Lords of Uhuru: the political economy of elite competition and institutional change in post-independence Kenya
Biniam Bedasso
#2012-042
The post-independence history of Kenya is characterized by an unusual
mix of stability with ever-lingering fragility. The high level of elite
persistence in Kenya could be seen both as a cause and a result of this
peculiar nature of the political economy of the country. This paper has
the objective of studying the effects of historical elite competition
and consolidation on political-economic stability and institutional
transition in post-independence Kenya. The logic of the natural state is
applied to organize the narrative and analyze the key features (North,
Wallis and Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History: Cambridge University
Press). Most of the existing institutional structures in Kenya are built
on elite configurations inherited from the colonial times. The robust
growth performance of the first decade after independence was generated
by smallholder agriculture, while most of the rent was transferred to
the elite via state patronage. The political instability of the later
years had a lot to do with dwindling patronage resources and elite
fragmentation. For most part of the political economy history of the
country, patron-client networks and tribalism have played key role in
regulating intra-elite bargains. Land has always been the leverage used
by the elite to manipulate the aforementioned structures. Although the
Kenyan elite have maintained keen interest in winning via constitutional
means, they have kept reverting to extralegal avenues whenever
intra-elite negotiations seemed to have failed to be enforced.
JEL codes: P16, D72, O55
Keywords: elites, dominant coalition, economic growth, institutional
change, Kenya