MAR) project. This project developed by Tedd Gurr at Maryland University tracks those ethnic minorities which are more prone to be the target of a discriminatory treatment within society. The criteria to which the status “at risk” is assigned follow two main well documented rules⁴¹: A minority group should “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society” and the group “is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.” In order for these criteria to be applied, the minority should represent at least 1% of the country’s total population, excluding all refugees and/or immigrants. In total, 76 ethnic groups have been identified, from which 23 majority groups and 54 ethnic minorities. From the pool of minority groups, 30 ethnies fulfill the criteria “at risk” of being discriminated.

6.4 Measurements

6.4.1 Dependent Variable

National pride can be considered as part of the state collective identity. It can be understood as the positive link of an ethnic community with its nation. When correlated with ethnic diversity, national pride can be viewed in terms of both patriotism and nationalist feelings (Flesbach 1994; Hurwitz and Peffley 1999). The level of national pride is an excellent measure for this study since it captures the

substance of both primordialist and constructivist feelings in measuring the attachment with national identity.

As a matter of fact, patriotism underlines those attitudes which reflect the comfort with the shared values of the hosting society. It denotes also an advance degree of assimilation or cultural integration of ethnic diversity in the hosting nation. Nationalism, on the other side, underlines a more aggressive character and emphasizes those feelings of national superiority which are linked with the desire to dominate within society.

Maykel Verkuyten (2005) has documented and concluded that ethnic identity, as a value, is more important to ethnic minorities than to the majority groups. Ethnic minorities seem to attach more weight to their ethno-genesis and group identity. This devotion for the intra-group distinctiveness do not allow however much room for sensing positively about their supra-group, national identity. Therefore, national pride is expected to be stronger among members of the majority groups and frailer among members of ethnic minority groups. The dominant ethnic communities are regarded also to be both the main actors and the main beneficiaries of the national projects. Individuals, members of ethnic minority groups, will report being proud of their nationality mainly if they sense that their ethnic values have been assimilated or accommodated into the national scheme. Higher pride values will thus signal closer emotional connection with the hosting state.

Since the accommodation and assimilation practices widely vary across European nations, the expected trends in pride values might widely differ across countries with different democratic backgrounds. Western democracies are more experienced in nation-building and integrating ethnic minorities. Here, it is expected that minority groups should have practically similar pride values as the majority groups. On the contrary, former communist countries had applied more aggressive policies of assimilation and uniformisation which forced many minority communities to feel discriminated and misrepresented at the national level. Since discrimination is assumed to be negatively correlated with national pride, we believe that ethnic minorities in former communist countries will have lower pride values than the majority populations.

The indicator measuring the level of national pride in EVS is represented by the following question: “How proud are you to be [country nationality]?” A limited number of scholars used this measurement to target several economic and cross-governance topics by using the same question from the World Values Survey (WVS) and International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Among them, Schulman (2003) explored how economic wealth influence national pride values. Before that
Dowley and Silver (2000) initiated a cross national project measuring the attachment to the individual ethnic group and loyalty to the larger country. Smith and Kim (2006) used the ISSP to correlate national pride with several socio-demographic factors in a temporal view. More recently, Ahlerup and Hansson (2008) conducted research on how government effectiveness impact national pride and ethnic diversity.

In EVS, the national pride question offers four options for an answer: 1 = very proud, 2 = quite proud, 3 = not very proud, 4 = not at all proud. To make the results more clear for analysis and interpretation, the order of response in the pride scale is reversed in the sense of having a high degree of pride assigned to higher scores (0 = not at all proud, 1 = not very proud, 2 = quite proud, 3 = very proud). For the empirical model the scale of national pride is re-coded by merging the negative values in one category. As result, the commenced scale will have the following structure: 0 for “Not proud”, 1 for “quite/relatively proud”, and 2 for “very proud”. Since the aim of this study is to observe the variation in pride at its peak levels, the obtained scale can be considered as optimal for the analysis.

6.4.2 Independent Variables and the Expected Causality

Diversity creates feelings of threat correlated with negative out-group orientation and less trust and social cohesion (Delhey and Newton 2005; Letki 2008). Similarly, ethnic diversity produces less harmonization across values and believes, and therefore ethnic minorities proved to have lower feelings of ethnocentrism and social cohesion (Soroka, Johnston et al. 2005). Ethnic diversity is further associated with potential problems, such as poor economic performance and week political agreement (Easterly and Levine 1997). Paolo Mauro (1995) claims that ethnic diversity is a stimulator for corruption which in turn negatively impacts on public goods and economic growth. By building a strong sense of national pride is widely seen as a good way to moderate some of these negative effects of ethnic diversity.

However, particular insights about national pride are rather scarce in the literature. Previous research has focused on different incentives which form the sense of national pride, but only a few looked on specific indicators which could predict the intensity to which national loyalty is manifesting. From the existing studies, a correlation can be observed between a strong sense of national pride and the feeling of too much diversity in the country. Furthermore, the feeling of too many “others” is directly linked with the advancing age, lower education levels, a tendency towards ‘materialism’ and right wing political preferences (Saggar and Drean 2001; 9).
Individuals have more other criteria, based on which they evaluate their attachment with the group-ethnicity and their loyalty to the larger nation. Drawing from identity, ethnocentrism42 and trust studies, a set of variables are identified to test for variation in pride attitudes. Prior studies have shown a relatively weak and inconsistent differences that gender has on national pride, with men usually expressing stronger national pride values than women do (Smith and Kim 2006; 3). The literature reveals however that women are more trusting and less ethnocentric then men are (Scheepers, Felling et al. 1992).

Based on the generational replacement theories older people have proved to be more proud of their nationality than younger individuals are (Abramson and Inglehart 1992). This aspect however widely varies, depending of the particular national domain targeted (Evans and Kelley 2002; 323-324). Age also has proved to have a positive effect on trust but also on ethnocentrism values (Scheepers, Felling et al. 1992; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Stolle 2001). Education is also one of the factors which are expected to have a direct effect on how people think of their national resemblance. In his post-modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart (1997) stipulates that highly educated individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan in thinking and thus less attached to their nations. Research done by Tilley and Heath (2007), but also by Evans and Kelley (2002) has found similar correlation patterns. Higher levels of education provide people with more mobility and international openness. They will be hence less tempted to connect with a particular national environment and are expected to report lower levels of national pride.

Researchers have also found that national pride is very much affected by the way people are attached with the religious practice (Inglehart 1997; 83, Tilley and Heath, 2005; 16). In Europe there is evidence that the decline in religious and cultural traditions goes in parallel with the decline in national pride (Tilley and Heath 2007; 662). The intertwined connection between the intensity of national loyalty and religiosity is expected to hold a strong positive causality in our study as well.

Given the extended research on civic values done by John Brehm and Wendy Rahn (1997), there is evidence showing that income-secured people are more prone to trust and oriented toward accepting ethnic diversity. This is because strong senses of community are given by the idea of equality of the membership in the nation. The equality among fellow citizens promotes solidarity across rich and poor in the social sphere and between left and right on the political scale (Hylland-Eriksen

42 Ethnocentrism is closely related to identity and inter-ethnic studies. It sees one’s cultural heritage as superior to others and all judgments related to ethnic and identity values are viewed from these stereotypical lenses.
2002 [1993]). Stephen Shulman (2003) has found that, in many countries, low income people have greater levels of national pride than the rich, upper class individuals. These results however hold true mainly in industrialized democracies where social welfare is omnipresent and all individuals are considered to be equal and treated as such. Ronald Inglehart (1997) also has observed that satisfaction with the national pride is inversely linked with the level of economic development of the country. At the individual level however, rich people are expected to be more proud of their nationality by virtue of the country allowing them to acquire more wealth. Even though the literature have mixed findings regarding this correlation (see Shulman 2003; 43), this study relies on the idea that poor people tie their status with feelings of social injustice and thus they tend to be more unsatisfied with their nationhood.

Sidanius, Fleshbach and his colleagues (1997) underlined that strong nationalism can be mainly labeled as a “right-wing” form of national pride. Therefore, left-right political partisanship is included as a control variable because of the assumption that more political extreme preferences are strongly linked with the nationalistic feelings. The link between extreme political preferences and pride attitudes has been weakly explored in the literature, with only few observed traces in the scholar work. In Western Europe the decrease in left-right wing views appears to go along with a decline in national pride feeling (Tilley and Heath 2007; 669). Since extreme political preferences are usually associated with greater emotions for national pride, we will consider this causality as such.

Economic performance and life satisfaction are usually strong positive predictors for any pride values. People satisfied with their life as a whole have proved to attach higher weight for nationalistic support (Shulman 2003; Verkuyten 2008, Lewis and Bratton 2000; 9). The existing research tends to find lower life satisfaction among ethnic minorities than within majority populations (Andrews and Withey 1976; Verkuyten 2008). Hence, it can be expected that ethnic minorities, being less satisfied with their life in the country will be also tempted to adopt weaker pride values within the same society.

This study also acknowledges for the shifting attitudes toward authority resulting from postmodernism, globalization or by ideological regime change (mainly in Eastern Europe). In such instances, individuals are thought to seek the security of strong leaders and powerful institutions (Inglehart 1999; 10). Research has also revealed that desire for strong authority breeds intolerance for cultural change and adversity for different ethnic groups (Inglehart 1999; 5). Further evidence indicates that respect for authority is declining in the advanced democracies with possible negative consequences for patriotism and national pride beliefs.
Finally, based on the pool of ethnic minorities in our sample, an indicator measuring the status of being “at risk” for discrimination will be taken into consideration. Discrimination proved to be a drawback factor which leads ethnic minorities toward within-group inclusiveness and less devotion to the nation (Verkuyten 2008; 401). Many groups perceive discrimination as an act of political injustice (Gurr 1993b) and therefore, they are reluctant to be part in the process of consolidating national identity. Instead of identifying themselves with the national-state, many minorities being “at risk” for discrimination tight the cohesion around their own ethnic group and thus become inclusive in their behaviour.

By default, discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national cohesion which make higher levels of national pride very unlikely. The discriminatory practices further limit the general access of members of disadvantaged minority groups to common resources in the country. In turn the created circumstances inhibit the ability of these people to integrate as full members in the nation. Discrimination also emphasizes the idea of “otherness” among kin people in the state which significantly reduces the overall national loyalty (Hjerm 1998). For that reason, those minorities considered to be “at risk” for discrimination are expected to reject more intensely the national pride values when compared to other ethnic communities in the same country.

The coding schemes of all variables used in this study are further documented in the Appendix D.

### 6.4.3 Empirical Method

The method used to analyze our empirical model is a discrete choice technique in the form of ordinal probit. The reason behind this choice is well-grounded in the nature of our dependent variable. This analysis uses a hierarchical scale for measuring the level and the intensity of national pride feelings. A typical measurement in such context is to apply an ordinal probit. It allows us to assess the magnitude of national pride at each level of the scale while controlling for potentially relevant indicators. This approach avoids treating the differences between pride levels as uniform, as it is in the case of a least-squares regression. It allows us to assess the magnitude of national pride at each level of the scale while controlling for potentially relevant indicators.

The equation below estimates the raw model by using data as a pool.

\[ P_i = \beta_1 k_i + \beta_2 x_i + \epsilon_i \quad (i=1 \ldots N) \] (Equation 1)
Where $P_i$ is the intensity of the national pride coded as 0—for negative pride, 1—for moderate pride and 3—for strong national pride; $k_i$ stands for a handful of socio-demographic variables at the individual level $i$; $x_{it}$ relates to some control variables quantifying values and believes (e.g. respect for authority, religious denomination, protesting actions etc.) which are measured at the individual level $i$; Accordingly, $\varepsilon_{it}$ is equal to the individual specific error term that is presumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the control variables.

Since this study uses a pooled data, some problems might arise in terms of individual heterogeneity. In order to control for this limitation, this study considers a procedure to “de-mean” the data in accordance to a technique established by Yair Mundlack in 1978. This technique controls for the fixed effects in the model by considering the within means of the regressors (Mundlack 1978).

By integrating the Mundlack terms, the following equation emerges:

$$P_{it} = \beta_1 k_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (i=1, \ldots, N) \quad (\text{Equation 2})$$

Where $\alpha_i$ is a group specific and time-invariant component which controls for the systematic fixed effects associated to our data; $\varepsilon_{it}$ is again the time and individual specific error terms which are considered to be exogenous, normally distributed, independent and uncorrelated across individuals.

However, the general probit model obtained from these formulas shows an ambiguous causality and do not clearly identify the causal effects on each level of the ordinal scale of the dependent variable. The raw results are considered to be irrelevant in drawing any conclusions since the literature is widely unclear when it comes to the interpretation of the coefficients of a raw ordinal probit model (Greene 2000; 876). To circumvent this limitation, the model estimates those marginal effects of the ordinal probit model which assess the impact of all variable on each hierarchical value of the dependent variable.

The analysis is conducted in STATA10 and employs specific command features to calculate marginal effects\(^{43}\) at the means of the independent variables by using the prediction associated with the previous ordinal probit estimation command. The final results and also the interpretation of the obtained model will be presented in terms of marginal effects.

\(^{43}\) In calculating marginal effects, this study makes use of the STATA “mfx2” command.
6.5 Descriptive Results

6.5.1 Summary statistics

Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all indicators used in this study. The dependent variable national pride has a mean value of 2.2 and a standard deviation of 0.8. Taking into consideration that the respondents referred to as quite proud = 2 and very proud = 3, one can conclude that, on average, individuals seem to feel relatively proud of their nationality. These facts however are expected to vary across ethnic groups, time and within different parts of Europe. The reason for this variation results from the characteristics of the applied multicultural policies which, depending on their context, emphasize more feelings of patriotism or of nationalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N of Obs.</th>
<th>Mean (M)</th>
<th>Std. Dev. (SD)</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>68,141</td>
<td>2.209</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Status*</td>
<td>6,920</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>72,668</td>
<td>1.536</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>72,514</td>
<td>2.133</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>70,988</td>
<td>1.868</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>61,390</td>
<td>1.966</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>67,156</td>
<td>1.671</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>55,414</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>68,042</td>
<td>1.614</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life satisfaction</td>
<td>71,934</td>
<td>1.095</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Applied only for ethnic minorities

Discrimination status is assigned to those ethnic minorities which fulfill the conditions of being “at risk” for unfair treatment. The descriptive numbers show that more than half (M = 0.68, SD=0.46) of the sampled minorities are considered to be “at risk” for discrimination. Generally, the analyzed individuals include, on average, more medium educated people (M = 1.86, SD = 0.71), relatively wealthy (M = 1.96, SD 0.79), and quite religious (M = 1.67, SD = 0.47). The mean scores for left-right political preferences are situated at a moderate value of 0.98 (SD = 0.58). Similarly, the values reflecting respect for authority were situated at a positive level (M = 1.6, SD = 0.73). For life satisfaction, respondents declared to have, on average, a moderate perception of their everyday existence (M = 1.09, SD 0.77).
6.5.2 The Change in National Pride Feelings

National pride is meant to be a changeful value across time. While analyzing both majority and minority groups this study is particularly interested to find if the time dimension impacts differently on the angle of the slope measuring national loyalty. Figure 6.1 graphically displays the intensity of national pride feelings extended on a timeframe between 1994 and up to 2004.

**Figure 6.1 Cumulative National Pride Values over Time: Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups**

![Graph showing cumulative pride values over time for minorities and majority groups.](image)

Source: EVS

The picture shows two different patterns in pride development among majority and minority groups. When considering ethnic minorities, there can be observed a general decreasing tendency in the overall national pride feelings in Europe. Among the pool of minority respondents, those being “at risk” for discrimination have, on average, lower pride feelings and steeper decreasing rates than those individuals belonging to non-disadvantaged ethnies. Over time, minorities “at risk” have higher decreasing rates in pride values and the lowest percentage of respondents with strong feelings of national pride. Ethnic minorities which are “not at risk” for discrimination have the highest percentage of respondents with neutral feelings of national pride but also a significant and most important, a stable proportion of individuals with strong feeling of national loyalty (aprox. 1/3).
However, the proportion of those who declared as being not proud of their nationality has almost doubled over time in the entire sample of minority groups.

It is worth mentioning that the negative feelings of national pride proved to be the most volatile across time, while strong attitudes of national belonging are the most stable among all sampled respondents. Less national pride during the observed decade should be considered in the context of the transitional chaos of the newly emerged democracies in Eastern Europe. According to Donald Horowitz (2000), the state of transitional disorder places identity values under a significant pressure. National minorities are the most affected since they see institutional change as an opportunity to enforce their ethnic demands which subsequently may result in weaker attachment with the national values they are part of.

Among the majority populations, the pride tendencies are more straightforward. The cumulative pattern of national patriotism shows a consistent temporal stability. Strong beliefs in national pride stay at the highest level in people’s credence with a slight increasing pattern over time. Only a small proportion of majority-group respondents declared to be not proud of their nationality and this trend is shown to be constant across time.

In general, the temporal dimension of national pride shows descriptive patterns in accordance with our posted assumptions. Minorities “at risk” have the lowest loyalty toward the hosting nations and all levels of national pride have negative decreasing slopes over the decade. Accommodated minorities appear to have more positive feelings of national pride with a significant and stable proportion of respondents embracing neutral and strong feelings of national loyalty over time. Majority groups feel most proud in their nation with high and stable patterns of national loyalty across time.

6.5.3 National Pride and Ethnic Diversity

This section further presents a snapshot picture of national pride feelings as they are distributed across the three European regions and between minority-majority samples. Figure 6.2 graphically displays national pride values among both ethnic minority and majority groups in South Eastern European countries (Balkans). From a first sight it is important to observe that almost all minority groups in the region are considered to be “at risk” for discrimination. Only two minority groups in FYROM (Vlahs and Turks) are categorized as being free of the perpetuated
discriminatory treatment. As expected, members of majority groups in all Balkan countries have on average higher pride values when compared with minority populations. All majority groups, except for Republic of Srpska, have the mean values of national loyalty situated above the “quite proud” level which reveals their strong confidence in national belonging.

**Figure 6.2 National Pride in Balkans: Minority and Majority Groups**

![Bar chart showing national pride in Balkan countries](chart.png)

Note: The majority groups are listed in capital letters. Ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination are marked with a “+”.

Source: EVS

When shifting to the average pride levels among Balkan minority groups, the picture is rather diverse. Members of only few ethnic minorities declared to have, on average, high values of national pride (at the level of “quite proud” and higher). Muslims in Republic of Srpska, Gypsies in Bulgaria and almost all minority groups in FYROM have declared of being relatively proud of their country-nationality. Especially, in Macedonia, ethnic minorities a very well accommodated in the national realm, mainly because of their successful policies in accommodating

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44 This status however might be relative and resulting from a weak political organization of these two minorities. Since the classification of being “at risk” heavily relies on the condition of political mobilization we cannot fully assess if this status is indeed immune for discriminatory practices.
ethnic diversity which were made not explicitly for the majority group, but structured around all ethnic groups within the country (Poulton 1991; 49).

The overall low levels of national pride among Balkan minorities reflect the tumultuous intergroup relations in this region. Many ethnic minorities have been involved, passively or actively, in the conflicting actions which followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavian state in the 1990s. The interethnic movements are still active in this region which positively connects with low pride values across many minority groups. The recent separation of Kosovo Albanians from Serbia serves as a pertinent example of how poorly integrated minorities with weak bounds of national identity might successfully demand and obtain severance from the hosting nation.

Figure 6.3 further shows the average national pride values among ethnic groups across former Soviet East European countries. Two clusters of countries emerge as having different patterns of national pride within this region. In the Caucasian states – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia there can be observed a strong sense of pride among both majority and minority groups. More than half of ethnic minorities are not “at risk” for discrimination and most of them share similar pride standards as the majority population. The compact national pride trend reflects a strong sense of national cohesion within Caucasian societies. Clifford Geertz (1963; 153-154) explains this consistent share in national devotion as a gradual shift of primordial loyalties from minority groups to majority population which may produce parallel attachments to more than one group or ethnicity. Moreover, this shift is amplified by the existence of a common external threat represented by the Russian neighborhood and the conflict zone in the Northern Caucasus. The need for security makes internal national cohesion to thrive which makes national pride more visible.

Several other factors could explain the strong national attachment in the Caucasus. First, many ethnic minorities are well integrated in the host societies and mixed marriages are very common (Bremmer and Taras 1993). Second, with small exceptions, all ethnic groups share similar religion beliefs within country. Thus, the tension rooting the religious nationalism is kept at a minimum level. Third, almost all listed minorities are not territorially concentrated, making their ethnic identity to weaker and group mobilization difficult to achieve. In addition, the geographical dispersion of ethnic minorities makes the process of assimilation easy to be achieved.
Figure 6.3 National Pride in the Former Soviet East European Countries: Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups

Note: The majority groups are listed in capital letters. Ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination are marked with a “+”.

Source: EVS

The second group of countries is made up from Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. All five countries contain important Slavic minorities and exhibit, on average, higher pride feelings among majority groups and lower levels of national pride across minority groups. The Soviet assimilation policies extensively undermined national feelings and led to weak cohesive stimulus within many former Soviet societies (Wozniakowski 1997). Most of these countries also experienced conflicting situations with their Slavic minorities. Being concentrated in distinct urban or regional locations, Slavic communities have continuously reinforced their desire for autonomy or greater political rights, and strongly resisted to integrate in the hosting nations.45

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45 Baltic States has been criticized of having restrictive citizenship law toward their Slavic minorities. This situation impedes portions of the Russian minority to own land, vote, being employed and extensively participate into the political realm of their hosting countries. Similarly, Moldova has been heavily criticized by the Council of Europe of giving to much
Especially in Ukraine there is a significant gap in pride feelings between the majority population and its Russian minority. Here, the Russian minority has a strong sense of its own ethnic identity, and is very well politically organized while receiving a constant support from Russia. Belarus is another distinct case in terms of the perceived national loyalty across country’s ethnic minorities. The Slavic minorities in Belarus have been in a privileged position during the Soviet period and kept this status till nowadays. Even though small tensions still exist between Belarusian majority and its ethnic minorities, these anxieties are kept salient by the authoritarian regime of the president Lukashenko. The differences in pride between the majority and minority groups might in fact reflect more the authoritarian political structure of the Belarusian society rather than the discrepancies between their true pride beliefs.

There is also a slight evidence which can be used to link the discrimination (at risk) status with lesser feelings of national pride. Minorities “at risk” for discrimination share lower levels of national loyalty, although not much lower than other minorities in the region. In the time of regime change, the baseline for loyalty is weakening within the society by affecting the pride feelings of many minority groups in the country. Almond and Verba (1989 [1963]) describe these as "system affected" feelings which may temporarily bias the true national attachment of a certain population. National loyalty is thus better to be conceived in the wider context of the regime change which can be seen in itself as a factor biasing the true national identity feelings.

In an extensive study on the declining of traditional values in Western Europe, Mattei Dogan (1999) has found that many individuals, members of both minority and majority groups, are still extensively proud of their nationality. Yet, the high feelings of pride in Western Europe reflect a ‘narcissistic’ path, which mainly mirror the high standards of living, the advanced democratic performance, or the country’s economic achievements (Dogan 1999; 82). At the same time, the author concluded that despite high levels of national loyalty, there is an increasing number of people starting to declare negative pride feelings in all Western European countries. To cross-test Dogan’s findings, this study explore the intensity of national pride among ethnic groups in Western Europe (Figure 6.4). Within this

autonomy in 1994 to its Gagauz minority but being hesitant to do the same for the mainly Slavic Transnistrian region.

46 Russians in Crimea are treated as a separate minority from other Russians in Ukraine. Constitutionally, Crimea holds autonomy which results in dissimilar historical, ethnic and national feelings compared with their ethnic counterparts from the eastern Ukrainian mainland.

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region, pride intensity stays at a fairly positive level and with a few exceptions the average values are not significantly different between ethnic minority and majority groups. Among few cases, ethnic minorities have higher pride feelings than the respective majority group in the country. It is the case of Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, and to a certain extend the United Kingdom. This situation is unique yet not surprising if compared with the findings from other regions in Europe. The high democratic standards guarantee extensive cultural and political rights for many Western European minorities which in turn elevate their national pride feelings.

**Figure 6.4 National Pride in Western Europe: Minority and Majority Groups**

- Belgium: Wallons + FLEMISH
- Finland: FINISH + Russians
- Italy: ITALIANS + Sardinians + Tyrians
- Spain: Gallegans + SPANISH + Catalans + Basques
- Sweden: SWEDISH + Finnish
- Switzerland: Italian Swiss + French Swiss + GERMAN SWISS
- Great Britain: Welsh + ENGLISH + Scots
- N. Ireland: PROTESTANTS + Catholics

Note: The majority groups are listed in capital letters. Ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination are marked with a “+”.
Source: EVS

Even though, there are a number of minority groups “at risk” for discrimination in Western Europe, all of them seems to be relatively comfortable with their pride status. The only visible exception is the Basque minority which exhibits considerably lower pride values than other ethnic groups in the country. Stephen Shulman (2003, 45-46) argues that within advanced democracies national identity serves as an equalizer factor which is able to bring together ethnic diversity and national cohesion in the country. Strong democracies offer a comfortable framework for all ethnic minorities to accommodate their needs while preserving
their ethnic distinctiveness. This means that in such environments, there is a tendency to treat ethnic minorities on the equal basis by the virtue of common rights deriving from the democratic practice (Shulman 2003; 45). These practices provide the necessary incentives for minority groups to invest more in feelings of national loyalty. It also may be seen as a reward for the good practices of the hosting nation.

The evidences presented in this section are conclusive with the posted research questions. National pride feelings do change across time. The national attachment in Europe is on the decreasing slope, but different for minority and majority groups. In the period between 1994 and 2004, ethnic minorities have much steeper decreasing rates in national pride as compared to majority groups. Minorities “at risk” for discrimination have, on average, the lowest feelings of national loyalty and the most abrupt decreasing trend among all sampled ethnic groups. As expected, majority groups have the most stable and constant feelings of national pride across time.

When the connection with national pride is analyzed in three different European regions, the findings exhibit different compelling trends. In Balkans, majority groups have high pride feelings while minority groups significantly lower levels of national loyalty. Given the past conflicting events and the fact that the utmost majority of minority groups in this region are labeled “at risk” for discrimination, this drift seemed predictable.

In the former Soviet East European countries, there are two different paths characterizing the state of national loyalty. In Caucasus, both ethnic minority and majority groups have on average high pride feelings. One explanation for strong national loyalty among all ethnic groups within Caucasian states can be given by the vicinity of the Russian empire. The historical struggle and resistance toward Russian influence has tightened national attachment of all ethnic minorities in these countries. The other group of former Soviet east European countries has on average low values of national pride among both minority and majority groups. Among these nations, the struggle toward democracy has created a transitional chaos which has weakened the sense of national loyalty among most of the countries’ ethnicities.

Last but not least, national attachment in Western Europe exhibits a rather reversed picture. Within this region, both ethnic minority and majority groups share, on average, equal feelings of national pride. In some instances, some minority groups have on average higher feelings of national loyalty than the dominant communities in the country. Multiculturalists would argue that these
particular trends are the result of successful assimilation and integration policies which are consistently implemented by the existing democratic institutions.

6.6 Empirical Evidence: Comparative Findings for Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups

The second part of the analysis is disclosing the empirical evidence of an ordinal probit regression with applied marginal effects. Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show the causality paths of those socio-cultural characteristics which in the existing literature have proved to affect individuals’ feelings of national pride. This section comparatively presents the obtained findings for ethnic minority and majority groups in three European regions: Balkans, Former Soviet East European countries, and Western Europe.

In the literature, discrimination proved to be a very powerful explanatory factor in assessing the degree of national loyalty. Controlling for the discrimination status, the results confirm our expectations: ethnic minorities considered “at risk” for discrimination are less likely to feel very proud of their nationality. Yet, there is substantial room for variation in the way ethnic groups perceive their attachment with the nation. In Western Europe, minorities “at risk” are very prone to feel relatively proud (quite proud) with their nationhood. In Balkans on the other hand, the results could not be correlated with the discrimination. There, roughly all ethnic minorities are labeled “at risk” for discrimination and therefore, no counterfactual sample could be established in testing the effects of “at risk” status on national loyalty.

The effects of gender exhibit a straightforward pattern. Across the entire sample, men express stronger feelings of national pride while women adopt more moderate feelings of national loyalty. Only in the sample of Balkan minorities, women prove to be more proud in the nation as compared to men, although at a relatively low significance level.

Different age cohorts have significant effects on national pride across both minority and majority populations in Europe. Yet, the results significantly vary across the analyzed European regions. In the entire sample, older cohorts have higher probability of having stronger feelings of national pride which widely confirms the stipulations from past research: that there is an outgoing declining trend in national pride among younger generations (Tilley and Heath 2007).
Irrespective of ethnic status, the youngest cohort shows to reach only the “quite proud” level in national pride. The obtained results can also be regarded as cohort effects (Smith and Jarkko 1998), with younger generations feeling less proud than older generations.

In the former communist societies, low values of national pride among young individuals can be triggered by the transition process and by feelings of seeing themselves as being the disadvantaged generation. Another explanation can rely on the growing process of globalization which proved to generally decrease the value of national pride worldwide (Smith and Kim 2006; 4).

In the process of building a cohesive national identity, many states are trying to develop special policies which could link common cultural bonds among all its citizens. One of the mechanisms used to promote such policies are through education systems where the historical, national, and cultural symbols are learned and further promoted in a continuous process described by Michael Billig (1995) as “banal nationalism”. In line with previous research, the results show that less education is positively related with stronger national pride. Within the samples of both minority and majority groups, those with only basic education have the strongest pride feelings while those with medium and high levels of education have only relative, “quite proud” considerations.

Some scholars have argued that the positive relationship between low education and stronger national pride is due to lower levels of schooling of earlier generations (Smith and Kim 2006; 5). The data confirms the proposed association by Ronald Inglehart’s (1997, 1999) post-modernization theory: that more educated individuals are more cosmopolitan and therefore, have lower probability of being loyal to their nation. More educated individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan and internationalized in their behaviour which by definition weakens the identification with national values. Given the same causality pattern among both minority a majority groups I tend to believe that this could be indeed the case.

Wealth is another important factor which was expected to significantly influence the pride attitudes in Europe. Data shows that less wealthy people are more likely to have stronger national pride values. Among majority groups, this causality is especially highly significant in the former Soviet countries and less significant in Western Europe. Similarly, there are no significant results connecting the income and minority status in Western Europe where this particular pattern was expected to be strong.
Table 6.2: Determinants for National Pride Values among *Ethnic Minority* Groups: Marginal Effects of an Ordinal Probit Regression with Applied Fixed Effects (Mundlack terms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quite Proud</th>
<th>Other Communist/Balkans</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
<th>Western Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk’ for discrimination (ref. ‘Not at risk’)</td>
<td>-0.0865 (0.0543)</td>
<td>-0.00107 (0.0880)</td>
<td>0.0218*** (0.0658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>0.0112 (0.0694)</td>
<td>-0.0115** (0.0494)</td>
<td>0.0163** (0.0806)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.0368 (0.0833)</td>
<td>0.000181 (0.0560)</td>
<td>-0.00240 (0.0106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50+) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.00217 (0.0868)</td>
<td>0.0106** (0.0493)</td>
<td>-0.0228* (0.0125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.00526 (0.0780)</td>
<td>0.00954 (0.0764)</td>
<td>0.0279*** (0.0907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0199 (0.0169)</td>
<td>0.00152 (0.0714)</td>
<td>0.0119 (0.0118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.00710 (0.0941)</td>
<td>-0.0118* (0.0697)</td>
<td>-0.000229 (0.0958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0245* (0.0132)</td>
<td>-0.0100 (0.0734)</td>
<td>-0.0181 (0.0129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious person (ref. not religious)</td>
<td>-0.0264*** (0.0996)</td>
<td>0.0231*** (0.0651)</td>
<td>-0.0314*** (0.0918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.00167 (0.0823)</td>
<td>0.00831 (0.0680)</td>
<td>-0.0143* (0.0802)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.0137 (0.0151)</td>
<td>0.00947** (0.0477)</td>
<td>-0.0427 (0.0277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority – relative (ref. positive))</td>
<td>-0.0263*** (0.0792)</td>
<td>-0.0203*** (0.0783)</td>
<td>0.0212*** (0.0647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)</td>
<td>-0.0703*** (0.0312)</td>
<td>-0.0785*** (0.0280)</td>
<td>0.00720 (0.0945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.0197** (0.0811)</td>
<td>0.0119*** (0.0441)</td>
<td>-0.0255 (0.0198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.0147*** (0.0526)</td>
<td>0.00656 (0.0584)</td>
<td>-0.0297** (0.0137)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.2 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Very Proud</th>
<th>Other Communist/Balkans</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union</th>
<th>Western Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘At risk’ for discrimination (ref. ‘Not at risk’)</td>
<td>-0.104 (0.0757)</td>
<td>-0.220*** (0.0262)</td>
<td>-0.0901*** (0.0280)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>0.0483* (0.0287)</td>
<td>-0.0475** (0.0189)</td>
<td>-0.0555** (0.0255)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.00159 (0.0360)</td>
<td>0.000748 (0.0232)</td>
<td>0.00811 (0.0354)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50+) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.00964 (0.0394)</td>
<td>0.0523* (0.0272)</td>
<td>0.0752** (0.0381)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0227 (0.0335)</td>
<td>0.0371 (0.0281)</td>
<td>-0.104*** (0.0304)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0634 (0.0416)</td>
<td>0.00649 (0.0313)</td>
<td>-0.192*** (0.0311)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0289 (0.0359)</td>
<td>-0.0425** (0.0215)</td>
<td>0.000780 (0.0326)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0844** (0.0358)</td>
<td>-0.0362 (0.0230)</td>
<td>0.0569 (0.0366)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious person (ref. not religious)</td>
<td>-0.114*** (0.0363)</td>
<td>0.0953*** (0.0210)</td>
<td>0.107*** (0.0266)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.00726 (0.0362)</td>
<td>0.0319 (0.0238)</td>
<td>0.0553 (0.0350)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.0479 (0.0431)</td>
<td>0.116*** (0.0358)</td>
<td>0.108* (0.0565)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive)</td>
<td>-0.137*** (0.0304)</td>
<td>-0.0658*** (0.0193)</td>
<td>-0.0907*** (0.0261)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)</td>
<td>-0.143*** (0.0366)</td>
<td>-0.129*** (0.0249)</td>
<td>-0.0277 (0.0414)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.0913*** (0.0335)</td>
<td>0.0569*** (0.0212)</td>
<td>0.0792 (0.0560)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.117*** (0.0441)</td>
<td>0.128*** (0.0336)</td>
<td>0.110** (0.0523)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 685  N 1,389  N 1,168
adj. R-sq 0.04  adj. R-sq 0.07  adj. R-sq 0.05

Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6.3. Determinants for National Pride Values among *Ethnic Majority* Groups: Marginal Effects of an Ordinal Probit Regression with Applied Fixed Effects (Mundlack terms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quite Proud</th>
<th>Other Communist/Balkans</th>
<th>Former Soviet</th>
<th>Western Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>0.0220***</td>
<td>0.0175***</td>
<td>-0.00647 (0.0651)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>-0.0210**</td>
<td>-0.0170***</td>
<td>0.0208*** (0.0825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50&gt;) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>-0.0503***</td>
<td>-0.0424***</td>
<td>0.000303 (0.0914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0369***</td>
<td>-0.00156</td>
<td>0.0705*** (0.0737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0633***</td>
<td>0.00577</td>
<td>0.0720*** (0.0510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.0168*</td>
<td>0.0184***</td>
<td>-0.0281*** (0.0904)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>0.00464</td>
<td>0.0222***</td>
<td>0.00377 (0.0907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious person (ref. not religious)</td>
<td>-0.0537***</td>
<td>-0.0493***</td>
<td>-0.0185*** (0.0697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>0.0571***</td>
<td>0.0108 (0.0820)</td>
<td>-0.0150* (0.0823)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>0.0498***</td>
<td>-0.00369 (0.0966)</td>
<td>-0.0326** (0.0142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority – relative (ref. positive))</td>
<td>0.0466***</td>
<td>0.0396*** (0.0491)</td>
<td>0.0428*** (0.0642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)</td>
<td>0.0746***</td>
<td>0.0446*** (0.0344)</td>
<td>0.0567*** (0.0607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>-0.0451***</td>
<td>-0.0429*** (0.0605)</td>
<td>-0.0348** (0.0146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>-0.0755***</td>
<td>-0.125*** (0.0130)</td>
<td>-0.0505*** (0.0123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.3 (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Very Proud</th>
<th>Other Communist/Balkans Former Soviet</th>
<th>Former Soviet</th>
<th>Western Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref. Male)</td>
<td>-0.0422***</td>
<td>-0.0420*** (0.0125) 0.0133 (0.0134)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults (30-49) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.0402**</td>
<td>0.0401*** (0.0150) -0.0436** (0.0175)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (50&gt;) (ref. young 15-29)</td>
<td>0.0933***</td>
<td>0.0942*** (0.0170) -0.000625 (0.0189)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0705***</td>
<td>0.00374 (0.0206) -0.153*** (0.0159)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level education (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.136***</td>
<td>-0.0140 (0.0228) -0.204*** (0.0178)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.0325*</td>
<td>-0.0455*** (0.0147) 0.0567*** (0.0178)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income (ref. low)</td>
<td>-0.00897</td>
<td>-0.0560*** (0.0160) -0.00781 (0.0188)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious person (ref. not religious)</td>
<td>0.103***</td>
<td>0.118*** (0.0142) 0.0381*** (0.0143)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate political views (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.107***</td>
<td>-0.0255 (0.0190) 0.0317* (0.0177)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing preferences (ref. left-wing preferences)</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>0.00874 (0.0227) 0.0625** (0.0254)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive)</td>
<td>-0.0905***</td>
<td>-0.103*** (0.0132) -0.0961*** (0.0153)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority - negative (ref. positive)</td>
<td>-0.179***</td>
<td>-0.160*** (0.0199) -0.136*** (0.0164)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.0863***</td>
<td>0.100*** (0.0134) 0.0694** (0.0283)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the life)</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td>0.233*** (0.0196) 0.108*** (0.0272)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 4,655</td>
<td></td>
<td>N 5,371</td>
<td>N 4,949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. R-sq 0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>adj. R-sq 0.03</td>
<td>adj. R-sq 0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
However, it is in this region and among majority groups that the middle-income individuals are more inclined to be loyal to their nation. According to Hylland-Eriksen (2002 [1993]), a strong national identity promote solidarity amongst rich and poor. Moreover, Stephen Schulman (2003; 46) believes that strong feelings of national identity is perceived as an equalizer factor within society where poorer individuals proved to be more attached to their nationality than the richer segments of the population. Especially in the transition countries where prosperity is not prevailing among large masses of populations, poor individuals might have additional psychological incentives to invest more in a positive national pride than in the well established democracies (Schulman 2003; 46).

There is a growing literature which focuses extensively on the specific relation between religion and national identity. The importance of religiosity for national values is usually negotiated within society (Kunovich 2003; 2), especially when a multiethnic and multi-religious environment is involved. As predicted, religiosity is shown to be an important and strong connecter between ethnicity and national pride. The results show that ethnic-minority individuals in Balkan countries which do not put too much weight on religious practice are 11 times more probable to develop strong or moderate national pride values. Religious diversity in Balkans makes it hard to impose faith as the leading sense toward national loyalty among minority groups. The mix of religious beliefs in this region still makes many individuals to place their in-group-religion above their feelings of nationhood which in turn weaken the solidarity surrounding national pride. For Max Weber (2003) this would be a traditional or religion-oriented approach toward national identity values which contrast with the modern, rational-legal view (which is seen mainly as an appendage of the Western democratic societies).

On opposite, members of minority groups which are religious in former USSR countries or in Western European democracies are up to 10 times more likely to have very strong feelings of national pride. Results for majority groups also conclude that religious believers have stronger national pride bonds all other Europe. Since almost all European countries are made by mono-religious practice, the shared religious values represent a gluing factor for ethnic communities and a strong provider for national pride. It may also correspond to the generation effect, meaning that older cohorts tend to be more proud but also more religious than younger generations (Tilley and Heath 2007; 667).

Generally, powerful religious beliefs are found on the European periphery, where church still has retained its influence in the traditional institutions in the society, such as schools, social welfare, culture (Dogan 1994; 81). In such countries religious practice acts as powerful nationalistic component in the formation of a strong national identity. On the same time, several scholars have pointed out on the
continuous decreasing role of religious practices and beliefs, especially in the Western and Central Europe (Acquaviva 1979; Dogan 1994; 81). One can think of the weakening of the traditional religious values in a post-modernist society to which Europe is driving nowadays. Given the fact that religion has not been very frequently included in previous empirical research on national pride, these results recommend it for further investigation.

Radical political views are usually regarded as strong incentives to boost nationalistic feelings. Data shows that ethnic minorities with right-wing political preferences are more prone to develop strong national pride attitudes in former Soviet and Western European countries. A more diverse picture can be seen when shifting the attention toward majority populations. Against our expectations, the Balkan right-wing supporters among majority population prove to be less proud of their nationality. This result might reflect the repulsion of individuals toward the rightist nationalistic doctrine which instigated the Balkan civil wars during the 1990s. In Western Europe however, the results are in line with our expectations. Within this region, the majority-group individuals with right-wing political preferences are significantly prone to strong national pride feelings.

Closely linked with religion, the belief in authority is one of the main traditional pillars of many nation states (Dogan 1994, 77). The data employed in our study shows a strong and significant causality between negative attitudes toward authority and lower national pride values across both minority and majority groups. In other words, those having greater respect for authority/leadership are highly attached to their nationality. This result seems unsurprisingly considering the massive decline in trust in authority worldwide (Inglehart 1999; 1). The results also indicate that, among minority groups, respect for authority is higher in former communist societies. As Robert Samuelson (1997) and Ronald Inglehart (1999) believe, there is not a straightforward answer for why this could be the case. Many former communist East European countries are more challenged in terms of having weak institutions or irregular rates of trust in political leadership. Ineffectiveness of the existing government, corruption, poverty – all these could make minority groups less eager supporting strong leadership settings.

This empirical evidence obliges us to make a clear separation between national pride and the legitimacy of the authority. Many European countries have traditionally lower rates of confidence in the institutional and political authority (Dogan 1994, 87). Yet, the legitimacy of regimes is not challenged since the virtue of democracy is to provide a reasonable framework for peaceful change of the political game. Therefore, individuals who do not trust their political leadership still have sufficient channels to express their national pride feelings. Drawing from
the literature, our results rely on the idea that in nowadays Europe, individuals still need to anchor their national pride values to a strong sense of authority.

The individuals’ life-being is also an important adherent factor predicting national pride attitudes. In line with the initial expectations, the results show a strong, positive and significant causality between high feelings of life satisfaction and high national pride feelings among both ethnic minority and majority populations. One might conclude that a positive sense of life satisfaction goes beyond the ethnicity factor and proves to give people sufficient adherence for feeling loyal to the nation.

6.7 Conclusions

The purpose of this analysis was set to explore the substance of national pride values by applying a comparative perspective at two levels: across ethnic status (minority – majority) and across different European regions (Balkans, Former USSR, and Western Europe). In order to get a better assessment of the national pride feelings, the minority sample was further split between ethnis “at risk” and those “not at risk” for discrimination in each sampled country. Besides, the variation in national pride has been analyzed by integrating a temporal dimension which comprises two consecutive waves in the European Values Survey. At the same time, the empirical method used in this study has allowed us to comparatively analyse national pride in its hierarchical composition (not proud, relatively proud, and very proud).

This study is structured upon the consideration that people usually build cultural barriers around their ethnic identities. This means that national pride tends to be approached through these specific group-based beliefs. When someone is about to make a choice involving supra-ethnic values, there can be seen little space for compromise or negotiation for adopting additional identity feelings. The rigidity of people’s beliefs can be widely seen all the way across the presented outcomes of this study.

Throughout the analysis, it was observed that there is a constant tendency among majority groups to feel more proud in the nation in all European countries. The exception is provided by some West-European democracies where minority groups seem to be well integrated in their host societies and showing greater than average feelings of national pride. One might carefully stipulate that higher feelings of pride among these minority groups could be the direct results of
efficient policies of assimilation and accommodation achieved by democratic institutions in many Western European societies.

The analysis also concluded that status of perceived discrimination among ethnic minorities seems to lower the feelings of national loyalty. There is a strong, positive and significant effect between the status of being “at risk” for discrimination and week feelings of national pride among the minority-group subsample. All other Europe, disadvantaged minorities have lower desire and lower probabilities to be highly attached to their hosting nation. This study reiterates the idea of considering pride and ethnic diversity always in connection with the status of discrimination of the analyzed minority sample.

By including a temporal view over the analyzed period (1994-2004), the analysis has revealed a general decreasing trend in national pride feelings over the decade. The subsample of minorities “at risk” for discrimination have both the lower levels of positive national pride values and the steeper decreasing rate in feelings of national loyalty over time. Majority groups, on opposite, have constant and stronger pride values across time.

The constant negative relationship between being “at risk” for discrimination and frail pride feelings, prompts us to consider that further tensions involving interethnic mobilisation events are still possible in some parts of Europe. Despite decades of democracy and efforts toward tolerance and acceptance of ethnic diversity, there are nonetheless profound discrimination roots in many European societies. In order to better assess the context of national cohesion, additional research is recommended to deeply analyse the way the attachment with the nation could be mediated along the discrimination and ethnic lines.

Our findings also emphasize the importance of analyzing national attachment in a comparative perspective across different European regions. There is a powerful sense of nationalism in Balkans. The evidence shows relatively high pride values among all majority groups in this region while almost all ethnic minorities in the area have, on opposite, weaker feelings of national loyalty. In the former Soviet East European states, there are two different patterns in national pride feelings among the observed ethnic groups. In Caucasus, there are remarkably high pride sentiments across both minority and majority groups. Inversely, the Baltic States, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus exhibit low national pride values among both minority and majority populations. In Western European democracies, there is a highly homogenized pattern underlying relatively high attitudes of national pride among both minority and majority groups. As previously mentioned, it is in this region that some ethnic minority groups prove to have higher feelings of national loyalty than the majority ethnic group in the country.
The intensity to which national pride is adopted by individuals also varies across groups when associated with structural and socio-demographic characteristics. The applied empirical model has analysed the intensity of national pride in its hierarchic order and has tested the impact of the employed characteristics on each level of the dependent variable. Thus it was found that individuals perceive differently the two positive national pride feelings: being “relatively proud” and “very proud”. In general, ethnic minority members are more likely to feel loyal to their country if they are men (women in Balkans); older people; poor, religious (less religious in Balkans), less educated individuals, having right wing preferences, high respect for authority, and satisfied with their everyday life. These patterns slightly differ across European regions given many reasons one could sense from the ideological and social background of each enclosed sample.

Comparatively, majority-group individuals standing more loyal to their nations are men and adult citizens (youngsters in Western Europe), less educated and religious, poor or middle class, left wing supporters in Balkans and right-wing and moderate followers in Western Europe, attached to a strong sense of authority and satisfied with their general life condition.

The diversity of the obtained findings suggests the need for further investigation of some interesting causalities. Because religiousness proves to be a strong, yet a diverse predictor of national pride, the role of religion should be further investigated in relation to nationalistic feelings. The strong association between national pride and the desire for powerful authority may also serve as an idea for future research. This study would be more complete if the dynamics of national pride could be modelled in a temporal dimension. Since the attitudes toward national loyalty are volatile and time-varying, the dynamics of national pride should certainly be the target for further research. The way people change their attitudes across time would be by far the biggest academic challenge but also an impressive achievement for future studies in the field of identity values.
7. Concluding Remarks
7.1 Summary Note

There are few socio-political phenomena which are as complex and volatile as the ethnopolitical movements worldwide. Many valuable contributions have dealt with this complexity and it is not an understatement to say that nowadays, ethnic contention is one of the most researched topics in social sciences. Across years, a wide spectrum of theoretical and empirical settings has been produced in a constant effort of explaining the mechanisms behind people’s choices to engage in violent or peaceful protesting actions. Many contributions are valuable in conceptualizing the patterns of conflict on a general scale and yet, most of them are unable to fully grasp the dynamics within and between different levels of ethnic contention.

This thesis addressed the within-levels variation of ethnopolitical contention and its implications for assessing the mechanisms at work modeling the intensity of protest mobilization in Europe. It contributed to both theoretical and empirical debates by filling specific conceptual gaps and by extending the arguments beyond the existing methodological norms. Chapter 2 explored the need of a theoretical model which would account for variations in different levels of ethnopolitical contention. The link between different theoretical preconditions and the development of conflict was also approached in this chapter, geared to the case of Europe. Chapter 3 empirically investigated the development of ethnopolitical protest among minorities “at risk” in Europe. It searched for similarities and differences between different intensity levels in a temporal perspective. The empirical analysis was further extended in Chapter 4 to integrate both minority and majority groups in a counterfactual comparison. In this chapter, the analysis moved beyond the group profile and investigated ethnopolitical contention as a sum of individual-level socio-demographic factors, identity feelings, and political beliefs. Chapter 5 consequently approached ethnic contention from a new methodological perspective. It adopted a technique from configurational comparative analysis (fuzzy sets) to study which theoretical set preconditions are necessary and sufficient to shape the consistency of ethnopolitical protest in Europe. Finally, Chapter 6 provided an in-depth investigation of the differences in national pride feelings across ethnic minority and majority groups in the larger European region.

The contribution of these chapters lies in investigating two main research issues mentioned in the introduction of this thesis. First goal gravitates around the need
of acknowledging the volatility of ethnopolitical contention by assessing all actions of unrest in their hierarchical stream. The analyses presented in this thesis grasp ethnic contention across an inclusive sample composed of both ethnic minority and majority groups. It also attempted to integrate a temporal view in the analysis of protest dynamics and revealed the time-varying facet of ethnopolitical mobilization.

In line with the research directions established by the first objective, there are several general concluding remarks which can be emphasized. First, there are significant differences within ethnic minority sample in the way people choose to protest. Under certain conditions, more integrated minority groups protest higher and more intensely than minorities “at risk” and/or majority groups (Chapter 4). Thus, the existing belief in the literature (Gurr 1970; Gurr 2000; Gurr and Moore 1997; Fox 2002; Lindström and Moore 1995; Saideman and Ayres 2000), that more discrimination positively correlates with more protest, is not completely sustainable.

Second, by employing a temporal angle over ethnopolitical contention it was revealed the rigidity of the protest transition rates between different intensity levels in time (Chapter 3, Chapter 4). This means that ethnic groups maximize their mobilization goals less by choosing to advance or regress on various protest intensity scales but more by relying on the substitution effect of different existent preconditions as described in Figure 2.1 (Chapter 2).

Third, there are distinct paths of protest mobilization when it comes to each intensity level. Across the mobilized ethnic groups, low intensity contention has distinct and contrasting explanatory trails as compared to medium and high intensity protest (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5). In line with the theoretical reason described in Figure 2.1 (Chapter 2), one might successfully argue that the substitution effects for the applied preconditions have different rationales alongside protest spectrum. In sum, each action of ethnopolitical contention should be regarded in its distinct path, instead of considering protest a general, one-leveled phenomenon.

The second focus of this thesis was directed towards analyzing national pride feelings in connection to both ethnic diversity and protest mobilization in Europe. This is a relatively new measure of national identity which quantifies the emotional attachment of ethnic communities to national values in cultural diverse environments. The scope of this analysis was to identify a reliable measure which can bind national cohesion feelings and explain the mobilization paths among both ethnic minority and majority groups in Europe. The established objective and the conducted analyses have proved the relevance of the identity indicator in the
overall structure of this thesis. Strong national pride was found to be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the absence of strong ethnopolitical protest (Chapter 5). This implies a significant role which identity feelings play in the theoretical framework (Figure 2.1) of this thesis. Among different ethnic communities, strong feelings of national pride were found among majority groups and among more integrated minority populations (Chapter 6). This particular pattern underlines the role of multicultural policies in building cohesive national identity values among European ethnic minority groups. Yet, this thesis acknowledges the volatility of the ‘national pride’ notion adopted by EVS, which links the value of ‘nation’ and ‘national’ in relation to the state and the majority groups.

Although the conceptual framework of this book was designed to sustain a significant theoretical role, all chapters have integrated a strong empirical component. The conceptual part of this thesis was thought to move beyond the mere theoretical debate and be relevant and of value added for all those working with the practical side of ethnic contention. The empirical part was carried out by using both qualitative and quantitative methods merged in a coherent and complex mix-method research design. The rationale behind the use of a combination of approaches was to target ethnopolitical contention in its more intimate detail. The thesis’s main findings with respect to the main goals are discussed more thoroughly in the following sections. This chapter concludes by elaborating on the needs for future research.

7.2 Ethnopolitical Protest: An Intense and Dynamic Phenomenon

Despite the increased attention in the study of ethnic contention in the last decades, there are still limited attempts in assessing the within dynamics (between different levels) of conflict among ethnic communities worldwide. Given the existing gaps in the literature, there is an emerging need of an approach geared towards capturing ethnopolitical contention in its dynamic configuration. The conceptual framework of this thesis is based on assessing the substitution effects among four sets of theoretical preconditions proved to hold relevance in understanding the multidimensional facet of ethnopolitical contention in Europe: deprivation, mobilisation environment, socio-political determinants, and the shared values of identity. On the one hand, this approach provides insights into and understanding of the precise motivators pushing ethnic groups to become mobilized at one level.
or another. It acknowledges the need of taking into account the time dependence as being a polishing factor for mobilization preferences. It also considers the European fluctuating reality and the long-term adverse effects coming from discrimination and other backward conditions in the decision to protest. On the other hand, the adopted approach was cross-tested at different empirical levels for the purpose of identifying exactly those sets of preconditions that are most relevant to comprehend the causes and the reasoning behind the actions of ethnopolitical contention in Europe.

In Europe, violent conflicts are rare and contingent to snapshot events which are very unlikely to be perpetuated in time. Yet, ethnopolitical movements do occur on a regular basis, which reflects various degrees of grievances and political struggle for greater socio-political rights in ethnically-diverse environments. While employing a reliable sample of ethnic minorities “at risk” for discrimination we have found that since 1989, there is a general decreasing trend in ethnopolitical protest in Europe. This type of mobilization varies in intensity, from symbolic protest up to mass demonstrations and rioting. Therefore, when approaching this trend one question appears logical: is protest decreasing steadily all the way across its intensity hierarchy? The answer is no. Although the most-intense protest activities decreased, the low-level (symbolic) protest increased markedly all across Europe. This means that ethnic groups remained mobilised but gradually shifted the intensity of their actions towards more symbolic ways of protest.

In order to check for the speed of the transition rates from one form of protest to another, the analysis has measured the dynamics of protest actions over a time period of 13 years (1990-2003). The transition rates have shown that those ethnic groups that originally stayed lowly mobilized were more prone to keep this initial condition over time. At the same time, a considerable proportion of highly mobilized groups still remained in the same status of protest over years. Only less than half of the highly mobilized minority groups chose to decrease their level of protest to lower intensity levels. This means that across years, the most stable actions of unrest are those in the lower and higher part of the protest spectrum. Also, evidence shows that ethnic groups shift their protest actions mainly to the neighbouring levels, and limited empirics were found of extreme transition rates. With confidence, one may conclude that protest dynamics follow a straightforward path: ethnic groups label their actions of protest to certain intensity levels and are willing to keep that particular status active over time.

The time dimension of ethnopolitical protest has been further integrated in a more complex empirical model which assessed the probability of being engaged in a certain level of protest given the previous status in ethnic unrest. Ethnic groups which have been engaged in no-protest or low intensity protest in \( t-1 \), have a
higher probability of being currently in no-protest. On the contrary, those groups being in medium or high intensity protest in t-1 have a higher probability of keeping the same status over time. These tendencies reveal the rigidity towards change in the status of ethnic mobilization among European ethnic minorities. As in the case of the transition rates presented above, one may conclude that the probability of radical changes in protest over time is very slim. In other words, these results suggest that time dependency, either positively or negatively affecting protest intensity, will keep the same slowly changing pattern in the coming future.

According to the statistical analysis, politically discriminated minorities protest at the highest levels. When taking the regional factor into account, “at risk” ethnicities in Western democracies engage less in mass protest than do ethnic groups in former communist countries. From all tested conditions, one result appears challenging. Since Europe is thought to be a cultural drift where three main religions meet, this study was very interested to test whether Huntington’s theory over the clash of civilizations holds for the ethnopolitical contention in Europe. While the prediction was that protest mobilization would be stimulated by cultural lines, the empirical findings did not find any significant and consistent correlation linking religious denomination with higher levels of protest. What would look like the rejection of Huntington’s theory, in reality is the mismatch between what “clash” is thought to be in relation to the conflict scale adopted by this thesis (peaceful protest vs. violent contention). In general, ethnopolitical protest is more adapted to cope with issues arising from cultural diversity and poses relatively weak challenge for the idea of intercultural clashes.

Among the traditional indicators predicting the intensity of ethnopolitical mobilization, some have proved to have strong significant connections with the outburst of powerful protest all over Europe. Geographical concentration and intra-group frictions seem to be strong significant factors in predicting the appearance of ethnic protest. In the same context, both semi-democratic and strong democracies successfully accommodate high protesting actions. Alike, ethnic mobilization is more active in ethnically divided societies. On the contrary, minorities with strong group identity/distinctiveness engage more in low-intensity protest but less in mass demonstrations. By considering the rights for association, I found that their presence provides ethnic minorities with fewer incentives to engage in high-level protest. Finally, the status of political discrimination stimulates the desire for high intensity protest across all sampled minority groups.

One important disparity appears when comparing how ethnic mobilisation is influenced by democracy levels in the one hand, and regional belonging to a democratic or transitional group of countries, on the other. High democracy scores are significantly correlated with strong protest. At the same time the well-
established democracies in Western Europe prove to better accommodate ethnic diversity. Results show that minorities protest less in the old European democracies than in the former communist societies. This means that the democratic status achieved through the transition process is still lacking proper mechanisms to address ethnic diversity in a way which allows for an extensive decrease in ethnic mobilisation over time.

In sum, the obtained results indicate that the empirical analysis of peaceful mobilization can provide fruitful yet challenging results. Against all odds, ethnopolitical protest in Europe has proved to be a timely rigid phenomenon. Although decreasing over time, protest mobilization moved mainly between neighbouring levels of unrest and only in exceptional cases minority groups choose to shift their level of unrest from one protest extremity to another. At the same time, the applied preconditions impact differently on the hierarchical scale of protest among ethnic minorities in Europe. Consequently, to fully understand and fairly interpret the estimates produced by a dynamic conceptual model of contention, one has to grasp both its conceptual framework, and its technical and empirical foundations. These generic outcomes create the enabling conditions to further build transparent and empirically based approaches studying ethnopolitical contention.

7.3 Protest as Political Action: Mobilized Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups in a Comparative Perspective

In this thesis, the analysis of ethnopolitical contention is considered from a multidimensional perspective. It integrates country specific, group related and individual based profiles analyzed from diverse empirical angles. The Minorities at Risk data has provided an excellent framework for conducting and testing a dynamic conceptual model targeting the variation in choice between different levels of unrest among ethnic minorities in Europe. Yet, the MAR empirical framework limits the applicability of the designed theoretical model given its criteria “at risk”. To a certain extend it can be regarded as a subjective way of categorizing some ethnic groups while at the same time significantly skewing the exclusion of other relevant minority groups. This leads to a certain degree of selection bias and any results driven from the MAR sample cannot keep full representativeness over the whole spectrum of minority populations. At the same
time, the possibility of a counterfactual reasoning is not possible in MAR since the majority populations are not included in the sample, and thus cannot be approached comparatively. The empirical design of this thesis addresses these limitations, mainly by assessing the intensity of political activism using a sample which integrates both ethnic minority and majority populations. The included minority groups are further split into two subsamples: those classified “at risk”, and those which are not officially part of the MAR typology.

The generic theoretical framework developed in this thesis was adapted to the multidimensional and European-specific ethnic contention approach to ensure a careful inclusion of a wide spectrum of concepts and indicators needed to comprehend the complexity of our final outcomes. In addition to the commonly used conditions analyzing ethnic contention as a function of group mobilization, this thesis encompassed also a measure for different intensities of the ethnopolitical activism at the level of individual feelings and beliefs. The correspondence of individual and group measures of ethnic contention enables the use of both approaches as complementary to one another. In this case, one can estimate the common features of the two approaches which can serve as a blueprint for developing a merged design for similar studies in Europe or other regions worldwide.

The empirical findings emphasized a number of relevant outcomes linking political activism and ethnic diversity. The results relate to both minority and majority groups, their political preferences, national identity feelings, socio-demographic features and their preferences to protest at different intensity levels. Given the richness in empirical findings, they will not be repeated here but summarized as general conclusions. Results have shown that overall, minority-groups protest at a higher intensity as compared to the majority groups. More specifically, ethnic minorities which are not disadvantaged in their host societies tend to protest more extensively and at higher intensity levels. Over the analysed decade, ethnic minorities have steeper increasing rates in protesting actions, especially among those which are classified as being “at risk” for discrimination. When including these patterns of protest in the conducted empirical model it was found that minorities “at risk” are more likely to protest at symbolic levels and are less prone to be mobilised at higher, more extreme levels. Several explanations are engaged in clarifying this relationship. From a multiculturalist viewpoint, less accommodated minorities have low incentives to participate in civic political actions. It is seen as a tendency of rejecting those sets of civic participation which are adopted by the dominant or the majority population in the country. At the same time, in order to protest at higher levels, there are certain institutional settings to be overpassed. These settings might become monopolized by specific ethnic groups, usually by the majority population (Gillon 2006). In most cases, the access to high levels of
protest may be institutionally permissible in a preferential way, and only for certain segments of the nation.

Specific characteristics at the level of individual feelings were found to contribute to the desire to protest at different intensity levels. Both minority and majority groups with strong feelings of national pride are less likely to be involved in a powerful protest. At the same time, those who are very proud of their nation, are keener to engage in more moderate, symbolic protest activities. National pride can be thus regarded both as a mediator for the intensity of protest at its peak levels, and as a motivator for political activism in its emerging, attentive phase. In an environment prone to ethnic diversity and ethnopoliical mobilisation, there has always been a need for a gluing factor which could close the gap between ethnic status, the resulting stereotypes and possible mobilisation reasons. In a diverse ethnic environment, every individual is subject to a dual identity. At the bottom of individual feelings stays the primordial perception of fitting in a certain ethnic status. There should be however a certain amount of interethnic cohesion going beyond ethnic symbolism and applicable at the national level. It is exactly these supra-ethnic feelings which were found to moderate high intensity contention in Europe.

Overall, the desire to become mobilised is widely influenced by the societal needs in which individuals reside. Nowadays, it is believed that an intergeneration shift is on the way to be completed: from a paradigm driven by pure Materialistic needs towards a more advanced Post-materialist society (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). This means that the rationale governing people’s choice for mobilisation is also influenced by the existing Post-materialistic values. The empirical findings highlight this shift, with people relying on Post-materialistic settings to engage in more intense protesting actions.

The risk of engaging in ethnopoliical protest varies also according to socio-demographic characteristics. Notable is the importance of gender (women – for low intensity protest), better education, and younger age in increasing the desire for strong protest actions. It is important to see limited disparity between demographic and ethnic groups in decreasing or increasing the risk of protest actions. It suggests a large degree of flat opportunities for engaging in protest among all socio-demographic segments of the population in Europe.

To conclude, this analysis provides sufficient evidence to redefine some of the existing opinions over protest mobilisation in connection to ethnic diversity in the current literature. Ethnic minority and majority groups have different mobilization paths driven by distinct feelings and perceptions over societal values. Specific elements from the analysis, such as national pride or Post-materialist values have a
highly explanatory potential and are worth being analyzed in future similar studies.

7.4 Ethnopolitical Protest as a Function of Necessity and Sufficiency

This chapter contributes to a large extend to the methodological debate regarding the options and the limitations of using different empirical tools in analysing the diversity of ethnopolitical contention. Nowadays, the data is widely available and the use of various methodological designs widespread. Given the unavoidable limitations inherent to any of the methodological approaches, a conflict analysis based on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative designs ensures that the conceptual weaknesses of one method can be bypassed by the use of the other. By combining different methodological views, one can prevent the rejection of an analysis of ethnic contention, based purely on sampling or conceptual grounds.

Given the commitment towards a mix-method design, this thesis employs a fuzzy-set technique to test for the status of necessity and sufficiency among a pool of conditions for the two poles of ethnopolitical protest: strong dissent and the absence of ethnic unrest. This technique was set to transcend the borders of the case and variable oriented approaches by allowing the researcher to be involved and contribute with qualitative knowledge to the consistency of each case under analysis. The use of the qualitative insights on quantitative data illustrates the match between the observed and the theoretical approaches in the study of different facets of ethnopolitical contention.

The choice of conditions has come naturally by taking into account the observed correlation from previous empirical research. In total, five conditions have been employed in designing the fuzzy-set model: democracy level, political discrimination, geographical concentration, ethnic fractionalization, and national pride feelings. In explaining the emergence of strong ethnopolitical protest, the condition of compact territorial location fulfils the status of necessity. However, this condition alone cannot guarantee the emergence of strong protest. Usually, such a complex phenomenon is conditioned by a combination of factors, the so called “multiple conjunctural causation" (Ragin 1987). Thus, the following combination of conditions embraces the status of sufficiency for strong protest mobilization: (1) a democratic environment, (2) a high degree of ethnic
fractionalization in the country, and (3) either weak feelings of national pride or a compact territorial location.

For the absence of protest mobilization there are two measures achieving the consistency threshold for the status of necessity: (1) strong national pride among members of the minority group and (2) the absence of political discrimination against the ethnic community. The conjunctural position leading to the status of sufficiency for the absence of protest is composed from (1) strong feelings of national pride, (2) limited political discrimination, and (3) the minority group should reside in an emerging democratic environment. These findings however must be approached as time varying measures. Since both conditions and the outcome are highly unpredictable, many minority groups may only temporary stay in the observed area of sufficiency over time.

The empirical findings illustrate that the underlying conceptual differences between the presence and the absence of protest mobilization are characterized by diverging configurations in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Strong protest is more present in advanced democratic systems and more absent in emerging democracies. Strong national pride feelings highly influence the absence of protest as it was stipulated by the sufficiency formulas. At the same time, the condition of political discrimination proved its meaningfulness only in relation to the absence of strong protest mobilization. Ethnic fractionalization and compact geographical location, are sufficient and to a certain extent necessary in the mobilization equation only when activated for pursuing strong protesting actions. Findings thus suggest that one approach toward measuring strong levels of protest cannot serve as a proxy for understanding the other side of the outcome. The interplay between specific conditions explaining one level of protest requires careful consideration, as the measurement of necessity and sufficiency are expected to diverge when different levels of contention are targeted.

The fuzzy-set models overcome the risk that ethnopolar contentions pivots on a one-sided perception of protest mobilization. It reveals a diversified picture where the different protest outcomes are only partially dependent on the similar sets of conceptual conditions in identifying the status of necessity or sufficiency. The fuzzy-set technique also allows for detecting the outlier cases while providing sufficient evidence for moving the analysis toward a case-study approach. Conceptualizing ethnic contention as a conjunctural phenomenon extends the fuzzy-set approach beyond a standard empirical analysis and provides enough incentives to rearrange older theoretical debates, a characteristic which the conventional quantitative models cannot easily do.
7.5 National Pride and Ethnic Diversity

In the process of explaining ethnic mobilization, there was one condition which constantly offered a significant option in explaining the choice for unrest. Reflecting a feeling rather than a particular characteristic, national pride can be comprehended as a measure for national identity, or a patriotic value, or just a code for evaluating the degree of civic nationalism. This thesis finds that a high value of national pride prevails over the minority-majority status and the condition of discrimination by bringing high desires for low intensity protest. It was also revealed that strong feelings of national pride do influence ethnopolitical mobilization by reducing the intensity to which both individuals and ethnic groups engage in powerful protesting actions. A strong national belonging is relevant in the context of Benedict Anderson’s idea of an “imagined community” – a shared value of a common national affinity for all members of the nation. In a multiethnic society, it gives a sense of harmony, where all members understand and trust each others. Especially, for many members of an ethnic minority group, living their daily life in a multicultural community rise problems related to national belonging, acceptance and unity.

The general findings emphasize the importance of analyzing national attachment in a comparative perspective across different European regions. There is a powerful sense of national pride in the Balkans. The evidence shows relatively high pride values among all majority groups in this region while almost all ethnic minorities in the area have, on the opposite, weaker feelings of national loyalty. Looking in the former Soviet East European states, we can distinguish two different patterns in national pride feelings. In Caucasus, there are remarkably high pride sentiments across both minority and majority groups. Inversely, the Baltic States, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus exhibit low national pride values among both minority and majority populations. In Western European democracies there is a homogenized pattern underlying strong attitudes towards national pride among both minority and majority groups.

Furthermore, the intensity to which national pride is adopted also varies across ethnies when associated with structural and socio-demographic characteristics. In general, individuals perceive differently the two positive national pride feelings: being “relatively proud” and “very proud”. Ethnic minority members are more likely to feel loyal to their country if they are men (women in Balkans), older, poor, religious (less religious in Balkans), less educated, with right wing preferences, with high respect for authority, and generally satisfied with their daily life. Comparatively, members of majority groups being more loyal to their nations are
men and adult citizens (youngsters in Western Europe), less educated and religious, poor or middle class, left wing supporters in the Balkans and right-wing and moderate followers in Western Europe, attached to a strong sense of authority and satisfied with their general life condition.

All in all, national pride is perceived as a unifying factor in many European societies, especially in Western democracies. However, a certain amount of caution should be imposed when adopting these conclusions. National pride is both a constructivist and a primordial measure, being greatly influenced by the socio-political factors varying over time. It might be that the influence of some macro-level conditions such as the economic progress, social policy measures, emerging conflict or terrorist attacks could greatly influence people’s feelings of national belonging. Therefore, the measurement of national attachment might be strictly approached in relation to the examined sample and in the context of the analysed time-period. Nevertheless, this study is of great relevance since it contributes to the general logic of minority-majority cohesion in a culturally diverse environment. Staying at the border between identity and ethnic values, such an analysis can provide further explanatory insights for the study of the challenging demands coming from the ethnic diversity.

To conclude, the contribution of this thesis referring to the hierarchical perception of protest culminates in a plea for studying the conflict phenomenon through a combination of conditions summed by an assorted theoretical and methodological design. The overall results suggest that any endeavor in approaching the hierarchical complexity of ethnic contention through a linear approach will result in a conceptual and an empirical inaccuracy. Conflict and ethnic diversity, studied on a hierarchical basis with dynamic methodological approaches, are able to better identify the different facets of conflict which exist among ethnic groups in culturally diverse environments.

7.6 Lines for Further Research

This thesis has provided a number of contributions for understanding ethnopolitical contention and the perceived values of national identity among a sample of minority and majority groups in Europe. Although it brings compelling insights into the literature, it also reveals options for further research. Apart from suggestions made in the main body of the thesis, there is one aspect which needs stringent improvement in the coming scholar work. Future studies aimed at understanding ethnopolitical contention should integrate the dynamics of ethnic
contention in a longitudinal perspective. The development of a dynamic model for the study of ethnic contention would bring new evidence regarding the impact of specific conditions on the probability to enter or exit protest mobilization. Similar recommendation is suggested for the analysis of national pride feelings. Since the attitudes towards different levels of national loyalty are volatile and time-varying, the dynamics of national identity should also be considered for future research. Longitudinal research however must not miss to include both minority and majority groups in its conceptual and empirical logic. Steps in this direction have been taken already, with scholars starting gathering bias-proof data that includes a complete split between the minority-majority sample among ethnic group populations worldwide (see Cederman, Girardin, et al. 2006).

Furthermore, the analysis of the hierarchical structure of ethnopolitical contention has proved fruitful for Europe, thereby paving the scope for similar exercises in other contexts. An appropriate effort would be to test the applicability of the mix-method approach for the violent side of ethnic contention. Moreover, further attention should be given to the degree to which the tested models should adapt to other, more violent conflict scenarios, without undermining its conceptual framework.
Bibliography


Disciplinary Perspective, Manchester Jean Monet Centre of Excellence.


annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2-5 September, Atlanta, GA, USA.


## A. Appendix to Chapter 3

### Table A. 1 Ethnic groups by country in the Minorities at Risk data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenians, Lezgins, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Poles, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Croats, Muslims, Serbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turks, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbs, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Slovaks, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Basques, Corsicans, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Muslims/Turks, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkhazians, Adzhars, Ossetians (South), Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Roma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sardinians, South Tyrolean, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Poles, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Albanians, Serbs, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz, Slavs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Magyars (Hungarians), Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Hungarians, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Basques, Catalans, Rroma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Jurassians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Catholics in Northern Ireland, Scots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russians, Crimean Tatars, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Serbia &amp; Montenegro)</td>
<td>Croats, Hungarians, Kosovo Albanians, Sandzak Muslims, Rroma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B. Appendix to Chapter 4

**Table B.1** Ethnic groups by country and discrimination status in EVS data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic Group (Majority &amp; Minorities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Albanians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Azerbaijani (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lezgins, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tatars, Avarians, Tallish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Armenians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians, Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flemish (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walloons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (without R. Srpska)</td>
<td>Muslims/Bosniaks (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croats, Serbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Bulgarians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gypsies, Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Byelorussians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poles, Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Estonians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finish (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Georgians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assyrians, Armenians, Azerbaijani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tyrolean, Sardinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Latvians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Byelorussians, Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Moldavians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gagauz, Russians, Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Protestants (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Romanians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarians (Magyars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spanish (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basques, Catalans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gallegans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>German Swiss (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Minority Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>Ukrainians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Russians, Crimean Russians</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macedonia (FYROM)</strong></td>
<td>Macedonians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Albanians, Gypsies, Serbs</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks, Vlah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia &amp; Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>Serbians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Albanians (Kosovo), Hungarians</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R. Srpska</strong></td>
<td>Serbians (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Muslims</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United kingdom</strong></td>
<td>English (majority group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Scots</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welsh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: minorities “at risk” for discrimination are presented in bold and italics*
### C. Appendix to Chapter 5

#### Table C.1 The Outcome: Ethnopolitical Protest (prior to fuzzy set coding)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Values</th>
<th>Labels in the original MAR variable (PROT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No protest r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Verbal Opposition (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Symbolic Resistance (Scattered acts of symbolic resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(E.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Small Demonstrations (Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots &lt; 10,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Medium Demonstrations (Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots &lt; 100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Large Demonstrations (Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation &gt; 100,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table C.2 Political Discrimination: Original Coding in MAR Prior to Fuzzy set Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Values</th>
<th>Labels in the original MAR variable (POLDIS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No political discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Neglect/Remedial policies (Due to historical neglect. There is substantial underrepresentation in the political office. There are public policies meant to improve this status)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Neglect/No remedial policies (Similar to (1), yet, there are no protective or remedial policies.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social exclusion/Neutral policy (Substantial social practices undermining the group access in political and social arena. There are inadequate policies to offset the discrimination practices.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Exclusion/Repressive policy (The group is heavily restricted in terms of political participation. No remedial policies.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table C.3** Geographical Concentration: Original Coding in MAR Prior to Fuzzy set Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Values</th>
<th>Labels in the original MAR variable (GROUPCON)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Widely dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primarily urban or minority in one region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Majority in one region, others dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Concentrated in one region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table C.4** National Pride: Original Coding in EVS Prior to Fuzzy set Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded Values</th>
<th>Labels in the original EVS variable – National pride</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not at all proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Not proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Quite proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Very proud</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table C.5** Calibration Syntax of the Outcome and Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome &amp; Conditions</th>
<th>Calibration syntax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protest - outcome</td>
<td>calibrate(protest,3,1,5,0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discrimination</td>
<td>calibrate(poldis,3,1,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level</td>
<td>calibrate(demscor,e,9.5,7,2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical concentration</td>
<td>calibrate(groupcon,3,2,1,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>calibrate(ethfrac,0.8,0.5,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>calibrate(pride,2.5,1.5,1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### D. Appendix to Chapter 6

**Table D.1 List of Variables used in the Empirical Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination status</td>
<td>Dummy for those ethnic minorities which are classified to be “at risk” for discrimination. Source: Minority at Risk Project (<a href="http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/terp/">www.cidcm.umd.edu/terp/</a>). Minorities where clustered in groups which are 0 - “Not at risk” for discrimination and minorities which are officially recognized as 1-being “at risk” to be discriminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Was originally dummy-coded in EVS with males as the comparison group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>We use the EVS structured indicator “x003r2”. Three intervals are established: Young (15-29), Adults (30-49), and Seniors (50 and more).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Three levels of education were established (EVS code - x025r). The coding was based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The Low level of education commences the first two ISCED stages (1 to 2), medium education comprises the next two ISCED levels (3 to 4), and higher education includes the last two levels of ISCED scale (5 to 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>The original code in EVS is “x047r”. This indicator registers the wealth status of the surveyed individuals. It has three levels: Low, medium and high income. Based on the particular wealth characteristics, each country has established their own criteria assessing the income status under which all interviewed persons are positioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>This indicator is structured on the perceived belief of each responded whether or not they consider themselves a religious person. The original variable in EVS (f034) has three categories: a religious person, not a religious person, and a convinced atheist. Since the last two values register practically the non-religious values, we matched them together. We use therefore a dichotomous variable: 1 - not religious, versus 2 - religious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right Political Views</td>
<td>The original code in EVS is “e033”. The question asks people to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale, positioned from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right). We recoded this scale into three categories: 1- Leftist preferences (1-3), 2 - Moderate Views (4-7), and 3- Rightist preferences (8-10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for authority</td>
<td>This variable measures the attitudes toward authority. Individuals were asked to express their opinion whether they think that 1 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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possible increase in respect for authority would be a good thing, 2 - do not mind, and 3- it is a bad thing.

**Life satisfaction**: Registers the perception of life as a whole. The measurement is placed on a 1 to 10 scale with lower values quantifying dissatisfaction and higher values satisfaction. We recoded this scale into three categories: 1 - Rather dissatisfied with life (1-4), 2 - Moderate satisfaction (5-7), and 3 - Rather satisfied (8-10).
Samenvatting

Er zijn weinig sociaal-politieke fenomenen die zo complex en veranderlijk zijn als de etnopolitieke bewegingen wereldwijd. Veel waardevolle onderzoeksbijdragen hebben de complexiteit hiervan behandeld en het is geen understatement om te zeggen dat tegenwoordig, etnisch conflict één van de meest bestudeerde onderwerpen in de sociale wetenschappen is. Over de jaren, is een breed spectrum van theoretische en empirische contexten geproduceerd om de keuzes van mensen om deel te nemen aan gewelddadige of vreedzame protestacties te verklaren. Veel onderzoek draagt bij aan het conceptualiseren van de patronen van conflict in het algemeen. Daarentegen zijn de meeste bijdragen niet in staat om de dynamiek binnen en tussen verschillende niveaus van etnisch conflict en protest volledig te verklaren.

Dit proefschrift gaat in op de variatie tussen de interne niveaus van etnopolitieke conflicten en de gevolgen daarvan voor de beoordeling van de mechanismen die de intensiteit van de mobilisatie van protest in Europa modelleren. Het draagt bij aan zowel het theoretische als het empirische debat op dit terrein, omdat specifieke conceptuele lacunes worden ingevuld en nieuwe argumenten worden toegevoegd die het bestaande methodologische kader aanvullen. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de noodzaak van een theoretisch model dat rekening houdt met variaties in de verschillende niveaus van etnopolitiek conflict. De link tussen de verschillende theoretische randvoorwaarden en de ontwikkeling van conflict, in dit geval in Europa, worden eveneens behandeld in dit hoofdstuk. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de ontwikkeling van etnopolitiek protest onder zogenaamde ‘risico groepen’ binnen minderheden in Europa empirisch onderzocht. De overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de verschillende niveaus van intensiteit in ‘protest mobilisatie’ worden in een tijdsperspectief geanalyseerd. De empirische analyse wordt verder opgehelderd in hoofdstuk 4 waarbij zowel minderheden als meerderheidsgroepen worden geïntegreerd in een zogenaamde ‘counterfactual vergelijking’. Hierbij verschuift de analyse van etnopolitieke conflicten op basis van een groepsprofiel naar een analyse op basis van de samenstelling van individuele socio-demografische factoren, identiteit gevoelens en politieke overtuigingen. Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt etnisch conflict vervolgens vanuit een nieuw methodologisch perspectief. Hierin wordt een configurationele vergelijkende techniek (de zogenaamde ‘fuzzy sets analysis’) gehanteerd om te onderzoeken welke theoretische randvoorwaarden noodzakelijk en voldoende zijn om de consistentie van etnopolitiek protest in Europa te verklaren. Hoofdstuk 6 tenslotte, geeft een diepgaande analyse van de verschillen in gevoelens van nationale trots tussen ethische minderheden en meerderheidsgroepen in de Europese regio.
De bijdrage van deze hoofdstukken ligt in het beantwoorden van de twee belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen zoals vermeld in de inleiding van dit proefschrift. De eerste vraag concentreert zich op de noodzaak van het erkennen van de veranderlijkheid van etnopolitiek conflict door het meten van alle protest acties in hun hiërarchische stroom. De analyses in dit proefschrift onderzoeken etnisch conflict in een steekproef onder een inclusief samengestelde groep van minderheden en meerderheidsgroepen. Ook is geprobeerd om het tijdsvariërende aspect van etnopolitieke mobilisatie aan te tonen door in de analyse een tijdsperspectief op te nemen.

In lijn met de onderzoeksuitkomsten die voortvloeien uit de eerste onderzoeksvraag, kan een aantal algemene conclusies geformuleerd worden. Ten eerste, er zijn aanzienlijke verschillen tussen etnische minderheden in de wijze waarop mensen kiezen om te protesteren. Onder bepaalde voorwaarden, protesteren meer geïntegreerde minderheidsgroepen meer en intenser dan minderheden die behoren tot de zogenaamde ‘risico groepen’ of tot de meerderheidsgroepen (hoofdstuk 4). Daarmee is de bestaande opvatting in de literatuur (Gurr 1970; Gurr 2000; Gurr en Moore 1997; Vos 2002; Lindström en Moore 1995; Saideman en Ayres 2000), dat een grotere mate van discriminatie van een groep automatisch leidt tot meer protest, niet meer helemaal houdbaar.

Ten tweede, door het hanteren van een tijdsperspectief in de analyse van etnisch conflict werd de rigiditeit van de protest transitie waarden tussen de verschillende intensiteitsniveaus in de tijd helder. Dit betekent dat etnische groepen hun mobilisatie doelstellingen niet zo zeer maximaliseren door het kiezen voor verhevigen of verminderen op basis van protest intensiteits waarden, maar meer vertrouwen op het substitutie effect van verschillende bestaande randvoorwaarden zoals beschreven in figuur 2.1 (hoofdstuk 2).

Ten derde zijn er verschillende paden van protest mobilisatie met betrekking tot ieder intensiteitsniveau. Over het geheel van gemobiliseerde etnische groepen kan geconcludeerd worden dat een lage conflict- intensiteit andere oorzaken heeft dan conflicten met een midden-en hoge protest intensiteit (hoofdstuk 3, hoofdstuk 4, en hoofdstuk 5). In lijn met de theoretische argumentatie zoals beschreven in figuur 2.1 (hoofdstuk 2), kan men dan ook succesvol betogen dat de substitutie-effecten voor de toegepaste randvoorwaarden verschillende oorzaken heeft voor elke niveau binnen het protest intensiteits spectrum. Dit betekent dat elke etnopolitiek protestactie zijn eigen patroon heeft en niet afgedaan kan worden als een algemeen eenduidig fenomeen.

De tweede kernvraag en focus van dit proefschrift is gericht op het analyseren van de gevoelens van nationale trots in relatie tot zowel etnische diversiteit en de
mobilisatie van protest in Europa. Dit is een relatief nieuwe manier van het meten van nationale identiteit, die de emotionele gehechtheid van etnische gemeenschappen aan nationale waarden in diverse culturele omgevingen kwantificeert. De doelstelling van deze analyse is om een betrouwbare methode te vinden die de verbinding tussen gevoelens van nationale cohesie en mobilisatie patronen binnen minderheds- en meerheidsgroepen in Europa kan verklaren. De relevantie van deze identiteits indicator voor het beantwoorden van de centrale vraagstelling in dit proefschrift, is aangetoond door de uitgevoerde analyses. Sterke nationale trots bleek zowel een noodzakelijke als ook een voldoende voorwaarde te zijn voor de afwezigheid van sterk etnopolitiek protest (hoofdstuk 5). Dit illustreert de belangrijke rol die identiteits gevoelens innemen in het theoretisch kader van dit proefschrift(figuur 2.1). Binnen de verschillende etnische gemeenschappen, worden onder meerheidsgroepen en meer geïntegreerde minderheden sterke gevoelens van nationale trots gevonden(hoofdstuk 6). Dit specifieke patroon onderstreept de rol van multicultureel beleid in het construeren van samenhangende nationale identiteitswaarden onder Europese etnische minderheidsgroepen. Inderdaad, dit proefschrift erkent de veranderlijkheid van de notie van ‘nationale trots’, zoals aangenomen door European Values Survey (EVS), die de waarde van ‘natie’ en ‘nationaal’ verbindt met de Staat en met de meerheidsgroepen.

Hoewel het conceptuele kader van dit boek is ontworpen om het theoretisch deel van deze thesis te ondersteunen, hebben alle hoofdstukken ook een sterke empirische component. De functie van het conceptuele deel van dit proefschrift beoogt dan ook verder te gaan dan de louter theoretische discussie en daarmee van toegevoegde waarde te zijn voor iedereen die in de praktijk van etnisch conflict werkzaam is. Het empirische gedeelte is uitgevoerd met behulp van zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve methoden die zijn samengevoegd tot een samenhangend en complexe onderzoeksopzet. De rationale voor deze mix van onderzoeksmethoden is gevoegd door de overtuiging dat alleen op deze manier beter inzicht in de complexe realiteit van etnopolitiek conflict gegeven kan worden.
Biography

Victor Cebotari was born in 1980 and grew up in Moldova. He started his studies in Political Science in 1998, at the University of Bucharest in Romania. After pursuing a specialization in international relations and European studies, he obtained his BA in July 2002. After that, Victor has followed his first MA programme in Project Management (National School for Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania, 2004), and the second MA Programme in Social Policy Analysis (Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), Belgium, 2005). In parallel with his MA studies, Victor has worked as junior researcher at the Conflict Prevention Studies Center (CPSC) in Bucharest, Romania (July 2002 – August 2004).

In September 2006, Victor has joined Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG), where he started his PhD studies as a Marie Curie fellow. His PhD research has focused on ethnic and identity studies. Victor’s general expertise lies in the field of ethnicity, European politics, governance structures, poverty measurements, migration, mix methods research designs (quantitative and qualitative). During his PhD studies, Victor has acted as coordinator, lecturer, and tutor for various courses at MGSoG, Maastricht University (UM), and the University College Maastricht (UCM). In addition, Victor has worked for several research and training projects commissioned by UNICEF, NUFFIC, NWO, and the European Commission. He has published his research in a number of international peer-reviewed journals and book volumes.

Victor now works as a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Technology and Society Studies (TSS), at Maastricht University. He is employed in a project financed by NORFACE and NWO which focuses on the effects of transnational families, on the wellbeing of children and their caregivers in Africa and on migrant parents in Europe.
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