Emerging challenges to long-term peace and security in Mozambique
Ayokunu Adedokun
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Emerging Challenges to Long-term Peace and Security in Mozambique

Ayokunu Adedokun, Ph.D.*
Maastricht University Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) & UNU-MERIT, Netherlands.

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Abstract

Mozambique’s transition from civil war to peace is often considered among the most successful implementations of a peace agreement in the post-Cold War era. Following the signing of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords (GPA), the country has not experienced any large-scale recurrence of war. Instead, Mozambique has made impressive progress in economic growth, poverty reduction, improved security, regional cooperation and post-war democratisation. Mozambique has also made significant strides in the provision of primary healthcare, and steady progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Nonetheless, these stellar achievements, Mozambique still faces a large number of political, social and economic problems: poverty, unemployment, natural resource boom, increasing political exclusion, dependence on foreign aid, and low access to social and economic services and facilities. This paper unpacks these challenges and the implications for Mozambique’s long-term peace and security.


JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D74, F52, N47, O55.

* E-mail addresses: a.adedokun@maastrichtuniversity.nl
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1. Introduction

Although it is indisputable that Mozambique has made impressive progress on the road to peace and security, post-war democratisation, economic growth, and in the expansion of education and health services as well as the promotion of gender equality, major challenges still remain. For example, despite being one of the world’s 10 fastest-growing economies over the last decade, Mozambique is still characterised by high level of economic inequality and poverty still affects the majority of the population. Fifty-four per cent of the national population lives on less than $1.25 a day (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2015; World Bank, 2016). Mozambicans in the central and northern regions live in even deeper poverty and have less access to schools, healthcare, and infrastructures than their southern neighbours (Vines et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016). In the political arena, the distrust between the Frelimo-led government and the main opposition, Renamo, remains high. Furthermore, citizens’ participation in formal political processes is declining - there is a worrisome trend towards ever-lower voter turnout at general elections (see tables 2 and 3 below).

Again, Mozambique is one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world. In 2015, for example, the net official development assistance was 50 per cent of the gross national income (OECD, 2015). Many interview participants believe that the government of Mozambique has paid greater attention to the requests and demands of the international donors than to the demands and needs of its own citizens, thereby creating concerns that the Mozambican relative political stability could be at risk.

This paper discusses these issues through four lenses: (i) socio-economic problems threatening long-term peace and security; (ii) Dominance of the ruling party; (iii) tensions in the security sector; and (iv) natural resources boom. The challenges outlined here are not exhaustive but form a series of emerging issues.

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2 This paper is part of my PhD dissertation. It is based on five months of fieldwork in Mozambique from May 2015 to October 2015. I utilised four methodological approaches: semi-structured interviews, archival research/process tracing, focus group discussions (FGDs) and non-participant observation. Though the four methods in themselves present an incomplete picture, the triangulation strategy (see Denzin 1970, 1978, 2006) that I employed enabled me to construct a comprehensive account of the dynamics of peacebuilding in Mozambique. Overall, I conducted 91 interviews with two groups of actors, broadly defined: (i) “local actors”, and; (ii) “international actors”. Out of 91 participants, 63 were local actors. The remaining 28 consisted of international actors.
that need to be addressed for Mozambique’s peace and stability to be consolidated. These challenges were identified in the existing literature and also in the voices of various stakeholders identified during my fieldwork in Mozambique from May 2015 to October 2015. At first glance, many of the factors and dynamics that have contributed to Mozambique’s peace and stability as discussed in Adedokun (2015, 2016)\(^3\) seem to be questioned in this paper. But this should not be surprising. As is to be expected, building peace and political stability in the aftermath of civil war is by its very nature a highly conflictual and potentially destabilising process. This is because countries emerging from civil war are by their very nature likely to fall short of fulfilling commonly identified conditions and mechanisms for sustainable peace. I will return to this in a moment. For now, let me unpack the four challenges to Mozambique’s long-term peace and security.

2. **Socio-economic Problems Threatening Long-term Security**

Despite the legacy of 17 years of civil war and high vulnerability to natural disasters, Mozambique’s macroeconomic and social development progress has been impressive when compared to other post-conflict countries. Alongside strong economic growth, averaging 8 per cent for over two decades, the country’s GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) more than doubled, from $176 in 1992 to $585 in 2014 (World Bank, 2016), and the inflation rate has also largely been controlled, declining from its highest level of 65 per cent in 1996 to 5.6 per cent in 2016 (Almeida *et al.*, 2015). Likewise, progress was also made in reducing poverty: the proportion of people living under the national poverty line dropped from 69.4 per cent in 1996-1997 to 54.7 per cent of the population in 2008-2009. Similarly, infant mortality fell by 19 per cent and has been accompanied by improvements in immunisation, maternal mortality and birth attendance (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2015; Vines *et al.*, 2015; IMF, 2016).

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\(^3\) My principal finding is that three factors are largely responsible for persistent peace in Mozambique: 1) local participation in and local ownership of the peace process; 2) credible and impartial international support through the United Nations; and 3) an inclusive political settlement. Other complementary factors include socio-economic progress and the legitimacy of post-conflict political leaders.
Notwithstanding these remarkable achievements, many serious socioeconomic problems remain in Mozambique. In particular, if one considers Mozambique’s (i) high levels of poverty and inequality, (ii) unemployment, (iii) rapid urban drift, (iv) land insecurity, and (v) malnutrition, it appears that there is some way to go – if the Mozambicans are to consolidate the gains of their hard-earned peace and stability. In the section below, I touch upon these socio-economic issues one by one.

2.1 Poverty and inequality

While Mozambique’s economy has expanded strongly for over two decades, its effect on poverty reduction and income inequality has been marginal. The majority of my interview participants identified high levels of poverty and income inequality as one of the major threats to Mozambique’s long-term peace and security. Negative trends in poverty and inequality are also found in other survey data as well as in administrative statistics. For example, World Bank data and three national major surveys (1996/97, 2002/03, and 2008/09) on poverty trends in Mozambique show huge insecurity and large movements in and out of poverty and income inequality. The table below shows that poverty fell from 69.4 per cent in 1996/97 to 54.1 per cent in 2003. This means that about 15 per cent of the population passed from poor to non-poor status between 1997 and 2003. More importantly, gains occurred in both urban and rural areas and the gains in rural areas were somewhat more telling.

Table 1 Official Poverty Headcounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levels (%)</th>
<th>Difference (%) points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance/DNPO (1998, 2004); Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP (2010)/ Arndt, Jones and Tarp 2015

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4 A fourth survey, 2014/15, is currently in the field (Ministry of Planning and Finance/DNPO 1998; 2004; Ministry of Planning and Development/DNEAP 2010).
However, the story from 2002/03 to 2008/09 poverty assessment, presents a different and troubling picture. Although GDP growth rates continue at 8 per cent, no progress was realised in poverty reduction. Instead, stagnation occurred in both urban and rural zones\textsuperscript{5}, largely due to the failure to create employment and increase productivity in the agricultural sector. This suggests that a large share of the Mozambican population is not benefiting enough from these high levels of economic growth.

Two potential explanations have been offered for the paradox of rapid economic growth and massive international aid, coupled with poverty stagnation. First, the growth in industry after 2000 contributed little to poverty reduction, as few jobs were created due to the enclave character and capital-intensity of the megaprojects. These megaprojects include the construction of the Mozal aluminium smelter (1998–2003), which was Mozambique’s prime post-civil war megaproject – a joint venture between BHP Billiton (47.1 percent), Mitsubishi Corp. (25 percent), Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (24 percent), and the Government of Mozambique (3.9 percent). Many of my interview participants point out that benefits do not flow equitably to the domestic economy in comparison with what foreign investors enjoy. UNCTAD report (2012) points out the inherent difficulty in establishing linkages between these megaprojects – which are capital intensive and export-oriented – and the local industries, which have not yet reached the level of business and financial innovation. Second, the spill-over effect through technology transfer or skills development, which could help to improve factor productivity, has been small (Masha and Ross, 2014).

Additionally, income inequality appears to have increased in Mozambique despite high rates of economic growth. For example, the Gini co-efficient, a measure of income inequality, increased from 0.44, on average, in the 1990s to 0.48 in the 2000s (IMF, 2016; World Bank, 2016). Income inequality in Mozambique also has a spatial dimension. Most of the country’s wealth is located in the southern region, and especially around the capital, Maputo (Masha and Ross, 2014). As one respondent commented: “It only takes you 10 minutes to

\textsuperscript{5} Though the point estimate declines in the urban zone and increases in the rural areas.
see a different situation outside of Maputo. Maputo does not reflect the rest of the country. There is so much disconnect between the Frelimo government and citizens countrywide; and there is so much political and social difference between the haves and have-nots. For a small country to have over $6 billion a year … you have more than enough to improve things in Mozambique and that has not happened yet (Adedokun, 2016).”

Reduction in poverty and income inequality is important for three reasons. First, high levels of poverty and income inequality make it difficult to sustain growth over long periods of time (Berg and Ostry, 2011). Second, high levels of poverty and income inequality can lead to political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Boix, 2015) as citizens demand increasing access to economic resources – a challenge that can become even more acute in a country like Mozambique that is likely to become one of the largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters in the world (more on this below). And finally, high levels of poverty and income inequality hamper government policies to promote inclusive growth and development. To cut the long story short: the higher the level of inequality the lower the elasticity of poverty to growth is likely to be and the greater the risk of conflict renewal.

2.2 Unemployment

Unemployment is a huge development and security concern for Mozambique: the African Development Bank estimates that 22 per cent of the population are unemployed, 87 per cent of the population are under-employed and over 300 000 new job seekers enter the Mozambican labour market every year (Almeida et al., 2015). Despite the government’s introduction of the reformed Labour Law in 2007, which made employment a priority, the labour market still remains rigid and an impediment to business. More disturbingly, the two sectors of the

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6 There is a great deal of disagreement on unemployment figures. Government unemployment figures as cited in the 2014 Mozambique Labour Force Survey show the overall unemployment rate in 2014 as 8 per cent, a comparatively low rate. However the UNDP (2014) explains that the definition of employment used in this survey is: ‘a person doing as little as one hour-work (paid or unpaid) during the reference week’. As such, the rates for ‘underemployment’, ‘vulnerable employment’ and the economically ‘inactive’ are more revealing about the population’s access to income.
economy which generally offer significant employment opportunities for Mozambicans are agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).

However, both of these sectors are facing significant constraints. On the one hand, the agricultural sector largely consists of subsistence farming with 99 per cent of all farms being classified as small. Agricultural productivity has stagnated over the past 10 years\(^7\) with only a minority of farmers having access to lands, services and markets. On the other hand, SME growth is constrained by lack of access to affordable capital, heavy red tape and a poor business climate.\(^8\)

On top of this, Mozambique is estimated to have the lowest education level among its workforce in the world at 1.2 years of formal education (Almeida et al., 2015; Africa development Bank, 2012). The low skills level of the labour force remains a significant issue both for employers who are unable to hire qualified labourers as well as for promoting a culture of entrepreneurship. Though the education level is improving, net attendance rate for secondary school is only 20 per cent (Africa development Bank, 2012). Education is free, but there are costs associated with uniforms and school supplies, which present a burden for the most vulnerable households. The increase in school enrolment has put the quality of education under pressure and has led the government to lower the requirements for becoming a teacher in order to meet demand. Furthermore, the low education level further makes training of employees a challenge and has led some foreign companies to resort to importing labour to fill key positions. Meanwhile, there is emerging hostility towards expatriates. If these challenges continue, Mozambique’s relative political stability could be at risk.

2.3 **Urbanisation**

Rapid urbanisation also poses a threat to Mozambique long-term peace and security, with the urban population growing at an average of 4 per cent annually since 2000 and huge numbers of Mozambicans, especially youths moving to

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\(^7\) For example, annual growth of agricultural sector fell from 7 to 2 per cent between 2008 and 2012 (World Bank, 2016).

\(^8\) Currently the SME sector accounts for 42.8 per cent of employment in the country and has been growing at 7 per cent a year.
Maputo, the capital (Arup, 2016). Meanwhile, there are problems of overcrowding, as houses and businesses compete for scarce public space and many members of the same family use the private space within the home. Furthermore, limited job prospects on arrival leave many ‘newcomers’ to urban areas without livelihoods or support networks. More importantly, rural–urban migration tends to loosen connections with the social structures and norms that act to prevent violence in rural areas. Due to patterns of rural–urban migration into Maputo, the capital also has a unique tendency for district-based low level conflicts and growing criminality (Reisman and Lala, 2012)

2.4 Land Insecurity

Land insecurity also constitutes one of the biggest threats to Mozambique’s long-term peace and security, particularly given the fact that over 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas and relies upon land for their livelihoods. Meanwhile recent predictions point to Mozambique becoming one of Africa’s most prolific biofuels producers – a driver of land grabs (Nhantumbo and Salomao, 2010). Although Mozambique’s Land Law of 1997 is noted for being progressive and for containing innovative elements (Nhantumbo and Salomao, 2010), such as (i) ensuring that women have equal rights to access and inherit land, overriding any customary law that rules otherwise; (ii) empowering oral recognition of rights: customary rights can be proved through oral testimony by neighbours and this is equal legally to that of a formal title (this is particularly important in a country where 55 per cent of adults are illiterate (USAID 2011), and ; (iii) requiring fair compensation in the event that land is expropriated by the state for “public interest” (which is qualified in the constitution) (Knight, 2010; Twomey, 2014).

Yet, despite the coherence of Mozambique’s legal framework, the extent of displacement and dispossession occurring is a source of serious concern (Cotula, et al., 2008). For example, between 2004 and 2009 over 2.67 million hectares of land were taken from the local farmers without any community consultation as

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9 Although Mozambique is still a predominantly rural country (70 per cent of Mozambicans live in rural areas), however, it has been estimated that, by 2025 50 per cent of the population will live in urban areas
laid down in the Land law (Deininger et al., 2011; Mousseau and Mittal, 2011; LAND Act, 2012). Increasingly, local farmers in Mozambique are concerned that agricultural development projects being pushed by foreign investors such as Japan, Brazil and the Mozambican government will amount to land grabbing. And given the value accorded to land, land grabbing has the potential to disrupt Mozambique’s long-term peace and security.

2.5 Spatial and Socio-economic Inequality in Healthcare – Malnutrition

Perhaps one of Mozambique’s most serious socioeconomic concerns is spatial and socio-economic inequality in health services. Despite the clear improvement in many health outcomes, a large challenge for the country moving forward remains the inequality of access to, and quality of, health services. As a result, a child in Cabo Delgado province is almost three times as likely to die before age five than a child in Maputo (Pose Rodriguez et al., 2014; UNICEF, 2011). While traditional sites of historical poverty and inequity between health needs and health services persist (especially between rural and remote regions of the north), in recent years urban poverty in and around Maputo has become an increasing concern. Efforts are being made to improve the situation through the allocation of funds, but medical practitioners are still unevenly distributed across the country, despite government efforts to increase recruitment for more remote areas, and it appears that incentives and facilities are still insufficient to encourage many health workers to spend substantial periods of time in remote areas. The deployment of newly graduated doctors and nurses to most needy locations can be delayed for months due to lack of housing near the health facility. There is currently little motivation for both doctors and nurses to work in these areas, and many, according to a civil society organisation worker interviewed: Believe that being in rural districts is some kind of punishment, and if they behave properly they may be transferred to the City (Pose Rodriguez et al., 2014; Adedokun, 2016).

Furthermore, the gap between rich and poor seems to be on the increase. As Pose Rodriguez et al. (2014) point out: “Mozambique’s new mineral wealth is leading to a class of people who are incredibly rich, which is contributing to higher
prices, as well as a two-tier health system with stronger incentives for doctors to move to private clinics.”

3. Dominance of the Ruling Party Threatening Long-term Security

In a context in which many third-wave democracies in Africa have failed to hold second presidential and parliamentary elections (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997), Mozambique is frequently considered an exceptional case of post-war democratisation (Manning and Malbrough, 2009; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman, 2008; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999). Having held five successful presidential and parliamentary elections, Mozambique is generally judged a good example of how a fragile society can become an effective state (Manning, 2015). According to the existing literature, the polity established a functional administration, brought forth visible signs of sovereign and democratic statehood (World Bank, 2013; IMF, 2014)\textsuperscript{10}, and, despite unfavourable post-war conditions, developed accountable political institutions (Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, 2014; Moran and Pitcher, 2004).

Yet, in spite of these achievements, overall, Mozambique’s post-war democratic project is weak (Adedokun, 2016). In fact, between 1999 and 2014 the Freedom House Index has consistently classified Mozambique as ‘partly free’. This is consistent with other classifications that label Mozambique’s political regime as ‘ambiguous’ (Diamond, 2002); as having ‘limited freedoms and high levels of corruption’ (Transparency International, 2014); as a ‘minimal democracy’ (Doorenspleet, 2003) and as being ‘in the gray zone’ (Forquilha, 2009). Accordingly, Doorenspleet (2003) contends that Mozambique cannot be regarded as a ‘liberal democracy’ on the grounds that the ruling party (Frelimo) controls the media and the opposition gets marginal coverage, an assessment which is corroborated by the 2011 Mozambique Media report by the African Media Barometer (Nuvunga, 2014:22).

However, from an analytical and objective viewpoint, it is possible to distinguish

\textsuperscript{10} Mozambique’s scores have improved on a variety of political and/or capacity indicators. In terms of Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, Mozambique was recently ranked among the stronger public financial management (PFM) performers in Africa. Good scores on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) also earned Mozambique a “medium capacity” rating (See Masha and Ross 2014; IMF 2014; World Bank 2013)
two distinct periods in Mozambique’s short democratic experience: 1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2014. In the first democratic experience Mozambique was under the leadership of President Joaquim Chissano. Under President Chissano Mozambique had a vibrant democratic system characterised by political and electoral competition and the separation of the party from state (Carbone, 2005; Nuvunga, 2005, 2014).

However, Mozambique’s democratic experience under President Armando Guebuza (2004-2014) took a different path. President Armando Guebuza entrenched the Frelimo party within the state and ensured its control of the state. Among the measures he introduced were the abrogation of the Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform initiated by President Chissano and the revitalisation of Frelimo party cells within the state machinery (Nuvunga and Sitoe, 2012). These measures limited the space available for opposition parties and public participation in the political process as the state machinery was increasingly aligned with Frelimo party directives.

As can be seen from tables 2 and 3 below, Renamo achieved a relatively high percentage of the votes in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994 and 1999. However, in the 2004 elections, led by President Armando Guebuza, Renamo lost a significant amount of the votes – almost one-third compared to its 1999 results. In particular, Renamo lost the elections in two of the five constituencies it had previously controlled, including the country’s major constituency, Nampula. Similarly, in the 2009 elections, support for Renamo was further reduced when it won only 51 (compared to 90 seats in 1999) of the 250 seats and lost two of the three constituencies in which it still had a major influence, including the second biggest constituency, Zambezia. The only constituency that Renamo won out-rightly in the 2009 elections is the central province of Sofala. Some scholars have argued that the sudden decline of Renamo’s share of the votes paved the way for the early end of what had been a vibrant two-party system, replacing it with a dominant-party system, with Frelimo as the ruling party (Nuvunga 2014; Rosario 2012, Forquilha and Orre, 2012).
Table 2  Presidential Election Results, 1994-2014

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>6.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(MDM)</td>
<td>(MDM)</td>
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</table>

Table 3  Parliamentary Election Results, 1994-2014

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (MDM)</td>
<td>17 (MDM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Mozambique National Elections Commission

Of course the data in the tables above are open to a range of different interpretations. For example, one may argue that Renamo is also to blame for its electoral defeats because of Afonso Dhlakama’s autocratic leadership and Renamo’s lack of internal democracy, which resulted in the expulsion of influential cadres and a party breakaway in 2002, which weakened the party. However, while these are relevant arguments their direct link to Mozambique’s democratic decline and Renamo’s abrupt collapse is unfounded. The data on voter turn-out (that is, high voter apathy) and numbers of invalid votes over the course of the five general elections are revealing. These are presented in the tables below. They show a sharp decline in voter turn-out from 87.9 per cent of registered voters in 1994 to only 36.3 per cent in 2004, rising modestly to 44.4 per cent in 2009. Likewise, there was first a decline in the number of invalid votes to 8.3 per cent in 2004 from the 1994 high of 11.7 per cent, probably attributable to the learning process following the nation’s first multiparty election (See EuroAid, Report 2014).
Table 4 Voter Turn-out and Invalid Votes Cast in Mozambique, Parliamentary Year of Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Voter Turn-out</th>
<th>Invalid Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>87.89%</td>
<td>11.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>68.09</td>
<td>9.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>36.34</td>
<td>8.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>48.84</td>
<td>13.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Mozambique National Elections Commission

However, this was then followed by a sharp rise in numbers of invalid votes in the 2009 elections to 11.2 per cent and 13.3 per cent in the 2014 elections. Casting invalid votes is a classic form of voter protest, and the 2009 and 2014 elections outcomes could be interpreted in such a way. High numbers of invalid votes are also frequently associated with electoral fraud (through the invalidation of votes for opposition candidates). The implication is that Frelimo now has more political power but less popular support. The violent protests that followed the rise in public transport fees in February 2008 and the combination of food and fuel price rises in September 2010 and the recent clashes between Renamo and the Frelimo government in 2013 over electoral reform have also raised fears that Mozambique may return to large-scale civil war. But luckily, an agreement was reached between Frelimo and Renamo in September 2014 which led to Renamo participation in the general elections held in November 2014. The foregoing challenges indicate that there is still much to be done towards achieving sustainable peace and development in Mozambique.

4. Security Sector Reform Threatening Long-term Security

While disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants have been relatively successful, with Renamo apparently unable to return to civil war, there is emerging evidence that Frelimo and Renamo officers are
increasingly heavily influenced by political affiliations rather than national security, thereby causing many fractures and tensions (Adedokun, 2016). The urban transport riots of February 2008 and bread riots of September 2010 and the rural/provincial political violence of 2013 and early 2014 can be cited as examples. There have been failures on both Frelimo and Renamo sides in developing the kinds of political relationships that are prerequisites for holistic security sector reform (SSR). While Frelimo accused ex-Renamo combatants of lack of cooperation, with allegations of leaking intelligence in advance of operations, ex-Renamo combatants, on the other hand, complained that: “Within the police and the military there is not a very good balance because Frelimo officers have more opportunities and have become the ‘big guys’, while opportunities for Renamo officers are still marginal and some have even been forcefully retired (Adedokun, 2016).”

However, there are further growing concerns: low morale, poor discipline and limited resources were the greater challenges identified by interview partners. For example, the Mozambican army consists of 11,000 personnel, and its $120.6 million budget is low compared with that of some of its African counterparts such as South Africa ($4.8 billion) or Angola ($6 billion) in 2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2014; In Vines et al. 2015). Apart from partisanship, what has constrained the FADM is the fact that it has been prevented from ever becoming effective or professionalised by the lack of resources assigned to it by the government.

A 2010 Chatham House report highlighted that ‘criminal networks operating in Mozambique are one of the greatest dangers to incipient democratic forces.’ The penetration of the state by organised crime has increased over the last five years. There were 14 abductions for ransom in 2012 alone. The authorities reported 44 kidnappings in 2013, including six in Maputo during a single week in October. According to the police, 11 Mozambicans of South Asian origin and three Portuguese were kidnapped between October 2014 and beginning of May 2015 (In Vines et al. 2015). The significant increase in kidnapping for ransom in Mozambique demonstrates how institutions are increasingly being eroded and the vulnerability of Mozambique’s long-term peace and security.
5. **Natural Resources Boom Threatening Long-term Peace and Security**

Recently, Mozambique has been placed on the international investment radar because of the discoveries of huge reserves of natural resources, primarily coal and natural gas. The gas reserves alone are estimated at 200 trillion cubic feet. According to Al Walker¹¹ (2014), Chairman of Anadarko, the operator of the gas-rich Offshore Area 1 block, “massive natural gas discoveries have the potential to elevate Mozambique to the world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas and the largest African natural gas producer (see Figure 1 below).” Likewise, Mozambique has been cited as “the next Qatar” (Matthews, 2014). By 2023 IMF (2013) projects that LNG exports will represent almost 30 per cent of GDP and nearly 50 per cent of total exports (see figure below). At present, the contribution of gas and coal to the economy is limited, with just 7 per cent of total exports in 2011 and roughly 2 per cent of GDP. There can be little doubt that the discoveries of coal and gas represent an unprecedented opportunity to accelerate sustainable and inclusive growth and reduce poverty in a country that currently ranks third from bottom on the Human Development Index, ahead of only the Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger.

### Table 5 African Countries By Proven Natural Gas Reserves (Tcf)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proved Natural Gas Reserves (Tcf)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>182.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>159.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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¹¹ Chairman of Anadarko, the operator of the gas-rich Offshore Area 1 block
Figure 1 Projected 2023 Exports from Mega-projects (% of total exports)

Source: IMF (2013) Traditional exports include sugar, tobacco, lumber

However, unless revenues from the resources boom are carefully managed through government accountability, strong political will, rule of law as well as effective policymaking, there are concerns that the dividend from the resources boom may not be equitably distributed, and could instead emerge as a source of social tension and massively increasing inequality. This is explicitly recognised by interview participants who told me that Mozambique’s discoveries of natural gas and coal have largely been unproductive in nature and benefitted only competing elites rather than the population as a whole. A further challenge here is Mozambique’s acute skills shortage, which will make it extremely difficult for Mozambicans, to obtain anything other than menial jobs during the construction phase. The importation of skilled personnel such as engineers could easily become a source of local tensions.

Conclusion
Taken together, socio-economic issues, the dominance of the ruling party, the limitations of the security sector reform and the natural resources boom are core challenges at the forefront of Mozambicans’ minds. There is a danger that if they continue, they could complicate efforts to achieve sustainable peace and broader developmental outcomes in the country.
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