The race for an artificial general intelligence: Implications for public policy
Wim Naudé & Nicola Dimitri
#2018-032
An arms race for an artificial general intelligence (AGI) would be
detrimental for and even pose an existential threat to humanity if it
results in an unfriendly AGI. In this paper an all-pay contest model is
developed to derive implications for public policy to avoid such an
outcome. It is established that in a winner-takes all race, where
players must invest in R&D, only the most competitive teams will
participate. Given the difficulty of AGI the number of competing teams
is unlikely ever to be very large. It is also established that the
intention of teams competing in an AGI race, as well as the possibility
of an intermediate prize is important in determining the quality of the
eventual AGI. The possibility of an intermediate prize will raise
quality of research but also the probability of finding the dominant AGI
application and hence will make public control more urgent. It is
recommended that the danger of an unfriendly AGI can be reduced by
taxing AI and by using public procurement. This would reduce the pay-off
of contestants, raise the amount of R&D needed to compete, and
coordinate and incentivize co-operation, all outcomes that will help
alleviate the control and political problems in AI. Future research is
needed to elaborate the design of systems of public procurement of AI
innovation and for appropriately adjusting the legal frameworks
underpinning high-tech innovation, in particular dealing with patents
created by AI.
JEL Classifications: O33, O38, O14, O15, H57
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, innovation, technology, public policy