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UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series

#2014-041

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Explaining migrants' intentions**

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To Return Permanently or to Return Temporarily? Explaining Migrants' Intentions

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Abstract

This paper studies migrants' intentions to return to their origin country by making the distinction between permanent return, temporary return and participation in temporary return programmes. Using survey data from first generation migrants in the Netherlands, we explore how migrants' experiences regarding both the origin and destination countries are linked to their return intentions. We show that there are significantly more people interested in temporary return than permanent return. Moreover, we demonstrate that while economic integration has no clear link with return intentions, individuals with a lower socio-cultural integration are more likely to intend to return permanently. We also find that social homeland engagement predicts intentions for all types of return. Considering the potential positive impact of (temporary) return on development through the transfer of skills, financial resources and experiences, this research provides insight into the profile of migrants who could be the target of programmes and policies on return for development.

Keywords

Return migration, socio-cultural integration, economic integration, transnational migration, the Netherlands

JEL Codes: F22, J15, O15

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1. INTRODUCTION

Although there is increasing attention paid to return migration, there is a lack of research that looks at the intentions of migrants to return to the origin country (de Haas and Fokkema, 2011). Not all migrants who intend to return necessarily go back to their origin country, for various reasons including social, economic and political constraints (Lu, 1999). Nevertheless, migrants' intentions with regard to "return" can tell us a great deal about migrants' future plans as well as their perceptions about their experiences in relation to their origin and destination countries. Having a better understanding of migrants' future migration plans with respect to return may help policy makers when developing programmes and policies to enhance return for development through the transfer of skills, financial resources and experiences (McCornick and Wahba, 2001; Klagge et al., 2007; OECD, 2008). This paper thus aims to shed light into the conditions under which migrants intend to return to their origin country by specifically testing the intention to return permanently, temporarily and to return under a temporary return programme. In other words, we aim to identify the factors that are positively or negatively related to migrants' intentions to different types of return.

Particularly in today's world where migrants' lives are considered to be simultaneously embedded in their origin and destination country, movement is more and more recognized as continuous (Gmelch, 1980; Cassarino, 2004; Duval, 2004). In this respect, "return migration" is conceptualized not as an end of a migratory movement but as an option of mobility. This means that return migration is not only permanent, but also includes other types of return such as temporary return and participation in temporary return programmes as options for mobility.¹ Nevertheless, most research fail to make a distinction between different types of return. In this paper, our objective is to contribute to the return migration literature by making a distinction between different types of return (permanent, temporary and via temporary return programmes), and to discuss the extent to which migrants have diverse attitudes towards different types of return.

For this paper, we use household survey data collected in the Netherlands for the IS Academie on Migration and Development: A World in Motion Project financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and partners. The data provides rich information regarding Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan first generation migrants in the Netherlands and allows us to answer the research question of this paper based on the experiences of these unique migrant groups. The Netherlands has been a country of immigration for several decades. Today, more than 21 per cent of the Dutch population consists of migrants or children of migrants. The Netherlands is also known for its policies and programmes that link migration and development. Since the turn of the millennium, return migration has become a key issue of interest. Both from a policy and academic perspective more knowledge is needed with regard to migrant perspectives on return migration.

Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco are migrant sending developing countries that show diversity in terms of their migration history and patterns in the Netherlands. Compared to the other migrant groups in this study, the Moroccan community is the largest migrant group with 356 thousand first and second generation migrants. Moroccans constitute 2.1 per cent of the total Dutch population. The Afghan community is the next largest in size with around 40 thousand people. The Ethiopian migrant community is one of the largest and the oldest within the African migrant community with about 12 thousand individuals. Finally, although the Burundian migrant community is the smallest (3 thousand individuals), in relative terms, it has grown substantially in the past decade. The Moroccans are known as family and labour migrants, while the other groups consist primarily of individuals who have fled their country of origin for political and security reasons in the early years of migration, but which are now also strongly characterized also by family and student migration (especially from the Ethiopians). From a diaspora engagement perspective, return migration can be of significant relevance for these migrant groups, hence we study their experiences to illustrate return intention differences.

To study the factors that influence migrants' intentions with regard to different types of return from a transnational perspective, we take into account factors that are related to migrants' experiences regarding both the origin and destination countries. More specifically, on the one hand, we discuss how structural and sociocultural integration processes in the country of residence are linked to migrants' intentions relating to return. On the other hand, we look into migrants' economic and social homeland engagement, initial motivation for migration and trust in the country of origin, with a specific focus on the economy. Combining these two spheres allows us to discuss the extent to which 'push' and 'pull' factors are important for return intentions.

2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Given the diversification and increase flows of international migrants, social scientists have revisited the concept of 'return migration'. Cassarino (2004) summarizes how different approaches to return migration are developed. Namely, he focuses on Neoclassical Economics, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), Structuralism, Transnationalism and Cross-border Social Network Theory. All of these perspectives argue different reasons for return based on various assumptions under what conditions migrants return. Their argumentations are at times competing or even conflicting when we take into account how integration processes and homeland engagement influence migrants' future plans. This section discusses some of these arguments and explains the theoretical reasoning behind the hypotheses of this research.

As de Haas and Fokkema (2011) suggest, there is very little research that incorporates simultaneously both integration processes and transnational involvement when looking at the intentions to return. Their study is a pioneer in the field looking at how these factors are linked to permanent return intentions. In this paper, we take this research a step further by making a distinction between different types of return. The relationship of integration and transnational involvement with permanent and temporary return migration or programme participation intentions may differ due to the nature of each of these types of return.

With respect to the role of integration processes and transnational involvement, Neoclassical Economics, NELM, Classical Assimilation Theory and Transnationalism are important to explore more in depth. When we look at the reasoning behind different approaches used in the return migration literature, we find that they have competing arguments as to how socioeconomic integration is linked to return migration. For instance, according to neoclassical economics, economic integration is negatively linked to return migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Return is perceived as a consequence of a *failed* migration experience. NELM reversely argues that migrants may decide to return when their (economic) objectives are achieved, and therefore, according to this approach return does not necessarily stem from a negative outcome (Stark, 1991). Accordingly, one can argue that economic integration is ambiguously linked to return migration.

In this paper, since we make a distinction between different types of return, we first test to what extent economic integration is linked to permanent return and expect no clear effect of economic integration on permanent return given the conflicting arguments that may even out the role of economic integration. Secondly, we argue that employed migrants would need to take a (relatively) long leave of absence from their job and thus may be less interested in temporary return. Moreover, unemployed individuals may see temporary migration (programmes) as a way to deal with economic challenges and a strategy to diversify income sources (Ellis, 1998). Thus, we test the hypothesis that economic integration is negatively linked to intentions for temporary return and temporary return migration programme participation (See Table 1 for hypothesized effects).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Return migration can only be partially understood through a rational choice, equilibrium model (Tsuda 1999). When we look at the assumptions regarding classical assimilation theory, we see that it is expected that the longer migrants stay in the destination country, the more difficult it becomes to return as the migrants are assumed to assimilate to the host country both in economic and socio-cultural domains (Castles and Miller, 2003; Portes, Parker, and Cobas 1980). It is argued that those migrants who integrate successfully will benefit more from migration, and thus not return to the home country (Waldrap and Esparza, 1991). In line with this argument, migrants who adopt the host country culture and build a social network in the host society will weaken their ties with their homeland, and will be less likely to return. Accordingly, we develop hypotheses regarding legal and sociocultural integration. We hypothesize that holding only origin country citizenship will be associated with higher rates of permanent return (Evans, 1988) while holding Dutch citizenship will be associated with higher rates of temporary return as people will not be concerned about being able to come back to the Netherlands and will feel more free to move away for short periods of time. Regarding sociocultural integration, (e.g. language use at home, cultural orientation), in line with the classical assimilation theory, we argue that those who are more socio-culturally integrated in the Dutch society may be less interested in temporary and permanent return as they feel more comfortable in the Netherlands and feel attached to the country. Nevertheless, temporary return is not necessarily a rupture with the country of destination,

and thus socio-cultural integration may not be significantly linked to temporary return intentions.

However, assimilation theory has been challenged by other approaches that criticize strongly linear assimilation (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton-Blanc 1992; Portes, 1999; Vertovec, 2004). In this respect, the transnationalism approach provides a theoretical framework which allows us to argue why challenges faced in different dimensions of the integration processes do not necessarily cause return migration. Those who are 'successfully' integrated may as well be likely to return to their countries of origin, especially on a temporary basis, because they have the capacity to remain in contact with their homeland through social, cultural and political activities. For those who are engaged in their homeland, return is not perceived as an end to a migratory movement, while mobility is seen as an integral part of those migrants who are transnationally involved and whose lives are embedded in different contexts (Tsuda, 1999). As a result, we argue that, homeland engagement is positively linked to all three kinds of return mentioned in this paper. De Haas and Fokkema (2011) have found that transnational economic involvement is linked positively to permanent return intentions. In this paper, we hypothesize the same direction of relationship between transnational economic involvement and permanent return intentions as well as temporary return intentions. De Haas and Fokkema (2011) do not find clear links between return intentions and the presence of family in the origin country. In our research, instead of looking at presence of family, we take into account the frequency of contact and expect to have a more refined analysis on the matter. We expect social contacts with the origin country to be positively linked to all forms of return (Gmelch, 1980; Duval, 2004).

Finally, we also look into several factors that may explain the differences between migrants' attitudes as a result of their country of origin (Rogers, 1984). For instance, we hypothesize that Afghans and Burundians will be less likely to intend to return permanently due to the uncertain future of these countries. In this research, as a proxy for certainty about the future, we argue that trust in the economy of the origin country may be used. Accordingly, we posit that higher trust in the economy will be associated with higher return intentions, since there is a greater likelihood of employment and positive well-being outcomes (Dustmann 1997). At the same time, In the Netherlands, there are specific temporary return programmes financed by the Dutch government that target Ethiopians and Afghans for development purposes. These programmes are promoted in these communities and usually include incentives. We hypothesize that Afghans and Ethiopians will be more likely to take part in a temporary return programme since these groups are known to have more access to and knowledge about these types of programmes in the Netherlands (Kuschminder, 2011; Kuschminder, 2013). Finally, the initial reason for migration could also be an important predictor of further migration decisions (King, 1986; Tsuda, 1999). We stipulate that those who have migrated for security or political reasons will be less likely to return permanently while those who have migrated for educational purposes will be more likely to return permanently.

3. DATA AND METHODS

This study uses data collected for the IS Academy on Migration and Development project. For this project, household level survey data was collected in the Netherlands, as the destination

country case where a considerable number of migrants from these origin countries reside. The data collected in the Netherlands in July 2010- July 2011 includes information on 1022 households (Burundian=164, Ethiopian=351, Afghan=260, Moroccan=247). For this study, we focus on the first-generation migrant respondents born in one of the four origin countries since they are our target group and some of the information on integration processes and opinions was asked to respondents only. Consequently, the subsample used in this paper consists of 218 Moroccan, 255 Afghan, 250 Ethiopian and 162 Burundian first-generation migrants living in the Netherlands.

3.1 Dependent variables

There are three dependent variables that we investigate in this study. Respondents are first asked whether they plan to permanently stay in the Netherlands. This was asked in the survey as: *Does [ID] plan to stay permanently in the Netherlands?*. Those who state that they do not plan to stay in the Netherlands are asked whether they plan to go back to their country of origin. This was asked in the survey as: *Does [ID] plan to return permanently to [origin country]?*. Thus, those who do not plan to stay permanently in the Netherlands and plan to return permanently to their origin country are considered as those who intend to permanently return in our study. Next, all respondents, including those who plan to stay permanently in the Netherlands and who plan to return to the country of origin or migrate to a different country are asked whether they would want to return to the country of origin temporarily (different than short visits), since intention to return permanently and return temporarily are not mutually exclusive. The question asked was: *Would [ID] want to temporarily return [to country of origin]?* The respondents can choose in this case between three answer categories (yes=1, no=2, maybe=3). Finally, all respondents are asked if they would want to participate in a temporary return migration programme if they were given the opportunity. For this outcome variable too, the respondents can answer positively, negatively or ambiguously. However, for the analysis, we have restricted our sample to those who only answer a concrete “yes” or “no” to reduce ambiguity of results.

3.2 Independent variables

Country of origin: Country of origin refers to the country of birth for the individual which can be: Morocco, Afghanistan, Ethiopia or Burundi. Morocco is used as the reference group in the analysis.

Reason for migration: The respondent was asked to indicate the most important reason for migrating (self-reported reason for migration), the following being the answer categories: 1) family reunification/formation, 2) political situation/security, 3) economic, 4) study/education, 5) other. In this case, political situation/ security is used as the reference group.

Economic integration: Economic integration is measured based on two main indicators. First, we take into account the employment status of the respondent. Second, we account for the per capita income which is generated by dividing the total household income from all sources by the total household size.

Citizenship Status: Respondents indicate whether they have only origin or destination country citizenship or both.

Socio-cultural integration: Sociocultural integration is measured based on two indicators. First, we look at language use at home by making the distinction between those who speak only their origin country language and those who speak only Dutch or some Dutch in combination with their origin country language. Second, we look at media and cultural consumption in a bi-dimensional way. More precisely, the respondent is asked how frequently he or she listens to Dutch/origin country music, reads newspapers from the Netherlands/origin country and looks at Dutch/ origin country websites. Information from these six separate questions was aggregated to create continuous variables with respect to orientation towards the origin country culture and Dutch culture. The combination of levels led to two variables with a 13 point scale.

Homeland engagement: We take into account both social and economic homeland engagement. First, the respondent is asked whether they have sent money to their family and friends in the last 12 months. We make use of this question as a binary variable. Second, the respondent is asked whether they maintain contact with their family and friends in the origin country. The frequency of contact is measured on an 8 point scale going from “no contact at all” to “every day” contact.

Trust in origin country economy: Respondents indicate the extent to which they trust in the origin country economy on a scale from 1(least trust) - to 4(most trust).

4. ANALYSIS

To start, we differentiate among migrant groups with respect to the three outcome variables exploring group differences based on basic descriptive analysis. Next, we present the results of binary logistic regressions where we include only reason for migration and citizenship as independent variables for the three outcome variables without including any controls. We also describe some of the descriptive statistics with respect to independent variables of our study by origin country to convey a sense of the background characteristics and experiences of migrants. Finally, to answer the main research question of this paper, we present three separate binary logistic regressions.² Namely, we present the odds-ratios of logistic regressions where the baselines for the dependent variables are “no intention for permanent return”, “no intention for temporary return”, and “no intention to participate in a temporary return programme”.

5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Return intentions

Examining the intentions to return of the four immigrant groups, we look at three different types of return: permanent return, temporary return and participation in a return programme. Guzzetta (2004) argues that most migrants do not intend to stay permanently in the destination country, but in our case, most migrants do. Overall, individuals are less likely to intend to return permanently (25 per cent). Yet, more individuals are positive about temporary return (43 per cent). This also shows different attitudes towards different types of return. As a preliminary analysis, we use T-tests to see whether the intentions differ among migrants from different origin countries. In Table 2, we see that Ethiopians state the highest proportions of intentions to return permanently with Burundians and Afghans showing minimal intentions to

return permanently. The high rate of permanent return among Ethiopians is partly due to the high concentration of students in the Netherlands but also due to the current opportunities available and the high growth rate in Ethiopia. Afghans and Burundians are significantly different in their intentions for permanent return from the Moroccans and Ethiopians but not significant from each other. Permanent return does not seem to be an option for Afghans and Burundians, and this may be due to their (forced) reasons for migration and the continued uncertainty in the countries of origin. The security situation in Afghanistan and the uncertainty about the future of both Afghanistan and Burundi likely impacts the decision of Afghans and Burundians to plan to return permanently. Intentions for temporary return give another picture. Afghans and Ethiopians are the most willing to return temporarily with Moroccans showing the lowest intentions (statistically significant result). These groups are also significantly different from each other. Afghans are often interested in returning for short periods of time to see family or friends or to help with development efforts but are reluctant to make a commitment to the future for reasons stated previously. Ethiopians are more return oriented in general and often return to visit family or friends or to get involved in development initiatives. Afghans and Ethiopians are most interested in programme participation. Burundians are the least interested in programme participation with Moroccans falling in between the two. These programmes often target the highly skilled, which may (partially) explain lower participation of the Moroccans. Groups that are more interested in temporary return are also more positive to participation in return programmes. From the descriptive statistics below, it is clear that permanent and temporary migration are not necessarily linked. For instance, Afghans have the lowest intention to return permanently but the highest intention to return temporarily.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Moreover, as can be seen in Table 3, for those people who do intend to return permanently, the main reasons cited are social cultural (family and missing home) for all groups. Some Afghans and Ethiopians also express an interest to return for reconstruction and development purposes. For those who want to return, three main time frames were proposed for when return would occur (retirement, when it is safe and when enough money was saved). We see that Moroccans are the most likely to return upon retirement or when they have reached a certain level of savings. For Afghans (50 per cent) and Burundians (33 per cent), the main time to return is when the country is safe. Ethiopians will mainly return upon graduation (49 per cent).

5.2 Integration processes, homeland engagement and trust in origin country economy

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

With regard to transnational social ties, we specifically investigate the transfer of remittances and social contact with family and friends in the origin country. All groups have regular contact with family and friends in the origin country. However, of the four groups, 31

per cent Afghans report no contact with family or friends in Afghanistan and 20 per cent of Burundians report no contact with family and friends in Burundi. In table 3, this variable is treated as a continuous variable on an 8-point scale (the higher the value, the higher the contact). Remittances play an important role for many migrants and are a way that migrants engage in economic transnational activities. Ethiopians are by far the greatest remittance senders with 61 per cent sending remittances in the last 12 months (Moroccans 29 per cent, Afghans 23 per cent, Burundians 36 per cent). The same distribution sent goods home and very few made an investment back home. Moroccans were the largest group to report having an investment in the origin country at 6 per cent.

Economic and social integration can also play a role in the intentions to return. Concerning economic integration, we specifically take (un)employment and per capita household income into account. Unemployment is between 10 and 13 per cent for all groups except Burundians who have a 22 per cent unemployment rate. Afghans are the most inactive in the labour market at 52 per cent although the other groups have high rates of inactivity as well (29-39 per cent). With regard to income, Ethiopians and Burundians are reporting slightly more income, probably due to their smaller household size on average. Under social integration, we examine language use at home and orientation towards Dutch culture (how often people consume Dutch media). More than half of all groups speak their native language at home (except for Burundians at 40 per cent, which may be due to lack of opportunity). In Table 3, Dutch cultural consumption is a continuous variable on a scale from 1 (less consumption) to 13 (more consumption). Moroccans have the least cultural consumption while Burundians have the highest on average.

Trust in the origin country institutions such as economy, legal system and government can play a role in the decision to migrate as well as the decision to return permanently or temporarily. In this paper, we particularly focus on trust in the economy given its potential role for future livelihood after resettlement. In the survey we ask respondents the extent to which they trust in the origin country economy and calculate it as a continuous variable between 1 (less trust) and 4 (more trust). The descriptive results show that all groups show low degrees of trust in the economy of their origin country. However, in relative terms Moroccans and Ethiopians demonstrate the most trust in the economy of the origin country while Afghans show the least.

5.3 Predicted probability of return intentions: Reason for migration and citizenship

The main reason for migration differs significantly among migrant groups. The main reason for Moroccans to move to the Netherlands is employment opportunities or family, while for Afghans and Burundians, the main motivation for migration is security related. For Ethiopians, initial reasons for migration are split between security and education. Taking the descriptive statistics a step further, we calculate the predicted probability for each type of return intentions taking into account self-reported reason for migration. Initial reasons for migration are inherently linked to future migration plans, and in our study we show differences in intentions to return in relation to migration motivation (see Table 3). Examining reason for migration, we observe large differences mainly in the probability of intentions to return permanently compared to migration for family reasons (See Figure 1). Those who

come for education purposes are 20 times more likely to intend to return permanently. Those who migrate for economic reason are 3 times more likely to intend to return permanently.

FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Turning our attention to citizenship, given its potential role in enhancing migrants' mobility, we observe that the four groups are mixed with regard to their citizenship status. Moroccans have the highest percentage of dual citizens (66 per cent) while Afghans have the highest percentage of only Dutch citizenship (75 per cent) (77 per cent of Moroccans have Dutch citizenship and 87 per cent of Afghans hold Dutch citizenship). More than half of Ethiopians and Burundians hold their origin country citizenship. When we look at the role of citizenship, we see that those who hold only origin country citizenship are almost four times more likely to have the intention to return permanently (See Figure 2).

6. RESULTS

In Table 4 we present the odds ratios from the binary logistic regression models for the three outcome variables with their statistical significance. The baseline for the dependent variables is having no intention for permanent return, temporary return or participating in temporary return programmes. Looking at the results regarding the country of birth effect, we observe that (with Moroccans being the reference group) only Ethiopians are more likely to intend to return to their origin country. However, with regard to temporary return intentions, all groups are significantly more likely to intend to go back to their origin country. The results on temporary return programme intentions are similar to that of temporary return; yet in this case, there is no significant difference between Burundians and Moroccans, who are the least likely to intend to participate in temporary return migration programmes.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

After controlling for other factors, the results indicate that compared to those who migrate for security reason, those who migrate for educational purposes are three times more likely to intend to return permanently. Those who migrated for family (reunification or formation) or employment reasons are two times more likely to intend to return temporarily and two or three times more likely to be interested in a return programme respectively.

With regards to citizenship, in the descriptive results section we have shown that having Dutch citizenship is linked to being more likely to intend to return on a temporary basis while having only origin country citizenship is positively linked to permanent return intentions. Our analysis shows that already after taking into account reason for migration and country of birth, the role of citizenship is lost.

Next to citizenship, economic integration (employment and income) in the Netherlands is also incorporated in the study. In previous research, de Haas and Fokkema (2011) have not found any effect of economic integration. Our research also does not show any clear links between employment status and return intentions. Regarding social integration related indicators, our research results are in line with the previous results of de Haas and Fokkema (2011). In particular, we observe that orientation towards the Dutch society is negatively

linked to permanent return intentions, and speaking only origin country language at home is positively linked to permanent return intentions. Interestingly, intentions about temporary return are not influenced by socio-cultural integration processes.

The results on homeland engagement are similar to those found by de Haas and Fokkema (2011). Our analysis confirms that migrants who have more contact with their family and friends in the origin country are more likely to intend to go back to their origin country both permanently and temporarily. Differently, remittances sending is not significant when social contacts with homeland are included in the model. However, it is important to state that, in a separate model, if economic homeland engagement is taken into account as the only indicator of transnational involvement, we observe that it is also positively related to all types of return intentions.

Finally, to account for migrants' perceptions about the context in their country of origin, we take into account their level of trust in the economy of their country of origin. The analysis shows that trust in economy does not seem to be an influential factor in predicting individuals' intentions for return. This factor is only marginally significant for permanent return.

7. CONCLUSION

The question if migrants have different attitudes towards different types of return is hardly addressed in the return migration literature. In this paper, we were able to map attitudes towards permanent return, temporary return and participation in temporary return programmes based on the example of Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants living in the Netherlands. We developed the hypotheses of this research based on previous research on return migration intentions (Waldorf 1995; de Haas and Fokkema, 2011) and the literature on the determinants of return migration as discussed in the theory section.

Table 5 about here

This study allowed us to test competing arguments regarding the role of homeland engagement and integration simultaneously. King (2000) argues that non-economic factors weigh more heavily than economic factors for return migrants' decision-making. Also in our research, we have found that economic integration is not significantly related to return intentions; however, sociocultural integration is important. In this regard, assimilation theory only partially explains the situation with regards to return intentions. Also in line with our hypothesis, we find that homeland engagement is significantly linked to higher return intentions for all types of return. In this matter, it is difficult to argue that 'pull' factors in the origin country are significantly more important for permanent return intention than 'push' factors from the host country, as King (2000) suggests. It is rather a combination of both contexts that influences intentions and multiple factors operate simultaneously (Zhao, 2002).

At the same time, trust in the origin economy does not play a decisive role in permanent return intention. This means that the effect of external economic conditions may be overshadowed by the combined effect of individual level integration and homeland engagement (Waldorf and Esparza, 1991).

The innovative aspect of our research was to compare the results with regards to different types of return options. We illustrated that we are able to predict permanent return better than temporary return and participation in temporary return programmes through integration processes and social ties maintained with the homeland. Most importantly, while host country integration seems to be linked only to permanent return, homeland engagement is influential in a positive way on intentions for all types of return. Consequently, we conclude that independent of the time frame of return, 'pull' factors may be more important (Gmelch, 1980), while 'push' factors are only important for long term return. Theoretically, our research emphasizes the significance of incorporating the time dimension when studying return migration for two main reasons. First, theories used to develop hypotheses on return migration focus primarily on permanent return, but their assumptions do not apply perfectly to different types of return. Second, in the current context of easier travel and communication, it would be incomplete to focus only on a binary understanding of mobility. Considering the increasing significance of temporary return, existing theories need to be adjusted to fit the new realities of mobility.

From a transnational migration theory perspective, an alternative way of interpreting our results involves dual engagement. We find no negative effect of sociocultural integration on temporary return or temporary return migration programme participation. Therefore, one can argue that being integrated in the Netherlands does not prevent people from temporary return. Another important point is that destination country citizenship (Dutch citizenship) does not seem to hinder return, be it temporary or permanent. Hence, we conclude that there is no counter evidence with regard to migrants being simultaneously embedded in different contexts, and their choices depend on opportunity structures and a combination of factors that influence their decision-making processes in a dynamic way.

This research not only sheds new light on the academic debate, including non-monetary factors into research on return and looking at different types of return intentions, but can also play a role in assisting policy makers when designing programmes and policies to enhance return for development. For instance, Burundians in the Netherlands do have access to return programmes via IOM in Brussels, but these programmes are not promoted as much as the ones for Afghans and Ethiopians in the Netherlands. As Black et al. (2004) suggests, it is of great importance that information on return programmes is disseminated and that migrants are actively directed to these sources of information. Student migration also appears to be linked to structural constraints. Those individuals who migrated for education purposes are much more likely to intend to return permanently. This is probably due to the fact that many of these students are in the Netherlands on scholarships that compel them to return after their studies. Future research on migrants' intentions regarding return should discuss further the question of choice, and evaluate to what extent intentions are influenced by external factors.

NOTES

¹ In this paper we consider temporary return programme like the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme and other similar programmes often implemented by the International Organization for Migration where highly skilled migrants are paid and facilitated to return to their countries of origin for usually 3-6 months to engage in capacity building.

² It should be noted that there is a challenge in determining whether this analysis reveals treatment effects or selection effects. The data available likely includes a self-selected group of movers, who probably differ in various ways from those who never migrated. This issue is compounded by the fact that the study uses cases from four distinct national migration streams, each potentially having a different set of selection factors that draw migrants to the Netherlands. It is difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish the influence of characteristics of immigrants from factors that may have been involved in perpetuating their migration.

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TABLE 1: FRAMING THE HYPOTHESES ON INTENTIONS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF RETURN

	Permanent Return	Temporary Return	Temporary Return Programme (TRP)
Economic integration	No effect	Negative effect	Negative effect

Socio-cultural integration	Negative effect	No effect	No effect
Homeland engagement	Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect
Citizenship Status	Origin citizenship: positive effect	Dutch or dual citizenship: positive effect	
Country of origin (compared to Moroccan)	Afghanistan and Burundi: least interested in permanent return		Afghanistan and Ethiopia: most interested in TRP
Self-reported Reason for migration	Security/political: negative effect		
Trust in origin country economy	Education: positive effect Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect

TABLE 2: INTENTIONS TO RETURN PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY TO THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (%)

	Moroccans	Afghans	Ethiopians	Burundians
Permanent return				
Yes	21.4%	8.0%	58.8%	9.1%
No	78.7%	92.0%	41.2%	90.9%
N	178	212	233	121
Temporary return				
Yes	20.9%	46.7%	41.1%	30.0%
Maybe	20.4%	12.1%	12.5%	29.3%
No	58.7%	41.2%	46.4%	40.7%
N	211	240	297	140
Temporary return migration programme				
Yes	17.4%	36.9%	32.9%	12.8%
Maybe	20.4%	10.7%	13.8%	10.6%
No	62.2%	52.4%	53.3%	76.6%
N	196	225	283	141

*Note: Ns are different because of the number of people who responded to each question. For the sake of clarity we have omitted any 'maybe' answerers for permanent return as 'maybe' was considered too vague to do anything meaningful with.

TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES OF INTEREST, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES (MEAN/FREQUENCY)

	Range	Moroccans	Afghans	Ethiopians	Burundians
<u>Background characteristics</u>					
Age	18-79 years	42.6 (SD 12.0)	37.8 (SD13.9)	37.8 (SD 9.2)	36.0 (SD 9.3)
Female		60.6%	52.2%	38.0%	31.5%
HH Size	1-11 persons	3.5 (SD 1.7)	3.18 (SD 1.9)	1.9 (SD.44)	2.1 (SD 1.5)
Human capital (education level)					
No formal schooling		17.3%	3.2%	2.0%	1.9%
Primary		16.2%	4.8%	0.9%	2.5%
Secondary		47.7%	52.2%	59.1%	59.6%
Above secondary		19.9%	39.8%	38.0%	36.0%
Main reason for migration					
Family Related		80.3%	33.6%	11.3%	8.2%
Security/Political		0.5%	62.7%	42.0%	84.8%
Employment opportunities		14.1%	1.2%	4.0%	2.5%
Education		4.7%	2.5%	42.6%	3.8%
Other		0.5%	0%	0.3%	0.6%
Legal integration (Citizenship status)					
Dutch Citizenship / Dual citizenship		76.5%	87.1%	43.2%	41.2%
Origin country citizenship		23.5%	12.9%	56.7%	58.5%
<u>Economic integration</u>					
Employment status					
Employed		47.2%	37.4%	47.9%	46.0%
Student		5.1%	30.1%	30.7%	25.5%
Unemployed		13.0%	13.3%	15.2%	26.1%
Inactive		34.7%	19.3%	6.3%	2.5%
<u>Socio-cultural integration</u>					
Language use at home					
Dutch / Partly Dutch partly mother language		39.4%	33.5%	32.8%	54.0%
Mother language only		60.6%	63.8%	44.4%	37.3%
Other (mainly English)		0%	2.8%	22.9%	8.7%
Dutch media and art consumption	0-13 points	5.8(SD 4.1)	7.9 (SD 3.7)	6.6 (SD 4.1)	8.7 (SD 3.2)
Trust in origin economy	1-4 points	2.9 (SD 0.9)	1.6 (SD 0.7)	2.5 (SD 0.9)	1.8 (SD 0.9)
Yearly income per capita €	540-105000	9326.0 (SD 8069.3)	8961.9 (SD 8770.4)	11784.3 (SD 11064.4)	10497.2(SD 8401.5)
<u>Social ties with the origin country</u>					
Social contact with the origin country	1-8 points	5.6(SD 1.9)	4.00 (SD 2.4)	6.3 (SD 1.3)	4.9 (SD 2.2)
Economic ties with the origin country (send money last 12 months)					
Yes		28.6%	23.0%	60.9%	35.8%
Origin country media and art consumption	0-13 points	4.7 (SD 3.3)	6.8 (SD 3.3)	8.7 (SD 3.2)	7.7 (SD 3.7)
Reason for Permanent Return Intention					
Socio cultural		92%	73%	87%	83%
Economic		0	7%	7%	0
Political		3%	7%	1%	8%
Environment					
Development effort		0	13%	4%	8%
Immigration status		3%	0	0	0
Other		3%	0	1%	0

**Time for permanent
return**

Retirement	40.0%	12.5%	9.4%	25.0%
Have enough money	36.0%	12.5%	10.4%	25.0%
It is safe	0	50.0%	9.4%	33.3%
Visa expires	0	6.3%	13.2%	0
After graduation	0	6.3%	49.1%	8.3%
Other	24.0%	12.5%	8.3%	8.3%
N Total	218	255	350	162


TABLE 4. ODDS RATIOS FROM BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MIGRATION INTENTION TO ORIGIN COUNTRY

Results are in odds ratios; *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (1-tailed	Permanent Return	Temporary Return	Temporary Return Programme
Country of origin			
Morocco	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Afghanistan	0.57	5.60***	5.55***
Ethiopia	3.90***	5.33***	3.62***
Burundi	0.73	5.80***	1.51
Reason for migration			
Security/ Political	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Family formation/ reunification	1.16	1.82**	2.30***
Employment	1.93	2.35*	3.17**
Education	2.72**	1.25	1.10
Legal Status (Citizenship)			
Dual citizenship or Dutch citizenship	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Origin country citizenship	0.74	.80	.72
Highest level of education			
No formal education	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary education	.28**	.35*	.52
Secondary education	.33**	.57	.51
Tertiary education	.39*	1.23	.91
Employment Status			
Employed	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Student	1.57	1.11	.91
Unemployed	.46*	.99	.53*
Inactive	.77	.59*	.65
Income	1.00	1.00	1.00
Social integration			
Orientation towards Dutch culture	0.90***	0.96	.95*
Language use			
Dutch only or some Dutch	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Origin country language only	2.35***	0.74	.97
Other	3.77**	.32***	.63
Homeland engagement			
Social contacts with homeland	1.15**	1.12**	1.14**
Remittance sender	1.33	.87	1.00
Trust in origin country economy	1.25*	.89	1.14
Control Variables			
Age	1.13*	0.86**	0.97
Age squared	1.00*	1.00***	1.00
Female	0.72	0.91	0.89
Married	0.67	0.81	0.72
Orientation towards origin culture	1.03	0.98	1.02
Household size in NL	0.94	0.91*	0.86**
N	556	539	522
Pseudo R square	40.0%	12.7%	11.1%

TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF HYPOTHESIZED AND ACTUAL FINDINGS


		Permanent Return	Temporary Return	Temporary Return Programme (TRP)
Economic integration	<i>Hypothesis</i>	No effect	Negative effect	Negative effect
	<i>Result</i>	Negative effect	No effect	No effect
Socio-cultural integration	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Negative effect	No effect	No effect
	<i>Result</i>	Negative effect	No effect	Negative effect
Homeland engagement	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect
	<i>Result</i>	Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect
Citizenship Status	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Origin citizenship: positive effect	Dutch or dual citizenship: positive effect	
	<i>Result</i>			No effect
		No effect	No effect	
Country of origin (compared to Moroccan)	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Afghanistan and Burundi: least interested in permanent return		Afghanistan and Ethiopia: most interested in TRP
	<i>Result</i>	Ethiopia: more interested in permanent return	Ethiopia, Afghanistan & Burundi: more interested in temp. return	Ethiopia & Afghanistan: more interested in return programme
Self-reported Reason for migration	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Security/political: least interested in permanent return Education: most interested in permanent return		
	<i>Result</i>	Security/political: least interested in permanent return Education: most interested in permanent return	Family: more interested in temp. return Employment: more interested in temp. return Security: less interested in temp. return	Family: more interested in temp. return programme Employment: more interested in temp. return programme Security: less interested in temp. return programme
Trust in origin country economy	<i>Hypothesis</i>	Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect
	<i>Result</i>	Positive effect	No effect	No effect

Figure 1: REASON FOR MIGRATION AND PROBABILITY OF RETURN INTENTION



*Odds ratios of binary logistic regressions are presented. Migrating for security and political reasons being the reference point (1), the figure shows how much more or less likely an individual intends to return depending on their migration motivation.

FIGURE 2: CITIZENSHIP AND PROBABILITY OF RETURN INTENTION



*Odds ratios of binary logistic regressions are presented. Having Dutch citizenship being the reference point (1), the figure shows how much more or less likely an individual intends to return depending on their citizenship status.

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ISSN 1871-9872

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