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Elites and ethno-nationalist conflict during democratisation**
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Tilting at Windmills or Whipping Up a Storm?*

Elites and Ethno-Nationalist Conflict during Democratisation

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Abstract

How much influence do political leaders have on the likelihood of ethnic civil war? Two opposing theoretical positions exist: elite manipulation theorists argue that leaders incite ethno-nationalism to secure their hold on power (Snyder 2000, Gagnon 2004). However, political leaders rarely have both the ability and the ideal environment to manipulate identities (Brubaker 1998). Instead, structural forces like ethnic security dilemmas could be driving forces behind conflict onset (Posen 1993), leaving elites virtually without influence on the probability of civil-war onset.

This study uses large-N regressions to test both theories and a hybrid alternative focussing on two problems inherent to democratisation settings: the need to settle the demos question and ongoing competition between incumbent and challenging political leaders. Results confirm that ongoing democratisation phases, the prior existence of security worries caused by politicised ethnic divisions, and factors threatening incumbents have a significant positive influence on the risk of civil war.

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1 Introduction

Democratisation is a time of hope, but it is also a time of social upheaval. The old societal order needs to be deconstructed, exclusive networks of interaction and trust within social groups and patron-client relationships with the former regime need to disintegrate. Therefore, it is not surprising that democratising countries have been shown to bear a greater risk of inter-state war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995a, b, 2002, 2005) and recent studies show that this influence holds for civil wars, too (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010).

The risk of civil war during democratisation weighs particularly on ethnically heterogeneous countries. It is a truism that the move towards democracy requires an answer to the *demos* question: should the nation be defined in terms of ethnicity, potentially requiring the redrawing of borders or the displacement of people; or can a supra-ethnic identity attract the loyalty of most current citizens? In countries with a deeply-rooted history of conflict between different ethnic groups, the need to settle the *demos* question can become the cause for conflict.

Leadership is one factor that has often been associated with the question why ethnic civil war breaks out during democratisation in some countries—such as Yugoslavia—but not in others. Two prominent and opposing views on the role of leadership in ethnic conflict are the theories of elite manipulation and ethnic security dilemma. The present study tests these two theories in the framework of ethnically heterogeneous societies undergoing a process of democratisation, and proposes a hybrid alternative that applies particularly to democratisation cases.

The following section presents the three theories by showing how they interpret the same case: Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Once testable predictions have

been derived, the third section describes the data and methods used. Section four shows how well the theories perform when it comes to the role of democratisation, ethnicity and leadership using large-N logistic regression, and section five concludes with an outlook on future research.

2 Three Paths to the Same Conflict: A Literature Review

An investigation into the role of political elites in the onset of civil war generally involves a judgement on where to place responsibility: with the individual leader, with situational forces, or somewhere in between. The endpoints of the agent-structure scale are defined by two prominent theories.

The theory of elite manipulation¹ (e.g. Gagnon 2004, Snyder 2000) places the blame squarely with elites, which for the purpose of this study are defined as any political figures that hold or compete for political office. Leaders, particularly incumbents, are argued to use the danger of an inter-ethnic conflict as a tool to secure their grip on power, and negligently or wilfully accept the onset of violent conflict as a consequence of their own doing.

At the other extreme of the scale, the theory of the ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993) argues that political leaders are relatively powerless in the face of structural and situational forces. If they work hard to improve the security of their people, they risk being seen by others as an aggressor preparing for attack, potentially inviting a first strike by others. Yet neglecting the security of their people equally puts them at risk. Conflict may be unavoidable regardless of the choices made by elites.

The following two parts illustrate these theories using the Yugoslavian break-up in the early 1990s. A third, hybrid theory that focusses particularly on cases of democratisation is then introduced, and testable predictions are derived for all.

2.1 Manipulation by Elites

Both Snyder (2000) and Gagnon (2004) see the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s as the result of incumbent elites seeking to defend their power in the face of mass mobilisation and the threat of regime reformation. Their “goal was to bring an end to political mobilisation that represented an immediate threat to the existing structure of power” (ibid.: 181) and to control the “impending democratisation [that] threatened the position of the communist elite” (Snyder 2000: 206). Gagnon (2004) argues that both parties that emerged victoriously in the 1990 regional elections in Croatia and Serbia² did not succeed by virtue of a strong backing by their respective populations but by legal and electoral trickery. At the same time, they were faced with “parts of the population that were actively mobilising against the interests of conservative elites and calling for fundamental changes to the structures of economic and political power” (ibid. 180).

The response by both Croat and Serbian leadership was to utilise “their near monopoly control over the news media” (Snyder 2000: 213) to “shift the focus of political discourse away from issues of change toward grave injustices purportedly being inflicted on innocents [...] by evil others defined in ethnic terms” (Gagnon 2004: 180-1). This change of subject served to demobilise any potential opposition: “anyone who questioned these stories or who criticised the president or the ruling party [...] was demonised as being in league with the enemy, of not caring about the innocent victims of the evil others” (ibid.: 179). This clearly included not only opposition politicians and their supporters, but also potential challengers from within. Especially given that only a small minority of Yugoslav citizens saw members of other ethnic groups as a threat only a few years before the outbreak of civil war (ibid.), the ethnic discourse is argued to be just a ploy that allowed a restructuring of

political (and geographic) space favourable to the incumbents. Since both Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman engaged in such ethnic outbidding to hold on to their jobs, the efforts of each could serve as the best proof of their threatening intentions to the other.

2.2 Ethnic Security Dilemma

In clear opposition to the “elite manipulation” school of thought, the proponents of the “ethnic security dilemma” argue that conflict is not caused by “short-term incentives for new leaders to ‘play the nationalist card’ to secure their power” (Posen 1993: 29). Instead, structural forces drive society to the brink of conflict, while political leaders have little to no ability to avoid the outbreak of violence.

Posen (1993) argues that the weakening, reform or collapse of the central authority of ethnically heterogeneous states that can happen during periods of democratisation (or regime type transitions in general) causes an “emerging anarchy” similar to the lack of hierarchical structure at the international level. With the break-down of the previous order and the resulting transitional absence of a “Leviathan”, the country experiences “special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security” (Posen 1993: 27). In the absence of a credible national authority that can guarantee the safety of ethnic groups, uncertainty kindles a rational fear for group survival.

“The process of imperial collapse produces conditions that make offensive and defensive capabilities indistinguishable” (ibid.: 29). The resulting ambiguity makes it difficult or impossible for any group to credibly signal their defensive intent. Posen discusses a number of events illustrating the difficulty of distinguishing offensive and defensive actions, including the confiscation of heavy weapons stored on the territory of the Croat Republic by the predominantly Serbian-controlled Yugoslav

Army in October 1990 (ibid.). Given the preceding downgrading of the Serbian population on Croat territory from “constituent nation” to “minority” and the associated condition that Serbs living in Croatia swear their loyalty to the Croatian Republic, the impounding can be interpreted as a defensive act: the attempt to control access to weapons that could potentially be used against the Serbian minority. At the same time, the confiscated weapons provided the Yugoslav Army with “a vast military advantage over the nascent armed forces of the [Croat] republic” (Posen 1993: 37). Even with hindsight, it is difficult to say to what extent this action was driven by a purely offensive or defensive intent.

As long as it is impossible to judge an opponent’s intent by his actions, the main mechanism that ethnic groups will use to determine offensive implications of another’s sense of identity is “history: how did other groups behave the last time they were unconstrained” (ibid.: 30)? Posen points out that “Serbs and Croats have a terrifying oral history of each other’s behaviour” (ibid.: 36) that goes beyond a history of more intense conflict dating back over 100 years. Given such a history of violent inter-ethnic conflict, any efforts to increase group cohesion by touting shared suffering during conflict is likely to be seen as vilification and sabre-rattling by others. Even without a history of conflict, “the ‘groupness’ of the ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic collectives that emerge from collapsed empires gives each of them an inherent offensive military power” (ibid.: 30). The combination of group cohesion and a history of confrontation produces a risk-reward structure that makes it attractive for actors to “choose the offensive if they wish to survive” (ibid.: 28).

As a result, the spiral of fear, defensive action and misinterpretation can lead to the outbreak of violence even without political leaders adding fuel to the flames.

2.3 Selection of Elites

So far, the discussion has focussed on the two polar cases in the debate on the influence of political leaders. Elite-manipulation theorists place the blame for ethnic civil wars squarely with the leaders of ethnic groups, arguing that they encourage conflict in an attempt to bolster their waning power. Proponents of the ethnic security dilemma see structural or situational forces at work, leaving political elites little or no room to manoeuvre.

Both schools of thought make convincing arguments. Political leaders cannot reasonably be expected to be an exception to the principal-agent problem. It is rational for them to look out for their personal interest (Brubaker 1998) and fear of democratisation provides a powerful motive (Snyder and Ballentine 1996). At the same time, democratisation does force ethnic groups to consider the intentions of their neighbours, especially if earlier interactions have been fraught with (violent) conflict.

Other parts of both arguments seem less convincing. Gagnon (2004) argues that elites were able to skilfully steer the public discourse away from political change towards ethnic conflict even though ethnicity was initially non-issue for the majority of the population. Still, one needs to ask whether the likes of Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman could have been successful in framing the debate if ethnicity was not already meaningful to their audience. Not only were Milošević's claims not disproven by ambiguous Croat actions (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999), they also seemed realistic due to a substantial history of inter-ethnic conflict. While the majority of people may have preferred to work towards increasing the standard of living and economic security—as polls at the turn of the decade indicate (Gagnon 2004: 33-46; see also Burg and Berbaum 1989)—once the old system with its safe-

guards is being dismantled, security considerations would become more urgent and their immediacy would trump longer-term considerations.

Just as the expectation of thorough elite control over public discourse seems too extreme, the assumption of anarchy in the “ethnic security dilemma” is overstated. While institutions will be weakened as the political regime is being reformed, a complete break-down of the apparatus of state power seems rare. And in the case of Yugoslavia, there was no non-ethnic superior power that disappeared, leaving the ethnic groups to their own devices. Rather, the same elites were at work both before and after the onset of reforms, and they had roughly the same power apparatus at their disposal until the conflict started to escalate.³

In the following, an alternative theory is proposed; a hybrid of these two schools of thought that focuses on a characteristic unique to democratisation processes: the inherent need to define the demos.

Recent empirical studies have clearly shown that periods of democratisation are associated with a higher risk of international war (Mansfield and Snyder 2005 and earlier studies) and there is initial empirical evidence that the likelihood of civil war also rises (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010). What can explain this significant deviation in the conflict risk in comparison with other periods in a country’s history? Neither temporary weakness of state institutions nor the threat to personal positions of power make likely candidates: both can occur during other regime-type changes and even during regime changes that do not affect the nature of the political system.⁴

The key difference between democratisations and other changes to the regime is that any move towards democracy requires an answer to the demos question. The issue of who can partake in the government and influence the future of all inhabitants forces citizens to examine their loyalties. Is their allegiance to an

ethnically heterogeneous state stronger than their loyalty to a more narrowly defined group of kin? This question is not contingent on the presence of anarchy, and it does not require that ethnic differences were of great concern immediately prior to the onset of the transition.

When debating the demos question, ethnic identities are one of multiple competing loyalties that inhabitants choose from. Assuming that they choose rationally, they can be expected to assess the utility of each of their identities. A history of ethnicity-based exclusion, discrimination, persecution or conflict will lead them to prefer the loyalty to a smaller, ethnically homogenous group over the potentially risky cohabitation with members of other ethnicities. This can be an alternative origin for an ethnic security dilemma: even if there is no anarchy yet, the potential of drastic consequences such as an attack by another ethnic group—even when very improbable—may lead risk-averse people to place their faith only in their own group. Such considerations also explain why the population of Yugoslavia shifted their focus from the issues of economic prosperity to ethnic divisions. Physiological needs and safety considerations receive the highest priority (Maslow 1943), but these needs were fulfilled before the onset of reforms, leaving the population free to concern themselves with less basic issues. Yet, any doubt regarding the provision of basic requirements would push any other goals into the background immediately. The desire to avoid the worst-case scenario of a violent attack then leads to a spiral of mistrust and suspicion similar to the one described in the ethnic security dilemma.

In essence, the nature of democratisation processes allows us to extend the theory of the ethnic security dilemma in two ways. Firstly, it allows us to relax the assumption that a previous, protective authority has ceased to exist. Instead, it is the necessity to reflect on potential future behaviour of others that causes the same

dynamic. Moreover, democratisation provides the reason why ethnicity suddenly becomes meaningful, even when—as critics of the ethnic security dilemma have pointed out⁵—it did not play a major role in public discourse before. The choice among different identities is at the heart of the democratisation process, and this choice will be guided both by lived experience and expectations of future behaviour.

However, it is unrealistic to expect that political leaders have no role to play in this dynamic: “it is scarcely controversial to point out the opportunism and cynicism of political elites, or to underscore the crucial role of elites” (Brubaker 1998: 289). The intuition behind the theory of elite manipulation is reasonable. Yet, here too, the democratisation process is at the heart of the matter. The first democratic elections will create winners and losers, and they force political elites—both incumbents and challengers—to compete for votes. The politician that realises and most effectively addresses the dominant issue for voters has the highest chance of being elected. But this is not a re-framing of public discourse away from topics that the population actually values more, i.e. a process of top-down manipulation in the sense of Kaufman (2001).

Instead, it is an accurate assessment of the subject that will influence voters most, a realistic appraisal of the public’s concerns. If fears for group survival resonate with the public at all, they will trump other concerns and they will lead the public to back the leader that most credibly promises to deal with this threat. Unless they have been removed from power at the start of the democratisation process, incumbents often still possess preferential access to news media as well as control over the power apparatus of the state. This implies that they have better means to position themselves as a non-diplomatic “defender of the people”, and the impending loss of office would motivate them to do so. In turn, this reaffirms the security dynamic made possible by the onset of democratisation: now the potential safety threat posed

by other ethnic groups becomes bigger with each leader arguing for the need of protection.

In essence, the ongoing, newly democratic process of elite selection provides an ideal means to capture public attention—the “fear” for their safety—and an obvious motivation for using it by any incumbent or challenger. This also shows the synthesis between ethnic security dilemma and elite manipulation theory: leaders are aware of the security problem and they do take advantage of it. However, the origin of safety worries is not a skilful manipulation by cunning leaders; it is the necessity to answer the demos question that is caused by the movement towards democracy.

2.4 Comparing the Three Causal Paths

The discussion has proposed three different theories explaining the onset of ethnic civil war in settings of democratisation (or even in regime-type change in general). In order to examine these three competing causal paths, testable hypotheses will now be derived along three crucial dimensions: democratisation, ethnicity and leadership. Table 1 summarises the different arguments and the resulting predictions by these three schools of thought.

Democratisation

Both elite manipulation and ethnic security dilemma require a weakness of or a change in the apparatus of state power that either threatens leaders or ethnic groups. Transitions to democracy satisfy both conditions since regime-type change often involves regime change and since there is likely a gap between the dismantling of old institutions and the construction of their successors that can be interpreted as a temporary, emerging anarchy.

	<i>Manipulation by elites</i>	<i>Selection of elites</i>	<i>Ethnic security dilemma</i>
<i>Democratisation</i>	Democratisation threatens incumbents who seek to defend their power.	Democratisation requires an answer to the demos question. The population is forced to weigh their loyalty to state and ethnic kin based on the potential threat from others.	The absence of a stabilising force engenders safety concerns at the level of ethnic groups.
	<i>Prediction: H1 holds, democratisation increases the risk of civil war.</i>		
<i>Ethnicity</i>	Ethnicity is a mobilisation tool, with political leaders defining or choosing ethnic boundaries suitable to their goals and escalating conflict along this identity dimension.	Ethnic identities are one of several potential answer to the demos question. Loyalty to ethnic kin will be preferred if ethnic divisions have previously been politicised through exclusion, discrimination or conflict.	Given anarchy at the state level, ethnic groups are the most relevant organisations for inhabitants. Threats to personal safety are perceived along ethnic divisions.
	<i>Prediction: H2a holds, the presence of relevant ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.</i>	<i>Prediction: H2b holds, the presence of politicised ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.</i>	<i>Prediction: H2a holds, the presence of relevant ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.</i>
<i>Leadership</i>	Political leaders compete for public support by positioning themselves on the most relevant issues. Realising that safety trumps more abstract economic and political issues, cunning politicians manipulate the public to create such fears, then portray selves as undiplomatic defenders of one ethnic group, increasing/securing personal power.	Political leaders compete for public support by positioning themselves on the most relevant issues. Given politicised ethnic divisions, personal safety trumps more abstract economic and political issues, leading elites to portray themselves as undiplomatic defenders of an ethnic group, and being selected for this trait.	Political leaders are by default aligned with an ethnic group and are trapped in a situation where any action makes their group less safe.
	<i>Prediction: H3 holds, threats to the incumbent are associated with a higher risk of civil war.</i>	<i>Prediction: H3 does not hold, threats to the incumbent are not associated with a higher risk of civil war.</i>	

Table 1: Predictions by the theories of elite manipulation, elite selection and ethnic security dilemma

In contrast, the theory of elite selection *requires* not just any regime-type change, but a movement towards democracy, since it posits the need to address the demos question as the cause of a spiral of rising suspicion that eventually leads groups to favour taking the offensive.

In summary, all three theories predict democratisations to be troublesome times.

H1. Democratisation increases the risk of civil war.

Ethnicity

Likewise, all three theories require the presence of ethnic identities: to be skilfully manipulated by self-serving leaders (elite manipulation), to serve as one potential level of loyalty competing with others as an answer to the demos question (elite selection), or to act as the primary level of loyalty for inhabitants in the absence of a protective, overarching state authority (ethnic security dilemma).

H2a. The presence of relevant ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.

However, the requirements posed by the theory of elite selection are more stringent: only ethnic identities that have been politicised through exclusion, discrimination or prior conflict should cause any realistic security worries during democratisation periods.

H2b. The presence of politicised ethnic dimensions increases the risk of civil war.

Leadership

The ethnic security dilemma differs from the two other theories in predicting that elite actions do not play a decisive role: not working to defend your group leaves it at the mercy of others, working to defend your group is perceived as preparation for an offensive and invites attack. Once the dilemma has formed, the actions of an individual leader would not matter.

On the other hand, both elite manipulation and elite selection argue that a threat to the power of the incumbent is associated with a higher risk for conflict. Proponents of the elite manipulation theory go furthest in arguing that conflict is the direct result of an active reframing of the public discourse. The elite selection theory argues that while competing political leaders add momentum to security worries (e.g. through ethnic outbidding), the initial cause is the democratisation process, essentially reducing the link from causation to correlation.

H3. A threat to the power of the incumbent leader is associated with a higher risk of civil war.

The following section presents the data and methods that will be used to test these hypotheses.

3 Data & Methodology

The previous section has provided an overview of three competing theories that attempt to explain the onset of civil war, and has offered hypotheses regarding the role of democratisation, ethnicity and threats to the power of incumbent leaders. In this section, the operationalisation of the relevant concepts is discussed, starting with the onset of civil war as the dependent variable and then covering democratisation, presence and politicisation of ethnic divisions, and threats to the incumbent. Finally, the applied regression techniques will be presented.

3.1 Operationalising Civil-war Onset

The onset of civil war is the dependent variable for this analysis and an appropriate dummy variable indicating the onset of civil war is conveniently provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts data-set (ACD; Gleditsch et al. 2002, Version 4/2008).

The ACD indicator is preferred over other data-sets due to its extensive coverage and its sensitivity to low-intensity conflict.⁶ Years of ongoing conflict are excluded from the analysis and a dummy variable controls for prior episodes of civil war.⁷

3.2 Operationalising Democratisation

Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) provide a mechanism for identifying democratisation periods in governance indicators that is more flexible than lag structures. The period-finding process distinguishes between stable periods of little or no variability in the governance indicator and transition periods during which the governance indicator deviates more than a set limit from the average of the stable period. The resulting dummy codes '1' whenever a transition period has resulted in a new stable period that is substantially more democratic than the previous stable state.

For the purpose of this study, the democratisation dummy demonstrated in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (ibid.) and originally based on the Polity IV indicator (Marshall et al. 2002) is adjusted in three ways. Firstly, the democratisation indicator is extended to include not only democratisation efforts that result in a new, more democratic stable period, but to also include *attempts* at democratisation. Such democratisation attempts are coded when the governance indicator registers a substantially higher level of democracy for a short while, but these changes to the regime type are reversed so quickly that no new, more democratic stable period could be established. (Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the difference.) The reasoning for this adjustment is that hypothesis H1a does not require democratisation to be successful. The direction of causality runs both ways: an attempted democratisation can lead to conflict, but the outbreak of conflict will likely diminish the chances of successfully

completing the democratisation process. Cases of attempted democratisation are theoretically relevant and their explicit inclusion seems prudent.




Figure 1: A completed democratization is coded when the regime stabilizes at a more democratic level.




Figure 2: An attempted democratization is coded when the regime made a substantial move towards democracy, but the changes were reversed almost immediately.

Secondly, Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) show empirically that conflict processes triggered by democratisation take more than one year to unfold. For this reason, the democratisation dummy is modified to include any attempted move towards democracy in the current or the preceding three years, as was done in the original study.

Finally, the democratisation dummy used here is calculated on the basis of the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) indicator (Gates et al. 2006).⁸ As discussed by multiple authors (Hegre et. al. 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Vreeland 2008), Polity IV suffers from an explicit inclusion of violent conflict in the operationalisation of its participation components. These elements are partially removed in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010), but the solution offered by the SIP indicator avoids the loss of the important participation component.⁹

3.3 Operationalising Ethnic Relevance & Politicisation

The relevance and politicisation of ethnicity is coded using the novel Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data-set introduced in Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010). The data-set relies on an extensive expert coding of all relevant ethnic groups and the extent to which they partook in government power in the post-WW2 period. This study uses two variables from version 1.07 of the EPR data-set.

Firstly, the coding whether ethnic distinctions were at all relevant will be used to operationalise the presence of ethnic dimensions required by hypothesis H2a. This dummy variable distinguishes between cases where ethnic differences play a role in the country's political life (the majority of countries and 79.64% of all country-years under analysis), and cases where it does not (both Koreas are examples for this category).

Secondly, the EPR data-set provides country-level summaries of the population share of ethnic groups¹⁰ that are actively excluded from political power on the basis of their ethnicity. This share is based on the total population politically relevant ethnic groups in the county and includes groups that have no or only local access to political power as well as groups that are actively discriminated. It is based directly on the experts' assessments of each group. This variable presupposes the existence of relevant ethnic identities and therefore is missing for all countries without ethnic distinctions.

3.4 Operationalising Threats to the Incumbent

According to hypothesis H3 (based on the theories of elite manipulation and elite selection) a threat against the incumbent should be positively correlated with the

onset of civil war. However, no useful indicator for threats against political leaders existed until now. Fortunately, the new Archigos data-set (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, version 2.9) enables the estimation of such a variable. Archigos provides personal information for political leaders, as well as the beginning and end dates of each leader's reign(s). This data can be used in a logistic regression to assess factors that may present a threat to the incumbent, and to estimate the probability of a threat based on these factors.

Two types of events can be understood as a threat to the incumbent: the loss of political power, and more drastically, the punishment of the leader. Archigos provides relevant information for both categories. Removals from power are divided into four categories: regular and irregular removals, death by natural causes and removals by another state. For the purpose of this study, irregular removals seem to be the best indicator for a threat against a political leader's power.¹¹ Archigos also provides data on punishments meted out to leaders after their reign, including imprisonment, exile and death.¹² For the purpose of simplicity, all punishments are included in our analysis. This yields two dependent variables capturing threats to political leaders: irregular removal from power and punishment in any form.

Causes of such threats to incumbents can be grouped into three categories. Firstly, there are factors related to the reign, particularly its length and the regime type. It can be hypothesised that rulers remaining in office for uncommonly long periods may only be removable through extraordinary means. Archigos allows the length of reign to be calculated. Similarly, it can be hypothesised that incumbents ruling without any constraints on the executive may rule in a self-serving way that attracts attempts to unseat and punish them. While this information is not included in Archigos, it can be obtained by matching the assessment of executive constraints from the Polity IV data-set to the reign of each leader (Marshall et al. 2002).

Secondly, a country's history of threats against its leaders can be used to estimate the threat level. Political actors will reasonably forecast the likelihood of threatening future events using prior occurrences. This is operationalised as a continuous variable measuring the years since the last occurrence, since recent events are more comparable to the current situation and should influence leader's actions more than older cases.¹³

Thirdly, the current situation can be a threat. In particular, a regime-type transition can indicate an imminent threat to the leader. A dummy for such transition periods can be constructed using the Polity IV governance indicator (*ibid.*), coding '1' for every country-year in which a change in the indicator value or a missing value due to foreign intervention, anarchy or regime-type transitions is recorded.¹⁴

Finally, personal factors such as age and gender, which should not have any influence on the threat to the incumbent, are included in the analysis as controls.

Table 2 shows the results of leader-year logistic regression models assessing the likelihood of these two types of threats as a function of the six independent variables derived above. The individual units of analysis are years of leadership tenure.

As the results show, none of the personal characteristics of the leader and her reign play a significant role. This was to be expected in the case the control variables for age and gender. And while both an extraordinary time in office and a lack of executive constraints could reasonably be expected to attract attempts to unseat the incumbent in an irregular fashion and to punish her afterwards, this does not appear to occur frequently in practice. Of course, a lack of executive constraints also gives any leader extraordinary powers to secure her position, and only leaders who succeeded at securing their power will be able to hold on to it for abnormally long periods.

	<i>Irregular Removal</i>	<i>Punishment</i>
<i>Time in office</i>	0.009 (0.77)	0.013 (1.17)
<i>No executive constraints</i> ¹⁵	0.193 (1.19)	0.020 (0.12)
<i>Prior occurrence</i> ¹⁶	-0.056 *** (-7.18)	-0.040 *** (-6.28)
<i>Transition Period</i> ¹⁷	1.733 *** (12.04)	1.602 *** (11.27)
<i>Age</i>	0.004 (0.69)	0.001 (0.16)
<i>Gender</i>	0.007 (0.01)	0.206 (0.48)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.256 *** (-9.85)	-2.563 *** (-6.96)
<i>N</i>	7'750	5'138
<i>-2LL</i>	-1054.8 ***	-999.0 ***

Table 2: Threats to incumbents (t-score in brackets; * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$)

The second and third category of causes of irregular removal and punishment—prior history of such threats and ongoing regime-type transformations—have sizeable and highly significant effects in the right direction. Recent cases of irregular removal from power or punishment after removal increase the likelihood of future recurrences substantially, an effect that fades with time. An irregular removal in the immediate past leads to a 5.53% higher probability of a future irregular removal when compared to no case of irregular removal for the entire 58-year period of observation. (The corresponding value for punishments is 8.44%.)

Ongoing regime-type transformations yield an even bigger risk to incumbents. In such years, the risk of irregular removal from power increases by 8.65%, with the risk of punishment increasing by 12.25%.

Based on this preliminary analysis, two factors will be used to estimate the threat to incumbents in the following models on the risk of civil-war onset: regime-type transformations and prior occurrences of threatening events. Since the two types of

threat obviously share a large amount of cases,¹⁸ only the risk of irregular removal is taken into consideration in the following analysis to avoid multicollinearity.

The indicator values for the risk to any leader are based on the predicted impact for these two variables derived from the first regression model in Table 2. Since both the indicator for previous irregular removals and the dummy for an ongoing transition period vary only over time and by country, but not by leader,¹⁹ the resulting estimate for the risk to incumbents can safely be used in the country-level analyses to follow.

3.5 Modelling Approach

The hypotheses regarding the role of democratisation, ethnicity and leadership on civil-war onset can now be tested empirically. For this purpose, a binomial logit model with country-year observations as units of analysis is used. Temporal autocorrelation is compensated by a cubic polynomial of years since the first year of observation in the dataset (Carter and Signorino 2009) and the prior occurrence of civil war is included as a dummy variable. Observations are clustered by country to account for correlation among the observations of each country. Additionally, controls for population size and GDP per capita are included (lagged and on a logarithmic scale; using Gleditsch 2002b, Version 4.1) since both factors have shown a robust influence on the onset of conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The absolute and squared value of SIP are included to allow for effects that the regime type may have on the likelihood of conflict.²⁰ Finally, any years of ongoing civil war are excluded from the data-set.

4 Results

The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps that correspond to the three factors theorised to drive conflict: firstly, the role of democratisation is assessed. Secondly, information on the relevance and politicisation of ethnicity is included. Finally, information on the threat to political leaders is added to the model. Table 3 presents the results.

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2a</i>	<i>Model 1'</i>	<i>Model 2b</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
<i>Democratisation</i>	1.410 *** (5.52)	1.394 *** (5.51)	1.463 *** (5.61)	1.482 *** (5.54)	1.376 *** (5.02)
<i>Relevant ethnicity</i>		1.068 ** (2.86)	... ²¹	... ²¹	... ²¹
<i>Politicised ethnicity</i>				0.878 ** (3.07)	0.875 ** (3.06)
<i>Threat to incumbent</i>					12.755 * (1.99)
<i>SIP</i>	-0.178 (-0.12)	-0.687 (-0.45)	-0.687 (-0.43)	-0.451 (-0.28)	-0.481 (-0.30)
<i>SIP²</i>	-0.423 (-0.28)	0.122 (0.08)	0.151 (0.09)	0.029 (0.02)	0.083 (0.05)
<i>Population size</i> (ln, lagged)	0.175 * (2.15)	0.163 * (1.98)	0.179 * (2.07)	0.191 * (2.25)	0.191 * (2.28)
<i>GDP per capita</i> (ln, lagged)	-0.335 *** (-3.30)	-0.331 ** (-3.22)	-0.307 ** (-2.79)	-0.266 * (-2.36)	-0.263 * (-2.34)
<i>Prior onset</i>	0.427 (1.71)	0.325 (1.29)	0.310 (1.17)	0.250 (0.95)	0.250 (0.95)
<i>t</i>	0.094 (1.00)	0.101 (1.06)	0.130 (1.32)	0.129 (1.30)	0.126 (1.27)
<i>t²</i>	-0.003 (-0.76)	-0.003 (-0.82)	-0.004 (-1.19)	-0.004 (-1.17)	-0.004 (-1.14)
<i>t³</i>	0.000 (0.57)	0.000 (0.63)	0.000 (1.06)	0.000 (1.04)	0.000 (1.01)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.832 ** (-2.96)	-5.610 *** (-3.36)	-5.128 ** (-3.13)	-5.898 *** (-3.52)	-5.944 *** (-3.59)
<i>N</i>	4'881	4'881	3'887	3'887	3'887
<i>-2LL</i>	-548.9 ***	-543.5 ***	-498.5 ***	-495.0 ***	-493.7 ***

Table 3: Onset of civil war (t-score in brackets; * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$)

Model 1 provides an initial test of the influence that democratisation has on the likelihood of civil war. The effect is both significant and oriented in the right

direction: as predicted in hypothesis H1, democratisation increases the risk of civil-war onset substantially, by 5.24%. This confirms the earlier finding (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010) that democratisation phases are also riskier at the intra-state level. The control variables behave roughly as expected: increases in average income reduce the probability of civil-war onset while increases in population size make conflict more likely. However, there seems to be no general time trend²² and the influence of prior conflicts on the risk of future onsets is only significant at the 10% level. A curvilinear effect of regime type that corresponds to a heightened conflict risk in mixed-type regimes also does not materialise, SIP and its square are jointly insignificant.

Model 2a adds the indicator for the presence of politically relevant ethnic divisions. Indeed, ethnic divisions seem to increase the likelihood of civil war without influencing the effect of the other explanatory terms, strengthening hypothesis H2a. Countries in which multiple ethnic groups are politically relevant are saddled with a 1.49% higher risk of civil conflict.

In order to test hypothesis H2b, the presence of relevant ethnic divisions becomes a precondition, since the indicator for exclusion along ethnic lines requires the existence of such lines. In order to check for the effect of reducing the number of observations, Model 1 is first replicated for the subset of country-years with politically relevant ethnic distinctions. Model 1' shows no relevant changes to the results when compared with Model 1.

Model 2b then introduces the share of politically excluded ethnic groups into the subset of observations for which ethnicity is relevant. Exclusion has a noticeable effect: when comparing the extreme cases of virtually complete exclusion of ethnic groups and no exclusion whatsoever along ethnic lines, the former country faces a

2.66% higher risk of an outbreak of civil war. Despite the fact that the political relevance of ethnicity is already accounted for by the exclusion of all other observations, this coefficient still achieves significance at the 1% level. This risk is also clearly separate from the history of prior conflict, which remains insignificant.

Finally, model 3 introduces the indicator for the risk to the incumbent developed in section 3.4. As argued by hypothesis H3, the presence of a threat to the incumbent leader increases the risk of an outbreak of civil war significantly. In the absence of any risk factors, the likelihood of civil war is 2.87% lower than in a case where both risk factors—a history of prior irregular removal and an ongoing transition period—are both present.²³

It should be noted that this second component of the leadership risk indicator, the transition period, weakly correlates with the democratisation indicator.²⁴ Therefore it is not surprising that the democratisation indicator loses a little of its value between models 2b and 3. However, the coefficient for democratisation remains significant at the 1% level and with 5.83%, the estimated effect remains of roughly the same value as in preceding models.

5 Conclusion

This paper aimed to test three different theories regarding the influence of political leaders on the onset of civil war in ethnically heterogeneous countries. The two polar positions in literature argue either that political leaders cause the outbreak of ethno-nationalist conflict by manipulating the public for self-serving reasons (elite manipulation), or that political leaders have little to no influence on the onset of civil war due to the structural forces of an ethnic security dilemma.

The results of this and prior studies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995 and following; Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010) show that democratisation phases face a higher risk of conflict. The elite selection theory, a hybrid of the elite manipulation and ethnic security dilemma theories, focusses on two characteristics of democratisation processes that can contribute to the onset of conflict. Firstly, democratisation forces citizens to consider the demos question: how and among which ethnic groups should the access to political power be distributed? The question whether citizens trust members of other groups will strongly be influenced by prior politicisation of ethnic divisions through political exclusion, discrimination or even violent conflict. At the same time, people are tasked with selecting their leaders, either during elections or in the preparation thereof, when candidates position themselves to be nominated by their ethnic group or political party. It is this concurrence of the selection of elites with the presence of an ideal subject for voter mobilisation—safety worries regarding the potential behaviour of other ethnic groups—that can lead a country towards conflict.

The present study sought to test these three theories using large-N regression analysis. Three categories of conflict factors were introduced to distinguish the different theories.

Firstly, an indicator of an ongoing democratisation phase was used to verify the joint prediction by all three theories that democratisation increases the risk of violent conflict. The democratisation indicator achieved a high level of significance and a substantial influence on the likelihood of civil war throughout the analysis, strengthening H1 and adding to the evidence of prior studies (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010) that Mansfield and Snyder's result (1995 and following) can be transferred to the intra-state level.

Secondly, the relevance of ethnicity was contrasted with the more narrowly defined presence of politicised ethnic divisions. Both indicators had the hypothesised effect, with the existence of politicised divisions adding to the risk of conflict even after the relevance of ethnicity had been accounted for. While this conforms with the predictions of the elite selection theory, it does not weaken the competing theory of ethnic security dilemmas. A pre-existing conflict could be argued to strengthen the structural forces leading to such a dilemma. On the other hand, this result highlights the distinction between the elite manipulation and elite selection theories. Can one speak of elites reframing public debate if the concerns are already present in the population and conflict onset appears more likely when the population has substantial, justified concerns about the behaviour of other ethnic groups? Instead, this seems to indicate that political leaders respond to the worries of their constituents. The actions of Slobodan Milošević in April 1987 can serve as an example. At that time, Milošević was sent to Kosovo to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions after continued discrimination and instances of violence directed at Serbian inhabitants of the province. In local council sessions, he was arguing strongly for national unity: “we must draw the line that divides the honest and progressive people, who struggle for brotherhood and unity and national equality from the counterrevolutionaries and nationalists on the other side” (Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000: 11). Only when confronted by crowds of worried Serbs outside the meeting place did he react by stating “no one should dare beat you” (ibid.: 10).

Thirdly and finally, an indicator for the threat to the incumbent was developed in order to differentiate between the ethnic security dilemma, which assumes no influence of the risk to the incumbent on the likelihood of civil war, and the theories of elite selection and elite manipulation, which both assume a correlation and which are both strengthened by the results.

The outcome of the empirical analysis provides some support to the proposed theory of elite selection. Democratisation periods do appear substantially more risky and the presence of previously politicised ethnic divisions suggests that the population is already concerned about the potential risks of ethnic cohabitation. Finally, the fact that the risk to incumbent leaders has a significant influence on the outbreak of violent conflict suggests that the competition between the present leader and potential challengers does play an important role in the dynamic of conflict onset.

However, the tools of large-N regression analysis only serve to test the correlation between factors and both the theories of elite manipulation and (to a lesser extent) ethnic security dilemma are supported by the evidence as well. The resulting challenge is therefore to establish the causal chain leading up to civil war. For this reason, follow-up research will focus on tracing the event history of a number of relevant cases to differentiate between the theories of elite manipulation and elite selection that are both supported by the importance of leadership threats in this study.

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

A.1 Leader-Year Analysis

Dependent variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Irregular removal	7'750	269	Irregular removal from office
Punishment	7'750	280	Punishment after (or during) removal from office

Independent, dichotomous variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Events</i>	<i>Notes</i>
No executive constraints	7'750	1'495	Polity IV codes "unlimited authority" for executive constraints
Transition period	7'750	579	Regime-type transition in the current year, but before any irregular removal.
Gender	7'750	128	Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female.

Independent, continuous variables:

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Description</i>
Time in office	7'750	7.394	7.581	Time spent in office (during the current reign)
Prior occurrence				Years since the last incident of the same type as the dependent variable
• irregular removal	7'750	16.480	14.204	
• punishment	5'138	21.696	14.797	
Age	7'750	56.859	11.492	Age of incumbent

A.2 Country-Year Analysis

Dependent variables

Variable	N	Events	Notes
<i>Civil war onset</i>			
• 2 year intermittency	5'288	131	Onset of new civil wars (following ACD), excluding country-years with ongoing other conflicts.
• 5 year intermittency	5'288	108	
• 8 year intermittency	5'288	101	

Independent, dichotomous variables

Variable	N	Events	Notes
<i>Democratisation</i>			
• based on SIP	5'288	336	Country-year or the three preceding years lie in a democratisation period
• based on Polity IV less PARREG	5'722	477	
Relevant ethnicity	4'881	3'887	Ethnicity was coded as relevant by the EPR expert coder for this country-year
<i>Prior civil-war onset</i>			
• 2 year intermittency	5'288	937	There has been a civil war onset prior to the current year in this country
• 5 year intermittency	5'288	944	
• 8 year intermittency	5'288	996	

Independent, continuous variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Description
<i>Politicized ethnicity</i>				
• by population share	4'881	0.165	0.256	The population share of all excluded groups divided by the population in all politically active groups.
• by group share	4'881	0.378	0.325	The number of excluded groups divided by the number of all politically active groups.
Population size	5'288	15.775	1.532	The population size of the country on a logarithmic scale and lagged.
GDP/capita	5'288	8.255	1.102	GDP per capita of the country on a logarithmic scale and lagged.
SIP	5'288	0.443	0.393	Scalar Index of Polities.
Polity IV less PARREG	5'163	8.631	6.882	Polity IV without the PARREG component and adjusted to create a positive value range between 0 and 18.
Threat to incumbent	5'288	0.002	0.008	Estimated probably of irregular removal.
t	5'288	31.853	13.877	Years since the first year of observation in the dataset

Appendix B: Robustness Tests

	Varying DV			Varying IVs	
	Model 3	5 year intermittency	8 year intermittency	Polity IV	Exclusion by group share
Democratisation (based on SIP)	1.376 *** (5.02)	1.484 *** (4.87)	1.608 *** (4.99)		1.337 *** (4.94)
Democratisation (based on Polity IV less PARREG)				0.643 ** (3.03)	
Politicized ethnicity (based on population share)	0.875 ** (3.06)	0.738 * (2.40)	0.755 * (2.42)	0.822 ** (2.68)	
Politicized ethnicity (based on group share)					0.799 * (2.32)
Threat to incumbent	12.755 * (1.99)	14.435 * (2.10)	15.155 * (2.18)	13.058 † (1.74)	13.177 * (2.06)
SIP	-0.481 (-0.30)	0.015 (0.01)	0.106 (0.07)		-0.765 (-0.48)
SIP²	0.083 (0.05)	-0.408 (-0.26)	-0.623 (-0.39)		0.356 (0.22)
Polity IV (without PARREG)				0.023 (0.98)	
Polity IV² (without PARREG)				-0.012 * (-2.51)	
Population size (ln, lagged)	0.191 * (2.28)	0.243 ** (2.92)	0.252 ** (2.69)	0.189 * (2.48)	0.129 (1.49)
GDP per capita (ln, lagged)	-0.263 * (-2.34)	-0.249 † (-1.94)	-0.298 * (-2.06)	-0.251 * (-2.31)	-0.360 ** (-3.18)
Prior onset	0.250 (0.95)	-0.238 (-0.79)	-0.492 (-1.54)	0.223 (0.91)	0.258 (0.96)
t	0.126 (1.27)	0.146 (1.22)	0.210 (1.63)	0.070 (0.83)	0.130 (1.31)
t²	-0.004 (-1.14)	-0.004 (-0.92)	-0.006 (-1.29)	-0.002 (-0.58)	-0.004 (-1.12)
t³	0.000 (1.01)	0.000 (0.67)	0.000 (1.00)	0.000 (0.39)	0.000 (0.97)
Constant	-5.944 *** (-3.59)	-7.292 *** (-3.91)	-7.732 *** (-4.04)	-5.246 *** (-3.48)	-4.444 ** (-2.74)
N	3'887	3'887	3'887	4'248	3'887
-2LL	-493.7 ***	-428.4 ***	-399.3 ***	-540.9 ***	-494.6 ***

Table 4: Onset of civil war (t-score in brackets; † <math>t < 0.1</math> * <math>p < 0.05</math> ** <math>p < 0.01</math> *** <math>p < 0.001</math>)

- 1 This school of thought is also referred to by the milder, but less common term “elite persuasion”.
- 2 Respectively, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).
- 3 Regime-type indicators such as Polity and SIP show no change for Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s for this very reason: there were virtually no reforms at the federal level.
- 4 N.B. The threat to political leaders is substantially stronger in a non-democratising context. E.g. Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, version 2.9) lists the majority of irregular removals from power and punishments at the end of a leader’s reign (incl. imprisonment, exile and death) as occurring in autocracies, independent of whether these regimes are moving towards democracy or not.
- 5 See for example Gagnon (2004), who reports that less than 20% of the population of the Croatian part of Yugoslavia perceived other ethnic groups as threatening prior to initiation of democratisation at the sub-federal level.
- 6 ACD uses a minimum of 25 annual battle-related fatalities, while others such as the Correlates of War data-set operate with a substantially higher threshold of 1’000 deaths. Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) show that this high threshold makes it difficult to establish the effect of democratisation periods.
- 7 The operationalisation used in this analysis requires an intermittence of two years before a new civil war can be coded. Alternative operationalisations requiring longer periods of intermittency are available in the ACD data-set. Robustness checks in Appendix B show that these more restrictive versions of the dependent variable do not lead to major changes in the results. The significance of politicised ethnicity is reduced somewhat with 5 and 8 years of intermittence, but stays significant at the 5% level. GDP per capita drops slightly below the 5% level when using the onset variable with a 5-year intermittency requirement ($p = 0.052$).
- 8 Δv is set equal to one standard deviation of the SIP indicator, since this approx. corresponds to the length of the SIP scale occupied by democracies. This is equivalent to Cederman, Hug, and Krebs’ (2010) approach when using Polity IV, since it prevents a low-score democracy from being coded as democratising (again) when it improves its score.
- 9 Appendix B provides a variation of the final regression model using the democratisation indicator based on Polity IV (less PARREG) as used in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010). While most variables remain unaffected, the significance of the risk to incumbents is reduced to the 10% level ($p = 0.082$). This is likely due to covariance between the risk and democratisation indicators.

- 10 Using the population share of excluded ethnic groups seems realistic, since group size is related to the likelihood of success should a group pursue conflict. However, it is also possible to measure the share of excluded groups simply by the number of excluded groups divided by the total number of ethnic groups. Appendix B shows a model that replaced the population-based exclusion indicator with one based on the number of groups. The results are not changed dramatically, however, the indicator of political exclusion is slightly less significant and the indicator for population size loses significance altogether.
- 11 Loss of power in a regular manner leaves the political leader with open options, including regaining power through equally regular means. It is therefore unlikely to cause the drastic reactions expected by the elite manipulation theory. Death by natural causes and removals by another state are unlikely to be remedied by internal agitation and therefore also need to be discarded.
- 12 It should be noted that death as a post-tenure fate is coded to include not just death sentences handed down by the judiciary or new government after the removal from power, but also any case where the leader is killed while in office (e.g. during a coup, assassination etc.).
- 13 In country-years where there has been no prior recorded case in the post-WW2 period, 1946 is used as the date of the last instance to avoid the loss of a large number of cases. All analyses were repeated with a dummy recording merely the existence of a prior case of irregular removal or punishment to ensure that this recoding does not produce misleading results. The regression results remain equivalent to those presented here.
- 14 Despite the limitations of the Polity IV data-set discussed before, this indicator is used here due its provision of transition onset information that is precise to the day. This information is required to avoid cases in which transformations follow the end of the leader's reign but occur in the same year. To avoid cases in which transitions are coded based on a heightened likelihood or the actual occurrence of conflict (cf. e.g. Vreeland 2008), any transition triggered only by the problematic codes in the PARCOMP and PARREG components were reset to '0'.
- 15 The lack of executive constraints is lagged by one year to avoid reverse causality.
- 16 The occurrence variables are based on the same event as the dependent variable.
- 17 Transition periods are discarded if they occurred in the same year as, but after the removal of a leader, yielding only transitions that occurred during the reign of the incumbent.
- 18 Over 20% of all reigns ended with both irregular removal and punishment, while only 9.4% ended with one, but not the other.

- 19 A minor exception to this rule are country-years with multiple irregular removals in which a regime-type transition begins after one but before another removal. Since regime-type transitions are only counted if they began before the removal of the incumbent, such a situation would lead to multiple different risk estimates for that country-year. In these cases, the lowest risk estimate is used.
- 20 Hegre et al. 2001 and Gleditsch 2002a find a substantial effect for mixed regime types or anocracies.
- 21 Models 1', 2b and 3 are restricted to those country-years in which ethnicity is already relevant.
- 22 The cubic polynomial is jointly insignificant.
- 23 It would be attractive to further test the relation between democratisation, politicised ethnicity and threats to the incumbent with the inclusion of an interaction term. Unfortunately, a quick check of our data-set shows that cases in which high values for the share of excluded population and for the threat against the incumbent coincide with the aftermath of a democratisation process and the onset of conflict are few and far in between. However, such an interaction term would not be meaningful in this setting for practical reasons. Several years will likely pass from the initiation of a democratisation process, past the point when changes are sizeable enough to be picked up by governance indicators, and finally to the onset of civil war. While the democratisation process, politicised ethnicity and threats to the incumbent clearly have an influence, none of the theories require that they peak in the same year. For this reason, no interaction term has been included in this model.
- 24 $r = 0.1729$, significant at the 1‰ level.

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