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SIMULTANEITY IN TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION RESEARCH:
LINKS BETWEEN MIGRANTS’ HOST AND HOME COUNTRY ORIENTATION
SIMULTANEITY IN TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION RESEARCH:
LINKS BETWEEN MIGRANTS’ HOST AND HOME COUNTRY ORIENTATION

DISSERTATION

to obtain the degree of Doctor at the Maastricht University,
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus Prof. dr. L.L.G. Soete,
in accordance with the decision of the Board of Deans,
to be defended in public on Friday, 21 November 2014 at 10:00 hrs.

by

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Motivation, research objective and outline
1. Introduction: Motivation, research objective and outline

“I am an Ethiopian living in the Netherlands, and I am in this culture with my differences, but I don’t just see differences. I am here, I go along, and I make it my own.”

(Ethiopian, F, 29)

“What I do here (the Netherlands) is geared towards improving the situation in Burundi. I am working with a Dutch program with a Dutch organisation and a local company of organisation for partnership to finance projects.”

(Burundian, M, 41)

“I do send money to Afghanistan...If I have more money and they request it, I would send them more money, but if I don’t have much, I will send as much as I can afford. I do too have a family here, and they need to be fed too.”

(Afghan, M, 35)

“I read the newspapers online. When I go to work every morning, I read the Dutch newspapers and after that also the Moroccan newspapers.”

(Moroccan, F, 31)

These quotes are from in-depth interviews that sought to understand migrants’ ways of living, their experiences in the Netherlands and their connections with their home country.¹ What these interviews revealed is that when migrants talk about themselves and their lives, it is very often the case that they mention both their homeland² and the country in which they reside. Migrants’ experiences in the residence country are intertwined with their relationships with friends and family in the home country, their wishes for their homeland and their local

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¹ In total 20 exploratory in-depth interviews were conducted with Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan first-generation migrants living in the Netherlands in 2012. These interviews aimed to help me develop a better understanding of migrants’ experiences and to interpret better the quantitative analysis results of my research, hence are not a main component of my research.

² In the dissertation I use “home country” and “homeland” as a reference to “one’s native land”. In other words, I use these terms objectively as the migrants’ country of birth. It is important to emphasize this point because I recognize that one’s definition of “home” can change over time and the country of residence may become “home” for many migrants.
culture, traditions and values. For social scientists, this is a phenomenon from which we can derive stimulating empirical questions: how are homeland engagements developed and maintained, what are the inherent linkages between host and home country orientations, and, what are their implications for individuals as well as the societies in which they are embedded? These are the central questions I will address in this dissertation using a transnational lens.

“Social life crosses, transcends and sometimes transforms borders and boundaries in many different ways.” This is the opening sentence of “The Transnational Studies Reader” edited by Khagram and Levitt (2008) and alludes to one of the core arguments based on which the authors construct Transnational Studies. Despite the international borders and the laws and regulations imposed by national states on migrants, they are nevertheless far from breaking off their contact with their communities and countries of origin even as they settle in the countries that receive them (Faist 2006, Faist et al. 2013). They not only maintain ties with their networks in their countries of origin, but also forge new ties with compatriots in other countries. It is these sets of relationships and complex social lives that transcend and transform borders and boundaries (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Transnational migration theory introduced in the early 1990s takes these developments into consideration and examines how these cross-border ties challenge conventional notions of belonging, citizenship, and identity.

Proponents of a transnational perspective have argued that we must reformulate the concept of society, and question the extent to which migrants’ experiences can be understood within the boundaries of the destination countries (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Due to changes in communication technologies, fast and cheaper travel and increasing interaction between communities across countries, time and space are compressed (Harvey 1989). In order to embrace and understand these new realities, scholars of transnational migration argue for the need to understand migration as potentially taking place within multi-sited multi-layered transnational social fields that simultaneously encompass migrants and non-migrants, both sending and receiving communities as well as other connected communities or organisations (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Pries 2005, Smith 2005, Faist et al. 2013). These social fields are constituted locally, nationally, transnationally, and globally.

Transnational migration theory has challenged long-standing explanations for international migration, integration processes and migrants’
engagement with their homeland in a global world (Basch et al. 1994, Faist 2000a, 2000b, Glick Schiller et al. 1992a, 1992b, Guarnizo 1997, Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Jacoby 2004, Kivisto 2001, Kyle 2000, Levitt 2001, Portes et al. 1999, Mahler 1998, Smith and Guarnizo 1998). It provides a framework for understanding how homeland engagement is developed and sustained through various on-going social, economic and political transborder activities. This framework helps bring to light the determinants of engagement in homeland oriented activities while focusing on factors that relate both to the home and host country, as well as the characteristics of the migrants themselves (Levitt 2008, Khagram and Levitt 2008, Guarnizo et al 2003). However, the overarching question of the framework goes beyond the determinants of homeland engagement. In fact, one of the main goals of transnational migration theory is to propose a social field approach that allows us to elucidate how individuals manage their lives in multiple settings including the home, host, and third countries (Levitt et al. 2003, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In other words, it is about how people identify with, belong simultaneously to, and participate in more than one community at one time.

One of the most relevant yet understudied research questions that has emerged from a transnational approach concerns the simultaneity of migrants’ lives. The concept of “simultaneity” denotes the assumption that enduring homeland ties and successful integration may exist in parallel (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Rather than migration resulting in a linear integration transition from home to host country, we need to explore the possibility that migrants craft a combination of home and host country orientations. Exploring simultaneity in migrants’ lives involves understanding the inherent linkages between this dual-orientation and discussing the ways in which they influence each other. To put it succinctly, the question is:

To what extent and in which ways do migrants experience simultaneity in different domains of life with respect to their home and host country?

This question is of great importance because its answer will reveal how migrants’ social lives cross and transcend borders and boundaries and how they will ultimately become integrated into their host countries and stay connected to their homelands at the same time. We can break it down further into two main components. The first component of the question, “To what extent do migrants experience simultaneity in different domains of life with respect to their country
of origin and destination?” relates to “transnationality” (Faist et al. 2013: 2). As defined by the authors, transnationality refers to “the degree of connectivity between migrants and non-migrants across national borders”. This first component necessitates measuring, classifying, and describing the extent to which migrants are involved in their home country. It considers the intensity, frequency and level of involvement in the home country to draw the different shades of grey of migrants’ embeddedness there.

Additionally, rather than implying a strict distinction between detachment from and involvement in the home country, the question of simultaneity imposes the need for coequally evaluating migrants’ incorporation in the host country. Therefore, to answer this question, research also needs to take into account the different levels of homeland engagement that go hand in hand with host country integration. Only then it is possible to raise further questions that challenge our assumptions and prejudgements regarding migrants and their various ways of living: Is it really the case that maintaining transnational ties and successful integration are relevant solely for socio-economic elites and highly mobile classes who control sufficient resources? Or is dual-engagement more common than many scholars and policy stakeholders surmise? These questions are of great significance because they help us understand how migrants actually enact mobility trajectories and secure cross-border livelihoods in specific, and more broadly they push forward our conceptions of multiple embeddedness and belonging.

The following second component of the question, “In which ways do migrants experience simultaneity in different domains of life with respect to their country of origin and destination?” on the other hand, refers to understanding the new ways of integration. In other words, migrants come from a wider range of countries, their patterns of return vary widely, and they vary considerably with respect to their insertion into the labour market, legal status, generation and age (Alba and Nee 2005, Castles and Miller 2003, 2005). These factors make it increasingly difficult to speak of a “uniform assimilation process” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006) for migrant groups. In this respect, as stated by Portes and Rumbaut (2006), transnational linkages may play a significant role in exploring new and diverse assimilation processes. Research about simultaneity, therefore, opens up space for discussing how homeland engagement and host country incorporation are interrelated. Is there a positive, negative or no relationship between
**homeland engagement and host country integration?** Is living transnationally a way to overcome poverty and powerlessness for migrants as suggested by previous research (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), or are migrants involuntarily compelled to this way of living due to negative experiences and social exclusion in the host and home country?

Moreover, simultaneity is about the dynamics between feelings of belonging and behaviour: how do migrants’ home country attachments actually translate into engagement into homeland oriented economic, social and cultural activities? Understanding the ways in which these phenomena are interlinked will serve to reveal how the social and economic advancement of migrants are influenced by their dual-embeddedness in multiple sites and that in turn will deepen our understanding of new forms of incorporation.

~ * ~

In this dissertation, I address the question of simultaneity in migrants’ lives and further deconstruct the above-mentioned research question to carry out a systematic analysis. Hence my objective is to contribute to a niche in transnational migration scholarship regarding the classification of transnational involvement in different life spheres and the systematic analysis of the relationship between homeland engagement and integration in the host society (Haller and Landolt 2005). King (2002) emphasizes the recognition of double embeddedness of migration in both the home and host countries and indicates how this double embeddedness influences the social processes in both contexts. In this regard, multi-sited research (See Hannerz 1998, Stoller 1997 and Marcus 1995) that acknowledges migrants’ embeddedness in the host country along with all the other sites that constitute the entirety of social fields (e.g. home country, third countries) would be the most appropriate research methodology (Mazzucato 2008a, Mazzucato 2009, Amelina 2010). While my research is not multi-sited in the strict sense and is implemented only in the host country, it devotes equal attention to migrants’ experiences in the host and home countries. In other words, I utilise a dataset that provides comprehensive information about migrants’ homeland engagement as well as their host country integration.

At the same time, I acknowledge the existence of a heightened awareness concerning the multidimensional character of international migration that touches upon all aspects of life, including the social, economic, political and
cultural (Castles and Miller 2003). This awareness encourages researchers to apply an interdisciplinary approach, and to bring different dimensions of the phenomenon together in their research. Akin to Castles (2000) who states that disciplinary and paradigmatic closure are the enemy of an effective, sympathetic study of human migration, King (2002: 90) argues that “despite a long history of scholarly study into the field, today migration still tends to remain a dichotomized and fragmented area of enquiry” and calls for a more interdisciplinary and holistic synthesis. Research responding to this call would improve our understanding of international migration and its influence; in a manner that extends beyond migrants themselves to encompass multiple societal levels and dimensions of life. Consequently, for the purpose of this dissertation, I implement an interdisciplinary research methodology that examines different dimensions of migrants’ lives using a transnational approach. After a more elaborate explanation of these elements, the remainder of this section is dedicated to a detailed explanation of the steps taken to answer the main research question of this dissertation.

In line with the social field approach proposed by Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), I make a distinction between “transnational ways of being” and “transnational ways of belonging” to study simultaneity in a systematic way. I conduct my research in two steps for an orderly analysis of different aspects of simultaneity. Levitt (2008) conceptualizes a wide range of border-crossing activities as “transnational ways of being”. These activities include economic, social, cultural and political activities, and are part of individuals’ different domains of life. “Transnational ways of belonging” refer more specifically to migrants’ multiple modes of identification and corresponding feelings of attachment through history, memory, or nostalgia. (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In particular, I focus on activities related to economic and sociocultural domains of migrant lives as part of transnational ways of being, and migrants’ future plans about their home country (e.g. return intentions) as part of transnational ways of belonging.

In the first stage of my research, I depart from the idea that integration processes and homeland engagement are not binary opposites (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004), and I affirm the need to look at the interrelationship between the two. For analytical purposes, I attend to the different domains of migrant lives one by one and wish to understand how simultaneity operates within each life
domain. Firstly, I observe the links between economic host country integration and economic homeland engagement, and secondly, the links between sociocultural host country integration and sociocultural homeland engagement. This way I aim to question the extent to which embeddedness in one context hinders or supports the embeddedness in the other, or whether these are in fact exclusive processes that are not at all linked. In the second stage, I investigate the relationship between enduring homeland ties and homeland attachment. The aim here is to examine whether feelings of belonging translate directly into behaviour. This is a question of great interest in that it helps challenge our understanding of loyalty, multiple belonging and the other motivations that come into play in maintaining ties with homeland. It is also important to see whether homeland attachment is directly related to different types of engagement in homeland oriented activities.

Conceptual framework 1 *,**,***

* In theory, transnational social spaces are multi-sited and include third countries. The conceptual framework is restricted to host and home countries because my project focuses only on migrants’ involvement in their home and host countries.
** The black arrow signifies the associations I study in Stage 1.
*** The dashed arrow signifies the associations I study in Stage 2.

This two-stage analysis enables a thorough discussion of simultaneity and more specifically that of the interrelationship between homeland
engagement and host country integration in a comprehensive way in different domains of migrant lives. As advocated by Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), full assimilation and home country orientation probably do not coexist and in fact change in relation to each other over time. This research sets out to explore the ways in which migrants combine and find a balance between the two, as well as facilitating a discussion about how home and host country experiences relate to each other in a dynamic way. In this respect, it designates the new realities of migrant lives in the Netherlands that need to be taken into consideration, rather than attempting to allocate migrant groups to categories defined solely by their host country experiences.

Moreover, beyond addressing these theoretical questions the research focuses also on the origin country differences. Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrant groups are included in this research, and I discuss whether origin country level differences still persist after controlling for individual level characteristics. The migrant groups in question differ from each other in various ways. Firstly, some are well established in the Netherlands, while others are relatively new communities. They also differ in terms of their size. For instance, while Moroccans are a large group that has been in the Netherlands for a long time, Burundians are relatively new and make up a small community. In addition, just as there is considerable variation within groups with respect to individual migration motivations, it is also the case that the groups studied here engage in distinct patterns of migration. Namely, the Moroccans are known as family and labour migrants, but the other groups consist primarily of individuals who, at least initially, have fled their country of origin for political and security reasons, and are now characterised by family and student migration in addition. Furthermore, the current socioeconomic and political situations as well as future prospects for development in sending countries differ significantly, which, in return, may affect migrants’ enduring homeland ties. Closely examining the within and between group differences will help us identify how contextual and group level factors may influence migrants’ homeland engagements and attachments.

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This dissertation is a part of the IS Academy\(^3\): *Migration and Development: A World in Motion* project. The project is implemented by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main objectives of this Netherlands-based research are: to understand the background characteristics of different types of migrants (e.g. family migrants, labour migrants, refugees, students) through the example of Moroccan, Afghan, Ethiopian and Burundian migrants in the Netherlands; learn about their experiences as migrants; and examine their engagement in their home country and their orientation towards family and friends in their countries of origin. The fieldwork in the Netherlands consisted of a household survey conducted in 2010-2011 among 1022 first generation Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan households in the Netherlands. In my research, I study the ways in which the migrants from these communities in the Netherlands simultaneously experience integration in the host country and engagement in their homelands.

In Chapter 2, I begin by reviewing thoroughly migrant integration literature. Subsequently, in Chapter 3 I focus on the transnational migration theory and go more in-depth into the research on simultaneity in transnational. Next, in Chapter 4, I explain my research methodology and describe my fieldwork experiences. In Chapter 5, the migration context in the Netherlands is outlined through a brief summary of its immigration history along with the political debates around immigration and integration. Chapter 6 focuses in particular on the migration history of Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands. Given that I work with four specific migrant groups, it is of great importance to be aware of group level characteristics, which in return helps me understand some of the striking differences encountered in the analysis.

Chapter 7 aims to describe migrants’ integration processes and homeland engagement and based on the IS Academy survey. Except for Moroccans and to a lesser extent for Afghans, little is known about the characteristics of the migrant groups in question. Therefore, in this chapter, I present extensive information thanks to the survey data we have collected. This part is followed by the core

\(^3\) IS Academie (IS Academy) is a cooperation between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists and civil society organisations. Migration and Development: A World in Motion Project is an IS Academie project financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and managed and executed by Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.
results section of the dissertation. Namely, the first results section (Chapter 8) is about simultaneity in economic transnationalism, and the second section (Chapter 9) is on simultaneity in sociocultural transnationalism. In the third results section, I focus on migrants’ future plans to assess their home country attachment and examine how homeland attachment relates to economic and sociocultural homeland engagement (Chapter 10). Finally, I dedicate Chapter 11 to a reflection on the group level differences among migrants with respect to their homeland engagement, and in Chapter 12, I conclude with a summary of my analysis and discuss variations in simultaneity among migrants.

All in all, this dissertation investigates different kinds of transnational activities and examines the interactions among transnationalisms, and accordingly contributes to establishing the foundations of transnational migration scholarship (see Khagram and Levitt 2008). It includes empirical transnationalism as it focuses on describing, mapping, classifying, and quantifying novel and/or potentially important transnational phenomena and dynamics which in this case are the simultaneous cases of embeddedness in multiple contexts among migrants. It is a model of methodological transnationalism because it is based on new data and observations that aim to capture transnational realities more accurately and rigorously by assigning equal importance to different social experiences including host country incorporation and homeland engagement. It also relates to theoretical transnationalism because it formulates, explanations, and crafts interpretations that complement and supplement existing theoretical frameworks about migrant integration literature in order to elucidate migrant’s experiences more effectively.

Moreover, the individual level experiences studied in this research have wider implications for social processes. Although migrants themselves are influenced by existing structures, they also shape economic, political and cultural conditions in return (Kyle 2000, Levitt et al. 2003, Faist et al. 2013). As a result of various sets of relationships in different spheres of life, transnational social spaces are developed and constantly reproduced towards a more solid and permanent structure. The permanence and strength of these structures allow more people to be involved in them and leads to more permanent and wider societal changes (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). These novelties challenge the two main models of migrant integration; namely, assimilation and ethnic pluralism, and urge us to envisage new models of incorporation which
acknowledge migrants’ multiple embeddedness as well as the ways in which they influence social, economic, political and cultural structures (Kyle 2000, Levitt et al. 2003). Consequently, this research not only contributes to transnational migration research, but has significant implications for policy debates on integration, and more specifically, on the tension between integration and enduring homeland ties.
Chapter 2

The state of the art in migrant integration research
2. The state-of-the-art in migrant integration research

Basch and her colleagues (1994: 7) defined transnationalism as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”. Transnational migration theory is one that aims to accommodate the new realities of migrants’ lives more satisfactorily, such that we can understand how they live in the host country while maintaining meaningful relationships with their home country. My contribution to this framework lies in analysing how homeland and host country involvements simultaneously interact with each other in different domains of life. In line with this, the objective of this research is to unpack the idea of simultaneous embeddedness in different contexts by examining how this simultaneity is experienced in diverse domains of life at different levels, through various types of activities and feelings of belonging. As this requires a thorough analysis of the transnational migration research as well as the integration literature in the European context, this chapter, before all else, provides an overview of the migrant integration literature with a specific focus on the ways it could be strengthened by including a transnational perspective. Subsequently, I concentrate on the discussions around transnational migration theory and explain how simultaneity can be studied within the framework that the theory proposes.

Surveying the origins of sociology of migration in Europe and North America, it is easily seen that migrant integration has always been one of the main topics in the field (Engbersen 2003, Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Already the plurality of concepts (adaptation, acculturation, incorporation) that are used interchangeably or developed to replace one another indicates how much attention this issue has received, and how challenging and sensitive the topic is in terms of its definition, measurement and evaluation (Modood 2005, Kivisto 2005, Van Craen et al. 2008). Also, because the topic is highly policy relevant and used in different platforms, Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003: 7) state that the concept of integration “bundles analytic concepts together with normative notions or
idealised projections of society, which are weighted with very different emotional and attitudinal valences in different groups and contexts”. In this sense, integration (assimilation) is not only a theoretical concept or a lived experience but also a political objective; a loaded term. For this reason, the conceptualisation of integration is highly influenced by the assumptions over and the context in which integration processes are studied. The remainder of this section delivers an overview of the evolution of integration theories in the United States and Europe.

2.1. Evolution of assimilation theories

Most migration studies have overwhelmingly focused on migrants’ assimilation into the host country. They address how quickly different groups of migrants lose their foreign qualities to resemble natives (Fitzgerald 2013). In the United States, until the late 1960s, in line with the political and ideological direction in the country at the time, assimilation theory was the dominant theory to explain migrants’ settlement processes (Zolberg 2009). The theory evolved around the idea that over time, migrants would become entirely absorbed into the host society and the differences between ethnic-cultural groups would disappear. It was expected that migrants who enter into contact with the new society and its members, would adopt new habits, grow accustomed to new situations and people and eventually assimilate. This meant not only a gradual socio-economic adaptation to the receiving society, but also cultural and behavioural changes that would bring migrants closer to the dominant and unitary political cultural core (Faist 2000a). For several decades, “assimilation” remained as the common term used to explain migrants’ settlement processes in the residence country. Gordon (1964) was the pioneer in classical assimilation theory in that he took over the term “assimilation” from the Chicago School sociologists and provided the first comprehensive discussion on immigrant incorporation.

Gordon (1964) proposed stages of assimilation followed by the acquisition of culture and language. The assimilation process, in his view, starts with structural assimilation which refers to close social relations with the host society. Increased social contacts lead to large-scale intermarriage and identification with the host society. As a result, prejudice, discrimination and value conflict are expected to diminish and lead to full assimilation (Brown and Bean 2006). Pedraza (2006: 420) states that according to assimilation theory,
assimilation is “a one-way process that is natural and evolutionary, a process that as time passed would yield the inevitable outcome of the adaptation of minority ethnic groups to the mainstream culture”. This research focused mainly on socioeconomic status, intermarriage, educational mobility, language proficiency, ethnic identity and the involvement in mainstream (American) life (Waters and Jimenez 2005), and concluded a huge variation in immigrant experiences of different nationalities in the United States (Fitzgerald 2013). While assimilationist theory had its time in the American context, over time, given the complexity of the reality on the ground, this understanding of integration as a one-way process has been reassessed. The lived experiences of migrants proved that assimilation is not a simple one-way process. Thus, in the US context, the classical approach has been criticised, and several amendments have been made to the linear understanding of assimilation. Alternative approaches include the new assimilation theory (Alba and Nee, 1997), the racial/ethnic disadvantage model (Glazer and Monyihan 1963, Glazer 1993) and segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1994). These theories identify different paths of assimilation and the many structural and societal constraints to integration including racism and discrimination that inhibit immigrant assimilation. Segmented assimilation theory also reveals that retaining a strong ethnic attachment or experiencing downward mobility by becoming part of the underclass are other possible trajectories for migrants, in addition to becoming part of the mainstream (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Portes and Zhou 1993). Consequently, the authors argue that assimilation into a specific segment of society strongly influences life chances of migrants (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Moreover, Gans (1992) describes assimilation as a “bumpy line” rather than a “straight line” to draw attention to the variety in assimilation scenarios among migrants. To explain these differences, the authors reflect on the contextual, structural, and cultural factors that contribute to successful or unsuccessful assimilation.

These studies also show that the different domains of assimilation are not always mutually reinforcing, and that in fact, they can be at odds with each other. Specifically, economic assimilation, in the sense of upward mobility, can actually be increased through ethnic retention (Fitzgerald 2012, Zhou and Bankston 1998, Waters 1999). With respect to the ethnicity dimension, some versions of assimilation theory argue that rather than disappearing, ethnicity survives and is reinvented (especially among the second-generation) as a claim to collective
identity (Gans 1979). Especially, there are conditions under which the maintenance of ethnic identity is reinforced as a result of reactive developments (Yancey et al. 1976). According to the new assimilation theory, while most migrants achieve socioeconomic parity by the integrative role of certain social institutions, for others, race and ethnicity continue to matter (Alba and Nee 2003, Jacoby 2004, Kivisto 2005). That is to say, ethnic background is not necessarily a disadvantage, but it can be of added value both for the migrant and the mainstream society. This is one argument showing that the perception regarding the effect of ethnic identity on integration and its interaction with the host society has changed.

As a result of the developments in the assimilation debate in the United States, the idea that immigrants also transformed the society as well as becoming incorporated into American society became prominent. In other words, integration is a two-way process during which migrants change the mainstream society as well, and make and remake America with the social resources they bring with them into the social context that greets them (Fix 2007). In this line of research, immigration is treated as “an international process that reshuffles persons and cultures across nations” (Pedraza 2006). This formulation regards immigrants as an asset because of the resources they bring, and engenders a more positive attitude towards societies consisting of multiple cultures. From this perspective, the nation-state is no more seen solely as a container of the national culture into which the newcomers assimilate, and cultural diffusion receives greater analytical attention. Integration of immigrants, including the different customs and values they bring along is seen as a positive process that makes the country not only “a nation of immigrants” but also an immigrant nation (Pedraza 2006).

The transnational migration theory which is discussed in the remainder of this chapter is a step beyond this conceptualisation. It is crucial to stress that beyond acknowledging that migrants bring their culture and assets with them to the receiving country, transnational migration theory even more importantly recognises they are not necessarily uprooted from their home society once settled in the host country (Faist 2000b, 2013a, 2013b). Before elaborating on this approach and what it entails regarding migrants’ settlement experiences, the next section examines integration research in Europe since this study applies transnational migration theory in the European context.
2.2. Migrant integration research in Europe

While the migration histories of most European countries differ remarkably, it is precisely the case that today, immigration and integration have become topics of great interest throughout the region. In the early 20th century, for many European countries ‘national purity’ was a sign of greatness, and most countries aspired to be ethnically and culturally homogenous. Nonetheless, this perspective changed considerably as a result of the disastrous consequences of the Second World War, and many nation states rejected extreme nationalism and racism. That being said, the idea of a “nation of immigrants” and an “immigration nation” has always posed strong challenges to the understanding of the society and the nation state in Europe.\(^4\) No European country defines itself as a “nation of immigrants”, but they increasingly accept that they have become countries of immigration. Therefore, how immigration is regarded in Europe differs considerably from the way it is considered in settler societies like the United States, Australia and Canada. Writing about methodological nationalism, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) note that especially in countries where the nation is not imagined as a plural society, but as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous one, migrants represent a challenge to the essence of the nation-building project. For most of the modern history of immigration in Europe, these values have dominated theories and approaches regarding immigrant integration.

If we were to survey the beginnings of significant immigration flows in Europe, the economic recovery period after the Second World War emerges as a key historical moment. At this time, many Western European countries saw immigration as a solution for their need for low-skilled labour that would heal the effects of wars and signed bilateral temporary labour agreements with migrant sending countries. Immigration also occurred in response to the post-colonial linkages of many countries. Consequently, by the early 1970s, many

\(^4\) It is in fact difficult to talk about a single unitary European context as a big political and historical difference exists between the older immigrant receiving countries of continental Europe (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium), the United Kingdom which is an immigration country without guest worker programs, and the newly immigrant countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Italy and Portugal).
countries were hosting considerable numbers of immigrants. During the period between Second World War and the 1973 Oil Crisis, when a significant influx took place, immigration was considered a temporary solution to the challenges of economic development. Therefore, not much attention was paid to the social integration of immigrants, as they were expected to return. It is only with the transition from temporary to permanent migration in Europe after the 1973 Oil Crisis, when family migration gained significance and with the increase in humanitarian migration flows after the 1980s that ‘integration problems’ have attracted more attention and became a topic of interest to social scientists.

Penninx (2005) writes that it was only in the 1980s that institutes with a special focus on immigration and integration were established in the immigration countries of Europe such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, France and the Netherlands. In the 1990s, they were established in other Western and Southern European countries. In these early stages of increasing interest in immigration and integration research, strong national concerns and perspectives dominated the field. Most research was conducted within nation states in different academic disciplines that rarely interacted. Only with the 6th Framework Programme for research of the European Union, more diverse, multidisciplinary studies that allowed for multi-national comparative research that advanced integration research in Europe developed. Accordingly, unlike the North American context where most research is conducted in one receiving country with various immigrant groups, in the European context, a lot of research focused on comparisons between different receiving country contexts and a variety of ethnic groups. Glick Schiller and Caglar (2009) argue that these different migration contexts have shaped knowledge production and theory making. Consequently, in the North American context, particularly with the idea of immigrant nation building, more holistic theories were developed to explain integration. In contrast, in Europe, research has remained more fragmented and organized around disciplines; no overarching integration theory has been developed, although different fields of integration have received attention.

refers to interpersonal relations, cultural, attitudinal and behavioural adaptation (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, Nell 2008). Migrant integration is defined primarily as a concept referring to the “absorption” of the migrant community into the host society. In other words, integration is perceived as a unidirectional process. This is particularly clear in the majority of the European migration literature on migrants’ sociocultural integration. Immigrants are assumed to be socially and culturally better integrated in the host country when interethnic contacts, friendships, and marriages are common, and when immigrants speak the destination language well (Van Tubergen 2006). This means that sociocultural integration of migrants in the host countries is a matter of social cohesion defined by similarity between groups.

The conventional integration literature is based on the underlying assumption that integration is about the difference/similarity between the native and migrant population with respect to their cultural, social and economic characteristics (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000), and thus achieved once migrants become similar to the native population. Structural integration, for instance, is also a question of social inequality. Migrants are considered to be well integrated when they have employment rates, occupational status and income levels that are comparable to those of the natives from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. This is consistent with the highly debated assimilationist perspective according to which integration is a “straight line” process whereby immigrants come increasingly closer to the dominant society (Gordon 1964). From this point of view, migrants and the native population are seen as distinct groups; the latter is the constant point of reference. Integration of migrants is therefore evaluated with respect to how they compare to the native population.

Nevertheless, rather than exclusively discussing a complete and unilateral adaptation by ethnic-cultural minorities (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006), migrant integration scholars have, in addition, increasingly adopted the idea of different pathways for integration in the European context. Although different fields of integration processes are interlinked, and can affect individuals’ experiences and position in another domain (Van Craen et al 2008), it does not necessarily follow that migrants have similar experiences in each field (Wong 2007). As opposed to Gordon’s multiple assimilation stages (1964) according to which integration in one society is preceded by integration in the other, migrants can experience different levels of integration in different
domains. In other words, multiple types of integration exist, which in turn signals that it is inaccurate to expect that there will be one correct trajectory of integration (Werbner 1999, Glick Schiller et al. 2004). To better understand the alternatives, researchers have incorporated different theories in integration research (e.g. human capital, social capital, prejudice and structural opportunity, social identity theories) and also corroborated the significance of the migrants’ interactions within their co-ethnics in the host country as an integral part of the integration processes (Schwarts et al. 2010).

The approach that assigns equal importance to migrants’ social relations with their co-ethnics and the native born population in the host country is based on a bi-dimensional evaluation of integration. Especially from a social capital theory perspective, this bi-dimensional perspective is important for understanding sociocultural integration research as migrants are sharing their lives not only with the native population but also with their ethnic community residing in the host country, and they find their own balance between the two (Van Tubergen 2006). More specifically, again in the European context, researchers are more inclined to accept that integration with the host community and maintaining contacts with the ethnic community in the host country are two concurrent, but mutually exclusive, dimensions of migrant lives that have differing effects on integration processes.

Despite these developments, integration research in Europe still faces drawbacks. Favell (2006a, 2006b) denotes that even today, the majority of integration research in Europe takes for granted the national terrain as the unit of analysis. Namely, research detaches migrants from their home country context, and integration processes are treated only in relation to the host country context. The literature has rarely extended its focus onto migrants’ homeland engagement and towards the influence of cross-border influences on migrants’ integration. Building upon this argument, I suggest that transnational migration theory should be incorporated further into integration research in Europe. It is only with transnational migration theory that multiple embeddedness in both the host and home countries, can be incorporated into an effective analytical framework for studying the integration processes.

From the start, the transnational perspective has been critical towards exclusive integration to the host country and hence of classical assimilation theory (Faist 2000a). Unlike the integration theories that are bounded by the
nation-state, transnational migration theory regards the lives of traditional migrants as ‘a continuous flow of people, goods, money, ideas that transgress national boundaries and in so doing connects physical, social, economic and political spaces’ (Mazzucato 2005: 2). It is this connectivity that distinguishes transnational migration theory from previous integration theories.

Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 137) state that “at first glance, the rise in transnational activism among today’s immigrants and the numerous programs of sending-country governments aimed at strengthening it appear to undermine the process of assimilation and retard the integration of immigrants.” However, before coming to conclusions about this statement, a concurrent consideration of integration theories and transnational migration theory is necessary in order to examine how integration processes and homeland engagement actually interact. In the past decade, this kind of research has developed under the rubric of simultaneity in transnational migration theory and my research dovetails precisely with this expanding strand of research. Accordingly, in the following section, I introduce transnational migration theory and the ways in which simultaneity research has evolved over the years to introduce the sub-questions and hypotheses of my study.
Chapter 3

Transnational migration theory
3. Transnational migration theory

3.1. Introduction to transnational migration theory

The transnational perspective has triggered several debates regarding not only its definition, prevalence, scope, and persistence over time, but also its historical newness and challenge to the hegemonic understanding of the nation-state (Saunier 2009, Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Morawska 2003, Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, Foner 1997, Portes 2001). Critics of transnationalism claim that homeland engagement is limited among migrants and is hardly sustained over generations (Waldinger 1997, Jones Correa 1998). And yet, within the burgeoning literature of transnational migration, there has been considerable research to prove that homeland engagement continues and is in fact re-established in various cases among the second and even third generations (Levitt 2009, Pries 2004, Smith 2006, Levitt and Waters 2006). Scholars have also debated how new transnational ties are, detractors often referencing the first use of the term “transnational America” by Randolph Bourne in 1916 (Kivisto 2001), and Znaniecki and Thomas’ monumental work “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918-1920)”. The biographical approach used in this work provides valuable insights into early examples of the relationships migrants maintained with their home country.

Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, today’s examples are arguably different than those of the early 1900s due to the way globalisation has influenced the intensity and scope of homeland linkages: faster, easier and cheaper access to air travel, the internet, and mobile phones has been influential in this sense. We now understand that transnational involvements are not new but that they have expanded and intensified because of the structures of global capitalism and technological change (Portes 2001, Guarnizo et al. 2003, Guarnizo 1997, Foner 2007). Moreover, Wimmer and Schiller (2002) are correct in saying that “deconstruction of methodological nationalism”\(^5\) made it possible for

\(^5\) Methodological nationalism is a term used to describe problem of viewing the nation-state as the natural societal container and unit of analysis (Fitzgerald 2012).
researchers to observe cross-border connections better, and to theorize them more adequately. In other words, the re-introduction of “transnationalism” in the 1990s made it possible to acknowledge the intensification, regularisation and normalisation of transnational activities, including return visits and economic, social and political contact with home country.

In spite of the controversy with respect to its novelty and scope (Guarnizo and Smith 1998, Morawska 2003, Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, Foner 2007, Portes 2001), from a research perspective, the transnational approach has challenged existing theories and methods in migration research to incorporate the new dynamics in migrant lives to a greater degree. The “new” transnational perspective suits the current era of globalisation more satisfactorily (Al-Ali and Koser 2012). The transnational perspective encompasses all aspects of migration and as Fitzgerald (2013: 114) has argued, it defines individuals not as definitive immigrants or emigrants, but rather as “human agents who lead lives that span international borders”. Consequently, migrants’ lives are strongly connected to their home country by a variety of economic, social and political activities, relationships and identifications within the framework of a transnational social field that crosses geographic, cultural and political borders (Basch et al. 1994, Glick Schiller et al. 1992a, 1992b). The maintenance of these relationships calls into question the assumptions about the direction and influence of international migration and integration processes (Levitt et al. 2003).

The transnational perspective has played a significant role not only in helping us to understand how migration influences development through the economic and social contacts that migrants sustain with their family and friends in the origin countries, but also by investigating the daily experiences of migrants living in transnational social fields. Thus, the transnational perspective introduced in the early 1990s by Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc (1992a, 1992b), and later on developed and implemented by various other researchers provide the appropriate theoretical framework and the methodological tools to study the extent to and the means through which the migrants sustain social, cultural, economic and political relationships with their countries of origin while simultaneously being embedded in the countries of residence. Faist (2000a, 2000b) claims that the expansion of border-crossing social ties contributes to the advancement of our understanding of immigrant integration in different realms of life.
Today, to the best of our knowledge, a wide variety of terms is used to define the totality of migrants’ transnational behaviours and identifications. For instance, the term “transnationality” introduced by Thomas Faist is “the degree to which families and individuals are engaged in transactions across borders and this may depend highly on and change over the life course” (Faist et al. 2013). Van Bochove (2012) states that transnationalism takes on different meanings for different groups, but that overall, the concept facilitates the understanding of migrants’ simultaneous incorporation into their host and home societies. Snel et al. (2006) use the term “transnational involvement” as the total of the transnational activities and identifications of individuals. Guarnizo (2003) alternatively discusses the transnational ways of living, referring to “an active, dynamic field of social intercourse that involves and simultaneously affects actors (individuals, groups, institutions) located in different countries”.

Finally, as discussed earlier in the introduction, Levitt (2008) conceptualizes the wide range of border-crossing activities as “transnational ways of being”, in contrast to “transnational ways of belonging”, which refer more specifically to migrants’ multiple identifications and feelings of attachment. Because I discuss the economic and social dimension versus the identity dimension of migrant lives separately, my research is built on the concepts proposed by Levitt (2008). In the remainder of this section, I first discuss what transnational ways of being and belonging entail from a social field perspective, and second spell out how simultaneity should be studied in transnational migration research.

3.2. Defining transnational ways of being and belonging

Vertovec (2009) argues that transnationalism is used indiscriminately for a wide range of border-crossing ties, and therefore has become a vague concept. However, it is possible to identify a variety of border-crossing activities. Disaggregating, contextualizing and specifying the domains/spheres of transnationalism will prevent transnationalism from becoming a “catch-all” term (Dickens 2007) or “an overripe buzz word” (Carling 2007) that may lose its analytical potency. Boccagni (2011) also agrees that the term has been overused but argues the analytical framework it proposes can be of great significance for studying migrants’ everyday lives and life trajectories. He emphasizes the need for theoretical refinement in terms of understanding two-way relationships and
reciprocity in multiple contexts and of focusing on identifications, feelings of belonging, and engagement in activities simultaneously.

The transnational ways of being, referring to migrants’ involvement in activities oriented towards their homeland, encompass different arenas of life. However, although several attempts to list the kind of activities that could be considered as transnational practices have been made, no comprehensive definition of these practices exists (Al-Ali et al. 2001a). Nevertheless, one can generally distinguish between social, economic, civic/political and cultural practices. In the economic domain, we mainly refer to financial remittances, in-kind remittances, investments in the home country (e.g. house, business, land), purchase of government bonds or purchase of entry to government programs, or charitable donations made either directly to the country of origin or in a community organisation in the residence country. The political/civic activities oriented towards the home country include participation in elections or membership in political parties in the home country on the one hand, and participating in political demonstrations or the mobilisation of political contacts in the host country for affairs related to the home country (Al-Ali et al. 2001a, Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Within the sociocultural domain, we include social relationships maintained through visits to friends and family in the origin country, or contact through telephone, letters, e-mails, links with homeland or diaspora organisations, and attendance at social gatherings with the ethnic community in the host country. In addition, individuals’ participation in cultural events (e.g. concerts, theatre, and exhibitions) about their country of origin, or consumption of media, art, and other cultural products can be included as part of practices in the sociocultural domain. All these activities are observable actions, meaning that they are quantifiable and measurable in a systematic way.

In addition to these relatively concrete and measurable aspects, there also exists a more subjective and identity-related dimension of transnationalism, namely, “transnational ways of belonging.” Transnational identities emerge and are recreated as a result of individuals’ memories, cultural productions and feelings of belonging. These are conscious demonstrations of individuals regarding their senses of belonging to a certain group or groups (Morawska 2007). In their definition of “transnational ways of belonging”, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) refer not only to an awareness of belonging and identification, but
also to actions that signify these identifications (e.g. wearing a Christian cross or Jewish star, flying a flag). Within transnational social fields, transnational ways of belonging occupy as significant a place as transnational ways of being.

The relationships that I seek to understand in my research occur in these transnational social fields. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 105) define social fields as “a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organized and transformed”. These transnational social fields are multidimensional and dynamic in character. They refer not only to social networks and organisations, but also to social processes and actions that involve the active participation of individuals who bring all sorts of capital and interact with others across borders, through the social, the cultural, the political and the economic aspects of life. They can be locally situated or may extend nationally or transnationally (Glick Schiller et al. 2006). Within these transnational social spaces, individuals configure different livelihood strategies to benefit from different opportunities presented by the presence of dynamic, cross-border linkages. It is this framework of transnational migration and border-crossing expansion of space that makes us rethink immigrant integration and envisage new ways of adaptation leading to simultaneous embeddedness of migrants in multiple contexts.

3.3. Prevalence and intensity of homeland engagement

Even though today’s contextual factors seem to encourage migrants to sustain durable relationships with their homeland, it would be wrong to assume that all migrants are engaged in transnational practices (Levitt et al. 2003). Not only is it that only a certain proportion of migrants are actively involved in their homeland, but also, among those who are engaged, there is a great variation in terms of the dimensions of transnational involvement, as well as its levels, strength and formality (Levitt 2009). While for some individuals transnational involvement occupies a significant part of their social, economic or political life, for others these engagements may be more sporadic, irregular and infrequent. It is more common that individuals would be occasionally involved in transnational practices through organisations such as hometown associations or

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6 Faist (2000a), in fact, identifies three types of transnational social spaces: transnational kinship groups, transnational communities and transnational circuits.
through sending remittances to family and friends for certain occasions (Levitt 2001). Moreover, not all individuals engage in all types of transnational practices. For instance, someone who is active in the economic affairs in their country of origin may not be so in the political domain and vice versa. Faist et al. (2013) also draw attention to the significance of life cycle effects, and to the way individuals may be more inclined to be involved more frequently in their homeland at certain times in their lives (e.g. family formation, geographical mobility due to work) (See also He Espiritu and Tran 2002). Levitt (2009) also states that individuals may be more involved at times of economic downturns or events like environmental disasters.

Transnational migration scholars who point to the diverse nature of individuals’ transnational engagement in different domains of life make a distinction between comprehensive and selective transnationalism (Levitt 2001). Hence the need to specify what factors influence the intensity, regularity and frequency of transnational involvement. Morawska (2001) marks that a considerable variety exists in homeland engagement between migrant groups, depending on the factors concerning the individuals, as well as the dynamics influenced by sending and receiving countries. The motivations for migrants to be involved in these activities can be highly varied. For example, Al-Ali, Black and Koser (2001a) specify that transnational sociocultural practices are more effective and less instrumental compared to political and economic activities. Given the different nature of these activities, the authors suggest that migrants’ capabilities and incentives influence the extent to which they become involved in these activities in different ways.

While some of these activities, such as sending economic remittances, demand a certain level of economic capital, for activities related to social relations, only the will to maintain contact would be enough. On a different note, not all sociocultural activities demand a physical presence in the home country, as most of them take place both in the country of destination and origin. To put it simply, for example, contact with family and friends through telephone calls, emails or participation in political demonstrations on home country related matters, take place in the host country. These activities are then intrinsically related to migrants’ social, economic and political lives in the host country. This highlights the inherent linkages between incorporation in the residence country and homeland engagement. Accordingly, the objective of my research is to build
on this idea and analyse how the engagement in different homeland oriented activities is affected by host country experiences.

3.4. Simultaneity in transnational migration research

The idea of simultaneity in transnational migration theory is closely linked to migrants’ embeddedness in various (transnational) social fields. If we conceptualize the migrant experience as individuals crafting combinations of destination country and origin country orientations, rather than a linear transition from the sending to the receiving society, then we can observe different aspects of their daily lives, social relations and practices, and their embeddedness in different transnational social fields. Analysing this interconnectedness also allows us to understand migrants’ ways of being and belonging more fully (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Therefore, more can be said about the implications of these new ways of being and how they hinder or help migrants’ social mobility and life trajectories. In what ways does the integration of migrants in the economic, sociocultural or legal domains in the host society relate to their involvement in their home country through homeland oriented activities? From a social mobility perspective, we can ask how simultaneity or engagement in one context enhances or inhibits mobility in the other. Mazzucato (2008b) argues that treating involvement in transnational economic activities and integration as separate issues leads to an incomplete view of migration and ultimately to ineffectual policies. A transnational perspective can help bridge this divide and lead to a more complete understanding of migrant livelihoods and of the reasons for maintaining contact with their homelands.

It is crucial to stress at this point that exploring simultaneity in migrants’ lives does not simply mean describing integration processes in the residence country and involvement in homeland oriented activities and social relations in the country of origin in isolation. Rather, the goal is to understand the inherent linkages between the two, and to discuss the ways in which they influence each other. On this basis, the most accurate way to do this is to examine whether there is a positive, negative or no relationship between the two processes.

On the one hand, there is the argument that highlights a negative association between homeland engagement and host country integration because the two aspects of migrant lives fall along a single continuum. Under this assumption of “competition”, the closer a migrant is to host country integration, the further they would be from homeland engagement and vice versa. This
would mainly be the perspective of traditional assimilationists. According to assimilationist theory, if migrants are not successfully integrated in the host society, they will be more likely to stay in contact with their home country. Conversely, if migrants are “well integrated”; they will have no incentive to maintain contact with their home country (Snel et al. 2006, Sana 2005). It is maintained that for those who are “marginalized” in the host society, involvement in home country oriented activities is the only choice (Portes et al. 1999).

On the other hand, it can also be argued that these host and home country orientations are parallel and independent from each other. In this regard, there would be no strong correlation between them and we can argue that host and home country orientations are “compatible” with each other. However, it may also be the case that they are positively dependent on each other, meaning that these processes reinforce one other and are “complementary” (Morawska 2004, Levitt 2008, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). This is a point of view that is supported by the transnational perspective, suggesting that those who are well integrated in the host countries also cultivate homeland ties (Portes 2003). Guarnizo and colleagues (2003) argue that those who participate in transnational activities are not the poorly educated migrants. On the contrary, migrants who are relatively highly educated and better embedded in the host country participate in home country oriented activities the most, since they have the capacity to do so. In other words, those who are better integrated are also more transnationally involved and vice versa (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In the analytical chapters of my research I go more in depth on these options of competition, complementarity and compatibility in order to discuss the links between home and host country orientations in the economic and sociocultural domains.

In the US context, there have already been several studies on this topic. The one that approximates my research the closest is by Waldinger (2008). My research, like Waldinger’s, focuses on one receiving country context and compares different migrant groups with respect to different types of homeland involvements, to assess how integration related outcomes correspond to migrants’ activities and attachments. In continental Europe, only a recent body of literature looks into different dimensions of homeland engagement and paves the way for a rich discussion on the links between integration and homeland
engagement (see Koopmans 2005, Snel et al. 2006, Mazzucato 2008a, 2009, Schans 2009, Muller 2009, Van Bochove 2010, Van Meeteren 2012). However, these studies are either qualitative in nature, or have a relatively small sample for quantitative research. More comparative and large-scale quantitative research on different migrant groups is needed in order to take the research a step further (Al-Ali and Koser 2012, Erdal and Oeppen 2013).

The void in research regarding migrants’ enduring homeland ties may also be due to the fact that systematically collected surveys among migrants in the host countries have largely focused on issues related to host country integration, and have ignored the significance of the contact migrants maintain with their family and friends in the home countries (Snel et al. 2006). In cases where homeland ties have been addressed, it is done only very superficially. The IS Academy survey allows us to fill in this gap in the literature and provide extensive information on migrants’ social and cultural links with their home country.

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In this first theoretical section, I discuss how years of stay in the host country and citizenship status, as conventional measurements of integration, are linked to homeland engagement in order to have an initial idea about how simultaneity may be experienced by migrants. Later on, in the core analytical chapters (Chapter 8, 9 and 10), I come back to the theoretical assumptions and elaborate specifically on the links between economic and sociocultural integration and homeland engagement and attachment.

Among existing studies on the issue, Waldinger’s (2008) work has shown no significant effect of citizenship status on remittances sending, but it was found to be significantly linked to return visits to the home country. Tamaki (2011), on the other hand, has also shown that for Latinos in the US, citizenship status is positively linked to return visits. Considering the capacity citizenship yields to migrants in terms of security and the ability to move without constraints, it is understandable why a positive association is found between legal status and return visits. In her study among Afghan families in the Netherlands, Muller (2009) has also claimed that those with Dutch citizenship had more ability to act according to the needs of their families back home and engage more actively in their homeland. However, the picture is not as clear for remittances sending. For
instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Sana (2005) show that undocumented Mexican migrants in the US remit more than documented. It is suggested that undocumented migrants need to maintain a stronger base in the home country, which leads to developing more economic linkages (Fairchild and Simpson 2004). However, several other studies regarding economic remittances, including Konica and Filer’s (2005) study on Albanian immigrants, have shown that documented migrants and those with higher occupational status tend to remit more.

One way to explain inconsistency among results may be the fact that it is difficult to isolate the effect of legal status from the effects of the other dimensions of migrant lives that are possibly relevant to remittance patterns (Carling 2008). That being said, in my research I am able to control for a large variety of individual level characteristics. Considering this, I argue that I can bring forward the sole effect of citizenship, and suggest that the isolated effect of citizenship will be positive because of the fundamental ability it provides for mobility and to travel outside the host country. Reversely, this may not necessarily be as crucial for other types of homeland engagement that do not demand physical mobility. Therefore, the role that citizenship plays may be different for different types of homeland engagement.

- Migrants with dual or only Dutch citizenship are significantly more likely to pay visits to their home country, but citizenship status has no other significant relationship to other aspects of sociocultural and economic homeland engagement.

Tsuda (2012) points out that the number of years spent in the country of residence may play a prominent role in defining the relationship between integration and homeland engagement. He states that newer migrants may be more oriented towards their homeland and have more challenges in the residence country which makes them feel more attached to their family and friends in the origin country and thus remit more. Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) have included years in the US as an incorporation variable and found a negative association in relation to involvement in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country. Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007) support the same line of reasoning by arguing that the longer a migrant has been abroad, the less frequently the migrant has visited the home country, the weaker the ties to the home country would be and thus of less importance it may be for migrants to develop economic
links with family and friends in the home country. Waldinger (2008) conversely finds no significant effect of years of stay in remittances sending behaviour, but marks a negative effect on social homeland engagement.

Proceeding from an assimilationist point of view, which emphasizes the importance of time, I would have to argue that, after controlling for other integration factors (e.g. family in the host country, economic and legal integration), there is a negative relationship between years in the Netherlands and homeland engagement, because migrants may not still have the same incentives to sustain relationships with their home country. However, it is also important to bear in mind that migrants’ capacity to remain in contact with their homeland may increase over time by stronger embeddedness in the host country and counterbalance the negative effect of years of stay (Carling and Hoelschar 2013). Consequently, I hypothesize that:

- **Years of stay in the Netherlands is not significantly linked to migrants’ sociocultural and economic homeland engagement.**

In this section I have developed the first two main hypotheses regarding simultaneity. In the core analytical chapters (Chapter 8, 9 and 10), thanks to rich data, I test these hypotheses but also take the existing work a step further in various ways. I do this firstly by including new types of homeland oriented activities and more specific integration indicators, both for economic and sociocultural dimensions of migrant lives. Moreover, in these chapters, I build upon the theoretical framework and develop further the concepts and analytical perspectives for each dimension. Secondly, I integrate homeland attachment in my model to assess the relative importance of feelings of attachment for simultaneous embeddedness. These two phases thus allow for:

1) A more thorough analysis of simultaneity by addressing the concepts of compatibility, competition and complementarity.

2) A systematic discussion on the capabilities approach as elaborated upon in Chapter 10.
Chapter 4

Methods and data
4. Methods and data

4.1. Methodological reflections

The challenge of my research is to explain the ways in which migrants manage their lives in the context of integration into a host country (in this case, the Netherlands) and continued engagement with their homeland (in this case Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco). I examine how these two apparently opposed processes influence one another. This question calls for a methodology that allows me to capture how migrants combine various home and host country orientations, and to make generalisations about how these orientations relate to one another. Because transnational migration is a process rather than a single occurrence, a one-time snapshot does not allow us to understand how the relationship between enduring homeland practices and host country integration change over time, particularly in response to economic conditions, election cycles, family or ritual events or climatic catastrophes (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). My research is not designed in a way to capture the influence of such contextual factors, shocks or changes over time in a dynamic manner. Instead, I look at the interrelationship between migrants’ home and host country related experiences at the time of the interview for understanding simultaneity.

Researchers raise several methodological points we must take into account when conducting cross-sectional research on transnationalism using quantitative research methods. To begin with, emphasizing transborder processes in quantitative research poses challenges in terms of ascertaining how common they are. Some scholars argue that the impression that there is an increase in transnational engagement can be due to the methodological approaches used in transnational migration research (see Portes et al. 2002, Guarnizo et al. 2003). The question therefore is whether there is an overestimation of migrants’ homeland engagement as some researchers suggest?

The unit of analysis may play a role in over-estimating how transnationally engaged migrants are. Some of the important research on
transnationalism focuses on communities that are known to be more involved in their home country (Portes and DeWind 2004). This line of research is of importance because it provides us with rich descriptions, and it allows for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. However, generalisations regarding the experiences of individual migrants cannot be made based on research that selectively examines already active groups. Taking the transnational community as the unit of analysis, and assuming that these communities are homogeneous also poses difficulties because it ignores more dispersed, fragmented or less institutionalized transnational activities (Al-Ali et al. 2001a, 2001b) and those migrants who do not engage in activities. In other words, not all migrant communities are as transnationally active as others and not all individuals in a given community engage equally in transnational activities.

To be able to make generalisations, we need to look systematically at the wider population. That is to say, sampling on the dependent variable (homeland engagement) may lead to an inaccurate estimation regarding the extent to which migrant populations are active in their home country (Mahler 1998, Itzigsohn et al.1999). At present, many valuable qualitative case studies exist to help answer why and how people experience transnationalism, but this is not the case with the opposite situation (Portes et al. 2002, Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). That is, while research is able to explain why migrants’ engage in their home country, we are not as successful in explaining why migrants do not participate in their home country. Systematic quantitative analysis in transnationalism research can also help us understand how transnational practices vary among immigrant groups (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In this research, given the sampling strategy used, we are able to include migrants from a wide range of diverse backgrounds. I am, therefore, able to address the issue of variation and discuss the differences between individuals with respect to their experiences. This also allows us to assess how widespread migrants’ homeland involvement is.

Other criticisms towards transnational migration research include the claims that most studies provide in-depth ethnographic analyses in one particular home country and one specific host country (Levitt 2001, Smith 2006). Early quantitative research also focused primarily on economic behaviour, neglecting transnational family ties and other social and cultural activities such as return visits or civic engagement in the home country. By incorporating a wider range of activities as part of homeland-oriented pursuits, my cross-sectional
research also contributes to a broader discussion on a wider array of practices. Considering the way in which the household survey that I use is constructed, it is also possible to address both transborder processes and integration-oriented activities without privileging one over the other. This in turn, allows me to capture the interrelationship between enduring homeland connections and social relationships within a single destination country context.

Finally, quantitative transnational migration research faces challenges in the operationalisation of concepts, in moving beyond the binaries such as migrant/non-migrant, homeland/host country or acculturation/cultural persistence. I hope that my research can shed light on the limits of existing measurements and consequentially improve them. In the remainder of this section, I describe the sampling strategies for the household survey, the practicalities regarding the fieldwork, and the challenges faced during the fieldwork.

In the remainder of this section, I describe the fieldwork experiences in the Netherlands which consisted primarily of household surveys. The sampling strategy, specificity of household surveys and challenges of the fieldwork are discussed. More detailed information about the survey content and fieldwork preparation can be found in Appendices A and B. I conclude the chapter by giving a general overview of the sample characteristics.

4.2. Fieldwork: Household surveys

 Sampling strategy

In quantitative migration research, it is a challenge to gather a representative sample that reflects the realities of the total population of interest. The sampling strategy chosen is of great importance in order to create the highest level of representation within the practical constraints of time and budget (Blumberg et al. 2008). For a non-biased sample that includes all segments of the population, it is vital that the households that are included are selected as randomly as possible. This means that the households that participate are not selected based on particular characteristics, such as their participation in community groups or organisations, the jobs of the household members, the wealth of the household, and so on. (Blanche et al. 2006). It is particularly challenging to do this in migration research because in most destination countries, migrants are a relatively small part of the population and thus not easy
to reach (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2007).

In addition, although migrant groups tend to cluster in ethnically diverse cities and urban areas in Europe, some groups are highly dispersed within the country (for example, the dispersal policy of the Netherlands towards the Surinamese migrants) (Rath 2009). Moreover, population registers used for the sampling frame do not include migrants who are not registered with the municipality, making them invisible to survey research. Furthermore, if the research targets migrants from a specific origin country, the sampling process may become “a search for a needle in a haystack” (Beauchemin and González-Ferrer 2011). The Migration and Development: A World in Motion project, on which my research is based, faced similar challenges.

The data collection consisted of two stages. In the first stage we received information from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) on the proportion of people from our target groups living in certain neighbourhoods in the Netherlands. From this information, we looked at the percentage of people from Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco living in a given postal code area. Depending on this percentage, we assigned interviewers a quota of households that should be interviewed in that area. Within these assigned neighbourhoods, interviewers were responsible for going door-to-door to find households that matched our study requirements. In highly concentrated migrant neighbourhoods, interviewers were asked to carry out more surveys than in areas where there were fewer migrants. Nevertheless, in order not to bias the sample towards only the highest migrant-density neighbourhoods, interviewers were encouraged to conduct interviews in other areas with low concentrations of migrants as well. This method meant that interviewers in some cases had to knock on many doors before they could actually find a target household. This method of random sampling turned out to be very costly and time consuming (See Chapter 4.3). Therefore, after collecting one third of the data, we included a new strategy for collecting data.

In the second part of the fieldwork, we also started conducting the surveys by allowing for snowball sampling. As Beauchemin and González-Ferrer (2011) state, “chain referral” techniques are a suitable solution to the difficulties

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7 See also Malheiro (2002), Musterd (2005), Muster and Ostendorf (2009), Bolt and Van Kempen (2009).
faced in data collection among migrant groups. In this case, interviewers asked the participants directly if they could suggest other households that would be interested in the project. Moreover, interviewers used their social networks to reach a wider range of migrants. Finally, interviewers looked for respondents in public areas, attending churches and community events in order to find potential participants. For our project, this method of reaching additional contacts worked successfully as we had a large number of interviewers from different cities who used different methods to reach participants. At the end of the fieldwork, although we could not identify the degree to which the sample was representative, the data included target groups with various background characteristics that allowed for a substantial comparison with respect to migration history and motivation, citizenship status, education level and other background characteristics such as gender, age and marital status.

**The household as the unit of analysis**

The survey we conducted in the Netherlands was a ‘household’ survey. This means that we did not just focus on individuals from the four migrant groups, but on the whole household. The survey therefore contained some questions that were to be answered for all household members, and some questions that were to be answered only by the main respondent. In the cases where not all the household members were present at home at the time of the interview, the main respondent answered the questions for the other household members.

For a household to be a target, there must be at least one person who was born in Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia or Morocco. No other restrictions applied. This means that as long as there was one first generation migrant from one of these groups, the household was valid for inclusion. It was acceptable if there were people born in other countries, or second and third generation migrants within the household.

The principal respondent was defined as a member of the household who had the following characteristics: the main respondent should be older than 18 years, and they should be one of the most knowledgeable persons in the household about its financial and social affairs and about the migration history of other household members. The main respondent also had to be born in one of the target countries. In the cases where several persons matched the profile of the
main respondent, one person was chosen. Interviewers were told to alternate between male and female main respondents. That is, if the interviewer had previously interviewed a man in a household, then a woman would be interviewed in the next household, where possible. At the end of the fieldwork, we observed that among the 1,022 main respondents, 472 (46%) were female, and 990 (97%) were first-generation migrants.

**Non-response**

Response charts were completed by interviewers at the beginning of the fieldwork, when we conducted surveys based on a stratified random sampling with quota system. In these charts, interviewers indicated whether a household was from a target group and if they accepted or declined to participate in research. Interviewers also indicated on the charts if their attempt to reach someone in the household was unsuccessful. In this case, interviewers were obliged to go back to the same household for a maximum of three times until they received an answer. If, at the end of three attempts, they could not reach anyone, they identified the household as non-responsive. Non-responses were tracked for the first third of the survey data collection period. The non-responsive rate observed during this period indicated that there was a very high non-response and rejection rate from the target groups. After this period, we allowed the interviewers to pursue with snowball sampling. We used various entry points in cooperation with interviewers provided by the “Colourview Research Company”. Consequently, during the second third of the data collection period, we stopped keeping track of non-response rates as this would no longer be indicative of the representativeness of the sample.

4.3. **Fieldwork challenges in the Netherlands**

Several challenges were encountered during the fieldwork. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, it can be very difficult to find a target household by knocking on doors. The cases of non-contact (not finding anyone at home or not having the door answered) were numerous when using this approach. We needed to pursue this strategy to make sure that we covered certain areas but having to make multiple visits to certain sites tremendously increased costs.

Secondly, when a target household was found, it was quite often the case that the participant did not have the time to complete an interview, that is,
assuming that the person had agreed to participate in the first place. Hence, a second visit was necessary in order to conduct the interview. As expected, this doubled the travel costs for a single survey as well as interviewer time and cost. Another related problem was that it was difficult to convince individuals to participate in the research, especially given the sensitive background of the migrant groups that we worked with that led to frequent refusal and non-response for participation. This demanded that researchers look for yet another household ‘on foot’. In sum, even if we could not calculate it precisely, we considered the non-contact and non-response rate as very high in the method initially used. Considering that interviewers were paid on an hourly basis for their work, the research budget was seriously affected by these challenges.

Thirdly, language emerged as another challenge for the research. For the surveys to be implemented successfully, the majority of interviewers were selected from those of the particular migrant background. A few Dutch-speaking interviewers were also included in the survey team. We were very fortunate to have very motivated interviewers with migrant backgrounds but the language abilities of these interviewers did not always suit the language needs of respondents. In some cases, although potential participants were found, a second visit often had to be conducted by a second interviewer so that the interview could be conducted in the appropriate language.

Forthly, the fieldwork strategy also revealed challenges on a practical level. Interviewers often conducted fieldwork in neighbourhoods they were not familiar with, and, in some cases, were unsafe. We therefore always encouraged interviewers (particularly females) to work in pairs, as the personal security of interviewers could not be risked. As a result, visits to certain neighbourhoods were made by a team of two people, doubling the travel costs for a single sampling unit. Another issue related to security of the interviewers was that the interviewers were required to check in and out with project team leaders by phone so their locations and working hours were always known. Working in pairs, interviewers also had to communicate with each other. In addition, among certain members of the target group (namely Ethiopians), a great deal of rapport had to be established prior to potential participants agreeing to complete the survey, which often required repeated phone contact. Consequently, communication related costs were added to the budget.

Fifthly, it should be noted that despite efforts to recruit interviewers from
different cities, it was very difficult to do this in a comprehensive way. Especially at the beginning of the fieldwork, interviewers were mainly recruited from Maastricht University, meaning more travel than initially expected was thus necessary to reach migrant neighbourhoods. The second largest group of interviewers (mainly Ethiopians) was located in The Hague, but it was not possible to recruit a large number of interviewers from other big cities. We managed to solve this problem to a great extent when we started working with the Colourview Research Company that had access to interviewers living in different cities.

Finally, it is worthwhile to mention a couple of general challenges about working with migrants. For this research, building trust with the migrants to engage them in the research, and assuring them about the anonymity of the research and that it has purely academic purposes were several challenges we faced. I explain more in detail how we dealt with these challenges in Appendix B, but to mention briefly, it was crucial for us to engage with the migrant communities through civil society. That is to say, we communicated about the research with migrant organizations and invited them to take part in some aspects of the research. This was not done only to build trust, but also to exchange knowledge and make sure that the research we conduct fit the realities of migrants and can in return have yielding and appropriate outcomes. Confirming strategies about approaching households for the survey, assigning specific interviewers for migrant households from different origin countries, ordering the survey modules in an thematic and chronological manner and warranting that participation in this research and sharing experiences with us will be beneficial for the wider community helped us overcome most of the methodological challenges we were to potentially face in this research.

Overall, in spite of the challenges, the fieldwork was completed successfully and we managed to achieve our goal of conducting at least 1000 household surveys. The fieldwork in the Netherlands has shown that despite the efforts to anticipate potential problems, unexpected challenges appear in the field, and that managing the fieldwork also includes being flexible and having the ability to make adjustments and improvements during the process in order to achieve the data collection goals.
4.4. Sample characteristics

The fieldwork resulted in 247 Moroccan, 351 Ethiopian, 165 Burundian and 259 Afghan households interviewed, totalling 1,022 households. These 1,022 surveyed households were distributed across 11 provinces of the Netherlands. In line with the concentration of migrant populations in bigger cities and urban areas, 51.7 per cent of the surveys were conducted in Noord Holland (11.3%) and Zuid Holland (40.4%) where the largest cities of the Netherlands Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague are located. Some 50.2 per cent of the Moroccan surveys, 43.5 per cent of the Ethiopian, 33.3 per cent of the Burundian and 31.3 per cent of the Afghan surveys were conducted in Zuid Holland. We gathered information about 891 people in Moroccan households, 682 people in Ethiopian households, 348 people in Burundian households and 824 people in Afghan households. In total, this amounts to information on 2,745 individuals.

While various characteristics of the migrant groups will be discussed in Chapter 7, at this point, to give a general overview of the sample, it can be indicated that (see also Bilgili and Siegel, the Netherlands Country Profile (2012a):

- The overall distribution of gender is balanced.
- 73 per cent of the sample is composed of adults (18 and over). Only a small share of the sample is above retirement age (5.3%).
- 35 per cent of the sample is married.
- 70 per cent of the total sample is a first-generation migrant.
- Considerable differences exist between the groups with respect to educational background.
  - A higher proportion of individuals have low levels of education in the Moroccan sample (15% with no formal education), and the highest share of individual with tertiary education and above is from the Ethiopian sample (34% with tertiary education).

For my research, I make use of various subsamples of the whole dataset depending on the specific outcome variable I was interested in. All of the subsamples I use, only take first-generation adult migrants who were born in one of the four origin countries into account (See Appendix C for more detailed information of the sample characteristics). Further specifications of each sample used are discussed in the results sections.
Chapter 5

Mapping the host country context
5. Mapping the host country context

Migrants’ participation in Dutch society, their feelings of belonging in the Netherlands, and their engagement with their homeland, are strongly shaped by the kind of societal environment the host country offers. The Netherlands has a long history of immigration; and the Dutch immigration, integration and development policies have witnessed marked changes over the years. In order to interpret migrants’ behaviour in the current context, it is necessary to give a brief summary of the immigration history of the country, as well as that of the political environment and policy perspectives. The aim of this section is to address these two issues.

5.1. The Netherlands: A country of immigration

The Netherlands has attracted migrants since the seventeenth century given its relative freedom and wealth (Ersanilli 2007). Yet, in spite of the on-going immigration for many years, strictly speaking, the country became a country of immigration only after the Second World War, whereby immigration rates exceeded emigration rates (Zorlu and Hartog 2002, Van Ours and Veenman 1999, Rath 2009). This was mainly due to the increase in immigration from former colonies in Asia and the Caribbean and from Mediterranean countries with which the Netherlands signed bilateral labour agreements for the so-called “guest worker” programs (Van Ours and Veenman 1999). As I discuss below, guest worker programs were initially developed as temporary and circular migration schemes that would not have a substantial effect on the country’s population, but history has shown that these movements turned into permanent migration flows. This was particularly driven by family formation and reunification, but the arrival of political refugees also increased the share of foreign population in the country (Heering et al. 2001), and led to the establishment of large migrant communities.

Being an immigration country for several decades, much has been written on the history of immigration in the Netherlands. The early recognition of “ethnic minorities” and the positive attitude towards international migration
since the second half of the 20th century, combined with a systematic approach to data collection in the country, have led to a relatively detailed record of the immigration in the form of a population register. In this documentation, the distinction is made between *autochtonen*, referring to native Dutch, and *allochtonen*, referring to persons who have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands (see Ersanilli 2007, Doomernik 2013). People originating from countries within Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Indonesia and Japan are considered Western *allochtonen*, whereas those coming from Turkey, Africa, Latin America and the rest of Asia are defined as Non-Western *allochtonen*. In this section, based on Dutch register data, I start with an overview of the current population characteristics and continue by summarizing the general immigration trends in the country over the years (from the 1970s onwards where data is available) with more emphasis on Non-Western *allochtonen*.

Migrants constitute a considerable part of the population in the Netherlands. Overall, more than 21 per cent of the total Dutch population consists of migrants or children of migrant parents. In 2011, non-Western *allochtonen* made up 11.4 per cent of the total population while Western migrants accounted for 9 per cent of the total population. As can be seen from Figure 1, the immigration of non-Westerners to the Netherlands has been greater than the immigration of Western migrants until 2004. After 2004, immigration to the Netherlands from both Western and Non-Western countries started to increase slightly; immigration from Western countries being more in absolute terms than immigration from Non-Western countries. This recent change in the increase of Western migrants can be explained by the expansion of the European Union from 1 May 2004, which was the largest single increase in terms of people and number of countries. The increase was especially observed after 2007 when the Netherlands opened its labour market to new member states. During this period, by far the largest group of immigrants came from Poland (Engbersen et al. 2010). Nevertheless, given the pre-2004 pattern of immigration, the largest immigrant communities in the Netherlands remain those of non-Western *allochtonen*.

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8 Although the validity of a distinction made between Western and Non-Western migrants is open to discussion and that the underlying meaning of being Western can be discussed, in this research, I remain loyal to this distinction for practical reasons, and acknowledge Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands as Non-Western *allochtonen*.
The percentage increase in the number of Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian migrants has been respectively 199, 190 and 680 percentage points in the last ten years (Table 1). Nevertheless, Table 1 also shows that the increase in the non-Western migrant population is three times greater than that of the Western migrant population. While the total number of Western allochtonen is about 1.5 million, the number of non-Western allochtonen is over 1.8 million individuals. In this regard, it is important to recognize the significance of the non-Western population in the country, and it would not be unsound to forecast a natural growth in the population size in the near future, despite the recent restrictions on immigration implemented through new policies.

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9 Immigration from Germany to the Netherlands dates back to the last quarter of the 19th century. German immigration in the Netherlands is quite a well-known phenomenon because of the geographical as well as the cultural and economic proximity between the countries (Lesger et al. 2002). A considerable share of the immigration from the European Union consists of German migrants.
Table 1 Population and population growth in the Netherlands, 1 January 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>Share in the total population</th>
<th>Growth since 1 January 2000</th>
<th>Share of second generation</th>
<th>Mean age</th>
<th>Number of females per 100 males ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(x \times 1000)</td>
<td>(\text{per 1,000 inhabitants})</td>
<td>(\times 1,000)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(\text{years})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16656</td>
<td>1000.0</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochtonen</td>
<td>13229</td>
<td>794.2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western allochtonen of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU-26)</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western allochtonen Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean /Aruban</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Western</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bevolkingsstatistieken.

Another noteworthy point about the increasing significance of the foreign population in the Netherlands is the continuous rise of the number of people with dual-nationality. As seen in Figure 2, the number of Dutch citizens with at least one non-Dutch nationality almost tripled between 1995 and 2009, reaching around 1.2 million individuals in 2011. The increase in the naturalisation rates also draws attention to the permanent settlement of individuals with a migration background in the country and the rising importance of their economic, social, and cultural integration.
Having established that a considerable share of the Dutch population has a migration-related background, I describe the migration patterns that have led to this increase in greater detail in the following section. Figure 3 illustrates that Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans are the most substantial non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands. During the period of post-colonisation immigration, it was mainly Indonesians, Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans who migrated to the Netherlands, starting with the independence of Indonesia in 1945 and of Suriname in 1975. At the time, more than 12,500 Moluccans immigrated to the Netherlands from Indonesia with the expectation of the formation of an independent Moluccan state; however, this project failed leading to their permanent stay. During the two decades following the Second World War, approximately 300,000 Indonesian Dutch people moved to the Netherlands (Penninx et al. 1993). Large numbers also migrated from Suriname after its independence in the 1970s, many believing that the country could not sustain its economic growth and political stability. As a consequence, approximately 150,000 African-Surinamese working class (creoles) individuals and the offspring of Indian indentured workers (hindostanis) migrated to the Netherlands (Rath 2009). The Dutch Antilles also remain important source countries of immigration. A considerable part of the early migrants from the Dutch Antilles came from upper class families who chose to move to the Netherlands for educational purposes (Rath 2009). However, since the 1990s, the unstable economy of the islands and the establishment of strong migration networks have led to the increased immigration of lower skilled Antilleans.
(Entzinger 1995, Ersanilli 2007). Since 2000, the growth rate of Surinamese population has been especially low (14%), while that of the Antilleans has been comparatively higher (32%) (See Table 1). In sum, in 2011, there were approximately 345,000 Surinamese of which 160,000 were second-generation migrants (46.5%), and 141,000 individuals from Dutch Antilles and Aruba of which 59,200 were second-generation migrants (42%) (See Table 1).

**Figure 3 People with a non-Western background in the Netherlands, 1 January 2010**

![Graph showing population trends](image)

Source: CBS Statline

The second phase of large immigration flows in the Netherlands coincides with the reconciliation and economic recovery period after the Second World War. This period holds particular significance for my research because it involves Moroccans who are considered a typical example of a migrant community established as a result of the immigration flows during this period. When the country witnessed labour shortages after the Second World War, the Dutch government recruited workers from Mediterranean countries.\(^{10}\) It was mainly labour-intensive sectors of the economy that faced manpower shortages, especially in the lower ranks of the labour hierarchy (Lucassen et al. 1974, Rath 2002). Although the recruitment was organised by private companies at first, the

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\(^{10}\) The countries involved can be listed as Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia (Heering et al. 2001).
government intervened not long after, setting up recruitment agencies in immigrant sending countries and signing bilateral agreements with migrant sending countries in the early 1960s. As in the case of many other Western European countries, bilateral labour agreements were signed with several South European countries as well as with Turkey and Morocco (Van Ours and Veenman 1999, Van Amersfoort and Doomernik 2003). The so-called “guest worker” programmes initiated a continuous inflow of low-skilled, primarily male labourers (Van Amersfoort 1995, Penninx et al. 1993). Simultaneously, there were also “spontaneous guest workers” (Engbersen and Broeders 2009) who arrived in the Netherlands as tourists, found a job through their networks, and over-stayed their permits (Rath 2009). At the time, when irregular migration was not a highly debated topic, the government was blind to these developments because the workers were seen as ‘a rational short run strategy’ for Dutch employers (Hartog and Vriend 1989).

Labour recruitment continued until the 1973 Oil Crisis, after which the government abolished it. At this point, labour migrants had to make a choice between returning to their home country and bringing their families to be reunified with them in the Netherlands. Considering the effects of the economic crises in the migrant sending countries, permanent return was not an appealing option for most individuals. Subsequently, migration from the Mediterranean countries continued through family formation and reunification (Van Ours and Veenman 1999). As can be anticipated, concurrent with the changes in migration patterns, the return rate of immigrants also decreased. While the return rate of the first wave of migration in the 1960s (especially the Italians and Spanish) (Heering et al. 2001) was quite high, those who came with the second wave during the 1970s had a much lower rate of return (15%) (Hartog and Vriend 1989). Consequently, these developments characterized the permanent settlement of labour migrants and the establishment of large (non-Western) immigrant communities in the Netherlands. Turks and Moroccans constitute the largest migrant groups who settled permanently. They are respectively the third and fourth largest migrant communities in the country. In 2011, there were approximately 389,000 Turks and 356,000 Moroccans in The Netherlands (See

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11 These migration flows depended on family networks initiated migration chains from specific sending communities to specific areas in the Netherlands.

12 No specific indication is made about how high the return rate was.
Table 1). The share of second generation immigrants is around half of the whole community for both immigrant groups (49.3% for Turks, 52.9% for Moroccans). However, it is important to acknowledge that the growth rate of these groups since 2000 is relatively smaller (26% for Turks, 36% for Moroccans) compared to other new emerging non-Western immigrant communities, such as Afghans (87%), Iraqis (58%) and Iranians (43%). It is for this reason that new migrant communities in the Netherlands need to be studied in comparison to the larger non-Western migrant groups like the Moroccans and Turks.

Thirdly, humanitarian migration movements are a significant component of migration history in the Netherlands. These flows are also highly relevant for this research because the migration from three of the four migrant groups that I study were initiated primarily by political and security concerns. To provide an overview of humanitarian migration movements in the Netherlands, it is critical to note that the Netherlands had started to receive a considerable number of asylum seekers and refugees already after the Second World War; but the most important influxes occurred after the 1980s, and more significantly in the 1990s (Entzinger 1994, Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). The first refugees in the Netherlands consist of those fleeing from the communist regimes and Poles who helped liberate the Netherlands. In the mid-1980s, the largest inflow of refugees came from Ghana and Turkey13, while in 1995 most refugees originated from the former Yugoslav Republics, followed by persons from Somalia, Iran and Iraq (SOPEMI 1997, Heering et al. 2001). Today the largest refugee groups in the Netherlands are from Afghanista n, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Bosnia. As one of the signers of the Geneva Convention, the Netherlands can grant refugee status to asylum seekers when they meet the criteria. This also includes dependent partners and minor children of the principal applicant if they have moved together or within three months of one another.14

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13In the first half of 1980s, the Nigerian government forced about two million migrants, including Ghanaians, to leave the country as a result of economic downturn. While many Ghanaians returned to their home country, many sought refuge in European countries (Bump 2006). In the Turkish context, the military interventions and the rising conflict due to the separatist movement by Turkey’s large Kurdish minority led to an increase in humanitarian migration movements (Kirisci 2003).

14Asylum seekers are received in camps and basic facilities provided by the center for the asylum seekers – (Center Opang Azielzoekers (COA). The COA is responsible for providing asylum seekers integration and orientation services as well as processing their applications. Since the situation of asylum seekers are not clear, they are not eligible for attending courses or learning Dutch. It is only after being granted a refugee status that they are registered by the municipality. Refugees receive
The Netherlands has signed up to accept 500 refugees a year from the UN refugee camps.\textsuperscript{15} In 2011, there were a total of 11,590 asylum seekers and 10,010 people from over 25 countries were granted refugee status. However, this number is not a perfect reflection of the numbers of those granted refugee status in the Netherlands. Over the years, there have been several amendments regarding the selection system of refugees as a result of the increasing number of individuals seeking asylum, and the numbers have fluctuated substantially. As Figure 4 illustrates, the inflow of asylum seekers in the Netherlands is quite similar to the overall trends in the member countries of the European Union. During the 10 years after 1985, nearly 277,000 people applied for asylum in the Netherlands. In this period, about 57,000 requests were granted, and approximately 121,000 were refused (Doomernik et al. 1997). In 1990, around 8,000 asylum migrants constituted 7 per cent of total immigration, while it reached 20 per cent in 1993 with around 20,000 asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{16}  

\textsuperscript{15} Four missions make visits to refugee camps annually to select refugees in need of resettlement. The countries visited changes depending on the priority situation at the time. The Dutch government also accepts individual resettlement cases (e.g. emergency cases, women at risk) suggested by UNHCR even when the countries of asylum are not visited by missions. (Source: http://www.refugee legal aid information.org).  

\textsuperscript{16} Many of the asylum seekers came from Angola and the former Soviet Union due to the political
According to the data provided by the Dutch Ministry of Justice, while the number of asylum claims filed in the Netherlands was approximately 52,600 in 1994, this number decreased to 29,300 in 1995 (UNHCR 2001). That being said, the main reasons for this decline are the intensification of the expulsion policy and the more selective criteria for admission, rather than changes in supply (Doomernik et al. 1997). Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) state that, although the Dutch policy remains less harsh and less restrictive than most other European countries, it has changed significantly over the years to limit the influx of asylum seekers. In the Netherlands, only a minor segment of asylum seekers obtain official refugee status under the criteria of the Geneva Convention. In most cases, however, asylum seekers receive temporary protection and are not sent back to their home country.17

Differently, if a brief history of immigration in the Netherlands is given based on the main immigration patterns, the picture is as follows: The inflows are caused by internal reasons, such as labour shortages, and external shocks (e.g. political refugees) (Van Ours and Veenman 1999). Overall, a summary of the migrants’ motivations in coming to the Netherlands, as data starting from 1995 indicate, suggests that family reunification has been the most important driver (Rath 2009). However, after 2006, labour migration has overtaken family related migration for the total foreign population (See Figure 5). Seeking asylum in the Netherlands has been an important migration motivation especially between 1995 and 2003 and it is somewhat on the rise again. Student migration, a trend which has received limited attention up to date, is another significant migration motivation that has been steadily but slowly on the rise since the 1990s. This migration trend is especially important for Ethiopians, as discussed below.

unrest, while many applied from the former Yugoslavia given the conflict that started in the Serbian part of the country.

17 On the basis of Alien Act 2000 (Article 29), the decision whether an asylum seeker is eligible for a temporary asylum residence permit is made. Some of the grounds based on which the decision is made include persecution of a specific group, special risk groups, persecution of homosexuals and persecution for religious reasons (See Annual Policy Report 2012: Migration and Asylum in the Netherlands for further details).
Finally, before concluding, it is crucial to note that irregular migration which includes illegal entry, stay or work, should not be ignored either. Undoubtedly, irregular migrants compose a group that is difficult to identify and quantify, and therefore are omitted in figures. For the period between 1997 and 2003, Van der Heijden et al. (2006) claimed that there were approximately 50,000 to 200,000 irregular immigrants. A follow-up study in 2009 produced an estimate of around 97,100 irregular immigrants in the Netherlands (mainly in the large cities) (Van der Heijden et al. 2011). In the light of these points, it is pivotal that irregular migrants are recognized as part of the immigration history in the Netherlands, and counted to the extent possible.

In overview, this section has shown that immigration increased and diversified in terms of origin countries and background characteristics of immigrants over the past couple of decades. The migration motives of immigrants have also changed considerably, leading to a diverse group of migrants with different intentions to settle in the country (Bijwaard 2008, 2010). Moreover, the increase in naturalisation rates as well as the population growth rates mentioned earlier additionally illustrate that larger migrant communities in the country are established, and will continue to be an integral part of the society. Therefore, we need to comprehend how exactly the Netherlands has dealt with immigration and integration in the political arena. Evidently, the societal, political and economic consequences of the inflow of immigrants depend
significantly on the rights and opportunity structures provided by the receiving country. In line with this, in this research, to serve the objective of understanding migrants’ integration patterns and homeland engagement, we must fully apprehend the policy context that influences migrants’ incentives, capacity and motivations in developing and maintaining contact with their home country as they integrate into the Netherlands.

5.2. Multiculturalism and integration policies in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the awareness of being an immigration country gained ground in the political realm very slowly, and the idea of immigration as a recent phenomenon has been dominant both in popular memory and in academic scholarship (Lucassen et al. 2006). Nevertheless, the Netherlands saw immigration as a source of economic and cultural richness for many years and represented itself as a tolerant country towards foreigners with different cultures and religions (Lucassen and Penninx 1997, Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). This perception has been reflected in the immigration and integration policies as well as in the attitude towards migrants arriving in the country after the Second World War. The Netherlands has been considered for many years as one of the first European countries to be called “multiculturalist” due to a set of multiculturalist policies introduced in the early 1970s.

The history of “Verzuiling” (Pillarisation)18 in the Netherlands paved the way for multiculturalism and offered a wide scope of opportunities for migrants to organize themselves (Entzinger 2003, Koopmans 2002). Dutch multiculturalism encouraged migrants to maintain their cultural heritage, gave easy access to citizenship and did not enforce “assimilation” into the native Dutch population (Vasta 2007). Van Ours and Veenman (1999) state that the lack of enforcement for adopting Dutch culture also owed to the conception that many of the migrants, particularly those who came for work, were to eventually return to their home country. Although returns did occur at the beginning, as history has shown, starting with the early 1980s it was evident that most immigrants would not

18 “Pillarisation” is a Dutch tradition that dates back to the 19th century. It is considered as a means to allow for tolerance among groups with different religious beliefs, especially Catholics and Protestants (Vink 2007). Pillarisation constitutes state sponsored, semi-autonomous institutions of various societal sub-groups in health, social welfare, education etc (Vasta 2007). With the establishment of immigrant communities in the Netherlands, pillarisation incorporated ethnic minority elites as one of the pillars and allowed them to participate in the policy process (Koopmans and Statham 2003: 221).
return (De Bree et al. 2010), and this new phenomenon of permanent settlement of migrants in the Netherlands demanded a shift in the focus of the government’s integration policy.

In this phase of permanent settlement, the Dutch government developed policies to encourage the emancipation and participation of ethnic minorities in Dutch society, to prevent discrimination and to diminish inequality within the society by advancing the socioeconomic position of ethnic minorities (Van Ours and Veenman 1999). In this period, the government was particularly occupied with ensuring equal access to the benefits of the welfare state and focused on specific measures for ethnic minorities (Engbersen 2003). The report published by the Netherland Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR: Wetenschappelijk Raad voor Regeringsbeleid) in 1979, and the 1983 follow-up policy on ethnic minorities constitute the core documents that emphasized the significance of reducing social and economic disadvantage among ethnic minorities and encouraged their active participation in society (Parliamentary Inquiry on Integration Policy Report, 2004). Rath (1993) defines this period as the “controlled integration” phase. However, these policies did not generate the anticipated consequences in terms of the socioeconomic integration of migrants. That is to say, primarily labour migrants, but also to a lesser extent migrants from former colonies, were observed to be doing poorly in the economic domain compared to the native Dutch population, and were considered to be marginalized (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Considering that the socioeconomic background characteristics of the individuals could not explain the difference between the migrants and the natives fully, a debate on the failure of the integration policies emerged.

It was soon granted that the policies aimed at improving migrants’ economic position did not lead to significant improvement. This coincided with other developments in the Netherlands as well as around the world, as a result of which migrant groups were put in a distinctively undesirable position. Namely, a more negative attitude towards multiculturalism emerged in the Dutch society especially with the turbulent first years of the new millennium, following the international and national events surrounding 9/11; and within the Netherlands, the rise of the anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn and the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh (Gijsberts and Dagavos 2009). Surveys conducted among the native Dutch also indicated a more negative attitude towards
immigrants and a growing preference for assimilation (Arends-Toth et al. 1998, Vijver 2003). The extreme right-wing party the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) also gained considerable support for their views on limited immigration and their emphasis on cultural assimilation (European Migration Network 2009). Consequently, in the Netherlands today, immigrant integration through multiculturalist policies is regarded almost as a failed project.

Why are the multiculturalist policies viewed this way? Vasta (2007) takes a step further and asks the question “Why is it that a self-defined ‘liberal’ and ‘tolerant’ society demands conformity, compulsion and introduces seemingly undemocratic sanctions towards immigrants in a move towards assimilationism?” This shift in opinion away from multiculturalism and from a rather liberal stance to a more restrictive one with respect to immigration and integration has been explained in various ways. Some argue that cultural assimilation is a precondition for successful integration and that multiculturalism policies do not encourage cultural adaptation on the part of immigrants (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010). Subsequently, these policies cause unintended consequences and integration challenges (Rath 2001). Other scholars argue that the multiculturalist policies put in place were never fully accepted or practised in the first place (Rath 1999, Vink 2007). Awortwi (1999) also states that minority groups were excluded from the decision-making processes and planning of activities designed to aid their integration, and hence the policies put in place were not well suited.

Alongside these competing arguments, other researchers draw attention to the impatience of Dutch society, which expected considerable change in a short period of time (Penninx 2005). They stress that challenges are inherent to the integration debate and should be treated with sensitivity, introducing more relativity to debate. In this line of argument, the reason why immigrant integration came to be perceived as a “problem” in the country was primarily due to the way the challenges were presented and how “integration” was defined and discussed by the politicians, the media and others. Poppelaars and Scholten (2008), in a similar vein, contend that there is a difficulty in evaluating the success or failure of integration policies because the national and local administrative levels perceive integration challenges differently, and they use disparate, sometimes competing approaches that lead to conflicting conclusions regarding
the situation of immigrants.  

While debates about why multiculturalism failed in the Netherlands persist, the country continues to become more and more restrictive regarding its immigration and integration policy (Bevelander and Veenman 2006). Not only has naturalisation become more difficult, but also cultural diversity is seen as an obstacle towards integration into Dutch society to a greater extent (Ersanilli 2007). Prior to changes in 1998, the famous ‘ethnic minority policy’ (introduced in 1994) emphasized the employment and education of migrants and their descendants. The government set up integration programs in which immigrants could participate. Providing language courses and integration courses were the responsibility of the municipalities, but participation to these programs was not obligatory (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). In contrast, current integration policies make participation obligatory and also put the onus on the individual to integrate into Dutch society. (Vasta 2007, Tk 2005-2006, 30308, nr. 3: 2. in Frouws and Bilgili 2012).

Today, the concepts of ‘shared citizenship’ and ‘autonomy’ are put forward, and newcomers are expected to participate actively in mainstream institutions (Joppke 2007). This implies that the government stresses the importance of learning Dutch and full integration in the labour market (Klaver and Odé 2009). The cornerstone of this new approach was the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, henceforth referred to as WIN). WIN obliged non-Western newcomers to participate in a twelve-month integration course, which consisted of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour market. This policy made the Netherlands one of the first countries to impose a mandatory post-entry integration program on certain immigrants (Klaver and Odé 2009). The underlying implication of these new integration policies is the view that integration is not simply about employment and civic engagement but is also based heavily on the individual’s commitment to the society, loyalty to national citizenship and knowledge of social values of the society as well as language proficiency (Goodman 2010).

Moreover, since 2006, foreign nationals (non-EU resident) wishing to

\[19\] While the national government applies more of a “citizenship approach”, giving less importance to the needs of specific communities (Sniderman et al. 1996), local governments are more accommodative of group level differences and expectations.
settle in the Netherlands for a prolonged period are obliged to take and pass the civic integration examination in their country of origin in order to obtain a residence permit (Frouws and Bilgili 2012). That is to say, before individuals are admitted to the country, they need to prove a certain level of linguistic competence and knowledge about the Netherlands. The pre-entry program is referred to as a selection criterion. Those who fail to pass the pre-entry tests are not to be admitted. Understandably, asylum seekers are exempt from these tests, considering the direct risk in their origin country (Frouws and Bilgili 2012). The reasoning behind this policy is that by restricting the immigration of ‘non-integratable’ migrants, it is believed that the Netherlands can ‘prevent the integration problem’. These civic integration policies are legitimated primarily with reference to the position of family migrants, as they do not apply to temporary knowledge migrants (TK 29700 no. 3, p.4. in Frouws and Bilgili 2012, Strik et al. 2010).

The Dutch Civic Integration Act Abroad (2006) also charted a new path, making an explicit connection between immigration and integration policies: “as immigration and integration are inherently connected – in the sphere of integration no sustainable effects can be achieved as long as immigration is not regulated and immigration is not well regulated if it takes no consideration of the conditions for integration of newcomers – the government chooses to connect integration conditions to immigration” (TK 29700 no. 3, p.4. in Scholten et al. 2011). With respect to immigration, a more selective policy is introduced with the Act. While the government perceives highly skilled migration positively, further restrictions are put in place for family formation and reunification. In other words, the Dutch government currently “attaches great importance to maintaining a selective and restrictive admissions policy, based on an effective control and return policy” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, 2008: 4). In sum, the more restrictive and stricter policies on...

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20 When the Civic Integration Abroad Act was passed, the government expressed the expectation that the new requirements would lead to a 25 per cent decrease in these types of immigration (TK 2003-2004, 29700, nr. 3. In Frouws and Bilgili 2012).

21 In addition, migrants coming for specific temporary reasons, such as for study, au-pair, exchange or medical treatment are exempt. Finally, migrants coming with a working permit, self-employed migrants and highly educated migrants are exempt (Strik et al. 2010).

22 Knowledge migrants are exempt from post-entry civic integration exam if they are on a temporary permit.

23 Within this new framework of controlled and selective immigration policies, it is important to
immigration, integration, return and asylum (see Van Selm 2000, Schuster 2000) in the Netherlands present an environment considerably different to that of the early 20th century for immigrants.

In this section I described the policy context in the Netherlands. In the conclusion, when discussing the implications of simultaneous embeddedness for migrants themselves but also for the wider society, I return to these contextual considerations and debates to speculate on the extent to which these policies are compatible with migrants’ realities.
Chapter 6

Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrant groups in the Netherlands
6. Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrant groups in the Netherlands

As outlined in the previous chapter, immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands have gained great importance over recent decades, and these highly politicised issues have occupied a substantial position in public debate and the media (ter Wal 2007). The largest migrant groups have been persistently the main targets in these debates. Likewise in academic research, Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese are the migrant groups that are most frequently discussed in relation to immigration and integration processes. In this current context of increasing interest in immigration, some immigrant groups have been invariably left outside the debate. The migrant groups of focus in this research, except for Moroccans, are examples of some of the communities that have not received significant attention. From a regional perspective, for instance, sub-Saharan African migrants have been given more attention in the literature only recently and there is little knowledge of their experiences in the Netherlands (Mazzucato 2008b).24 With regards to Afghans, Van Willigen (2009) states that though Afghans have received attention in relation to the conflict and by extension the political and military developments in their country, they have been an invisible migrant group in the Netherlands.25

This research includes the Moroccan community as one of the oldest and

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24 Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the new research projects conducted in the Netherlands with migrants from Africa. Some of these international, multi-year and interdisciplinary research projects that can be cited here are: Effects of Transnational Child Raising Arrangements on Life-Chances of Children, Migrant Parents and Caregivers between Africa and The Netherlands, Migrations between Africa and Europe, and Transnational child-raising arrangements between Africa and Europe.

25 Social Position and use of Provisions by Ethnic Minorities (SPVA) data includes refugees in the Netherlands, including Afghans. Additionally, the Survey Integration New Groups (SING2009) dataset gathered in 2009 and the Survey Integration Minorities (SIM11) gathered in 2011 both by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) are new important data sources to understand the experiences of new migrant groups and refugees in the Netherlands.
largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, characterized by traditional labour migration followed by family migration. The Afghan community, on the other hand, represents a newer migrant group in the Netherlands, created initially through political unrest and subsequently through family reunification. Ethiopian and Burundian migrant communities are cases of African immigration enhanced by a combination of factors such as seeking asylum, family reunification and education. Building on this brief characterisation of the immigrant groups in question with regards to their immigration patterns, the remainder of this chapter examines these patterns while taking into account the social, political and economic factors that trigger international migration in the origin countries; with the overarching objective of providing more detail about these different migration flows and their root causes. After presenting a detailed description of the migration history of each specific group, I lay out the general migration flows, population characteristics and growth and naturalisation rates of the groups in a comparative manner to provide a general overview of the four migrant groups in the Netherlands.

6.1. History of migrations

6.1.1. Afghan migration

Afghanistan is a landlocked sovereign state forming part of South, Central and to some extent Western Asia. It is a multi-ethnic society, with a population of almost 30 million (2.45% growth rate) (World Bank 2013b). According to the World Factbook (2013), 42 per cent of the population is Pashtun, 27 per cent Tajik, 9 per cent Hazara and Uzbek and other minority ethnic groups. The modern history of Afghanistan has been characterized by war, civil strife and poverty. Today, Afghanistan is still unstable, with continuing conflict and random violence. Prior to the 1978 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, international migration was mainly towards Pakistan and Iran where Afghans sought better employment opportunities. The large refugee flows that started after 1978 were also directed primarily to those neighbouring countries; but later continued towards the more distant countries of Europe and North Africa, with the peak occurring in 1990 with 6.2 million Afghan refugees outside the country. The war spanned social classes and ethnic groups. Ethnic polarisation damaged social structures and led to limited access to social services for certain groups as a result (Jazayery 2002). On top of the political problems, environmental factors were also among the causes of emigration. Namely, in the 1990s, drought also drove people
from the country (Stigter 2006).

During these times of high emigration rates, there were points of increased repatriation as well. The fall of the Najibullah in 1992 led to a large-scale repatriation. However, when the Taliban gained power in 1996, the number of refugees began to increase once again to approximately 3.8 million in 2001. During this period, Afghans applied for asylum in more than 77 countries across the world and became the largest group arriving in Europe (UNHCR 2005, Muller 2009). Since 2001, refugee flows from Afghanistan have been in decline, although a slight increase towards the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands can be observed after 2003. The most significant trend after 2002 has been the return of Afghan refugees to the country. More than 5.7 million returned since 2002, increasing the population by 25 per cent. Despite the fluctuations in refugee flows over the years, in 2006, once again Afghanistan was the highest refugee producing country, followed by Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia (Castles and Miller 2005).

In terms of the relationship between Afghanistan and the Netherlands, since the fall of Taliban in 2001, the Netherlands has been active in supporting Afghani reconstruction efforts. The Netherlands has provided humanitarian aid, development assistance, and deployed Dutch troops. The Dutch effort is mainly targeted at fighting poverty in Afghanistan and helping to establish stability in the region. The Netherlands has also been the lead country in the area of good governance, and is responsible for providing assistance during elections on the way towards a democratic state (Buitenlandse Zaken 2006).

Moreover, in 1994, considering the alarming safety and human rights situation in the country, the Netherlands passed a policy that allowed for protection for all asylum seekers from the region. That is to say, cases would be evaluated on an individual basis and asylum seekers would either be assigned refugee status or given temporary protection. When the security situation in the country worsened even more after 11 September 2001, the Netherlands decided to hold all asylum seekers for a year and entitled those with a temporary protection to apply for family reunification (Hessels 2004).

Overall, the migration flows between the two countries have been important since the early 1990s. As can be seen in Figure 6, immigration from Afghanistan increased steadily from 1991 till 1998, when a peak was achieved by an inflow of more than 5500 migrants. Starting from 2001, particularly till 2007,
immigration from Afghanistan decreased sharply. Nevertheless, within a couple of decades, a considerable migrant community was established in the Netherlands (Van Willigen 2009). Since 2008, Afghan migration has been on the rise again, while at the same time return migration of Afghan refugees has also been encouraged.

**Figure 6 Number of immigrants from Afghanistan, 1972-2010**

![Graph showing number of immigrants from Afghanistan, 1972-2010](image)

Source: CBS Statline

When the UNHCR declared that the situation in Afghanistan safe enough for return, the Netherlands put an end to the categorical protection policy and by 2003 return policy came to the fore. At this time, voluntary return of Afghan nationals and the deportation of rejected Afghan asylum seekers started. From the Netherlands, in the period between 2003 and 2011, a total of 1006 individuals were sent back to Afghanistan through the assisted voluntary and reintegration programs (IOM 2013). The new situation left those with temporary protection in an insecure position, and for many Afghans, the 2007 pardon regulation became the final chance to obtain a residence permit in the Netherlands. However, simultaneously, as will be shown below, an increase in family reunification and formation led to a continuation of immigration from the country with the turnaround in 2001.

As illustrated, Afghan migration was motivated primarily by political and security related reasons (Figure 7). In 1991, more than 60 per cent of Afghans

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26 Figures regarding Afghan return migration are limited. What is known is that since 2002, return migration to Afghanistan has been over 6 million people. The majority of returnees were refugees from Iran and Pakistan (IOM 2013).
were seeking asylum in the Netherlands; and based on registered numbers, asylum accounted for more than 95 per cent of the migrant flows between 1993 and 1996. From 1993 onwards, slowly but steadily, migration for the purposes of family formation and reunification increased, up until 2005. In 2003 family migration was almost as significant as asylum, and in 2005, more than 60 per cent of Afghans coming to the Netherlands did so for family reasons. This is in line with the trend with respect to gender, as exactly during that period a rise in the migration of females was observed as well. Since 2005, family migration remains an important migration motivation; yet it is currently on the decrease as once again a rise in asylum migration is experienced.

Figure 7 Afghan migration by motivation, 1987-2010

Source: CBS Statline

Since the fall of the Taliban, the number of asylum applications has significantly fallen. Figure 8 shows the trend in asylum applications.27 The number of Afghans seeking asylum in the Netherlands increased from 295 individuals in 1990 to almost 7200 individuals in 1998. More specifically, in 1998 7,120, in 1999 4,400 and in 2000 5,030 applications were filed (IOM 2013: 83). Regarding the number of applications that were granted, we observe that the grants followed with a few years lag after the applications. Between 1994 and

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27 Prior to 2007, there was no distinction made between first and subsequent requests for asylum, therefore the numbers before 2007 included the repeated requests as well as the new applications (IOM 2013).
1998, more than 16,830 asylum applications were granted in the Netherlands; however, after this period, the number of applications granted in one year never exceeded 1,970, which was the case in 2004. At the times when return migration was high, there was a sharp decrease in asylum claims as well.\textsuperscript{28}

**Figure 8 Afghan asylum applications, 1980-2010**

![Graph showing Afghan asylum applications, 1980-2010](image)

Source: CBS Statline

A unique aspect of the total asylum applications from Afghanistan since 1998 has been the predominant position of young people (Figure 9). Although adult asylum seekers represent more than 50 per cent of the total applicants throughout this period, a considerable part of the asylum seekers are children between 0 and 14 years with a percentage ranging between 27 to 37 percentage points. In 2003, almost half of the total applicants were minors. Many are unaccompanied minors who tend to be granted refugee status more often than other asylum seekers (ICMPD 2011). In the EU and the Netherlands, in 2009 about a quarter of all of all asylum seekers were unaccompanied minors (IOM 2013).

\textsuperscript{28} Van der Leun and Illies (2008) indicate that in 2003 and 2007, there were respectively 490 and 520 asylum applications. In 2009 the number of first asylum applicants increased from 700 (2008) to 1,400. In 2010, there were 1,885 asylum applicants, of which only 685 were females, which is in line with the general trend that most asylum seekers are males.
6.1.2. Burundian migration

Burundi is a landlocked country in the Great Lakes region of Eastern Africa, bordered by Tanzania to the east and south, Rwanda to the north, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west. In 2011, Burundi had a population of 9.5 million with an annual growth rate of 3.2% (World Bank 2013b). Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world characterized by long lasting (ethnic) conflict and civil war (See Lemarchand 1996, Ndikumana 2000, Uvin 2009, Watt 2008). Burundians in the Netherlands may be small in absolute numbers; yet relative to the size of the country (6.2 million in 2010) and the total number of Burundian migrants and refugees living in other OECD countries, their number is large. To be precise, it is estimated that today there are more than 10,000 Burundians living in OECD countries with the major destination countries being Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Turner and Bronden 2011). The Burundian diaspora is highly diverse and includes both high and low skilled and high and low-income individuals (Bruyn and Wets 2006). Bruyn and Wets (2006) further suggest that Burundians compose a diversified group in terms of their legal status as political refugees, undocumented migrants, or regular migrants who are recently reunified with their families. Colonized by Belgium between 1897 and 1962 (Turner 2007), Burundians are mainly proficient in French, but not necessarily in English. Consequently, their choice of French speaking countries is understandable, while the Netherlands is a country that does not fit this criterion. Nevertheless, about one third of Burundians abroad live in the Netherlands, probably as a result of the less restrictive asylum policies in the 1970s as described in the previous chapter.
There are three primary ethnic groups in Burundi. The majority is Hutus (85% of the total population), followed by Tutsis (14%) and Twas (1%) (Makoba and Ndura, 2006). Ethnic disparities were reinforced in the colonial period, when the Belgians established the Tutsi as the political elite, which led to conflict with the numerical majority of Hutus after decolonisation. Researchers attribute the root causes of civil war on the one hand to ethnic polarisation, and on the other hand to an authoritarian ill-governed polity that reifies ethnic differences (See Collier et al. 2004, Elbadawi 2000). Ngaruku and Nkurunziza (2005) argue that in the Burundian case, it is the combination of these forces that led to socio-political upheaval and that ethnicity has been used by the elites of both ethnic communities to achieve political goals (Makoba and Ndura 2006). Consequently, the major role of ethnicity in the political sphere in creating and reinforcing social exclusion and inequality led to large outflows of refugees from Burundi during the 1960s.

Corduwener (2007) mentions the civil war, oppressive politics and genocide as the core causes of outmigration in Burundi (See also Turner 2008). More specifically, five major civil conflicts that took place in Burundi caused large migration flows out of the country; respectively in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993. Before Burundi’s independence in 1962, a certain degree of migration to Belgium took place, mainly of the political elite or the royal family and for education purposes (Mascini and Snick 2012). After the independence, the major conflict between the Burundian military and the Hutu population in 1972 led about 300,000 individuals to seek refuge in neighbouring countries (ICG 2003, Ngaruku and Nkurunziza 2005). The 1988 and 1991 conflicts generated relatively small refugee flows, of 50,000 and 38,000 refugees respectively (Ngaruku and Nkurunziza 2005). In 1993, however, the violence that followed the assassination of president Ndadaye led to an estimated 687,000 refugees (ICG 2003, Ngaruku and Nkurunziza 2005). Most Burundians fled to neighbouring countries, while others sought refuge in Europe and North America (IOM 2005, De Bruyn and Wets 2006). Between 1995 and 2000, the average annual net migration rate was 12.9 per 1000, making Burundi the highest country of emigration in East Africa during the period (Black et al. 2004).

It is estimated that by the time the civil war officially ended in 2005, it had caused over 300,000 of deaths, while displacing another 1.3 million (Brachet and Wolpe 2005). In 2006, Burundi was still one of the main source countries of
refugees, with approximately 400,000 officially recognized refugees according to the Geneva Convention (UNHCR 2007). In 2009, there were 281,592 refugees from Burundi, although more than 95,000 had returned to the homeland by January 2009. According to a World Bank report published in 2012, the net migration in Burundi last reported was 370,000 in 2010, when there were also approximately 150,000 internally displaced persons living in settlements as well as around 90,000 refugees and asylum seekers outside the country (Mascini and Snick 2012).

Given the conditions described above, only those who had the economic resources could seek refuge in faraway destinations in Europe and North America. Not surprisingly, this long war had a devastating impact on the economy, causing the collapse of its infrastructure and the inability of the rural population to farm their land.29 The psychological impact has been even more devastating. Every single Burundian has probably lost a friend, relative, neighbour, or at least an acquaintance.30 Lately, reports reveal that national economic and social development is moving forward more positively than in previous years (Ewusi and Butera 2012).31 Yet, it is extremely difficult to say that the country has fully recovered, especially from the societal damages caused by the war. Within this picture, Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000) assert that poverty affects Hutus and Tutsis equally, with the exception of the small elite of powerbrokers and their clients.

In this brief history of Burundian emigration, the Netherlands comes into the scene only later. Burundian migration to the Netherlands started in the early 1990s reaching two climax points in 2002 and 2005. However, after 2005, the number of Burundians coming to the Netherlands decreased. Even in the years of high migration, the inflows never exceeded 450 individuals a year (Figure 10).

29 The resulting rate of malnutrition and under-nutrition increased from 6 to 20 per cent of the population (Nkurunziza 2002, World Bank 1999).
30 In a survey carried in several parts of the country, 77 per cent of household heads admit to have been directly affected by the crisis, of whom 57 per cent have been strongly affected. 28 per cent have lost close relatives, while another 23 per cent have been displaced as a result of the fighting (ISTEEBU 2001).
31 During the Civil War, the percentage of people living below the 1 dollar a day poverty line rose from 35 per cent to 67 per cent between 1993 and 2006 (World Bank 2011). Burundi has almost reached its pre-war level of per capita GNI (Ewusi and Butera 2012). Today Burundi has a very high density of population with a GNI per capita of US$160 in 2010 (World Bank 2012).
Prior to 1995, Burundian migration was very small and could be considered almost negligible. From 1993 to 2008, 3,444 Burundians applied for asylum in the Netherlands. Until 2006, all Burundian asylum seekers were given at least a temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds based on Dutch immigration policy for specific countries; the Dutch government indeed considered the situation in Burundi to be too dangerous to return asylum seekers. In 2006, this categorical policy was abolished and temporary residence permits were taken away (Mascini et al. 2012). Until 2003, more than 80 per cent of Burundian migration was generated by political and security reasons, but a considerable change was observed by 2004 when family formation and reunification started to increase. The change in trend from asylum migration to family migration is similar to the Afghan case discussed earlier. In the Burundian case, after a peak of 70 per cent of the migration caused by family reasons in 2006, we observe another increase in the number of people seeking asylum (Figure 11). The motivation driving migration has similarly shifted, but the absolute number of asylum seekers is not increasing.
From 1994 on, the number of asylum seekers increased until 2002, when the number reached 450, with another peak in 2006 with 455 applicants (Figure 12). The decrease after this date is understandable, as the civil war officially ended in Burundi in 2005. Overall, Mascini and Snick (2012) conclude that between 1993 and 2008, a total of approximately 3,300 Burundians applied for asylum in the Netherlands.

**Figure 12 Burundian asylum applications, 1994-2011**

Source: CBS Statline
6.1.3. Ethiopian migration

Found in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s population is almost 90 million with an annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent (World Bank 2013b). Ethiopia is an ethnically diverse country, containing over 80 different ethnic groups. The Oromos, Amharas, Tigrays and Somalis together make up three-quarters of the population. Today Ethiopians constitute one of the largest African migrant populations in the world (Shinn 2002). They are the second largest Sub-Saharan group in the United States and the fifteenth largest in Europe (AFTDC-AFTQK 2007). Ethiopians also constitute one of the largest African migrant groups in the Netherlands. Although the migration channels have changed today, the initial outmigration from Ethiopia is characterised by refugee crisis (Bariagaber 1997). Not only ethnic conflict and political instability, but also scarcity of resources, food insecurity, drought and overpopulation have triggered continuous outmigration from the country. Sharing a border with all other countries in the Horn, Ethiopia has been influenced by the multidirectional regional and international migration flows (Terrazas 2007).

In contrast to many of its neighbouring countries, Ethiopia has never been colonized; it was invaded only briefly by Italy between 1936 and 1941. Nevertheless, since 1974, the country has experienced various political upheavals starting with the overthrow of the Last Emperor, Haile Salisse, by the military. This period is known as one where civil liberties were drastically limited by a totalitarian regime known as the “Derg”. It is during this period called the “Red Terror”, when the government oppressed certain ethnic groups, that large migration flows started. Before then, emigration was not a big phenomenon in Ethiopia; the few Ethiopians who went abroad did so mainly for education purposes and eventually returned to the country (Kuschminder et al. 2013).

In 1991, different ethnic groups formed a coalition called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDP) and overthrew the “Derg” Regime. This period led to a new wave of outflows but also to the repatriation and return of Ethiopian refugees (See Hammond 2004), primarily from neighbouring countries (Kuschminder et al. 2013). The EPRDF represented the triumph of those who promoted ethnic federalism and the right to self-determination (Lyons 2007). As a reaction to the success of the EPRDP, many

32 In 1991, more than 800,000 Ethiopian refugees were repatriated from Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and other countries (Pankhurst and Piguet 2009).
pan-Ethiopian nationalists feared that ethnic federalism would result in the break-up of the historic Ethiopian state. It is these political events that have primarily caused increasing refugee flows, especially at certain points in time (Lyons 2007). Further political developments saw the establishment of Ethiopia’s Constitution in 1994, and in 1995 the country had its first elections.

Another historical event that has led to increasing migration has been the war with Somalia over the Ogaden region in 1997-98. Additionally, the conflict with Eritrea also led to thousands of Ethiopians fleeing (Bariagaber, 1997). The protracted war with Eritrea that started in 1961 eventually ended in 1991 with the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. At this time, with the fall of the Derg, some Ethiopians have returned home (Terrazas 2007). Yet, from 1998 to 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea were at war until the signing of a peace treaty in 2000, and tensions still remain high along the border between two states. As a result of these violent events and political conflicts, the number of refugees from Ethiopia increased from 55,000 in 1972 to over a million in 1992. Terrazas (2007) states that these outflows and the associated increase in internal displacement were mainly caused by the ethnicisation of Ethiopian politics and a drift toward ethnic federalism. Considering the extended diversification of the Ethiopian sociocultural context, Matsuoko and Sorenson (2001) argue that it would be a ‘phantasm’ to talk about Ethiopia as a nation-state. Accordingly, the proliferation of ethnonationalisms as a result of ethnic federalism and failed assimilation led to long years of continued emigration and immigration in the country. By 2004, the border conflict with Eritrea had not been resolved, which has in turn prolonged the uncertain situation for internally displaced people (see Pankhurst and Piguet 2009) and refugees, and has negatively affected Ethiopia’s economic capacity and development (Barnes 2006).

Although temporary and circular migration to neighbouring countries has indeed occurred in times of stress, permanent migration has not been a big phenomenon in Ethiopia (Terrazas 2007). In 2011, emigration rate in Ethiopia was estimated to be 0.7 per cent (World Bank 2011). Yet, given that the population of the country is about 80 million, Ethiopia had a considerable migrant community abroad all the same (Kuschminder et al. 2013).

33 The Ethiopian-Eritrean war also caused the largest number of internally displaced people since 1991 as more than 300,000 people had to be displaced and another 90,000 were deported from Eritrea (Rahmato and Kidanu 2002).
The Ethiopian case is a good example of how the root causes of migration are intertwined. That is to say, it is the political conflict that severely damaged the agricultural sector in the country, forcing people to leave not necessarily because of political persecution, but to seek better living conditions as farming declined (De Waal 1991, Bariagaber 1997). Although the international community defines Ethiopian migration mainly as a refugee crisis, emigration is also caused by a combination of political and economic reasons (Terrazas 2007).

Ethiopian migration to the Netherlands has a relatively long history, dating back to 1976, motivated by migrants seeking asylum. Although the first arrivals sought asylum, migrants’ reasons for coming changed over time, as the socioeconomic and political history of the country shifted. Until 1991, family reunification with the first migrants who fled abroad constituted a significant section of the outflow (Kuschminder et al. 2013).

The first Ethiopians arrived in the Netherlands in the early 1970s, and the flow continued to increase until the early 1990s, marking the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia (Van Heelsum and Hessels 2006). After this period, a sharp decline was observed till 1994, but migration from Ethiopia never came to a halt. Since the mid-1990s, every year there are about 400 to 600 individuals emigrate from Ethiopia, as shown in Figure 13. Overall, from 1995 till 2008 the number of Ethiopians and Eritreans living in the Netherlands increased to 11,000 from about 8,000 (CBS 2009).

Figure 13 Ethiopian migration to the Netherlands over the years, 1972-2010

Source: CBS Statline
As demonstrated, prior to 1996, for Ethiopians, seeking asylum was the primary way of entering the Netherlands (See Figure 14). With the exception of 2000 and 2001, after this date, humanitarian reasons never exceeded the total of other migration motivations, and the number of asylum seekers has considerably fluctuated over the years. During this period, concurrently, migration for education surfaced an important channel and has gradually increased (with the exception of 2000). Indeed, in Ethiopia, student migration is considered a critical issue since many of the students and professionals who went abroad have not returned to their academic and medical professions in Ethiopia (Shinn 2002). Ter Wal (2005) points out that some of the Ethiopian students remain in the Netherlands after graduation as a result of finding employment or of marriage.

**Figure 14 Ethiopian migration by motivation, 1987-2010**

![Figure 14](image)

Source: CBS Statline

### 6.1.4. Moroccan migration

A country of the Maghreb, located on the extreme Northwest of the African continent, Morocco has a population of about 32 million with an annual growth rate of 1.3 per cent. Forty per cent of the Moroccan population is composed of Berbers whereas the remaining majority is Arab. Morocco has become one of the most important emigration countries in the last few decades (Collyer et al. 2009, De Haas 2005, 2009b). The major Moroccan migration boom, which led to Moroccans being among the most prominent diaspora groups in Europe including the Netherlands, started with the ‘guest worker’ programs in the 1960s. This means that the case of Morocco is significantly different from Afghanistan, Burundi and Ethiopia.
As noted previously, the labour shortages faced by the booming economies of many European countries like Germany, The Netherlands and France during the post-World War II period were filled mainly by migrant workers from countries such as Morocco and Turkey and from other Southern European and North African countries. Morocco assessed emigration during this period not only as a means of reducing domestic demographic and labour market pressure, but also that of reducing political and ethnic tensions within the country (Reniers 1999). The general trends regarding the labour migration history of Morocco with regards to overall Europe are also reflected in the migration history of Morocco and with respect to the Netherlands in particular. That being said, the first outflows from Morocco were towards France. After the end of WWII, especially as a result of the end of French recruitment in Algeria, Moroccans increasingly migrated to France to work in factories and mines. It was only in the second stage that the Moroccan emigration diversified towards Belgium and the Netherlands. Today it continues towards Southern European countries (Shadid 1979, Van den Berg-Elderin 1986, Muus 1990 cited in Collyer 2009).

Most Moroccans in the Netherlands come from the rural Rif region, which is characterized not only by high population density and a shortage of agricultural resources, but also by the ethnic minority of Berbers (Esveldt et al. 2000, van Amersfoort and Heelsum 2007). Of the Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, approximately two thirds came from the Rif (De Mas 1995, Nelissen and Buijs 2000).

34 In World War I between 34,000 and 40,000 Moroccan men were recruited into the French army, and many more were recruited for work in mines and industry. During World War II Moroccan men were recruited in the French occupied zone to offset labour shortages. Moroccan men were again recruited into the French army, and as many as 126,000 served the French during WWII and subsequent wars in Korea and French Indochina (de Haas 2009a with reference to Bidwell 1973).
35 The Moroccan population in France increased from around 20,000 to 53,000 between 1949 and 1962 (de Haas 2007b).
36 A new development is the increasingly-undocumented nature of Moroccan migration to Europe. Moroccans were attracted by working possibilities in agriculture, construction, and the service sector, and they often obtained a regular status after marrying in the destination country or through legalisation campaigns (de Haas 2007b). Spain and Italy are the most important destinations for irregular migrants, particularly because they are the countries that closed their borders the latest (Carling 2007, Bilgili and Weyel 2010).
37 The Rif area has a dense rural population that is out of proportion with the scarcity of means for making a living from agriculture (De Mas 1990).
38 Along with the Souss Valley and southern oases, the Rif region constitutes the main out-migration
proportion with the scarcity of means for making a living from agriculture (De Mas 1990). Outmigration from these regions was not an autonomous process, but was instead stimulated by the Moroccan state for political and economic reasons (De Haas 2007a). Immigrants, to a lesser extent, came from the Southern regions of Morocco as well; particularly from around Ouarzazate and Agadir (van Amersfoort and Heelsum 2007). The majority of first generation Mediterranean immigrants had a very low educational background and originally came from the countryside (Haffmans and De Mas, 1985, Vermeulen and Penninx 2000).

In line with the previously discussed post-Second World War era labour migration patterns into Europe, the immigration flows from Morocco and the relevant recruitment policies have been regulated by the Dutch government through bilateral agreements with Morocco in the 1960s (Heering et al. 2002). Thanks to these formal agreements, Moroccans were able to obtain work permits for the Netherlands and enter the Netherlands officially (see Van Amersfoort and van der Wusten 1976, Van Amersfoort 1995, Schoorl 2002). Moreover, many Moroccan migrants entered the Netherlands first as tourists without a work permit, with the strategy to obtain the necessary documents for one upon arrival, whilst looking for a job (Neubourg et al. 2008).

Until the mid-1970s, Moroccan migration to the Netherlands was characterized by low skilled male migration from selective regions, and by well-functioning migration networks. This migration often generated localized settlements of the Moroccans from certain villages in specific towns in The Netherlands (van Amersfoort and Heelsum 2007). Migrants usually aspired to return home and felt a strong connection to their families and home country; an attitude that matches the idea that ‘guest workers’ were originally meant to be temporary labour migrants (van Amersfoort and Heelsum 2007). However, this changed with the economic downturn in the 1970s that caused stagnation in labour recruitment (Haffmans and De Mas 1985). After the recruitment stopped, many immigrants chose not to return to their origin country39 since this would

39 It is difficult to give a robust estimate about the number of returnees at this time as the existing data is fragmented. It is even more difficult to suggest estimates about the number of returnees specifically from the Netherlands. However, based on the general population census in 1994, it can be argued that 68,000 Moroccan migrants returned between 1975 and 1982 from various immigration countries (Gubert and Norman 2008).
have permanently closed the door to coming back to Europe.

**Figure 15 Moroccan migration to the Netherlands over the years, 1972-2010**

![Figure 15](image)

Source: CBS Statline

In 1965, there were only 4,500 Moroccans in The Netherlands; and by 2005, their number had reached almost 330,000 individuals (van Amersfoort and Heelsum 2007). Within the span of forty years, Moroccan migration had several peaks (See Figure 15), but the number of Moroccans in the Netherlands increased after 1973 in particular due to family migration. When the economic recessions of the 1970s caused by the Oil Crisis put a halt to legal labour migration to the Netherlands and Europe in general, the scope of migration through family reunification increased to a larger extent and translated into a profound change in the demographic and socio-professional structures in Moroccan communities. The current picture portrays Moroccan migration as no longer dominated by male migrants but as including women and children as well (Berriane and Aderghal 2008).

After family reunification was, to a large extent, completed by the end of the 1980s, marrying a partner in the Netherlands became a strategy of migrating as well. Family formation thus became an important means of migration, triggered in addition by the fact that many second-generation Moroccans in Europe preferred to marry someone from their family’s home country (de Haas 2007b). Lucassen and Laarman (2009) argue that the policies that complicated and hindered immigration from Morocco and Turkey made marriage migration one of the few legal channels for immigration. In their view, these policies
reinforced pressure from the origin countries for the second generation to marry someone from the home country as a means of migration. Hooghiemstra (2001) has shown that in 2000, more than 70 per cent of first and second generation Moroccan migrants had married a co-ethnic from their origin country. Figure 16, which starts from 1987, also shows that family migration continues to be the most dominant reason for migration, while labour, study and asylum migration remain as marginal trends for Moroccan migration.

**Figure 16 Moroccan migration by motivation, 1987-2010**

Source: CBS Statline

**6.2. Current population characteristics**

In accordance with the migration histories laid out in the previous section, Figure 17 shows the differences in the overall size of migration and changes in the intensity of migration inflows among the origin countries. To summarize the inferences, Morocco stands out as the oldest origin country with a substantial and constant inflow since the early 1970s, while the Afghan migration did not become important until after the early 1990s. Ethiopian and Burundian migrations have been relatively smaller, with Ethiopian migration dating from the mid-1980s, and Burundian migration emerging in the late 1990s.

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40 Of the same group, only 4 per cent have married a native Dutch, and 22 per cent of them have married a co-ethnic living in the Netherlands.
Table 2 shows the population in 2011 and the population growth since 2000. The Moroccan community, by and large, is the largest migrant community of the groups under study with about 356,000 individuals, which constitute 2.1 per cent of the total Dutch population (Table 2). The Afghan community comes next with about 40,000 people, and is the second migrant community, the size of which has grown substantially since 2000. Although the Burundian migrant community is the smallest, with about 3000 people, it is the group that has grown the most since 2000. As already mentioned, the Ethiopian migrant community is one of the largest within the African migrant community, and is one of the older migrant groups. As Table 2 indicates, after Moroccans, of whom more than 50 per cent are now second generation migrants, almost 35 per cent of the individuals with Ethiopian origin are also second generation. The Burundian migrant community has the smallest share of second generation, and in line with this, it also has the smallest mean age with 24.1.41

41 The IS Academy survey results are similar to the current population characteristics. The small
Table 2 Population and population growth among Afghans, Burundians, Ethiopians and Moroccans in the Netherlands, 1 January 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>Share in the total population</th>
<th>Growth since 1 January 2000</th>
<th>Share of second generation</th>
<th>Mean age</th>
<th>Number of females per 100 males ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x 1,000</td>
<td>per 1,000</td>
<td>1,000 x 1,000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16656</td>
<td>1000.0</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
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<td>794.2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>21.4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS Statline

Another factor here to be mentioned is years of stay in the country of destination, as this may relate to migrants’ integration processes and the strength and frequency of their homeland ties. First-generation Moroccan migrants make up the largest number of migrants who have been in the Netherlands for more than 25 years (See Figure 18). Since Ethiopian migration is also one of the older migration corridors, we observe that the share of Ethiopians who have been in the Netherlands for more than 25 years is also considerable. At the same time, we have mentioned that there is an increasing trend in Ethiopian migration due to student migration; and in line with this trend, we see that the share of migrants who have been in the Netherlands for less than 5 years is actually the largest. Burundian migration to the Netherlands has also considerably increased since the beginning of the millennium, and accordingly, more than 80 per cent of the first-generation Burundian migrants have been in the Netherlands for less than 10 years. In contrast, Afghan migration is older than the Burundian one and rose after the mid-1990s. Thus, a larger share of the first-generation Afghan migrants has been in the Netherlands for less than 15 years.

The difference is that in the survey data there are slightly fewer second-generation among the Afghan (13%) and Burundian (17%) migrant groups. This can be understandable as the project had a specific focus on first generation migrant households.

42 Figure 20 in Chapter 7 shows the duration of stay of migrants according to the IS Academy survey and shows that the survey results are very similar to the CBS data.
Another important potential influence over simultaneity as previously discussed is citizenship status. In the EU countries, the number of naturalisations increased significantly during the 1990s, and the Netherlands is one of the countries that has a relatively higher rate of naturalisation (Bevelander and Veenman 2006, Böcker and Thränhardt 2006). Among Afghans, Burundians, Ethiopians and Moroccans, the distribution of naturalisation varies (Figure 19). However, it is also noteworthy that these status differences are linked to countries’ perspectives on dual nationality. For instance, because Moroccans are allowed to have dual nationality, they are unlikely to renounce their Moroccan nationality. Thus, we see that the share of Moroccans who have only Dutch citizenship is very marginal, and about 60 per cent of the population has both Dutch and Moroccan nationality. As expected, this share of dual nationality increases even more among second-generation migrants making up almost 80 per cent.

While Ethiopia and Afghanistan do not recognize dual-citizenship, Burundi does allow its citizens to have another citizenship. In the Ethiopian case, we observe that naturalisation in both first and second generations is very high as well. De Valk and colleagues (2001) also state that about half of the Ethiopians in the Netherlands are naturalized. The picture is more mixed for Burundian and Afghan migrants. Among the Burundians, a considerable part of the group has another nationality, are stateless or their nationality is unknown. Among the first generation, less than half of the group has only Dutch nationality or Dutch and one other nationality. The situation is different for second generation migrants; where a larger share of them has only Dutch nationality. Unlike Burundians, many of the first-generation Afghan migrants have already been naturalized and hold dual nationality. Among the second generation, however, we see an increase in the number of individuals of Afghan origin holding only Dutch nationality.

In summary, considering the immigration history and current population characteristics of the migrant groups in the Netherlands, it can be concluded that Afghan and Burundian migrations are similar given that the largest flows from these countries have been caused by political and security reasons. In both cases, 

[^44]: In the Afghan case, there is the exception that citizens who have fled from violence and political instability 'unofficially' retain their citizenship that allows them to maintain the possibility of returning to Afghanistan as Afghan citizens without losing their newly acquired foreign citizenship (http://www.multiplecitizenship.com/w scl/ws_AFGANISTAN.html).
humanitarian flows have been followed by increasing family migration. Moreover, both countries are going through reconstruction efforts. What is different, though, is that the Burundian migrant community is much smaller and more recent than the Afghan one, as demonstrated by the lower naturalisation rates and a larger share of the community that is in the Netherlands for a shorter period of time. As in the cases of Afghan and Burundian migration, Ethiopian migration has been defined primarily by humanitarian migration flows. However, the diversification in flows has been slightly different for the Ethiopian case. While in the first two cases humanitarian flows were continued by family migration, for Ethiopians, family migration has never become a major driver. Instead, student migration has been on the rise and it has led to the migration of highly skilled individuals from the country. In comparison to Burundian migration, Ethiopian migration is also older, continuous and at a much larger scale. The Moroccan migration history, on the other hand, is different than the Afghan, Burundian and Ethiopian cases in several ways. First of all, the Moroccan migrant community is one of the oldest and largest in the country. Moreover, asylum migration has never been a major migration motivation for Moroccans. Instead (low-skilled) labour migration followed by family migration characterizes Moroccan migration. Given the history of migration, the share of second generation, and the number of people with a long period of stay in the Netherlands, it is also significantly extensive.

These historical and structural variations will help better understand the differences with regards to homeland engagement between the migrant groups in the later steps of the research. Part of Chapter 11 where I discuss group level differences, I benefit from these information to give an understanding of why certain groups engage significantly more or less in their home country compared to others. To build upon these background information, in Chapter 7 I describe on a group level migrants’ integration processes and homeland engagement according to the IS Academy survey data.
Chapter 7

Migrants' host and home country orientation according to the IS Academy Survey Data
7. Migrants’ host and home country orientation according to the IS Academy Survey Data

The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of migrants’ integration processes and homeland engagement and attachment according to the IS Academy household survey. As previously mentioned, a subsample composed of first-generation adult migrants born in one of the four origin countries is used. In addition, this chapter is on the one hand a preparation for the main result sections; and an opportunity to develop a general understanding of the experiences of migrants in the Netherlands on the other hand.

7.1. Integration processes in the Netherlands

7.1.1. Years of stay and citizenship status

As an initial part of my examination of the duration of residence and citizenship status with regards to their integrative effects, in Chapter 6, I confirmed that Moroccan (and Ethiopian) migration is older; and the other migration flows are newer in the Netherlands. We can also see this reflected in Figure 20, where the length of residence in the Netherlands among the migrant groups is shown. It illustrates that a remarkable proportion of Moroccans have been in the Netherlands for more than 16 years, with only one in every five persons of Moroccan origin being in the country for less than 15 years, while the rest have been in the Netherlands for longer.

Figure 20 Years of stay in the Netherlands
It is also interesting that about 30 per cent of Burundians and 40 per cent of Ethiopians in the sample have been in the Netherlands for less than five years. While these two groups are both characterised by more recent immigration and hence younger people, differences appear when we look at the number of people who have been in the Netherlands for longer periods of time. More specifically, while more than 30 per cent of Ethiopians have been in the Netherlands for more than 15 years, this share is negligible among Burundians (less than 5%). This difference may be due to the older migration flows from Ethiopia to the Netherlands and the increasing family migration that resulted from the humanitarian flows in the 1970s. The distribution is slightly different among Afghans, as a majority of them have been in the Netherlands between over 11 years. Considering the integrative effect of longer stay in the host country these differences between the countries should be marked.

Next, I consider citizenship status as an indication of migrants’ legal integration. Figure 21 shows interesting differences among the groups but also demonstrates that, for all groups, naturalisation rates are fairly high. Some of the main observations are as follows. First, around one in five Moroccans hold only Moroccan citizenship. The majority had dual-citizenship as the Moroccan government does not allow Moroccan migrants to give up their origin country citizenship although it recognizes dual citizenship. In the Afghan case, the naturalisation rate is particularly high, as only slightly more than 10 per cent had only Afghan citizenship. The picture is more balanced for the other two groups. That is to say, around 55 per cent of Ethiopians and Burundians still had only their origin country citizenship. These results are comparable to macro data on naturalisation rates among these groups, except that among the Burundians, there are more people with other nationalities than in the case of our sample.
7.1.2. Economic integration

Economic integration is multifaceted; therefore looking at migrants’ employment status reflects only one aspect of their labour market performance and economic integration. In this section, I look at the employment status of the migrants, their occupational status, contract status and income per capita. For employment status, a distinction is made between employed, unemployed and inactive people. I further differentiated those inactive as students versus others, since many individuals in the sample are students and they form part of a distinct group.

The most straightforward way of studying economic integration is employment status. Although a larger share of Moroccans is low-skilled compared to the other groups considering their educational attainment, interestingly, they are not significantly more likely to be unemployed. Burundians are far more likely to be unemployed; with almost one in four Burundians without a job. For the other groups the share of unemployed migrants is between 10 to 15 per cent. About 24 per cent of the sample is not in the labour market because they are in school, but the groups show considerable differences in this regard. Only 3 per cent of adult Moroccan migrants are in school compared to 32 per cent of Afghans, 28 per cent of Ethiopians and 30 per cent of the Burundians.

**Figure 22 Employment status**

In addition to education, there are other reasons to be out of employment, including retirement, permanent sickness or disability and full time
engagement in housework. Among the inactive population, Moroccans are overrepresented.\textsuperscript{45} Overall, considering employment status, it can be concluded that Burundians and Afghans are in a more fragile economic situation than others due to their higher unemployment rate.

Occupational status is an important indicator of how well migrants are doing in the labour market. In the survey, employed people were asked about the title and content of their job. Based on the answers we received, I created the internationally accepted ISCO index of occupational status, reconstructing the occupational status variable, and making a distinction between low (1-3), medium (4-6) and high (7-9) level occupational status.

**Figure 23 Occupational status**

Surveying the occupational status of the employed individuals, it is observed that more than 35 per cent of Burundians are clustered heavily in low occupational status jobs, compared to the overall sample average of 16 per cent. Half of the total sample (52%) occupies mid-level jobs, and around 32 per cent are in high occupational status jobs. The high occupational status jobs include a wide range of professions from engineers to accountants and professors in the sample, while most of the individuals with low occupational status jobs are cleaners or construction workers. Regarding occupational status, no significant differences across the groups exist and, surprisingly, although Moroccans are less likely to be in highly skilled labour, those who are employed often occupy high status jobs. Moreover, it is worthwhile mentioning that the problem of over-qualification is most visible

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\textsuperscript{45} The overrepresentation of inactives among Moroccans and Afghans cannot be explained only by the number of retirees in these groups. The age distribution has shown that not as many individuals have reached their retirement age. When we look more in detail to the data, it is observed that 10 per cent of Moroccans, and 7 per cent of Afghans are permanently sick and disabled, and 23 per cent of Moroccans and 10 per cent of Afghans are doing housework. Accordingly, considering the composition of the inactives, it is important to bear in mind that they are not only older individuals but the group of inactives includes these other groups.
among Burundians and Afghans compared to Ethiopians and Moroccans, meaning that they have a harder time finding jobs that are equivalent to their highest level of education.46

The job stability also demonstrates which groups struggle the most in the labour market. To reveal this, migrants who have an unlimited contract were compared to those who have either limited contracts or no contracts at all. Those with no contract or limited contracts are considered to have an unstable position compared to others. Burundians are in the most precarious situation as only 28 per cent of them have a stable job compared to 70 per cent among Moroccans. Less than half of Afghans (44%) and Ethiopians (46%) seem to have a stable job, although this is partially explained by the high numbers currently in education.

Per capita income also indicates integration. Analysing the survey, three income groups are generated.47 Although Moroccans seem to be doing better in the labour market, they are mainly found in the low-income category (37%). In the case of Burundians, their economic struggle is reflected in their income level, as 41 per cent of them are low-income. Nevertheless, at the same time, it was also observed that 30 per cent of Burundians appeared to have a high income per person in the household. This may be explained by the tendency of Burundian households to be smaller in the Netherlands. Ethiopians, who are the most highly educated, are also overrepresented in the middle income and high-income categories with 48 per cent and 34 per cent respectively. Household size comes

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46 Some 40 per cent of Burundians, 30 per cent of Afghans, 20 per cent of Ethiopians and 13 per cent of Moroccans are over-qualified for their current job (Bilgili and Siegel 2012a).
47 Three level yearly income per capita is generated according to the data. In this relative measurement, those with an income lower than 5001 Euros are considered to have low income, those with an income between 5001 Euros and 9000 Euros are considered to have medium income, and those with an income higher than 9000 Euros are considered as having high income.
into play once again with Afghans, who generally live in larger households. 42 per cent of Afghans seem to have low income in comparison to the 34 per cent average found across the total sample.

**Figure 25 Income per capita**

In conclusion, all these different dimensions show variation among migrant groups with respect to their economic integration in the Netherlands, and this hints towards the importance of looking at various factors regarding economic performance for a more refined analysis. However, the general picture suggests that Burundians struggle the most in the labour market compared to the other groups. This picture nonetheless changes slightly when we take into account the income per capita, because the results regarding income have shown that the share of migrants with low and medium income is the highest among Afghans. Surprisingly, Moroccans are doing better in the labour market relative to their human capital, and their overall economic integration is not significantly different to Ethiopians who possess an overall higher level of education in comparison. This is a very intriguing result that needs further exploration in the future in terms of understanding which factors other than education come into play to put Moroccans in a relatively better position in economic terms.

**7.1.3. Sociocultural integration**

Now looking at sociocultural integration, I focus on different aspects of migrant lives in relation to their language use, social contacts, media and art consumption, and civic involvement through membership in organisations.

Migrants’ proficiency in the host country language is an important indicator of sociocultural integration firstly because it is positively associated with better interethnic relations in the host society (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, Gordon 1964), but also because it has spill-over effects in other dimensions.
of life in the host country and can positively affect integration processes (Van Tubergen et al. 2004, Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005). Developing on the previously stressed strength of language use at home (both in proficiency and preference), the respondents were asked which language they use the most at home, in order to learn about migrants’ language use preference. Possible responses included: Dutch, native language (if different than Dutch), partly Dutch and partly native language or other. From this variable, a dichotomous variable is created, which makes a distinction between those who speak only the native language versus those who speak some Dutch or only Dutch at home.

**Figure 26 Language use at home**

Some notable differences exist between the migrant groups (See Figure 26). In general, almost 60 per cent of all migrants speak only their native language at home. Burundians stand out as the group of migrants who seem to speak at least some Dutch at home (63%). In contrast, more than half of the other groups speak only their native language. Some 64 per cent of Moroccans and almost 60 per cent of Afghans and Ethiopians speak only their native language at home. This can be explained by the fact that a larger share of Moroccans, Afghans and Ethiopians are reunified with their family in the Netherlands, and this makes it easier for them to speak their home language at home. Moreover, the project data shows that the Burundians compose the smallest and most dispersed group compared to the other groups. This may motivate them to invest more in becoming fluent in Dutch. Plus, the spatial dispersion may encourage them to establish more contact with other groups, increasing their likelihood of speaking more Dutch at home. The results regarding the frequency of contact with people from the home country and the native Dutch also support these results, as discussed below.
Figures 27 Leisure time spending with co-ethnics

Regarding social contacts, respondents were asked separately how often they spend time with the native-Dutch and their ethnic community members during their leisure time. Leisure time spending preferences are a strong indicator of social integration because they reflect migrants’ social networks and their preferences about who to spend their time with (Sigelman et al. 1996). In contrast, they have less choice with whom to spend their free time at work. Burundians are by far the largest group to have the least contact with their co-ethnics (54%). They are followed by Afghans of which 47% have infrequent and intermediate contact with their co-ethnics. It is an intriguing question as to whether these differences in social relations can be explained by the transmission of ethnic problems from the home country, and the persisting tension among different ethnic minorities within the migrant community from these countries, which in turn can lead to a lower degree of social interaction. The amount of leisure time spent by Ethiopians is similar to that of Afghans, although it appears that a slightly larger group of Ethiopians has more frequent contact with their co-ethnics. In contrast to all three groups, the majority of Moroccans frequently spend time with their co-ethnics.

Figure 28 Leisure time spending with the native Dutch
When it comes to spending time with the native-Dutch population, the time spent is much less frequent in the Ethiopian and Moroccan groups as compared to the Afghan and Burundian groups for which it is more equally spread. More specifically, while more than half of the Afghan (64%) and Burundian (66%) migrant populations spent time with the Dutch population regularly and frequently, more than half of the Ethiopian (55%) and Moroccan (63%) spent time with the Dutch populations infrequently.

Overall, I observe that on the one hand, the sociocultural integration patterns of Afghans and Burundians show more similarities among each other, on the other hand, the sociocultural integration patterns of Ethiopians and Moroccans resemble each other more. It emerges that the members of the Moroccan community are more in contact with people within their own community as the size of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands is rather large, while Ethiopians are less oriented to the Dutch culture and social life since a large share of the first generation migrants are students who are in the country on a temporary basis. In contrast, it is inferred that most Afghans and Burundians are more involved in the Dutch community compared to Moroccans and Ethiopians. Nevertheless, despite the differences between the groups with respect to their sociocultural integration patterns, more than half of the sample is also involved equally in the Dutch society as well as their ethnic community in the Netherlands.

Another dimension of sociocultural integration is being involved in civic life in the host country. Here, it is important to note that I consider any membership as a sign of sociocultural integration because it shows that the individuals have access to organisations and associations. Some researchers may not consider membership in a Mosque or a migrant association as a sign of integration, but I argue that through any kind of organisation, even when they are solely oriented towards to home country or other migrants, individuals learn about the ways of living, have access to information and new institutional structures in the host country (Oeppen 2009). Regarding associational membership in the Netherlands, the respondents were asked whether they are active or inactive members of any organisation.⁴⁸ The associations that are categorised in the survey are religious organisations, sport, recreational, music or

⁴⁸ Being an active member is defined as participating in activities of events organized by the association and attending meetings regularly.
educational organisations, labour union and diaspora organisations, and finally humanitarian organisations. For the descriptive analysis, I exclusively examine whether someone is a member of any organisation, rather than counting the number of organisations respondents are members of.

**Figure 29 Association membership**

![Bar chart showing association membership by nationality](image)

The survey data show that more than 65 per cent of the total sample belongs to at least one organisation. Especially Ethiopians and Burundians stand out as migrant groups that are highly involved in associations, as three out of four Ethiopians and almost nine in every ten Burundians are part of an association; be it a religious organisation, diaspora organisation, labour union or other recreational organisation. Afghans and Moroccans are relatively less involved in organisations, yet almost 60 per cent of both groups are part of an organisation. In the Netherlands Country Report, Bilgili and Siegel (2012a) show that the most migrants are part of cross-ethnic organisations involving members from diverse backgrounds. Compared to the other groups, Moroccans most commonly belong to organisations composed of co-ethnics only. In fact, this composition is consistent with the results regarding leisure time spending.

Finally, I look at the level of Dutch music and media consumption to have an idea about the sociocultural orientation of migrants towards the Netherlands. This dimension is about the frequency of listening to Dutch music, visiting websites about the Netherlands and reading Dutch newspapers (including online newspapers). The frequency of media and art consumption was measured on a 6-point scale for each activity. To construct a variable that encompasses all the aspects, the scores for each dimension were added to create a continuous variable, and then sub-divided into three categories of low, medium and high consumption.
The results are relatively similar to leisure time spending with the Dutch population. Almost 60 per cent of the total sample can be considered to be oriented towards the Dutch culture and media, but within the groups, Afghans and Burundians seem to be the migrants who are oriented towards Dutch social life and culture the most as 31 per cent of Afghans and 47 per cent of Burundians often read Dutch newspapers, websites, and listen to Dutch music. In contrary, 60 per cent of Moroccans and a little less than half of Ethiopians make little use of Dutch media and art. They are underrepresented in the medium and high consumption categories. In particular, Moroccans stand out by having the least number of people who use Dutch media and art category frequently (17%).

In sum, this section’s coverage of the different aspects of sociocultural integration in order to create a comprehensive profile indicates the following results. Overall, all groups have relatively high interaction with the native Dutch population and consume Dutch media and art, although Moroccans score lowest on each of these criteria. Conversely, Moroccans are in frequent contact with their co-ethnics in their leisure time and also through organisations, while the other groups have also relatively more interaction with the native Dutch. Yet, it is interesting to see that while the co-ethnics occupy a significant position of Moroccans’ social lives, for Burundians and Afghans, this does not seem to be the case. Further exploration is needed to understand the differences on these dimensions and discuss how they may relate to migrants’ homeland engagement and attachment.
7.2. **Transnationality: Level of homeland engagement and attachment**

The previous section documented considerable differences among the migrant groups with respect to their integration processes. In this section, the objective is to describe to what extent and in which ways migrants maintain economic and sociocultural contact with their home country, and to show their intentions with regards to returning permanently to their home country. In this direction, before proceeding with the main empirical analysis of the links between integration processes and homeland engagement and attachment, a general overview of migrants’ characteristics, behaviours and attachments in the sample follows.

### 7.2.1. Economic homeland engagement

“I send money to people who really need it. Not just family, I send it to children and poor people. Sometimes I send it independently and sometimes through local organisations in Burundi.” (Burundian, F, 35)

In terms of economic homeland engagement, migrants’ remittances sending behaviour is central in this research. The survey data provide information on whether anyone in the household has sent money home in the past twelve months. We have gathered information regarding up to three remittances senders in each household who gave details about the remittances they sent to up to three people abroad. Based on this information, three aspects of economic remittance sending behaviour were analysed. First, I simply start by constructing a binary variable looking at whether a migrant has sent any money in the past year to their family and friends or to any organisation in their home country. Since only homeland engagement is of interest in this research, in the analysis, money sent to third countries is excluded. In any case, the number of individuals who have sent money to third countries is negligible in the data as less than 3 per cent of remittances were sent to countries other than the country of origin. Next, within remittances senders, the total amount of remittances and the main reason for sending remittances were taken into account in order to understand the remittances sending behaviour of migrants better.

Before moving on to the descriptive analysis of the results on these three dimensions, it is worthwhile to present an overview of the household level remittances sending behaviour among the different migrant groups. As described in the Netherlands Country Report (Bilgili and Siegel 2012a), migrant households
that are the most involved economically in their home country are Ethiopians (61%) followed by Burundians (37%), Moroccans (37%) and finally Afghans (27%). In most households, there is only one main remittances sender. Interestingly, although the Afghan households send remittances most infrequent, about 15 per cent of the households have two remittances senders while this share does not exceed 10 per cent in the other migrant groups. The majority of households have up to three remittances receivers; and only in about 5 per cent of the households there are more than three remittances receivers. Moreover, in all migrant groups, but especially among Ethiopians, the main remittances receivers are immediate family members. About 80 per cent of remittances receivers in Ethiopia are immediate family members of migrants in the Netherlands49, while this share is lower in other countries (66% in Morocco, 55% in Burundi and 46% in Afghanistan) In these countries, a considerable share of remittances receivers are indirect family members; and especially in Burundi, about one fifth of remittances receivers are friends of the migrants in the Netherlands. Remittances sent to religious organisations and other organisations are negligible in the data. Bearing in mind these differences, in the remainder of this section, I examine the differences on an individual level among the migrant groups.

**Figure 31 Remittances sender**

![Bar chart showing remittances sender by nationality](image)

Of the total sample, 27 per cent of the individuals have sent money back home in the previous year at least once. Afghans seem to be the group with the least economic activity in their home country as only 13 per cent of them have sent remittances. Moroccans and Burundians also fall below Ethiopians, as 23 per cent and 24 per cent of them respectively have sent money

49 This difference can be explained by the fact that more than half of the Ethiopian migrants who are in education are remittances senders. In other words, student migrants who are separated from their families may be sending money to their immediate family, and hence the increased number of immediate family members as remittances receivers.
home over the previous year. It is clear that the first generation Ethiopian migrants are the most active in sending remittances with about half having sent money in the last year.  

Secondly, the total amount of remittances sent to the home country in the previous year is considered. To calculate the total amount of remittances sent by the person, I added the amount of money sent to each remittances receiver (excluding money sent to third countries). As can be extrapolated from Figure 40, Ethiopians and Moroccans are sending the highest amounts of money. Some 17 per cent and 16 per cent of them respectively have sent more than 1001 Euros in the last year. However, in terms of the average amount of money sent, more than twice as many Ethiopians sent between 501 and 1000 Euros as Moroccans. This means a larger share of Moroccans send low amounts of money in comparison to Ethiopians. Afghans, who send money the least, are also the group who send the smallest amounts of money, a characteristic they share with Burundians.

Figure 32 Total amount of remittances sent

Third, I take into account the purpose of sending remittances. The

\[50\] The binary logistic regression on the probability to remit with respect to the country of birth, with no other controls, also showed that – compared to Afghans and Moroccans – Ethiopians were significantly more likely to send remittances, whereas no significant difference exists between Moroccans and Burundians.

\[51\] According to the regression results with no controls, while Afghans send significantly less money than Moroccans, no significant difference exists between Moroccans and Burundians.
respondents were asked their main reason of sending money back home. For constructing the binary variable on the purpose of sending remittances, a specific distinction is made between remittances sent for investment and consumption purposes. Investment-related monetary remittances refer to money that is especially sent for investment/business education, or for the purchase of real estate, land or durable goods. The consumption related monetary remittances include money sent for daily needs, savings, leisure, debt payments and healthcare. To be precise, the decision to include savings and healthcare expenditures on the consumption side were made to keep within the investment classification only those expenditures which were surely used for investment. To elaborate on this, it was not specified in the survey whether savings were drawn upon for investment purposes or for consumption-smoothing or whether healthcare expenditures were for preventative or curative care.

Figure 33 Reason for remitting

![Consumption and Investment Reasons for Remitting]

It is observed that although Afghans and Burundians send less money overall, they are not the ones who send money the least for investment purposes (See Figure 33). On the contrary, it seems that Moroccans send money with the least frequency for investment purposes while Burundians and Ethiopians are most likely to send money for family and friends in the home country to invest in education, land, housing, business or to buy durable goods. According to the Netherlands Country Report (Bilgili and Siegel 2012a), within

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52 As mentioned earlier, migrants could mention more than one remittances receiver and the reason for sending money to each receiver may differ. In my research, I decided to focus only on the first remittance receiver, and to exclude the reasons for sending money to the other remittances receivers, as it is not possible to combine different motivations of sending money to different individuals for the same remittances sender.

53 The binary logistic regression on the reason for remitting without controls also shows that all groups send money for investment significantly more than Moroccans.
consumption related reasons, for all groups, daily needs are the most important reason. For Moroccans and Afghans, sending money for healthcare related reasons is also of significance. For Burundians and Ethiopians, education is the most important investment related money sending purpose.

Overall the survey data show that in the sample Ethiopians and Burundians are the main remittance senders who are also more likely to send money for investment purposes rather than for consumption when compared to Afghans and Moroccans. Despite this similarity between groups, Ethiopians send significantly more money than Burundians. Moroccans and Ethiopians are the ones who send the largest amounts of money, while Afghans are the least likely group to send money and send lesser amounts. In the following section, migrants’ sociocultural homeland engagement will be discussed and it will be revealed whether the migrant groups’ behaviours differ in a similar vein in this domain.

7.2.2. Sociocultural homeland engagement

“If I need them (family), I call or Skype and email. I talk with my brothers – mostly if there is something exciting we will talk about it – that’s typically Ethiopian. The political agenda, what is happening with people there, these are always talking points.” (Ethiopian, F, 37)

“Every day, I read online newspapers about Burundi – 5 or 6 newspapers usually. They are from the diaspora and also from Burundi. One is from France, two or three from Belgium. I like to check differences in reporting. I also watch the Dutch news and if I had French news I would watch that too.” (Burundian, F, 35)

In my research, the main sociocultural activities oriented toward the home country are contact with family and friends in the home country, short term visits, being a member of an organisation in the home country and consumption of media and art related to the home country. In the main results section, I will seek to explain the differences I present here with respect to migrants’ background characteristics and integration processes, as well as the contextual factors that I have discussed in previous chapters.

In Figure 34, having contact with family and friends in the home country are presented as binary: having any contact vs. no contact at all. According to the survey data, it can be concluded that a high proportion of migrants, some 87 per
cent, have contact with their family and friends in the home country. However, there are clear differences between the migrant groups. To start with, almost all Moroccan and Ethiopian migrants have contact with their family and friends in the home country, while the share of Afghans and Burundians who have contact with the homeland is smaller. 30 per cent of Afghans have no contact with people in Afghanistan, while the percentage of Burundians who have no contact with their home country is 20 per cent. More specifically, in the Netherlands Country Report, Bilgili and Siegel (2012a) show that the majority of Moroccans and Ethiopians maintain frequent contact with family and friends in the home country, while Burundians and Afghans have intermediate and less frequent contact. What is important to note here is less contact with family and friends in the home country should not be taken as a direct sign of disinterest in the home country. As will be shown below with Figure 36, more than half of Afghans and Burundians consume intermediate or high levels of media and art related to their home country. In this regard, we need to bear in mind that many family members of Afghans and Burundians may have fled the country, and therefore they do not have as many people to contact in their home country and their social networks may be more scattered around the world.

**Figure 34 Social contacts and return visits in the home country**

The social contacts take different forms including telephone calls, internet based chat/phone, e-mails, letters, visits to home country as well as visits made to

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54 In the survey, the frequency of contact is measured on an 8 point scale going from “no contact at all” to “every day” contact. For descriptive analysis, in the Netherlands Country Report, frequency is expressed in three levels: Frequently= once a week or more; Intermediate= every three months or more; Infrequently= Less than every three months or never.
the Netherlands. For all migrant groups, telephone and internet based calls are the most common ways of maintaining contact. For Ethiopians and Burundians, e-mails are also important while for Moroccans, visits to the home country are of significance. Finally, for all migrant groups, the most contacted people are immediate family members. After immediate family members, Moroccans and Afghans contact wider family members the most often, while Ethiopians and Burundians maintain contact with friends the most (Bilgili and Siegel 2012a).

Next, in the survey, respondents who were in at least some contact with their home country were asked if and how often they go back to their home country. This question is answered with a 6-point scale ranging from “no visits” to “a few times every year”. In Figure 34, the results are presented as dichotomous. This necessitates making a distinction between migrants who make no visits versus those who return at least occasionally rather than considering the frequency. In total, about half of the respondents stated that they have made at least one trip back home since their arrival. Especially, a large share of Moroccans, with 91 per cent, seems to make temporary short visits back to the home country. A much lower proportion of the other groups visits their home country. While 56 per cent of Ethiopians go back to Ethiopia for visits, only 35 per cent of Afghans and 24 per cent of Burundians have visited their home country. The difference between Burundians and Afghans is that, among the Afghans who are in contact with people in their home country, about half of them made at least one trip back home, but among the Burundians this share is much lower, as seen in Figure 34.

**Figure 35 Association membership in the home country**

Another way to operationalize sociocultural homeland engagement is to ask respondents if they are a (active or inactive) member of an association in their home country while residing in the Netherlands. Respondents were given the choice of being part of religious organisations, sport or recreational, art, music or educational organisation, labour union, political party or humanitarian and charitable
organisations. In general, a large share of the migrants is not part of an organisation (84%). In particular, it seems that the Burundians (25%) and Ethiopians (23%) are the most active ones in terms of association membership. Only 7 per cent of Afghans are part of an association and have the lowest representation in associations in the home country. The majority of Burundians, Ethiopians and Moroccans are members of religious organisations in their home country. Afghans constitute the group with the least number of people who are a member of an organisation in the home country. This is not surprising considering the current political and security situation in the country. Among those who are a member, be it active or inactive, a relatively larger share is part of political organisations rather than religious organisations.

I conceptualize media and art consumption related to home country as homeland engagement as well. Our survey asked questions about how often an individual listens to origin country music, visit websites about the origin country, and read origin country newspapers. The variable is constructed in the same way as it was done for media and art consumption related to the Netherlands.

![Figure 36 Home country media and art consumption](image)

Not having contact with family and friends in the home country does not necessarily mean that migrants are not connected to their homeland in the sociocultural domain. Home country media and art consumption is a good example here, because although the proportion of Afghans and Burundians who do not have contact with family and friends is relatively large compared to Moroccans and Ethiopians, they apparently consume more media and art oriented towards their home country. Some 67 per cent of Afghans and 69 per cent of Burundians have medium to high levels of consumption.
of media and art related to their home country. Compared to other groups, Ethiopians (88%) compose the group that is the most oriented towards home country culture. Interestingly, Moroccans who are regularly in contact with their family and friends in Morocco do not show high levels of home country media and art consumption. About 57 per cent of the sample shows low levels of consumption. However, this result should not be regarded in isolation. As is shown below, Moroccans also show low levels of consumption of Dutch art and media. In this respect, one can argue that in general Moroccans are less likely to listen to music, surf on the internet or read newspapers (online or not) in general, and thus the results must be interpreted with this in mind.

7.2.3. Permanent return intentions as a function of homeland attachment

“...I have a study loan, so I want to work until I pay back that loan and then after that I will go back. And make some savings. It feels like home there, and I feel like I have to do something for Burundi, like helping orphans or something like that. But mostly it feels like home.” (Burundian, F, 22)

Migrants’ permanent return intentions to their home country are also observed as an indicator of homeland attachment in this research. To assess migrants’ intentions about return, the respondents were first asked whether they plan to stay in the Netherlands permanently. Those who stated that they do not plan to stay in the Netherlands were then asked whether they plan to go back to their home country. Those who answered negatively to the first question and positively to the latter are here considered as migrants who intend to return permanently to their home country. In contrast, those who plan to stay in the Netherlands or intend to migrate somewhere else are in the category of those who do not intend to return to the home country.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} Those who have answered “don’t know” or “maybe” to this question are excluded from the analysis since the meaning of these responses are ambiguous.
The overall interest in permanent return is very low in the sample, only one quarter of the migrants plans to return permanently to their home country. The intention to return permanently is highest among Ethiopians (55%), followed by Moroccans (21%). Burundians and Afghans conversely are not interested in permanent return to the home country, with more than 90 per cent of the migrants from these groups having no such intention.

These group level differences between migrants lead me to reflect on the ways in which they may affect migrants’ integration to the Netherlands while maintaining or cutting off homeland links. What difference does it make to be part of an established migrant community or part of a more dispersed, newer and smaller migrant community? Is there a disparity due to the size of the migrant groups with respect to diaspora solidarity and engagement that enhances the influence of migrants on their homeland? After the main analytical chapters on simultaneity, in Chapter 11, I come back to these points to elaborate more on variations among migrant groups. Before that, in Chapter 8 to 10, I focus on the theory, hypotheses and main analysis results regarding the links between home and host country integration which constitute the core results chapters of my research.
Chapter 8

Simultaneity in the economic domain
8. Simultaneity in the economic domain

8.1. Theory and hypotheses

Not all migrants are economic migrants, but all migrants – independent of their migration motivation – need to make a living in their new home and therefore become part of an economic system in the host country as employers, employees or simply consumers (Castles and Miller 2003). At the same, once settled in the host country, migrants do not sever all economic contact with their homeland. Many, if not most, of them maintain some sort of economic and social relationship with family and friends at home and make economic contributions through several channels. Broadly, these channels include transnational entrepreneurship, investments and monetary and in-kind remittances sent to family and friends in the home countries or in other places (Guarnizo 2003). In this research, I will be focusing on monetary remittances and ask the question:

*To what extent and in which ways is migrants’ remittances behaviour linked to their economic integration in the Netherlands?*

In the last couple of decades, migrants’ remittances have received special attention in the literature due to the remarkable increase in the volume of these remittances (US$334 billion) over the past years (World Bank 2010). Remittances to developing countries were observed to be US$20 billion in 1998, and had reached US$334 billion by 2010 (Banga and Sahu 2010). This 15-fold increase is indicative of the increase in the amount of formal remittances. Another reason for which a significant body of research has been devoted to remittances is the potential impact of economic remittances on receiving communities in terms of poverty alleviation and development (Massey and Basem 1992, Skeldon 1997, Portes 2003). Also, as stated by Stark (2009: 155-156) “Remittances are a puzzle: they constitute transfers between entities that have separated and are distanced from each other, often by thousands of miles; they are neither mandated nor enforceable by the legal power of the state (or states); and it appears that the mere force of intra-familial altruism cannot account for their intensity and variability.”
As such a complex phenomenon, economic remittances remain a fascinating subject of study for academic researchers.

One of the main questions addressed by researchers regarding the issue is: “What determines remittance sending?” Most of the research on this topic has been dominated by economists who have developed a rationale based on the New Economics of Labour Migration theory. Carling (2008), as a response, has argued that there is a lack of research on demographic and other non-economic determinants of remittances sending behaviour. Carling and colleagues (see Carling and Hoelscher 2013), as well as other migration scholars such as Al-Ali et al. (2001a, 2001b), Portes et al. (2002), and Waldinger (2008) have taken the challenge to look into the determinants of remittances from a more sociological perspective. In particular, these researchers have asked whether integration in the host country, however it may be defined, has a positive or negative effect on migrants’ propensity and amount to remit. In the North American context, several surveys have analysed how migrant characteristics and interaction with the host country environment have influenced remittance behaviour (Lindley 2009) (see Brown and Poirine 2005, DeSipio 2002, Marcelli and Lowell 2005, Menjívar et al. 1998, Posel 2001, Taylor 2000). However, this line of research has been a late comer in Europe.

With the increase in the number of migrants and recent technological and communication developments that facilitate migrants’ economic homeland engagement, economic transnationalism has become a hot topic (Light et al. 2002, Min 1990). So, what do researchers who incorporate the economic integration literature with economic homeland engagement research have to say about the links between the two phenomena? Some migration scholars claim that economic homeland engagement drives integration forward more efficiently because migrants are motivated to earn as much income as they can to send home (Miller 56).

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56 Research on economic remittances is highly influenced by the theory of New Economics of Labour Migration, according to which remittance behaviour depends on family arrangements and the limitation of risk. Robert Lucas and Oded Stark’s (1985) article “Motivations to remit: evidence from Botswana” has strongly shaped the research field regarding the determinants of migrant remittances. Based on this theory, economists have defined two main motivations for remitting: altruism and self-interest (Stark 2009). Pure altruism, various forms of pure self-interest and intermediate motivations constitute the conceptual framework for understanding why migrants remit a certain amount of their earnings back home. De la Brière and colleagues (2002) name insurance, social security, reimbursement of past expenditures, and investment as intermediate motivations. Remittances are seen as a central element of implicit family contracts with which families benefit in the realms of risk-diversification, consumption smoothing and intergenerational financing of investments.
Portes (2001: 189), for instance, marks that transnational activities, such as being involved in ethnic businesses, provide immigrant groups with “an extra ‘lift’ in terms of material and moral resources unavailable to those cut off from these activities”.

In this research, while my objective is to contribute to this discussion whether we can indeed talk about integration and homeland engagement as ‘extra lifts’ for each other, I recognise that studying a relationship of causality is not possible when working with cross-sectional data. Therefore, rather than looking at the effect of economic integration on remittances sending behaviour, I seek to understand how the two phenomena are correlated and to initiate a debate based on the associations I find.

In order to understand why there is not necessarily a decrease in migrant remittances over time57 and who remits under what conditions, research needs to reach beyond the conceptualisation of migration as a family decision for economic reasons (de Haas 2007c). In the early 1990s, Massey and Basern (1992:188) brought attention to the fact that “many of the decisions regarding savings and remittances are made within a social milieu of family and friends living and working abroad” (in Marcelli and Lowell 2005:73). Writing about the remittances channel between Mexico and the US, Marcelli and Lowell (2005) claimed that data collected in the origin countries were biased towards how the needs and wants of the family and friends in the home community influenced the remittance behaviour of migrants abroad. This strand of research has therefore focused on the pull factors of remittance sending. But, the other dimension of the story requires attention as well. Namely, the “push factors” for sending remittances can be brought into the discussion by focusing on the experiences of migrants in the host country. Proceeding from this idea, in the remainder of this section, I survey the existing literature on this topic and develop the hypotheses of my research.

Regarding the question of how integration relates to homeland engagement, competing arguments have been raised in the literature. Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) argue that economic integration leads to accumulation of

57 Theoretically, Stark (1991:223) has argued that it is difficult to predict remittances sending behaviour because remittances depend on contractual arrangements and bargaining within households. Therefore, they do not necessarily decrease over time. De Haas (2007c) also states that remittances show a stable or even increasing pattern over time.
economic resources that allow migrants to engage in homeland oriented activities (See also Funkhouser 1995). Al-Ali and her colleagues (2001a) also formulate that those who are better integrated economically have the capacity to remain in contact with their homeland. Employment provides a regular salary and the possibility of savings, and thus is the single most important factor to increase the capacity of migrants to assist relatives abroad.

Therefore, I also argue that the more a migrant is integrated, the more resources they will have and the more they will be involved in their homeland. In other words, the general hypothesis of this section is:

- Successful economic integration is positively linked to engagement in homeland oriented economic activities.

In their study, Al-Ali and her colleagues (2001b) show that employed Eritreans are much more likely to contribute to their families’ finances compared to unemployed Eritreans, or Eritreans employed on a an informal or part time basis. Hammond (2013) in her study among Somalis in the United Kingdom concluded that those who were able to access the labour market found it easier to send remittances back home. Carling (2008) also remarks that migrants’ income has either a positive effect on the propensity to remit or no effect at all. Income may have no effect depending on the obligation of sending money home. Intuitively, it is sensible to assume that economic integration and homeland engagement are positively correlated. However, in his work among Somalis in Norway, Carling (2008) has shown that those with the worst economic problems sent money the most because it was expected of them to do so. In this sense, although their capacity is low, they still find the means to send money back home. On a different note, Stark and Dorn (2012) argue that although integration is expected to increase one’s earnings, it is also costly because a migrant needs to invest to acquire host country specific human capital (see McManus et al 1983, Lazear 1999) and thus having more income does not necessarily mean that migrants will send more money back home. Nevertheless, they also admit that overall, the extra resources may positively influence remitting behaviour. The earlier studies in the United States context on this matter also show that those with higher incomes are more likely to remit (See Menjivar et al. 1998, De Sipio 2000).

In economic integration literature, it is assumed that migrants’ economic
integration is stronger when they have higher labour market participation rates, lower unemployment levels, better jobs and a higher income (Van Tubergen 2006). Considering the definition of successful economic integration in the host country and previous research on the effect of economic integration on remittances sending behaviour, I hypothesize the following:

- **Employed migrants and those with higher income are more likely to remit.**

  Carling (2008) has summarized the literature on economic remittances and shown that the effect of economic integration is similar for both the likelihood of remitting and amount of remittances. Therefore, I also expect the effect of employment and income to be similar for propensity to remit and amount of remittances. Hence, the next hypothesis is:

- **Employed migrants and those with higher income are more likely to remit larger amounts.**

In addition to assessing the propensity to remit and amount of remittances, I take into account migrants’ reason for remitting by making a distinction between remittances sent for consumption versus investment (See Section 7.2.1 for the operationalization of the variable). On the one hand, one can argue that remittances sent for investment purposes are probably greater and, therefore, that migrants who are better integrated are more likely to send money for investment than consumption. On the other hand, research reveals a positive correlation between successful economic integration and educational attainment (Barro 1991, Mankiw et al. 1992, Levine and Renelt 1992, Card 1999) and that more educated people generally come from families with a higher socioeconomic status (Blau and Duncan 1967). Their families may not need remittances for consumption purposes and, therefore, they may be freer to invest in other things such as businesses, housing and land. Consequently, I hypothesize that:

- **Employed migrants and those with higher income remit more for investment related purposes than consumption.**

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58 I make a deliberate distinction between these two types of motivation for sending remittances. Although I do recognize that consumption related remittances may also have multiplier-effects, I still argue that the nature of remittances sending may be different for direct investment and consumption purposes.
As a next step, I focus on employed individuals in order to evaluate the relationship between employment-related factors and economic homeland engagement. Having the opportunity to go more in-depth regarding the links between economic integration and homeland engagement, and to go beyond the conventional measurements of economic integration for all adult individuals, I do the same analysis among the employed sample only. By taking into account occupational status and contract status, I consider whether having a stable labour market position is positively related to economic homeland engagement. One can argue that those with higher occupational status and stable jobs will be less likely to be influenced by economic fluctuations in the host country. Having a less precarious situation, it will be easier to save money to send back home (Cox et al. 1998). Accordingly, I hypothesize that:

- Migrants with higher occupational status and a stable job will be more likely to remit; to remit larger amounts; and remit more for investment related purposes than consumption compared to those with lower occupational status and with an unstable job.

8.2. Main analysis results

With a specific focus on economic remittances, I conduct a two-step analysis. In the first step, the model is run with the whole sample; in the second step, the model is run among employed individuals only, to see whether job related factors play a significant role.
Table 3 summarizes the specific hypotheses discussed in this chapter and previously in Chapter 3. Table 4 presents the results of each analysis for dependent variables representing a different aspect of economic remittances behaviour (propensity to remit, amount of remittances, reason for remitting) to test these hypotheses. The Models 1, 3 and 5 are run for all first generation migrants born in one of the four origin countries, while Models 2, 4 and 6 are run for employed migrants only to test the final hypothesis of this section.

Table 3 Hypotheses regarding the links between economic integration and homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status (Citizenship)</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in NL&gt;5 years</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the dependent variables of propensity to remit and reason for remitting are dichotomous, I conduct binary logistic regression. For the amount
of remittances, I run a Tobit model because the dependent variable is a numerical continuous variable. A Tobit model assumes a one-stage decision which means that the decision to remit and the decision regarding the amount of money to be sent are made simultaneously (Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007). While I present the odds ratios for the binary logistic regressions, I present the marginal effects for the Tobit model (Table 4, M3 and M4).

**Length of stay and citizenship status**

I start with examining the links between length of residence in the Netherlands and remittances sending behaviour. The hypotheses are partially confirmed. The hypothesis that migrants who have been in the Netherlands for more than five years are significantly less likely to send remittances (OR = .65, p-2 sided < .05) is confirmed, but this result does not apply to the amount of remittances and to the reason for remitting. Although the sign of the associations hint at a negative relationship, they are not significantly strong enough to claim that by longer stay, “older migrants” remit smaller amounts or remit less for investment related reasons than consumption.

As hypothesized previously, I find almost no link between citizenship status and economic remittances behaviour. The only significant relationship is between citizenship status and reason for remitting among the employed sample (See M6 in Table 4). This result suggests that those with only origin country citizenship are almost five times more likely to send remittances for investment purposes than consumption purposes compared to someone with only Dutch or dual citizenship (OR=4.85, p-2 sided < .05).
### Table 4 Results for economic homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Binary logistic regression</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tobit model</strong></td>
<td><strong>Binary logistic regression</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds ratios and SE</td>
<td>Marginal effects and SE</td>
<td>Odds ratios and SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.50**(11)</td>
<td>0.57**(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.53**(51)</td>
<td>2.86**(88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.89**(21)</td>
<td>1.33**(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest level of education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1.37**(27)</td>
<td>1.14**(38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.57**(33)</td>
<td>1.31**(46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.86**(18)</td>
<td>-.02**(04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.71**(15)</td>
<td>-.06**(04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>0.52**(13)</td>
<td>-.12**(04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income per capita</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.23**(22)</td>
<td>0.95**(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.51**(30)</td>
<td>1.48**(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited contract</td>
<td>1.97**(49)</td>
<td>.12**(05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.24**(44)</td>
<td>.02**(07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.06**(40)</td>
<td>.02**(08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language use at home</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country language</td>
<td>.99**(15)</td>
<td>1.10**(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Status (Citizenship)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country citizenship</td>
<td>0.83**(16)</td>
<td>1.17**(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in NL&gt;5 years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.65**(16)</td>
<td>0.38**(21)</td>
<td>-.07**(05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in NL</td>
<td>0.58**(11)</td>
<td>0.71**(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.82**(11)</td>
<td>0.63**(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.90**(17)</td>
<td>0.94**(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.00**(04)</td>
<td>1.13**(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>.99**(0)</td>
<td>0.99**(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.16**(12)</td>
<td>0.06**(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-square</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Economic integration indicators

Next, I focus on the specific economic integration indicators and their association with propensity to remit (See M1 and M2 in Table 4). The binary logistic regression results, presented by odds ratios, show that compared to employed people, unemployed (OR=.70, p-2 sided<.1) and inactive (OR=.52, p-2 sided<.01) people are less likely to remit. The results show that students do not necessarily remit less than employed migrants, which was different from the hypothesis suggesting that employed migrants would be significantly more likely to remit than all others. Taking into account income per capita, I observe that in line with my hypothesis, the probability to remit increases with higher income. Namely, someone with high income is 1.5 times more likely to remit than someone with low income. These results clearly indicate that economic integration is positively linked to remittance sending.

Within the employed sample, I observe that having a stable job is positively linked to sending remittances (OR=1.97, p-2 sided<.01). More specifically, someone with an unlimited contract is twice likely to send remittances than someone with limited or no contract. Surprisingly, occupational status does not seem to be linked to propensity to remit.59

What is interesting in this model is that with the inclusion of job-related variables, the previous positive associations of education and income are reduced. It can be argued that those with higher education are more likely to have a stable job and have higher income, and this would explain why the effect of education on propensity to remit is mediated by having an unlimited contract.

For the amount of remittances sent back to family and friends in the home country the results are similar to the results regarding the propensity to remit. As expected, it is shown that employed migrants tend to remit significantly greater amounts of money than those with no employment (β=-.06, p-2 sided<.05) and the inactive (β=-.12, p-2 sided<.01). Interestingly, students do not necessarily remit amounts that are significantly smaller than those remitted by employed migrants. Moreover, those with a higher income tend to remit more than those with lower income. Thus, for the total sample, I confirm the hypotheses I have developed in the theory section: economically better integrated migrants are significantly more likely to send larger amounts of remittances.

59 This result is unlikely to be linked to the correlation between the two indicators (Corr <.3).
When I look at the results for the employed sample, I observe that the effect of income is no longer significant. The results indicate that those with a stable job are likely to remit larger amounts of money ($\beta = 0.12$, $p$-2 sided $< 0.05$). Put differently, having a stable job increases the expected amount of remittances sent by $0.12$ units, holding all other variables constant. But, occupational status does not relate to the amount of remittances sent.

In short, I find that the results are quite similar for propensity to remit and amount of remittances, and are in line with Carling’s (2008) suggestion that the way economic integration relates to propensity to remit and amount of remittances behaviour are comparable. In other words, the factors that significantly relate to likelihood of remitting, relate in the same way to the amount sent as well.

Finally, I explore the reason to remit as an attempt to identify whether economic integration is linked to sending remittances for investment related purposes. The results show that employment status or income do not positively and significantly relate to the decision to remit for investment-related purposes compared to consumption-related purposes. Within the employed sample, those who occupy a higher job status, and those with a more stable job are more likely to remit for investment purposes when other factors are controlled for. More specifically, someone with a stable job is $5$ times more likely to send money for investment purposes than consumption. Plus, someone with a medium level job is $20$ times and someone with a high level job is $24$ times more likely than someone with low level job to send money for investment purposes than consumption. Consequently, while I reject the hypothesis for the total sample, I confirm the hypotheses for the employed sample, suggesting that economic integration is positively correlated with sending money back home more for investment purposes than consumption.

### 8.3. Results on country differences and control variables

In addition to the hypothesized relationships, other relevant results are found in the study. With respect to age, Carling (2008) suggests that remittances tend to increase with the age of migrants, and my research is in line with this statement. However, the effect of age is no longer significant when the job status of migrants is taken into account. Consequently, age may be positively correlated
with labour market success, rather than having an independent effect on remittances sending behaviour.

Finally, married and female migrants tend be less engaged in economic activities oriented towards their home country as the sign of the relationships suggests; but these associations are not consistent in every model to make accurate claims (See Table 4). Posel (2001) also argues that gender differences in remittance behaviour are not always statistically significant, but when they are, men are generally more likely to remit, and remit larger amounts (see Posel 2001). Interestingly though, although female migrants are less likely to be remitters, the results show that, if they remit, they are significantly more likely to remit for investment related purposes than men. This might be due to the fact that education-related remittances were included as part of remittances for investment. Women may be more likely to send money for education related purposes to care for children in their families and network compared to men.

Finally, one of the objectives of this research is to observe whether differences between migrants from different origin countries remain even after controlling for individual level characteristics. The results suggest that they do to a large extent. First of all, within the total sample, compared to Moroccans, Afghans are significantly less likely to send remittances and send lesser amounts, while Ethiopians are significantly more likely to send remittances and send bigger amounts (See M1 and M2 in Table 4). No significant differences are found between Moroccans and Burundians with regards to the likelihood of remitting and amount of remittances sent, although the sign of the association suggests that Burundians are slightly less likely to remit and remit lesser amounts.

At the same time, it is important to note that for these two outcome variables, within the employed sample, the differences between Moroccans and Afghans are reduced and are no longer significant, while Ethiopians are still more likely to remit and remit larger amounts. The pattern of differences is slightly different when we look at remitting for investment purposes; because the results indicate that Afghans, and more surprisingly Burundians are significantly more likely to remit for investments reasons than consumption compared to Moroccans, while not a strong difference exists between Moroccans and Ethiopians.
8.4. Conclusion

Mazzucato (2011: 455) states that “giving is an act of creating and establishing social relations. Remittances can be seen as part of this system of reciprocal exchange wherein remittances from migrants are part and parcel of the same system of reciprocity in which social relationships are embedded.” In addition to whatever effect potential remittances may have on the livelihoods of migrant households and development as mentioned in the theory section, it is due this social aspect that remittances constitute a significant dimension of migrants’ lives. The objective of this section was then to understand how remittance behaviour is related to migrants’ experiences in the host country.

Table 5 Summary of results regarding the links between economic integration and homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status (Citizenship)</td>
<td>No significant association</td>
<td>No significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in NL&gt;5 years</td>
<td>Negative significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational status</td>
<td>No significant association</td>
<td>No significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Confirmed hypotheses are highlighted in bold.

As a result of the analysis, overall, in many aspects it can be concluded that economic integration goes hand-in-hand with remittances sending behaviour which I treated as an essential dimension of economic homeland engagement. Above and beyond what previous research has shown regarding the links between economic integration and remittances behaviour, I have shown that not only employment status and income matter. The results indicate that it is important to look at different dimensions of economic homeland engagement and to incorporate different dimensions of economic integration in research. There is the additional importance of the kind of job migrants have. This is also in line with what Carling and Hoelscher (2013) have found in relation to non-Western migrants in Norway. In particular, they have made a distinction between secure and insecure employment and shown that compared to those
with secure employment, the odds of sending money back home are 24 per cent lower for respondents with insecure employment. This is very similar to what I have found in my research.

Especially, I was able to show that if migrants’ jobs are not stable, if they do not have a job with a limited contract or no contract at all, they are less likely to send money back home, and when they do, they also remit lesser amounts. This result can be considered as a further justification of the complementarity between economic integration and homeland engagement. This result indicates that it is a misconception that transnational ways of living is a sign of powerlessness and poverty. On the contrary, migrants appear to engage in home country oriented activities voluntarily given their higher capacity. Migrants’ economic homeland engagement in my research challenges the assumption that migrants do not integrate economically in the host country for the sake of their pure interest in the home country. This idea seems to be completely unjustified because the current picture shows that those who are active and perform well in the labour market are in fact the ones who are more involved in their home country. These results make it difficult to suggest that migrants cannot be successfully integrated in the host country while being oriented predominantly to their home country. In this regard, the main conclusion to be drawn from this research is that economic integration and economic homeland are not alternatives to each other, but can complement each other (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Levitt 2008).

Then, what does the complementarity between economic integration and homeland engagement mean? Before answering this question, it is important to remember that migrants’ aspirations to maintain economic contact with their home country may motivate them to integrate better in the home country. In this regard, the causal relationship between better integration and increased homeland engagement can work both ways. That is to say, migrants’ incentive to send money back home may increase their motivation to do better in the host country. Lindley (2009) shows in her study among Somali refugees that many of them have left their home country to be able to send remittances. Migration as a household project inherently demands better economic integration in the host country without which migrants would fail to send money home. Independent of the direction of causality which can in fact work both ways, what we must recognize from a policy perspective is the idea that increased employment
opportunities and policy driven initiatives to encourage migrants’ economic
mobility in the host country are not only beneficial for the host countries, but also
for the home countries. This is a clear point where the inherent linkages between
integration and development policy dimensions can be observed. The challenge
is to use the resources and skills migrants acquire in one context to address issues
in the other to create a profitable environment for both the host and home
countries as well as the migrants themselves (Levitt 2004).

Moreover, it is worthwhile to emphasize the results for purpose of
remitting. Within the employed sample, it is shown that those with a stable job
and a higher occupational status tend to remit more for investment related
reasons than consumption related reasons. On the one hand, one can argue that
migrants with a stable job and high status job send money back home more for
investment related purposes because they can be part of investment projects in
their home country by sending money back home since they have the capacity to
do so. On the other hand, these migrants may be coming from wealthier families
who do not necessarily need remittances for daily needs but for more productive
projects.

Considering the limits of my research, it is difficult to make a distinction
between self-interest and altruism as referred to in the new economics of labour
migration. Admittedly, remittances can help migrants enhance their social
prestige in their home country and strengthen their relationship with relatives
and friends (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008). However, I cannot provide any
evidence to suggest that migrants sending money for daily consumption needs
than investment have different purposes for doing so. To be able to answer this
specific question, qualitative research would be needed to understand why
migrants send money for a particular reason. This on its own is a challenging
task, as Lucas and Stark (1985), who have developed the main taxonomy of
motivations for remittances sending, admit that motives are inextricable and
difficult to understand. Nevertheless, what my research has shown is that
economically better integrated migrants have a greater variety of options to
choose from. That is to say, they are less bounded to send money for only
consumption related reasons. Having a bigger pool of economic resources to
spare for remittances, economically better migrants may choose to help family
and friends in the home country to invest in significantly more productive
matters such as businesses, cultivable land or house construction. One
meaningful way to address this issue in the future may be to follow up on Mazzucato’s (2008a) work among Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands where she looks at the relative importance of sparing money for remittances sending within all other consumption in the Netherlands. This approach would give a more sound understanding of how those with more economic capital behave differently than others.

In short, it is important to recognize that with well-fitted policies, behaviour of migrants can be channelled in a productive way to benefit not only the relatives of migrants, but their wider community in the home country.
Chapter 9

Simultaneity in the sociocultural domain
9. Simultaneity in the sociocultural domain

9.1. Theory and hypotheses

The social contacts that migrants maintain with their family and friends in the home country have been for a long time under the radar of most studies of migrants’ economic relations with their homeland. Yet, in the past few decades, more and more social scientists have acknowledged that migrants also sustain strong social, cultural and political relationships with their homeland, and that over time these relationships may strongly influence societies of origin (Khagram and Levitt 2008, Faist et al. 2013). As a result of these relationships, migrants share and introduce new ideas, practices, values, skills and identities to their social networks abroad. These transfers are defined by Levitt (1998) as “social remittances”.

Actual physical proximity is not required for social remittance transfers. While they are exchanged during return visits, they also circulate during phone calls, letters, the internet and videos (Levitt 2003). In addition, when migrants’ participate in the sociocultural and civic life of their home countries, they import experiences, values and ideas.

Social remittances may alter people’s behaviour, and transform notions about gender relations, democracy and so forth. (Levitt 1999). It is noteworthy that not all social remittances are ‘good’ and constructive; some can be detrimental to migrant sending communities indeed (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). But whether positive or negative, it is crucial to understand how and under which conditions migrants maintain contact with their family and friends in the home country; because these relationships are essential components of migrants’ experiences and may relate equally to their well-being in the host country. Hence, the research question I address in this section is the following:

*To what extent and in which ways is migrants’ engagement in sociocultural activities oriented towards their homeland linked to their sociocultural integration in the Netherlands?*
In Europe, there has been a considerable amount of research on migrants’ sociocultural integration in the host country (Penninx 2005, Van Tubergen 2006). Yet this line of research has fundamentally underestimated the significance of sociocultural contact that migrants maintain with their homeland (Snel et al. 2006). Research on the sociocultural dimensions of migrant lives has mainly focused on the degree to which migrants have contact with the host society, are proficient in the host country language, and are oriented towards their host countries through association membership and cultural consumption. These issues are addressed to discuss the extent to which migrants are embedded in the sociocultural life of the host country. What is problematic with this approach is that it overlooks the idea that migrants’ contact with family and friends in the home country (and third countries) and participation in sociocultural activities oriented towards their home country, also give meaning to their sociocultural life in the host country (Mollenkopf et al. 2009, Bean and Stevens 2003). In this sense, sociocultural homeland engagement is an integral part of migrants’ sociocultural life in the host country and is inherently linked to their sociocultural integration.

In the US context, the subject of ‘transnational social ties’, mainly defined as contact with family and friends in the home country and temporary return visits to the home country, has been studied by several researchers (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002, Waldinger 2008, Tamaki 2011). These studies have quantified migrants’ frequency of contact with their homeland and examined the factors that influence these contacts. Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) studied this topic by combining a set of economic and social transnational activities. They focused on association membership in particular, and Waldinger (2008) and Tamaki (2011) focused in addition on the frequency of contact and temporary return visits. In the case of my research, I build on these earlier studies and define sociocultural homeland engagement as several certain activities. In specific, social contacts maintained with family and friends in the home country, association membership in the home country, short-term return visits, and following news and consuming arts from the home country.

In terms of the correlation between integration and participation in sociocultural homeland oriented activities, Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) assert that integration does not necessarily weaken the latter. Waldinger (2008) similarly found that having US citizenship is positively linked to homeland trips and that time in the US is also positively related to the intensity of social contacts.
in the home country. Also addressing these questions, Tamaki (2011), using survey data including Hispanics and Asians in the US, likewise found a positive effect of host country citizenship on the number return visits among Latinos. On the other hand, in the European context, the work of Schans (2009) has shown a negative association between duration of stay and migrating as a child (younger than 12) on the frequency of contact with relatives in the country of origin, while Snel and colleagues (2006), in their influential study on migrants in the Netherlands, did not find a negative correlation with social integration and feelings of belonging to the Dutch society and engagement in transnational activities.60

These previous studies provide some clues about how integration and sociocultural homeland engagement are interlinked, but the research field is still in its infancy. Therefore, it is fundamental that a systematic analysis of sociocultural homeland engagement is linked to indicators that relate to sociocultural integration in the host country. By extension, I consider language use at home, leisure time among co-ethnics versus Dutch people, and being part of an association in the Netherlands in addition. Moreover, I look at migrants’ orientation towards Dutch culture, defined as their frequency of listening to Dutch music, reading newspapers about the Netherlands and visiting websites about the Netherlands.

The underlying assumption of social integration is that the more migrants integrate to the host society, the less incentive they will have to remain in contact with their home country (Sana 2005). This is the point of view that assumes a negative relationship between sociocultural integration and sociocultural homeland engagement. In this case, the social lives in the two contexts function as substitutes to each other. As Tsuda (2012) explains, given their limited time and resources, migrants are forced to make a choice between the two contexts. Hence, simultaneously increased engagement in both contexts is not considered to be a plausible option. However, it can also be argued that the time and resources allocated to each of these two different social networks can be separate and independent. I argue that social contact with the host society is not necessarily linked to migrants’ incentives to maintain social ties with their family and friends in the home country, because these are distinct aspects of

60 Snel and colleagues (2006) have found that only transnational social activities are significantly negatively linked to identification with the Netherlands.
migrant lives; migrants can be mutually embedded in separate social networks and engage in activities related to both simultaneously. Thus, first I hypothesize that:

- **Social contact with the Dutch society has no significant negative relationship with migrants’ sociocultural homeland engagement.**

In other words, I do not expect those who spend more time with the Dutch to be less likely to have contact with their family and friends in the home country, to make fewer return visits home, or to be less likely to continue to belong to associations or to be less inclined to consume home country media and art.

In addition, I take into account migrants’ social contacts with co-ethnics in the host country. Social integration is supposed to benefit migrants by providing them access to other resources and other (personal or organisational) networks that also enhance their resource base (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2009). Most research on social integration focuses only on migrants’ engagement with the host society, ignoring that being embedded in the social life in the host country can also be realized through contacts with co-ethnics (Putnam 2007, Vervoort et al. 2011). This idea has paved the way to a new strand of research on the effects of migrant networks on migrants’ lives in the host country. More specifically, most research on this topic has been investigating the differential role of these contacts (migrant networks) on integration related issues compared to contacts with the native population. However, one can ask the question whether contact with the natives and the co-ethnics in the host country relate differently to migrants’ sociocultural contacts with their homeland.

One possible view is that contact with co-ethnics in the host country functions as a substitute for contacts with the home country. However, I claim that being more in contact with co-ethnics is not only a replacement, but can increase migrants’ incentive to maintain more contact with family and friends in the home country. Those who spend more time with other co-ethnics may accumulate more interest in home country affairs. It can be argued that these relations feed into each other and function in a way to reinforce the relationships.

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61 These studies include issues such as accommodation, knowledge exchange about life in the host country and job search mechanism etc. (see Aguilera, 2002; Ryan et al., 2008; Aguilera and Massey, 2003; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004).
in both contexts. Therefore, regarding the simultaneity between relationships with co-ethnics and sociocultural homeland engagement I argue that:

*Those who have more frequent contact with their co-ethnics are more likely to engage in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country.*

Following on with the additional factors, the language that migrants use at home is also regarded as an important indicator of sociocultural integration in the host country. Language use at home is of particular interest, because it can be seen as an indicator both of language proficiency and of preferences (Veltman 1983). If an individual speaks some or only the host country language at home, this is seen as an indicator of the person’s orientation towards the host country, while exclusive native language use may be interpreted as the person’s stronger affiliation with their home country and culture (Phinney et al. 2001). Accordingly, one can argue that those who speak only their native language may be significantly more likely to be involved in their home country. However, conversely, from a transnational perspective, one can argue that migrant preferences to use some or only Dutch at home is not necessarily a hindrance to engaging in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country. Those who speak Dutch at home may still have strong connections with family and friends in the home country. Hence, when controlling for all other factors, there may *not* be a significant difference between migrants’ homeland engagement depending on their language use. Consequently, with regards to the link between language use in the Netherlands and engagement in sociocultural activities in the home country, I argue that:

➢ *No significant difference exists between those who use only their native language and those who speak only or some Dutch at home with regards to their engagement in sociocultural activities oriented towards their home country.*

I test these hypotheses about leisure time and language use at home for all four types of home country oriented activities as I do not foresee any significant differences between them. If the results hold for all outcome variables, it will facilitate stronger conclusions about the links between sociocultural integration and engagement in homeland-oriented sociocultural activities. Then again, if there are differences, I will be able to discuss the underlying meaning of each sociocultural activity.
Additionally, for association membership in the origin country, I also take into account association membership in the Netherlands to test whether involvement in civic life in one context is related to the likelihood of civic engagement in another context. I also test whether consumption of home country related media and art is related to that of its Dutch counterpart. In line with Tsuda (2012), I predict a positive correlation between host and home country experiences with respect to media and art consumption and association membership. In a way, I conceptualize these aspects of migrants’ social lives as part of their social and cultural capital. Just as human capital is transferable from one country context to another, (although imperfectly in most cases) (see Chiswick and Miller 2007, 2009, Basilio and Bauer 2010), migrants can transfer sociocultural capital to the host country as well. Therefore, I expect there to be a positive correlation within sociocultural transnationalism in relation to civic involvement and media and art consumption. In other words, I hypothesize that:

- Those who are a member of an association in the Netherlands are more likely to be a member in an association in the home country.
- Those who consume Dutch media and art are more likely to consume home country related media and art.

9.2. Main analysis results

The hypotheses of this chapter and the specific hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 are summarized in Table 6. I begin by testing the links between conventional measurements of integration (length of residence and citizenship status) and sociocultural homeland engagement and then move onto focusing on the role of sociocultural integration indicators, before culminating with the discussion of origin country related differences and other control variables.
Because the dependent variables are all dichotomous in the first three models, the appropriate method for the statistical analysis was binary logistic regression. In the final model, where I look at media and art consumption, the dependent variable is continuous; therefore I conduct a multivariate regression analysis. In Table 4, the odds ratios are presented for the first three models and the coefficients are presented for the final model.

I have hypothesized that there is no significant association between longer stay in the Netherlands and engagement in homeland sociocultural activities. For the dependent variables of social contact with family and friends, and return visits to home country, although the odds ratios suggest a positive association, the association is not statistically significant. Hence, no strong conclusion can be drawn regarding the links between these two types of sociocultural engagement and the length of residence in the host country. When it comes to the other two dependent variables, namely association membership and media and art consumption in the home country, the results indicate a negative association, but only the association between membership and length of residence (OR=.45, p<.01) is statistically significant. That is to say, migrants who have been in the Netherlands for longer than 5 years are significantly less likely to be part of an association in their home country.
Table 6 Hypotheses regarding the links between sociocultural integration and homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language use at home</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with Dutch</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with co-ethnics</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association membership in the NL</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch media and art consumption</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status (Citizenship)</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in NL&gt;5 years</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
<td>No association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, I look at the links between legal integration (citizenship status) and sociocultural homeland engagement. The analysis shows that those who have only origin country citizenship (OR=.37, p-2 sided<.01) are significantly less likely to make trips back home. This means that those who have only Dutch citizenship or dual citizenship make more visits to the home country.

I also find that there is not enough evidence to suggest that having more contact with the Dutch society through leisure activities is negatively linked to engagement in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country. Independent of time spent with Dutch people in leisure time, migrants have contact with family and friends in the home country or make return visits. The results also indicate that those with more contact with Dutch are not less likely to be a member of an association in the home country or consume less home country related media and art. This is the first result that illustrates engagement in sociocultural activities in the home country are not a substitute to social integration in the Netherlands, and that these processes can coexist without negatively influencing each other.

I also find that having more contact with co-ethnics in the Netherlands is positively related to more social contacts with friends and family in the home.

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62 As discussed earlier, these contacts can be maintained through various channels such as telephone calls, e-mails, letters, and chats but also visits both to and from the home country.
Table 7 Results for sociocultural homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binary logistic regression</td>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
<td>Binary logistic regression</td>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M3</td>
<td>M4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.23*** (.09)</td>
<td>0.04***(.02)</td>
<td>0.27***(.07)</td>
<td>2.20***(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.99***(.07)</td>
<td>0.26***(.98)</td>
<td>0.47***(.13)</td>
<td>3.41***(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.37**(.17)</td>
<td>0.04***(.02)</td>
<td>0.94(.27)</td>
<td>3.02***(.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest level of education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.56**(.18)</td>
<td>0.78(.22)</td>
<td>1.22(.30)</td>
<td>.83***(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.26(.48)</td>
<td>0.83(.25)</td>
<td>2.27***(.38)</td>
<td>1.10***(.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.72(.27)</td>
<td>0.74(.21)</td>
<td>2.03***(.54)</td>
<td>.30(.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.53**(.20)</td>
<td>0.63*(.19)</td>
<td>1.72**(.48)</td>
<td>.75***(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>0.26**(.12)</td>
<td>0.55(.20)</td>
<td>1.34(.42)</td>
<td>-.03(.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.69**(.49)</td>
<td>0.96(.23)</td>
<td>1.34(.30)</td>
<td>-.18(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.78*(.62)</td>
<td>1.81*(.50)</td>
<td>1.78**(.45)</td>
<td>.17(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language use at home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only or some Dutch</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country language</td>
<td>1.86*(.51)</td>
<td>1.40*(.32)</td>
<td>1.97**(.40)</td>
<td>1.26***(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with Dutch</td>
<td>0.98(.08)</td>
<td>0.96(.06)</td>
<td>1.00(.06)</td>
<td>.68(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with co-ethnics</td>
<td>1.20**(.13)</td>
<td>0.92(.07)</td>
<td>1.12*.09)</td>
<td>.21***(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the Netherlands              | 4.13**(.94) |                      |            | .21**(.03) |            |
| Dutch media and art consumption|         |         |         |         |                      |            |
| Legal Status (Citizenship)     |         |         |         |         |                      |            |
| Only Dutch or dual citizenship | Ref.    | Ref.    | Ref.    | Ref.    |                      |            |
| Only origin country citizenship| 1.28(.51) | 0.37***(.10) | 0.84(.20) | .39(.39)   |                      |            |
| Years in NL>5 years            | 1.55(.70) | 1.55(.53) | 0.45***(.13) | -.40(.32) |                      |            |
| Control variables              |         |         |         |         |                      |            |
| Family in NL                   | 1.24(.38) | 2.18***(.55) | 0.36***(.09) | -.84***(.25) |                      |            |
| Female                         | 1.00(.29) | 0.95(.19) | 0.63**(.11) | -.54***(.18) |                      |            |
| Married                        | 1.71*(.57) | 1.60*(.34) | 2.12***(.51) | .95***(.23) |                      |            |
| Age                            | 1.08*(.06) | 1.03*(.05) | 1.04(.05)  | .18***(.04) |                      |            |
| Age squared                    | 0.99*(.00) | 0.99(.05)  | .99(.00)   | -.00***(.00) |                      |            |
| Constant                       | 0.45(.69) | 4.87(.20) | 0.02***(.02) | -4.79***(.07) |                      |            |
| Observations                   | 793     | 773     | 1,346   | 1,294   |                      |            |
| Pseudo R-squared               | .23     | .30     | .20     | Adjusted R-Squared | .35 |            |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
country (OR=1.20, p-2 sided<.05), and home country related media and art consumption (β=.21, p-2 sided<.01). Nevertheless, I do not find a significant association between this independent variable and return visits and association membership in the home country. This means that migrants are equally likely to be part of an association or make return visits to the home country independent of their level of their contact with co-ethnics in the Netherlands.

Next, I look at language use at home as an indicator of sociocultural integration in the Netherlands. For all dependent variables, I reject the hypothesis regarding language use at home. Contrary to what I expected, the results show that those who speak only the native language at home are significantly more engaged in their home country. Only return visits are marginally significant compared to those who speak some or only Dutch at home.

Finally, it is significantly more likely that those who are a member of an organisation in the Netherlands (OR=4.13, p-2 sided<.01) are also a member of an organisation in the home country. The results regarding home country related media and art consumption based on multivariate regression are parallel to findings on association membership. In other words, if a migrant consumes more Dutch media and art (β=.21, p-2 sided<.01), they are also significantly more likely to consume more home country related media and art, and these behaviours are not negatively related to each other.

9.3. Results on country differences and control variables

The control variables included in the models also provide interesting insight into who engages in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country. It seems that those with their family in the Netherlands are significantly more likely to make return visits home to visit other family members and friends. Nevertheless, they are less likely to be part of an association in the home country (OR=2.18, p-2 sided<.01) and attend to media and art related to the home country (β =-.84, p-2 sided<.01).

No significant difference exists between males and females with regards to contact with family and friends in the origin country and return visits. However, female migrants are less likely to be part of an organisation in the home country (OR=.63, p-2 sided<.01) and consume significantly less home country related media and arts (β =-.54, p-2 sided<.01). In addition, the results show that those who are married are more likely to engage in all sociocultural
activities oriented towards the home country (See Table 7).

As a final point, when I look at the association between country of origin and sociocultural homeland engagement, I observe that variation exists with respect to different types of activities. Compared to Moroccans, Ethiopians (OR=5.99, p-2 sided<.01) have significantly more contact with their family and friends in the home country, while Afghans and Burundians have significantly less contact. Although Ethiopians have more contact with family and friends, they are not more likely to make visits back home. In our case, Moroccans are significantly more likely than all other groups to make return visits home.

Moroccans are also more likely to be part of an association in the home country than Ethiopians and Afghans, but the difference between Moroccans and Burundians is not significant. While these results suggest that Moroccans are the most active group in sociocultural homeland engagement, this view is challenged by their home country related media and art consumption. All other groups are significantly more likely to consume home country related media and art than Moroccans (See Table 7).

9.4. Conclusion

As a result of the analysis, I showed that rather than a relationship of competition, there is no relationship or a positive relationship between the sociocultural integration and engagement in sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country. Nevertheless, nuances exist when different dimensions of sociocultural integration and homeland engagement are taken into account.

Applying a bi-dimesional measurement of leisure time spending in the Netherlands allowed me to disentangle diverse associations between sociocultural integration and homeland engagement. The analysis showed in a consistent way that spending more time with the Dutch society in leisure time is not negatively related to sociocultural homeland engagement. This is an important finding because it shows that migrants who spend a lot of time with the Dutch society are as likely to maintain social contacts with their home country, make return visits and so on. This means that migrants are able to make time for both contexts depending on their wishes. And, being more oriented towards the home country is not a hindrance for social integration in the
Netherlands.

Table 8 Summary of results regarding the links between sociocultural integration and homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status (Citizenship)</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in NL&gt;5 years</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language use at home</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with Dutch</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time with co-ethnic</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
<td>Non-significant association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association membership in the Netherlands</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive association</td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch media and art consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Positive association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Confirmed hypotheses are highlighted in bold.

While the implication of compatibility between sociocultural homeland engagement and integration is clear from a host country perspective, because it justifies the possibility of dual-embeddedness, what does it mean from a home country perspective? In the theory section, I emphasized the particular importance of sociocultural homeland engagement as it provides the channels through which social remittances are transferred. If migrants who are socioculturally integrated are equally likely to maintain contacts with their home country as those who are primarily concerned with their co-ethnic community in the Netherlands, this may give us some ideas about the qualitative differences in terms of the transfer of social remittances.

The more time migrants spend with the host society, the more new and different sociocultural capital they accumulate.\textsuperscript{63} Levitt (1998) argues that migrants who interact more with the host society learn more about different

\textsuperscript{63} As Williams (2006, 2007) suggests certain types of knowledge result only from experiences of physical presence and contact. Residing in a new context and interacting with others, migrants accumulate such knowledge and skills.
features of the new culture, and reflect more intensively on existing practices. In this regard, it is important to realise that socioculturally more integrated migrants may have other types of knowledge and information to share with their family and friends in the home country. This certainly does not mean that co-ethnically oriented migrants do not have anything to offer back. On the contrary, even if they do not “actively explore their new world”, they can still take in new ideas and practices by “observing the world around them, listening to the how other describe it, or learn about it by reading the newspaper or watching television” (Levitt 1999: 931). Yet, being bounded to their ethnic community, they may be weaker and emanate from fewer sources.

Those who are in the higher end of sociocultural integration can be considered as “purposeful innovators” who actively absorb new ideas and practices to expand and extend their cultural repertoire. Given the difference in their approach, this group may be likely to have more versatile, productive and innovative practices and knowledge to transfer. Considering that my research did not show that this group is less interested in their home country, it would be important to develop ways to engage them more actively in development oriented initiatives.

When it comes to civic engagement and media and art consumption, I confirmed the hypotheses of significant positive association. I conclude that engagement in these aspects of life both in the home and host countries are positively related to each other. Put differently, this means that those who are more involved in the sociocultural life in their home country are also likely to be more involved in these dimensions of life in the Netherlands as well. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this result is that if migrants seem to be less involved in civic life or to participate less in cultural activities in the host country, this cannot directly be interpreted as “little interest of integration” as discussed in the public discourse according to which migrants are to be blamed for their lack of engagement in social affairs in the host country. It is important to emphasize that perhaps migrants’ are transferring their cultural capital from one context to the other, and therefore a positive association is found between the

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64 This result also points that educational attainment is not a strong enough measurement to assess migrants’ cultural capital. Future research may try to capture migrants’ cultural capital through different operationalisations.
two types of behaviour. This links perfectly to the idea of simultaneity between multiple contexts, and conclusively, based on this idea more cooperation between host and home country based organisations and associations can be encouraged.

In conclusion, overall, in view of the main results discussed in this section, it can be concluded that sociocultural integration is not a substitute for sociocultural homeland engagement, and it is difficult to talk about a zero-sum relationship.
Chapter 10

Simultaneity between homeland attachment and engagement
10. Simultaneity between homeland attachment and engagement

10.1. Theory and hypotheses

In the introduction, I suggested that “transnational ways of belonging” describe feelings of attachment and identity. Drawing from previous researchers who have indicated a close relationship between transnational acts and identities (Portes 1998, Vertovec 1999), I want to explore this precise relationship, as a distinct aspect of simultaneity. The interrelationship I study in this part of the research can be formulated as the following:

*To what extent and in which ways is the engagement of migrants in economic and sociocultural activities oriented towards their homeland linked to their homeland attachment?*

Before developing the hypotheses related to this question, I need to justify what variable I use to measure homeland attachment. The independent variable in question needs to be operationalized in a meaningful way. I make the choices on operationalisation based on previous research, but am restricted by what the IS Academy survey provides. In terms of previous research, one of the most significant studies on transnational ways of belonging in the European context has been conducted by Snel and colleagues (2006). Snel and colleagues assessed different dimensions of identification and distinguished between identification with the host society, compatriots in the host country, compatriots in the origin country and compatriots in other countries. They looked at the group dimension, normative dimension, and feelings of closeness to achieve a total score on identification and illustrated that migrants show different orientations depending on the dimension being examined. Waldinger (2010) has also looked at migrants’ feelings of belonging while simultaneously studying various homeland-oriented activities. He approached the issue of homeland attachment in three ways. Firstly, he looked at migrants’ settlement plans. He considered those who plan to someday move back to the origin country as being attached to the home country. Secondly, he took into account migrants’ definition of their “real home”. He assumed those who chose the country of origin as the “real home” are more attached to the home country compared to those who...
stated that the “real home” was the United States. Thirdly, he used migrants’ self-described identity to measure homeland attachment. He made a distinction between those who identified as a home country national only versus those who included American nationality in their self-definition. In this manner, the study focused on how integration indicators are related to migrant’s homeland attachment.

Operationalizing transnational ways of belonging is a challenging task for quantitative researchers. Previous research, as can be seen, has used strict definitions based on national identification and attachment. A distinction is made primarily between expressing multiple belonging and belonging to the home country only. However, this distinction is insufficient as it is focused primarily on ethnic and/or national identity and disregards the idea that transnational ways of belonging can extend beyond single nation state or ethnic group (Glick Schiller et al. 2011). Namely, transnational ways of belonging encompass professional, religious, cultural and other types of identities that transcend national borders. A thorough analytical and methodological exercise is thus required to operationalize transnational ways of belonging. The IS Academy survey reveals limitations when addressing the issue of transnational identities. Therefore, rather than focusing on identification, as Waldinger (2008) has done, I focus on migrants’ future plans as an indicator of their homeland attachment.

Migrants’ intentions to return back to their home country do not necessarily signal that they are more attached to their home country. However, two issues are particularly significant in this regard. First of all, return intentions can be related to individuals’ migration project (Bilgili and Siegel 2012b). For instance, student migrants may see education abroad as an investment, and therefore plan to return upon completing their education. Moreover, student migrants may arrive with scholarships that oblige them to return back to their

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65 The survey does include information about individuals’ ethnic self-definition, but this question comes early in the survey immediately after the question on citizenship. In this regard, there may be a bias in the way respondents have answered the question. Namely, rather than giving their subjective self-identification, they may have answered who they are perceived to be.

66 In a separate paper, I introduce acculturation strategies (Berry 1997) as a way to discuss how migrants’ motives and incentives to integrate into the host society relates to the ways in which they sustain enduring relationships with their home country (Presented conference paper, October 2013, PRIO). However, due to the measurement and what acculturation attitudes entail with regards to multiple identifications, they cannot be considered as transnational ways of belonging.
home country. A similar explanation can be given for labour migrants who are temporarily employed and intend to return to their home country. On the other hand, for family migrants and political refugees the option of return may not be of high relevance. Therefore, when modelling homeland attachment using the intention to return, migration motivations need to be controlled for. This way, indications of return intentions can be regarded as migrants’ feelings of belonging and attachment to their home country with greater degree of clarity.

Additionally, individuals may plan to return because they have friends and family in the home country (de Haas and Fokkema 2011). Therefore, this must be controlled for as well. Only after taking these aspects into account, and controlling for individual and background characteristics, will permanent return intentions represent feelings of attachment to the home country more accurately.

Taking into account future migration plans as an indicator of homeland attachment, the research question of this section can be reformulated as: To what extent do migrants’ intentions about permanent return to their home country relate to their engagement in homeland oriented economic, social and cultural activities?

From a theoretical point of view, permanent return intentions as an indicator of homeland attachment can be associated with migrants’ aspirations to sustain relationships with their home country (Mason 2004). When discussing migrants’ capabilities of transnational involvement, Al-Ali and her colleagues (2001a) suggest that it is relevant to distinguish between capacity and aspirations. They argue that migrants who have an intention to return to the home country can have more incentives and willingness to be involved in their home country. In a similar vein, Carling and Pettersen (in press) mark that return intentions are significant in their own right because they show migrants’ attachment to the home country and explain why migrants invest certain in economic and sociocultural relationships.

There is evidence in the literature supporting the hypothesis of positive association between remittance-sending and return intentions to the home country (Brown 1997, Cai 2003, Merkle and Zimmermann 1992). However, this positive association is not supported in all quantitative research. For instance, Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) found that a decline in homeland engagement did not automatically transfer into a decrease in homeland identification as these
combined identifications can be a product of positive and nostalgic memories and imaginings (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2008, Tsuda 2009). In other words, they show that return intentions and homeland engagement are unrelated. In their study, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) find no clear link between economic and social homeland engagement and concrete return plans among four African migrant groups in Spain and Italy. If a significant positive relationship does not exist between homeland attachment and engagement, one can argue that homeland engagement functions as a substitute for return and may not positively relate to migrants’ intentions for permanent return.

Boccagni (2011) also claims that it is not entirely clear why more involvement in the country of origin would be positively linked to more homeland attachment. One way to address the inconclusive results in the literature may be to look at the links between permanent return intentions and different types of homeland engagement. At this point, it is important to mention that the previous research that I refer to do not always treat return intentions as the independent variable, but the dependent variable. However, considering that none of this research can claim causality due to methodological constraints and only look at the overall association between return intentions and homeland engagement, I can benefit from this wide range of studies. In this dissertation though, considering the focus of my interest, I study how permanent return intentions are linked to economic and sociocultural homeland engagement and test the following hypothesis:

- Permanent return intention to the home country is positively linked to engagement in homeland oriented economic and sociocultural activities.

By exploring the link between permanent return intentions and different types of homeland oriented activities, it becomes possible to discuss what each activity signifies for migrants and if they are differently related to their homeland attachment. Consequently, the hypotheses developed here will help in discussing the links between home and host country orientations in a systematic way.

10.2. Main analysis results: economic homeland engagement

Not all migrants who intend to return necessarily go back to their origin country, for various reasons including social, economic and political constraints (Lu 1999). Nevertheless, migrants’ intentions with regard to “return” can tell us a
great deal about migrants’ future plans as well as their perceptions about their experiences in relation to their origin and destination countries (Bilgili and Siegel 2012b). In the theory section, I have suggested that return intentions may be shaped by individuals’ migration project and presence of family in the host country. Therefore, by controlling for especially these factors and other integration related indicators as in the previous models, I seek to better reflect the attachment aspect of return intentions.

Conceptual framework 4

As can be seen in Table 9, for all economic and sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country, I expect to find a positive association in relation to permanent return intentions (See Section 7.2.3 for the operationalization of the variable).
Table 9 Hypotheses regarding the links between homeland attachment and engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent return intentions to home country</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows the empirical analysis results and demonstrates that permanent return intentions are positively linked to sending remittances and sending bigger amounts of money in a significant manner. Nevertheless, the purpose of sending remittances does not seem to be related to migrants’ permanent return intentions. In other words, there is not enough evidence to suggest that someone with permanent return intentions is significantly more likely to send money back home more for investment related purposes than for consumption. Moreover, in these models where permanent return intentions and migration motivations are included, the results regarding the links between economic integration and remittances sending behaviour can also be observed in comparison to the previous results found in Chapter 8.67 What Table 10 illustrates is that there is still no significant difference between employed and unemployed individuals in terms of their probability to remit and the amount of remittances they would be sending. However, the positive link of income (OR =1.68, p-2 sided<.05) with remittances sending behaviour is significant. Finally, with regards to origin country differences, it is observed that the difference of remittances sending between Moroccans and Ethiopians (OR= 2.78, p-2 sided<.10) remains to be significantly positive, but the difference is reduced in relation to Afghans and is only marginally significant (OR=.66, p-2 sided<.10).

67 The samples used in Chapter 8 and Chapter 10 are different due to missing values. Hence, as a robustness check I ran the models of Table 5 with the same sample used for the models in Table 10. The results were similar but for the coherence of comparison, rather than referring to these results that I do not present in the main text, I make the comparison between Table 5 and Table 10.
Table 10 Results for homeland attachment and economic homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Binary logistic regression</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tobit model</strong></td>
<td><strong>Binary logistic regression</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
<td>Marginal effects</td>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country of origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.66*(.19)</td>
<td>-.09**(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.78**(.86)</td>
<td>.15**(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.96(.32)</td>
<td>-.04(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest level of education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1.42*(.32)</td>
<td>.04(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.26(32)</td>
<td>.06(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.95(25)</td>
<td>-.02(05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.95(26)</td>
<td>-.02(05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>0.61**(1.17)</td>
<td>-.10**(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income per capita</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.30(27)</td>
<td>.06*(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.68**(10)</td>
<td>.10**(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language use at home</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only or some Dutch</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country language</td>
<td>0.89(17)</td>
<td>-.04(03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Status (Citizenship)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Dutch or dual citizenship</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country citizenship</td>
<td>0.65**(1.65)</td>
<td>-.06*(0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in NL&gt;5 years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>0.78(25)</td>
<td>-.07*(0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family in NL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent return intention</td>
<td>0.58**(1.13)</td>
<td>-.06*(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration motivation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification/formation</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.83(19)</td>
<td>.00(07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/ Political</td>
<td>0.80(27)</td>
<td>-.02(04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1.03(38)</td>
<td>-.06(06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.82(14)</td>
<td>-.02(03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.95(22)</td>
<td>-.03(04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.07**(0.04)</td>
<td>.01(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>.99(0.00)</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.10**(0.09)</td>
<td>-.00(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Squared</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
10.3. Main analysis results: sociocultural homeland engagement

As can be seen in Table 11, permanent return intentions are positively and significantly linked to all sociocultural activities oriented towards the home country, except for association membership. Namely, someone who has return intentions is 4.2 more times more likely to have contact with family and friends in the home country and 2.4 times more likely to make return visits back home than those who have no return intentions. Table 11 also shows that those with permanent return intentions are also significantly more likely to consume more home country related media and art ($\beta = .56$, p-2 sided<.05). In this respect, the hypotheses are confirmed to a large extent as I find a positive association between homeland attachment measured by permanent return intentions and sociocultural homeland engagement.

In the first analytical section of this chapter regarding economic homeland engagement, I briefly stated how the previous results discussed in Chapter 8 changed when permanent return intentions and migration motivations were included in the models. A similar exercise where I compare the main results of Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 shows that while the positive association between sociocultural integration and homeland engagement remains, the significance level is reduced for some independent variables.\(^\text{68}\)

\(^{68}\) The samples used in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 are different due to missing values. Hence, as a robustness check I ran the models of Table 7 with the same sample used for the models in Table 11. The results were similar but for the coherence of comparison, rather than referring to these results that I do not present in the main text, I make the comparison between Table 7 and Table 11.
Table 11 Results for homeland attachment and sociocultural homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.22*** (.11)</td>
<td>0.07*** (.03)</td>
<td>0.25*** (.10)</td>
<td>1.81*** (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.97** (.21)</td>
<td>0.33** (.17)</td>
<td>0.45** (.18)</td>
<td>2.23** (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.32** (.20)</td>
<td>0.08** (.05)</td>
<td>0.89 (.37)</td>
<td>2.74** (.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest level of education</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0.55** (.19)</td>
<td>0.74 (.26)</td>
<td>1.19 (.34)</td>
<td>0.64** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1.25 (.56)</td>
<td>0.63 (.25)</td>
<td>2.25** (.67)</td>
<td>0.73** (.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0.76 (.32)</td>
<td>0.52** (.19)</td>
<td>1.37 (.48)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.73 (.31)</td>
<td>0.93 (.36)</td>
<td>1.57 (.53)</td>
<td>.98** (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>0.32** (.17)</td>
<td>0.37** (.17)</td>
<td>1.21 (.42)</td>
<td>0.14 (.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income per capita</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1.71 (.56)</td>
<td>0.84 (.25)</td>
<td>1.17 (.30)</td>
<td>-0.15 (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.56 (.61)</td>
<td>1.70 (.58)</td>
<td>1.38 (.40)</td>
<td>0.35 (.28)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language use at home</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only or some Dutch</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country</td>
<td>1.36 (.43)</td>
<td>1.52** (.43)</td>
<td>1.63** (.39)</td>
<td>1.10** (.24)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leisure time with Dutch</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>0.97 (.09)</td>
<td>1.02 (.08)</td>
<td>0.99 (.06)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.12 (.14)</td>
<td>0.89 (.10)</td>
<td>1.21** (.12)</td>
<td>0.69** (.09)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association membership in the Netherlands</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch media and art consumption</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.42** (.17)</td>
<td>0.18** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Status (Citizenship)</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only Dutch or dual</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>1.12 (.49)</td>
<td>0.23** (.08)</td>
<td>0.78 (.22)</td>
<td>0.29 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only origin country</td>
<td>1.12 (.49)</td>
<td>0.23** (.08)</td>
<td>0.78 (.22)</td>
<td>0.29 (.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years in NL&gt;5 years</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.79 (.91)</td>
<td>2.07** (.12)</td>
<td>0.40** (.15)</td>
<td>-0.15 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>4.24** (.27)</td>
<td>2.43** (.86)</td>
<td>0.97 (.25)</td>
<td>0.56** (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.73 (.105)</td>
<td>.83 (.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.31 (.45)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration motivation</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.85 (.94)</td>
<td>1.59 (.69)</td>
<td>2.26** (.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/ Political</td>
<td>1.32 (.48)</td>
<td>0.46** (.15)</td>
<td>1.24 (.40)</td>
<td>.99** (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1.73 (.105)</td>
<td>.83 (.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.31 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and education</td>
<td>2.79* (.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family in NL</td>
<td>1.48 (.51)</td>
<td>3.10** (.04)</td>
<td>0.41** (.12)</td>
<td>-0.53** (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.96 (.30)</td>
<td>0.94 (.24)</td>
<td>0.65** (.14)</td>
<td>-0.36** (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1.96** (.67)</td>
<td>1.79** (.46)</td>
<td>2.27** (.62)</td>
<td>0.73** (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.06 (.06)</td>
<td>1.07 (.07)</td>
<td>1.02 (.05)</td>
<td>0.16** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.99 (.00)</td>
<td>0.99 (.00)</td>
<td>0.99 (.00)</td>
<td>-0.00** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.55 (.94)</td>
<td>1.09 (.79)</td>
<td>0.03** (.04)</td>
<td>-4.4 (.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations       | 595                                             | 577                             | 992                                         | 963                                           |
| Pseudo R-squared   | .25                                             | .36                             | .21                                         | .36                                           |
When we look at the links between speaking only the home country language at home, leisure time spending with co-ethnics, and social contacts with family and friends in the home country, I observe a change in the effect. To be more precise, this means that, in the way the model is structured, those with permanent return intentions tend to spend more time with their co-ethnics and use their home language more, which in return mediates the positive link between permanent return intentions and sociocultural engagement in the home country.

With regards to differences between origin countries, it would not be wrong to say that including permanent return intentions and migration motivations in the model did not cause a major change. The only observable difference is that Ethiopians have more social contacts with family and friends compared to Moroccans, and in this model there is only a marginal difference between migrants from these two countries (OR=2.97, p=2 sided<.10).

In the final conclusion and discussion, it will be of importance to take into account these changes for a more elaborate discussion on simultaneity in migrants’ lives. This way it will be possible to answer the question what factors come into play to understand the interlinkages between host and home country orientations.

10.4. Conclusion

I studied whether home country attachment that I measured by migrants’ permanent return intentions to their home country is associated positively to their engagement in home country related economic and sociocultural activities. Intuitively it was not difficult to hypothesize that migrants who intend to return are more likely to make the effort to develop economic and sociocultural relationships more with their family and friends in the home country. However, the significance of the question goes beyond how aspirations are linked to migrants’ behaviours. Departing from Al-Ali and colleagues’ (2001a) capabilities approach as discussed in Chapter 4, I made a distinction between migrants’ capacity and aspirations for home country orientation. Being able to look at how both of these dimensions are linked simultaneously to migrants’ home country engagement, I could discuss whether one aspect is more important than the other. In other words, the analysis allowed me to debate on the relative importance of capacity versus aspirations.
In this research, permanent return intentions to the home country were treated as a way to take into account migrants’ attachment to their home country. The results indicated strongly that migrants with the intention of going back permanently to the home country are significantly more likely to engage in economic and sociocultural activities in the home country. This finding suggests that indeed migrants who do not wish to go back to the home country permanently invest less in relationships in the home country. A higher level of attachment to the home country is associated with more engagement. From a development policy perspective, it is of significance to recognize that this finding suggests that migrants’ with more loyalty and feelings of belonging to the home country can be targeted. Those with higher levels of attachment may be more inclined to engage in programs and initiatives that help them contribute to their home country through various economic, cultural, social and political channels.

More importantly, my research shows that attachment to the home country on its own is not enough for more engagement. What is important is that when aspirations are included, the significance of capacity is diminished but not vanished totally. In this regard, it is of great importance to recognize that when we study migrants’ simultaneity, both capacity and aspirations matter. What does this result mean from a policy perspective? First of all, it means that migrants will engage in their home country not only when they aspire to, but also when they have more capacity. The contribution of migrants with higher aspirations can be significantly enhanced by helping them increase their capacity. That is to say, capacity defined as migrants’ host country integration in this study is not only beneficial for the wellbeing of migrants for their lives specifically as situated in the residence country, but also for their potential to have a positive economic and sociocultural impact in their home country.

What it all comes down to is that migrants’ host country integration is of great significance, a positive migration experience is not only mutually beneficial for the migrants themselves and the receiving society, but also for the home countries which can profit from the contributions of migrants. This result challenges the receiving society perspective according to which migrants who are oriented in their home country do not integrate to the host country. In fact, migrants who do well in the host country will continue to remit, and transfer skills and knowledge as long as they have the capacity, and even more so when they have higher levels of attachment to the home country. Plus, it is not realistic
to expect migrants to decrease their involvement over time. While in the early years of migration, migrants may have higher aspiration to engage in their home country, they are more likely to lack the capacity to do so. But over time, even if there may be a decrease in their interest, the likelihood that they can contribute if they want to is much higher as they will be better integrated. These combined results suggest that capacity and aspirations of migrants can be targeted together for the benefit of all parties involved.
Chapter 11

Reflections on differences among migrant groups
11. Reflections on differences among migrant groups

In the empirical analysis, I consistently controlled for migrants’ demographic characteristics, human capital, migration experience and economic and sociocultural integration. I found that even after controlling for relevant individual level factors, considerable differences exist between migrant groups with regards to their home country engagement. Given this result, one of my aims is to speculate on which contextual factors related to migrants’ home country and community characteristics in the Netherlands may explain this variation. Put differently, I want to question why migrants from a certain country are significantly more likely to engage in economic and sociocultural activities oriented towards their home country than others.

When referring to contextual factors, I exclude host country characteristics. It is not possible to make suggestions about how the Dutch context influences migrants’ behaviours because no other destination country is included in the analysis to make a comparison. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention that in the literature, the host country context is recognised as a determinant for migrants’ homeland engagement. For example, the economic situation in the country of residence is found to have a positive impact on remittance levels (Vargas et al. 2006). This is also related to the idea that in countries with a higher wage level, migrants would also have higher income and hence have more economic capital to remit back to their home country. In fact, Vargas and colleagues (2006) argue that the host country economy influences migrant remittances more strongly than the home country economic situation. This being said, it is not unreasonable to question the ways in which the home country context may be linked to migrants’ homeland engagement. In my discussion of migration histories of the home countries in Chapter 6, I have already shown that the countries vary significantly from each other and it is valuable to look at the differences in more detail.

Several sending country characteristics may influence migrants’ capabilities to maintain and develop stronger contacts with their home country. These discussion points will help shift the transnational approach from an
individual to a contextual level analysis. Consequently, a contextual level discussion can help develop policies aimed at increasing the benefits of transnational ways of living for all parties involved, namely the host and home countries as well as the migrants themselves.

11.1. Home country characteristics

To start with one of the crucial country level characteristics is the political and security situation. The political and security situation in Afghanistan is more precarious than in the other countries; according to the US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Afghanistan\(^{69}\) remains an extremely dangerous country. Burundi, on the other hand, is considered to be a relatively more stable country where the overall security situation is acceptable despite frequent violent crime and incidents of targeted political violence. Compared to Afghanistan and Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco are much more secure and instability remains regional and sporadic rather than a national problem.

Moreover, the political engagement of the governments with their diasporas abroad appears to be significantly more positive for Ethiopia and Morocco. The Moroccan and Ethiopian governments have been particularly active in the past years in founding institutions as well as developing programs to enhance emigrants’ contributions to their home country (See Bilgili and Wejel 2011, Kuschminder and Siegel 2012a). Even though Burundi also recognizes the potential positive impact that its diaspora may have on the country’s socioeconomic development, it still struggles with security issues and principally needs to create a stronger institutional policy environment for this to occur (Fransen and Siegel 2011). Finally, in Afghanistan, where the situation is the most precarious, the government has tried to actively recruit international organisations to support reconstruction efforts (see Kuschminder and Siegel 2012b), but as will be discussed below, these efforts, according to my research results, do not seem to overcome the other problems.

On another note, with the exception of Morocco, all countries in my research are on the development aid priority list of the Netherlands. The World Bank data suggests that in 2011, the net bilateral aid flows from the Netherlands

\(^{69}\) See [https://www.osac.gov/](https://www.osac.gov/) for further information.
(current US$) to Afghanistan reached almost 109 million, followed by 68 million to Ethiopia, 20 million to Burundi and 1.6 million to Morocco. Relative to total bilateral aid flows, the Netherlands has made the largest contribution to Burundi and Ethiopia, followed by Afghanistan and Morocco. The Netherlands is also actively involved in spreading good governance practices in Afghanistan and has been forthcoming in developing temporary and circular migration programs for knowledge transfer towards Afghanistan. For example, working with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Netherlands put in place a program for Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals, in Afghanistan and Ethiopia. It also encourages origin countries to engage more with their diasporas and supports diaspora organisations. Moreover, in cooperation with the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC), the Dutch government is running a program to train African country governments to include their diasporas in their national development policy. It is relevant to question the extent to which migrant communities are aware of these relationships, and whether this awareness creates a higher level of trust among migrants in the Netherlands and increases migrants’ engagement in their home country.

It is also important to indicate a number of factors relating to the countries’ economic development. Depending on how the migrant groups are selected from each country, the economic situation in the country may influence migrants’ homeland engagement in different ways. The World Bank data on the number of people living at the national poverty line suggests that a severe problem exists particularly in Burundi, followed by Afghanistan and Ethiopia. In 2006, the poverty ratio was 67 per cent for Burundi, 36 per cent for Afghanistan (in 2008), and 30 per cent for Ethiopia (in 2011). The ratio is the lowest for Morocco at 9 per cent in 2007. If we consider annual GDP growth in 2011, the picture is slightly more positive. Ethiopia and Afghanistan enjoyed GDP growth of 7.3 per cent and 8.4 per cent respectively. These countries also share the second and third rank when it comes to GDP per capita with US$354 and US$620 respectively. Burundi is by far the poorest country with a GDP per capita of $246 and an annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent. While the GDP per capita is the highest in Morocco with US$3,044, the annual growth rate of the country remains lower than that of Ethiopia and Afghanistan at 4.9 per cent. Considering that migration from Morocco consists of more low-skilled individuals compared to the other countries, it is interesting to question whether we can assume a correlation
between economic development and homeland engagement.

Finally, what can be said about the differences in technological and communications infrastructure between the four countries? According to the World Bank (2013a), the share of the population who has access to mobile cellular subscription and Internet is greatest in Morocco. Compared to only 5 per cent of Afghans and 1 per cent of Burundians and Ethiopians, 53 per cent of Moroccans are internet users. Morocco also has more mobile subscribers (113 per cent)70 followed by 54 per cent in Afghanistan, 22 per cent in Burundi and 16 per cent in Ethiopia. Given this information and the different levels of migrant groups’ homeland engagement, can we say that it is easier to maintain contact with family and friends in countries where technology is significantly more advanced? Does it matter if a larger share of the population has mobile and/or Internet access? In the remainder of this chapter, building upon this and other data, I seek to give meaning to the differences between migrant groups’ levels of economic and sociocultural homeland engagement.

11.2. Differences in the economic dimension

To summarise briefly, in the economic domain, the results of my research have shown that Ethiopians are the most active remitters along with Moroccans and Burundians. The first generation Ethiopian migrants are significantly more likely than all other groups to remit and remit bigger amounts. Afghans constitute the group that is the least likely to remit back to Afghanistan.

The increased engagement among Ethiopians can be explained by the positive future economic prospects in the home country. A strong economy can encourage remittances with the expectation of positive returns from money inflows and consider them as a means of investment (Carling 2008).71 In booming and more economically stable countries, there is also more certainty regarding the exchange rates that may positively influence migrants’ risk assessment about remitting (Higgins et al. 2004). Ethiopian migrants who feel more confident in the economic future of their country may be more inclined to remit larger amounts.

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70 “Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology, which provide access to the public switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid subscriptions are included” (World Bank 2013a). When the rate is more than 100, it means that proportionally there is more than one subscription per person.

71 Also as Katseli and Glytsos (1986) suggests that lower inflation in the home country may cause an increase in remittances.
Previous research has also shown that if it is more facile and less costly to remit to some countries, this may have an overall effect on remittances behaviour. Considering the active diaspora engagement policies in Ethiopia, opportunity structures in the country may have also facilitated channelling remittances.

For the following reasons, being from Burundi could be related more negatively to remittances sending than being from Morocco or Ethiopia. Firstly, one of the main differences is that the remittances corridor between the Netherlands and Morocco is a well-established one due to a longer migration history and a bigger migrant community. Secondly, remittances are a larger phenomenon in Morocco than in Burundi in general. To say a word on the place remittances hold in the countries, the raw data from the World Bank suggests that, among the four countries, Morocco is by far the biggest remittances receiver, followed by Ethiopia and Afghanistan, with Burundi receiving the lowest amounts (World Bank 2013c). Possibly, once the remittances corridor has matured, and if the migrant community grows continuously as in the case of Moroccans, it becomes easier to maintain these economic channels. Thirdly, the economic prospects and political security in Burundi are relatively less stable compared to Morocco. Surprisingly, despite these arguments, in my research I find no significant differences between Burundians and Moroccans with regards to their economic homeland engagement.

It is therefore interesting to question why Burundians do not seem to be significantly less likely to engage economically in their home country. One can argue that remitters respond in an altruistic manner and transfer more money to their relatives when coming from a country that struggles economically (Carling 2008). Moreover, Burundi has the worst technological infrastructure out of the four countries, which would suggest that the expansion of mobile remittances in Africa cannot explain Burundians’ relatively higher engagement. However, the link between transnational engagement and access to communication technologies is not that straightforward. In Burundi, international migration, especially towards the developed North, is a positively selected phenomenon. Migrants come from relatively wealthier families with already above average access to various communication methods. Additionally, while rural migration is much more common among Afghans and Moroccans, Ethiopians and Burundians, who are more highly educated, come from cities with easier access to mobile cellular and Internet lines. In this regard, Burundian migrants may not
be dealing with infrastructure-related challenges and may benefit more from mobile remittances.

Another observation on remittances is that, relatively speaking, there seems to be fewer remitters among Afghans. First of all, their reluctance to remit can be explained by the future prospects of the country both politically and economically. In their overview of the remittances corridor between Afghanistan and the Netherlands, Siegel and colleagues (2013) give a comprehensive summary of the infrastructure and opportunity structures in the country. Despite the steady and adequate developments regarding bank systems, one of the main issues that comes to the fore is the lack of knowledge and trust to make use of these options. It is also fairly costly to send money through formal channels (Siegel et al. 2009). These factors may explain Afghans’ lower economic homeland engagement. Moreover, as an emerging new migrant community, Afghans in the Netherlands show a strong orientation towards settlement in the Netherlands. The large flows of asylum seekers are recently surpassed by family migration as shown in earlier chapters. The relatively lower engagement can also be explained – despite stronger diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the Netherlands and the existing development initiatives – by the time effect and the priority of the community as a whole to integrate before taking action towards the home country. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, homeland engagement is not necessarily permanent or steady, and can change over time. Perhaps once they are more strongly established in the Dutch society, the Afghan community will undertake more economic engagement.

Finally, although not significantly strong, the direction of the relationship (See Chapter 10) showed that compared to Moroccans, all other groups tend to remit for investment-related purposes rather than for consumption. This may be related to the positive selection of these three groups. All three migrant groups have a higher level of education than Moroccans and consist of individuals coming from wealthier families. Imaginably, then, while Moroccans remit mostly for consumption-related purposes, the other groups are sending money not to cover daily needs but for more productive purposes.

It is also important to bear in mind that Afghans and Burundians are less likely to remit, but when they do it is more for investment purposes compared to the other groups. One can argue that while sending money back home to help out with daily needs is a widely accepted and common behaviour for a large part of
Moroccan migrants, it can be considered as a less expanded and more selective behaviour among the other groups. Possibly, remittances-sending is a behaviour that is associated only with the most involved migrants. From a policy perspective, this may indicate the potential of Afghans and Burundians to contribute back to their home country insofar as, while the pool of remitters from Afghanistan and Burundi in the Netherlands is smaller, they may nevertheless have higher aspirations to be more involved in their home country from an economic development perspective.

11.3. Differences in the sociocultural dimension

The country and community level differences that may explain the variation in migrant groups’ sociocultural homeland engagement cannot be attributed to the same factors that explain the variation in economic homeland engagement. While the social aspect of remittances behaviour cannot be denied, sociocultural contact with the home country is still different in nature. Hence, the kind of non-individual level characteristics we need to look at are also dissimilar. Before going into these factors, it can be summarized that, in the sociocultural domain, Moroccans migrants are most active in terms of having contact with family and friends and paying return visits to the home country. While Ethiopians are slightly more likely to have social contacts, they are significantly less likely to make visits back to the home country.

With Burundians and Afghans having fewer social contacts with family and friends in their home countries overall, it can be argued that, due to the political and security situation in Burundi and Afghanistan, social networks may have been largely disrupted. Many family members and friends of Burundians and Afghans may also have fled their country of origin to live in other parts of the world. More importantly, Burundians and Afghans may even have experienced losses in their network due to conflict in their home country. Conversely, it may be easier for Moroccans to maintain contact with their relatives in Morocco.

It is important to recognize that social contacts are also preserved through return visits. As much as migrants may keep in contact via telephone calls, internet and other communication technologies, making return visits back to the home country is important to maintain even stronger relationships. In this regard, we need to remember that Moroccans make the most visits. This can
initially be explained by the shorter distance between the Netherlands and Morocco and hence the cheaper travelling costs. Moreover, in Morocco, as an emigration country, return visits are an important phenomenon especially during the summer time. It is part of the migrant culture to spend time in the home country and bring back goods and gifts to family and friends in Morocco. In fact, it is such a big phenomenon that the Moroccan government engages in special activities to facilitate these visits for Moroccans. For instance, “Opération transit”, managed by the Fondation Mohammed V pour la Solidarité since 2000, is an initiative of which the objective is to reduce the delays, harassment and abuse that migrants experience at the borders, and to accelerate various administrative procedures for returning migrant visitors (Bilgili and Weyel 2012). This is also a good example of how the Moroccan state has changed its relationship with Moroccans abroad and developed its diaspora engagement policies since the 1990s (de Haas 2007a).

Besides, interestingly, after controlling for individual level characteristics, it is observed that Moroccans are significantly more likely to be a member of an association compared to Afghans and Ethiopians. This difference can be explained by the fact that Moroccans continue to keep up relations with their local community organisations and mosques more easily due to frequent visits back to the home country. The smaller difference between Burundians and Moroccans, on the other hand, can perhaps be explained by the increased involvement of the Burundian community in the politics of their home country, again homeland engagement being a more selective behaviour among those who have a strong interest in the affairs of their home country.

A final point of interest relates to the consistency among migrants in terms of engaging in different types of sociocultural activities. The Ethiopian migrant group is clearly engaged equally in all dimensions of homeland engagement, except for return visits which may be restricted by temporary migration plans and costly travels. However, inconsistency is observed among the other groups. For example, while maintaining high levels of social contact with family and friends in Morocco, it seems that the Moroccan migrants do not follow news, visit websites or listen to music from their home country as much as the other migrant groups. Conversely, Burundians and Afghans who do not have much contact with relatives in the home country seem to consume much more media and art oriented towards their home country. Why is there not a
consistency between the different dimensions of sociocultural homeland engagement?

One possible answer to this question may be that media and art consumption is a substitute for social contacts with family and friends. On the one hand, Moroccans who are able to contact their family in Morocco more often and more easily learn about their country’s affairs through these contacts rather than via more formal channels such as reading newspapers and surfing the Internet. On the other hand, Afghans and Burundians who face challenges to maintain strong relations with their acquaintances, but are still interested in their home country affairs consume more media. In this regard, it is important to recognize that while we assume to measure similar aspects of a certain dimension of a life, these intriguing results show us that they may have different meanings for migrants. Another explanation could be that, given that the Moroccan community is larger and older, they may be more interested in what is produced and happening among Moroccans in the Netherlands rather than in Morocco itself.\textsuperscript{72} In this regard, the overall size, concentration, social cohesion and embeddedness of a migrant community may influence the overall engagement of a migrant group in their home country media and art.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{72} This result is not in contradiction with what I have shown in the analytical chapter (Chapter 10) where I conclude that sociocultural homeland engagement and integration are independent from each other.

\textsuperscript{73} Another explanation could be that even though we have specified clearly during survey implementation that we do not necessarily refer to media and art produced in Morocco itself, but what relates to Morocco in general, the respondents may have misinterpreted this question. This may have caused us to underestimate Moroccans’ media and art consumption related to Morocco.
Chapter 12

Conclusion: Variations upon simultaneity
12. Conclusion: Variations upon simultaneity

This research aimed to explain to what extent and in which ways first
generation migrants living in the Netherlands experience simultaneity in their
lives. Beyond providing rich descriptive information regarding Afghan,
Burundian, Moroccan and Ethiopian migrants’ home and host country
orientation in the Netherlands, leading to a comprehensive overview of the
migration experiences of these groups that differs from the traditional non-
Western migrant groups that are highly studied in the Dutch context, my
research also sought to provide the basis for a discussion about migrants’ new
ways of living, forcing us to rethink the way we study migration, integration, and
homeland engagement. Consequently, the central research question helped me
contribute to discussions regarding three main issues.

Firstly, I discussed the links between host country integration and home
country engagement. Specifically, I questioned whether the relationship between
host country integration and home country engagement is positive, negative or
non-existent. To answer this question, I focused primarily on the economic and
sociocultural dimensions of migrant lives.

Secondly, I explored whether home country attachment, measured by
migrants’ intentions of a permanent return to their home country, is associated
positively to their engagement in home country related economic and
sociocultural activities. While intuitively it was not difficult to hypothesize a
positive association, the significance of the question was also related to its
relative importance in comparison with host country integration. Mainly, the
difficulty was to explain whether, after controlling for home country attachment,
host country integration still had a significant association with home country
engagement.

Thirdly, in addition to these theoretical questions, I addressed whether
individual level characteristics can fully explain the differences between migrants
living in the same host country with regards to their economic and sociocultural
engagement in their home country. Having found remaining differences between
migrants, my aim in Chapter 11 was to speculate on which home country related characteristics could explain this variation.

In this final chapter, bringing together the results of each analytical section, I seek to draw general conclusions regarding migrants’ home and host country orientations.

12.1. Host and home country orientations as “twin processes”

When discussing the core elements of transnationalism, Tsuda (2012) puts the emphasis on “transborder” and “simultaneity” aspects of transnationalism. The transborder aspect refers to the social connections and linkages that migrants create and maintain with their home country while being in the host country. The notion of simultaneity draws attention to the emergence of a transnational social field which allows immigrants to sustain strong connections with different contexts concurrently. He states that “deterritorialised consumption of national culture from the home country is not true transnationalism unless it involves simultaneous consumption of the host society’s cultural products as well” (Tsuda 2012: 640). My research built upon this idea, seeking to understand how migrants host and home country experiences are interlinked.

For a simultaneous way of living to be prominent, the first condition to satisfy was to show whether the core indicators of integration can co-exist with homeland engagement. Through the concept of ‘compatibility’, I demonstrated that host and home country orientations are not necessarily negatively related to each other but that they can co-exist without significantly influencing each other. The concept of ‘competition’, which I found hardly any evidence for, was associated with the assimilationist perspective according to which migrants’ resources are limited, and limited resources and time are shared between host country integration and home country engagement. As Tsuda (2012) formulates, if resources are consumed for one purpose, less is left for other purposes. This hinted towards a negative association between host and home country orientation. Finally, with ‘capacity’ I suggested that host country integration provides an extra lift to migrants to be able to build economic and sociocultural relations with their home country (See Al-Ali et al. 2001a). More specifically, involvement in one context increases one’s economic, social and cultural capital,
giving more opportunities, knowledge and incentives to be able to contribute to
the other context.

Based on the primary results of my research, I can strongly suggest that
the compatibility hypothesis is especially apparent in the sociocultural dimension
(see Chapter 9). The lack of negative association between integration and
homeland engagement was an important research finding, and is in line with
various researches in the field (See Snel et al. 2006, Mazzucato 2008a, 2009, Muller
2009, Van Meeteren 2012). Null associations refute the competition hypothesis
and, consequently, the assimilation theory which suggests that host country
integration and home country engagement compete for migrants’ limited
resources.

The results of this research showed that host country integration and
homeland engagement are to a large extent positively related to each other,
meaning that integration relates to home country engagement more as a function
of capacity. There is not enough evidence to suggest that those who are more
integrated in the Dutch society are significantly less likely to maintain contact
with their home country. This result is evident in the economic dimension as well
as certain aspects of the sociocultural dimension of migrant lives, and has been
elaborated upon in the concluding sections of Chapter 8 and 9. Having discussed
compatibility and capacity in these chapters for the specific indicators, to
conclude, I propose that host and home country orientations, or put differently
integration processes and homeland engagement, are “twin processes”.

12.2. Directions for future research
In the introductory chapter, I stated that this dissertation contributes to
transnationalism studies in three main ways: empirical, methodological and
theoretical. In particular new data were collected. These gave equal weight to
migrants’ integration processes and homeland engagement as well as explaining
migrants’ simultaneous host and home country orientation in both sociocultural
and economic life domains. At the same time, the dissertation broached new
issues to reflect upon regarding different aspects of empirical, methodological
and theoretical transnationalism. Scrutinizing these issues can provide the basis
for new research questions to be addressed in order to develop further
transnational migration theory.

My research was primarily cross-sectional in nature and hence able to
show the association between integration and homeland engagement at a given point in time. However, it was not possible to draw conclusions regarding change over time. Mazzucato and colleagues (Mazzucato 2008) have shown in the Ghana TransNet research program that interviewing migrants several times over the course of a year allows researchers to observe the evolution of changing attitudes and social relationships. These researchers have shown that with longitudinal data, it becomes possible to criticise the dominant discourse and to incorporate previously unobservable factors that may play a significant role in changing migrants’ capacity and aspirations to be involved more with their home country. With longitudinal research, integration can be more suitably treated as a process in which changes in legal status, employment and sociocultural life can be observed. These, in turn can be linked in a dynamic manner to migrants’ home country engagement.

Furthermore, following upon the Ghana TransNet program, it is worthwhile to mention that the empirical data for this research were collected in different localities contemporaneously where the networks of people were interlinked across national borders. This led the researchers to have a matched database. Firstly, such a database allowed researchers to avoid many of the pitfalls of human recollection and to triangulate the information coming from different localities to complete and correct information (Mazzucato 2008). Secondly, this research methodology provides a relevant point for the study of simultaneous embeddedness and contributes significantly to methodological transnationalism. That is, because the data consist of information from both the origin and destination countries, many more elements related to home country can be included. This means that in the analysis of migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness, factors related not only to the host country, but also the home country can be taken into account.

Besides the relevance of longitudinal and matched empirical data, it is worthwhile to mention that due to data limitations in my dissertation, I excluded the study of political transnationalism as another dimension of migrant lives. Political transnationalism is about migrants’ networks and activities that involve them in politics oriented towards their country of origin (Bauböck 2003). As defined by Martinello and Lafleur (2008: 9), political transnationalism refers to “any political activity undertaken by migrants who reside mainly outside their homeland”. These activities include interaction with all kinds of local, regional or
national institutions, support of political movements and involvement in activities that intervene directly in the origin country’s politics. The activities that can be included in this definition have been largely studied in the literature (e.g. extraterritorial voting, membership in political parties), but not directly as a matter of simultaneous embeddedness in the political domain (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003, Smith and Bakker 2008, Itzigson and Villacrés (2008), Lafleur 2013). To take simultaneity a step further in transnational migration research, it will be important to study how migrants’ political integration and political homeland engagement relate to each other in a quantitative manner, and put the results of this present research in perspective.

It can also be added that future empirical research should look more in-depth at the interaction between sociocultural and economic life domains, regarding the links between integration and home country engagement. For analytical purposes, in this dissertation, I treated each dimension separately. The results suggest that simultaneity is best understood within domains as most of the significant associations were found for the indicators that related directly to the same life domain. However, from a theoretical perspective, this does not necessarily refute the idea that interactions exist also across domains. For example, below, I discuss the policy implications of the association between citizenship status and temporary return visits to home country. The analysis I conducted gives a first indication of the positive association between better economic integration and increased involvement in associations and temporary return visits (See Chapter 10). This is a concrete example of how economic capital can be positively linked with migrants’ capacity to sustain sociocultural relationships with their home country.

Another aspect of simultaneity research about which the present research remains limited is the strong emphasis on the distinction between host and home country. This dichotomy excludes the role that “other spaces” have in migrants’ lives. That is to say, from a transnational social fields approach, it would be wrong to suggest that migrants’ lives are embedded only in the home and host countries. Other contexts where migrants have contacts and relationships are also part of the transnational spaces. As Mazzucato (2004: 157) states elsewhere, “as a result of cross-border flows, new social, economic, political and social spaces are being created that cannot be superimposed on the geographical space of the nation. Transnationalism thus offers a way to conceptualize and understand
these disjointed spaces”. Future research needs to address these issues and develop methodological tools to grasp this diversity and spaces that go beyond geographical definitions to take research on simultaneous embeddedness a step further.

Finally and as mentioned in Chapter 10, I was not able to focus directly on the topic of transnational identities as there was no convincing operationalization of the concept, and hence I have focused on homeland attachment. If, by definition, transnational identities take various forms and are substantially different from each other (e.g. ethnic, professional or religious) (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004), from a methodological perspective, the question of how to measure and categorize transnational identities in a quantitative manner becomes challenging. To date, no unique system or method has been developed to identify, to measure and attribute levels to different types of transnational identities that go beyond multiple national belonging. This is a significant drawback of transnational migration research conducted with quantitative research methods.

Thus, the limitations of the present research are illustrative of the empirical, methodological and theoretical challenges that transnational migration research faces. Innovative approaches to empirical data collection, original operationalizations of variables and new socially and politically relevant analytical questions are needed to take transnational migration research a step further.

In the following section, I focus on a policy relevant integration indicator that I have not yet discussed in depth, namely the implications of simultaneity for discussions around dual-citizenship.

### 12.3. Implications of simultaneity for dual-citizenship

In the analyses, I found no significant correlation between sociocultural and economic homeland engagement and citizenship and years of stay in the Netherlands. These results imply that someone with Dutch citizenship is as likely as someone with only home country citizenship to send money back home and develop sociocultural contacts. These results that provide evidence for “double

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74 In a similar vein, despite the integrative effect of length of residence of stay in the host country, a long term resident of the Netherlands has the equal probability of maintaining economic and sociocultural contact with their home country.
engagement” (Mazzucato 2008a) show that more and more people fit into multiple social orders concurrently, and may maintain relations with the home country even after living in the host country for a considerable number of years and becoming a citizen of the host country.

While citizenship seems to be marginally important for engagement in some types of sociocultural activities that do not demand physical presence in the home country, it seems to be important for return visits as it provides a more secure condition for mobility. I showed that having dual citizenship is significantly positively linked to return visits compared to having only home country citizenship. In other words, dual citizenship is strongly linked to more mobility, allowing migrants to be simultaneously embedded in multiple contexts. Having only origin country citizenship can be considered as a precarious legal status in the Netherlands, and this makes it more difficult for migrants to make visits. Citizenship status can thus be an important facilitator of home country engagement.

Citizenship thus does not only imply a connectedness to and identification with the society and not only gives the right and ability to participate as a full member of the host society (Marshall 1950), but is also an instrument that facilitates international mobility (Pettersen 2009). This interpretation illustrates how legal integration can in fact be an influential pre-condition for certain types of sociocultural homeland engagement, and how integration related indicators may in fact be positively linked to home country engagement.

Hence, one of the implications of the research results is that dual citizenship is more relevant and well-fitting for migrants’ ways of living. From a policy perspective though, the topic of dual-citizenship is not that straightforward. In many European countries, dual-citizenship is seen as a threat to national identity and considered to undermine states (Koser 2007, Bloom and Feldman 2011). Hence, there are several challenges that needed to be recognized. While dual citizenship is important as it gives opportunities and access to multiple contexts, at times it also challenges the interests of the host and home countries. The policy challenges are concerned with which state should take responsibility for particular aspects of migrant lives (Levitt 2004, Faist 2010). Which state is responsible for migrants’ protection and representation and in which ways should states communicate in order to solve these challenges? Not
negotiating these social, economic and political rights and responsibilities causes uncertainty and fuels the debate on the legitimacy of multiple embeddedness.

Moreover, although not much evidence exists to refute compatibility between host and home country orientation, these uncertainties cause normative debates about the loyalty of migrants to their home and host countries. To overcome these normative discussions, policy makers and practitioners need to reassess the rights and responsibilities of migrants by putting them in the centre of discussions. Only then a middle ground regarding the rights and obligations of migrants with multiple affiliations can be established.

To add to this picture, I conclude by a critical note on the current Dutch integration policies. In Chapter 5 where I have summarized the evolution of immigration and integration policies of the Netherlands, it was clear that the Dutch integration policies have become stricter. It has become more difficult to obtain Dutch citizenship and dual-citizenship is still a hotly debated issue. Moreover, the policies are putting more responsibility on the shoulders of migrants with less economic and institutional support. For example, the newly announced law on civic integration, which is effective since 2013, suggests that immigrants are expected to take all the initiative needed to successfully prepare for a civic integration exam (Frouws and Bilgili 2012). Municipalities are not given any more a budget from the central government to provide any form of support. Plus, even though loan offers exist, overall the idea is that migrants pay for their own integration courses. Such examples imply that the current policy approach is even severer today, and not focused on facilitating migrant integration or aiming at enabling migrants faster and easier access in the early times of settlement.

From an integration policy perspective, it is suspicious how efficacious and successful the current policies are for the better integration of migrants in practice when they do not seem to function as a support mechanism. Considering the precarious situation of many migrants upon arrival, more inclusive policies that consider the needs of migrants as a central element are indispensable. Only then migrants’ successful integration can be enhanced substantially, which in return may increase the capability of migrants to make a positive difference in their countries of origin.
12.4. Simultaneous embeddedness as choice

Throughout my research, the underlying tone suggested that “simultaneous embeddedness” and the new ways of living that connect host and home country contexts are positive: positive for the migrants, positive for the receiving society, and positive for the home country. The assumption has been that in a context of multiculturalism, it is not realistic to bound people to a single space and to expect singular loyalties and uniform cultural belongings. I was able to show that transnational involvement is widespread in various ways among different migrant groups and can be considered as a fundamental part of migrant lives (See Chapter 7).

While a big majority of the migrants do not have intentions to return permanently back to their home country, they nevertheless maintain relatively frequent and intense economic and sociocultural contacts with their home country. The data also supports the claim that those with a higher attachment to the home country engage even more in their home country, but only when they have the capacity to do so. In other words, it is not enough that migrants aspire to make contributions to their home country; to be able to maintain contacts, they need to have the necessary resources. Only then can they make the choice of developing economic and sociocultural contacts with their family and friends in the home country.

With regards the implications of these research results, I argued that integration and development policies can be shaped in such a way as to benefit both the host and home countries through these new ways of living. This means that for migrant empowerment and to increase migrants’ voluntary social and economic transfers to their home country, policies also need to target migrants’ better integration in the host country through including them in the society and giving them access to more rights and institutions. Above all, the role of the policy needs to be focused on enabling environments to increase migrants’ capabilities for more contribution. That said, I conclude by stressing that this approach should not fall into the trap of targeting migrants as “agents of development” and putting false responsibilities on individuals. Ultimately, opting for a more transnationally involved way of living is the choice of migrants, and theirs alone.
Nederlandse samenvatting

Transnationale migratie-theorie heeft lang bestaande verklaringen voor internationale migratie, integratie van processen en de betrokkenheid van migranten met hun thuisland in een globale wereld uitgedaagd. Het heeft een andere visie dan de assimilatie-theorie ontwikkeld die een uni-directionele aanpassing veronderstelt van het gastland vanuit het thuisland. Een van de belangrijkste doelen van transnationale migratie-theorie is geweest om een sociaal veld-aanpak voor te stellen die ons in staat stelt om te verhelderen hoe individuen hun leven beheren in verschillende omstandigheden waaronder thuis, gast-, en derde landen (Levitt et al. 2003, Levitt en Glick Schiller 2004). Met andere woorden gaat het over hoe mensen zich identificeren met, tegelijk behoren tot en deelnemen aan meer dan één gemeenschap tegelijk. In mijn proefschrift heb ik mij gericht op dit thema en had als doel het beantwoorden van de volgende onderzoeksvraag: In welke mate en op welke wijze kunnen migranten verschillende domeinen van het leven ervaren met betrekking tot hun thuis- en gastland? Deze vraag is van groot belang, omdat het antwoord laat zien hoe het sociale leven van migranten grenzen overstijgt en overstijgt, en hoe ze uiteindelijk integreren in hun gastlanden en tegelijkertijd verbonden blijven met hun thuisland.

Het concept van gelijktijdigheid geeft de veronderstelling dat blijvende banden met het vaderland en succesvolle integratie naast elkaar bestaan (Levitt en Glick Schiller 2004). In plaats van migratie dat resulteert in een lineaire integratie-overgang van thuis- naar gastland, moeten we de mogelijkheid verkennen dat migranten een combinatie van oriëntatie op thuisland en op gastland creëren. Het verkennen van gelijktijdigheid in het leven van migranten omvat het begrijpen van de inherente verbanden tussen deze tweeledige oriëntatie en het bespreken van de manieren waarop zij elkaar beïnvloeden.

Voor mijn proefschrift onderzoek heb ik onderzoek gedaan naar de ervaringen van de Afghaanse, Burundese, Ethiopische en Marokkaanse migranten die in Nederland wonen. Dit proefschrift is een onderdeel van de IS-academie Migratie en Ontwikkeling: A World in Motion-project geïnitieerd en gefinancierd door het Nederlandse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en uitgevoerd door de Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. De gegevens
voor het project bestaan uit 1.022 enquêtes onder huishoudens (247 Marokkaanse, 351 Ethiopische, 165 Burundese en 259 Afghaanse huishoudens). Deze huishoudens werden over 11 provincies van Nederland verspreid. In lijn met de concentratie van migranten in de grotere steden en stedelijke gebieden, werd de meerderheid van de onderzoeken uitgevoerd in Noord-Holland en Zuid-Holland, waar de grootste steden van Nederland, Amsterdam, Rotterdam en Den Haag zijn gevestigd. Het project was gericht op het bijdragen aan de lange traditie van evidence-based beleidsvorming van Nederland en heeft de mogelijkheid gegeven om de ervaringen van de verschillende en weinig bestudeerde migrantengroepen (met uitzondering van de Marokkanen) in Nederland te presenteren.

De onderliggende aannemer die ik probeerde het hele onderzoek te houden, was dat het niet realistisch is om mensen aan een enkele ruimte te binden en om enkelvoudige loyaliteiten en uniforme culturele bezittingen te verwachten. In lijn met de conceptualisering van transnationale migratie, onderzocht ik gelijkvloedigheid in twee levensdomeinen, de economische en sociaal-culturele. Met andere woorden, ik keek naar hoe de economische integratie en betrokkenheid met het vaderland aan de ene kant, en de sociaal-culturele integratie en betrokkenheid met het vaderland aan de andere kant, samen functioneren. Als een eerste stap naar deze analytische vraag, bracht ik de migratiecontext voor alle groepen in kaart en beschreef hun achtergrondkenmerken, integratieprocessen en betrokkenheid met het vaderland op basis van de enquêtegegevens.

Wat dit project aantoonde is dat een grote meerderheid van de migranten geen intenties heeft om permanent naar hun land van herkomst terug te keren, toch onderhouden ze relatief frequente en intensieve economische en sociaal-culturele contacten met het land van herkomst.

Het onderzoek liet op een consistente manier zien dat migranten sterke banden onderhouden met hun familie en vrienden in hun land van herkomst door middel van bezoeken, Skype-gesprekken, e-mails en andere sociale media, zelfs als ze frequent contact hebben met de Nederlandse samenleving. Op een beschrijvend niveau heeft bijna 90 procent van de migranten contact met hun familie en vrienden in het thuisland en ongeveer driekwart van alle migranten heeft frequent sociaal contact met de Nederlanders. Dit betekent dat migranten in staat zijn om tijd te maken voor beide contexten, afhankelijk van hun wensen. En,
meer gericht op het eigen land zijn is geen belemmering voor sociale integratie in Nederland.

Met betrekking op verenigingslidmaatschappen en de consumptie van media en kunst concludeerde ik dat engagement in deze aspecten van het leven, zowel in de thuislanden als in de gastlanden, positief gerelateerd zijn aan elkaar. Dit betekent dat degenen die meer betrokken zijn bij het sociaal-culturele leven van hun land van herkomst, waarschijnlijk ook meer betrokken worden bij deze dimensies van het leven in Nederland. Daarom kan dit, als migranten minder betrokken lijken te zijn bij het maatschappelijk leven of minder aan de culturele activiteiten in Nederland deelnemen, niet direct worden geïnterpreteerd als "weinig interesse in de integratie", zoals besproken in het publieke discours. Het is belangrijk om te benadrukken dat migranten verschillende niveaus van cultureel kapitaal van de ene context naar de andere overbrengen, en meer steun kan nodig zijn om migranten te stimuleren om deel te nemen aan het maatschappelijk leven in het algemeen.

Het is ook een misvatting dat de betrokkenheid bij het land van herkomst, terwijl ze in het buitenland zijn, een teken van onmacht, armoede en gebrek aan integratie is. Het huidige beeld toont aan dat mensen die actief zijn en goed presteren op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt in feite degenen zijn die meer betrokken zijn bij hun eigen land. In dit verband is de belangrijkste conclusie die getrokken kan worden, dat de economische integratie en de economische betrokkenheid met het thuisland geen alternatieven voor elkaar zijn, maar dat ze elkaar kunnen aanvullen.

Tot slot laat het proefschrift zien dat gehechtheid aan het land van herkomst op zichzelf niet voldoende is voor meer betrokkenheid. Belangrijk is dat wanneer wensen mee worden genomen, de betekenis van de capaciteit wordt verminderd, maar niet geheel verdwijnt. In dit verband is het van groot belang te erkennen dat wanneer we de gelijkstijdigheid van migranten bestuderen, zowel capaciteit en wensen ertoe doen.

Voorbij het aanpakken van deze theoretische vragen richt het onderzoek zich ook op de verschillen tussen de landen van herkomst. Afghaanse, Burundese, Ethiopische en Marokkaanse migrantengroepen zijn opgenomen in dit onderzoek, en ik bespreek of niveauverschillen van landen van herkomst blijven bestaan na controle voor individuele niveaukenmerken. De
migrantengroepen in kwestie verschillen van elkaar op verschillende manieren, met inbegrip van hun achtergrondkenmerken, migratiegeschiedenis, patronen, motieven en toekomstige intenties, maar ook met betrekking tot niveauijkenmerken van hun thuisland. Nauwgezet onderzoek van de verschillen tussen groepen helpen ons te bepalen hoe contextuele en groepsniveau-factoren de betrokkenheid en verbondenheid van migranten met hun thuisland kunnen beïnvloeden. In dit verband stel ik dat de politieke en veiligheidssituatie in het land van herkomst, het beleid waarop het thuisland betrokken is bij diaspora, de internationale betrekkingen van Nederland met het land van herkomst, de economische en technologische ontwikkeling van het thuisland alsmede de samenstellingseigenschappen van de migrantengroepen kunnen van belang zijn om de verschillen tussen groepen te verklaren.

Tot slot, wat uit dit proefschrift blijkt, is dat de contacten die migranten onderhouden met hun land van herkomst een deel zijn van hun leven in Nederland, en dat het leven van migranten zowel in relatie tot hun contacten in hun eigen land als die in Nederland wordt gedefinieerd. Derhalve is het belangrijk te erkennen dat meer en meer mensen hun leven gelijktijdig hier en daar leven, en dat integratie succesvol is zolang migranten de mogelijkheid hebben om de inrichting van hun leven zelf te bepalen. Vooral in een context van een dergelijke geglobaliseerde wereld, hoeft integratie niet het recht van migranten te ontkennen om hun culturen en voortdurende economische, culturele en sociale relaties te onderhouden met hun land van herkomst.
Valorisation

From a scientific point of view, this research sought to contribute to the advancement of transnational migration theory and our understanding of migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness in origin and destination countries. The conclusions of the present research also have direct implications for migration and integration policies.

Throughout the four years of research, various occasions arose which gave me the opportunity to share these important points with a larger and non-scientific audience. Given that this dissertation is part of a larger project, namely the IS Academy Migration and Development: A World in Motion, I was part of activities that allowed me to communicate regularly with policy makers, practitioners, NGOs, international and diaspora organizations about my research and not just academics.

One of the objectives of my research was to create awareness of the ways of living of migrants, and to challenge the conventional understanding of immigrant integration. The first step for this was to help organize the inaugural meeting of the IS Academy project on migration and development, where we invited not only academics working on the topic, but also international organisations, civil servants, policy makers and practitioners. This was the first occasion where we had the chance of drawing more attention to the experiences of migrants and how their well-being in the destination country can relate to their capacity and willingness to contribute to their home country. The same project, after four and a half years, organized the closing conference which allowed to build upon this awareness and to share the research results with a similar audience.

During these conferences the message I sought to convey was regarding immigrant integration. The knowledge produced as a result of the research on the experiences of migrant groups in relation to the Netherlands and their home countries, first of all, challenges our current understanding of integration and allows us to discuss whether the Dutch integration policy evolved in a way to capture and respond to the needs of migrants.

“Everyone who settles in the Netherlands must integrate into Dutch society. Newcomers need to learn Dutch and familiarise themselves with Dutch
society.” This is the first sentence of the section on migrant integration in the website of the Government of the Netherlands. At a first glance, one may not see big problems with this statement. However, in a second thought, it is not difficult to question what integration actually entails. In a context where anti-immigration sentiments are on the rise and migrants are accused to not assimilate into the Dutch society due to their strong attachment to their home countries and lack of effort and commitment to integrate, it is time to look at migrants’ daily lives and experiences in a more comprehensive way. It is a must to challenge the definition of integration, and to reconsider our understanding of integration based on the real life experiences of migrants.

This reconsideration certainly does not need to negate the importance of Dutch language proficiency, intercultural dialogue, and migrants’ effort to participate in economic, sociocultural and political domains of life. However, it is primordial to take into consideration migrants’ lives as a whole and acknowledge the significance that their culture and contact with their family and friends back in their home country for their well-being. Integration is not simply assimilation to the receiving society; it is about migrants’ well-being as a whole and having the means to be able to make a life that you can call your own and be content with. Consequently, I state that integration policies should take into consideration these aspects of migrant lives. Moreover, it is necessary to acknowledge that dual-citizenship in this regard may be well-fitting to the lives of many migrants.

I had the opportunity to share these views on integration policy and the information on migrants’ daily experiences at other occasions. For example, I have been a discussant in a panel debate organized by the United Nations Student association on Migration in Europe. As part of the IS Academy, I organized an international policy debate as a follow up to the Global Forum for Migration and Development thematic meetings. This Policy Debate sought to move a step further to reflect on the broader migration and development dialogue context as well as following up of the GFMD thematic meeting. Inviting over forty policy makers and practitioners from various countries, during the international policy debate, among others, we discussed migrant empowerment and voluntary social and economic assets transfer. During these discussions, I contributed to the debate by introducing the significance of the role of successful integration in migrants’ capacity to contribute to their home country through
economic and social remittances. As a result of these debates, in cooperation with colleagues from Maastricht University, we wrote a policy brief that has been added to the university website and disseminated among all participants of the international policy debate.

In other occasions where I presented my research, I also sought to inform people about the experiences of Afghans, Burundians, Ethiopians and Moroccans living in the Netherlands. I find this knowledge transfer of great significance because both the academic literature and political debates tend to focus primarily on traditional migrant groups in the Netherlands. That is to say, much attention is paid to migration initiated in the post-colonial period from Surinam and the Antilles, and the labour migration flows from Turkey and Morocco in the post-World War period. However, although the research field is expanding, not as much is known yet about more recent and smaller migrant groups with different migration patterns. In this respect, it is important to show others that no single migrant group exists, only numerous groups with different experiences and needs to which policy makers must pay attention. Only then will it be possible to develop better targeted policies. For example, one occasion during which I had the chance to communicate this message was as a participant in PhD Researchers Day, organized by the Dutch Ministry of Interior, where policy makers were invited to learn about the most recent research in the Netherlands about migrants. Besides the presentations that were communicated to politicians, it was also important to try disseminate these ideas to a larger audience. For this reason, I contributed to a Dutch blog (http://www.versvak.nl/) where I could talk about the four migrant groups and their experiences in the Netherlands. Moreover, I published an article in the European Affairs section of the Government Gazette (EU) on the integration debate in the Netherlands.

Finally, one other extremely important societal achievement of my research was to engage actively not only with political actors and the public, but migrants themselves and their representatives. Consequently, during this research we integrated migrants in our fieldwork and cooperated with them in order to make this research a success. Moreover, we organized civil society days with representatives of the migrant communities in the first and second half the research. In the first civil society day, we shared with them the objectives of our research and incorporated their knowledge when preparing our survey and fieldwork. In the second civil society day, which took place after the analyses of
the data, we shared with each migrant group representatives the main results. This knowledge sharing is significant both on a societal and symbolic level as it sets an example of how the dialogue between researchers and the civil society can increase the knowledge of both sides and widens our perspectives on migrant experiences, integration processes and homeland engagement. It is through such activities that all parties involved in policy making can develop policies that target more specific objectives for the better future of the societies. Consequently, this research has successfully achieved its societal and political goals along with its primary academic objectives.
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Appendices

A. Survey modules

In total, the survey included 169 questions. The majority of the questions are asked to all members of the household. Nevertheless this does not overrule the fact that some questions were asked only to the principal respondent whereas others were asked either to adults, children, (un)employed or first-generation migrant members of the household.

A Identification: This module serves for quick identification of when and where the survey was done, by whom it was done, time needed for the interview, the number of visits etc.

B List of household members: In this list, the main respondent listed all the household members by names. In that way, each household member could be assigned an ID number.

C Household information: This module gives an overview of who lives in the house and of certain characteristics of the household members. We were interested, among other things, in the demographic characteristics of interviewees, their socioeconomic status, educational achievement and work environment related experiences.

D Migration history: This module only asks information from first generation migrants. We sought to learn why people chose to migrate, how long it took them to come to the Netherlands, with whom they migrated and what job they had before they decided to migrate.

E Current situation in the Netherlands: This module includes questions about several aspects of the household members’ lives in the Netherlands. We were interested in language proficiency and political participation as well as the well-being and health integration of members of the household. Moreover, we asked questions about membership in associations, social contacts and peoples’ attitudes towards the Dutch society and their own ethnic community.

F Transnational social ties: This module includes questions about the main respondent’s contacts with people in their origin country and about their connection to the origin country.

G Economic remittances: This module asks for information on money and goods that are received from and sent to friends and family members abroad. We aimed to learn how remittances are sent and how they are used but also about the characteristics of the people who are sending and receiving remittances.
H Wealth: The wealth module includes questions about the household’s income, assets and expenditures. We also learned about the economic shocks that a household experienced and how the household would react if there were financial difficulties.

J Children’s well-being: The questions of this module deal with the daily environment of the household’s younger members at school and with the friendships they have. Moreover, the respondent is asked how he or she feels about the Netherlands as a place to grow up and how this compares to the origin country.

K Future migration: The future migration module includes questions on whether people plan to return to their country of origin or to migrate to another country. We included additional questions on migrants’ motivations and reasons for return as well as their intentions for temporary return and participation and temporary return programs. There are several additional questions for members of Ethiopian households to learn more about their knowledge regarding the diaspora engagement policies of their home country.

L Migration and development: This module provides questions about the respondent’s attitude towards migration and how they think migration affects the situation in the country of origin and in the Netherlands. Questions regarding the respondent’s opinions about social issues (e.g. gender equality, divorce) were also asked in this section.

Interviewer observations: In this part, we asked the interviewer to answer a few questions after having conducted the interview. We were interested in knowing the interviewer’s opinion of how the interview went, and whether the respondent was easy to talk to and understood the questions easily. It was also of interest if the interview was influenced or interrupted by any other people than the respondent.
B. Practicalities regarding the fieldwork

α. Survey translation

The survey was developed in English, but also translated into Dutch, French, Amharic, Arabic and Persian. The surveys were translated by native speakers who had knowledge of the IS Academy project and the migration research field. The translation was undertaken primarily by a team of Bachelor and Masters students familiar with migration studies. The survey was then reviewed by qualified individuals (Doctoral students) who had an understanding of both migration studies and the languages in question. In practice, the survey implementation languages were mainly Dutch and English. French, Amharic, Arabic and Persian versions have been made available for interviewers who in some cases needed to do translations on the spot. Since simultaneous interpretations arbitrarily made by interviewers can lead to serious interpretation problem, interviewers were provided with surveys according to their language proficiency. The language in which the survey was conducted was recorded so that comparative analyses could be done to reveal any bias that may have occurred.

β. Fieldwork preparation in the Netherlands

χ. Research Team

Fieldwork was managed by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance migration research team and fieldwork supervisors. In addition we worked with Colourview Research Company in The Hague during the second part of the fieldwork.

ι. Interviewers

Our target groups when recruiting interviewers were senior bachelor students, master students as well as recent graduates. The interviewers needed to competent in conducting interviews, genuinely interested in the project, and motivated to work for the project. In addition to these criteria, given the multi-cultural character of our research, two related dimensions became very important: language proficiency and ethnic background. When choosing interviewers we needed to find the balance between language proficiency and the preferred type of interviewer desired by the interviewees when participating in the research. Based on the consultations we made with civil society groups from migrant communities, we discovered that whilst some groups preferred to
undertake interviews with those of their own communities, others were in favour of conducting interviews with Dutch interviewers. For instance, the Moroccan representatives suggested that Moroccan migrant households would be offended to answer questions regarding their integration processes to a native Dutch person. It was suggested that this could lead to socially desirable answers. The Moroccan representatives hence stated that Moroccan households would prefer to have a Moroccan-Dutch interviewer with whom they could have a more open and honest interview. Conversely, for the Afghan and Burundian migrants, given the ethnic tension originating from the conflict in these home countries, the level of trust between the members of these communities is questionable. Accordingly, the representatives of these groups suggested that migrants from these groups would prefer to conduct interviews with native Dutch interviewers or interviewers coming from different countries with the right language proficiency. For Ethiopian migrants, the ethnic background of the interviewer was not an important issue, but for this group language proficiency in Dutch was more of a problem. Ethiopians were open to cooperate with interviewers from any ethnic background as long as they could communicate in English or Amharic. As a result, we built a fieldwork team composed of individuals from different backgrounds and with different language abilities to answer the needs of each migrant group.

Training of the enumerators

The interviewers received extensive training after being recruited. The training was adjusted according to the number of interviewers undertaking training at the same time and their previous experience with survey implementation. During the training sessions, all interviewers and supervisors received a detailed training manual, consisting of an explanation of the project and its goals, an introduction to the surveys and a guide to approaching households. The training manual also contained a trouble-shooting section, in which potential difficult situations were discussed, and a safety protocol provided.

Overall, all training included the following elements:

- Background information on the Migration and Development: A World in Motion Project
- Explanation of the household definition, discussion of examples, practising of test cases
- A thorough explanation of all questions in the questionnaire, including interviewer instructions and coding systems (non-response codes, open ended questions, multiple answer categories)
- In-depth discussion of the general interview guidelines especially the
selection on respondent selection, explanations of the codes and questionnaire section

- Procedure before the interview: Training in techniques to convince people to participate in the study and to answer all questions, where to go, who to go with, how to approach the household
- Explanation of the household sampling strategy and call-backs
- Trouble shooting: Dealing with difficult situations
- Conducting interview: Building trust, privacy; objectivity/neutrality, interview behaviour and professionalism, sensitive issues, asking questions, interpreting answers, handling long and elaborate or desirable answers
- Procedure after the interview: thanking the participant, giving the gift, sending the survey to Maastricht
- Practice interviews and coding
- Debriefing
- Safety protocol
- Administrative issues

It takes several steps for researchers to decide on the final version of the survey (Ronald and Blair 1996, Blumberg et al. 2008, Bryman 2008). There are several ways to improve and adjust the survey before finalising it. In our research, we used various channels to gain feedback on the draft survey. To start with, once the first version of the survey was completed, it was sent to experts and scholars on migration research with extensive fieldwork experience. A round of adjustments was made after receiving these comments. Cross-cultural research poses different challenges than intra-cultural research: appropriate translations, formulation of statements, adequacy of items and administration of instruments need to be adjusted in a way to fit the sensitivities of all migrant groups (Clark and Schover 1992, Van de Vijver 1997, Mullings 1999). Therefore, as a next step of testing the survey, we organized Civil Society days with migrant group representatives. During these days, we went through the survey to invite their comments, learn about sensitive issues and discuss the formulation of statements and questions. Finally, we tested the survey among migrants to see how long the survey took, and how participants reacted to questions. At the end of test interviews, we also asked participants’ opinions about the survey and made final
adjustments on the survey.

δ. Logistics and supervision during the data collection

ι. Data collection mode

The data collection was made by well-trained interviewers based on face-to-face interviews.

ιι. Logistics

When random sampling was used, interviewers did not know exactly where eligible migrant households for the survey were located—they could only know how many eligible households (based on municipal registration) were in the area and how many surveys should be completed within each postal code area as determined by the quotas assigned for that area by the researchers. This implied that interviewers travelled every day to different neighbourhoods and tried to identify migrant households by knocking on each door in the area. In most cases, interviewers worked in pairs. The reason for this was mainly practical. Namely, working in pairs was important for personal safety as in many cases interviewers went to neighbourhoods that they did not know very well. Also, we tried to pair interviewers with different language skills together so that in case a target group was found, they could immediately communicate in the right language. We also paid attention to pairing male and female interviewers for cases when a respondent would prefer to do the survey with an interviewer from the same sex. The surveys took place throughout the Netherlands; therefore, many interviewers did not only work in their city of residence but were obliged to travel by train or bus to go to the identified neighbourhoods.

ιιι. Supervision

Throughout the fieldwork, interviewers were constantly in contact with fieldwork supervisors. To start with, every time an interviewer was in the field, they had to ‘check-in’ and ‘check-out’ with the fieldwork supervisor. Especially at the beginning of the fieldwork, all interviewers gave feedback to the fieldwork supervisor about their daily experiences. As a result of the comments from interviewers, the fieldwork supervisor communicated ways of improvement for the survey implementation to all interviewers so that the information about the experiences of each interviewer could be communally shared.

Moreover, the fieldwork supervisors thoroughly checked every survey that they received. The surveys were brought to the fieldwork supervisors either in person or sent by post. The fieldwork supervisor identified problems with the survey and asked for corrections from the interviewer. When the fieldwork supervisor identified systematic problems with survey completion, they would communicate this to the whole fieldwork team so that mistakes would not be
repeated by other interviewers. In addition to the continuous supervision from the side of the fieldwork supervisors, interviewers also supported each other throughout the fieldwork period. In most cases, interviewers were working in pairs for practical and logistical reasons and thus, they constantly checked each other’s work and shared their experiences.

Data entry

Data entry is one of the most significant phases in quantitative research, during which the data collected by paper-based surveys are inserted into data entry programs. In this project, after an initial check of completed surveys by the fieldwork supervisor, the surveys were entered into SPSS files as soon as possible. For data entry, masters students were recruited, trained and given the task of inserting a certain number (around 20) surveys per week. It is of importance that these students were not those who conducted the interviews. In this project, only one interviewer also did data entry, but was never assigned to enter the surveys that he conducted himself. Once a data entry person had been trained, they were given the task of entering a few surveys, and these surveys were immediately controlled by the fieldwork supervisor. The data entry person was given weekly assignments to enter the most recent surveys that have been checked. Once a survey was entered, the data were controlled by a second data entry person to check for mistakes, omissions and inconsistencies. This second person was responsible for reporting to the fieldwork/data manager any problems that were found in the data, and check the English translations made for open-ended questions. The entered and controlled data were finally merged together and made ready for data cleaning and overall checking by the data manager.
C. Background characteristics of Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands
Demographic and other background characteristics

Figure 38 Gender distribution

Figure 39 Age distribution

Figure 40 Marital status

Figure 41 Family composition
Figure 42 National/Ethnic affiliation

Figure 43 Religious background

Figure 44 Educational attainment
Figure 45 Migration motivation

![Diagram showing migration motivation for different nationalities. The categories include Family, Security/Political, Employment, and Education. The diagram compares Burundian, Ethiopian, Afghan, and Moroccan migration motivations.]
### D. Descriptive statistics of independent and dependent variables

#### Migration history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for migration</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>298*** (75.83)</td>
<td>241*** (39.97)</td>
<td>72*** (17.14)</td>
<td>34** (15.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/Political</td>
<td>1*** (0.254)</td>
<td>352*** (58.37)</td>
<td>180*** (42.86)</td>
<td>178** (78.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>77*** (19.59)</td>
<td>4*** (0.663)</td>
<td>16*** (3.810)</td>
<td>7** (3.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>16*** (4.071)</td>
<td>6*** (0.995)</td>
<td>151*** (35.95)</td>
<td>6** (2.655)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1*** (0.254)</td>
<td>1*** (0.238)</td>
<td>1** (0.442)</td>
<td>1*** (0.442)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>226</td>
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</table>

#### Companions during migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companions during migration</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrated alone</td>
<td>113*** (28.39)</td>
<td>92*** (14.65)</td>
<td>337*** (76.59)</td>
<td>125** (55.80)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated with family</td>
<td>266*** (66.83)</td>
<td>532*** (84.71)</td>
<td>77*** (17.50)</td>
<td>73** (32.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrated with others</td>
<td>19*** (4.774)</td>
<td>4*** (0.637)</td>
<td>26*** (5.909)</td>
<td>26** (11.61)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>224</td>
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#### Settlement in the Netherlands

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of stay in the NL</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5 years</td>
<td>22*** (5.392)</td>
<td>31*** (4.867)</td>
<td>171*** (38.69)</td>
<td>66** (28.21)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>30*** (7.353)</td>
<td>121*** (19.00)</td>
<td>47*** (10.63)</td>
<td>126** (53.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>30*** (7.353)</td>
<td>304*** (47.72)</td>
<td>73*** (16.52)</td>
<td>33** (14.10)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 years or more</td>
<td>326*** (79.90)</td>
<td>181*** (28.41)</td>
<td>151*** (34.16)</td>
<td>9** (3.846)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Citizenship status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Burundian</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch/Dual citizenship</td>
<td>320***</td>
<td>(78.43)</td>
<td>556***</td>
<td>(87.97)</td>
<td>202***</td>
<td>(47.09)</td>
<td>101**</td>
<td>(44.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin country</td>
<td>88***</td>
<td>(21.57)</td>
<td>76***</td>
<td>(12.03)</td>
<td>227***</td>
<td>(52.91)</td>
<td>126**</td>
<td>(55.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>408</td>
<td></td>
<td>632</td>
<td></td>
<td>429</td>
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<td>227</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Close family in the NL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Burundian</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>35***</td>
<td>(8.516)</td>
<td>70***</td>
<td>(10.87)</td>
<td>217***</td>
<td>(48.12)</td>
<td>90**</td>
<td>(38.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with family</td>
<td>376***</td>
<td>(91.48)</td>
<td>574***</td>
<td>(89.13)</td>
<td>234***</td>
<td>(51.88)</td>
<td>145**</td>
<td>(61.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
<td>451</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Human capital

#### Educational attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Burundian</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>189***</td>
<td>(51.92)</td>
<td>180***</td>
<td>(28.80)</td>
<td>41***</td>
<td>(9.172)</td>
<td>55**</td>
<td>(23.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>119***</td>
<td>(32.69)</td>
<td>236***</td>
<td>(37.76)</td>
<td>247***</td>
<td>(55.26)</td>
<td>103**</td>
<td>(44.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>56***</td>
<td>(15.38)</td>
<td>209***</td>
<td>(33.44)</td>
<td>159***</td>
<td>(35.57)</td>
<td>73**</td>
<td>(31.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>364</td>
<td></td>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
<td>447</td>
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</table>
### Sociocultural homeland engagement

#### Contact with family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Contact</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No contact</td>
<td>14** (6.481)</td>
<td>174** (69.32)</td>
<td>7*** (2.017)</td>
<td>31 (19.75)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with family</td>
<td>202** (93.52)</td>
<td>174** (69.32)</td>
<td>340*** (97.98)</td>
<td>126 (80.25)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>157</td>
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</table>

#### Return visits to home country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Country Visit</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No visit</td>
<td>19** (8.796)</td>
<td>160** (64.26)</td>
<td>146*** (43.98)</td>
<td>113 (75.84)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visited home country</td>
<td>197** (91.20)</td>
<td>89** (35.74)</td>
<td>186*** (56.02)</td>
<td>36 (24.16)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>149</td>
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</table>

#### Media and art consumption home country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art Consumption</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>295*** (71.78)</td>
<td>328*** (50.93)</td>
<td>80*** (17.74)</td>
<td>72** (30.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>70*** (17.03)</td>
<td>173*** (26.86)</td>
<td>173*** (38.36)</td>
<td>71** (30.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>46*** (11.19)</td>
<td>143*** (22.20)</td>
<td>198*** (43.90)</td>
<td>92** (39.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>235</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

#### Association membership in the home country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association Membership</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>330*** (80.29)</td>
<td>593*** (92.08)</td>
<td>349*** (77.38)</td>
<td>177** (75.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>81*** (19.71)</td>
<td>51*** (7.919)</td>
<td>102*** (22.62)</td>
<td>58** (24.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Sociocultural homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth (Morocco ref.)</th>
<th>Contact with family and friends in the home country</th>
<th>Return visits to the home country</th>
<th>Association membership in the home country</th>
<th>Home country related media and art consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.157*** (0.0483)</td>
<td>0.0536*** (0.0147)</td>
<td>0.350*** (0.0671)</td>
<td>1.785*** (0.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3.366** (1.587)</td>
<td>0.123*** (0.0325)</td>
<td>1.191 (0.199)</td>
<td>4.054*** (0.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.282*** (0.0962)</td>
<td>0.0307*** (0.00944)</td>
<td>1.335 (0.261)</td>
<td>2.699*** (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.43*** (3.988)</td>
<td>10.37*** (2.491)</td>
<td>0.245*** (0.0304)</td>
<td>4.474*** (0.167)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations                    | 971                                                | 946                              | 1,741                                     | 1,666                                         |
| R-squared                       |                                                    |                                  |                                           | 0.161                                         |

seEform in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
## Economic homeland engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remittances sender</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sender</td>
<td>313***</td>
<td>(76.34)</td>
<td>537***</td>
<td>(86.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sender</td>
<td>97***</td>
<td>(23.66)</td>
<td>82***</td>
<td>(13.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
<td>619</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-500 Euros</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>(69.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1000 Euros</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(13.75)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(21.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 Euros or more</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(16.25)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(9.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for remitting</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>(89.36)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>(78.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(10.64)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(21.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Analysis with no other controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth (Morocco ref.)</th>
<th>Sending remittances</th>
<th>Amount of remittances</th>
<th>Remitting for investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.493*** (0.0818)</td>
<td>-3.352*** (0.765)</td>
<td>2.250* (0.997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3.496*** (0.523)</td>
<td>4.408*** (0.720)</td>
<td>2.834*** (1.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1.107 (0.211)</td>
<td>0.0230 (0.904)</td>
<td>4.800*** (2.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.310*** (0.0360)</td>
<td>-6.515*** (0.672)</td>
<td>0.119*** (0.0398)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>1,710</th>
<th>1,741</th>
<th>442</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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</tbody>
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**seEform in parentheses**

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

### Homeland attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent return intentions</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Moroccan Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Afghan Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Ethiopian Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Burundian Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No intention to return</td>
<td>256***</td>
<td>(76.42)</td>
<td>461***</td>
<td>(92.57)</td>
<td>121***</td>
<td>(44.98)</td>
<td>154*</td>
<td>(90.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intend to return</td>
<td>79***</td>
<td>(23.58)</td>
<td>37***</td>
<td>(7.430)</td>
<td>148***</td>
<td>(55.02)</td>
<td>16*</td>
<td>(9.412)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>269</td>
<td></td>
<td>170</td>
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</table>
Analysis with no other controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>176***</td>
<td>(43.46)</td>
<td>217***</td>
<td>(36.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In education</td>
<td>14***</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>190***</td>
<td>(31.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>44***</td>
<td>(10.86)</td>
<td>72***</td>
<td>(12.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>171***</td>
<td>(42.22)</td>
<td>116***</td>
<td>(19.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>221</td>
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</table>

Income

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Freq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>137***</td>
<td>(35.49)</td>
<td>222***</td>
<td>(39.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>140***</td>
<td>(36.27)</td>
<td>216***</td>
<td>(38.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>109***</td>
<td>(28.24)</td>
<td>126***</td>
<td>(22.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>215</td>
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Economic integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth (Morocco ref.)</th>
<th>odds ratio</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.260***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3.964***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.337***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.309***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0397)</td>
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Observations: 1,272
R-squared:
### Occupational status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>26 (17.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15* (8.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 (13.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 (35.53)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>73 (48.67)</td>
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<td>109* (61.58)</td>
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<td>81 (53.29)</td>
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<td>26 (34.21)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>51 (34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>53* (29.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>51 (33.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 (30.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
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### Job security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No/ Limited</td>
<td>49* (29.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td>110** (55.56)</td>
<td></td>
<td>110** (53.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>66 (71.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlimited contract</td>
<td>117* (70.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td>88** (44.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td>97** (46.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td>26 (28.26)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sociocultural integration

#### Language use at home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Use</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only or some Dutch</td>
<td>140*** (34.57)</td>
<td></td>
<td>239*** (38.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>179*** (40.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td>140** (60.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only native language</td>
<td>265*** (65.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td>389*** (61.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>259*** (59.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>90** (39.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>405</td>
<td></td>
<td>628</td>
<td></td>
<td>438</td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

#### Association membership in the home country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Moroccan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not a member</td>
<td>171*** (41.61)</td>
<td></td>
<td>252*** (39.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>104*** (23.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>31** (13.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>240*** (58.39)</td>
<td></td>
<td>392*** (60.87)</td>
<td></td>
<td>347*** (76.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>204** (86.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
<td>451</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure time spending with co-ethnics</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>Freq</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
<td>Freq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequently</td>
<td>14***</td>
<td>(3.465)</td>
<td>41***</td>
<td>(6.477)</td>
<td>34***</td>
<td>(7.675)</td>
<td>32**</td>
<td>(13.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>39***</td>
<td>(9.653)</td>
<td>247***</td>
<td>(39.02)</td>
<td>139***</td>
<td>(31.38)</td>
<td>89**</td>
<td>(38.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>351***</td>
<td>(86.88)</td>
<td>345***</td>
<td>(54.50)</td>
<td>270***</td>
<td>(60.95)</td>
<td>109**</td>
<td>(47.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>404</td>
<td></td>
<td>633</td>
<td></td>
<td>443</td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Leisure time spending with Dutch</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrequently</td>
<td>157***</td>
<td>(38.57)</td>
<td>88***</td>
<td>(13.90)</td>
<td>113***</td>
<td>(25.34)</td>
<td>34**</td>
<td>(14.85)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>103***</td>
<td>(25.31)</td>
<td>153***</td>
<td>(24.17)</td>
<td>135***</td>
<td>(30.27)</td>
<td>52**</td>
<td>(22.71)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>147***</td>
<td>(36.12)</td>
<td>392***</td>
<td>(61.93)</td>
<td>198***</td>
<td>(44.39)</td>
<td>143**</td>
<td>(62.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>407</td>
<td></td>
<td>633</td>
<td></td>
<td>446</td>
<td></td>
<td>229</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dutch media and art consumption</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Afghan</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Ethiopian</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Burundian</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>222***</td>
<td>(54.01)</td>
<td>194***</td>
<td>(30.12)</td>
<td>176***</td>
<td>(39.02)</td>
<td>42**</td>
<td>(17.87)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>104***</td>
<td>(25.30)</td>
<td>235***</td>
<td>(36.49)</td>
<td>125***</td>
<td>(27.72)</td>
<td>75**</td>
<td>(31.91)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>85***</td>
<td>(20.68)</td>
<td>215***</td>
<td>(33.39)</td>
<td>150***</td>
<td>(33.26)</td>
<td>118**</td>
<td>(50.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
<td>451</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
E. Country level characteristics

**Communication technologies**

![Bar chart showing internet users and mobile cellular subscriptions in four countries: Ethiopia, Morocco, Burundi, and Afghanistan.](chart1)

Source: The World Bank

**GDP growth (annual %)**

![Bar chart showing GDP growth in four countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Morocco.](chart2)

Source: The World Bank
Source: The World Bank
Özge Bilgili is an evaluation researcher at United Nations University - Merit & Maastricht Graduate School of Governance for the MIPEX 2015: Integration Policies, Who Benefits? Project in partnership with Migration Policy Group and Center for International Affairs Barcelona. She coordinates the evaluation research and undertakes meta-analysis research on impact evaluation studies on integration policy outcomes in 7 policy dimensions, in 18 migrant receiving countries. She also works as a migration and integration policy expert for the SAHWA "Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract" Project (CIDOB) (2014) and INTERACT Project (MPI and EUI) (2014).

Previously, she was a PhD research fellow at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University where she worked for the Migration and Development: A World in Motion Project financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IS Academy) focusing on the situation of immigrants in the Netherlands. Earlier, she received a Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Sociology from Galatasaray University, Istanbul as the top ranked student in 2007. In 2009, she acquired a Master of Science degree from the Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism Prestige Research Master Program at Utrecht University where she studied with an Utrecht Excellence Scholarship, and worked as a research assistant. During her Master’s, Özge received intensive training on immigration, integration, social cohesion and equality in Europe with a specific focus on the Netherlands. She has formerly worked on various research projects including topics such as the educational achievement of immigrant children in economically developed migrant receiving countries, Muslims’ identity formation and integration in Europe, Diaspora engagement policies in Morocco and Turkey, ‘brain drain’ in Turkey and civic integration policies in Europe. She is competent in both qualitative and quantitative research skills, and has extensive fieldwork experience in the Netherlands, as well as in Turkey and Morocco. As an expert in the field of international migration, transnationalism, integration policies and social cohesion, she regularly lectures graduate students in these areas, and travels extensively around the world to present research findings to practitioners, policy makers and academics.
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