Agenda Disputes and Strategic Venue Preferences: The Doha Crisis and Europe’s Flight to Regionalism
Francisco Toro
#2008-048
Agenda-setting disputes have become increasingly central to the conduct
of multilateral trade negotiations. Introducing some simple concepts
from Negotiations Theory, we focus on the dynamic interplay between the
Doha Round’s agenda setting and bargaining stages, underlining their
implications for the European Union’s evolving win-set in the
negotiations. We argue that, by successful enshrining a narrow agenda,
key developing countries reduced the set of possible final settlements
that were both multilaterally viable and attractive from the point of
view of key European interests. In an attempt to avoid imposing
concentrated costs on those interests, the European Commission has
responded by pursuing its best alternative to a multilateral agreement,
shifting negotiating resources away from the multilateral table and
towards regional FTA negotiations.
JEL Code: F13
Keywords: Trade Policy-making, Doha Round, EU, sectoral lobbying, trade
negotiations
UNU-MERIT Working Papers
ISSN 1871-9872