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**Pharaohs of the deep state: Social capital in an obstinate regime**
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Pharaohs of the Deep State:
Social Capital in an Obstinate Regime

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Abstract

The paper aims to analyse the process of ‘democratisation’ or lack thereof after the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring uprisings in the context of ‘social capital’. While popular demand for reform toppled Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the transition period that followed showed the determination of regime remnants and the deep state, to preserve the underlying institutional structures of an entrenched authoritarian system. Mubarak’s power base was grounded in a complicated system of interwoven relationships which entailed economic, social and political benefits. This social structure is analysed under the umbrella term ‘social capital’ to give an account of which network(s) pulled the cart in the pursuit of a contra democratic political agenda. A critical analysis of literature, relevant to the aim of the paper, is provided. Social capital is defined as the generalisation of norms and reciprocity which results from individuals’ engagement in social networks. A general account on the most important social networks in Egypt is provided in the context of a military dominated social contract established after the 1952 military coup. This analysis concludes that the existing social capital network structure fostered and continues to foster the preservation of the authoritarian status quo. The transition period after the ousting of Mubarak presents a clear illustration of this. The well-embeddedness and the interdisciplinary nature of the deep in state in Egypt’s power institutional structure were never eradicated, since the deep state restricted the interference of any ‘non-conforming’ entities in politics. The Egyptian deep state can be seen as self-sufficient, their penetration in every realm of society enables them to balance off adversaries when needed. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it attempts to show that authoritarianism is preserved when an elitists power network is established which thrives as a direct consequence of the underlying institutional structure. Secondly, it argues that social capital structures can produce an environment which is unfavourable to democratic development.
Introduction

On 25 January 2011 demonstrations, marches, riots, non-violent civil resistance, acts of civil disobedience and strikes spread throughout Egypt. Millions of protesters from all ranges of socio-economic and religious backgrounds went to the street demanding the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, the longest standing president in Egypt’s modern history. While Egypt’s private sector was prospering at the time with foreign direct investment hitting unprecedented levels (Cook, 2012, para. 5) Mubarak’s power stronghold was thriving on ever-growing class divisions. While the international community was discussing a promising emerging market in Egypt, the middle and working classes were increasingly struggling to make ends meet. Economic grievances were rapidly accumulating (Cook, 2012). The gap between rich and poor was growing in a steady pace, with more and more Egyptians slipping below the poverty line, and more unjust distributions in income shares (World Data Bank, 2008) and wealth. What made matters worse was the rigidity of Egypt’s power system, which profoundly benefited an elitist group of relevant political actors (Cook, 2012). This entailed that the incentive of the handful of Egyptians powerful enough to be able to dissolve the system was eliminated by their proliferation under the system (Shafick, 2014). These mechanisms, apparent in Egypt since the founding of the state are examined in this paper.

Eighteen days after they took to the streets, Egyptian revolutionaries celebrated the ousting of Mubarak believing that this was going to be the beginning of the era of political reform in the Egypt that they were demanding. Their grievances had focused on legal and political issues, police brutality, state-of-emergency laws, and lack of free elections and freedom of speech, corruption, and economic issues including high youth unemployment, food-price inflation and low wages.

Approximately five years later, one could argue the democratisation process which was initiated by the young revolutionaries was annihilated before it could blossom. Mubarak’s era ended, but the institutional power structure, the foundation of his power-stronghold, remained intact (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). This is clearly manifested with the victory of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s presidential election victory which resembled Mubarak era traditions. The ex-army chief received more than 90% of the votes and had to compete against only one opponent, labour activist Hamdeen Sabahi, who received merely 3.5% of votes. Opposition activists stated other plausible candidates were cracked down on and were too scared to participate. Besides, critical voices were sceptical towards the turnout rates. The reported 46% seemed improbable, taking into account Egypt’s prime minister stated turnout only exceeded 30% at the end of the second voting-day (Kingsley, 2014).

How could the revolution which boasted new hopes for the people of Egypt conclude with a discernible re-establishment of the military (Souef, 2014) and a sway back of the authoritarian status quo? How did Mohamad Morsi, Egypt's first democratically-elected president, and the ousted Muslim Brotherhood (MB), become subject to arrests, prosecution and oppression in a way which many considered as unlawful cooperation between judges, prosecutors and the Ministry of Interior (Souef, 2014). How did the young activists who were celebrated during the revolution become subject to crackdowns which were not only limited to them and MBs but swiped through to grab anyone who dared to challenge the authorities’ political narrative (Amnesty International, 2015).

These incidents and the lack of democratic reform after the Egyptian Revolution will be addressed in this paper under the concept of ‘social capital’ to offer some explanation and give a better understanding to what actually happened in Egypt over the past five years. Social capital is defined as social networks which facilitate the embeddedness and generalisation of norms and reciprocity (Putnam & Goss, 2002). The statement ‘it is not what you know, but who you know’ illustrates
Egypt’s society, where a military officer could become an oligarch and a Business Mogul a member of parliament (MP) (Abul-Magd, 2012; Brownlee, 2008).

In the authoritarian setting of Egypt it comes naturally that this does not hold for everyone. The young revolutionaries though they overthrew Mubarak, found themselves powerless in the transition period. ‘The power of the people’ did not translate to inclusive democratic institutional building.

The following question will be addressed in this context: ‘which social capital networks seemed to have pulled the cart in the pursuit of a contra democratic political agenda in the aftermath of the Arab Spring’? The notion of a deep state is introduced to analyse this phenomenon. The deep state is defined here as “the huge swaths of the state bureaucracy that have no interest in change, as well as former stalwarts of the old regime” (Hellyer, 2012, para. 3). This paper considers that the three dominant institutional components in Egypt to be the army (represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces SCAF), the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Ministry of the Interior (Springborg, 2014). While the paper discusses how it appears the GIS and the Ministry of Interior are subjected to rotation initiated by the new president, this paper mainly focuses on the role of the military, supported by the media, the judiciary and the business associates. The paper argues that the all-encompassing nature of the deep state’s power infrastructure provided the relics of Mubarak the means to restrict the interference of any alternative political agenda.

The purpose of this paper is to provide is a comprehensive understanding of the relation between social capital theory and the lack of democratic reform after the Arab Spring uprisings while focusing on Egypt. Through an extensive literature review the paper considers historical, political, societal and economical angles which are analysed and presented to offer an explanation of the absence of democratisation after the people demanded popular representation; the paper could serve as the basis for primary empirical research, as it attempts to present a reflective analysis of underlying mechanisms of the de-democratisation process in Egypt (Mertens, 2015). A critical evaluation of secondary sources, published by inter alia political scientists, sociologists, human rights activists, documentary directors and lawyers is presented. Trends among scholars are considered and different approaches are taken into account.

This paper begins with a discussion on the topic of social capital. Secondly, contextual background information on Egypt is presented to provide the foundation required for the analysis which follows. Thirdly, the most relevant social capital networks under Mubarak are discussed. This section is split into elitist power and society networks. Fourthly, an analysis on the most relevant social capital networks and the de-democratisation process after the Arab Spring uprisings is provided. The main observations, which follow from this analysis, are elaborated upon, followed by concluding remarks.
Social Capital

Classical political theorists, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, postulated the importance of a politically active and engaged civil society for democracy. Since they pioneered this positive exchangeability, profound evidence has been found to substantiate this claim. ‘Social capital’ has often provided the link between a civil-based political culture and a flourishing democracy (Putnam & Goss, 2002). A flourishing democracy connotes a ‘liberal democratic system’ in which civil and political rights are well-established, elected officials have power and authority to which the military and police forces are subordinated and the rule of law is safeguarded by an independent judiciary to which all citizens (including state officials) are equal and supposed to adhere (Diamond, 2000).

Social capital could be conceptualised as “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 8). Social capital theory, underlining the importance of social networks, emphasises the value of the internal and external returns of social capital. The value is represented by the reciprocal ties arising from involvement in social network structures which facilitate the generalisation of a certain set of values, norms and information streams (Putnam & Goss, 2002). This set influences what is regarded by society as appropriate measures for behaviour. In this way, coordinated collective action is fostered (Woolcock & Narayan, Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy, 2000).

Woolcock and Narayan (2000) align with Putnam and connote social capital as “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 225). They introduce social capital in the context of development. Communities characterised by strong social capital are better equipped to cope with poverty and vulnerability. Coleman (1988) takes a slightly different perspective and presents social capital as a resource, which entails benefits to the people who invests in the generation of social relationships. The productivity of social capital should be evaluated in the context of collective action problems which confine cooperation.

Putman and Goss (2002) advocate the positive exchangeability between social capital and democracy by arguing that social networks and norms mobilise civic mindedness and engagement. This results in active participation in civic associations and communities, the hallmarks of civil society and the cornerstones of accountable, effective and responsive democratic governance (Putnam, 1993). The paper conceptualises civil society as “a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, parties and groups that come together to provide a buffer between state and citizens” (Singerman, 2006, p. 7).

Putman (1993) supports this claim with three reasons. First, social networks are key transmission mechanisms for codes of conduct and thereby facilitate the generalisation of reciprocity and sturdy norms. The social community constructs a discourse which determines a set of expectations regarding appropriate behaviour. This fosters the creation and preservation of economic, political and social power hierarchies (Singerman, 2006). Secondly, when economic and political interactions are cultivated in a web of dense social ties, facilitating exchanging information about the trustworthiness of other individuals, incentives regarding opportunism and misconduct are reduced.

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1 Robert D. Putnam based his conceptualisation of social capital on Lyda Judson Hanifan’s connotation of the term. Hanifan introduced social capital to describe a different kind of capital than the traditional forms, such as real estate or personal property. The term was employed to capture “that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily life, namely, good-will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit” (Hanifan, 1916, p. 130).
Lastly, past successes of collaborative reciprocal interactions foster future cooperation (Putnam, 1993).

The appropriateness of applying social capital theory appears from the integrative strength of the concept. The conceptualisation of social capital provides linkages between disciplines concerning economics, politics and sociology (Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olsen, & Woolcock, 2007). The social capital as described in this paper aligns itself with the conceptualisations provided by Putman, Woolcock and Narayan and Coleman, and view social capital as a connection among individuals with norms of reciprocity, (Putnam, 2000) these norms of reciprocity dictate the rules by which individuals create, terminate, and maintain social ties.

However, the interdisciplinary nature of the concept has resulted in a wide application of the term among scholars. The most profound issue associated with this is regards to the conceptualisation of social capital, which is observed by many scholars as ill-defined and imprecise. To illustrate this, Francis (2002) critiques the inconsistent application of social capital, especially at the World Bank. The main problem concerns the ill-conceptualised limitations of the term (Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olsen, & Woolcock, 2007). Woolcock (1998) acknowledges the problems; that the concept is too often employed without analysing its intellectual history and ontological standing. The appropriateness of applying social capital depends on the boundaries a scholar sets for the conceptualisation of the term. The contextualisation of social capital is crucial, since this reveals how networks are operating within society and provides insights into discursive power relations (Bebbington, Guggenheim, Olsen, & Woolcock, 2007).

Another issue with the term social capital is that it is usually assumed to be a societal good whereas there are well documented examples of its downside See for example: (Wacquant, 1998; Portes, 2000; Portes & Landolt, 1996). Thus an argument is made that Social capital would also result in negative outcomes if the country’s political institutions and democracy structures are not strong enough and/or are overtaken by specific social capital groups. An example of that is provided by Sheri Berman in her paper Civil Society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic, where she argues that was weak political institutionalisation and the mobilisation of social capital which was behind the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler (Berman, 1997).

This paper is thus concerned with downside of social capital, or what could be called negative social capital sustained within the Egyptian case with the permanency of the deep state. Social capital persistent in Egypt’s social and power network infrastructure is analysed, within the context of the social contract, as well as collective behaviour, development and productivity. However, taking the aforementioned critiques into account, a historical narrative on Egypt’s social capital development is adopted to take a critical strand on the catalysing relationship between social capital and democracy.

It is important to keep in mind however that while this paper is concerned with the conceptualisation of the term and how this would transfer in its application; this is nonetheless aligned to subjective interpretation. The elements regarded most important are analysed, leaving space for different opinions and interpretations of both the term and what is most relevant to the case-study of Egypt. Next to this, only secondary sources were used, which might indicate that the behaviour of the key-players is subjected to (subjective or biased) interpretations.
Overview of the Egyptian Case

Mubarak’s Egypt

Under Hosni Mubarak and his world-renown predecessors, Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat, Egypt was a major stable regional power in the Middle East characterised by steady economic development. To find the basis for this, one has to go back to the 1952 military coup against King Farouk in which a social contract was sealed between the military and the civilians. Civil obedience to a presidency synonym to absolute monarchy was exchanged for security and economic stability (Shafick, 2014).

The hallmark for this discourse, the ‘Emergency Law’, provided Mubarak unlimited powers. The Law, prolonged for more than 30 years, enabled the ruling elite and the military to severely suppress the people through the constitution (Reza, 2007). This law institutionalised the army as the only entity capable of ensuring security against the “enemy” (Monier & Ranko, 2013). Military courts were established and the police was entitled to execute arrests independently (Slackman, 2011). The emergency-law also restricted the possibility of alternative political groups, most profoundly regime opponents, to gain popular support (Reza, 2007).

The co-optative strategies, based on inclusion within Mubarak’s formal institutional structure, proved most effective for achieving this goal. Manipulative means were adopted which drew social groups within formalised cohorts. Networks founded on loyalty and facilitating upward social mobility, were created to increase dependency among political relevant actors. Parliamentary seats became the prime negotiation tools of this system (Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004). The firm establishment of segments of society within this framework made it easier for the regime to track, control and eventually divide political actors (Koehler, 2008) which ultimately resulted in increasing polarisation in the country.

The Arab Spring

In January 2011 growing dissatisfaction erupted and the Egyptians took the streets (Noujaim, 2013). The hallmark of Egypt’s society, the social contract, required redefinition, since the protest groups were not incorporated within the implicit social contract. The social contract was a deal made between Egypt’s upper class power elite (military officials, businessmen and civil statesmen) and the lower-classes in need of protection (Shafick, 2014). A new segment in society appeared to be rising, determined to get rid of the manipulative measures meant to ‘protect’ Egypt. The revolutionaries challenged the social contract to the extent the situation became untenable. Eventually, Omar Suleiman, the recently appointed Vice-President, announced, after 18 days of demonstrations, Mubarak would step down (Aljazeera, Timeline: Egypt’s revolution, 2011).

De-democratisation

After Mubarak’s ouster, the SCAF formed a care-taker government. The political space for true democratic reform opened up, but the stakes were high and several forces competed for power, most notable: the Brothers (Islamists), democratic secular forces and the deep state. Democratic forces are described as groups who truly aim at developing an inclusive political process, strong representative governance and well-established civilian and political rights (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014).

True democratic forces however did not manage to organise themselves and mobilise a sufficient support base (Mady, 2013). Accordingly, the role of the young revolutionaries was diminished
(Sarquis, 2012). The MB gradually started to control the transition period – assuming responsibility for Egypt’s domestic and foreign policies (Monier & Ranko, 2013). The military and the MB collaborated to ensure the proliferation of their own interests. Eventually, Mohammed Morsi was elected (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). Compendious, his presidential career ended quickly. His public vindication for re-employing Mubarak’s institutional legacy marked the end of presidency, the Brothers were outlawed again. The army presented Morsi and the MB as opponents of the 2011 revolution (Monier & Ranko, 2013). This resulted in a military take-over, in which General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi assumed power (Brown, 2013). Thus, Egypt never eradicated the autocratic modus. Mubarak’s era institutional power structures remained largely intact. The foundations of the social contract were briefly shaken by the revolutionaries, but quickly after the uprisings the old pattern was re-established. Before this process is elaborated later in the paper, a historical account on the most relevant social capital networks is provided.

**The Construct of social capital in Egypt**

**The Social Contract**

As aforementioned, since 1952, a social contract has been enforced on the basis of a mutual beneficial agreement between the ruling elites (military officials, businessmen and civilian statesmen) and the lower-classes (Shafick, 2014). Linking this back to the stated conceptualisation of social capital, one could perceive the importance of the reciprocal ties arising from an individual’s involvement in a social network. For the preservation of social networks, both sides of the equation need to reap the benefits from the relationship in which they engage. This social contract is the basis of the next section which explores the structures of social capital which seem most important in Egypt.

**Elitist power networks**

**Military**

Abul-Magd (2012) reflects upon Egypt’s power network as “a republic of retired generals” (para. 1). The militarisation of Egypt is evident from the army’s domination in the civilian positions where influence and prosperity are concentrated: one can find retired military officers in every high position, from provinces to city councils and from oil to seaport companies. To uphold the façade of a civilian government, only a handful of officers became ministers. The institution controls sizable swatches of the economy and has a monopoly on the use of violence. Concluding, the social network within which the army operated was characterised by their superiority and irreplaceability (Harb, 2003).

The origins of the militarisation of Egypt can be traced back to the historical 1960s social contract of Gamal Abdel Nasser which institutionalised economic and bureaucratic military domination (Hellyer, 2012). His successor, Anwar Sadat, attempted to demilitarise this power infrastructure, only to be restored by Hosni Mubarak, following Sadat’s assassination in 1981. After ruling Egypt for 30 years with his National Democratic Party (NDP), Mubarak’s concluding objective was to ensure military loyalty and silence potential dissent so he could forward Gamal, his son, as the next president (Abul-Magd, 2012). However, Mubarak’s aspiration to groom his son, a neo-liberal educated businessman without any military education, has arguably caused severe dissatisfaction within the highest bodies of the military (Bahgat, 2015).
Neo-patrimonial relationships

The second hallmark of Egypt’s political arena is clientelism, which is a direct consequence of the class divisions of the social contract: both ends of the social ladder were connected by mutual benefits. Egypt’s political power hierarchy embodied an informal pyramidal structure of personal relationships between ‘patrons’ and ‘clients’. Egyptian MP’s, who merely served as neo-patrimonial mediators between the inner circle of the NDP and the constituency, exchanged material resources for support to Mubarak’s NDP and to ensure their re-election.

A social capital network marked by unequal relationship unfolded, however one can argue that the oppression of the lower classes by the patrons was accompanied by benefits to the former. Reaping the fruits of voting on the NDP must have seemed the ‘best option’ to the clients, since election results were manipulated to the extent that they could not have had a significant influence anyway (Koehler, 2008). Additionally, clientelist relationships provided the solution to collective action problems. The bureaucratic apparatus under Mubarak failed to establish institutions concerning for example health care and educational systems (Ottaway, 2011). Thus the benefits both sides of the equation reaped from engaging in the neo-patrimonial social structure created a vicious circle.

The economic elites and Brotherhood members also invested in the establishment of sturdy neo-patrimonial networks (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014; Ottaway, 2011). The connectedness to Mubarak’s constituency provided in particular the businessmen with enormous leverage, which will be illustrated in the next section.

The Business Moguls – the “Fat Cats”

The last decade of the Mubarak era was characterised by privatisation policies. An elitist group of entrepreneurs, the ‘Fat Cats’, steadily gained control over large segments of Egypt’s economy; they acquired this success as a consequence of their involvement in networks of political leadership, since widespread corruption only provided a limited number of Mubarak associated business men with state-owned companies and public contracts (Roll, 2013). This culminated in a private sector characterised by extremely wealthy and powerful private enterprises in monopoly positions. Accordingly, a significant number of wealthy business men were appointed to important political functions (Roll, 2013).

The main link between the business elite and politics was provided by Gamal Mubarak, who profoundly benefited from the alliance with the powerful business men. He sought a strong support-base which backed his position as the potential family heir. The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), founded by Gamal, functioned as the main ‘power-basis’ by providing empirical research supporting neo-liberal market working. The ECES acquired great political influence, because of Gamal’s position as the family heir and the Fat Cats’ willingness to support Gamal’s grooming in return for a say in governmental economic decision-making. Gamal also introduced several Business Moguls to the NDP bodies he chaired (Roll, 2013). This informal treaty, fostering the interest of Mubarak, Gamal and the business moguls created an economic and political power network of crony capitalism. The reciprocity on which these social capital linkages were based advanced the plan of the Mubarak-clan to groom Gamal, however the political influence and wealth accumulation of the military was still balanced off against the rising Moguls (Roll, 2013).

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2 At the end of 2010 it was estimated that at least 21 families were worth more than $100 million assets (Roll, 2013).
3 In 2007, Gamal married the daughter of Egypt’s wealthiest businessmen, thereby reinforcing his support-base among Business Moguls (Brownlee, 2008).
4 In 2005, the cabinet transformation provided 6 well-acquainted business men of Gamal a seat (Roll, 2013).
5 Crony capitalism applies to an economy in which close acquaintances of government officials are favoured despite the overall gains for the economy (Henry & Springborg, 2012).
**Media**

In Egypt the media has been the main communication tool for the Mubarak regime; mainly occupied with propaganda, employed to restrain and control civil society activism and to preserve the social contract (Altan-Olcay & Icduyg, 2015). Under Mubarak’s rule, the guidelines for the media were set by the Minister of Information. He was also granted the privilege of appointing the editors-in-chief. The Shura Council\(^6\) approval which followed was merely a predetermined performance, since the Shura council was dominated by NDP-members (Mabrouk, 2012).

The trend concerning privatisation can also be distinguished in the media sector: licenses went to Business Moguls, typically closely associated to Mubarak’s crony-capitalism (Berger, 2015). Nevertheless, a tense alliance culminated between Mubarak, Gamal and the businessmen. The enterprises were used at the bargaining table as assets to contest and control political and economic power (Berger, 2015).

**Judiciary**

Since the 1990s, the government exercised power over the judiciary through a combination of arrests, insinuations and obligate resignations which efficaciously effaced recalcitrant judges. This resulted in the establishment of Egyptian courts compromised by judges loyal to Mubarak’s state apparatus (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009). The judicial branches and the government were not aligned to complete separation; judges did not enjoy complete independence and were often highly intertwined with politics (El Medni, 2013).

The most profound example of this is the ‘Judges Club’, a former critical ‘watchdog’ of the regime. Mubarak’s interference with the association started in 2005 when members threatened to abdicate their legal obligation to oversee elections unless Mubarak’s regime would implement the reforms the Club demanded. Mubarak attenuated the Judges Club with a combination of threats and material incentives. Ahmed al-Zind, a pro-militarist, was elected in 2009 by the Club on the grounds that he would restore the club’s image as a defender of the integrity of the judiciary\(^7\). Under his leadership however the Judges Club started to take more modest strand and profiled itself as a “social” club and professional advocacy association (Revkin, 2012). Thus the social capital concerning the judiciary was characterised by a highly undemocratic intertwinement between judges and politics, whereby the relationship is two-folded. Judges influence political decision-making to promote their interest and Mubarak’s clan aimed at developing a judicial framework beneficial to them.

**Opposition**

Mubarak’s regime can be defined as ‘non-competitive authoritarianism’, a system characterised by rigid elections and ineffectual opposition parties (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014, p. 988). The state apparatus included the opposition parties within the formal electoral system, which simplified monitoring and restricting the ‘privileges’ of the opposition. Additionally, the participation of an ‘opposition’ increased the legitimisation of Mubarak’s regime, especially concerning the international community (Koehler, 2008).

To illustrate this phenomenon, the 2005 presidential elections were the first multi-candidate elections in Egypt where other parties were allowed to participate. However, the elections were subjected to controversy, corruption and fraud; the opposition did not have a chance against

\(^6\) Upper house of parliament composes 264 seats (6 year term) of which 88 are appointed by the President. Half of the remaining seats are subjected to elections every three years (HRW, Elections in Egypt - State of Permanant Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair, 2010).

\(^7\) In May 2015, al-Zind was appointed minister of Justice under the presidency of El-Sisi
Mubarak⁸. As could have been predicted, Mubarak was re-elected, receiving 88% of the votes (Sharp, 2005). It was clear that the opposition parties were utilised by the regime to preserve the social contract, but when they threatened the basis of the implicit agreement the Emergency Law rescued the ruling elite.

Mubarak’s state apparatus was upheld by a par excellence combination of the priory discussed facets, which indoctrinated Egypt’s society of the fact that Mubarak and the military were the only entities able to provide security and safety concerning regional and national threats. The autocratic nature of the regime is preserved by the extraordinary legitimacy the military enjoys, the neopatrimonial hierarchy, the support business moguls provide, the ongoing propaganda producing media and the Mubarak appointees penetrated judiciary. In this way any form of opposition was slandered.

Societal networks

Civil Society

Another important characteristic of Mubarak’s era were the severe restrictions imposed on Civil Society Organizations⁹ (CSOs). According to figures at the Ministry of Social affairs, the number of CSOs in Egypt was relatively high. However, the majority was latent as a consequence of the confined civilian and political freedoms under which they had to operate. The CSOs activities were contained by their profound embeddedness in the bureaucratic system and traditional power hierarchies (Altan-Olcay & Icduygu, 2015). The restrictions limited the deepening of the Egyptian civil society (El Medni, 2013). The Kifaya movement, the 6th of April movement and the National Association of Change (NAC) illustrate the above.

These anti-regime coalitions were grounded in severe dissatisfaction with the Mubarak state apparatus. They paved the way from the January 2011 uprisings. However, they lacked strong leadership and a coherent political agenda. The Kifaya movement lost edge as a consequence of violent regime oppression and the renouncement of Islamists adherents (CEIP, 2010). The 6th of April movement, while being considered as the backbone of the revolution, was not able to organise the movement into a solid political entity in the transition period. Accordingly the NAC, despite being able to engage important public figures and representatives of opposition parties, most notably the MB and Mohamed El-Baradei, became subjected to the power of the traditional status quo loyalists (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014; Mady, 2013).

Islamists – Muslim Brotherhood

In 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and other Islamist groups were deprived of the right to participate in political life through formal associations (Mady, 2013). However, to divide the Islamists opposition bloc, some moderate Brotherhood members were allowed to apply for elections as independents (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). Eventually, this appeared of crucial importance, granting the MB profound political experience. Despite severe oppression, the MB was well-embedded in the structure of the civil society in Egypt, since they focused on providing public goods which were not provided by Mubarak’s weak state apparatus. Medical services, educational opportunities and charity funds were used by Islamists to create a wide network of patronage (Ottaway, 2011).

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⁸ Ayman Nur, the most promising opponent of Mubarak, was convicted to a 5 year prison sentence, because of forgery to establish his party. This conviction was even upheld after one of witnesses admitted he testified against Nur while being tortured (Brownlee, 2008)

⁹ Defined as “formal associations catering to the varied interests of citizens in several areas of their social activities” (Al-Sayyid, 1993, p. 290).
The grass-root support the Brothers enjoyed was illustrated by the 2010 campaign instigated by Mohamed ElBaradei’s NAC to advocate broad-base political reforms. It became clear that the inclusion of the Brothers is required to become an opposition party which cannot be neglected by the regime (Hauslohner, 2010).

**Familial networks**

According to Singerman (2006) the family-unit constitutes a strong non-state power in Egypt, referring back to Halim Barak, she quotes that “Family is the center of social organizations and constitutes the dominant social institution through which persons and groups inherit their religious, class and culture affiliations” (Singerman, 2006, p. 7). These connections deeply penetrated every realm of public life. The family-unit is thus regarded in the context of the preservation of the social contract, framed within the historical stability/security-discourse. To make this explicit, the informal familial networks constitute the basis of the neo-patrimonial domination of Egypt’s societal structure. Kin-relationships are very important for a person’s social and economic status. Furthermore, parents appeared very protective of their offspring when it comes to participation in regime adversary activities, which was grounded in the fear for police brutality (Noujaim, 2013). The Islamists movement also benefited from the family as the central entity, for example, familial and informal networks were utilised to build social Islamist initiatives (Singerman, 2006).

An argument could be made that the CSOs were grounded in a shared mutual dissatisfaction with Mubarak’s state apparatus. This fostered linkages and cooperation. However, a coherent political programme did not envelop the Kifaya Movement, the April 6 Movement, the NAC or the MB. The reason for this can also be found in the oppressive environment in which they operated. The political space necessary to create social capital networks required to develop a substantial CSO, containing a clear ideology, was not just lacking, it was absent.

The oppressive nature of Egypt’s power structure prevented the development of Putman’s social capital ties favourable for democratic institutional building. Additionally, the strong focus on familial and informal ties fostered clientelism, thereby supporting the hierarchical nature of patron-client relationships on which Mubarak’s regime relied.
Social Capital & De-democratisation

The political space which opened up after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak served as an arena, utilised by the different parties to accumulate power (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). This section analyses the role of social capital networks operating within Egypt’s power and social structure during the de-democratisation process. The main focus is on the deep state, represented by the military and the judiciary and next to this the MB. Elections are chosen as reference-points, since these aggravated the already profound polarisation embedded in the Egyptian society (Brown, 2013). A schematic overview is presented in Table-1 below; the paper will expand on this scheme throughout the next section. First a general account on the decision-process which defined Egypt’s path to democracy will be provided.

Table 1: Schematic Overview of Egyptian Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 March 2011</td>
<td>National referendum constitution</td>
<td>80 % of the voters validated the referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012</td>
<td>Elections parliament (The focus is on the lower house, since this body is directly chosen by the people)</td>
<td>MB (45%), Salfi al-Nour Party (22%), secular liberal and leftist parties (16%), felool parties 10 5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-24 May 2012</td>
<td>First round presidential elections</td>
<td>Sabahi (21%), Fotouh (17.5%), Ali (0.5%), Shafiq (24%) and Morsi (25%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17 June 2012</td>
<td>Second round presidential elections</td>
<td>Shafiq (48.27%) and Morsi (51.73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-28 May 2014</td>
<td>Presidential elections</td>
<td>Sisi (90%) and Sabahi (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Kingsley, 2014; Landolt & Kubicek, 2014; Sarquis, 2012)

The de-democratisation of elections

The SCAF care-taker government

When Mubarak was forced to resign, power was handed over to the stronghold of the military establishment, the SCAF. The council announced to guarantee constitutional reforms and free and fair election and the 30-year-old Emergency Law would be lifted, but only if the ‘current circumstances’ appeared. Their performance reinvigorated the military’s prominence as the ‘heroic institution’11 (Hellyer, 2012). However, while upholding an image of impartially to prevent uprisings, no concrete institutional reforms occurred during SCAF’s care-taker government period. The Emergency Law was not lifted and the trials against Mubarak, his sons and his closest advisers were merely a façade to provide the impression of regime change. The institutional power structure of the deep state, represented by clientelism, military domination and the media, remained largely intact. The Supreme Constitution Court (SCC), penetrated by Mubarak personal appointees, was not

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10 Remnants of the Mubarak regime, in particular former NDP members, either formed new parties or joined others political parties (Tavana, 2011). Their performance was poor: “The Freedom Party (five), the National Party of Egypt (six), the Democratic Peace Party (one seat), the National Union Party (one seat) and the Union Party (one seat)” (508 seats in total) (Egypt’s post-Mubarak legislative life begins amid tension and divisions, 2012, para. 26)

11 The military showed its support for the revolutionaries who gathered together by the presidential palace by turning the turrets of the tanks towards the palace. This show took place in the morning of February 11 (Stacher, 2011). Peculiar is that Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resigning in the following afternoon (Aljazeera, Timeline: Egypt’s revolution, 2011). It comes more natural now that the confidence ratings of the military never went below 80% throughout the care-taker government period (Hellyer, 2012).
dissolved (Hellyer, 2012; Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). Heyller (2012) provides an explanation for this by stating that the SCAF sacrificed Mubarak to prevent further instability which could potentially threaten the deep state structure. Additionally, the number of retired official in top-ranked civilian positions rapidly increased under SCAF control (Abul-Magd, 2012). Furthermore, the media glorified the role of the military during the demonstrations (Hellyer, 2012). Consequently, Mubarak’s social capital legacy provided the basis on which SCAF’s popularity and credibility could be preserved and to some extent even increased.

**The Constitutional declaration**

After Mubarak’s ouster the discussion evolving around what should come first, elections or a new constitution, dominated Egyptian politics. The referendum of March 2011, designed by the military, was meant to determine the way to develop a new constitution. The main inquiry evolved around the question of having parliamentary elections or a new constitution first (Brown, 2013).

The SCAF and the MB under the postulation that they needed each other sealed a deal: the SCAF’s support was necessary to build a new regime and the MB was the only entity, enjoying sufficient domestic support, to be able to restore order and stability. They sided on parliamentary elections first, since this would diminish the time democracy proponents had to organise themselves. This was especially important to the MBs, long-term parliamentary elections meant the possibility of losing votes to secular/liberal opponents and the political experience they gained during Mubarak’s era equipped them with comparative advantage they should optimally use (Brown, 2013). Democracy proponents advocated the opposite, but their claims were ignored for obvious reasons (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). The pact between the MB and the Military was affixed with 77% of Egypt’s voters accepting the amendments. Stacher (2011) argues the majority of Egypt upheld “a genuine belief in the military’s benevolent, stabilizing role” (para. 13). A ‘yes’ to a new constitution was set equal to a ‘yes’ to stability (Stacher, 2011). This sentiment can be linked back to the military-dominated social contract, whereby the military is granted the irreplaceable role of the only institution capable of ensuring security and stability. The SCAF took charge and wrote a temporary constitutional declaration. The Brothers accepted and pushed for elections, hoping to marginalise SCAF’s influence after another round of elections (Brown, 2013).

In first instance this appeared to be a smart move: Egypt showed its support for the Brothers in the parliamentary elections. Accordingly, the constitutional assembly’s majority was Islamist, resulting in many non-Islamist MPs to resign. This disagreement was transferred to the Supreme Constitutional Court which mainly consisted of Mubarak appointees, who suspended the constitutional assembly (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). The MBs however ignored the new selection guidelines developed by a coalition of liberal and secular opposition groups and the SCAF. A new constitutional assembly, resembling the former, was founded and again followed by non-Islamist protest (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). In the end a new constitution was approved12 (Brown, 2013). This power play resembled the social capital structure of the Mubarak era with the evident role of the judiciary supporting the deep state.

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12 The new constitution appeared more liberal than expected, freedom of speech and thought were guaranteed and constitutional laws needed be approved by the SCC before the election process. However, the constitution did not prohibit military trails for civilians, the military maintained responsibility concerning its budget and activities, and presidential powers were still sizeable (especially regarding institutional appointees). Besides, the amount of SCC judges was reduced, implying MB opponents were eliminated (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014).
**Revolution 2.0**

During the spring and fall of 2011 new protests occurred. Revolutionary groups remobilised, dismayed by the possibility of a MB-SCAF deal and to demand justice concerning the unaccountability of the military and security officials in court (Brumberg, 2012). The army brutally beat down the new wave of demonstrations. Thousands of civilians were prosecuted by military trials (Noujaim, 2013). In addition, the army adopted a law, prohibiting protests and strikes (Amar, 2011). Most worrying is the military’s far-reaching capacity to turn events in their favour without being subjected to any ‘effectual’ resistance. The demonstrations in front of the headquarters of Egyptian Radio and Television (Maspero) were a clear example of this. The demonstrations ended when the military used extreme violence against the protesters. However, any evidence was whipped out: secret police forces infiltrated the hospitals to ensure autopsy reports would refer to stampede as the cause of death instead of run over by a military thank, since the bodies were clearly marked (Noujaim, 2013).

The media, backing up the military, provided Field Marshal Tatwani (the Head of SCAF) the platform for further indoctrination. He stated the revolutionaries were trying to deceive the public, they ‘started’ first and were planning on entering the Maspero building, thereby covering Egypt in resent towards the young revolutionaries and increasing the military legitimacy as the protector of the good-willing Egyptian citizen (Noujaim, 2013). The army and the interior ministry restored stability and accordingly the social contract just before the Brothers could claim their unexpected victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

**Elections parliament**

The parliamentary elections indicated an overwhelming victory for the MB. However, the parliamentary victory left the SCAF and the Brothers dissatisfied. The Islamists soon discovered that their majority in parliament had no ‘real’ implications, since the military adopted an amendment in their constitutional declaration which stated “the new parliament would have no power to oversee the cabinet or pass legislation without the general’s approval” (Brown, 2013, p. 47).

Despite adopting this peculiar clause, the military realised they oversaw one crucial aspect. They would lose any formal mechanism to influence the outcome of the constitutional process, once a new president would take office (Brown, 2013). Eventually, the parliament was declared to be elected under an unconstitutional law by the SCC and of course the SCAF obliged 13. This ended the SCAF-MB deal (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014).

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13 Especially, the chairman of the Judges Club, al-Zind. a pro-militarist, played a peculiar role. During the presidential elections he clearly showed his preference for Shafiq, by referring to Morsi as a leader with “a systemic plan meticulously designed to destroy this country” (Revkin, 2012, para 2). He also ‘warned’ the Islamists parliament by stating “from this day forward, judges will have a say in determining the future of this country and its fate. We will not leave it to you to do with it what you want” (Revkin, 2012, para 3).
**Electing a president**

Following a controversial first round\(^{14}\), a second round of elections saw a standoff between the MB represented by Morsi and the military (as well as the Mubarak’s regime) represented by Ahmad Shafiq. Shafiq could count on support provided by the military and old NDP networks. This was manifested by financial supplies\(^ {15}\), media support and clientelism (Khazbak & Afify, 2012; Roll, 2013). For example, the Minister of Interior issued warnings stating MB affiliated organisation, such as Hamas, were planning attacks in Egypt (Souef, 2012) revealing how Mubarak-era’s manipulation tactics of the ‘will of the people’ were preserved.

The deep state also prepared itself against a Morsi victory. As aforementioned the Islamists-dominated parliament was dissolved. The military granted itself legislative powers until the new parliament would be elected, thereby limiting the powers of a potential Islamist president concerning military oversight and national security. Lastly, to ensure their stakeholders position, a decree was adopted providing the SCAF preponderance in the constitutional writing process (Mandaville, 2012). Eventually, Morsi claimed victory\(^ {16}\), but only to find himself trapped in a highly antagonistic political climate.

**The return of the Deep State**

In retrospect, one could clearly see how a series of events and wrong decisions by the MB, led to the re-emergence of the Deep State. First it must be noted how the MB reacted to the intense pressure during Egypt’s political transition by closing in on itself and marginalising other political groups (Saleh, 2013). Although it had to operate in a hostile political environment, it could be argued that Brotherhood ultimately fell because of its own political, ideological, and organisational failures (El-Sherif, 2014) while an in-depth analysis of the overall failure of the MB is beyond the scope of the paper, it is important to highlight how the deep state was overlooked by the MB. The deep state and the social capital which it sustains ultimately resulted in the demise of the MB and the re-emergence of the old regime in a different guise. The Brotherhood’s ultimate shift from the failed policy of containment of the old state to the even more failed policy of confrontation with it paved the way for its ouster in 2013 (El-Sherif, 2014). This section will discuss the major aspects of the deep state which contributed to this outcome.

**Judicial resistance**

Morsi’s took off his presidency with the implementation of several decrees which increased his power position, thereby provoking the deep state, most profoundly the judiciary. He transferred all power vested in the SCAF to the Brothers and reconstituted the elite group of top-ranked generals. Important to note is that Abdel Fattah El-Sisi succeeded Field Marshal Tantawi, a Mubarak loyalist

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\(^ {14}\) The first round of the presidential elections was marked by the controversial decision of the electoral commission (which was from the time of Mubarak, and never dissolved) to exclude 3 high-profile candidates: Omar Suleiman (Mubarak’s spy chief), Jairat al Shatter (the MB’s first choice) and Hazam Abu Ismail (Ma popular conservative Salaist) (Sarquis, 2012). According to Brown (2013), these decisions were made on ambiguous and unproven grounds. To illustrate this, al Shatter was dismissed from presidential candidacy, because of his criminal record concocted by Mubarak’s regime, thereby indicating the determining influence of regime holdovers.

\(^ {15}\) An abundant poster-campaign portraying Shafiq spread all over Egypt (Khazbak & Afify, 2012).

\(^ {16}\) The MB probably saved Morsi’s victory by releasing results from every precinct in an instant. This entailed a Shafiq victory would have been interpreted as fraud (Mandaville, 2012).
(Rashed, 2012) (the next section will elaborate on this). Morsi provoked the judiciary further by overstepping the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and appointing a new Prosecutor General, Talaat Ibrahim (Shehata, 2012). The first elected Egyptian president even accumulated more power than Mubarak ever had when he adopted a new temporary presidential decree which made his decisions unchallenged by anyone, including the highest bodies of the judiciary. (Noujaim, 2013). Unsurprisingly, the judiciary branch stroke back.

Morsi advocated that his presidential decree was needed and its ultimate aim was to support Egypt’s transition to democracy. The former president’s suspicious of status quo loyalists within the judiciary branch increased (Brown, 2013). The court asked Morsi for evidence which would back up his claims concerning the willingness of the SCC to dissolve the constituent assembly. One should keep in mind the Islamist parliament was also dissolved. Eventually, Morsi, who by now has alienated most of the revolution’s secular partakers, cracked under the pressure and reversed most of the presidential decree (Shehata, 2012).

**Sisi’s unholy alliance**

Despite being the director of military intelligence and reconnaissance, under Mubarak and a member of SCAF, Abdel Fatah El-Sisi became a familiar and trusted face to the Brothers when he directed the negotiation between the MB and the SCAF. The “pious” Sisi cunningly maneuvered between the military and the Brothers to perversely the trust of both. He ensured the honouring of the dismissed officers, assuring the SCAF he was safeguarding their interest, while simultaneously cultivating the belief of Mr. Morsi and the Brothers that he was their man, a well-devoted conservative Muslim. The field marshal bended on the occasions the media had conceived disagreement between the military and the Brothers. However, regarding the military’s vital security role, he reciprocated, thereby showing his military colleagues his unwillingness to subordinate the legitimising security role of the army to the Brothers. This was also reflected by the Islamists dominated assembly written constitution, which accredited the military with a new set of privileges that they had never enjoyed before (Springborg, 2014).

**Morsi’s inspiration of Gamal**

Morsi’s economic policy-making mimicked Gamal’s political career. The new president, just like Mubarak’s offspring, sought support by the Business Moguls. Morsi did not interfere with the economic status quo. Enterprises could still thrive from close contacts to Ministers and redistribute tax reforms, in particular affecting Business Moguls, were not adopted. Accordingly, Mubarak-era crony capitalists were not held accountable. The contrary even happened, Morsi visited China accompanied by the most liked business associates of Mubarak (Souef, 2012). Additionally, they were offered out-of-court-settlements to ‘pay-off’ their responsibility in corruption cases. However, the bulwark of Moguls, too suspicious of the Islamists, supported growing opposition against Morsi (Roll, 2013).
The propaganda media machine

State television and papers were re-employed as MB propaganda system, the media sector was infiltrated with loyalists\(^{17}\). Accordingly, the Minister of Information was replaced by a prominent MB-member. Opponents of the Brothers were silenced and replaced (Mabrouk, 2012). This use of media underlined the MB’s inability win over crucial elites and other political actors, thus galvanising the powerful old state.

An examination of the period that followed in Egypt, one could clearly see how the MB inherited a wrecked economy from the SCAF. In the period between Mubarak’s withdrawal and Morsi’s inauguration, the economic situation went from bad to worse. Economic grievances proved fertile ground for public support for a petition by the "Tamarud - Rebel!" youth movement demanding Morsi’s resignation and an early presidential election. The petitions received a lot of attention, while the MB claimed that the movement was financed and supported by Gulf money, exiled Egyptian businessmen and the military\(^{18}\).

June 30

The reinstatement of the social contract

El-Sisi delivered a speech on the evening of July 3 in which he announced the military take-over. The façade of a national consensus and thereby the nonappearance of a military coup was initiated by the presence of the two most important religious figures of the country (the Grand Imam and the Patriarch of the Coptic Church), Dr. Muhammad ElBaradei (National Salvation Front)\(^{19}\), 2 activists from the Tamarod Movement\(^{20}\) and the leader of the Salafi Nour Party. The general assured the Egyptians true democratic reforms, national reconciliation and political space for all opinions (Aljazeera, Egypt: Analysis of an Arab Military Coup in the Twenty-First Century, 2013). However, the following actions imply this was merely covering the true motivation of the military, reinstalling the social contract.

First, after Morsi was jailed, Mubarak-Tantawi loyalist Gen Tohamy was allocated head of the General Intelligence Service (GIS), thereby replacing a Morsi loyalist. Amr Moussa, a close associate of SCAF and Foreign Minister under Mubarak was appointed to oversee the development of a new military-based constitution. Secondly, Al-Zind, the pro-military Judge, was appointed Minister of Justice the 20th of May 2015 (Mostafa M. , 2015). Lastly, the exiled cronny capitalist of the Mubarak-era were lured back into Egypt (Springborg, 2014).

Roll (2013) emphasises the role Business Moguls played during the military coup, they provided financial support to the Tamarud movement and Gulf States who are close associates of several Business Moguls provided Egypt with financial assistance after the coup. Concluding, the deep state

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17 The Brotherhood’s media discourse became more intolerant and sectarian over time, and it offered room for extremists. The climax was the “Support for Syria” conference in Cairo Stadium, where Morsi remained silent as some of his Islamist followers invoked takfiri discourse against Morsi’s opponents, accusing them of apostasy (El-Sherif, 2014).
18 For example, Billionaire businessman Naguib Sawiris, who left Egypt shortly after Morsi’s election, told Reuters he threw his full support behind the youth movement (E. Blair, 2013)
19 The Nationalist Salvation Front, founded by ElBaradei, was an alliance of left-winged parties, liberals and youth groups grounded in their dissatisfaction with the 22 November decree (BBC, 2013)
20 Tamarod (translation: ‘revolt’) is a new protests group against Morsi founded by members of the Kifaya movement in late April 2013. Mass demonstrations, backed up by the military, were organised against the Brothers. (BBC, 2013)
successfully utilised and outmanoeuvred another political adversary. In the end, Morsi got subjected to the all-encompassing nature of the deep state, which benefitted from its stabilising role in the preservation of the status quo, but when their interests were threatened they were bound to abdicate.

**The crackdown of Morsi’s brothers**

El-Sisi also made Tohamy (the head of the GIS) responsible for the ‘crackdown’ of the Brothers. Two weeks later, when the Brothers were requesting the reinstatement of Morsi during a sit-in, the military violently hit. Army and police forces opened gunfire at the protesters, creating a bloodbath, in which 1000 demonstrators were massacred (Springborg, 2014). El-Baradei resigned as Vice-President as result of the gross human rights violations (El-Adawy, 2013) However, the old narrative being re-established, the Brothers were seen as terrorist, they hijacked the revolution and the military became again the glorified protector of the average good-willing Egyptian citizen. The army restored its legitimacy required to restart brutally suppressing regime opponents.

**The Supreme Commander**

The Pharaohs of the deep state triumphed with the establishment of the de-facto military government led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. He cunningly manoeuvred to uphold the outlook of a civilian government. His overwhelming victory made his power unchallengeable. Sisi continues to widen the scope of the boundaries set by the international community through re-cycling the old narrative: radical Islamism is outlawed by the military. The western nations compel, since they require the Supreme Commander in their struggle against Islamic fundamentalism (Bahgat, 2015). The Sinai Peninsula, where terrorism thrives and ISIS gets broad supports, gives him enormous leverage. While adopting anti-terrorist laws Sisi further concentrates power into military hands. Especially journalists became subjected to his iron fist (Fahim & Thomas, 2015).

**Discussion: the obstinateness of the Egyptian deep state**

This section will provide a discussion on the deep state’s primal role regarding the de-democratisation process in Egypt. Three elements are emphasised: the first is the preservation of Mubarak’s institutional structure, the second is the nonappearance of a democratic alliance and the third is the continuation of the economic status quo.

First, the legacy of Mubarak’s institutional structure remained largely intact. The hallmarks of the social contract, the military stronghold establishment and the neo-patrimonial structure, maintained ascendancy. Accordingly, the prominent position of media, the judiciary and the Business Moguls was preserved. These facets promoted the preservation of the deep state, since these bodies flourished from the power position of the entity. Nonetheless, the role of the ‘average’ Egyptian citizen should not be neglected. Egypt is more than Tahrir Square, one should keep in mind all the Egyptians reaping the fruits from Mubarak’s institutional structure. The clients supported by the neo-patrimonialism should be emphasised in this context.

The political career of the Islamists became subjected to a tactical power struggle between Morsi and regime remnants. Reflecting upon the above analysis it becomes clear the MB, despite enjoying wide
grassroots support, was bound to crack under the all-encompassing nature of the pressure the deep state exercised on the movement.

Secondly, deep state actors shut down the political space required for the development of a democratic alliance of true democratic forces, which appeared detrimental for the ideas of the revolutionaries. The established political stronghold did not tolerate any interference of revolutionary pro-democratic forces. Secular pro-democratic groups lacked the popular support basis required to force the SCAF to accept their inclusion. The MB on the other hand were included in the transition process, since they were the only movement enjoying sufficient grassroots support to restore order and stability (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). The presidential election results shown on page 28, imply a collaboration between Sabahi (21%) and Fotouh (17.5%)21 which could have culminated in a pro-democratic victory. Their political agendas were ideologically divided, but a coalition grounded in what they did share, a reformist vision, could have led to a pro-democracy victory.

Finally, Mubarak’s socio-economic status quo, extremely favourable for the deep state affiliated business men was persevered. As aforementioned, the social contract is based on the existence of an elite and a lower class which benefits from clientelism (Shafick, 2014). Mubarak’s economic management in favour of this system was re-applied by Morsi, presumably to win over the business elite. However, in this way the foundation of clientelism and thus the deep state dominated social contract was preserved.

The Egyptian Arab Spring was based on ‘the power of the people’. A decade of severely oppressed activism proceeded the unleashing of protests in January 2011. Tahrir Square, the bulwark of the revolution, shook the foundations of Egypt’s society. The social contract preserved since the military coup against King Farouk was challenged. An atmosphere of unity, solidarity and hope captured Egypt. The deep state’s power discourse was threatened by the young revolutionaries, who were not included in the historically preserved social contract. The social contract was founded on well-embedded class division between the elites and lower classes which fostered patrimonial relationships. Nonetheless, elite regime remnants, who embodied Mubarak’s institutional legacy, retained the social, political and economic ascendancy.

The institutional basis on which the deep state relied was all-encompassing. Mubarak created a system which fostered interdisciplinary linkages between different sectors to ensure the dependency of economic and political relevant actors on his regime. The system, stretching from the media to the judiciary, to business branches, thrived under the authoritarian status quo. The deep state was determined to re-install the networks that served their interests so well.

The SCAF took the lead in the transition period, foremost to ensure inclusive democratic institution building was prevented. Elections did not accurately capture the will of the people and merely resembled Mubarak era tactics to manipulate the will of the people. The judiciary’s political involvement appeared a major asset in this process. The Egyptian political field became an arena for a partisan tactical game between politicians and economic stakeholders.

This made the mood on the ground turn 360 degrees and the people took the streets again. However, this time there was no personification of regime oppression which could be used as an asset to attenuate the demonstrations. The deep state showed off its ascendancy and protesters were brutally cracked down on. ‘The power of the people’ got little meaning in a situation marked by remorseless violence exercised by the regime. Meanwhile, the media and the judiciary safe-guarded the reputation of the military’s transitional-government. The deep state’s power discourse was further threatened by the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless the social capital

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21 Sabahi was a supporter of Nasserism and Fotouh an Islamist liberal MB defector (Landolt & Kubicek, 2014). Both claimed to be the prone to substantial reform (Abul-Magd, 2012).
structure of the deep state also bounded Morsi’s accumulation of power. Mubarak’s era of institutional interrelations cooperated to first appease and then too relocate the MB into its Mubarak era position of an illegal extremist religious movement. Accordingly the grassroots support base the MB enjoyed was violently cracked down.

It should be emphasised in this context that anti-Morsi sentiments accumulated as a consequence of the re-employment of Mubarak era institutional structures by the MB. Nevertheless, the deep state had a peculiar way of manipulating popular sentiments in their favour. In particular segments of the media, the judiciary and the business elite turned things to their advantage. Additionally, the demands of the people were only, as could be expected, the decisive factors when they could be used to their benefit.

In conclusion, the deep state, in particular the army, pulled the cart away from substantial democratic reform. Social capital networks thrive on a positive cost-benefit analysis on both sides of the equation. The deep state infrastructure which surrounded the stronghold of Mubarak did not tolerate any interference with their position of ascendency within the social capital system. Mubarak era mechanisms created a rigid structure of individuals who reaped the fruits from engagement with the authoritarian status quo. Typically these actors were steadily vested in the positions in which political influence and economic power is located or dependent on clientelism. This increased the leverage of the upper elite to preserve the social contract under which class divisions thrived. A self-sufficient system was created which allowed the deep state to balance-off any force which interfered with their interests. The de-facto military government can be seen as the peak of this system.
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