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# **Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique**

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## **Abstract**

With the heavy involvement of the United Nations (UN) and the international community, the Rome General Peace Agreement (GPA) of 1992 ended more than 16 years of civil war in Mozambique. The peace agreement and post-conflict initiatives by the international community was successful in transforming the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) from a rebel group into a viable political party. Key components of Mozambique's success in negotiating peace and creating conditions for political stability and democracy were the provision of demobilisation before democratisation, decentralisation of humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial and district levels, financial support directly for the development of political parties and budget support to sectors relevant to peacebuilding. Though imperfect, Mozambique remains an important case study in how the UN and international community can help in post-conflict environments. Thus, the paper argues (both theoretically and empirically) that success in peacebuilding operations depends on credible and impartial international support through the UN, as opposed to 'unilateral' peacebuilding operation through a 'powerful state'.

**Key words:** Civil war. Peacebuilding. United Nations. Mozambique.

**JEL Classification Numbers:** D74, F53, F54, N47, O55.

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## 1. Introduction

Throughout the 1980s, Mozambique was often labelled as an unlikely candidate for sustainable peace and post-war democratisation by international aid agencies and donor communities, with persuasive reasons. For one, Mozambique was officially the poorest country in the world, with the lowest level of GDP per capita (averaging -7.7 per cent per year), and very low levels of infrastructure and productive economic assets, both human and physical (see Adedokun, 2016; Jones and Olken, 2005; Manning, 2002). For another, Mozambique lacked all the desirable pre-conditions usually held to be conducive to peace and democracy including weak political institutions, non-functional state bureaucracy, low rule of law, no democratic experience and low degree of civic culture (Adedokun, 2016; Manning, 2002). In addition, Mozambique was plagued by one of the most brutal civil wars in Africa that lasted for 16 years (1977-1992) and cost more than 1 million lives and left nearly 6 million people displaced - 4.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.5 million refugees (Miller and Ferris, 2015).

Yet, since 4 October 1992 when the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo), led by President Joaquim Chissano, and the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), led by Aphonso Dhlakama, the country has successfully undertaken three crucial transitions, namely: From war to peace; from one-party state to formal liberal democracy; and from state-centred economy to market economy. After the peace agreement, thousands of refugees returned to their home and thousands of ex-combatants were demilitarised. Post-civil war democratisation, while not without challenges, has been relatively successful. Since 1994 Mozambique has conducted five presidential and parliamentary elections. All of them have been held on schedule, most recently on 15 October 2014. Mozambique's post-conflict economy also grew at high rates, with GDP growth at levels averaging 7.5 per cent per annum over 1994-2014, buoyed by high levels of foreign aid and private foreign investment (African Development Bank report, 2015).

Again, Mozambique has made a great leap in terms of human development and well-being. For instance, infant mortality rates have declined from 175 deaths per

1,000 live births in 1975 to about 70 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011. Between 1980 and 2013, Mozambique's life expectancy at birth increased by 13.2 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.5 years, and expected years of schooling increased by 4.5 years (UNDP report, 2015). This is a surprising development in many ways, considering Mozambique's unfavourable initial conditions before, during and shortly after the civil war. It is thus worth asking: How did Mozambique make the leap from violent conflict to 'sustainable peace'? Put differently, what factors account for the successful transition from civil war to peace in Mozambique?

Based on extensive primary research<sup>2</sup> this paper scrutinises some of the most prominent ideas that surround Mozambique's trajectory – namely that its peacebuilding endeavour has been a success (Manning 2002; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman, 2008; Weimer, 2004; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999) which is 'unique' (Hume 1994) in that it has been characterised by 'peaceful progression' (Manning 2009; Moran and Pitcher 2004) based on the 'end of the Cold War' (Berman 1996:19-20), 'drought' (Ohlson, Stedman and Davies 1994:113-116), 'military stalemate' (Lloyd 1995:153), luck (Vines 1998; Hume 1994) and heavy donor support (Ball and Barnes, 2000; Manning and Malbrough 2009, 2012).

While refraining from wholly dismissing these accounts, I argue that Mozambique's relative peace and stability since 1992 is largely due to three complementary factors: (i) local participation in and local ownership of the peace process; (ii) the persistence of an 'inclusive elite bargain', and; (iii) credible and impartial international support through the United Nations. I focus my discussion in this paper on the last point. Namely, that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations contributed to Mozambique's

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<sup>2</sup> This paper is part of my PhD dissertation. It is based on five months of fieldwork in Mozambique from May 2015 to October 2015. I utilised four methodological approaches: semi-structured interviews, archival research/process tracing, focus group discussions (FGDs) and non-participant observation. Though the four methods in themselves present an incomplete picture, the triangulation strategy (see Denzin 1970, 1978, 2006) that I employed enabled me to construct a comprehensive account of the dynamics of peacebuilding in Mozambique. Overall, I conducted 91 interviews with two groups of actors, broadly defined: (i) "local actors", and; (ii) "international actors". Out of 91 participants, 63 were local actors. The remaining 28 consisted of international actors.

relative peace and stability. I am not the first to discover that the United Nations and the broader international community played a prominent and perhaps determinant role in the implementation of Mozambican peace process. Alden (1995), Stedman (1997), Manning (2002) and Bekoe (2008) have written on the same subject. However, the mechanisms and strategies adopted by the UN and the international community in Mozambique are yet to be fully explored in the literature. In this paper, I show that any assessment of the UN's role and performance as well as that of the international community in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four instruments, namely: (i) Re-integration of ex-combatants strategy, (ii) Humanitarian assistance, (iii) political and electoral assistance, and; (iv) budget support.

The chapter is organised into six sections: (i) a brief background on the causes of civil war in Mozambique: external vs. internal causes, (ii) peace initiatives in Mozambique, (iii) theoretical argument on why the United Nations and the broader international community is key to peacebuilding, (iv) the nature of external peacebuilding operations in Mozambique, (v) the analysis of the four UN strategies that have contributed to sustainable peace in Mozambique, and (vi) conclusion.

## **2. The Causes of Civil War in Mozambique: External or Internal Causes?<sup>3</sup>**

In 1977, just two years after independence from Portugal, Mozambique plunged into 16 years of civil war that left the country economically ravaged and politically fragile. The underlying causes of the civil war have been the subject of controversy, and have tended to polarise around two opposing ideological positions. The first line of argument is that the war in Mozambique was an externally sponsored project of destabilisation against the Frelimo led government in the context of the South African apartheid regime's "total

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<sup>3</sup> This section only provides relevant outline of the causes of civil war in Mozambique in order to inform discussion and analysis in later sections. Extensive and factually rich accounts of Mozambique conflict are provided inter alia by Minter William (1995), Malyn Newitt (1995), Hall Margaret and Young Tom (1997), Joao Cabrita (2000), Carrie Manning (2002), David Alexander Robinson (2006) and Ayokunu Adedokun (2016).

strategy” for the region, and conservative Western concern about a communist-inspired government providing an alternative development model for other African states (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983; Hanlon, 1984; Fauvet, 1984). Here, the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) is seen as a puppet force, set up and sustained by external support, with no real political programme or intent to govern, and no domestic power base (Hanlon, 1984: 1989).

The opposing argument is that the causes of the war in Mozambique were mainly internally driven. Particularly prominent amongst these researchers were Geffray (1988), Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Otto Roesch (1988, 1992) and Cahen, (1987). First, they argue that Frelimo Marxist-Leninist ideology and social policy initiatives played a role in the conflict. Frelimo nationalised health services, education, legal services and land. Frelimo also abolished several of the core values of indigenous communities, including chieftaincy and/or traditional authorities and witchcraft. Frelimo further implemented aggressive policies: communal villages, state farms, a bias towards cities compared to rural areas, intense repression and rigid social organisation (Cahen, 1998; Newitt, 1995; De Brito, 1991) – a situation not dissimilar to the one that existed under the colonial regime (Siteo, 2004). Renamo took advantage of these misplaced policy initiatives to build upon rural peasant dissent (Stephen and Venancio, 1998).

Second, a rapid deterioration of economic conditions also contributed to the Mozambican conflict. The sudden withdrawal of Portuguese experts after the independence left Mozambique without skilled manpower and managerial leaders to revive production and export capabilities. Moreover, throughout the 1980s, Mozambique GDP per capita went negative and economic conditions worsened. For example, GDP declined by 30 per cent between 1982 and 1985 while external debt increased from zero in 1982 to \$4.7 billion in 1989 (Plank, 1993:410). From 1975 to 1987, the per capita incomes declined by nearly two thirds (Bruck *et. al.*, 2000; Sambanis, 2003).

Third, uneven development between the northern and southern regions that started in the colonial period also continued even after independence, thus

contributing to the war. For example, the northern political elites were not included in the highest echelons of the government, which was mainly organised in the southern part of the country. The ethnic power relations (EPR) dataset developed by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) identifies the Shona-Ndau (Renamo support base) as an excluded group during the period 1975–1994, and the Tsonga-Chopi and Makonde-Yao as partners in control of the state. These characterisations of the configuration of political power are consistent with a model that links exclusion to civil war onset (Lieberman and Singh, 2012).

Finally, the Frelimo leadership made political opposition illegal, for fear that this implied sharing decision-making power and would be perceived as weakness. Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution defined the People’s Republic of Mozambique as guided by the political line defined by Frelimo, which was the directing force of state and society. The article also stated that Frelimo developed the basic political path of the state and directed the action of state institutions. Under this Constitution any private exercise of advocacy and political participation were declared null and void. On top of this, the government set out to persecute those who had “benefited” most directly from the colonial leadership by forcing citizens into re-education camps and prison for supposed counter-revolutionary activities. Singled out for punishment and/or re-education were former Mozambican members of the police force, the army, and the intelligence units, including the *flechas*, a group of highly trained, Special Forces that operated as part of the colonial army against the guerrilla struggle (Flower, 1987). The excluded groups increased the risk of war by forming a pool of recruits to the rebel organisation. Renamo’s first recruits were from the Mozambican in Rhodesia (Sambanis, 2003).

In this paper, I take a step back from the polarising debates about external and internal causes and focus centrally on their interactions. My argument is that both external and internal factors are complementary and do not substitute each other. Because at every point in Mozambique’s conflict, external actors played a crucial role: They provided the means to mobilise domestic grievances, the resources to wage a protracted war, and the financial incentives to end the war (Weinstein and Francisco, 2005). Similarly, Frelimo’s policy errors during its



radical socialist policy phase, and in particular, the secular zeal of the Frelimo government in disrespecting both the religious and traditional leaders certainly contributed to the onset, duration and the intensity of the war (Chan and Venancio, 1998).

### **3. Peace Initiatives in Mozambique**

In light of the negative consequences of Mozambique's war, several attempts at resolving the conflict and stabilising the country were explored in the 1980s and 1990s. These included the 1984 Nkomati Peace Talks, the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process, and the 1992 Rome General Peace Agreement. However, the Nkomati Peace Talks, and the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process failed in all senses to produce a durable peace. However, a 'sustainable negotiated treaty' was reached in Rome, Italy in 1992. I will limit my analysis in this section to the Rome General Peace Agreement.

#### **3.1 Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: The Rome General Peace Agreement as a Guide**

After the collapse of the Nairobi peace talks in 1989, representatives of Frelimo and Renamo finally met for a first round of direct negotiations and peace talks in Rome during the month of July in 1990. The Rome peace negotiations were hosted and mediated by the Italian government and the Roman Catholic Sant' Egidio community, an Italian Catholic lay order and voluntary charitable organisation and were observed by Mozambique's major donors, including the U.S, UK, Portugal, and Germany. After 12 rounds of peace talks, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed on 4 October 1992 by Joachim Chissano, the President of Mozambique and leader of Frelimo, and by Afonso Dhlakama, the President of Renamo. The General Peace Agreement consisted of seven protocols designed to address both the formal resolution of Mozambique's civil war and the establishment of a new political system meant to provide the basis for lasting peace and political stability. Below, I briefly explain the contents of the 7 (seven) protocols; the full text of the agreement is in Appendix 1.

**Protocol I** contained the “basic principles” of the GPA, in that the parties were committed to reach peace. Under the terms of this protocol the question of the legitimacy and the mutual recognition between the parties were overcome. Renamo agreed to respect the government’s authority and to renounce the use of force for political gains. The government promised in turn, to delay further legislation on any other issue under discussion until democratic multi-party elections were held. To monitor the implementation of the Agreement, the two parties agreed to set up a commission composed of members of the government, Renamo, the UN and other organisations.

**Protocol II** focused on political issues, namely, the need for implementing multi-party democracy in Mozambique. The protocol reaffirmed the Law of Political Parties unilaterally adopted by Frelimo earlier in 1991. Under this protocol Renamo obtained the special guarantee of being recognised as a legitimate political party following the ceasefire.

**Protocol III** outlined the principles for the electoral process, in which the government was entitled to draft the law in consultation with Renamo and other political parties. It also included the guiding principles for the elections and the participation of the international observers during the electoral process.

**Protocol IV** dealt with military matters and provided for the complete demobilisation of Renamo and Frelimo forces, while simultaneously calling for the joint recruitment and establishment of a much smaller and entirely new Mozambique Defence Force, consisting of professional (non-conscript) soldiers only, with maximum troop strength of 30,000. The Command of the new force would, during the transitional period, vest in a joint High Command consisting of one Frelimo and one Renamo General, who would operate under a special Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. Finally, Protocol IV established the calendar for the demobilisation of the troops from both sides.

**Protocol V** provided a timetable for the elections; it also suggested that the government and Renamo should request the UN to participate in the monitoring

and implementation of the GPA; and the establishment of the Supervision and Monitoring Commission and its Sub-Commissions.

**Protocol VI** established the timetable for the ceasefire and its implementation in four steps: (i) ceasefire, (ii) separation of forces, (iii) concentration of the separated forces and (iv) demobilisation. Prisoners, except those being held for ordinary crimes, were supposed to be released.

**Protocol VII** called for a donor conference and requested the international community to finance the entire implementation of the GPA. Finally, the Peace Agreement called for UN participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement including providing technical assistance for the organisation of general elections and monitoring those elections. The agreement was overseen and supported by a 6,800-strong UN peacekeeping force and observation mission (UNOMOZ<sup>4</sup>), in addition to substantial support and active participation by Mozambique's key donor countries. The main Commission set up by the Peace Agreement was the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission<sup>5</sup> (CSC). The CSC was charged with executing the peace agreement. UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Aldo Ajello, chaired the CSC, which included representatives of the government, Renamo, the Organisation of African Union (now known as African Union), and donors, namely the US, the UK, Italy, Portugal and France. Representation on the CSC, as well as on the peace commissions formed to monitor the ceasefire (CCF), and to oversee the formation of the new armed forces (CCFADM) and the re-integration of demobilised soldiers (CORE), provided formal roles for donors as participants, as well as funders, in the peace process.

However, the Rome General Peace Agreement was only a guiding instrument to end the 16-year war. How peace was eventually attained in Mozambique remains unanswered by most scholars (Bartoli *et. al*, 2010). Observers and

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations Operations in Mozambique.

<sup>5</sup> Under the CSC, the following additional commissions were set up: the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force (CCFADM);<sup>5</sup> the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF);<sup>5</sup> the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilised Defence Force Staff - Reintegration Commission (CORE);<sup>5</sup> the National Information Commission (COMINFO); the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL); and the National Elections Commission (CNE).

theorists of the Mozambican peace process have long argued that Mozambique's transition from war to peace lay in one of five reasons. First, a lengthy military stalemate made it clear to both Renamo and Frelimo that neither could win a decisive military victory (Lloyd, 1995:153). Second, external aid to both parties (both in terms of financial and technical support) had been significantly reduced. With the end of the Cold War, support for an ideological battle between Mozambique's Marxist-leaning government and the rebels disappeared, as did their sponsors (Walter, 1999: 145; Berman, 1996:19-20;). Third, a worsening drought threatened the country with mass starvation, making it increasingly difficult for both sides to feed their soldiers and supporters (Alden and Simpson, 1993: 126; Ohlson, Stedman and Davies, 1994:113-116). Fourth, Mozambique was a "unique case" or it was simply that good fortunes guided the peace process (Hume, 1994). Similarly, other scholars have suggested that "hidden hands" had paid off the rebels and "bought" peace in Mozambique (Vines, 1998). Finally, a large number of studies based on 'liberal peace thesis' debunk existing studies and suggest that peace came to Mozambique as a singular result of the heavy external intervention, and that without the intervention the same outcome would not have prevailed (Bekoe, 2008; Manning, 2002; Stedman, 1997).

While the last explanation points in the right direction, I argue that it does not get to the 'heart of the matter', partly because: (i) it ignores the strategies and tools adopted by the international community to facilitate Mozambican peacebuilding process; (ii) it focuses on Mozambique's transition from war to peace, and does not capture the factors that sustain the transition. Therefore, while existing studies have offered useful analyses on the Mozambican peacebuilding trajectory, they have tended to overlook the most important causal mechanisms and processes employed by the UN and the international community. The next section provides a theoretical argument that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding programmes. Subsequent sections subject this argument to empirical testing.

#### **4. Theoretical Argument: Why Credible and Impartial International Support through the UN Increases the Survival of Peace after Civil War**

Drawing from, and building on, the established findings of peace scholars such as Caplan, Hoeffler and Brinkman (2015), Collier *et al.* (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Fortna (2004, 2008) that external actors contribute to conflict resolution and post-war development, I also argue that external actors not only facilitate the transition from war to peace, but also contribute to the sustainability of peace after the transition. This argument raises an important question: why are external actors critical to the sustainability of peace after war? The bargaining model of war tells us that there are three main sources of problems for states emerging from civil war. The first difficulty is information asymmetry. Here, the focus is on the strategic incentives each warring party may have not to reveal its true strength. Because doing so compromises the party's position at the negotiation or bargaining table, and so actors may have incentives to misrepresent their resolve or capabilities. In this sense, bargains may fail because of symmetry: neither party knows the other party's true strength, and they resort to fighting as a way of revealing this information (Slantchev, 2003).

The second source of problems why peace could break down in the absence of external actors relates to issues of indivisibility of stakes in the conflict. Here, negotiations might fail if the rebels and the incumbent government cannot divide the stakes in a mutually agreeable way. As Paul Pillar (1983) has written, "if the stakes are chiefly indivisible, so that neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants, negotiations are less apt to be successful. Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in other types of war." An example is territory, which often carries symbolic or strategic value (as in the case of Cabinda in Angola or Niger Delta in Nigeria). This makes it difficult or impossible for the parties to accept any partial division of the stakes (Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2003). Thus, parties may have no choice but to resort to war.

The third challenge for states emerging from war is a commitment problem. This type of problem typically arises when warring factions and/or parties cannot credibly guarantee to adhere to the peace agreements over a long period of time. This explanation is also described as time inconsistency in the literature and

leaves at least one party vulnerable to renegeing at some point in the future. Taken together, these three challenges in civil wars make brokering a peace extraordinarily difficult and often require a third party to alter the cost and benefit structure associated with the belligerents (Walter, 1997; 2009; Fearon, 1995).

Now that we have established that external actors or a third party intermediary is important among civil war combatants, since governments are often reluctant to officially recognise rebels because their existence poses significant threat to its authority, and rebels often have more to gain in profit through war than through peace (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2004), this begs another question: how can external actors contribute to effective conflict resolution and the sustainability of peace after war? The existing literature presents several arguments to address this question. First, external actors can escalate the costs among the warring parties for reigniting war. When a stalemate is reached among the warring factions, the presence of a third party as a security guarantor increases the prospect of greater cost to a belligerent that initiates a breach of the ceasefire. Second, since bargaining theory suggests that war is a result of misperceptions and an inability to effectively transmit credible information, a third party can facilitate the transfer of information among the combatants.

Third, external actors can “shame” belligerents into ceasing violence and accept a peace agreement and/or tenable compromise. Ideally, the combatants should be concerned over reputational costs they may suffer by resuming hostility against the wishes of the greater international community. This idea is embedded in the notion that when the international community speaks with “one voice” they are able to convince, rather than coerce, civil war combatants into accepting a more universal international norm of conduct (See Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Walter 2002; Fortna 2008; Osborn 2013).

Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, a third party/external actors can also use its peacebuilding operations’ tools to overcome the credible commitment problem. DDR, humanitarian and electoral assistance schemes, for example, are designed to enforce the terms of peace agreements and thus build trust in former

combatant groups that the peace will endure. Similarly, budget support or foreign aid, whether provided bilaterally or multilaterally through international financial institutions, also plays a critical role in helping rebuild state institutions devastated by war, thereby contributing to sustainable peace.

However, not all external peacebuilders or third parties will serve these purposes adequately. Essentially, external peacebuilders fall into two groups: unilateral and multilateral peacebuilders. In the context of this study, multilateral peacebuilding means UN-authorized mission that reflects a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council - China, France, Russia, the US, and United Kingdom (UK). By contrast, if a state engages in peacebuilding mission without the UN authorization, the action is defined as a unilateral peacebuilding. Examples of unilateral peacebuilding missions thus include cases when a state engages in peacebuilding operations along with its allies without authorization from the UN.

Here, I argue that unilateral peacebuilding mission is likely to impede the development of war-torn states and also reduce sustainable peace. This is because unilateral peacebuilders often intend to expand influence on target states, thereby ensuring their own security interests and gaining political and economic benefits (Autesserre, 2010; Dobbins *et al.*, 2005; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2005; Waltz, 1979; Levi, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006). The goal of unilateral peacebuilding mission is to either preserve or change a target state's governing systems so that they can control post-war policy. And one result of this peacebuilding mission is the formation of a less respondent government (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006; Enterline and Greig, 2008). A less respondent government has greater hurdle raising taxes that can be used for post-war development. Another limitation of unilateral peacebuilding mission is that they often face nationalist resistance because they do not have mutual consent by warring parties. Hence, a targeted group and its domestic supporters may perceive them as violators of state sovereignty (Dobbins *et al.*, 2005; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2005).

However, unlike unilateral peacebuilding missions that often support one side of the belligerents and attempt to alter the balance of power for strategic interests, including the maintenance of regional influence, the expansion of markets as well as access to natural resources (Morgenthau, 1967; Regan, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006), multilateral peacebuilding missions under the auspices of the UN contributes to a negotiated settlement by helping ensure that the current power distribution remains static (Fortna, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Regan, 2000). Hence, multilateral peacebuilding missions do not intend to benefit or disadvantage a particular group (Barnett and Weiss, 2008), and thus do not face national resistance. According to Finnemore (2003:73), “peace-building operation must be multilateral to be legitimate and indeed successful; without multilateralism, claims of humanitarian or peacebuilding motivation and justification are suspect.”

There are three main reasons why multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN should contribute to sustainable peace compared to unilateral peacebuilding missions. First, the UN with high moral authority and international legitimacy can incentivise civil war combatants to cooperate for disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) by affecting soldiers’ morale, focusing international attention on non-cooperative groups, and providing direct benefits for cooperation (Fortna, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). DDR strategy enable a post-war country to divert both material and human resources allocated to military uses to important and urgent social programmes, such as the improvement of education, access to public health services and decent infrastructure. In this way, it can be argued that a multilateral intervention under the leadership of the UN contributes to the increase of resources available for post-war reconstruction by helping resource diversion and thereby facilitating sustainable peace after war.

Second, given their commitment to humanitarian concerns, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN often accompany humanitarian and development aid, which invariably increase resources available for post-war development. Besides DDR, UN peace operations can include large-scale development efforts to assist in post-war reconstruction, such as refugee



resettlement programmes, demining initiatives, the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of roads, schools, health facilities and food aid (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Howard, 2008). Such UN-led programmes and activities can contribute to citizens' wellbeing and post-conflict peace and stability. The UN often undertake these tasks through its specialised agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and World Health organisation (WHO).

Third, and finally, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN can encourage sharing of costs for post-war reconstruction; for which the fixed burden-sharing mechanism of the UN provides an institutional solution that reduces the risks of bargaining failures, decreases transaction costs, and alleviates the problem of free riders (Voeten, 2005: in Kim 2013).

Multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN are not without criticisms, however. The UN attempts to change political and economic systems of post-war states, such as political democratisation and electioneering, economic and/or market liberalisation, and reforms of police and judicial systems can undermine a government's sovereignty and accountability (Paris, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). However, in civil war affected societies international assistance may matter more than sovereignty for physical well-being of citizens at least temporarily, as long as it is not motivated by the unilateral peacebuilders' self-interest, but by Multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN –which is largely driven by humanitarian and development concerns (see Doyle and Sambanis, 2006).

Translating these arguments to the post-conflict peacebuilding context, we can infer that external peacebuilding mission will be most successful when it is led and/or authorised by the UN (employing instruments such as DDR, humanitarian and relief efforts, political assistance and budget support), rather than unilateral peacebuilding mission led by the United States or Russia. These conditions were all met in Mozambique, primarily because of the partnership between the United Nations, regional actors and the presence of a large and

varied network of experienced and committed donors. Sections 6 to 7 below empirically show that Mozambique's successful transition from war to peace is a product of multilateral peacebuilding through the United Nations, and not unilateral.

## **5. Nature of International Peacebuilding in Mozambique**

Having outlined theoretically the importance and positive effects of international peacebuilding under the auspices of the UN to sustainable peace in section 4 above, the analysis now turns to empirical material from Mozambique. As noted earlier, virtually all my interview participants agreed that external actors played a key role in the negotiation process and during Mozambique's transition to peace and democracy as well as post-conflict development. The Italian government, for instance, hosted the peace negotiations and led in financing its implementation. The role of the United States of American was also prominent in the peace negotiations as well as in the post-war development. In particular, the United States via its Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided emergency food assistance and assisted in other peacebuilding efforts, especially in the areas of education, public health care and governance reforms. The United Kingdom through its Department for International Development (DfID) has also played a vital role. In particular, the United Kingdom aid portfolio focused on food security, budget supports, and transport (roads, railways, and ports) etc. Similarly, the European Union has provided significant funds for peacebuilding activities in Mozambique, with a focus on economic development and reconciliation between communities. Several other donors such as Japan, Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and the African Development Bank (AfDB) also contributed to the reconstruction of Mozambique (See Adedokun, 2015; Manning and Malbrough 2009, Bekoe, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Manning 2002, Ajello, 1999; Manning 1997; Stedman 2008). As Ball and Barnes point out, bilateral donors as well as NGOS created several forums, both formal and informal, to coordinate assistance for peace implementation in Mozambique (2005: 16-17).

More importantly, the Security Council Resolution 797 established the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in December 1992 to help implement the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 October 1992 by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo. The mandate of ONUMOZ was: (i) to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; (ii) to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors; (iii) to monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; (iv) to authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for UN and other international activities in support of the peace process; (v) to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process; (vi) to coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, IDPs, demobilised military personnel and the affected local population

## **6.1 How the UN and the Broader International Community Contributed to Sustainable Peace In Mozambique**

Although the United Nations Operations mandate's in Mozambique formally came to an end on 9 December 1994, the UN is still present in Mozambique today and continues to influence the country's post-war peace in four ways: (i) Security/DDR assistance, (ii) Humanitarian assistance, (iii) political and electoral assistance, and (iv) budget support. Below, I explore each of these strategies one after the other.

### **6.1.1 The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (I): Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**

The UN together with a committed group of bilateral donors played a vital role in advancing and promoting peace and security in Mozambique. The disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) component of ONUMOZ provided security for the humanitarian and relief efforts as well as for the elections. UNOMOZ was also responsible for setting up and supervising the assembly areas for government and Renamo troops and for disarming soldiers

on both sides. Significantly, ONUMOZ helped to establish a new Mozambican Defense Force. Under the guidance of the UN, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom trained and instilled professionalism and commitment to 540 government and Renamo officers to enable them to serve as military instructors and these officers later trained infantry soldiers at the three Mozambican Defense Force training centres (Adedokun, 2016).

Likewise, the Civilian Police Mission provided the technical support to the Police Commission established under the Rome Agreement. It also monitored all the police activities in the country and verified whether they were consistent with the General Peace Agreement. Furthermore, the UN approved a total of 19 documents relating to the organisation, operating procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified armed forces and other matters.

In a sense, the UN believed that DDR activities are crucial components of both the initial stabilisation of war-torn societies as well as their long-term development. Having learned a hard lesson in Angola, where a four-year peace negotiation process came crashing down in 1992 because the UN pushed for the holding of elections despite both armies remaining nearly intact, ONUMOZ made clear that elections would only be held after the Frelimo and Renamo combatants demobilised. In his address to the Security Council in December 1992, Boutros-Ghali highlighted the importance of DDR before elections as follows: "In the light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented (Boutros-Ghali, 1992)." This initiative was pivotal in laying the foundation for sustainable peace in Mozambique because should the outcome of the elections be in doubt, whether due to accusations of fraud or a patent unwillingness to accept the outcome, neither side would be in a position to renew the conflict (Alden, 1995; Interviewee no. 11). Moreover, moving forces back to barracks and integrating officers and troops of the two factions into a new organisation led to collective security guaranteed between the two contending actors (Adedokun, 2016).

Support for the DDR process was in a nutshell representative of the credible and

impartial approach that foreign donors and UNOMOZ took to put Mozambique back on its feet. For example, compared to Angola, the capacity, composition and constitution <sup>6</sup> of the UN mission in Mozambique were more robust and comprehensive (that is credible and impartial) - 7,000 troops, 1,087 civilian police units and 354 military observers.<sup>7</sup> Again, the demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration effort in Mozambique was a joint effort by the UN and bilateral donors. For example, while UNOMOZ was responsible for setting up and supervising the assembly areas for government and Renamo troops, bilateral donors were involved in the provision of support for vulnerable groups and preliminary information about social reintegration, including capacity development and financial support of demobilised soldiers for 18 months.

Taken together, bilateral donors (excluding UNOMOZ) contributed around U.S. \$119.5 million, with the government contributing around \$10 million.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, although the Reintegration Support Scheme, which provided financial and material benefits for demobilised soldiers, was managed by UNDP, it was conceived and funded by bilateral donors working separately from the UN. A significant number of international NGOs were also involved in the demobilisation process. The World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, and UNICEF provided food, health care and other assistance to both sides in the cantonment areas. As Ball and Barnes point out, bilateral donors as well as NGOs created several forums, both formal and informal, in order to coordinate assistance for peace implementation in Mozambique (2005: 16-17: In Manning and Malbrough, 2009).

Although the overall progress of the DDR and the security sector reform including the professionalism of the military is still an important policy issue in Mozambique to date, some success has been made, however. ONUMOZ, with the help of UN-OCHA and other UN agencies and donors, was able to

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<sup>6</sup> Here, capacity refers to the number of personnel deployed; composition refers to the country's origins of the personnel deployed; and constitution refers to the type of personnel deployed; that is armed military troops, police, and unarmed observers. Recent studies of peacekeeping effectiveness also demonstrate that UN mission capacity, composition and constitution are critical for various aspects of operation success.

<sup>7</sup> Overall, more than 19 countries contributed personnel to the Military Observer Group in Mozambique

<sup>8</sup> The demobilised soldiers were given their salary for two years, the first six months paid by the government and the next 18 months paid by donors UN administered trust fund.

demobilise and reintegrate about 100,000 combatants from both sides. Seventy per cent of demobilised soldiers who received training ended up with secure employment after the departure from the camps (Morgan and Mvududu, 2000). Several years after the Peace Agreement, demobilised soldiers had been well integrated into the communities of their choice (Kane, 1998). ONUMOZ collected more than 200,000 weapons and gave them to the newly formed Mozambican Defense Force. The United Nations also helped establish a National Mine Clearance Plan to clear an initial 4,000 kilometres of roads, develop a mine awareness programme, and educate the population on the dangers of land mines.

Similarly, there has been reduction of military expenditure. Before 1994, defense spending was the largest single item in the annual budget expenditure. With UN and donors support, however, resources have been shifted towards social sectors. For instance, from 1994 to 2014 budgets, the education and health ministries benefited from significant increases in both capital and recurrent allocations while funds for the military and other security agencies were cut down. The trend continued in the 2015 budget<sup>9</sup>.

### **6.1.2 The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (II): Humanitarian Assistance**

The UN system and development donors also championed humanitarian and relief efforts in Mozambique. In fact, the Mozambican repatriation and reintegration programme was one of the largest humanitarian and relief efforts ever undertaken by the United Nations. Within two years after the peace agreement, over 1.7 million refugees returned to their homeland, from six neighbouring countries – Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, more than 4.5 million internally displaced Mozambicans are believed to have returned home during the same period (UNHCR, 1998). According to a UN respondent: “The underlying rationale for humanitarian assistance is that if humanitarian capacity building is well implemented, it can build resilience at the community level; assist national actors in developing the ability to cope with current and future crisis; and more

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<sup>9</sup> See the table on budget support below

importantly, it can contribute to a more sustainable peace without compromising the principles of humanitarian assistance which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Adedokun, 2016).”

Although ONUMOZ through the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) was the lead agency for resettling demobilised soldiers, repatriating refugees, and demining the country, UNOCHA worked in concert with donor agencies, Western powers, as well as a plethora of NGOs and local stakeholders already in Mozambique, rather than devote precious time and resources to building these itself (Interviewee no. 64). For example, the international organisation for migration (IOM) was charged to arrange the transportation of demobilised soldiers and their families. The World Food Programme was employed to provide foodstuffs for the assembly areas. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was responsible for providing long-term assistance to ex-combatants as well as organising the Reintegration Support Scheme in partnership with the Mozambican Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile the IOM and Core were charged with creating the Information Referral Service. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) together with other like-minded development agencies were charged with demining programmes (Alden, 1995; Dobbins *et.al.* , 2005).

Another unique aspect of a broader UN approach to humanitarian assistance programme in Mozambique was UNOCHA’s decentralised administrative structure that was replicated at both national and provincial levels. This initiative led to the introduction of emergency assistance in all 11 provinces, and helped manage the long-term elements of the demobilisation process (Interviewee no. 65). Representatives from the Government, Renamo, and several Western powers, as well as South Africa organised the various aspects of the assistance programme. UNOCHA's central office in Maputo provided overall co-ordination of the humanitarian efforts. An information and Referral Service and Reintegration Support Scheme were set up to inform ex-combatants about available support and employment opportunities and to provide them with financial assistance for 24 months.

In addition to 24 months of financial assistance, demobilised soldiers also had access to orientation and counselling services, training programmes, funding for jobs and small business tool kits. The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) jointly coordinated these activities. All in all, the humanitarian assistance programme budget was \$560million and was funded by both donor agencies and the UN.

### **6.1.3 The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (III): Political Party Development and Electoral Assistance**

After considering the military and humanitarian dimensions, this section turns to the political component of the peace process in Mozambique. The political component refers to those aspects of the process with specific political objectives: the political management of the peace process; the reunification of territorial administration; and the electoral process leading to multi-party elections. The dynamics between the Frelimo led government and Renamo in this dimension influenced all aspects of the process, but was itself influenced by progress in the military and humanitarian components. The connections between the three components focused on Renamo's legitimisation and political socialisation; its transformation into a political party, inclusion in the political space of Mozambique and acceptance by the government. Although the process centred on the two parties, space was also opening up for other political actors (Manning and Malbrough, 2009).

As with the other two dimensions, the role of the UN in the political process in Mozambique was far different compared to other post-conflict situations – that is to say, Mozambique was one of the 'litmus tests' in which the UN provided financial support directly for the development of political parties (Manning and Malbrough 2009). The United Nations Operation in Mozambique created two trust funds in order to: (1) support all registered political parties (17 parties received U.S. \$150,000 each), and; (2) support the transformation of Renamo into a political party.



Although the UN spearheaded the “money for peace” initiative, 13 bilateral donors including the European Commission largely funded it.<sup>10</sup> For example, Italy made the largest contribution, over \$11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of over \$1.96 million to Renamo’s trust fund, with the Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States (Manning and Malbrough 2009). According to Aldo Ajello (1995:123), chief of the UN mission and the Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Mozambique: “The Trust Fund played a crucial role for the success of the mission [...] the two parties needed to have enough political and economic capital to dissuade them from returning to war [...] that the peace would only prevail if both parties felt that it was beneficial for their interests [...] in this operation it was also important to give particular attention to Renamo which, at the beginning, had nothing to lose (In Nuvunga 2007).” As a UN respondent noted: “The existence of viable opposition parties is essential instruments to the success of the peace process and money is key (Adedokun, 2016). The Renamo’s Chief negotiator, Raul Domingos, summed it up in a statement on 16 June 1992: “there is no democracy without money” (Vine, 1996).”

Following the development of political parties, the UN in conjunction with development donors established an independent national electoral commission (CNE). Again, the United Nations Operations in Mozambique provided overall technical assistance (e.g a new electoral code, the electoral calendar and ballots, and to arrange all of the equipment required to hold the elections), political guidance and monitored as well as verified all aspects and stages of the electoral process by working closely with the UNDP, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, the European Union and the bilateral donors (Adedokun, 2016).<sup>11</sup>

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
<sup>10</sup> The Government of Mozambique met US\$5 million of the \$60 million price tag for elections, with the rest provided by the donors (Howard 2008; Jett 1999: 110).

<sup>11</sup> The United Nations trained 1,600 civilians to educate the population about the elections and encourage participation. On the eve of the elections, the international community jointly deployed approximately 2,300 electoral observers, including 900 from the United Nations, to observe and verify the polling booths and the counting of votes in all provinces of the country. They were further supplemented by another 1,400 international observers from such organisations as the , the Organisation of African Unity, the European Union and the Association of European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa.

The first national elections in Mozambique were held in October 1994. The international community deployed over 2,300 electoral observers. Although Renamo President, Afonso Dhlakama threatened at the last minute to boycott the elections on the ground of irregularities in the election process, he eventually agreed to participate in the elections following pressure from the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, and the presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and several other countries in the region. Over 90 per cent of 6.1 million registered voters participated. The incumbent President, Mr. Chissano, won the presidential election with 53.3 per cent of the votes. The leader of Renamo, Mr. Dhlakama, received 33.7 per cent of the votes. The candidate receiving the third largest number of votes (2.9 per cent) was Mr. Wehia Ripua of the Partido Democrático de Moçambique (Pademo).

In the legislative election, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) received the largest share of the votes with 44.3 per cent, followed by Renamo with 37.8 per cent votes and the União Democrática (Ud) with 5.2 per cent of the votes. Those three parties would have the following share of the new Parliament's 250 seats: Frelimo - 129, Renamo - 109 and UD - 12. Both local and international observers judged the Mozambique elections of 1994 as free and fair. Since the transitional multi-party elections were held in 1994, the democratic process has been consolidated by four subsequently national elections (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014). Frelimo has won a majority in parliament and the presidency in each of the general elections (see figure 7.1 below).

**Figure 7.1 – Mozambican Elections, 1994 –2014**



Source: Azevedo-Harman (2015)

#### 6.1.4 The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (IV): Budget Support

Alongside the use of DDR, humanitarian and electoral assistance, the UN and donor agencies also employ budget support as a strategy to sustain peace and development in Mozambique. Since the peace settlement in 1992, Mozambique has been recognised as one of the largest recipients of direct budget support<sup>12</sup> in the world - budget support accounts for 30 per cent of the Mozambican state budget, provided by 19 development partners<sup>13</sup> (International Monetary Fund 2015). In the table below, for example, budget support increased almost three-fold between 2004 to 2012: from just under \$160 million to about \$450 million.

<sup>12</sup> Mozambique is also among the most advanced countries in terms of the Paris Declaration Agenda

<sup>13</sup> Among the biggest donors to Mozambique are the World Bank (IDA), the USA, the EC, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway.

**Table 7.1: Budget Support Disbursements by Development Partners, 2004-2012**

<b>AGENCY</b> <i>(Millions of USD) <sup>23</sup></i>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>GRANTS</b>									
Germany	3.99	4.34	11.93	13.49	16.74	18.67	18.98	18.08	11.62
Austria					2.47	4.33	3.90	4.62	3.10
Belgium	3.67	2.04	3.54	4.08	4.67				
European Union	58.04	53.75	46.45	58.38	68.57	86.59	83.06	71.91	74.84
Canada		2.03	1.90	4.26	7.57	9.89	14.21	16.03	14.84
Denmark		9.54	2.49	19.20	10.55	8.51	7.34	12.96	10.69
Spain		3.78	3.59	4.23	6.22	9.87	9.71	9.47	
Finland	4.55	4.91	5.85	6.79	10.39	8.76	8.43	10.31	9.27
France	3.77	3.19	3.24	2.65	3.04	3.10	2.72	2.90	2.52
The Netherlands	17.16	14.01	21.24	24.16	26.23	25.15	21.68	25.83	11.24
Ireland	7.01	6.03	6.80	12.28	15.17	14.82	14.72	16.12	11.55
Italy	3.78	3.32	3.55	5.35	5.86	5.27	5.68	5.28	5.14
Norway	8.12	15.04	17.01	22.61	29.70	23.82	27.74	29.58	23.44
Portugal	1.48	1.53	1.41	1.49	1.51	1.60	1.93		3.90
United Kingdom	27.53	46.37	55.69	69.81	81.71	58.30	54.16	136.44	77.65
Sweden	12.53	17.95	23.92	44.45	56.50	40.12	44.42	51.35	43.40
Switzerland	7.20	7.88	6.33	6.95	7.08	6.64	6.91	4.18	7.30
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>	<b>158.84</b>	<b>195.73</b>	<b>214.95</b>	<b>300.19</b>	<b>353.98</b>	<b>325.43</b>	<b>325.59</b>	<b>415.06</b>	<b>310.48</b>
<b>LOANS</b>									
AfDB			58.08	30.29	32.31	30.28	30.05	28.20	30.32
World Bank		65.91	56.48	69.37	72.09	78.72	88.77	92.90	108.07
<b>SUB TOTAL</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>65.91</b>	<b>114.55</b>	<b>99.66</b>	<b>104.40</b>	<b>109.00</b>	<b>118.82</b>	<b>121.10</b>	<b>138.39</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>158.84</b>	<b>261.64</b>	<b>329.50</b>	<b>399.84</b>	<b>458.38</b>	<b>434.44</b>	<b>444.40</b>	<b>536.16</b>	<b>448.86</b>

Source: Direccção Nacional do Tesouro – Ministry of Finance.

By definition, budget support is the provision of aid directly to the state budget. According to OECD-DAC (2006), budget support is a method of financing a partner country's budget through a transfer of resources from an external financing agency to the partner government's national treasury. The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance with the recipient's budgetary procedure with conditions set by a donor. The UN and donors expect budget support to increase government ownership of the peace and development process, to create mechanisms of mutual accountability between donors and the government, to bring about greater harmonisation, co-ordination and information sharing amongst donors, and to unite donors in the support of a common goal, which is sustainable peacebuilding (Manning and Malbrough, 2012).

Budget support for sustainable peacebuilding is grounded in National Poverty Reduction Strategy Document (known by its Portuguese acronym PARPA). The PARPA<sup>14</sup> is jointly prepared by the Government of Mozambique, development partners and CSOs. The PARPA has four main objectives that are considered critical to achieve sustainable peacebuilding: (i) rural and agricultural and development; (ii) poverty and macroeconomic management; (iii) governance;

<sup>14</sup> PARPA is a five-year programme. Mozambique is now on its third PARPA, which was drafted in 2011.

and (iv) human and social development, especially health and education.

Through budget support, total spending on the priority sectors designated in PARPA has more than quadrupled in nominal terms between 2004 and 2012, increasing by more than 7 percentage points of GDP (see table below). Similarly, as a percentage of total expenditure, education, health, agriculture, good governance and infrastructure, together with the other smaller priority sectors, have increased their share from 61 per cent to just over 67 per cent of total spending. The bottom line here is that: budgetary allocations – boosted by Budget Support disbursements – have been consistent with the planned expansion of priority sectors outlined in PARP (see table 6.2 next page).

**Table 6.2: Influence of Budget Support on Sectors Relevant to Peacebuilding**

**Priority sectors as % of nominal GDP**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Education	4.85%	4.88%	5.74%	6.23%	6.26%	6.31%	6.58%	6.48%
Health	3.32%	3.36%	3.66%	3.20%	3.14%	2.61%	2.70%	3.81%
Agriculture & Rural Dvt.	1.16%	1.10%	0.91%	1.03%	1.37%	1.18%	2.55%	2.55%
Infrastructure	2.90%	4.05%	3.56%	3.94%	3.81%	4.88%	5.65%	5.20%
Good Governance	2.00%	1.96%	2.01%	2.60%	2.87%	2.67%	2.41%	2.54%
Other priority Sectors	0.21%	0.23%	0.24%	0.39%	0.41%	0.37%	0.46%	1.05%
<b>Total Priority Sectors</b>	<b>14.44%</b>	<b>15.58%</b>	<b>16.13%</b>	<b>17.39%</b>	<b>17.86%</b>	<b>18.02%</b>	<b>20.34%</b>	<b>21.62%</b>

**Priority sectors as % of total expenditure**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Education	20.56%	18.77%	20.86%	22.47%	19.26%	19.91%	18.27%	20.13%
Health	14.08%	12.90%	13.29%	11.53%	9.67%	8.24%	7.49%	11.84%
Agriculture & Rural Dvt.	4.90%	4.24%	3.30%	3.71%	4.21%	3.73%	7.08%	7.93%
Infrastructure	12.29%	15.57%	12.95%	14.20%	11.71%	15.40%	15.68%	16.16%
Good Governance	8.49%	7.54%	7.32%	9.37%	8.83%	8.44%	6.68%	7.90%
Other priority Sectors	0.88%	0.88%	0.89%	1.41%	1.25%	1.17%	1.28%	3.25%
<b>Total Priority Sectors</b>	<b>61.20%</b>	<b>59.90%</b>	<b>58.60%</b>	<b>62.69%</b>	<b>54.93%</b>	<b>56.89%</b>	<b>56.47%</b>	<b>67.21%</b>


Sources: Ministry of Finance and Fiscal tables from the Bank of Mozambique (for years 2005-2011) and \*IMF Article IV estimates (2012)

How successful has budget support been in contributing to sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique? Although the answer to this question is not straightforward, there is evidence of remarkable and track-able progress in education, health, and good governance – all of which are predictors of stable societies. Consider education for example: between 1980 and 2014, Mozambique’s human development score increased 75 per cent, or an average annual increase of about 1.66 per cent – a better performance than Zimbabwe or Angola, two countries in the region that had a similar score to Mozambique in 1980. This performance has been driven by a jump in life expectancy at birth, rising from 46 years in 1995 to 55 in 2014, and a leap in income per capita, from \$233 in 1995 to \$585 in 2014 (constant 2011 US dollars, purchasing power parity)<sup>15</sup>. The UNDP Education Index, which reflects both literacy and enrolment, also shows an improvement between 1995 and 2011 (UNDP Report 2014): in 2011, 90 per cent of school-aged children were enrolled in basic education, which is a significant improvement from the rate of 56 per cent in 1995. Similarly, the secondary school net enrolment rate (NER) more than doubled from 8.2 per cent in 2002 to 22 per cent in 2009. In terms of provincial trends, progress was made

<sup>15</sup> World Bank 2016

across all provinces both in primary and secondary enrolment, thereby reducing regional educational inequality (see figure 6.2 below).

**Figure 6.2: Net Enrolment Rates (NER), Primary and Secondary Schooling by Region 2002/03 and 2008/09**




Source: Arndt, Jones and Tarp 2015

There are several reasons why education improvements should contribute to sustainable peacebuilding. First, according to a World Bank report (Aoki *et al.*, 2002), government investment in education is a means by which governments can make a direct and lasting positive impact on people's lives, which may directly reduce the level of grievances in society. Second, the expansion of public spending in education can reduce grievances and conflict by spurring economic development and social equality (Thyne, 2006). According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), rebel recruitment is more costly and rebellion is less likely the higher the level of education in a society. Third, education promotes a culture of peace (Sargent, 1996). As Lipset (1959: 79) pointed out: 'Education presumably broadens men's outlook, enables them to understand the needs for norms of tolerance, restraining them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines'. In line with this, several scholars hold that higher educational attainment reduces the risk of political violence by encouraging political participation and channelling conflicts of interest through institutional pathways rather than

through the use of violence (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003; Huntington, 1968). More recently, education has also been argued to promote social cohesion, such as learning how to work together peacefully, which in turn enables peace and political stability.

Mozambique’s health scores with regard to immunisation, access to sanitation facilities and clean water, life expectancy for both sexes, and maternal and child mortality improved steadily between 1995 and 2011 (World Bank and UNDP data). According to the 2013 Lancet Commission on Investing in Health report, co-chaired by Larry Summers and Dean Jamison: ‘Financing health services reduces mortality, plays a critical role in ending poverty, accounts for 11 per cent to 24 per cent of economic growth in low- and middle-income countries, thereby contributing to sustainable peace and security.’ Likewise, Mozambique performed better than both sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, with improvements in key areas such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law, though rankings continue to suffer in other areas (see Figure 7.3 below).

**Figure 6.3: Governance Indicators**



Source: World Bank, 2013

Similarly, Mozambique scored better than sub-Saharan African countries on the Mo Ibrahim Index of Governance, ranking 20th out of 53 countries in the 2013 edition, with 54.8 out of 100 maximum points (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The index covers four broad categories — safety and the rule of law,



participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Several studies highlight the importance of good governance as a prerequisite for sustainable peacebuilding (Hegre *et al.*, 2012; Fearon, 2011; Cederman, Hug and Krebs, 2010; Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi, 2009, 2010; Hegre and Nygard, 2012; Walter 2014). Zakaria (1997), for example, includes an effective 'rule of law' as an important element of political stability and liberal democracy. Walter (2014) claims that civil war are less likely to repeat themselves in countries where government elites are accountable to the public, where the public participates in political life, and where information is transparent. Huntington (1965) also highlights the distinction between 'mobilisation' and 'institutionalisation.' Overall, it can be said that without the flow of funds provided by Budget Support to education, health and governance sectors, the changes made in the sectors and the contributions to sustainable peacebuilding in the country would not have been easily undertaken (Adedokun, 2016).

More generally, budget support serves four purposes. First, budget support has led to an increase in the coordination, monitoring and assessment of government performance amongst donors. This has helped to foster a strong relationship of accountability between the Mozambican government and the donor community as well as the wider population. This creates fewer motives for the opposition (Renamo) to return to war. Second, it creates multiple non-violent means to influence government policy, making renewed violence less essential as a means to promote change. Third, budget support helps the government of Mozambique to credibly commit to the political terms of the Rome peace agreement, making post-conflict peace sustainable. Finally, budget support has influenced the kinds of initiatives donors are willing to support in post-war Mozambique. Most importantly, it has reinforced a focus by donors on the institutional capacity of the state, and particularly the state's capacity to plan and manage public spending, since this is the focus of the PARPA. The result is a situation where Renamo and other opposition parties have an easier time resolving their underlying differences and supporting a permanent halt to fighting. Thus, the case of Mozambique shows that generous budget support, especially when it is rightly targeted, can help to consolidate the peace process.

## **Conclusion**

Although a combination of factors was responsible for the emergence and survival of peace and stability in Mozambique, this chapter has argued that one of the most important factors behind Mozambique's success was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of the United Nations, Western powers, and major donors, who were committed to making peace work and had long-standing relationships with the both Frelimo and Renamo. The chapter further shows that any assessment of the UN and the broader international community's role and performance in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four intervention strategies or instruments, namely: (i) DDR assistance, (ii) Humanitarian assistance, (iii) political and electoral assistance, and; (iv) budget support. Overall, the Mozambican case reinforces many of the findings from the literature on the role of third-party guarantors in securing negotiated peace settlements. Specifically, it provides insight into the argument that external intervention led by the UN is more likely to be successful than a unilateral intervention led by a powerful state without UN approval.

Still, while much progress has been achieved in building a more peaceful polity in Mozambique through the United Nations and development agencies, there are also challenges. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that signs of peace and progress notwithstanding, Mozambique still faces a large number of social and economic problems: poverty, unemployment, natural resource boom, increasing political exclusion, dependence on foreign aid, and low access to social and economic services and facilities.

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