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The Power to Protect: Household Bargaining and Female Condom Use*

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Abstract: Women may face systematically greater benefits than men from adopting certain technologies. Yet women often hold lower bargaining power, meaning that men's preferences may constrain household adoption when decisions are joint. When low female bargaining power constrains adoption of the first-best technology, introducing a version of the technology that is second-best in terms of cost or effectiveness, but more acceptable to men, may increase adoption and welfare. This paper contributes the first explicit model and test of the trade-offs when introducing a second-best technology in such a setting. We conduct a field experiment introducing female condoms – which are less effective and more expensive than male condoms, but often preferred by men – in an area with high HIV prevalence. We observe an increase in the likelihood that women have sex and find strongest adoption of female condoms among women with lower bargaining power, who were previously having unprotected sex.

JEL classification: C78, O33, C93, J16, I12

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1 Introduction

The costs and benefits of adopting household technologies may differ systematically across genders. There is evidence that women have a stronger preference for risk reduction (Agnew et al., 2008; Eckel and Grossman, 2008), investment in children's education (Duflo, 2003), and investment in health via nutritious food (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Attanasio and Lechene, 2014). Women may also bear more of the costs of technology non-adoption, through responsibility for domestic chores, caring duties, and greater exposure to certain health and safety risks. If a technology can be adopted unilaterally, for example the pill or concealable contraceptives, then even women with lower bargaining power may be able to adopt (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Ashraf et al., 2014b). When adoption of a technology requires agreement between partners, intra-household bargaining matters, and men's preferences may constrain household adoption. Examples include improved cookstoves (Miller and Mobarak, 2013), private latrines, anti-malarial bednets, and condoms. One way to increase adoption may be to target men's preferences (Stopnitzky, 2017; Miller et al., 2020), although this can prove difficult (Creese et al., 2002). Another option is to increase women's bargaining power directly (Bandiera et al., 2015; Ashraf et al., 2017), or via giving women control of income from government safety nets (Field et al., 2019). A substantial proportion of women, however, will continue to have lower bargaining power than their male partner, in the absence of broader changes in labour and marriage markets. In contexts where lower female bargaining power and male preferences continue to constrain adoption, a second-best solution may be to introduce a variant of the technology that is more acceptable to men, even if less effective or more costly.

To our knowledge, we are the first explicitly to model and estimate the trade-offs when introducing a second-best technology, when low female bargaining power constrains adoption of the first-best technology. We do so by characterising the nature of the second-best constraint and measuring it, in order better to understand the tradeoffs a policy-maker faces when promoting the adoption of household technologies. To do so, we use a field experiment in Maputo Province, Mozambique. We study adoption of condoms: a technology which is observable to both parties and hence requires joint adoption;[1] but where women face higher costs from non-adoption, via higher risk of

[1] Female condoms can be inserted by women prior to intercourse, but remain observable.

contracting HIV in this context, and unwanted pregnancy.[2] We examine how intra-household bargaining affects adoption of female condoms when they are introduced, in a setting where only male condoms are available. Female condoms are second-best insofar as they have lower effectiveness than male condoms and higher unit cost.[3,4] However, female condoms are viewed by men in particular as more comfortable and less stigmatising than male condoms (Philpott et al., 2006; Wanyenze et al., 2011; Koster et al., 2015). We show that women with lower bargaining power — many of whom are unable to convince their partners to use male condoms at baseline — convince their partners to adopt female condoms when they are made freely available. An illustrative cost-benefit analysis shows that this could lead to free provision of female condoms being cost-effective. However, this result is sensitive to a behavioural response that we observe: namely, an increase in the number of sex acts.

Condoms are an important technology from a public health perspective, as they are the only well-established protection against HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) for individuals who are sexually active. Yet an estimated 3.3 billion risky sex acts took place without condoms in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015, leading to 910,000 new HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2016a). Condoms exemplify technologies where adoption is partially or fully observable within the household, agreement of both partners is needed to ensure sustained and proper use, and hence bargaining may constrain adoption. Indeed, there is evidence that women struggle to convince their partners to use male condoms, helping to explain their persistent under-adoption (Anderson,

[2]In 2015, women accounted for 59% of all individuals aged 15 and over living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the rate of new infections among young women aged 15-24 was double that among young men (UNAIDS, 2016a). Reasons for this gender disparity include that women tend to have older partners, lower access to sexual and reproductive health services, and a higher biological risk than men of becoming infected from heterosexual intercourse (UNAIDS, 2016b).

[3]In ordinary use, female condoms have 79% effectiveness at preventing pregnancy in the first year, while male condoms are 85% effective (Farr et al., 1994; Trussell, 2011; Beksinska et al., 2012).

[4]The unit production cost for female condoms at current volumes is \$0.57, compared to \$0.03 for male condoms (Mantell et al., 2015). There is currently a monopoly on the production of WHO-approved female condoms, and consequent low production volumes (Peters et al., 2010). Lower-cost female condoms have been developed in India and approved by the EU, but are still awaiting WHO approval (*ibid.*). Costs would likely substantially decrease at a larger scale of production (Dowdy et al., 2006); although female condoms will likely remain more expensive, because of higher input costs due to their larger size compared to male condoms.

2018).[5] Female condoms are also a particularly good example of a second-best version of a technology to study: existing epidemiological models of HIV transmission allow us to quantify the potential trade-offs between improving condom coverage and decreasing average effectiveness — as well as behavioural responses such as increases in the frequency of sex acts — while taking into account the negative externalities from HIV transmission.

We evaluate a condom programme in the slums of Maputo, Mozambique. The programme seeks to increase condom use by offering female condoms alongside male condoms. Women attend a series of group sessions that provide information about contraceptives, including female condoms. Female condoms are also added to the set of products carried by local health workers — which already includes male condoms — that participants can access freely and discreetly at the end of each session. The intervention thus allows us to study which women, if any, adopt female condoms when informational, access, and price constraints are alleviated. Importantly, free provision allows us to study couples' willingness to adopt unconfounded by their ability to pay, which may be correlated with female bargaining power. Free provision is also arguably the most relevant policy option in countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, where male condoms are typically already provided for free by the government.

We conduct a randomised control trial to assess the short-run impacts of the programme on women who were assigned to receive it at the end of 2014, compared to those who were assigned to receive it six months later. In addition to baseline and endline data, we collect weekly sexual diary data for a subsample of the women. This allows us to investigate impacts at the sex-act level, including effects on the frequency of sex acts. To measure bargaining power, we use two different survey modules covering decision-making and power dynamics in the relationship (Donald et al., 2017).

To formalise our predictions, we introduce a collective model of the household, where partners jointly decide whether to adopt STI protection technologies. Both men and women value the levels of pleasure and of health protection associated with different technologies. However, for the reasons outlined above, we argue that the marginal rate of substitution between pleasure and health is greater for men than for women. When

[5] We refer here to under-adoption from the perspective of a social planner who cares about costs and effectiveness of protection against HIV/AIDS.

the only STI protection technologies available are male condoms or unprotected sex,[6] the model predicts that women may prefer to use male condoms, but that those with lower bargaining power may be unable to convince their partners to do so. When female condoms — an intermediate technology with lower health but higher pleasure than male condoms — are introduced, the model predicts two effects. First, while women with the lowest bargaining power will still not be able to convince their partner to use condoms, some women with intermediate bargaining power, who were previously having unprotected sex, may now be able to convince their partners to adopt female condoms (but not male condoms), increasing condom coverage. At the same time, some women with intermediate bargaining power who were previously using male condoms may also substitute into using female condoms, decreasing average condom effectiveness. The relative magnitudes of the margin of switching from male condoms to female condoms and the margin of switching from unprotected sex to female condoms depend on how "close" the technologies are, as well as the distribution of preferences and bargaining power. These magnitudes are important to determine empirically, in order to establish total effects on transmission of HIV/AIDS and other STIs. Second, on the margin of whether couples have sex or not, some couples who were previously not having sex now have sex with female condoms.

The results show a large impact of treatment on female condom use: an increase of 18.4 percentage points in the proportion of women who have ever used female condoms, and of 7.7 percentage points in the proportion of those currently using female condoms, compared to baseline means of 8.8% and 2.0% respectively. Reassuringly for our intervention, and for interventions providing female condoms in similar contexts, we see no significant evidence of substitution away from male condoms. As predicted by the model, adoption of female condoms is driven by women with intermediate baseline bargaining power, who are having unprotected sex at baseline. On the extensive margin, the diary data show that treatment leads to an increase of 9.1 percentage points in the probability that a woman has sex each week. We rule out various alternative explanations for the heterogeneous treatment effect by bargaining power, including experimenter demand effects, or that baseline bargaining power may be proxying physical access to male condoms, baseline use of other contraceptives, HIV status, or beliefs

[6]This includes sex protected by pure contraceptives such as the pill, but not by an STI protection method; see Section 2 for details.

about partner fidelity.

Given that this is a second-best technology, a social planner whose primary concern is the cost and effectiveness of these technologies should weigh the observed increase in condom coverage against the increase in production and distribution costs, and the reduction in average condom effectiveness; as well as the observed increase in the likelihood of sex acts, which may also increase disease transmission.[7] To demonstrate the potential magnitude of these trade-offs, we conduct an illustrative exercise in which we estimate the costs and benefits of scaling up access to female condoms to all of Southern Mozambique, focusing solely on the benefits in terms of reduced HIV transmissions and the costs in terms of providing anti-retrovirals, drugs for prevention of mother-to-child transmission, and productivity losses. In our naïve scenario, before accounting for the behavioural response (i.e. the observed increase in sex acts), both our full programme and adding female condoms to existing sex education programmes are cost-effective. Intuitively, this is because low female bargaining power implies that the main margin of female condom adoption is from women previously having unprotected sex, rather than substitution away from male condoms. However, once we account for the increase in sex acts, only adding female condoms to existing sex education programmes has the potential to be cost-effective. These illustrative simulations thus show how behavioural responses may partially offset direct benefits of a programme (Greenwood et al., 2017).

Regarding our contribution to the literature on contraceptive technologies, to our knowledge this is the first experimental study explicitly to consider how intra-household bargaining may constrain adoption of condoms. The existing literature on bargaining within couples focuses on fertility (Eswaran, 2002), and emphasises limited commitment or imperfect information (Rasul, 2008; Ashraf et al., 2014b). In contrast, we emphasise bargaining over STI protection, where use of the technology is fully observable and potentially negotiated each time. Gertler et al. (2005) model bargaining over male condom use, between female sex workers and male clients in Mexico, as a finite-horizon, non-cooperative interaction mediated by price. Our contribution is to model bargaining over condoms within the collective household model, capturing the efficiency arising

[7] Given that the negative health effects and externalities of unprotected sex are large in the context of our study, it is reasonable to assume that these are the social planner's first-order concern. We hence abstract from quantifying individuals' pleasure from using different types of condoms and from the increase in sex acts.

from the repeated household bargaining process that takes place within couples.

Our study also highlights female condoms as a way to reduce HIV transmission in the presence of male resistance to male condoms and low female bargaining power. Numerous studies have examined the effects of information interventions which attempt to change preferences or beliefs, or incentive interventions which attempt to change risky sexual behaviour directly (see, for example, Thornton (2008); Dupas (2011); De Walque et al. (2012); Baird et al. (2012); Bjorkman Nyqvist et al. (2015); Duflo et al. (2015)). Many of these studies focus on young women. In contrast, we highlight the importance of considering male preferences in contexts where men typically hold high bargaining power within couples. Medical studies have shown that introducing female condoms alongside male condoms improves protection rates (Fontanet et al., 1998; Vijayakumar et al., 2006; Coman et al., 2013; Mantell et al., 2015), but have largely overlooked the role of intra-household bargaining. Meanwhile Ashraf et al. (2014a) examine the effect of incentives on agents selling female condoms, but do not study impacts on end users.

There have been many papers that investigate interventions that are likely second-best in the welfare economics sense. As such, we contribute to a broader literature examining the relationship between intra-household bargaining and technology adoption, such as in the form of cookstoves (Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Mohapatra and Simon, 2017), savings accounts (Schaner, 2015), saving through ROSCAs (Anderson and Baland, 2002) and microfinance (Van Tassel, 2004). To our knowledge, however, we are the first explicitly to model and estimate the relevant trade-offs when a second-best technology is introduced, in circumstances when the adoption of the first-best technology is constrained by low female bargaining power. We characterize the nature of the second-best constraint and measure it in a field experiment so that the tradeoffs a policy-maker faces are better understood.

2 Theoretical framework

In this section we introduce a simple model of intra-household bargaining over STI protection technologies. We abstract from pure contraceptive technologies such as the pill, since these are not close substitutes for STI protection methods in contexts with high HIV prevalence and/or where concurrency is high even in stable partnerships. Our

study setting is one such context, as are many settings targeted by programs promoting (male or female) condom use. We use the model to formalise three main predictions about what will happen when female condoms are made freely available, in a context where male condoms are already readily and freely available. First, while women with the lowest bargaining power will still not be able to adopt any type of condoms, some women with intermediate bargaining power who were previously having unprotected sex may adopt female condoms. Second, while women with the highest bargaining power will continue to use male condoms, some women with intermediate bargaining power who were previously using male condoms may switch to using female condoms. Third, the availability of female condoms will increase the probability that couples have sex.[8]

Preferences: Consider a population of heterosexual couples each consisting of a male m and a female f. When considering the choice of STI protection technology, individual i has preferences over the levels of pleasure (P) and health (H) that the technology yields on average to the population, $u_i(P, H)$, which is quasi-concave and increasing in each argument. For example, P may include the average level of discomfort associated with the material used to produce the technology, and H may include the average level of HIV transmission risk provided by the technology. We allow for idiosyncratic and gender-specific heterogeneity in preferences over P and H through the utility functions. For example, an individual may place a larger weight on health if she is particularly risk-averse, or believes that she has a particularly high risk of HIV infection due to her beliefs about her partner's sexual behaviour. However, we assume that on average, couples' preferences satisfy the following single-crossing property:

Assumption 1.

$$\frac{\partial u_m(P, H)/\partial P}{\partial u_m(P, H)/\partial H} > \frac{\partial u_f(P, H)/\partial P}{\partial u_f(P, H)/\partial H} \tag{1}$$

That is, we argue that the marginal rate of substitution between pleasure and health is greater for men than for women. This assumption is motivated by the facts discussed

[8]For ease of representation, we present the model here without the possibility of intra-household transfers – for example, if one partner offers to do more household chores in order to compensate the other partner for a given choice of contraceptive technology. Online Appendix B.1 shows that all of the predictions are robust to generalising the model to allow for transfers, as long as those transfers are not perfectly frictionless: a reasonable assumption if there are utility costs to negotiating transfers, or productivity losses from overriding the usual division of chores within the household.

above, that women on average face greater risk of contracting HIV and greater costs from pregnancy than men do, and that men have stronger reported displeasure and stigma from condom use.

Technologies: In general, let the STI protection technology frontier be represented by a continuously-differentiable function $P(H)$ for $H \in \left[\underline{H}, \overline{H}\right]$. By definition of being on the frontier, $P'(H) < 0$, and let $P''(H) \leq 0$ such that the frontier is weakly concave. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In reality, only certain points on the frontier are easily accessible to couples, depending on the technologies that are readily available.[9] For simplicity, we assume that prior to our intervention, the set of readily-available technologies, unprotected sex (US) and male condoms (MC), is just the binary set of points on the frontier $\{US, MC\}$. This is presented in Panel 1a in Figure 1. We model no sex (abstinence) as an outside option, rather than a technology on the frontier $P(H)$, see below. Male condoms offer greater health than unprotected sex because of their protection against HIV/AIDS and other STIs, but offer lower pleasure.

By introducing female condoms (FC), our treatment expands the set of readily-available technologies to the ternary set of points on the frontier $\{US, FC, MC\}$. As discussed in Section 1, female condoms provide lower effectiveness and thus lower health than male condoms, but are considered more pleasurable especially by men. For both men and women, female condoms hence represent an intermediate option between male condoms and unprotected sex, as shown in Panel 1b in Figure 1. Of course, couples may have initial uncertainty about the pleasure and health associated with female condoms. In what follows we abstract from such uncertainty and consider the permanent adoption decision, once learning has taken place.

Co-operative decision-making: We model decision-making in stable couples, and assume that sex within such couples is voluntary; thus the woman's (as well as the man's) participation constraint is binding.[10] It is reasonable to assume that decision-

[9] Couples could mix their use of two or more technologies so as to obtain a wider range of points on the frontier. However, as long as there are transaction costs from mixing, couples will prefer to adopt a new technology that yields a given point rather than mixing two other technologies to obtain that point.

[10] Almost all women in our sample (91%) report in the survey that they can refuse sex with their partner.

Figure 1: Intra-household bargaining over STI protection technologies



(a) Before the introduction of female condoms

(b) After the introduction of female condoms

Notes: "STI" stands for sexually transmitted infections. The dotted line is the STI protection technology frontier. The dashed line labelled u^0_{female} represents the reservation utility of the female. The dashed line labelled u^0_{male} represents the reservation utility of the male. The solid line labelled $u^0_{household}$ in panel (a) represents the reservation utility of the household. The solid line labelled $u_{household}$ in panel (b) is the indifference curve of the household that maximizes utility in case female condoms are available.

making over condom use occurs under full information – since use of both male and female condoms is observable by both parties. We can also assume commitment, since in stable couples the decision to use condoms can be thought of as a repeated game with an infinite horizon. It is therefore natural to make the following modelling assumption:

Assumption 2. Decisions over STI protection technologies are taken co-operatively, resulting in choices that are Pareto efficient.

Chiappori (1992) shows that any bargaining process which satisfies these properties can be represented by the collective model, in which the household maximises the following utility function

$$V = \alpha u_f \left(P(H), H\right) + (1 - \alpha)\, u_m \left(P(H), H\right), \tag{2}$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is the woman's Pareto weight in the couple's sharing rule (Browning and Chiappori, 1998).[11] The weight α may depend on factors such as the woman's relative contribution to the couple's income and housework, and her options outside of the relationship.

As a simplification, we also assume that the financial and opportunity costs of acquiring any of the technologies is zero, and hence that there is no budget constraint. This is true in our experimental setting, and in most public health programmes, where male and female condoms are made available for free if they are provided.

Intensive margin: It is straightforward to show that as long as Assumption 1 holds, the optimal choice of health is increasing in α. The full proof can be found in Online Appendix B.1. The intuition is simple: if the woman places relatively greater weight on health than the man does, then the more bargaining power she holds, the more the household's choice of STI protection technology will be tilted towards health, and consequently away from pleasure. Given this result, our first prediction follows (again, full proof in Online Appendix B.1):

[11] Such a model can accommodate altruistic or "caring" preferences, where each individual's utility function also has the other partner's consumption as an argument. We abstract from this here by making P and H public goods. However, intuitively the predictions below about the relationship between female bargaining power and choice of STI protection technology would hold if pleasure and health were private, as long as both partners' degree of altruism was not perfect.

Proposition 1. Female condoms will be adopted by:

i) women with intermediate bargaining who are previously having unprotected sex;

ii) women with intermediate bargaining power who are previously using male condoms.

Women with low bargaining power will continue to have unprotected sex, and women with high bargaining power will continue to have sex with male condoms.

In terms of the margins of adoption, both couples who were previously having unprotected sex and couples who were previously using male condoms may adopt female condoms if this interior option allows them to get closer to their optimal point on the technology frontier. Among the women who are engaging in unprotected sex at baseline, women with relatively higher bargaining power — i.e. intermediate bargaining power compared to the whole population — may take up female condoms. Among women using male condoms at baseline, women with relatively low bargaining power — i.e. intermediate bargaining power compared to the whole distribution — may switch from male to female condoms. The quantitative importance of these margins of adoption will depend on the distribution of preferences and bargaining power in the population, and also on the position of the new and old technologies on the frontier.

Which effect dominates empirically is an important question. If take-up of female condoms mainly comes from women who were engaging in unprotected sex at baseline, then introducing female condoms unambiguously increases rates of protection against HIV/AIDS and other STIs. On the other hand, if female condoms are mainly used as substitutes for male condoms, then offering female condoms will not lead to an increase in condom coverage. In that case, whilst couples who switch to female condoms must be better off in terms of their private utility, the marginal loss of effectiveness is likely to reduce welfare from the perspective of a social planner, given the negative externalities inherent in transmission of HIV and other STIs.

Extensive margin: Let $s \in \{0, 1\}$ indicate the choice of whether to have sex or not. The no-sex option $s = 0$ can be enforced by either partner, and gives reservation utility u_i^0 to each partner. This can be thought of as the utility from partners' best immediate alternative, for example in terms of time use. Along with $s = 1$, partners make a choice of contraception from the available sets as described above.

It is straightforward to see that the introduction of female condoms increases the probability that both couples' reservation utilities are satisifed, and hence that $s = 1$; see Online Appendix B.1 for formal proof. This leads to our second prediction:

Proposition 2. Making female condoms freely available increases the probability that couples have sex.

To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts a couple whose reservation utilities are only both satisfied following the introduction of female condoms.

Note that bargaining power α does not enter a couple's decision as to whether to have sex or not: this extensive-margin decision depends only on individual reservation utilities and preferences over pleasure and health, and the set of readily-available points on the technology frontier.

3 Context and experimental design

3.1 HIV and condom use in Maputo

Our study took place in Matola, which is the capital of Maputo Province and lies approximately 10km west of Maputo City. HIV prevalence in Maputo Province is high and disproportionately so among women, at an estimated 29.6% for women and 15.8% for men (Ministério da Saúde, 2015). Concurrency among men has been identified as a contributing factor, even among men in stable relationships (Macia et al., 2011). Indeed, 85% of the women in our sample are in stable relationships, but of these 36% report believing their partner is "involved" with other people. In such a climate, technologies which protect against transmission of HIV and other STIs are not close substitutes for pure contraceptive technologies such as the pill, and may be used in addition to pure contraceptive technologies. In our baseline sample, 39% of respondents are currently using pure contraceptive methods (mainly the pill or injectables), and of these 40% are also currently using male condoms.

Both male and female condoms are available in Matola, but male condoms are far more accessible. Female condoms are typically only available at health facilities, which women report would take on average 60 minutes to reach, and even there are subject to frequent stock-outs (Pilz, 2014). In contrast, male condoms are readily available,

both for free at health facilities and from local health workers, as well as cheaply on the private market. Yet despite the widespread availability of male condoms, there is evidence that men's preferences constrain adoption. Of the women in our study who are currently sexually active but not using any form of protection at baseline, by far the most common reason given is that their partner does not like to or refuses to use male condoms (45% of responses).

3.2 Female condom intervention

Evidence suggests that small-group information and education interventions may be particularly important for promoting female condom use (Terris-Prestholt and Windmeijer, 2016). The intervention we study is run by Pathfinder International, and is aimed at women in populations with high HIV transmission risk. The programme consists of six group sessions lasting ninety minutes each, held fortnightly over a three month period. Pathfinder trains female health workers from the local area to facilitate the programme, and thus facilitators are socially proximal to the participants. The sessions cover: information on male and female condoms and demonstration of their use on pelvic models; information about other contraceptive methods; information on HIV/AIDS and other STIs; discussing consent and contraceptive use, and intimate partner violence and women's rights.[12] Group sizes range from a minimum of five to a maximum of twelve women per facilitator, which are thresholds set by the NGO for creating an environment conducive to discussion. Female condoms are also added to the set of products carried by local health workers — which already include male condoms — that participants can access freely and discreetly at the end of each session.

The intervention thus allows us to study which women — if any — in terms of their bargaining power adopt female condoms when informational, access and price constraints are alleviated. The estimated treatment effect may also include the effect of simply coming together in a group with other women to discuss personal issues. We do not attempt to disentangle these mechanisms, since our primary objective is to study how bargaining power affects adoption of female condoms once all constraints

[12]Qualitative evidence from the medical literature suggests that information about use and about negotiation help introduction of female condoms (Schuyler et al., 2016). The discussions are also included for ethical reasons, to mitigate any risk of these women facing increased violence when introducing new contraceptives into the home.

to adoption apart from intra-household bargaining are alleviated. Moreover, since any standard sex education programme would likely involve all of these components, their combined impact is arguably of most interest to policymakers.

3.3 Study design

Pathfinder International began its female condom programme in Matola in 2011. We expanded the progamme to four additional neighbourhoods in 2014, using a phased-in experimental design with participant-level randomisation across all four neighbourhoods. Seventeen programme facilitators — healthcare workers from the local community — were recruited and trained by Pathfinder to deliver the programme. These facilitators then conducted door-to-door recruitment to identify women willing to participate. The eligibility criteria were that women needed to be between 18 and 49 years of age, sexually active, and not pregnant.

The baseline survey was conducted by enumerators from an independent survey firm in August 2014, after the sign-up period but before randomisation and the start of the programme. At the end of the baseline interview, each participant was told that two phases of training sessions would be organized to accommodate the large number of interested participants, and that assignment to the first or second round would be determined randomly by a computer for fairness. Once the entire sample had responded to the baseline survey, the research team randomly allocated half of the respondents recruited by each facilitator to the treatment group (i.e. the first round of training sessions) and half to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions).[13] The reason for stratifying on facilitator was to improve power, and to ensure that there would be enough space for treatment and control participants to attend sessions close to their home.

To limit spillovers between participants in the treatment and the control arm, we organized a third and separate set of training sessions for women who registered together and who knew one another. This separate group received the intervention at a later stage, but was not included in the study. The women assigned to the first or second

[13]The randomisation was done in private, given the sensitive nature of participating in our intervention. A member of the research team took the list of respondents for each facilitator, sorted them by a randomly-generated number, and assigned the first half to treatment and the second half to control.

round of training sessions were not connected to each other; we expect spillovers between them to be negligible, given the small number of participants compared to the total population of these neighbourhoods (which each had 20,000 inhabitants on average). Indeed, Section 5.1 presents evidence that there do not appear to be spillovers from our treatment.

The treatment group then received the intervention from September-December 2014. The endline survey was conducted in February-March 2015, five to six months after the intervention had started for treated individuals, and two to three months after treated individuals had received their last group session. Following the endline survey, the control group then received the intervention from March-May 2015.

Our baseline sample consists of 298 women, of whom 232 were re-interviewed at endline and so constitute our balanced panel.[14] The retention rate was thus 78%, which is similar to that in other studies tracking female populations in urban or peri-urban areas (Banerjee et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2017). Online Appendix Table B.1 shows that the observable predictors of attrition are not differential across treatment and control groups, and that treatment itself does not significantly predict attrition.[15] Due to an administrative error, the control group for one facilitator received the endline survey only after having been treated in the second phase of implementation. These five observations are dropped from all estimations of treatment effects, leaving a final estimating sample of 227 respondents. The sample remains balanced across treatment and control when excluding these five individuals (results available on request).

4 Data

4.1 Survey data

Table 1 shows measures of key covariates and contraceptive use for the full baseline sample, and demonstrates that all are balanced across treatment and control. These

[14] 317 women were initially recruited into the study. However, one facilitator fell severely ill at the start of the study, and there was nobody sufficiently trained to replace her. She had recruited a total of 19 participants, whom we drop from the sample.

[15] Since attrition is high, despite it not being differential on observables across treatment and control, we conduct a Heckman selection correction to account for potential differential attrition by unobservables. Our results are robust to this correction, as discussed in Section 5.4

variables are also balanced when attritters are excluded (results available on request). 85% of respondents report being in a stable relationship with an average duration of 8.7 years, comprising 63% who are married and 22% who are unmarried but still in relationships of on average 4.8 years.[16] The rest of the sample (15%) are sexually active but not in a stable relationship. The vast majority of respondents report having had just one sexual partner in the last twelve months, with 10% reporting zero partners and 3% reporting two partners. A third of respondents report being HIV-positive, which is close to the official statistics reported above. Slightly more than 10% of respondents report having had an STI in the last three months; although this may be under-reported.[17] Fewer than half, 41%, mention the female condom when asked to list contraceptive methods that they know about.

Our primary outcome variables are the use of contraceptive methods, disaggregated by female condoms, male condoms and other modern contraceptive methods — mainly the pill and injectables. For each method, we ask respondents whether they have ever used that method, and whether they are currently using it, i.e. consider it to be part of their current portfolio. For male and female condoms, we also ask whether they have used that method in the last thirty days. Table 1 describes the baseline values of each of these measures. Baseline use of female condoms is low: 9% of the respondents have ever used a female condom, 3% have used one in the last 30 days, and 2% are currently using female condoms. Male condom use is substantially higher: around three quarters of women have ever used a male condom, 32% have used one in the last 30 days, and 39% percent say they are currently using male condoms. Altogether, 39% of our sample are currently using pure contraception methods at baseline, comprising 20% using the pill and 14% using injectables, and a small number using intrauterine devices (IUDs), the diaphragm, and sterilisation. As mentioned above, even if these women plan to continue using their pure contraception method, they may have signed up to the female condom programme because they are seeking an additional method

[16]The former includes traditional marriages and respondents who describe themselves as "living as married" but not legally married. The latter is common in this region due to the high bride price and costs of obtaining a marriage certificate.

[17]We do not test for HIV, since the accuracy of testing is sensitive to the timing of infection, especially shortly after infection, and our endline survey is only a few months after the end of the intervention. We also opted not to test for STIs such as chlamydia, given the already sensitive nature of participation in the study and the budgetary implications of providing treatment to those who test positive (as required by medical research ethics guidelines).

Table 1: Baseline balance of covariates and contraceptive use – full sample

	Mean	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	t-test	Total N	Control N	Treatment N
Demographics							
Age in years	30.32	30.12	30.52	-0.42	298	146	152
Years of education	6.22	6.26	6.18	0.24	298	146	152
Literate	0.84	0.84	0.85	-0.17	298	146	152
Household head	0.22	0.21	0.24	-0.51	298	146	152
Income							
Has job	0.38	0.42	0.33	1.64	298	146	152
Personal income last 30 days (MZN)	880.74	942.19	821.72	0.51	298	146	152
Relationships							
In a stable relationship (incl. married)	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.17	298	146	152
Married (officially or unofficially)	0.63	0.64	0.62	0.37	298	146	152
Years relation	8.50	8.47	8.54	-0.09	298	146	152
# Partners last 12 months	0.92	0.92	0.93	-0.23	298	146	152
Sexual knowledge & behaviour							
Pregnant	0.05	0.05	0.06	-0.41	298	146	152
HIV positive (self-report)	0.33	0.35	0.31	0.75	260	129	131
STI last 3 months (self-report)	0.13	0.13	0.13	-0.10	259	124	135
Wants another child now	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.87	298	146	152
Wants another child	0.56	0.59	0.54	0.82	298	146	152
Beliefs high risk of HIV – general	0.66	0.67	0.65	0.33	298	146	152
Beliefs high risk of HIV – for self	0.69	0.68	0.70	-0.23	298	146	152
Walking distance to health centre (in min.)	54.97	53.06	56.80	-0.90	298	146	152
Mentions female condom as contraceptive	0.41	0.44	0.39	0.90	298	146	152
Baseline use							
Ever use female condoms	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.11	298	146	152
Ever use male condoms	0.74	0.76	0.73	0.59	298	146	152
Ever use other	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.04	298	146	152
Use female condoms last 30 days	0.03	0.01	0.04	-1.39	298	146	152
Use male condoms last 30 days	0.32	0.28	0.35	-1.26	298	146	152
Current use female condoms	0.02	0.02	0.03	-0.33	298	146	152
Current use male condoms	0.39	0.37	0.41	-0.79	298	146	152
Current use other	0.39	0.41	0.37	0.75	298	146	152
Attrition							
Attrited	0.21	0.25	0.18	1.59	298	146	152

Notes: N=298 in the baseline sample. Lower sample sizes reflect observations that are missing or not applicable. "Treatment" contains all individuals assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions), whether or not they attended the sessions. "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Column 4 presents the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean in the treatment group is equal to the mean in the control group. Unless otherwise indicated, all are binary variables. MZN stands for Mozambican meticais. HIV stands for Human Immune-deficiency Virus. STI stands for Sexually Transmitted Infections. "Beliefs high risk of HIV – general ' and "... – for self" are binary variables which are coded 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the respondent scored a value above the median for the questions "What is the risk of being infected with HIV when having unprotected sex for a woman in general? And for you specifically?" measured on a 1-5 scale ranging from No risk to Very risky. "Ever used other" and "Current use other" refer to use of any other modern contraceptive method apart from condoms, e.g. the pill, injectables, or an IUD.

that protects against HIV/AIDS and other STIs; although they may also be open to substituting away from their existing method.

Finally, Table A.1 in the Appendix compares our sample to a representative urban sample of women from Maputo Province, from the 2011 Demographic Health Survey (DHS, 2011). It is important to stress that we did not seek to recruit a representative sample of women into our intervention; not least because it may have been unethical and difficult to convince the least empowered women to attend, given our prediction that such women would never be able to convince their partners to use male or female condoms. Nonetheless, Table A.1 shows two important features of our sample. First, our sample happens to be close to the overall adult female population of Maputo Province, in terms of demographic characteristics such as age, years of education, marital status, pregnancy, and desired fertility.[18] Second, in contrast, the women in our study appear to have greater bargaining power than the representative sample: they began to have sex at a later age, are more likely to have used a condom the last time they had sex, and report greater decision-making power.

4.2 Bargaining power

To test the model's predictions, we require proxies of women's bargaining power within their relationship. We include a standard survey module on how decision-making on key domains is distributed across a woman and her partner, and a survey module on power dynamics within the relationship, which we adapted through extensive local piloting.[19] By their nature, this latter set of questions is only asked to the 85% of our sample who have a stable partner. Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the questions at baseline.

Since each of these modules contains multiple questions whose responses are highly correlated, we perform a tetrachoric factor analysis to construct a baseline bargaining power index. This bargaining power index explains 30.1% of the variance in all the

[18]One exception is that the women in our sample are much less likely to have a job, which makes sense if women with a lower opportunity cost of time are more willing to participate in a time-intensive programme.

[19]We also collected data on assets brought to the relationship. However, only a very small percentage of our respondents report that they brought assets to the relationship, of which 7.58% brought jewelry, 1.14% brought land and 0.34% brought animals. Given such little variation is observed, we exclude assets from our analysis.

decision-making and power dynamics questions. Online Appendix Figure B.2 presents the distribution of the index. The index is balanced across treatment and control, in both the baseline sample and the balanced panel sample.[20]

Table 2: Bargaining power – summary statistics

	Mean	sd	Min	Max	Total
Who decides about...					
...buying clothes for you?	0.80	0.40	0.00	1.00	297
...buying phone credit?	0.76	0.43	0.00	1.00	297
...education for the children?	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	288
...health expenses for you?	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	297
...health expenses for the children?	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	291
...if you are allowed to work?	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	296
...how earnings are used?	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	297
...visits to friends?	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00	296
...visits to family?	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00	294
Who usually has more say when you talk about serious things	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	250
In general, who do you think has more power in your relationship	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00	249
Power dynamics					
Most of the time, we do what my partner wants to do	2.33	1.08	1.00	4.00	250
My partner won't let me wear certain things	2.61	1.11	1.00	4.00	250
When my partner and I are together, I'm pretty quiet	3.07	0.96	1.00	4.00	250
My partner has more say about important decisions that affect us	2.39	1.09	1.00	4.00	250
My partner tells me who I can spend time with	2.79	1.09	1.00	4.00	249
I feel trapped or stuck in our relationship	3.20	0.86	1.00	4.00	250
My partner does what he wants, even if I do not want him to	2.86	1.00	1.00	4.00	249
I am more committed to our relationship than my partner is	2.74	1.08	1.00	4.00	250
My partner is involved with other people apart from me	2.77	1.02	1.00	4.00	249
My partner always wants to know where I am	2.16	1.10	1.00	4.00	250
When my partner and I disagree, he gets his way most of the time	2.73	1.06	1.00	4.00	248

Notes: All values taken from the baseline survey. The "Decision-making" module was enumerated to all respondents (N=298), except the questions "who has more say" and "who has more power" which were asked only of women in a stable relationship at baseline (N=250). Decision-making variables are indicators for whether respondent was involved in making decisions on each of the activities or if respondent had more say/more power than her partner."Power dynamics" questions were only asked from women who were in a stable relationship at baseline (N=250), based on a Likert-scale coded from 1 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree), and recoded such that a greater value represents higher bargaining power for the respondent. Lower observation numbers in the final column reflect missing values or unwillingness to answer.

The bargaining power index is correlated with baseline characteristics in the way we might expect. Specifically, bargaining power is positively correlated with a woman's income (correlation 0.21, p-value < 0.01), having a job (0.20, p-value < 0.01), being the

[20] A regression of treatment on the bargaining power score, while controlling for facilitator dummies, gives a coefficient of -0.031 (p-value 0.524, t-statistic -0.64) in the baseline sample, and of -0.045 (p-value 0.430, t-statistic -0.79) in the balanced panel sample.

household head (0.30, p-value < 0.01), and age (0.13, p-value 0.04). One anomaly is that bargaining power is negatively correlated with a woman's education (-0.12, p-value 0.06), but this disappears when we control for age. Meanwhile, bargaining power is negatively and significantly correlated with a woman believing she faces a high risk of HIV infection if she has unprotected sex with her partner (correlation -0.12, p-value 0.05), with wanting another child now (-0.11, p-value 0.09), wanting another child in general (-0.11, p-value 0.08), and with being married (-0.37, p-value < 0.01). To avoid the bargaining power index spuriously proxying the effects of any of these variables, we include these variables as controls when estimating the effects of bargaining power on condom adoption; see Section 5.3.

As predicted by the model, we also observe a positive correlation between the bargaining power index and the use of male condoms at baseline. This correlation is significant for the "last 30 days" measure of male condom use at baseline (correlation 0.12, p-value 0.06), and marginally insignificant for the "current use" measure (0.09, p-value 0.15).

4.3 Diary data

At the end of the baseline interview, all respondents were also invited to participate in a weekly sexual diary exercise. Altogether 56 respondents volunteered to participate, comprising 27 who were subsequently randomised into the treatment group and 29 who were subsequently randomised into the control group.[21] The diaries recorded detailed information on all of the respondents' sexual encounters in the seven days prior to each interview, with the high-frequency nature of the data collection designed to reduce recall bias (Das et al., 2012). Diary interviews took place over a period of 17 weeks, beginning four weeks prior to the first group receiving its first session and ending one week after the last group received its last session. The baseline period for each

[21] We did not stratify the randomisation on diary participation, but there is balance on treatment status, covariates and baseline contraceptive use within this diary subsample; tables available on request. Online Appendix Table B.2 shows that the diary participants are representative of the balanced panel of all survey participants, except that the diary participants have been in a relationship for longer than the average study participant, no diary respondents are pregnant, and diary respondents are more likely to have ever used other contraceptives. The results from the diary subsample presented below are robust to re-weighting to make the diary subsample representative of the full sample (available on request).

respondent is taken to run from the start of the diary data collection until the week that the facilitator to which the respondent was assigned began her first meeting for her treatment-group participants (5.6 weeks on average). The endline period is taken to run from the week after a respondent's facilitator started her first session until the end of the diary data collection, comprising 8.9 weeks on average. On average 75% of the diary sample participated each week.[22]

The diary data allow us to analyse the impact of the intervention at the level of the sex act. Altogether respondents report a total of 349 sex acts during the endline period: an average of 6.1 sex acts per respondent, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 30. The diary data also lend support to our bargaining model, as we see that a large proportion of sex acts involve discussions or disagreements over the use of condoms: 31% of sex acts in the last fourteen days in the control group at endline, see Online Appendix Table B.9. This in turn implies that even if sorting on contraceptive preferences occurs in the dating or marriage market, a substantial gap in preferences still persists.

5 Results

5.1 Impacts on condom use

Our preferred estimations are derived from an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) linear probability models of the following form:[23]

$$Pr\left[Y_{if1} = 1 | Y_{if0}, treat_{if}, \eta_f\right] = \alpha + \delta Y_{if0} + \beta treat_{if} + \eta_f, \tag{3}$$

where Y_{if1} is the outcome variable of interest at endline for individual i assigned to facilitator f, and Y_{if0} is its value at baseline. $treat_{if}$ is a dummy for being assigned to the treatment group, i.e. to receiving the programme in the first rather than the second phase. β represents the intent-to-treat effect, since not all individuals assigned to treatment attended the programme: the participation rate was around 65% for each

[22]Individual respondents took part in the diaries an average of 13 times, with a minimum of three weeks and a maximum of 17 weeks. There are no significant differences in participation between the treatment and control group.

[23]Results are robust to using OLS specifications without the lagged dependent variable and to using logit specifications (available on request).

individual session, with 20 women (17.7% of the treatment group) not attending any of the six sessions. η_f is a facilitator fixed effect, which is included for inference since randomisation was blocked on the seventeen facilitators (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, as this was the level of randomisation (Abadie et al., 2017). We also report additional p-values for the treatment coefficients as calculated from randomisation inference tests (Young, 2016).

Figure 2 displays the treatment effects on condom use as estimated from Equation 3, while the full estimations are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The programme has a substantial and highly significant effect on the use of female condoms: we observe an 18.4 percentage point increase in the proportion of women who have ever used female condoms (compared to an endline mean of 8.8% in the control group); a 4.7 percentage point increase in the proportion who have used a female condom in the last thirty days; and a 7.7 percentage point increase in the proportion who are currently using female condoms. The fact that the treatment effects on ever use is higher than the treatment effect on use in the last thirty days and current use suggests that many women in the treatment group try female condoms at the start of the intervention, then a smaller although sizeable fraction continues to use them. This is a natural adoption pattern if couples experiment with female condoms and thereby learn more about their costs and benefits, then some return to their original contraceptive method while others adopt female condoms more permanently.

We see no evidence of anticipation effects or spillovers — e.g., through the control group obtaining female condoms from the treatment group — as there are no significant differences between baseline use in the control group and endline use in the control group for any of our outcome indicators (see Online Appendix Table B.10). This is unsurprising, since female condoms are difficult to obtain in the study area through channels other than our intervention. Indeed, the number of free female condoms that a respondent in the treatment group took from the sessions is highly correlated with her report of ever use (correlation 0.38, p-value < 0.01), use last 30 days (0.21, p-value 0.02), and current use (0.29, p-value <0.01). This also weighs against concerns that reported use of female condoms might represent response bias.

We do not observe any significant evidence that respondents substitute away from

Figure 2: Treatment effects on condom use and sex acts



Notes: Predicted average marginal effect of treatment on outcome variables. Each marker (diamond, circle, triangle, x) represents the average marginal treatment effect. Each bar represents the 90% confidence interval. Treatment is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the treatment coefficients represent the intent-to-treat effect. The panels titled "Female Condom Use" and "Male Condom Use" present regressions on the balanced survey sample, N=227. Dependent variables are binary indicators. The bars with a "diamond" marker refer to whether the respondent has ever used the method, the bars with a "circle" marker refer to whether she has used it in the last 30 days, and the bars with the "triangle" marker whether she is currently using it. Regressions in these panels are linear probability model ANCOVA specifications, including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a regressor. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. The panel titled "Probability of a Sex Act in a Week" presents regressions on the balanced diary sample, N=56. Dependent variables are binary indicators for whether a respondent had at least one sex act in a particular week. In this panel, the bars with a "diamond" marker refer to the treatment effect on the probability that the respondent had at least one sex act in a week, the bars with a "circle" marker refer to the treatment effect on the probability that the respondent had at least one sex act per week in the last 30 days, and the bars with the "x" marker the treatment effect on the probability that the respondent had at least one sex act per week in the last 14 days. All regressions in this panel are linear probability individual fixed effects models comparing the probability of a sex act in a week during the baseline period with the probability of a sex act in a week during the specified endline period, with the respondent-week as the unit of observation (N=863 for the full endline period, N=536 for the last 30 days, and N=367 for the last 14 days). All regressions include facilitator × endline fixed effects (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors in all regressions are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation.

or increase their use of male condoms.[24] Table A.3 in the Appendix shows that when we split the sample by women who are using or not using male condoms at baseline, both groups experiment with female condoms (Columns 1 and 2), but it is those women not using male condoms at baseline who appear to drive the more sustained adoption (Columns 3 and 5); although we note the reduced power in these subsamples.Importantly, the lack of substitution suggests that the intervention decreases the number of women having sex unprotected from HIV/AIDS and other STIs. Section 6 describes use of epidemiological modelling to estimate how our observed impacts on condom coverage translate into impacts on longer-term rates of HIV transmission.

Table A.2 shows that we also see no increase in or substitution away from other contraceptive methods such as the pill and injectables. This suggests that women who adopt female condoms were either previously using no contraceptives, or use female condoms in addition to other methods in order to protect against HIV/AIDS and other STIs. Indeed, of the women who are currently using female condoms at endline, 42% are also using other contraceptive methods (mainly the pill or injectables).

When we restrict the sample to just those women in a stable relationship, we still observe positive treatment effects on female condom use: a 16.4 percentage point increase in ever use of female condoms (p-value < 0.01), a 5.6 percentage point increase in use in the last 30 days (p-value 0.042), and a 7.9 percentage point increase in current use (p-value 0.019).[25] This may be rational if one partner is HIV-positive while the other is HIV-negative, or if one or both partners have relations with others or suspect that their partner does. Even individuals who are already HIV-positive have an incentive to avoid further infection, as getting infected with a different strain of HIV may increase the viral load, and getting infected with other STIs may lead to further complications and increase the risk of transmitting HIV/AIDS.

[24] We have 80% power to detect the following minimum detectable effect sizes at the 5% level in a two-tailed test: ever use – female condoms 7.6 pp, male condoms 9.6 pp, other 10.3 pp; use last 30 days – female condoms 3.5 pp, male condoms 14.0 pp; current use – female condoms 4.9 pp, male condoms 13.9 pp, other 13.6 pp.

[25] We would expect women who are not in a stable relationship to place a larger weight on the health offered by STI protection technologies, and so to have a higher demand for condoms. Indeed, Online Appendix Table B.7 shows that the treatment effect on ever use of female condoms is stronger for women who are not in a stable relationship at baseline.

5.2 Extensive-margin impacts

We use the diaries to examine the effects on the extensive margin, i.e. the probability of having sex. Our preferred measure of this is the likelihood of at least one sex act per respondent per week, so that results are not unduly influenced by a very small number of respondents who report a large number of sex acts. Taking advantage of the weekly nature of the diaries, we estimate the following fixed effects panel specification:

$$\begin{aligned} &Pr\left[Y_{ift} = 1 | treat_{if}, \eta_f, \phi_{if}\right] \\ &= \alpha + \delta \times endline_t + \beta treat_{if} \times endline_t + \eta_f \times endline_t + \phi_{if}, \qquad t = 1, 2, ..T \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where Y_{ift} is the outcome variable of interest for individual i assigned to facilitator f in week t. The unit of observation is thus the respondent-week. Standard errors are again clustered at the individual level.

Figure 2 shows that, in line with Proposition 2 of the model, the introduction of female condoms leads to a significant increase in the likelihood of sex acts. The full estimations of Equation 4 are presented in Table 3. In the full endline period, respondents in the treatment group were on average 9.1 percentage points (pp) more likely to report a sex act in a given week, compared to a control group mean of 46.9%. In the last 30 and 14 days, the treatment effect on the likelihood of sex acts per week was 11.3 pp and 15.8 pp respectively, compared to 47.1% and 49.1% in the control group. The fact that we observe this increase in the treatment group indicates that there are couples in which one or both partners' participation constraints are sometimes or always binding when the only options are male condoms or unprotected sex, but where both find sex with female condoms preferable to not having sex. The introduction of female condoms therefore increases utility for such couples. Again, we do not see evidence of spillovers or anticipation effects in the control group, for example that control-group respondents withheld from regular sex in anticipation of treatment: the mean of sex acts per week in the control group is 0.91 (standard deviation 0.51) during the baseline phase and 0.86 (s.d. 0.54) during the endline phase, and a t-test that these are different is rejected (t=0.71). We also observe a large and highly significant reduction for the treatment group in the proportion of sex acts in which a discussion or disagreement

about condoms takes place (Table B.9 in the Online Appendix). This supports the idea that the expansion from a binary to a ternary choice allows the couple to choose an STI protection technology that is closer to their preferred choice on the technological frontier. Reassuringly, in the survey data we see no negative impact of treatment on measures of women's self-reported well-being, nor do we see any impacts on emotional or physical violence (results available on request).

Table 3: Impacts on likelihood of sex acts per respondent week – diary subsample

	(1) **Sex act per week full endline period**	(2) **Sex act per week last 30 days**	(3) **Sex act per week last 14 days**
Treat × endline	0.091**	0.113**	0.158*
	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.086)
Facilitator × endline f.e.'s	✓	✓	✓
Observations	863	536	367
Control mean	0.469	0.471	0.491

Notes: Regressions on the balanced diary sample, N=56. Dependent variables are binary indicators for whether a respondent had at least one sex act in a particular week. Column 1 refers to whether the respondent had at least one sex act per week in the full endline period, Column 2 whether she had at least one sex act per week in the last 30 days, and Column 3 whether she had at least one sex act per week in the last 14 days. All regressions in this panel are linear probability individual fixed effects models comparing the probability of a sex act in a week during the baseline period with the probability of a sex act in a week during the specified endline period, with the respondent-week as the unit of observation (N=863 for the full endline period, N=536 for the last 30 days, and N=367 for the last 14 days). "Treat × endline" is an indicator for observations in the treatment group (i.e. assigned to the first round) during the relevant endline period ("full endline", "last 30 days", or "last 14 days") as opposed to the control group (i.e. assigned to the second round). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treat × endline" is the intent-to-treat effect. All regressions include facilitator × endline fixed effects (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$

5.3 Heterogeneity by bargaining power

We now test our main predictions about which women, among those in stable relationships, adopt female condoms in terms of their bargaining power. If we first run a naïve, linear regression of endline current use of female condoms on the interaction of treatment with the bargaining power index, we observe a strong, negative effect of the bargaining power index on the treatment effect on female condom adoption. Specifically, a one standard-deviation increase in our bargaining power index decreases the likelihood that the respondent adopts female condoms as a result of receiving the treatment by -0.198 percentage points (p-value 0.056) on average (see Table B.3 in the Online Appendix for the results).

However, according to Proposition 1, we expect to observe an "inverse-U" relationship between bargaining power and female condom adoption over the full distribution of women with low, intermediate, and high bargaining power. To test flexibly for such a non-linear "inverse-U" relationship we next regress endline current use of female condoms on a cubic function of the bargaining power index, controlling for baseline current use of female condoms, a full set of baseline controls,[26] and facilitator dummies. This estimation indeed suggests that there exists an inverse-U relationship between female bargaining power and female condom adoption, and that the maximum of the inverse-U occurs at the lower tail of the distribution of bargaining power in our sample.[27] However, as was shown in Table A.1, the women in our sample have a higher average level of bargaining power than women in the population, suggesting that women with the lowest bargaining power in the population, whom our model predicts would not be able to persuade their partners to use even female condoms, are likely underrepresented in our sample. This would explain why we find a significant negative coefficient on the interaction between bargaining power and treatment status in the naïve linear regression: the negative interaction effect at higher levels of bargaining power masks the positive interaction for those women with low bargaining power.

[26] Controls are "Age in years," "Years of education," "Literacy," "Household head," "Has job," "Personal income last 30 days (MZN)," "In a stable relationship (incl. married)," "Married," "Years relation," "Number of partners in the last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Wants another child now," "Wants another child," "Beliefs high risk of HIV – general," "Beliefs high risk of HIV – for self," "Walking distance to the health centre," "Mentions female condoms as contraceptive," as described in Section 4.2.

[27] See Figure B.3 in the Online Appendix.

Figure 3: Impacts on Female Condom Use by Female Bargaining Power



Notes: Predicted marginal effect on current use of female condoms for respondents with low bargaining power (lowBP), intermediate bargaining power (midBP), and high bargaining power (highBP) for the control group in the left panel and the treatment group in the right panel. The thresholds for low versus intermediate bargaining power was set at the 5th centile, and the threshold for intermediate versus high bargaining power was set at the 20th centile. Each marker (circle) represents the predicted marginal effect. Each bar represents the 95% confidence interval. Treatment is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the effect of treatment represents the intent-to-treat effect. The marginal effects are predicted based on a regression on the balanced survey sample (N=227) for those women in a stable relationship (N=194). The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification where dummies for low bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) and high bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) are interacted with treatment. The regressions include the baseline value of the use of female condoms, controls, and facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Controls are "Age in years," "Years of education," "Literacy," "Household head," "Has job," "Personal income last 30 days (MZN)," "In a stable relationship (incl. married)," "Married," "Years relation," "Number of partners in the last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Wants another child now," "Wants another child," "Beliefs high risk of HIV – general," "Beliefs high risk of HIV – for self," "Walking distance to the health centre," "Mentions female condoms as contraceptive." The factor analysis to create the bargaining power index, the creation of the binary bargaining power variables, and the regressions were bootstrapped with 11,566 replications.

To investigate the inverse-U relationship, we create dummies for low, medium and high bargaining power taking thresholds at the 5th centile and 20th centile of the index – since the point of inflection occurs towards the lower end of our sample distribution of bargaining power.[28] We regress endline current use of female condoms on the interaction of these dummies with treatment, controlling as above for current use of female condoms at baseline, the full set of controls, and our facilitator dummies. This allows us to effectively pull apart the upward- and the downward-sloping segments of the interaction between bargaining power and the treatment effect. To create standard errors, we bootstrap over the tetrachoric factor analysis used to produce the bargaining power index and the creation of dummies on the 5th and 20th centiles, as well as over the regression, with 11,566 replications.[29] Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of female condom use at endline, and their 95% confidence intervals, for each level of bargaining power in the treatment and the control group (Online Appendix Table B.4 reports the results in full). We observe a strong inverse-U relationship between bargaining power and female condom adoption in the treatment group.[30]

In terms of margins of adoption, as predicted by our model, our results show that the interaction between baseline bargaining power and treatment is especially strong for women who do not use male condoms at baseline (see Online Appendix Table B.4). Conversely, we do not see evidence of a large degree of substitution away from male condoms (see Online Appendix Table B.6). A possible explanation is that women with higher bargaining power who take up female condoms also intersperse their use with the use of male condoms. Indeed, 81% of women who are currently using female condoms at endline also report currently using male condoms. This "double protection" is a typical pattern of adoption observed in the medical literature, and is found to be associated with a large increase in the number of protected sex acts (Vijayakumar et al., 2006).

[28]Appendix Figure A.1 shows a sensitivity analysis of our results when we use alternative thresholds in our distribution.

[29]Because the usual estimation methods for factor analysis only predict a point estimate for each respondent without carrying standard errors, any use of factor analysis and estimations using factors requires bootstrapping the standard errors.

[30]The sensitivity analysis in Appendix Figure A.1 shows that if the thresholds for the low, medium and high bargaining power dummies are shifted towards the right tail of the bargaining power index distribution, we see a transition from the inverse-U shape to a negative, linear effect of the bargaining power index on female condom adoption, as observed in the naïve linear specification.

Finally, Online Appendix Table B.8 shows no systematic treatment impacts on the time-variant measures of bargaining power themselves, namely decision-making and power dynamics.

5.4 Robustness and alternative explanations

Additional controls: One possible concern is that the interaction effect of treatment with our bargaining power dummies might be proxying the interaction of treatment with any of our controls — especially since some of our controls are correlated with our bargaining power index as one might expect, as described in Section 4.2. To overcome this, we run a post-double LASSO specification in which we include the full set of control variables and their interactions with treatment, and then re-run our main specification with the LASSO-selected controls. Column 5 in Table B.4 in the Online Appendix shows that our results are robust to this procedure.

Selection on bargaining power: Our results suggest that women with low bargaining power may be underrepresented in our sample compared to the local population (see Table A.1). This could reflect women with the lowest bargaining power in the population rationally not expressing interest in our intervention, and hence not making it into our sample, if they anticipate that they would not be able to convince their partner to use any type of condoms even after participating. To check whether our finding of an inverse-U relationship between bargaining power and adoption of female condoms would hold if our sample were more representative of the population in terms of bargaining power, we re-weight our results by the inverse probability of the likelihood that a woman with low bargaining power is in our sample, when controlling for all controls and baseline contraceptive use. Our finding of an inverse-U shape is robust and strengthened, as presented in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.

Attrition: Despite the fact that predictors of attrition are not different across treatment and control, and that treatment status does not predict attrition, we do observe sizeable attrition between the baseline and endline survey. To check if our results are robust to the possibility that *unobservables* differentially predict attrition across treatment and control, we conduct a Heckman sample selection correction. To select the predic-

tors of attrition that we include in the sample selection correction specifications, we first run a linear LASSO specification of attrition on all our control variables, measures of baseline contraceptive use, treatment, and facilitator dummies. The LASSO-selected variables are then included in our sample selection equation that we use for the Heckman selection correction. Our main treatment effects (Online Appendix Table B.5) as well as the results on heterogeneity by bargaining power (Online Appendix Figure B.4) are robust to this correction.

Experimenter demand: A possible alternative explanation for the negative interaction terms could be that women with lower bargaining power are more susceptible to experimenter demand, and so over-report use of female condoms whilst more empowered women do not. While we acknowledge potential concerns about our self-reported measures of condom use, we find little evidence of misreporting. First, we observe high consistency in reported use across the survey and diary data. The diaries are a more complex and granular instrument than the baseline and endline surveys, and administered at different points in time, yet we observe only a handful of cases where an individual's reporting in the surveys and diaries diverges.[31] Second, when we re-run analyses using the diary data, the estimated treatment effects are similar to those estimated from the survey data (tables available on request). Third, we also observe a strong correlation between reported condom use and the number of condoms an individual took from the sessions for ever use of female condoms (0.318, p-value <0.01), use of female condoms in the last 30 days (0.240, p-value <0.01), and current use of female condoms (0.389, p-value <0.01).

Access: Another possible alternative explanation could be that women with intermediate bargaining power are less able than women with high bargaining power to access male condoms (or other contraceptives) through the market or at health clinics. However, if this were the case then we would expect also to see stronger treatment effects for

[31] There is actually limited evidence of *under*-reporting of contraceptive use in the surveys: 5 out of 56 diary participants report never having used a female condom during the endline survey but report using them in the diaries; whilst for male condoms the figure is 4 out of 56 respondents. We cannot make the opposite comparison, given that the endline survey took place two months after the end of the diaries: if a respondent reports using condoms in the survey but not the diaries, it may be that she adopted them during those two months.

women with intermediate bargaining power on current use of *male* condoms, which the health workers also carry. Instead, we see that women with lower bargaining and higher bargaining power are equally likely as women with intermediate bargaining power to take up male condoms as a result of treatment (see Column 6 in Online Appendix Table B.6).

Use of other contraceptive methods: The interaction between bargaining power and treatment is also not proxying a differential effect of treatment depending on whether the respondent is using other methods of contraception (i.e. the pill or injectables) at baseline. When baseline use of other forms of contraception and its interaction with treatment are included into the regressions, the interactions between treatment and bargaining power remain negative and highly significant (see Column 2 in Online Appendix Table B.6).

HIV status: Finally, heterogeneity by bargaining power is also not proxying the observed heterogeneity by HIV status. This could have been the case since we observe that women with lower bargaining power are more likely to be HIV-positive. However, the interaction of the bargaining power measures with treatment remain negative and significant when controlling for HIV status and its interaction with treatment (see Column 4 in Online Appendix Table B.6). We also consider whether the respondent believes her partner is involved with other women. This variable is negatively correlated with our bargaining power index at baseline; but again, including it and its interaction with treatment does not remove the negative interaction between treatment and bargaining power (see Column 5 in Online Appendix Table B.6).

6 Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

To understand how our results might combine to impact welfare and policy, it is important to weigh the increase in condom coverage — and associated reduction in negative externalities from HIV transmission — against the decrease in average condom effectiveness compared to pure use of male condoms, and the observed increase in the number of sex acts. As an illustrative exercise, we conduct a cost-benefit analysis of two possible scale-ups to the entire female population of South Mozambique: a scale-up of our full

training intervention; and a scale-up of just the free distribution of female condoms, with the assumption that information about female condoms can be provided with zero marginal cost via existing sex education programmes. The purpose of this exercise is to highlight the potential magnitudes of the trade-offs involved in introducing a second-best technology, and the quantitative importance of the behavioural response. The purpose is not to provide an accurate cost-benefit estimation, given the inherent uncertainty in extrapolating from our observed treatment effects to what treatment effects would be in the whole population, over a longer time horizon, and from a different version of the intervention in the case of provision via existing sex education programmes.

Online Appendix Section B.4 details the methodology of our cost-benefit analysis in full. We adjust the epidemiological model used by UNAIDS in order to estimate the number of HIV infections and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) that free access to female condoms would help avert, based on our observed treatment effects. We also factor in productivity gains from a reduction in the burden of HIV, as is standard in the literature. On the cost side, we consider programme costs of introducing female condoms, but also cost savings from reduced provision of anti-retroviral therapies and prevention of mother-to-child transmission treatments.

The results show that accounting for the behavioural response, i.e. the observed increase in the number of sex acts, is crucial. Before accounting for this, both our full programme and adding female condoms to existing sex education programmes actually imply a cost saving. Intuitively, this is because low female bargaining power implies that the main margin of female condom adoption is from women previously having unprotected sex, rather than substitution away from male condoms. However, once we incorporate the behavioural response, only adding female condoms to existing sex education programmes has the potential to be cost-effective in our illustrative simulations.

7 Conclusion

Our results suggest that women with lower female bargaining power indeed struggle to adopt male condoms, in a context typical of many areas of Sub-Saharan Africa with high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. When female condoms are introduced with adequate information and support, they are taken up by women with lower bargaining power,

who are otherwise having unprotected sex.

In terms of policy, this means that the correct cost comparison for free provision of female condoms is not the free provision of male condoms, but rather the costs of anti-retroviral therapies and other costs associated with unprotected sex. However, more evidence from a similar intervention with a representative sample of the population and a longer time horizon after adoption is needed to refine the cost-benefit calculations and inform funding decisions.

More broadly, we have highlighted how low female bargaining power may constrain adoption of potentially welfare-improving household technologies, in cases where women have a stronger preference for adoption or face higher costs of non-adoption compared to men. There are many other examples of technologies where women may have a stronger willingness than men to adopt. For instance, women may have a higher demand for insurance, given evidence that they are more risk-averse. In such cases, enhancing women's bargaining power or targeting information and social norm campaigns specifically at men may be the first-best approaches to increasing investments and adoption. Otherwise, providing alternative versions of the technology that are more acceptable to men, or bundling technologies with goods for which men have strong demand, may offer a second-best solution. These remain important topics for future research.

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A Appendix

Table A.1: Comparison of Study Sample to DHS Representative Sample

	Study Mean	DHS Mean	t-test	Study N	DHS N
Demographics					
Age in years	30.32	29.47	1.55	298	1007
Years of education	6.22	6.72	-2.55	298	1007
Literate	0.84	0.76	3.51	298	1007
Income					
Has job	0.38	0.58	-6.50	298	1007
Relationships					
Married (officially or unofficially)	0.63	0.61	0.52	298	871
Pregnant	0.05	0.07	-0.82	298	1007
Wants another child in future	0.56	0.57	-0.17	298	961
Decision-making visiting family	0.64	0.39	7.27	294	580
Decision-making spending earnings	0.60	0.21	11.63	297	569
Decision-making her health	0.55	0.39	4.65	297	580
Sexual Behaviour					
Age of sexual debut in years	16.56	16.16	2.97	298	955
Used condom during last time sex	0.55	0.31	7.67	298	871

Notes: Column 1 displays the mean from our study sample at baseline (N=298). Column 2 shows the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) mean for women in urban areas of Maputo Province (N=1007). Lower sample sizes in Columns 4 and 5 reflect observations that are missing or not applicable. Unless otherwise indicated, all are binary variables. Column 3 presents the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean in the study sample is equal to the mean in the DHS sample. Variables selected for comparison are those that appear in both our study and the DHS, with similar or identical wording. The three "Decision-making" variables are indicators for whether the respondent is involved in making decisions on the respective activities.

Table A.2: Treatment effects – primary outcome variables

	(1) **Ever use female condoms**	(2) **Ever use male condoms**	(3) **Ever use other**	(4) **Use last 30 days female condoms**	(5) **Use last 30 days male condoms**	(6) **Current use female condoms**	(7) **Current use male condoms**	(8) **Current use other**
Treatment	0.184***	-0.012	0.020	0.047**	-0.052	0.077**	0.060	0.030
(Standard errors)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.053)
[Randomization inference p-value]	[0.000]	[0.777]	[0.649]	[0.080]	[0.359]	[0.025]	[0.348]	[0.583]
Observations	227	227	227	227	227	227	227	227
Control mean endline	0.088	0.824	0.735	0.010	0.363	0.020	0.353	0.412

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample, N=227. Dependent variables are binary indicators for the use of female condoms, male condoms and other modern contraceptive methods (other), such as the pill, injectables or IUD. Columns 1-3 refer to whether the respondent has ever used the method, columns 4 and 5 to whether she has used it in the last 30 days (this was only asked for condoms, not for other contraceptive methods), and columns 6-8 whether she is currently using it. "Treatment" is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. All regressions are linear probability model ANCOVA specifications, including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a regressor. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Randomisation inference p-values are estimated from Monte Carlo simulations re-assigning treatment within facilitator strata, with 1000 repetitions. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table A.3: Treatment effects on female condom use, by baseline male condom use

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Ever use female condom	**Ever use female condom**	**Last 30 days female condom**	**Last 30 days female condom**	**Current use female condom**	**Current use female condom**
	No use male condom at baseline	**Current use male condom at baseline**	**No use male condom at baseline**	**Current use male condom at baseline**	**No use male condom at baseline**	**Current use male condom at baseline**
Treatment	0.169***	0.232***	0.073**	0.030	0.085***	0.049
(Standard errors)	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.057)
[Randomization inference p-value]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.023]	[0.532]	[0.035]	[0.490]
Observations	141	86	141	86	141	86
Control mean endline	0.092	0.081	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.054

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample, N=227. Dependent variables are binary indicators for the use of female condoms: ever used in columns 1-2, used in last 30 days in columns 3-4, and currently using in columns 5-6. Odd-numbered columns present results for the subsample of individuals who were not currently using male condoms (No use) at baseline; even-numbered columns present results for the subsample of individuals who were currently using male condoms (Current use) at baseline. "Treatment" is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. All regressions are linear probability model ANCOVA specifications, including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a regressor. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Randomisation inference p-values are estimated from Monte Carlo simulations re-assigning treatment within facilitator strata, with 1000 repetitions. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Figure A.1: Sensitivity analysis of thresholds for low, intermediate, and high bargaining power



Notes: Each panel shows the predicted marginal effect and the 95% confidence interval of the effect of low bargaining power (lowBP), intermediate bargaining power (midBP), and high bargaining power (highBP) on current use of female condoms at endline. Each panel presents the predicted marginal effects for the bargaining power dummies when the thresholds for low versus intermediate bargaining power and for intermediate versus high bargaining power are set at varying centiles of the bargaining power index. The thresholds are indicated above each panel. The regressions on which the predicted marginal effects are based are on the balanced sample of respondents who are in a stable relationship (N=194). The dependent variable is a binary indicator for current use of female condoms at endline. The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification where low bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) and high bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) are interacted with treatment. We include the baseline value of the dependent variable, as well as all control variables. Controls are "Age in years," "Years of education," "Literacy," "Household head," "Has job," "Personal income last 30 days (MZN)," "In a stable relationship (incl. married)," "Married," "Years relation," "Number of partners in the last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Wants another child now," "Wants another child," "Beliefs high risk HIV – general," "Beliefs high risk HIV – for self," "Walking distance to the health centre," "Mentions female condoms as contraceptive." All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation.

Figure A.2: Reweighting for selection into sample by bargaining power



Notes: Panel (a) shows the results from Figure 3. Panel (b) shows the results from a reweighting of our regression specification by the inverse probability of the likelihood that a woman with low bargaining power is in our sample, controlling for all control variables as in Figure 3 as well as baseline contraceptive use. Both panels show the predicted marginal effect on current use of female condoms for respondents with low bargaining power (lowBP), intermediate bargaining power (midBP), and high bargaining power (highBP) for the treatment and control group combined. The threshold for low versus intermediate bargaining power was set at the 5th centile, and the threshold for intermediate versus high bargaining power was set at the 20th centile. Each marker (circle) represents the predicted marginal effect. Each bar represents the 90% confidence interval. Treatment is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the effect of treatment represents the intent-to-treat effect. The marginal effects are predicted based on a regression on the balanced survey sample (N=227) for those women in a stable relationship (N=194). The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification where dummies for low bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) and high bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) are interacted with treatment. The regressions include the baseline value of the use of female condoms, controls (as in Figure 3), and facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. The number of observations in the unweighted sample is 194 which translates into 148 observations for the regression that is reweighted.

B For Online Publication – Appendices

B.1 Theoretical Appendices

B.1.1 Proof of proposition one

The couple will choose $s = 1$ if and only if there exists some readily-available technology on the frontier (P, H) such that $u_i(P, H) \geq u_i^0 \quad \forall i = m, f$. Define

$$I^0 = \left\{(P, H) \in R^2 | u_i(P, H) \geq u_i^0, i = m, f\right\} \tag{B.1}$$

as the set of all points (P, H) that satisfies both partner's participation constraints. [32]

To see why the optimal choice of health is increasing in α, assume that the intersection $\{US, FC, MC\} \cap I^0$ is non-empty, and thus that sex with some readily-available technology provides greater utility to both members of the couple than no sex. Consider then the unconstrained household maximisation problem

$$\max_H \left\{\alpha u_f(P(H), H) + (1 - \alpha) u_m(P(H), H)\right\}. \tag{B.2}$$

Since each $u_i(P(H), H)$ is quasi-concave, the objective function is also quasi-concave and has a unique solution. Denote this solution $\widetilde{H}(\alpha)$. It follows straightforwardly from the single crossing property in Assumption 1 that $\widetilde{H}'(\alpha) > 0$.

For convenience of notation, define

$$U_j(H) = u_j(P(H), H) \tag{B.3}$$

for partner $j = m, f$, where $P(H)$ describes the technological frontier. Equation B.2 becomes

$$\max_H \left\{\alpha U_f(H) + (1 - \alpha) U_m(H)\right\}. \tag{B.4}$$

[32] Specifically, $I^0 = I_m^0 \cap I_f^0$, where $I_i^0 = \left\{(P, H) \in R^2 | u_i(P, H) \geq u_i^0\right\}$ is the upper contour set of the indifference curve corresponding to the reservation utility u_i^0.

The first-order condition is

$$\alpha U_f'(H) + (1-\alpha) U_m'(H) = 0. \tag{B.5}$$

Note this implies that at the optimal choice $\widetilde{H}$, U_f' and U_m' must be of opposite signs. It follows from the single-crossing property in Equation 1 that at the optimum, $U_f'(H) > 0$ and $U_m'(H) < 0$.

The second-order condition is

$$\alpha U_f''(H) + (1-\alpha) U_m''(H) < 0. \tag{B.6}$$

Taking the first-order condition in Equation B.5 as an implicit definition of $\widetilde{H}(\alpha)$, and differentiating with respect to α, we obtain

$$\left[\alpha U_f''(H(\alpha)) + (1-\alpha) U_m''(H(\alpha))\right] \widetilde{H}'(\alpha) + U_f'(H) - U_m'(H) = 0, \tag{B.7}$$

which yields

$$\widetilde{H}'(\alpha) = -\frac{U_f'(H) - U_m'(H)}{\alpha U_f''(H(\alpha)) + (1-\alpha) U_m''(H(\alpha))}. \tag{B.8}$$

To determine the sign of the numerator, note that from the first-order condition we have that

$$-U_m'(H) = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} U_f'(H), \tag{B.9}$$

and thus that

$$sgn\left[\widetilde{H}'(\alpha)\right] = sgn\left[U_f'(H) - U_m'(H)\right] = sgn\left[U_f'(H)\left(1 + \frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)}\right)\right] = sgn\left[U_f'(H)\right]. \tag{B.10}$$

As reasoned above, at the optimum $U_f'(H) > 0$ because of the single-crossing property. Thus $\widetilde{H}'(\alpha) > 0$.

However, it is possible that $\widetilde{H}(\alpha)$ does not lie on the intersection of I^0 and the technology frontier. By the single crossing assumption, the left-most endpoint H_L of this intersection is defined by $u_f(P(H_L), H_L) = u_f^0$, while the right-most endpoint H_U

is defined by $u_f\left(P\left(H_U\right), H_U\right) = u_m^0$. This is illustrated in Figure 1. It could therefore be that $u_f\left(P\left(\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right), \widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right) < u_f^0$ or that $u_m\left(P\left(\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right), \widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right) < u_m^0$ (but not both). Consider the case in which her participation constraint binds, such that $u_f\left(P\left(\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right), \widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right) < u_f^0$. The couple then instead chooses the closest incentive-compatible choice, which solves the incentive-constrained household utility maximisation problem

$$\max_H \left\{u_m\left(P(H), H\right) | \mu_f\left[u_f\left(P(H), H\right) - u_f^0\right]\right\}. \tag{B.11}$$

They hence choose H_L, which is independent of α. Vice versa, if his participation constraint binds they choose H_U. If neither partner's participation constraint binds, they choose $\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)$ as before.

Given that $\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)$ is increasing in α, this implies that there are threshold values for α defined by $\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha_j\right) = H_j$ for $j = L, U$ such that

$$H^*\left(\alpha\right) = \begin{cases} H_L & \text{if } \alpha < \alpha_L \\ \widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right) & \text{if } \alpha \in \left[\alpha_L, \alpha_U\right] \\ H_U & \text{if } \alpha > \alpha_U. \end{cases} \tag{B.12}$$

It follows that $H^*\left(\alpha\right)$ is weakly increasing in α: $H^*\left(\alpha\right)$ is constant below α_L and above α_H, and is strictly increasing inbetween. This is illustrated in Figure B.1.

When only the binary set $\{US, MC\}$ is available, it follows directly from the weakly increasing nature of $H^*\left(\alpha\right)$ that there will be cut-off values of α such that

$$H^*\left(\alpha\right) = \begin{cases} H_L & \text{if } \alpha < \alpha_L \\ H_{US} & \text{if } \alpha \in \left[\alpha_L, \alpha'\right] \\ H_{MC} & \text{if } \alpha \in \left[\alpha', \alpha_U\right] \\ H_U & \text{if } \alpha > \alpha_U. \end{cases} \tag{B.13}$$

The introduction of female condoms expands the available technologies to the ternary set $\{US, FC, MC\}$.[33] Given that $H_{MC} > H_{FC} > H_{US}$, it follows directly that there

[33]Inserting female condoms prior to intercourse may also allow women with low bargaining

Figure B.1: Interior optimum health choices by female bargaining power



will threshold values of α such that

$$H^*(\alpha) = \begin{cases} H_L & \text{if } \alpha < \alpha_L \\ H_{US} & \text{if } \alpha \in [\alpha_L, \alpha''] \\ H_{FC} & \text{if } \alpha \in [\alpha'', \alpha'''] \\ H_{MC} & \text{if } \alpha \in [\alpha''', \alpha_U] \\ H_U & \text{if } \alpha > \alpha_U. \end{cases} \tag{B.14}$$

QED.

B.1.2 Proof of proposition two

Prior to the introduction of female condoms, the couple will only choose $s = 1$ if the set $\{US, MC\} \cap I^0$ is non-empty. Meanwhile, following the introduction of female condoms, the couple will choose $s = 1$ if the set $\{US, FC, MC\} \cap I^0$ is non-empty. Since FC is an intermediate option between US and MC, and since I^0 is a quasi-convex set, the latter condition is more likely to be satisfied. Put differently, there is a weakly positive probability that there exist couples for whom US and MC lie outside of I^0, but for

power to change the default from unprotected sex to female condom use as partners enter into bargaining over condom use.

whom $FC \in I^0$.

QED.

B.1.3 Model with transfers

We can generalize the model to include transfers in the following way. Let q_i be an action that spouse i can take, for example housework, with marginal cost to spouse i of unity and marginal benefit to the other spouse of $\phi(q_i)$. This nests the no-transfer case if $\phi(q) = 0$. Let $\phi(0) = 0$, and assume that $\phi'(q) \in [0, 1]$ and $\phi''(q) < 0$, implying that transfers involve some friction. We normalise such that at no sex, $s = 0$, both transfers are equal to zero.

The individual utility functions with sex and transfers become

$$v_i(P, H, q_i, q_{-i}) = u_i(P, H) - q_i + \phi(q_{-i}). \tag{B.15}$$

All other aspects of the model are kept intact.

Extensive Margin: The couple will choose $s = 1$ if and only if there exists some $(P, H, q_m, q_f) \in \{US, FC, MC\} \times \times R_+^2$ such that $v_i(P, H, q_i, q_{-i}) \geq u_i^0 \quad \forall i = m, f$. It follows that the possibility of transfers increases the likelihood that $s = 1$ compared to the no-transfer case, insofar as there are cases where $s = 1$ occurs with transfers but would not if transfers were not possible. Note that it is still the case that the choice of $s = 0$ or $s = 1$ does not depend on α.

Intensive Margin: Suppose that the above condition is satisfied and thus that $s = 1$. The unconstrained household utility maximisation problem generalises to

$$\max_{H, q_m, q_f} \{(1-\alpha)[u_m(P(H), H) - q_m + \phi(q_f)] + \alpha[u_f(P(H), H) - q_f + \phi(q_m)]\}. \tag{B.16}$$

Due to the separable form, the first-order condition with respect to H is the same for the model without transfers, namely

$$\alpha u'_{fH}\left(P(H),H\right)+\left(1-\alpha\right)u'_{mH}\left(P(H),H\right)=0. \tag{B.17}$$

Thus the unconstrained function $\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)$ is preserved. In addition we now have the complementary slackness conditions

$$\left(1-\alpha\right)\geq\alpha\phi'\left(q_m\right), \tag{B.18}$$

and

$$\left(1-\alpha\right)\phi'\left(q_f\right)\leq\alpha, \tag{B.19}$$

implying a solution $\widetilde{q}_j\left(\alpha\right)$ for $j=m,f$. Note that $\phi'\left(q\right)\leq 1)$ implies that only one of the complementary slackness conditions can hold with equality — i.e. q_f and q_m cannot be positive at the same time — and thus transfers will only occur in one direction. Intuitively, if α is low then $q_f>0$, and vice versa if α is high. Taken together, this gives rise to implied utilities

$$\widetilde{V}_i\left(\alpha\right)=u_i\left(P(\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)),\widetilde{H}\left(\alpha\right)\right)-\widetilde{q}_i\left(\alpha\right)+\phi\left(\widetilde{q}_{-i}\left(\alpha\right)\right)i=m,f \tag{B.20}$$

with $\widetilde{V}'_f\left(\alpha\right)>0$ and $\widetilde{V}'_m\left(\alpha\right)<0$.

However, as before, if α is low enough such that $\widetilde{V}_f\left(\alpha\right)<u_f^0$ then the female's participation constraint binds. The couple instead choose an allocation that just satisfies her participation constraint, solving

$$\max_{H,q_m,q_f}\left\{U_m\left(P(H),H\right)-q_m+\phi\left(q_f\right)|U_f\left(P(H),H\right)-q_f+\phi\left(q_m\right)\geq u_f^0\right\}, \tag{B.21}$$

with the following Lagrangean

$$L=U_m\left(P(H),H\right)-q_m+\phi\left(q_f\right)+\mu_f\left\{U_f\left(P(H),H\right)-q_f+\phi\left(q_m\right)-u_f^0\right\}. \tag{B.22}$$

Since the female's participation constraint failed at the unconstrained solution, it follows that the constrained solution involves a larger implicit relative weight to the woman: $\mu_f^* \geq \alpha/(1-\alpha)$. The reverse logic applies if his participation constraint fails.

Taken together, this implies that $H^*(\alpha)$ is weakly increasing in α as in the no-transfer case, but that the range of values for which it is strictly increasing (i.e. in which an interior solution $\widetilde{H}$ is chosen) is smaller than in the no-transfer case. In terms of Figure B.1, as transfers become less costly, the horizontal segments of the line move closer to one another vertically, and thus the range $\alpha_H - \alpha_L$ becomes smaller.

B.1.4 The limiting case of frictionless transfers

Consider the limiting case where transfers are frictionless, such that $\phi'(\cdot)$ is constant and equal to unity. In this case we can simply refer to q as the net transfer from her to him, which is negative if on net he transfers to her. Hence the household's unconstrained optimisation problem collapses to

$$\max_{H,q} \left\{(1-\alpha)\left[u_m\left(P(H),H\right)+q\right]+\alpha\left[u_f\left(P(H),H\right)-q\right]\right\}. \tag{B.23}$$

It is straightforward to see that this problem has no solution, except in the knife-edge case where $\alpha = 1/2$. Taking the first-order condition with respect to q, we obtain

$$1-\alpha-\alpha=0. \tag{B.24}$$

Since generically $\alpha \neq 1/2$, the solution will involve infinite transfers in one of the two possible directions. However, this then trivially leads to the failure of the donor's participation constraint. Suppose that $\alpha < 1/2$ whereby she is the donor. In that case the couple instead solves

$$\max_{H,q} \left\{u_m\left(P(H),H\right)+q \middle| u_f\left(P(H),H\right)-q \geq u_f^0\right\}, \tag{B.25}$$

with Lagrangean

$$L = u_m\left(P(H), H\right) + q + \mu_f^* \left[u_f\left(P(H), H\right) - q - u_f^0\right]. \tag{B.26}$$

Note that the first-order condition with respect to q is $1 - \mu_f^* = 0$, implying $\mu_f^* = 1$. The first-order condition with respect to H therefore implies $u'_{fH}\left(P(H), H\right) = u'_{mH}\left(P(H), H\right)$. By a corresponding analysis of the case where $\alpha < 1/2$, we obtain that, with frictionless transfers, $u'_m\left(H\right) = u'_f\left(H\right)$ characterizes the couple's choice of H for any α. That is, the choice of contraceptive technology is independent of the bargaining weight. In terms of Figure B.1, we reach the limiting case where the horizontal segments of the line become completely aligned vertically, and $\widetilde{H}$ is just a constant for an value of α.

B.2 Additional Tables

Table B.1: Predictors of attrition – treatment and control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Treatment		**Control**		**Test $\beta_1 = \beta_2$**			**N**	
	Mfx	**p-val**	**Mfx**	**p-val**	**χ^2**	**p-val**	**T**	**C**	**All**
Demographics									
Age in years	-0.01	0.12	-0.01	0.22	0.03	0.86	152	146	298
Years of education	-0.01	0.45	-0.01	0.46	0.00	0.99	152	146	298
Literate	-0.09	0.27	-0.06	0.52	0.13	0.71	152	146	298
Household head	-0.05	0.49	0.01	0.95	0.32	0.57	152	146	298
Income									
Has job	-0.03	0.67	0.01	0.89	0.17	0.68	152	146	298
Personal income last 30 days (MZN)	-0.00	0.11	-0.00	0.17	0.89	0.35	152	146	298
Relationships									
In a stable relationship (incl. married)	-0.08	0.32	-0.02	0.82	0.31	0.58	152	146	298
Married (officially or unofficially)	-0.02	0.78	0.04	0.57	0.35	0.56	152	146	298
Years relation	-0.01	0.20	-0.01	0.15	0.01	0.93	152	146	298
# Partners last 12 months	-0.09	0.19	0.00	0.98	0.84	0.36	152	146	298
Sexual knowledge & behaviour									
Pregnant	0.00	<0.01	0.03	0.86	0.03	0.86	152	146	298
HIV positive (self-report)	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.84	1.37	0.24	131	129	260
STI last 3 months (self-report)	0.06	0.47	-0.16	0.25	1.80	0.18	135	124	259
Wants another child now	-0.04	0.74	0.11	0.29	0.72	0.40	152	146	298
Wants another child	-0.02	0.80	0.12	0.10	1.62	0.20	152	146	298
Beliefs high risk of HIV – general	-0.10	0.11	-0.17	0.02	0.15	0.70	152	146	298
Beliefs high risk of HIV – for self	-0.11	0.08	-0.18	0.01	0.18	0.68	152	146	298
Walking distance to health centre (in min.)	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.36	0.01	0.92	152	146	298
Mentions female condom as contraceptive	-0.04	0.53	-0.06	0.39	0.01	0.94	152	146	298
Contraceptive use									
Ever use female condoms	0.05	0.60	0.06	0.64	0.00	0.94	152	146	298
Ever use male condoms	0.08	0.28	-0.00	0.95	0.75	0.39	152	146	298
Ever use other	-0.07	0.27	0.05	0.56	1.44	0.23	152	146	298
Use female condoms last 30 days	-0.01	0.94	0.00	<0.01	0.01	0.94	152	146	298
Use male condoms last 30 days	-0.04	0.53	-0.09	0.31	0.06	0.80	152	146	298
Current use female condoms	0.00	<0.01	0.00	<0.01	n.a.	n.a.	152	146	298
Current use male condoms	0.07	0.23	0.01	0.90	0.64	0.42	152	146	298
Current use other	-0.03	0.68	0.08	0.28	1.03	0.31	152	146	298

Notes: N=298 in the baseline sample prior to attrition. Lower sample sizes reflect observations that are missing or not applicable. "Treatment" contains all individuals assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions), whether or not they attended the sessions. "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Columns 1-4 show marginal effects (Mfx) and p-values (p-val) for logit regressions of the probability of attritting on each covariate, in the treatment and control group, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show the χ^2 statistic and p-value for the test that the marginal effects are equal across the treatment and control groups. Columns 7-9 show sample sizes. Unless otherwise indicated, all are binary variables. MZN stands for Mozambican meticais. HIV stands for Human Immune-deficiency Virus. STI stands for Sexually Transmitted Infections. "Beliefs high risk of HIV – general ' and "... – for self" are binary variables which are coded 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the respondent scored a value above the median for the questions "What is the risk of being infected with HIV when having unprotected sex for a woman in general? And for you specifically?" measured on a 1-5 scale ranging from No risk to Very risky. "Ever used other" and "Current use other" refer to use of any other modern contraceptive method apart from condoms, e.g. the pill, injectables, or an IUD.

Table B.2: Diary sample representativeness of full sample – covariates

	Mean	Survey Mean	Diaries Mean	t-test	Survey N	Diaries N
Demographics						
Age in years	30.48	30.32	31.32	-0.81	298	56
Years of education	6.17	6.22	5.95	0.62	298	56
Literate	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.14	298	55
Household head	0.24	0.22	0.30	-1.18	298	56
Income						
Has job	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.02	298	56
Personal income last 30 days (MZN)	896.90	880.74	1005.36	-1.18	298	56
Relationships						
In a stable relationship (incl. married)	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.12	298	56
Married (officially or unofficially)	0.61	0.63	0.54	1.24	298	56
Years relation	9.13	8.50	11.78	-2.24**	298	41
# Partners last 12 months	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.24	298	56
Sexual knowledge & behaviour						
Pregnant	0.05	0.05	0.00	4.11***	298	56
HIV positive (self-report)	0.33	0.33	0.33	-0.09	260	48
STI last 3 months (self-report)	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12	259	48
Mentions female condom as contraceptive	0.39	0.41	0.27	2.08**	298	55

Notes: N=298 in the baseline sample, of which N=56 are in the subsample who respond to the diaries. Lower sample sizes in columns 5 and 6 reflect observations that are missing or not applicable. "Survey" contains all individuals in the baseline sample, whether or not they participated in the diaries. "Diaries" contains only the subsample of individuals who also responded to the diaries. Column 4 presents the t-test statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean in the diary subsample is equal to the mean in the survey sample. Unless otherwise indicated, all are binary variables. MZN stands for Mozambican meticais. HIV stands for Human Immune-deficiency Virus. STI stands for Sexually Transmitted Infections. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table B.3: Interaction of treatment with bargaining power index

	(1) Current use of female condoms
Treatment	0.215**
	(0.097)
Bargaining power index	-0.037
	(0.058)
Treatment × Bargaining power index	-0.198*
	(0.103)
Controls	✓
Observations	194
Control mean endline	0.020

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample of respondents who are in a stable relationship (N=194). Dependent variable is a binary indicator for current use of female condoms at endline. The regressions are lineair probability model ANCOVA specifications where we include the baseline value of the dependent variable, as well as all control variables as in Figure 3. "Treatment" contains all individuals assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions), whether or not they attended the sessions. "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. "Bargaining power index" is the result of a factor analysis on all the survey questions in the decision-making and power dynamics survey modules. The index is normalized so that a one point increase represents an increase of one standard deviation. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table B.4: Impacts on current use of female condoms by female bargaining power

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) All	(4) All	(5) All	(6) No MC at baseline
Low bargaining power	-0.241**	-0.054	-0.087	-0.083	-0.094	0.087
	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.081)	(0.122)	(0.206)
Treatment	0.074**	0.328**	0.373**	0.339**	0.296*	0.326**
	(0.033)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.142)	(0.161)
Low bargaining power× Treatment		-0.347**	(-0.366)**	-0.339**	-0.312*	-0.381**
		(0.165)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.176)	(0.183)
High bargaining power	-0.229***	-0.077	-0.047	-0.072	-0.090	0.014
	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.079)
High bargaining power× Treatment		-0.285*	-0.330**	-0.295*	-0.260*	-0.288*
		(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.159)	(0.153)	(0.167)
Controls	✓	✓	✓			✓
Lasso-selected controls					✓	
Observations	194	194	194	194	194	113
Control mean endline	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample of respondents who are in a stable relationship (N=194) in Columns (1)-(5), and for a subset of respondents in a stable relationship who were not using male condoms at baseline in Columns (6). Dependent variable is a binary indicator for current use of female condoms at endline. "Treatment" contains all individuals assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions), whether or not they attended the sessions. "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. The threshold for low versus intermediate bargaining power was set at the 5th centile of the bargaining power index, and the threshold for intermediate versus high bargaining power was set at the 20th centile of the bargaining power index. "Bargaining power index" is the result of a factor analysis on all the survey questions in the decision-making and power dynamics survey modules. The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification. We include the baseline value of the dependent variable, as well as all control variables. Controls are "Age in years," "Years of education," "Literacy," "Household head," "Has job," "Personal income last 30 days (MZN)," "In a stable relationship (incl. married)," "Married," "Years relation," "Number of partners in the last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Wants another child now," "Wants another child," "Beliefs high risk HIV – general," "Beliefs high risk HIV – for self," "Walking distance to the health centre," "Mentions female condoms as contraceptive." All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table B.5: Heckman sample selection correction for attrition – primary outcomes

	(1) Ever use female condoms	(2) Ever use male condoms	(3) Use last 30 days female condoms	(4) Use last 30 days male condoms	(5) Current use female condoms	(6) Current use male condoms
Treatment Heckman	0.192***	0.003	0.052*	-0.001	0.091**	0.119
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.099)	(0.037)	(0.111)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	525	525	525	525	525	525
Selected observations	227	227	227	227	227	227

Notes: Results from a Heckman selection correction for attrition, to check if our results are robust to the possibility that unobservables differentially predict attrition across treatment and control. Treatment is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the effect of treatment represents the intent-to-treat effect. The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification, controlling for the baseline value of the use of the specified contraceptive method and facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. To select the predictors of attrition for the selection equation in the Heckman we first run a LASSO specification of attrition on all our control variables, measures of baseline contraceptive use, treatment, and facilitator dummies. The LASSO-selected variables are then included in our sample selection equation that we use for the Heckman selection correction. The LASSO-selected variables are "Use of male condoms in the last 30 days at baseline," "Current use of female condoms at baseline,"; "Literate," "Years of education," "Has job," "In a stable relationship," "Years relation," "# Partners last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Beliefs high HIV risk – general," "Beliefs high HIV risk – general," "Treatment," "Facilitator 2," "Faciolitator 33' "Facilitator 4," "Facilitator 9. The number of observations in the selection equation is 298, and the number of observations in the selected regression equation is 227.

Table B.6: Impacts on current use of condoms by female bargaining power – Alternative explanations

	(1) Current use female condoms	(2) Current use female condoms	(3) Current use female condoms	(4) Current use female condoms	(5) Current use female condoms	(6) Current use male condoms
Low bargaining power	-0.054	-0.052	-0.062	-0.128	-0.052	-0.098
	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.156)	(0.121)	(0.248)
Treatment	0.328**	0.332**	0.286*	0.380**	0.368**	0.116
	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.183)	(0.154)	(0.216)
Low bargaining power×Treatment	-0.347**	-0.341**	-0.355**	-0.320	-0.366**	0.007
	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.214)	(0.171)	(0.333)
High bargaining power	-0.077	-0.074	-0.106	-0.056	-0.072	-0.025
	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.111)	(0.084)	(0.188)
High bargaining power×Treatment	-0.285*	-0.289*	-0.265*	-0.397**	-0.301*	-0.092
	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.187)	(0.154)	(0.232)
Use other contraceptives×Treatment		-0.010				
		(0.079)				
Distance to health facility×Treatment			0.119			
			(0.105)			
HIV positive×Treatment				0.151		
				(0.105)		
Partner involved with others×Treatment					-0.071	
					(0.058)	
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	194	194	194	169	193	194
Control mean endline	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.353

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample of respondents who are in a stable relationship (N=194). Dependent variable is a binary indicator for current use of female condoms at endline. "Treatment" contains all individuals assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions), whether or not they attended the sessions. "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. The threshold for low versus intermediate bargaining power was set at the 5th centile of the bargaining power index, and the threshold for intermediate versus high bargaining power was set at the 20th centile of the bargaining power index. "Bargaining power index" is the result of a factor analysis on all the survey questions in the decision-making and power dynamics survey modules. The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification. We include the baseline value of the dependent variable, as well as all control variables. Controls are "Age in years," "Years of education," "Literacy," "Household head," "Has job," "Personal income last 30 days (MZN)," "In a stable relationship (incl. married)," "Married," "Years relation," "Number of partners in the last 12 months," "Pregnant," "Wants another child now," "Wants another child," "Beliefs high risk HIV – general," "Beliefs high risk HIV – to self," "Walking distance to the health centre," "Mentions female condoms as contraceptive." All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table B.7: Treatment effects – heterogeneity by relationship status

	(1) **Ever use female condoms**	(2) **Ever use male condoms**	(3) **Use last 30 days female condoms**	(4) **Use last 30 days male condoms**	(5) **Current use female condoms**	(6) **Current use male condoms**
Treatment	0.358***	-0.089	0.040	0.061	0.165*	0.179
	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.054)	(0.153)	(0.088)	(0.150)
Stable relationship	0.030	-0.038	0.007	-0.052	0.024	-0.064
	(0.051)	(0.078)	(0.020)	(0.120)	(0.024)	(0.109)
Treat×Stable relationship	-0.202*	0.090	0.009	-0.132	-0.102	-0.141
	(0.109)	(0.121)	(0.064)	(0.166)	(0.093)	(0.162)
Observations	227	227	220	221	227	227
Control mean endline	0.088	0.824	0.010	0.366	0.020	0.353

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample, N=227. Reduced observations in columns (3) and (4) reflect there being no variation in the outcome variable conditional on the facilitator fixed effect and controls. Dependent variables are binary indicators for the use of female condoms (FC) and male condoms (MC). Columns 1 and 2 refer to whether the respondent has ever used the method, columns 3 and 4 to whether she has used it in the last 30 days, and columns 5 and 6 to whether she is currently using it. "Treatment" is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. "Stable relationship" is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports being in a stable relationship at baseline. All regressions are linear probability model ANCOVA specifications, including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a regressor. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$.

Table B.8: Treatment effects – bargaining power

	Mfx	s.e.	p-val	N
Who decides about...				
...buying clothes for you?	-0.03	0.04	0.46	227
...buying phone credit?	0.03	0.04	0.52	227
...education for the children?	-0.03	0.04	0.46	226
...health expenses for you?	-0.10	0.04	0.01	227
...health expenses for the children?	-0.06	0.04	0.13	225
...if you are allowed to work?	-0.06	0.04	0.16	227
...how earnings are used?	-0.01	0.04	0.74	227
...visits to friends?	-0.00	0.04	1.00	226
...visits to family?	-0.01	0.05	0.80	226
Who usually has more say when you talk about serious things	0.11	0.05	0.03	177
In general, who do you think has more power in your relationship	0.11	0.05	0.02	177
Power dynamics				
Most of the time, we do what my partner wants to do	-0.03	0.05	0.45	193
My partner won't let me wear certain things	-0.01	0.05	0.82	193
When my partner and I are together, I'm pretty quiet	-0.04	0.05	0.37	193
My partner has more say about important decisions that affect us	-0.03	0.05	0.51	193
My partner tells me who I can spend time with	-0.03	0.05	0.52	193
I feel trapped or stuck in our relationship	-0.00	0.05	0.99	193
My partner does what he wants, even if I do not want him to	-0.05	0.05	0.27	193
I am more committed to our relationship than my partner is	0.04	0.05	0.34	193
My partner is involved with other people apart from me	-0.15	0.05	0.00	193
My partner always wants to know where I am	0.13	0.04	0.00	193
When my partner and I disagree, he gets his way most of the time	0.07	0.05	0.12	193

Notes: Regressions on the balanced sample (N=227). Lower sample sizes reflect observations that are missing or not applicable. Dependent variables are the individual bargaining power indicators measured at endline, as indicated in each row. The decision-making questions "Who has more say" and "Who has more power" as well as the "Power dynamics" questions were asked only of women in a stable relationship (N=194). Columns (1)-(3) shows the marginal effects (Mfx), standard errors (s.e.), and p-values (p-val) respectively, for regressions on the "Treatment" indicator of being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treatment" is the intent-to-treat effect. All regressions are linear probability model ANCOVA specifications, including the baseline value of the dependent variable as a regressor. All regressions include facilitator dummies (N=16), since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation.

Table B.9: Impacts on proportion of sex acts in a week where the respondent and her partner had discussions about protection – diary subsample

	(1) **Discussion full endline**	(2) **Female-initiated full endline**	(3) **Discussion last 30 days**	(4) **Female-initiated last 30 days**	(5) **Discussion last 14 days**	(6) **Female-initiated last 14 days**
Treat×endline	-0.031	-0.078	-0.126	-0.144*	-0.282**	-0.219***
	(0.111)	(0.078)	(0.103)	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.064)
Facilitator×endline f.e.'s	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	398	398	259	259	179	179
Control mean	0.227	0.192	0.275	0.228	0.311	0.265

Notes: Regressions on the balanced diary sample, N=56. Dependent variables are the proportion of sex acts of a respondent in a particular week where the respondent and her partner had discussions about condom use. Column 1 and 2 report the results for the full endline period, Column 3 and 4 for the last 30 days, and Column 5 and 6 the last 14 days. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for any discussion while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report results only for female-initiated discussions. All regressions are linear probability individual fixed effects models comparing the proportion of sex acts of a respondent in a week with discussions during the baseline period with the proportion of sex acts of a respondent in a week with discussions during the endline period, with the respondent-week as the unit of observation and weeks with zero sex acts being counted as missing (N=398 for the full endline period, N=259 for the last 30 days, and N=169 for the last 14 days). "Treat × endline" is an indicator for observations in the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) during the relevant endline period ("full endline", "last 30 days", or "last 14 days") as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the coefficient on "Treat × endline" is the intent-to-treat effect. All regressions include facilitator × endline fixed effects (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to individual-level heteroskedasticity, since this was the level of randomisation. Significance levels $p < 0.10^{*}$, $p < 0.05^{**}$, $p < 0.01^{***}$

Table B.10: Equality of means baseline and endline contraceptive use in control group

	Mean	**Baseline Mean**	**Endline Mean**	**t-test**	**Control N**
Ever use female condoms	0.09	0.07	0.11	-0.94	107
Ever use male condoms	0.79	0.77	0.81	-0.84	107
Ever use other	0.71	0.71	0.72	-0.15	107
Used female condoms last 30 days	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	107
Used male condoms last 30 days	0.33	0.30	0.36	-1.01	107
Current use female condoms	0.04	0.03	0.05	-0.72	107
Current use male condoms	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.00	107
Current use other	0.40	0.38	0.41	-0.42	107

Notes: Based on the subset of respondents in the balanced sample who were assigned to the control group (N=107). "Control" contains all individuals assigned to the control group (i.e. to the second round of training sessions). Column 4 presents the t-statistic of the hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean of our outcome measures for contraceptive use in the baseline and endline. Outcome measures are binary indicators for the use of female condoms, male condoms, and other modern contaceptive methods (other), such as the pill, injectables, or IUD.

B.3 Additional Figures

Figure B.2: Histogram of the bargaining power index



Notes: Histogram of the distribution of the bargaining power index in our balanced sample (N=194). The bargaining power index was created by conducting a tetrachoric factor analysis of all the baseline bargaining power survey questions that were asked in the "Decision-making" and the "Power dynamics" survey module (see Table 2. The index is normalized so that a one point increase represents an increase of one standard deviation.

Figure B.3: Predicted marginal effect of bargaining power index on female condom use



Notes: Predicted marginal effects of the bargaining power index on the current use of female condoms at endline. The marker (circle) presents the predicted marginal effect. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The predicted marginal effects are based on a regression on the balanced sample of respondents who are in a stable relationship (N=194). Dependent variable is a binary indicator for current use of female condoms at endline. The predicted marginal effect is the effect of the bargaining power index on current use of female condoms, produced by a regression including bargaining power, its square, and its cube, baseline use of female condoms, treatment and control variables as in Figure 3. The bargaining power index was created by conducting a tetrachoric factor analysis of all the baseline bargaining power survey questions that were asked in the "Decision-making" and the "Power dynamics" survey module as in Table 2. The index is normalized so that a one point increase represents an increase of one standard deviation.

Figure B.4: Heckman sample selection correction for attrition – heterogeneity results



Notes: Panel (a) shows the results from Figure 3. Panel (b) shows the results from a Heckman selection correction for attrition, to check if our results are robust to the possibility that unobservables differentially predict attrition across treatment and control. Both panels show the predicted marginal effect on current use of female condoms for respondents with low bargaining power (lowBP), intermediate bargaining power (midBP), and high bargaining power (highBP) for the treatment and control group combined. The threshold for low versus intermediate bargaining power was set at the 5th centile, and the threshold for intermediate versus high bargaining power was set at the 20th centile. Each marker (circle) represents the predicted marginal effect. Each bar represents the 90% confidence interval. Treatment is an indicator for being assigned to the treatment group (i.e. to the first round of the family planning training sessions) as opposed to the control group (i.e. the second round of training sessions). Not all respondents assigned to treatment attended the sessions, thus the effect of treatment represents the intent-to-treat effect. The marginal effects are predicted based on a regression on the balanced survey sample (N=227) for those women in a stable relationship (N=194). The regression is a linear probability model ANCOVA specification where dummies for low bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) and high bargaining power (versus intermediate bargaining power) are interacted with treatment. The regressions include the baseline value of the use of female condoms, controls (as in Figure 3), and facilitator dummies (N=16) since randomisation was stratified on facilitator. To select the predictors of attrition for the selection equation in the Heckman we first run a LASSO specification of attrition on all our control variables, measures of baseline contraceptive use, treatment, and facilitator dummies. The LASSO-selected variables are then included in our sample selection equation that we use for the Heckman selection correction. The LASSO-selected variables are "Use of male condoms in the last 30 days at baseline," "Current use of female condoms at baseline,"; "Literate," "Has job," "Years relation," "# Partners last 12 months," "Beliefs high HIV risk – general," "Treatment," "Facilitator 2," "Facilitator 4," "Facilitator 9. The number of observations in the selection equation is 298, and the number of observations in the selected regression equation is 194.

B.4 Cost-Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis

We estimate the effects on the entire population of Southern Mozambique of scaling up the intervention to cover all women in the age-group typically considered as most sexually active (15-49 years) for the years 2015-30, excluding high-risk groups.[34] We take the current HIV/AIDS national strategic program in Mozambique as given, assuming that commitments including the provision of anti-retroviral therapies (ART) would not change if female condoms were also offered. We first simulate a control projection, where estimates from 2015-16 are taken and projections for 2017-30 are made based on the status quo, with none of the epidemiological and behavioural parameters changed. We then simulate two female condom intervention scenarios, based on the impacts of the intervention estimated from our experiment. In the first scenario, we focus purely on the increase in condom coverage and marginal decrease in average condom effectiveness when individuals adopt female condoms as a result of the intervention. In the second scenario, we also take into account the behavioural response via the estimated increase in the number of sex acts. This second scenario is our preferred estimate, but comparison with the first scenario allows us to quantify the importance of the behavioural response and its negative spillovers.

To model the health impacts of our intervention, we use the we use the AIM module of the SPECTRUM suite of epidemiological models (as used by UNAIDS) to estimate the number of HIV infections and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) that the scale-up scenarios would help to avert in comparison to the control scenario. Figure B.5 shows the simulated number of new HIV infections per year in the control as well as the two intervention scenarios. Table B.11 summarizes the total number of HIV infections and DALYs that would be averted by 2030.[35]

[34] In the epidemiological model that we use, adults above the median age of first sex are allocated into one of five risk categories, identified for males and females separately. These are: stable couples (men and women reporting a single partner in the last year); multiple partners (men and women with more than one partner in the last year); female sex workers and clients; men who have sex with men; and injecting drug users. Our intervention targets women in the first two categories, whose partners are estimated by the epidemiological model to be primarily in the second category. It does not target individuals in the last three, high-risk categories.

[35] The SPECTRUM suite is developed by Avenir Health, see http://www.avenirhealth.

To estimate the implied financial benefits to the healthcare system, we focus on the reduction in the number of adults and children that require ART, cotrimoxazol (an antibiotic used both to treat and prevent pneumocystis pneumonia and toxoplasmosis in people with HIV/AIDS) and the number of mothers requiring Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission for the period from 2015-2030, including unit costs for counseling, drugs and treatment (tables available on request). To estimate the cost-savings of our intervention in terms of productivity gains, we estimate the reduction in productivity losses as a result of continued workforce participation of adults who did not get infected with HIV as a result of our intervention.

We next calculate an upper and a lower bound of the intervention costs per participant. For the upper bound, we use the full costs of our intervention as implemented, plus the full cost of acquiring and distributing the subsequent increase in the number of female condoms used between 2015 and 2030, assuming full subsidisation of female condom provision by the government (tables available on request). For the lower bound, we assume that the provision of information about female condoms is included into existing sex education programmes in schools and at health centres. This is a realistic add-on to such programmes, given that they already provide information about and practical demonstrations of male condoms, as well as information about HIV/AIDS and other STIs. The lower bound cost estimates therefore comprise just the costs of acquiring and distributing the additional number of female condoms when adoption subsequently increases, assuming that the government fully subsidises free provision of female condoms (tables available on request).

Comparing the programme costs to the DALYs averted allows us to calculate the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). This measure is often used to compare the cost-effectiveness of policies across the public health spectrum, in terms of cost per DALY averted (see e.g. (Creese et al., 2002; Oster, 2005)). Comparing the programme costs to the cost savings allows us to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR). This is an indicator of cost-benefit, which can be used to evaluate the policy as a financial

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investment.

In scenario 1 the ICER for the full intervention is -50 USD, i.e. a saving of 50 USD per DALY averted, meaning that scaling up the full intervention is therefore *very cost-effective*.[36] It also offers a positive financial return, with an IRR of 1.02. Meanwhile, the ICER for the lower-cost, add-on intervention is -1,574 USD, i.e. a saving of 1,574 USD. This means that adding female condom provision to existing sex education programs is also *very cost-effective*, and in fact represents a substantial saving per DALY averted compared to the existing set of treatments. It also offers a highly favourable return on investment of 1.82.

In contrast, in scenario 2 the ICER for the full intervention is 7,413 USD, meaning that a full scale-up of the intervention is *not cost-effective*. Nonetheless, the ICER for the lower bound is 3,497 USD, implying that adding female condom provision to existing sex education programs is *cost-effective*. Yet despite being cost-effective in the lower bound scenario, the intervention does not offer a positive financial return on investment: the IRR for the upper-bound cost is 0.21 and for the lower-bound cost is 0.36.

In summary, in scenario two when taking account the observed increase in risky sex acts, only adding female condom provision to existing sex education programmes is *cost-effective*. However, there are still several reasons to believe that our estimates of the IRR and ICER are conservative, and thus that scale-up of both the full programme and adding female condoms to existing initiatives could be substantially more cost-effective than we estimate. First, we use an upper bound for the estimated costs of condoms, which is likely to be highly conservative given that the scale-up of the intervention to the entire female population of South Mozambique would lead to economies of scale in production and procurement. Second, as mentioned above, potentially sizeable benefits such as reduction in unwanted pregnancies and other STIs, indirect costs to the health system, and costs for orphan care, are not included in our estimates.

[36]Following the recommendations of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, WHO-CHOICE deems interventions *highly cost-effective* if the ICER is less than GDP per capita, cost-effective if the ICER is between one and three times GDP per capita, or *not cost-effective* if the ICER is higher than three times GDP per capita (Walensky et al., 2013). The GDP per capita of Mozambique was 511 USD in 2014.

Figure B.5: Simulation of annual number of HIV infections



Table B.11: Simulation of impact on HIV infections and DALYs averted by 2030

	# HIV infections averted	# DALYs averted
Scenario 1: condom use response only	39,425	72,628
Scenario 2: condom use response & sex act response	9,647	3,607

Notes: Results from simulations based on 2017 UNAIDS data of South Mozambique using the DemProj, AIM, and GOALS module of Avenir Health's SPECTRUM software. Total population (15-49 years) in 2014 was 3,048,905. Columns 1 and 2 present the number of HIV infections and the number of Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) averted in each scenario, respectively. The statistics are calculated by comparing control projections up to 2030 without any changes to the demographic and behavioural data (control) with intervention projections where behavioural data (condom use) and epidemiological data (condom efficacy) are changed from 2015 onward.