

# Migration Routes in West and Central Africa & East and Horn of Africa *2018 Update*

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## List of Abbreviations

AMMi	Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in East Africa
AU	African Union
AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
BMM	Better Migration Management
CAR	Central African Republic
CRU	Conflict Research Unit
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European Union External action/European External Action Service
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
EU	European Union
EUCAP	EU Capacity Building
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund for Africa
FMM	Freedom of Movement and Mobility initiative for West-Africa
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	International Government Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
RSF	Rapid Support Force
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
UMIRR	Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Repression of Sexual Violence to Women and Children
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VHR	Voluntary Humanitarian Return
VoT	Victim of Trafficking

## Disclaimers

The analysis, results and recommendations in this paper represent the opinion of the authors and are not necessarily representative of the position of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

The maps used in this report are for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG), nor the sources upon which these maps are based.

## Executive Summary: Recent shifts in migration accross West and East Africa

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The report at hand is the 2018 edition of two extensive reports on the drivers, characteristics and routes of migration in West and Central Africa (Part 1) and in East and the Horn of Africa (Part 2). It highlights the main developments in West and East African migration from 2015 to 2018. Migration throughout Africa remains fundamentally mixed and presents an increasingly complex picture. In West and Central Africa, where intra-regional migration accounts for the largest share of flows (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016), refugees and IDPs share migration routes with labor and economic migrants. In both West and East Africa, migration is most often driven by an overlap of factors such as conflict, environmental or economic factors.

While the main smuggling hubs in West and Central Africa remain frequented (Agadez, Gao or Sebha), intermediary smuggling hubs have re-emerged in Niger and Libya (among others, Assamaka or Dirkou in Niger; Edjibia and Jalu in Libya). In recent years, smuggling routes through Niger and Libya have diversified. For instance, there are re-emerging routes from Tahoua (South-East Niger) to Tamanrasset (Algeria) and from Agadez to Sabha (Libya), as well as 'new' routes and hubs in North-Eastern Libya. It is important to note that smuggling routes are never completely new; in the past year, old routes or secondary routes are being used with more frequency.

As highlighted in recent reports, the diversification of routes implies that these have become more dangerous, which has increased the human and financial cost of journeys across the Sahara. Indeed, EU efforts to curtail irregular migration in the region have contributed to diminished migrant flows through Niger and Libya but have also translated into riskier underground journeys. An increasing amount of West African migrants access Libya via new transit routes through Cameroon, Chad and the Lake Chad basin.

The overall number of arriving migrants through the Mediterranean routes is back to pre-2015 levels. Arrivals to Italy have drastically decreased, while arrivals to Spain are increasing by more than 134 per cent (IOM, 2018c). However, the phenomenon shall not be reported as a blanket shift in the Mediterranean routes. It is rather explained by a combination of factors; on the one hand, the closure of the route from Libya to Italy and on the other hand, a changing socio-political context in Morocco.

Migration movements in East and the Horn of Africa are largely driven by forced displacement. Whether climate- or conflict-induced, the region hosts one of the largest groups of displaced persons on the globe. This displacement has largely been contained to the region; arrivals of East Africans in Italy have been declining since 2016. Even in 2018, monthly arrivals are lower than previous years, which plummeted after 2015 and even further in 2017 in parallel with a decline in departures from Libya.

Similar to Niger, EU policy interventions in Sudan have had an impact on migration routes and flows in the country. While these policies have played a role in decreasing the number of irregular entries into Europe, there is documentation of human rights abuses and corruption perpetrated by Sudanese authorities. As local conflicts within the East and Horn of Africa continue to displace its citizens, notably in South Sudan and Ethiopia, a positive development is the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, given the continued exodus of Eritreans into Ethiopia and still into Europe, it is clear that open borders between the two countries will not alone extinguish the drive to leave Eritrea.

## Introduction

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This report has been commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH as part of a series of projects that explores (irregular) migration in Africa. Through these studies, GIZ aims to better understand the complex dynamics and realities of migration in and from West and Central Africa as well as in East and Horn of Africa. The report focuses on 21 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, namely Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. North-African countries are occasionally included given their importance regarding migration flows and routes from the region.

The report at hand is the 2018 edition of two extensive reports on the drivers, characteristics and routes of migration in West and Central Africa (Part 1) and in East and the Horn of Africa (Part 2). Each of these parts includes, first, a review of mixed migration trends, a description of migration routes and of the main border areas. Secondly, the study highlights emerging (irregular) migration trends and analyses the role that EU policy interventions might have played in shaping these trends. The study thus aims to identify and analyse the new developments in migration trends from 2015 to 2018.

Indeed, the picture of migration in West and East Africa is complex and fast changing. A myriad of socio-economic and geo-political factors come into play to shape migration flows and routes, such as social and cultural change, unemployment, conflict and climate-change, among others. Amidst this mosaic of migration drivers, the study at hand provides some insights on the impact of EU policy interventions in both regions after several years of implementation.

During and after the peak of arrivals through the Mediterranean routes in 2015, EU stakeholders developed several migration-related policies with partner governments in West and East Africa. One of the main policy instruments in that domain, for instance, is the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa* (EUTF Africa) launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015. Projects financed within EUTF focus both on migration management and migration governance as well as on livelihoods and development in countries of origin and transit. While the analysis provided here is not aimed at establishing causality, EU policy interventions and inter-government agreements seem to have played a role in re-shaping migration trends in both regions.

The report has been compiled based on desk research. Data was extracted from various reliable statistical sources such as IOM Flow Monitoring and IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, UNHCR, Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC). All data sources are available in the "Overview of sources" provided in this report. Given its reliance on secondary data sources, the report is only as detailed and nuanced as its source materials.



### 1. Regional Overview

Migration through West and Central Africa is characterised by mixed migration flows. According to the Mixed Migration Centre (2018), mixed migration includes irregular migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers (forced migrants), victims of trafficking (involuntary migrants), stateless persons, unaccompanied and separated children and other vulnerable persons on the move<sup>1</sup>. Drivers of migration in the region are varied and often overlapping. These include violent conflict and persecution, environmental disasters, the lack of economic opportunities as well as a long-standing culture of migration throughout the region<sup>2</sup>. The upcoming sections look at the different components of mixed migration, analyse migration trends established in recent years and highlights the new developments in 2018.

According to the most up-to-date reports, there are three main emergent trends that developed through 2017 and 2018 in West and Central Africa. The first one is the diversification of smuggling routes and re-emergence of secondary smuggling hubs both in Niger and in Libya. The main smuggling route from Agadez (Niger) to Sabha (Libya) has become less frequented, while some secondary routes to Algeria and to Libya re-emerge. These are not fundamentally new routes, rather, these are secondary routes that re-emerge due to stricter controls at the main routes and hubs (Zinder, Agadez, Seguedine or Madama). Migration routes also move to other countries; more migrants reportedly accessed Libya from Cameroon and Chad. Smuggling routes within Libya have also diversified (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2018). Analysts seem to agree that the diversification of routes implies that these have also become more dangerous, which has increased the human and financial cost of journeys across the Sahara (Brachet, 2018; Tubiana, Warin, & Mohammud Saeneen, 2018).

Secondly, there have been notable changes in migration flows across the Mediterranean. The data reflects two important trends; the fact that the number of overall crossings has gone down significantly and is now back to pre-2015 level and the fact that the number of crossing into Spain has experienced an important rise in the last two years, becoming the first country of arrival in 2018 (IOM, 2018c).

Thirdly, return, repatriation and resettlement constitute a note-worthy migration trend in the region in the past two years. This concerns both voluntary returns as well as forced returns, mainly from Algeria. Returns from Libya and Algeria has a direct link with the increase of inflows into Niger. IOM's Voluntary Humanitarian Return program has assisted over 23,000 migrants stranded in different regions of Libya since its implementation in 2017 (IOM, 2018e). The first phase of evacuation often re-settles migrants temporarily in Niger before the phase of return to their origin country or re-settlement to third countries. Additionally, recent UN reports state that forced returns from Algeria have affected more than 17,000 persons in 2018 alone (UN, 2018a).

Finally, forced displacement remains an important part of the migration picture in West and Central Africa. Since the escalation of the conflict in Lake Chad in 2009 and 2010, over 2.7 million persons have been displaced (Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) & European Commission, 2018). The largest share is constituted by internally displaced people (IDPs), particularly in North-Eastern Nigeria. Niger has the largest refugee population in the region; it currently hosts 177,565 refugees, 67% of which are Nigerians and 33% Malians (UNHCR, 2018c).

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex E for a glossary of key migration terms

<sup>2</sup> See Annex D for an overview on the drivers of mixed migration

## 2. Mixed Migration in West and Central Africa

### 2.1. Emerging trends in smuggling routes and hubs across West and Central Africa<sup>3</sup>

While the vast majority of migration throughout West Africa is regular and intra-regional, smuggling of migrants remains a prevalent issue in West and Central Africa (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; MMC, 2018a; UNODC, 2018). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) -which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo- signed the ECOWAS free movement protocols in 1979. However, de facto free movement in the region remains difficult and migrants often rely on smugglers or simply undertake irregular crossings by avoiding official border-crossing points (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2018). Many national regulations still contravene the free movement protocols and states are only making modest efforts to cooperate on this issue (Mbachi & Ikeanyibe, 2017). Therefore, when traveling across the region, most ECOWAS citizens still face visa on arrival fees or informal 'taxes' raised by misinformed or corrupt border officials. On West African migration routes, the largest share of migrants thus travels regularly or 'irregularly' on their own means across the region. The level of irregularity involved in these movements seems to increase the further north migrants go. Smuggling activities primarily concentrate from the North of Mali or Niger onwards, as Algeria or Libya are not part of the ECOWAS free-movement area (UNODC, 2018).

As highlighted in a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Report on the Smuggling of Migrants, smuggling routes change and adapt rapidly over time, while hubs remain relatively stable (UNODC, 2018). **In response to certain policy interventions, among other factors, migration routes diversify and move to other countries** (Tubiana et al., 2018). Indeed, when observing the evolution of irregular migration from West Africa to North Africa and Europe, migration movements often maintain the same transit hubs while there have been some adaptations concerning the routes.

#### 2.1.1. Diversification of smuggling routes in Niger


The city of Agadez in Niger remains a primary hub for migrant smuggling towards North Africa. **However, as detailed in [section 2.1.](#), several EU and Nigerien policy interventions could have altered the smuggling routes to and from Agadez.** In fact, new smuggling routes have appeared or became more popular since such interventions were implemented in 2016 and 2017, mainly in Niger and Libya.

In Niger, smuggling routes towards Algeria have become more frequented and a new direct smuggling route from Agadez to Assamaka -located right before the Algerian border- has appeared in 2017, as shown in [Figure 1](#) (European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2018; Howden & Zandanini, 2018). The city of Gao in Mali is also an important point of departure for smuggling into Algeria and Niger. From Agadez or Gao, migrants travel to the main transit hubs of Tamanrasset in Algeria or Sabha in Libya (ECFR, 2018; Molenaar & El Kamouni - Janssen, 2017). **However, the routes linking these two transit points have experienced deviations, in an attempt to avoid check points and intermediary transit cities.** In Niger, smuggling routes now avoid Arlit or Madama, where EU-member states military missions and EU security missions have been implemented in 2016 (Howden & Zandanini, 2018).

<sup>3</sup>The internationally agreed definition of **migrant smuggling** stems from the Protocol against the smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Protocol defines the crime of migrant smuggling as 'the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.'

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FIGURE 1: EMERGING SMUGGLING ROUTES IN NIGER



Notes: map adapted from (ECFR, 2018; Howden & Zandanini, 2018); This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

### 2.1.2. Diversification of smuggling routes in Libya


In Libya, there is indication that new migration hubs have emerged since 2017. A UNHCR-REACH 2018 report finds that while the main Libyan hubs of Tripoli and Bani Waleed are still functioning in 2018, there is a multiplication of smuggling hubs on the Eastern coast, particularly the areas of Sirte, Ejdabia and Tobruk. In the interior-east of the country, the cities of Zalah, Marada and Jalu have consequently become important transit hubs (see [Figure 2](#), below). This is due to the fact that there have been increased border-guard controls focused on the Western coast of Libya as well as the fact that conflict in the east has been stabilizing in 2018 (UNHCR, 2018)

Departure hubs for smuggling by sea require territorial control by specific groups of smugglers (UNODC, 2018), which could mean that new or re-emerging smuggling networks have been able to develop in the last months. Reportedly, routes to and from Ejdabia, as well as smuggling hubs in the area, change continuously, mirroring changes in police checkpoints in the region (Altai Consulting & IMPACT Initiatives, 2017).

As eastern smuggling hubs re-emerge, smuggling routes within and to Libya have substantially diversified since 2016-2017. [Figure 2](#), below maps the new emerging routes towards the eastern hubs mentioned above. Migrants entering Libya from the South-East have been using new routes from Tazirbu to Jalu and then to Ejdabia. New routes between the smuggling hubs of Sirt, Ejdabia and Tobruk have also recently re-emerged.

Finally, it is also relevant to note that there is an increase of arrivals from Algeria and Chad rather than from Niger (Tubiana et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2018b). A recent study notes that the number of West-African migrants crossing from Chad into Libya has increased sharply between 2017 and 2018. West Africans also travel through Nigeria and Cameroon to N'Djaména before they head north to Chadian city of Faya. Others cross the Niger-Chad border, often north of Lake Chad, to reach the Tibesti Mountains at the border with Libya (Tubiana et al., 2018).

FIGURE 2: EMERGING SMUGGLING ROUTES AND HUBS IN LIBYA



Notes: map adapted from (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 3). This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

### 2.1.3. *Changes in migration flows through Niger and Mali*

Indeed, a decrease in the transit through Niger to Libya is observable; both the ingoing and outgoing flows through Niger have been decreasing since 2016. Between February and July 2017, IOM recorded 27,117 refugees and migrants leaving Niger towards North Africa, compared to 221,992 during the same period in 2016 (MMC, 2018d). Now comparing the first semester of 2017 and 2018, IOM reports a 58% decrease in incoming flows to Niger and a 14% decrease in outgoing flows (IOM, 2018d). **As will be discussed in [section 2.3.](#), inflows are increasingly composed by migrants repatriated or forcefully returned from Libya and Algeria (IOMc, 2018).** Altogether, the numbers show that the volume of transit through Niger is decreasing, however, the presence of migrants and refugees in protracted situations is increasingly higher (Aldekoa, 2018).

In the case of Mali, in 2016 and most of 2017, only Malians were recorded exiting the country at IOM's Flow Monitoring Points. However, since August 2017, **citizens of other West African countries are transiting through Mali in increasing numbers, to the point that incoming flows are slightly overgrowing outgoing flows since April 2017** (IOM, 2018b), although the overall incoming and outgoing flows in Niger remain higher in absolute terms. Nationals of Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and the Gambia constitute the majority of transit flows through Mali. Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso are major transit countries for West Africans after the stopover in Mali, often around the city of Gao.

**In sum, while the main smuggling hubs in West and Central Africa remain frequented, new intermediary smuggling hubs have emerged.** Smuggling routes through Niger and Libya have diversified but also become more dangerous, which has increased the human and financial cost of journeys across the Sahara (Aldekoa, 2018; Brachet, 2018; Tubiana et al., 2018). EU efforts to curtail irregular migration in the region have contributed to diminish migrant flows through Niger and Libya but have also translated into riskier, underground journeys and into the strengthening of specialized organized crime groups (Jerome Tubiana et al., 2018).

## 2.2. Emerging trends in smuggling routes across the Mediterranean


Since the peak of unauthorized sea crossings to Europe took place in October 2015 (with 221,454 arrivals), the flows of arrivals at the EU has kept decreasing every month. **In October 2018, the number of arriving migrants in Greece, Italy and Spain is back to pre-2015 levels** (Kingsley, 2018a). IOM reports that 82,100 migrants and refugees have entered Europe by sea since January 2018, of which 36,654 arrived in Spain, the leading country of arrival this year (IOM, 2018c).

**On the Central Mediterranean route, unauthorized crossings from Libya to Italy have experienced an 82% decrease since 2016.** From January to August 2018, there were 20,077 arrivals in Italy as compared to 114,694 for the same period of 2016. According to IOM data, Tunisians represent 19% of arrivals, which makes Tunisia the top country of origin for arrivals to Italy in 2018. This is a substantial change from previous years (IOM, 2018c). Eritreans represent 15% of arrivals, followed by Sudan (8%) and Nigeria (6%). The main ports of disembarkation in 2018 have been those of Sicily as well as Crotone (ibid.). As analyzed in section 3.2., restricting unauthorized crossings from Libya does not automatically reduce the number of migrants present on the Central Mediterranean route. Rather, UN agencies warn that it prolongs situation of protracted transit for migrants and refugees in Libya (UN, 2018b).

**On the contrary, flows have substantially increased on the Western Mediterranean route. Between January and end of August 2018, authorities in Spain registered a total of 33,912 migrant and refugees arrivals, a 134 percentage increase from 2017.** Spain has thus become the top country of destination for Mediterranean crossings in 2018. Most arrived in Spain by sea (86%), while others arrived by land

through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (14%), with 4,575 unauthorized land crossings (IOM, 2018c).

FIGURE 3: MAP OF ARRIVALS THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN ROUTES



Notes: map adapted from (UNHCR, 2018a). The numbers correspond to the period January to July 2017 and 2018. This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

Smuggling occurs at many stages on the Western Mediterranean route. That said, **smuggling activities are concentrated on the Northern coast of Morocco, where routes from Morocco to Spain have substantially diversified in recent years.** While the route from Tangier to Tarifa and Malaga remains one of the main routes, a new “Atlantic” route from Asilah to Barbate and Cadiz has become more frequented since 2017. This route to Cadiz has been taken by nearly 7,000 migrants in 2017, however, it is also the most dangerous route. The routes from Nador to Motril and Almeria (3,386 and 5,680 crossings respectively) have been primarily used by Moroccan and Algerian nationals in 2017 (Sanmartin, 2018). Most migrants arrived to Spain in 2018 are nationals of West African countries; from Guinea (Conakry), Mali and Côte d’Ivoire mainly, while Morocco remains the first country of origin (IOM, 2018c).

Lastly, smuggling through the West African route, to the Canary Islands from Mauritania or Morocco remains a residual phenomenon. From January to August 2018, 496 West African nationals reached



the Canary Islands on rubber-dinghies from the coast of Morocco. While this represents an important increase from 2017, the numbers remain comparatively low (Cadena SER, 2018).

### 2.3. Trafficking in persons<sup>4</sup>

In addition to human smuggling, trafficking in persons is a major concern in the West and Central Africa region. Irregular migrants, especially those using smugglers, are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking (VoTs). **The recent crackdown on migrant smuggling in Niger and Libya has brought smugglers to use longer and riskier routes, often merging with existing drug and human trafficking routes** (Tubiana et al., 2018). Hence, migrants taking these routes could face greater risks of ending-up in trafficking and exploitation.

**West and Central Africa are some of the main regions of origin of victims of human trafficking, as well as a main region of exploitation.** According to UNODC, 90% of victims of trafficking from the region are trafficked over a short distance: within their country of origin or within the region (UNODC, 2016). West African VoTs whom are trafficked over a long distance are often destined for the Middle-East for labour exploitation and to Southern and Western Europe for sexual exploitation (ibid.).

The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, published annually by the US Department of State, provides a comprehensive overview of governmental anti-human trafficking efforts by presenting main trends regarding the nature and scope of trafficking in persons and the broad range of government actions to confront and eliminate it. As shown in [Table C.1.](#), most countries in West and Central Africa are located within the Tier 2 Watch List, implying that these governments do not fully meet minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and for which:

- “a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
- b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecution, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of trafficking by government officials; or
- c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional steps over the next year”(US Department of State, 2018).

As shown in [Table C.1.](#) Annex C, Burkina Faso, CAR, Ghana, Guinea and Mali have improved their position respective to 2017. This implies that, in the course of 2017, these governments have taken small steps forward to combat human trafficking. For instance, the government of Ghana validated and started the implementation of the National Anti-Trafficking Action Plan and the government of Mali prosecuted an increased number of trafficking cases in 2018, including several Quranic school teachers for allegedly forcing children to beg. Importantly, the government of CAR made significant achievements in 2017/18, with the establishment of a Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Repression of Sexual Violence to Women and Children (UMIRR) in Bangui and the implementation a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR) and referred more than 3,000 former child soldiers to international organizations programs. On the other hand, Sierra Leone downgraded to the Tier 2 Watch List in 2018 for not having taken action against trafficking networks in the last seven years (US Department of State, 2018)..

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<sup>4</sup> **Trafficking in persons** is legally defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Trafficking in Persons (2000). Trafficking in persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

It is important to note that West and Central African migrants are also vulnerable to trafficking as they transit through Northern African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and particularly Libya, in which human trafficking is also a very prominent phenomenon (UNODC, 2016).

#### 2.4. Forced displacement: Refugees and IDPs

The countries in West and Central Africa are both countries of origin as well as host countries for forced migrants, including conflict-induced and environment-induced displacement. Several factors such as weak governance, chronic insecurity, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty, and a range of persistent development challenges are the main causes of forced migration and displacement in the region. **Refugees continue to arrive at camps across the region as a direct consequence of Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area but also as a result of the ongoing violence in the CAR and northern Mali.** Nigeria, Mali and CAR are the main countries of origin of refugees in the region, while Niger, Chad and Mauritania are main host countries (see annex A). Niger has the largest refugee population in the region; it currently hosts 177,565 refugees, 67% of which are Nigerians and 33% Malians (UNHCR, 2018c).

The nine-year conflict between Boko-Haram, national governments and militias in the Lake Chad Basin continues to threaten populations in the area. Taking into account internally displaced persons (IDPs), nearly 2.7 million people have been forcibly displaced in the Lake Chad basin since 2010 (ERCC, 2018). The North-Eastern regions of Nigeria remain the most affected by the conflict, most of the 1.9 million IDPs in the country have been forcibly displaced from the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. A series of flood in Eastern Nigeria in September 2018 added to the number of IDPs (MMC, 2018g).

Internal displacement in Chad, Cameroon and Niger remains on the rise as well. Children constitute half of the displaced populations (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2018). In parallel, **there was a high number of returnee crossings back to their home country in 2018, with 1.5 million refugees returning to Nigeria from their settlements in Niger and Cameroon** (ERCC, 2018). To the date, the conflict shows no sign of appeasement and INGOs estimate that 11 million people in Lake Chad Basin depend on aid. Triparty agreements have been elaborated between UNHCR Nigeria and Cameroon, Chad and Niger respectively on the safe return of Nigerians to their homes (Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 2017).

In parallel, the on-going armed conflict in Mali continues to generate international and internal displacement. **Displacement numbers remain high; close to 50,000 people have fled their homes in Northern and Central Mali in 2018 alone.** There are currently 58,000 Malian refugees in camps in the West of Niger and over 24,000 Malian refugees in Burkina Faso (UNHCR, 2018d). The number of Malians who fled through Algeria remains unknown.

Finally, the displacement crisis in the Central African Republic shows no signs of abating either. In 2017, the levels of displacement increased by 50 %, to the point that one in every five people in CAR is displaced. Currently, there are 545,500 refugees from CAR registered by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018b). Half of the displaced remain in CAR while another half has mostly fled to DR Congo and Chad (Concern, 2018).

The largest majority of West and Central African refugees reside in neighbouring countries. However, the United States, Italy and France regularly appear as top 3 host countries for certain West-African nationalities. For instance, over 70% of Gambian refugees reside in Italy, 43% of Burkinabe refugees reside in the US and 38% of Guinean refugees reside in France (UNHCR, 2017).



## 2.5. Labour migration across West and Central Africa<sup>5</sup>

While recent literature often focuses on West-African irregular migration towards North Africa and Europe, intra-regional movements in West Africa remain far more significant in volume than international migration (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016; MMCa, 2018). The very limited availability of immigration data throughout the region hinders estimation efforts. In 2006, an OECD report estimated that intra-regional migration constitutes 84% of West-African migration, with about **8.4 million intra-regional migrants, and that intra-regional flows are at least seven times greater than flows to Europe** (Sahel and West Africa Club & OECD, 2006).

Most intra-regional migration is driven by economic factors such as employment, education and urbanization (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Litchfield, 2018). In particular, labour migration is the dominant driver of migration flows in the ECOWAS area (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). There is increasing evidence that West-African migration is characterised by the same push-factors as in most emigration regions; family, work and study (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). Labour migration within the region includes temporary and seasonal migration, which is common in the agro-pastoral region of the Sahel (IOM & ICMPD, 2015).

However, the lack of comprehensive migration statistics in most West-African countries does not allow us to make concise inferences on the direction and volume of these movements. The Freedom of Movement and Mobility initiative for West-Africa (FMM) monitors and advocates for activities enhancing regular mobility across ECOWAS, among which is the support for harmonized migration data statistics in the region. A high-level meeting on capacity building for migration data was held in June 2018 with representatives from eight ECOWAS states. Additionally, FMM reports that Sierra Leone launched its National Labour Migration Policy (FMM, 2018a) and Ghana is currently preparing its own National Labour Migration Policy (FMM, 2018b).

The evidence available reveals that, in absolute terms, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana host the highest number of immigrant from the region, with above two million registered immigrants. In relative terms, the Gambia and Côte d'Ivoire have the largest share of immigrants relative to the size of their populations. Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, mainly attracts nationals of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali to work in agriculture, herding and fishing. Other countries like Niger or Sierra Leone attract migrant workers in the mining sector (IOM & ICMPD, 2015, p.29). The vast majority of migrants work in low skilled position in the informal sector, which prevents them from regularising their situation (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Once again, the informal nature of movement and work does not allow for the compilation and analysis of migration data.

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<sup>5</sup> This section refers mainly to ECOWAS member states: the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo

### 3. Emerging trends in West and Central Africa: The impact of EU policies

In recent years, the EU has intensified its cooperation efforts across West and Central Africa. Several EU member states have strengthened their military presence across the Sahel region, mainly through the *EUCAP Sahel missions in Niger and Mali*, as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2018). In parallel, the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa* (EUTF Africa) was launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015. This is the largest migration programme of the EU, with a pledged budget of 4.1 billion euros. Within the EUTF, the *EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration* has been destined 347 million euros to support the efforts of African partners on returning migrants along the Central and Western Mediterranean route (EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), 2018).

Many activities of the EUTF take place in the frame of the *Migration Partnership Framework* signed between the EU and 13 countries in West and Central Africa in 2016, of which Niger, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria are considered African priority countries. According to EU authorities, the range of measures in place under this framework produce their effects in terms of reducing migration flows, increasing returns and enhancing migration governance across West and Central Africa (European Commission, 2017). This section will present a nuanced analysis of emerging trends in the region and the impact of EU policy interventions.

**TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF EU POLICIES IMPLEMENTED IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA**

Policy	Start year	Description	Implementing partners
<a href="#">EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)</a>	2015	<p>The policy has 4 thematic pillars:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Greater Economic and employment opportunities. Project Example: <i>Building a future - Make it in The Gambia</i>: Improve economic development and future prospects for youth and potential and/or returning migrants.</li> <li>2. Strengthening resilience Project example: <i>Emergency programme for the stabilisation of G5 Sahel border areas</i>: A direct response to a request by the G5 Sahel heads of state. This project mains to improve the living conditions, resilience, and social cohesion of (vulnerable) populations in the G5 Sahel's most fragile regions.</li> <li>3. Improved migration management Project Example: <i>Erasmus+ in West Africa</i>: Promotion of sustainable development. Contribute to poverty reduction through increasing the pool of highly skilled individuals in West Africa.</li> <li>4. Improved governance and conflict prevention Project Example <i>Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region</i>: Main aim to harmonise and structure the management of police information to improve law enforcement capacities.</li> </ol>	<p>Implementation Partners for Building a Future - Make it in The Gambia: ENABEL, ITC, GIZ, GK Partners, IMVF,</p> <p>Implementation Partners for Emergency programme for the stabilisation of G5 Sahel border Areas: AFD, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency, GIZ</p> <p>Implementation Partners for Erasmus+ in West Africa: EU27 Member states.</p> <p>Implementation Partners for Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa Region: Interpol</p>
<a href="#">Migration Partnership Framework</a>	2016	<p>Framework which fully integrates migration into the foreign policy of the European Union. The priority countries in West Africa are Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and Senegal. The approach includes attention to short- and long-term measures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Short term measures include saving lives at sea, shutting down trafficking and smuggling networks; addressing why migrants and refugees leave their homes, and creating legal channels of migration for those in need.</li> <li>o Long term means include addressing the underlying factors that contribute to irregular migration and forced displacement. This is through supporting the political, social, and economic development of</li> </ul>	

		partner countries. Also included is improving available opportunities and sustainable development for individuals in their countries of origin.	
<a href="#">Common agenda on migration and mobility (CAMM)</a>	2015	The Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) furthers existing partnerships to create a framework that harmonises actions related to migration and mobility between the EU and national governments. The intention is to better organise legal migration and mobility whilst at the same time combating irregular migration and human trafficking. In West Africa a CAMM has been signed with Nigeria.	European External Action Service, ICMPD, Nigerian authorities
<a href="#">EUCAP Sahel Niger</a>  <a href="#">Mali</a>	2012  2014	The European External Action service (EEAS) runs two EU Capacity Building (EUCAP) projects in the Sahel regions of Niger and Mali. These projects intend to strengthen the capacity of the internal security forces of Niger and Mali. In 2015 a new objective was added to the EUCAP Sahel mission. Alongside combating terrorism and organised crime the mandate was broadened to include fighting irregular migration and the associated criminal activities. The current objectives are : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help the security forces achieve interoperability and develop operating strategies.</li> <li>• Strengthen technical expertise in combating terrorism and organised crime.</li> <li>• Supporting capacity to improve irregular migration flows and to combat irregular migration and associated criminal activities more effectively.</li> <li>• Support the development of regional and international coordination in fighting terrorism and organised crime.</li> </ul>	European External Action Service EU Delegation Niger
<a href="#">EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration</a>	2016	Funded by the EUTF the EU-IOM Joint Initiative is a programme designed to save lives through protecting and assisting migrants along key routes in Africa. The main objectives are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve protection, provide direct assistance, and assist voluntary return of migrants on migration routes.</li> <li>• Support the reintegration process of returning migrants in a holistic manner.</li> <li>• Collect better data on migration data and communication.</li> <li>• Capacity building of state- and non-state actors in migration governance and protection.</li> <li>• Stabilise communities through revitalising local economies, improving basic infrastructure, strengthening social cohesion.</li> </ul> Project focus in Sahel and Lake Chad region <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Backing ECOWAS efforts for coordination on migration and the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA)</li> <li>• Establishing a resource centre on migration and the creation of a West African expert group to promote the intra-regional expertise exchange.</li> </ul>	IOM
<a href="#">Plan of Action for Rapid Economic Impact (PAIERA)</a>	2016	The objective of this policy is to identify measures to accompany those of law enforcement and the judiciary to combat irregular migration in Nigeria. Specifically the aims are to initiate a dialogue with those involved in irregular migration and raising awareness of state policy and risks related to irregular migration. The second aim is to reduce the comparative financial benefit of (irregular) migration by improving socio-professional integration opportunities and providing employment.	Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix - HACP
<a href="#">FMM West Africa</a>	2013	FFM West Africa is an EU funded project for the support of free movement of persons and migration in West Africa. The intention is to harness the development potential freedom of movement of people and migration in the region. The FMM stirs and monitors the implementation of the ECOWAS Freedom of Movement Protocol.	IOM, ICMPD, ILO
<a href="#">Regional Indicative Programme (European Development Fund)</a>	2014	Funded by the 11th European Development Fund the Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa. The aim is to support growth and regional economic integration in the region to reduce poverty. Main priorities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace, security and regional stability</li> <li>• Regional economic integration and support for trade and private sector</li> <li>• Resilience, food and nutritional security and natural resources</li> </ul>	West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS)

### 3.1. EU policy interventions in Niger; implications for migration flows and routes

Niger has always been an important country of transit for migration routes from West and Central Africa towards North Africa and Europe. In 2018, IOM reported a record number of migrants present in the country (IOM, 2018d). **In fact, since 2017, the number of people returning to Niger is higher than the number of people departing from the country.** This is due to several reasons, such as stricter migration controls implemented in Niger, the important number of returns from Libya due to violence and abuses as well as the expulsions of West-African migrants from Algeria (Aldekoa, 2018).

Niger is a key partner country for the EU in the Sahel region, to the point that the country is now the biggest per capita recipient of EU Aid (Howden, 2018). Given the lack of unified government in Libya and the difficulties of policy interventions, policy makers have turned to Niger. **Niger is generally perceived as a strategic and reliable ally in a fragile region;** in December 2018, the EU announced it mobilized an extra 108 million euros for social policies, security and governance in Niger (European Commission, 2018c). Many analysts point out to the fact that, in practice, Niger has become the external border of the European Union as initiatives to halt irregular migration towards the EU are mostly concentrated in Niger (ECFR, 2018; Lebovich, 2018; Molenaar, 2018a, 2018b).

In May 2015, after several discussions with EU stakeholders, **Niger passed the Law 2015/36 that made it effectively illegal for foreign nationals to travel north of Agadez** (Brachet, 2018; ECFR, 2018; Howden, 2018). Since then, EU and Nigerien authorities have closely coordinated efforts of border control and the arrest of smuggling networks in the frame of the EU Partnership Framework on Migration, signed in 2016 (European Commission, 2017). However, the 2015 Law against clandestine migration is a major challenge for the Nigerien authorities, torn between the “freedom of mobility” efforts of ECOWAS and the migration policy demands of the EU (Tubiana et al., 2018). Indeed, most migrants transiting through Niger originate from the ECOWAS area, which guarantees its 350,000 million citizens freedom of movement without a visa.

In parallel, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) has set up EU Capacity Building (EUCAP) Sahel missions in Niger since 2012, with a total budget of 69,5 million euros from 2012 to 2017 (European Court of Auditors, 2018). The EUCAP Sahel Niger was initially focused on strengthening the capacity of Niger’s internal security forces, as well as improving the country’s readiness to fight terrorism and organised crime. **Soon after the Valletta summit of 2015, the EU re-focused its mission on the fight against clandestine migration. In 2016, EUCAP set up a permanent contingent in Agadez with the exclusive mandate to prevent irregular migration** (Lebovich, 2018). Additionally, European countries’ activism in Niger translates into the deployment of French and US contingents, along with activities at a German base in Niamey and Italian and French military bases in Madama, the last outpost for migrants travelling north before they reach Libya (European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 2018; Molenaar & van Damme, 2017). In September 2018, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger for two more years and allocated a budget of 63,4 million euros for that period (MMC, 2018h). It is important to nuance that, parallel to its security-related interventions, the EU and its Member States have implemented several projects focused on the creation of employment and greater economic opportunities (more than 82 million euros invested in that policy sector).

**Several reports indicate that these EU policy interventions have had a noticeable impact on migration in, through and from Niger** (Aldekoa, 2018; Brachet, 2018; Howden & Zandanini, 2018; Lebovich, 2018). These interventions have resulted, first, in the diversification and further “clandestinization” of migration flows. Secondly, these interventions could be having unforeseen consequences on Nigerien’s livelihoods.

Firstly, migrants are still transiting through Niger but are using more diverse and riskier routes. Indeed, critics say that EU-supported policies are intensifying, rather than mitigating the dangers on the routes towards North Africa (Howden, 2018; Brachet, 2018). For some, the so-called crackdown on irregular migration seems to have re-directed migration underground rather than stopped it (Reidy, 2018). The estimated outgoing flows in 2018 are much higher than in 2017; between January and September of this year, 129,937 people left the country (IOM, 2018d). While some of these registered exits account for assisted voluntary returns, the majority represents flows to Algeria, Libya or Chad. However, research shows that bus companies transporting people from Niamey to Agadez have experienced a drop in passengers. This seems to indicate that remaining routes have gone “underground”. According to the most recent accounts, migrants who undertake the journey face prices five times higher than in 2016 (Molenaar, 2018a).

According to smugglers interviewed, the routes have changed and the distances doubled since the interventions in 2016, thus becoming more dangerous (Howden, 2018). Drivers circumvent established route and checkpoints and increasingly travel by night. Additionally, the fear of arrests results in drivers abandoning their passengers when they suspect a military patrol is close by. Some argue that the number of death and rescues by IOM has increased since the implementation of the anti-smuggling laws in combination with other restrictive migration policies in North-African states (Molenaar & van Damme, 2017; Reidy, 2018; Villa, 2018). The IOM chief of mission in Niger announced that the mission has assisted 3,000 migrants abandoned at the Algeria-Niger border from February to May 2018, the highest number of rescued migrants since the beginning of the mission (Loprete, 2018).

Since it became more difficult to access Libya from Niger, more migrants are moving from Niger to Algeria or from Niger to Chad, to then access Morocco or Libya, respectively. For instance, a new route from Tahoua (South-East Niger) to Tamanrasset (Algeria) has emerged in 2017 and 2018 (Howden, 2018). Despite the crackdown, Agadez remains an important transit hub, migrants still use the route from Agadez to Arlit and then to Algeria. There is also a new emerging route from Agadez to Assamaka, at the border with Algeria, which bypasses Arlit (ECFR, 2018). Other West-African migrants have transited through Niger into Chad, then cross into Libya (Tubiana et al., 2018). Both West and East-African migrants increasingly use old and new routes from Sudan and Chad into Libya (ibid.). The routes from Agadez to the Libyan border has changed, the convoys aim to avoid the town of Seguedine, where migration checks have been implemented (ECFR, 2018).

Secondly, EU policy interventions have had an impact on Nigerien socio-economic landscape. Several authors have emphasized the fact that policy interventions to halt irregular migration through Niger could be counter-productive when not taking into account the historical and cultural importance of trans-Saharan migration. In Niger, transportation of persons as an economic activity firmly embedded in the political and economic context (ECFR, 2018; Brachet, 2018; Molenaar, 2018). The criminalization of smuggling and the efforts on border control have affected employment in Agadez, as the economy mainly revolved around hosting and transport of migrants. Estimates show that around 7,000 people in this transit hub have lost their activity within the job value-chain of smuggling, drivers or mechanics and are now awaiting EU funds for reconversion (Aldekoa, 2018; Reidy, 2018).

In order to address the loss of jobs in the Agadez as well as tackle the root causes of irregular migration; there myriad of development aid projects being implemented by the EU and other partners, notably in the framework of the EUTF, as shown in [Table 1](#) above. Indeed, in parallel to the crackdown on the irregular migration business that started in 2015, EU authorities have set up the *Plan of Action for Rapid Economic Impact (PAIERA)* in December 2016. The plan dedicates 8 million euros to support the creation of jobs, infrastructure and care services in the region (European Commission, 2016). Reportedly, only a small share of the 7,000 people who stopped the illegal activity are receiving support (Howden, 2018). Those who continue smuggling activities have learned to adapt,

by changing their routes, paying higher bribes and collaborating with more dangerous groups, such as weapon and drug trafficking networks (Reidy, 2018; Brachet, 2018).

### 3.2. Shifts in the Mediterranean routes

As seen in [section 2.2](#), there have been important changes in the volume of cross-Mediterranean migration. In October 2018, the number of arriving migrants in Greece, Italy and Spain is back to pre-2015 levels (IOM, 2018c; Kingsley, 2018a). IOM reports that **104,029 migrants and refugees have arrived in Europe by sea from January to November 2018, of which 50,911 arrived in Spain, the leading country of arrival this year** (IOM, 2018c). [Figure 3](#), and [Figure 4](#), below illustrate the decline in the number of arrivals to Italy, parallel to the increase of arrivals by land and sea to Spain.

- Changes on the Central Mediterranean Routes

On the Central Mediterranean route, unauthorized crossings from Libya to Italy have experienced an **80% decrease since 2016**. From January to August 2018, there were 20,077 arrivals in Italy as compared to 114,694 for the same period of 2016 (IOMc, 2018). This substantial decline is the result of a series of new policies implemented by EU and Italy. On 2 February 2017, Italy's Prime Minister signed a memorandum of understanding with Libya's National Reconciliation Government to reduce the number of departures from Libya to Italy. Right after the memorandum, during the EU summit in Malta in February 2018, EU-policy makers drafted the Malta Declaration. The declaration focuses on "reducing significantly migration flows, break the business model of smugglers and save lives in the Mediterranean" (IOMb, 2018). In parallel, Italian and EU forces (Frontex), conducted several capacity building missions addressed at Libyan coast guards.

This security-driven approach did have an immediate impact on the situation in the Central Mediterranean route, with a significant decrease in the number of arrivals in the second and third quarter of 2017. Arrivals from Libya to Italy continued to decrease in 2018; with 20,077 arrivals from January to August 2018 compared to 99,127 for the same period in 2017. According to experts, this short-term policy does not provide a stable solution. As arrivals to Italy were simply blocked, migrants remained caught in Libya and "the profiteers of detention centres simply replaced those of human trafficking" (ECFR, 2018). **There remain close to 700,000 migrants stalled in Libya, among which close to 50,000 asylum seekers registered with UNHCR**. Only 300 asylum seekers have been relocated to the EU since November 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). To compensate, the Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) programs have been scaled up; IOM announced it relocated more than 23,000 migrants through VHR since January 2017 (IOM, 2018d). In many cases, migrants have been temporarily transferred to Niger (Aldekoa, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). Others have been re-settled to Europe through the Emergency Transit Mechanism, as detailed in [section 3.3](#).

In parallel to the decline of arrival from Libya to Italy, the number of crossings from Tunisia to Italy has increased steeply since September 2017 (ECFR, 2018). According to UNHCR data, Tunisia represents 23% of arrivals, which makes it the first country of origin for arrivals to Italy in 2018 (IOM, 2018c). It is important to note that the spike in arrivals from Tunisia is not a consequence of the [Italy-Libya deal](#) of 2017 (Palm, 2017). In fact, the large majority of migrants arriving from Tunisia are Tunisians, mainly proceeding from the interior of the country (Torelli, 2017). Since January 2018, 4,827 Tunisians arrived to Italy by sea, via the ports of Sicily and Calabria (UNHCRd, 2018). It is also relevant to note that this number represents a small fraction of the total number arrivals to Italy.




- Changes on the Western Mediterranean routes

Contrary to the developments in Italy, Spain has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of arrivals through the Western-Mediterranean route. **Between January and end of November 2018, authorities in Spain registered 56,863 migrants (including refugees and asylum-seekers) arrivals by sea and land, a 100 per cent increase the same period of 2017.** In October 2018 alone, more than 11,000 migrants arrived to Spain, more than three times the numbers of October 2017 (IOM, 2018c). Most migrants and asylum seekers arrived by sea and 14 per cent arrived via the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Northern Morocco. More than 23,000 people crossed over to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. According to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, the largest share of new arrivals were Moroccan nationals, followed by nationals of Mali, Guinea Conakry and Côte d'Ivoire (IOM, 2018c).

Smuggling activities are concentrated on the Northern coast of Morocco, where routes from Morocco to Spain have substantially diversified in recent years. While the route from Tangier to Tarifa and Malaga remains one of the main routes, a new “Atlantic” route from Asilah to Barbate and Cadiz has become more frequented since 2017. This route to Cadiz has been taken by nearly 7,000 migrants in 2017, however, it is also the most dangerous route. The routes from Nador to Motril and Almeria (3,386 and 5,680 crossings respectively) have been primarily used by Moroccan and Algerian nationals in 2017 (Sanmartin, 2018). **Most migrants arrived to Spain in 2018 are nationals of West African countries; from Guinea Conakry, Mali and Ivory Coast mainly, while Morocco remains the first country of origin (IOM, 2018c).**

FIGURE 4: INCOMING FLOWS TO SPAIN AND ITALY IN 2017 AND 2018



- Is there a shift from Central Mediterranean to Western Mediterranean?

The decrease of arrivals to Italy parallel to the increase of arrivals to Spain led many to report a “shift” of migration flows for West and Central African migrants (Ehler, 2018). **While counter measures can have an impact on migration flows, experts point out to the fact there has not exactly been a blanket shift of flows from the Central Mediterranean route towards the Western route (Brenner, Forin, & Frouws, 2018).**


The first nationalities of arrival in Italy in 2017 were Nigerians and Eritreans. However, in 2018, there has not been an increase in the arrival of these two nationalities to Spain; on the contrary, the arrival

of Nigerian nationals has decreased as compared to previous years. The same is true for nationals of Sudan, Somalia and Bangladesh who were also among the top arrival nationalities to Italy (Brenner et al., 2018).

However, recent reports of the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism (4Mi) do find that while most nationals of Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Gambia and Senegal use to travel through the Central Mediterranean route, since 2018, 76 per cent of West-African migrants report Spain as their final destination. It is important to note that, in absolute terms, the overall number of West African migrants has decreased by nearly 80% since 2016 (MMC, 2018). [Figure 5](#) below illustrates the arrival of West and Central African nationals to Italy and Spain throughout 2018.

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FIGURE 5: INCOMING FLOWS TO ITALY AND SPAIN FROM WEST AFRICA IN 2018



The “shift” from the Central to the Western Mediterranean isn’t a direct transfer of migrants from one route to another but rather the result of two parallel situations; on the one hand, the closure of the route from Libya to Italy and on the other hand, a changing socio-political context in Morocco.

First, as the majority of new arrivals to Spain are constituted by young Moroccan men, this new influx corresponds to an upsurge in the Harraga movement in response to the deterioration of living conditions in Northern Morocco and social unrest in the Rif region (Harris, 2018; Mekouar, 2018).

Second, analysts have noted that the influx to Spain could be the result of a bargaining strategy from Morocco to leverage more EU funds by relaxing migration control, at a time in which the country is in dire need of budget for its development reforms (Brenner et al., 2018; Teevan, 2018). The latter can be a controversial political statement and might not entirely reflect the reality given that flows have kept increasing even after Morocco received part of the 55 million euros’ package for migration management in August 2018 (Teevan, 2018). For its part, the Moroccan government declared that the country is making considerable efforts to halt migration flows to Europe, denying all claims of using migrants as a political leverage (Koundouno, 2018).



### 3.3. Increasing flows of returns and resettlement

**A trend worth noting in West and Central Africa in 2017 and 2018 is the steep increase in the number of returns, voluntary or involuntary, of West-Africans to their transit or origin countries.** In 2017, IOM continued experiencing an important increase in the number of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) beneficiaries returning to West and Central Africa, with a 47 per cent increase as compared to 2016 (IOM, 2018a). Most persons returned from protracted transit in Niger (67 per cent), from North-African countries (21 per cent) and from the EU (10 per cent). Concerning the latter, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were the top 3 countries for departing returnees. In total, IOM assisted the return of more than 11,000 West-African nationals to their origin countries. This trend continued and even increased in 2018; only in Niger, IOM assisted 10,000 returnees up to July 2018 (IOM, 2018e).

Partly, the increase in return flows could be due to the resuming of IOM program on Voluntary Humanitarian Return Programme (VHR) in Libya (IOM, 2018f). After two years of stand-by, the Sabha section of the VHR program resumed in August 2018. This year alone, IOM has provided Voluntary Humanitarian Return to 14,662 migrants stranded in this Southern region, of which over 3,500 were from Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria is the first country of return in West Africa, followed by Mali and Niger. The AVRR activities of IOM are taking place in the frame of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration described earlier. In total, under this Joint Initiative activities starting from May 2017, 23,500 migrants have received immediate post-arrival and reception assistance after voluntary return, mainly from Libya and Niger.

Additionally, the EU has been working with its Member States and with UNHCR to ensure that the most vulnerable refugees evacuated from Libya to Niger are swiftly resettled to the EU through the **Emergency Transit Mechanism**. The EU supports this effort with €20 million (European Commission, 2018). Evacuations from Libya to Niger were suspended between March and May 2018 as the Nigerien government considered that the resettlement program was not keeping up with the pace of arrivals to Niger. According to a UNHCR report of December 2018, a total of 2,476 persons were evacuated from Libya to Niger as well as to Emergency Transit Centres in Italy (312) and Romania (95) (UNHCR, 2018f). **Since the beginning of the program in September 2017, a total of 1271 individuals have departed on resettlement from Libya and Niger to Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.** A total of 595 individuals have been accepted for resettlement and are pending departure from Niger to Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (UNHCR, 2018f).

**Finally, it is relevant to note that mass forced returns from Algeria constitute an increasingly large part of return flows from North Africa.** From January to July 2018, over 8,000 West Africans were rescued in 84 search and rescue missions around the Algeria-Niger border. Most of them were rescued around the Nigerien towns of Arlit and Assamaka, bordering Algeria (MMC, 2018g). This trend seem to have continued over the summer 2018, to the point that the UN called upon Algerian authorities to halt arbitrary deportations. **The UN Special Rapporteur reported there were more than 17,000 West-African migrants forcibly expelled from Algeria in 2018** (UN, 2018a). According to a recent statement from the Algerian interior minister, more than 27,000 repatriation have taken place since 2015 (ECRE, 2018). Testimonies reveal that groups of migrants are trucked past Algeria southern-most town and dropped in the desert with no water or food supplies. West-African irregulars in Algeria have been arbitrarily and forcibly expelled at both the borders with Niger and Mali. Expulsions to Mali are said to be significant but there are currently no figures available on this situation (ECRE, 2018).

### 4. Regional Overview

Migration movements in East and the Horn of Africa are largely characterized by displacement. Whether climate- or conflict-induced, the region hosts one of the largest groups of displaced persons on the globe. Of UNCHR's 71.44 million persons of concern by the end of 2017, nearly 12 million of them were located across the eight countries that will be reviewed in this section of the report: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda (UNHCR, 2017). By the end of 2017, there were more refugees from each, with the exception of Somalia, than there were in 2016 (see [Tables A.7 & A.8](#)). On the whole though, this displacement has largely been contained to the region; arrivals of East Africans in Italy have been declining since 2016. Even in 2018, monthly arrivals are lower than previous years (IOM, 2018g), which plummeted after 2015 and even further in 2017 in parallel with a decline in departures from Libya (ECFR, 2018). [Tables A.3 & A.4](#) show that each country, with the exception of Kenya, hosted more refugees in 2017 than in 2016.

The past year has seen large climate-induced displacements, especially in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda, further compounding already challenging humanitarian situations in these countries. Conflict continues to be a major driver of displacement, especially in Ethiopia and South Sudan. Even with all the displacement in the region, returns and repatriations, sometimes forced, sometimes voluntary, are ongoing, notably from Kenya, Libya and Saudi Arabia. These are a result of regional policies, as well as European and intergovernmental organisation (IGO) intervention and facilitation.

Earlier in the year, the resignation of Ethiopia's Prime Minister amidst demonstrations and ethnic clashes led the government to declare a 6-month state of emergency, before appointing Abiy Ahmed of the Oromia ethnic group as Ethiopia's new Prime Minister (the first member from this group to hold the position). Perhaps one of the most significant political developments in the region this past year was the Ethiopian Government's announcement in June to abide by the Algiers Agreement and 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopian Boundary Commission decision (Mwangi, 2018). The potential of this development has yet to be fully realized in terms of regional stability and Eritrean asylum seekers and refugees abroad. Even still, Eritreans remain one of the top groups crossing the Mediterranean into Italy and Spain (see [Section 4.1](#)).

Since our last review, the human trafficking and smuggling situations in the region have only marginally improved; by measure of the United States Department of State's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report rankings, Djibouti has dropped from tier 3 to tier 2 in just two years, and Sudan is now tier 2 watch list as of the 2018 report (see [Table C.2](#)). Otherwise, all eight countries remain at tier 2 or higher. That being said, irregular Mediterranean crossings are down overall compared to this time last year (IOM, 2018c).


Finally, the European Union, partner countries and IGOs are implementing several projects under the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), in an effort to address the root causes of irregular migration through durable solutions. These development programs, along with a deportation deal with Sudan, are all part of a coordinated European reaction to the so-called "migration crisis," aiming to stem the flow of migrants from Middle Eastern and African countries. According to recent analyses, these policies are in effect externalizing Europe's border to African countries south of the Mediterranean. Similar to the case of Niger, Sudan has become an EU outpost for stemming smuggling and trafficking.

## 5. Mixed Migration in East and the Horn of Africa

### 5.1. Smuggling

Like West and Central Africa, smuggling of migrants is an issue throughout the East and Horn of Africa region. As later illustrated in [Figure 10](#), there are three main smuggling routes leading out of the region: the Northern Route ([Figure 6](#)), the Eastern Route (see [Figure 7](#)), and the Southern Route. While freedom of movement protocols exist in principle for member states of the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), there is generally poor implementation of these (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Thus, migration movements that begin as regular ones may become irregular over the course of the journey.


FIGURE 6: ROUTES WITHIN EAST AFRICA FEEDING INTO THE NORTHERN ROUTE



Note: map adapted from (Altai Consulting & IMPACT Initiatives, 2017). This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

Sudan is a key transit country for smuggling in the region, with Khartoum being not just a hub for smuggling activities, but also a line of defence against them for the EU and African Union (AU). Djibouti

FIGURE 7: KEY DEPARTURE POINTS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA TO YEMEN



connecting Eritrea to Ethiopia/Sudan and then Egypt/Libya reportedly cost around 4,000 USD (Reitano, Tinti, Shaw, & Bird, 2017). Somalis, on the other hand, are prominent in smuggling to Yemen, but to a lesser extent to Europe and Southern Africa (UNODC, 2018). Ethiopians are also smuggled to Europe and are prominent in flows to Southern Africa.

The major borders crossed in the region are Ethiopia to Sudan and Kenya; Somalia to Yemen and Kenya (and Mozambique by sea); Kenya to Tanzania; Sudan to Libya and Egypt; and Djibouti to Yemen. There are also air routes from Kenya and Somalia (UNODC, 2018, p. 24). The coasts of Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya are all areas affected by sea smuggling as well. Hubs for the route to Southern Africa are located on the Ethiopia-Kenya border. 60% of a city's income can be from migrant smuggling and related services (*ibid.*, p. 31).

While the major land routes are from Horn of Africa to Southern Africa and North Africa, the major air route is only to Southern Africa, and the major sea routes are to Southern Africa and the Arab Peninsula. However, "the vast majority of migrants smuggled from the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa ... use land routes" (UNODC, 2018, p. 6). Overall though, the UNODC reports that smuggling to Southern Africa from the Horn of Africa has declined in the past few years, as has smuggling to Yemen since 2017 along with smuggling towards North Africa since 2015 (*ibid.*, p. 71). While asylum applications in South Africa have dropped since 2010, it is difficult to estimate how many migrants from the Horn of Africa are still arriving since not all of them apply for asylum, nor do they all use smuggling services (*ibid.*, p. 71). Most migrants on the route to Southern Africa used to come via land through Kenya and Tanzania, but the air and sea routes from the Horn of Africa to Mozambique may be increasing.


UNODC reports that there is an emerging route between the Horn of Africa and Europe via Yemen. After crossing the Arabian sea, departing from Bosaso (see Figure 7), to the southern coast of Yemen, migrants travel up to the western coast and cross the Red Sea into Sudan and then travel overland to Libya and into the Central Mediterranean route (see Figure 10). Estimates put the magnitude of this route's usage at around a few hundred per month (UNODC, 2018).

Smugglers provide a variety of services to migrants, which vary to a degree depending on the route. For the migrants from the Horn of Africa going to North Africa/Europe, interviews with 1,164 migrants revealed that the most frequently used smuggler services were safe transit across the border (85.3%), transportation to a holding place (70.7%), accommodation (53.9%), and collecting clients from a meeting point (54%) (4mi, 2018b). As seen in Figure 7, Migrants reported far fewer services provided

is the key transit country on the Eastern route (see Figure 7). Eritrea remains a primary country of origin for migrants on the northern route and the only country in this part of the report that is still a major country of origin for migrants on their way to Europe as of a 2017 assessment of routes, although arrivals through the Mediterranean sharply fell after 2015, and even further in 2017 (ECFR, 2018). As seen in Table 2 below, land routes

by smugglers for the route to Yemen/KSA than for the route to North Africa/Europe or the route to South Africa.

FIGURE 8: SERVICES PROVIDED SMUGGLERS ON SELECTED ROUTES



Note: data from (4mi, 2018b)

Smuggling, while it may initially be voluntary, puts migrants in vulnerable and risky positions along their journeys, most of all on the route to North Africa/Europe. 4mi documented 315 incidents of sexual violence on the route from the Horn of Africa to North Africa/Europe based on 596 interviews, and 7 incidents on route to Yemen/KSA based on 90 interviews, all conducted between May 2017 and September 2017 (4mi, 2018a). Also on the route to North Africa/Europe, 4mi documented 470 fatal incidents based on 1,664 interviews, 8 fatal incidents on route to Yemen/KSA based on 312 interviews, and 28 on the route to South Africa based on 145 interviews. **Smugglers themselves were the reported perpetrators of 75.9% of the acts to North Africa/Europe, and 58.9% on to South Africa. Single unknown individuals were the top perpetrators (40.9%) of incidents on route to Yemen/KSA, while smugglers (50.9%) and groups of thugs/criminals (45.7) were also top perpetrators on the route to South Africa.** During the same period, 4mi also interviewed 219 smugglers in Egypt, Kenya, Somaliland and South Africa (MMC, 2018i). Overall, 40% of the smugglers had witnessed a sum of 2,907 deaths, the leading causes of which included vehicle accidents, sickness and lack of access to medicine, and harsh weather/lack of adequate shelter (*ibid.*). 4mi does not provide a disaggregation of these deaths by location/route.

“What stands out is the bitter realization that smugglers are developing ever-more sophisticated organizational capacities, and using more dangerous routes to circumvent border controls, while misinforming migrants about the conditions” (UNODC, 2018). Being misled by a smuggler about something was also something migrants recounted when interviewed by 4mi; across 7 migration routes, 28.1% of migrants said they were misled about costs, 27% about the travel conditions; 25.5% about the routes; 17.7% about the route’s safety; and 14% about the conditions in the destination country (4mi, 2018b).

In the first seven months of 2018, Eritrea (2,900) and Sudan (1,600) were the second and third most common country of origin amongst arrivals in Italy (UNHCR, 2018a, p. 6). In the same period of time, Eritreans, Sudanese, and Ethiopians were among the 3,700 people that were disembarked by the Libyan Coast Guard and transferred to detention in Libya. A high share of interviewed arrivals from Eritrea and Sudan in Italy in 2017 reported experiencing some form of abuse on the route between Libya and Europe (*ibid.*, 23). Of the arrivals in Italy so far this year, unaccompanied and separated children are a significant sub-group: 553 from Eritrea, 252 from Sudan, and 137 from Somalia (UNHCR, 2018e).

**TABLE 2: SMUGGLING FEES FOR ROUTES CONCERNING THE HORN OF AFRICA REPORTED IN RECENT STUDIES**

Smuggling passage or route	Type of smuggling	Reported costs	Sources:
Eritrea → Sudan/Ethiopia → Libya/Egypt	Land route	Around US\$4,000	The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, <i>Integrated responses to human smuggling from the Horn of Africa to Europe</i> , May 2017: 20.
Somalia (Somaliland) → Sudan → Libya/Egypt	Land route	From around US\$2,000 to 3,500	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Altai Consulting, <i>Mixed migration: Libya at the cross-roads</i> , November 2013.  The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, <i>Integrated responses to human smuggling from the Horn of Africa to Europe</i> , May 2017: 20.
Horn of Africa → Southern Africa	Mainly land route (possible sea route deviations)	Around US\$3,000-3,500	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, <i>Smuggled south. An updated overview of mixed migration from the Horn of Africa to southern Africa with specific focus on protection risks, human smuggling and trafficking</i> , RMMS briefing paper 3, March 2017: 16  Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, <i>Migrant smuggling in the Horn of Africa &amp; Yemen: the political economy and protection risks</i> , June 2013: 30
Ethiopia → Bossaso (Somalia) → Saudi Arabia	Land-sea-land route	Around US\$900	Research and evidence Facility, <i>Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen</i> , EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41
Ethiopia → Obock (Djibouti) → Saudi Arabia	Land-sea-land route	Around US\$850	Research and evidence Facility, <i>Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen</i> , EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.
Bossaso (Somalia) → Yemen	Sea route	Around US\$120-150	Research and evidence Facility, <i>Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen</i> , EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.
Obock (Djibouti) → Yemen	Sea route	Around US\$60- 200	Research and evidence Facility, <i>Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen: A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen</i> , EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window), 25 July 2017: 41.

Note: table adapted from (UNODC, 2018, p. 46)



## 5.2. Trafficking

As seen in [Table C.2](#), trafficking of persons remains a significant issue in the region as well. Little progress has been made with regards to the region's governments' efforts to eliminate trafficking, but Sudan and Djibouti have improved their respective TIP rankings, both of which are key transit hubs for irregular migration. That being said, most of the countries in the region have been and continue to be designated source, transit and destination countries for trafficking, so there are significant improvements countries in the region can make. For example, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda are amongst those not State Parties to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (US Department of State, 2018).

The crossing from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and beyond saw 117,000 passages of primarily economic migrants in 2017, although their transit through Djibouti was irregular. While these movements are voluntary, some of these same migrants suffer forced labour and sex trafficking in their destination countries (*ibid.*, 168), a phenomenon that encapsulates the very mixed nature of migration in/from the region. In each discussed country in this report, the US Department of State reports the high vulnerability to trafficking, along with documented incidences of sex trafficking and forced labour, of irregular migrants both in transit and at their destination countries. In Djibouti City, officials reported an increasing number of vulnerable minors. Migrant women and street children are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking in Djibouti City, on the Ethiopia-Djibouti trucking corridor, and in Obock (*ibid.*, 168). In Somalia, UNOCHA reports that children are fleeing their homes out of fear of being recruited by extremist groups like Al Shabaab, who use have used intimidation to coerce families into 'volunteering' their children for recruitment (UNOCHA, 2018b).

## 5.3. Forced Displacement: Refugee Situations

The ongoing conflict in Yemen has displaced people across the Gulf of Aden into Djibouti. **Djibouti** received 37,428 arrivals from Yemen in 2017 (RMMS, 2017), while at least 38,000 people transited the country (mostly Ethiopians) on their way through the Eastern Route (MMC, 2018d). Despite being the smallest country amongst those included this section of the report, Djibouti is an important transit country for those on their way to or through Yemen as well (MMC, 2018b).

In May, Djibouti received 132 Ethiopian migrants evacuated from Yemen, bringing the total number of evacuees to 233 (MMC, 2018). Migrants were evacuated by IOM from the Hodeida region in Yemen and received humanitarian assistance, medical support and transportation to Ethiopia. 518 refugees from Yemen had arrived in Djibouti by July, bringing the total to 4,290 (UNHCR, 2018). The top countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers in Djibouti are Somalia (12,166) and Ethiopia (10,078), which account for the majority of the total figure, 27,431 (*ibid.*).

In neighboring **Ethiopia**, there were 905,831 refugees and asylum seekers in the country (UNHCR, 2018b). 59% are below the age of 18, and there were 36,135 new arrivals this year as of August (*ibid.*). South Sudan is the top country of origin, accounting for 422,240 of the population of concern in Ethiopia, followed by Somalia (257,283), Eritrea (173,879), Sudan (44,620), and Yemen (1,891).

With the signing of the peace agreement, Eritreans are free to cross the border with Ethiopia without a permit or passport or the need to confirm if or when they intend to return (Jeffrey, 2018). Shortly after border crossing points were reopened on September 11, 2018, UNHCR reported a fourfold increase in the average daily arrival rate, with the expectation that the influx is likely to continue and increase (European Commission, 2018b). Meanwhile Existing Eritrean refugees in the Shire zone worry about their refugee status but have been reassured by UNHCR and the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs. Beyond that, Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, most of whom are men,

expressed fear that they could be targeted by Eritrean governmental operatives who would be enabled by an open border (Poole & Riggan, 2018). After all, the peace agreement does not compel the Eritrean government from changing the abusive practices that drive people out of the country in search of asylum. Therefore, it is unknown whether the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia will bring an end to the flow of Eritrean refugees (D'Orsi, 2018). Additionally, the UN Security Council plans to lift an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Eritrea (Nichols, 2018). Progress on normalizing relations with Djibouti will be reported back on by February 15, 2019, with semi-annual reports following.

As of the end of July, there were 471,330 refugees and asylum seekers in **Kenya**, slightly down from 488,415 at the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2018a). The major countries of origin are Somalia (256,609), most of whom are in Dadaab, and South Sudan (114,593), most of whom are in Kakuma. The stock of Somalis has been decreasing since 2014, while the stock of South Sudanese has been increasing since 2014, but both have remained the top origin countries over the same period. About 56% of the refugees and asylum seekers are under the age of 18, and 49% of the total are female. Registrations peaked so far at 5,020 in April and fell to 754 in July.

Given the insecurity in **Somalia**, its stock of refugees and asylum seekers is relatively smaller than most of the other countries in the region, and is mainly comprised of Yemenis (MMC, 2018a). Totalling 30,959 by June, the figure has grown from 18,201 in 2015, and is up from 29,272 in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018a). There have been 2,158 new registrations this year as of June. The majority of registered refugees in the country are from Yemen (11,437), while those from Ethiopia (15,268) make up the majority of asylum seekers (UNHCR Somalia, 2018). 45% of the population of concern are female, and 45.2% are under the age of 18. Despite a growing stock, yearly flows have been declining since 2015.

Of the 298,037 refugees hosted in **South Sudan**, 93% originated from Sudan, as of July (UNHCR, 2018b). New arrivals in the previous 12 months peaked in March 2018 at 4,411 but declined to just 551 in July. The Upper Nile hosts 48% of the refugees, and Unity hosts another 43%, and 99% of the total refugee population reside in camps. A majority of the refugees are female (53%), and 61% are below the age of 18. The Eritrean/Ethiopian peace agreement is not the only one being tested at the moment; another was signed between all parties of the South Sudanese conflict on September 12, but experts have criticized its integrity (Specia, 2018). This conflict, which began in 2013, is estimated to have claimed nearly 400,000 lives, half of which at the hands of violence (Checchi, Testa, Warsame, Quach, & Burns, 2018).

Not only is **Sudan** a main country of transit for Horn of Africa migrants, but it is also a major host country of refugees. There were 766,064 refugees from South Sudan by mid-June this year; 413,852 arrived post-2013, and 21,165 arrived thus far this year (UNHCR Sudan, 2018). Monthly arrivals are well below what they were at the same point in 2017 and have decreased in the first half of 2018; it is worth highlighting that arrivals in previous years were at their highest in the first half of the year. Most of the pre-2013 refugees reside in Khartoum and north-eastern states, while the post-2013 refugees mainly live in the south-west states. Most arrivals have entered East Darfur (8,115) and West Kordofan (5,076) this year. A majority of the South Sudanese refugees (76%) live out of camps, 47% are male, and 57% are under the age of 18.

As of July 2018, approximately 72% of the 1,470,981 refugees and asylum seekers in **Uganda** were from South Sudan (UNHCR, 2018e). Uganda also hosts 288,766 refugees and asylum seekers from DRC, an influx of whom began in December 2017, and continued through July 2018. In July alone, 7,434 refugees from DRC and 1,720 from South Sudan arrived in Uganda. The former group mostly reside in the south-west, while the South Sudanese are in the north-west.




#### 5.4. Forced Displacement: IDP Situations

While there are significant refugee situations in most of the countries in this region, there are far more Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (see [Table B.2](#)). This subsection will give an overview of the major IDP situations in the region. By the end of 2017, there were an estimated 5.9 million IDPs across Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), between Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan, there were an estimated 2.9 million newly internally displaced persons in the first half of 2018 (IDMC, 2018).

New displacements due to conflict in **Ethiopia** alone accounts for 1.4 million IDPs in the first six months of 2018, the highest of any country (including Syria). IDMC reports that most of these happened in April and June and were caused by violence along the border of the Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' regions between communities in West Guji and Gedeo, highlighted in Figure 9 (IDMC, 2018a). Peace and reconciliation conferences were being held in the Gedeo and West Guji zones to establish security so that voluntary returns can take place (UNOCHA, 2018a). Many of the 1.6 million IDPs in Ethiopia in January were located in along the Somali Oromia border having been displaced from drought and conflict (MMC, 2018a).

FIGURE 9: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENTS IN ETHIOPIA



Source: (Hajzmanova, 2018)

Also in June, over 15,000 households were displaced due to renewed violence between the Borana and Garre communities in Moyale (UNOCHA, 2018). Conflict or climate-induced displacements also occurred in Addis Ababa, Afar, Amhar, Gambella and Hareri, Oromia, Somali and Tigray (excluding Hareri for the latter cause) (MMC, 2018b).

IDMC reported 341,000 new conflict-induced displacements in **Somalia** for the first half of 2018 (IDMC, 2018b). In terms of climate-induced displacement, flooding in May affected 750,000 people in Somalia and displaced at least 229,000 and damaged infrastructure and crops (UN News, 2018a). Uganda, too, has been affected by flooding in 2018, which caused 150,000 new displacements in the first half of the year (IDMC, 2018b). Furthermore, violent clashes, near the Tukaraq area of the Sool

region between Puntland and Somaliland, further exacerbated the already difficult environment recently impacted by tropical cyclone Sagar (UNSOM, 2018). As of July, there were an estimated 2.6 million IDPs across Somalia (Global Shelter Cluster, 2018).

In the first half of 2018, IDMC reported that **South Sudan** had 215,000 new displacements due to conflict (IDMC, 2018b). UNOCHA reports that there were 1.84 million IDPs in South Sudan as of July (UNOCHA, 2018d). Furthermore, there were 7.1 million severely food insecure people, and only about half of the 7 million in need of humanitarian assistance had received it. Despite the signing of a peace agreement in December 2017, hostilities have continued through 2018 (UNOCHA, 2018c). In February, UN investigators found more than 40 South Sudanese military officers responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, marking a departure from only naming crimes to naming perpetrators (Reuters, 2018). Furthermore, the government was urged to set up a Truth and Reparations Commission for dealing with these crimes (UN Human Rights Council, 2018). Amidst ongoing conflict and displacement (UNOCHA, 2018e), the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan in an effort to prevent the flow of weapons to parties to the conflict in the country (UN News, 2018b). Additionally, the United Nations Security Council renewed The South Sudan Sanctions regime until 31 May 2019, as well as imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on suspects accused of violence.

As seen in [Table B.2](#) there were 2,072,000 IDPs in **Sudan** at the end of 2017. DTM put the figure at 2,034,058 as of July 2018 and reported that there had been 21,624 newly registered IDPs since the beginning of 2018 while 113,454 registered as returnees (DTM, 2018). UNOCHA estimates that there are 5.5 million people in need in Sudan, 3.1 million of whom are in Darfur (UNOCHA, 2018g).

### 5.5. Repatriations and Facilitated Returns

There are several major channels of facilitated return migration in the region: Ethiopians from KSA; Somalis from Kenya; Sudanese from KSA, and East and Horn of Africa origin migrants from Libya. By mid-June, an estimated 170,000 **Ethiopians** had returned from KSA since November 2017, the end of the amnesty period granted by KSA authorities (European Commission, 2018a). Of the arrivals registered by IOM, 81% were returned involuntarily and suffered “inhumane conditions and widespread physical and sexual abuse in the detention centres as well as during their journey to Saudi-Arabia” (*ibid.*).

In the case of repatriated **Somalis**, as of July 2018, 6,085 had been voluntarily repatriated from Kenya (UNHCR, 2018). Amnesty International reports that some Somali repatriates who have returned to Kenya due to instability at home (Nyamori, 2018). With returns to Somalia ongoing, the UN has previously cautioned against large-scale returns due to the conditions in South and Central parts of Somalia (UNHCR, 2016). Furthermore, there are over 2 million IDPs in the country, and it is estimated that half of the populations needs humanitarian assistance (IOM Somalia, 2018). Amnesty International has called for a cessation of returns “until they meet the requirements of voluntariness, safety and dignity,” and called for more international support to Kenya and Somalia (Amnesty International, 2017). Amnesty International also reports that some Somali repatriates have actually returned to Kenya due to instability at home (Nyamori, 2018). There are also cases of returns from Libya: In May, IOM assisted 161 Somalis, who were held in Libyan detention facilities, voluntarily return to Mogadishu (EEAS, 2018).

In **Sudan**, DTM had registered 51,811 returnees from Saudi Arabia since July 2017, most of whom were tracked and registered at Khartoum International Airport (DTM, 2018a). Most of the returnees (58%) had spent more than three years in KSA, 32% were women, and the highest reported occupation was ‘laborer’ (36%).

## 5.6. Labour Migration

The East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have established rules for free movement of member state nationals, but these agreements have generally been poor implemented, even contradicted, by member states (Castles et al., 2014). The fact that there are protocols in place, at least in principle, certainly complicate the separation of irregular and regular migration. As discussed in [Section 5.3](#) the majority of migration movements tracked at IOM's Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) in the first half of 2018 were based on economic reasons, yet many were along irregular routes. Despite ongoing deportations from Saudi Arabia, migrants from the region are still traveling to Gulf states for work opportunities, constituting a major flow out of the Horn of Africa.

## 6. Emerging Trends and Developments

### 6.1. Securitization and Externalizing the EU Border in Sudan

Since 2015, Sudan has been allocated more than €175 million in EU funds to help stem migration (Chandler, 2018). It has been used to finance training and equipment for border police, judicial capacity building, and legal reforms meant to crack down on traffickers and smugglers. In addition to EU cooperation with Sudan, the UK, Italy and Germany have all bilaterally engaged with Sudan on migration issues as part of the Khartoum Process (Tubiana, Warin, & Saeneen, 2018). Looking solely at the number of arrivals of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy, a figure that sharply dropped from 40,773 in 2016 to just 8,688 in 2017, it would seem that the funding is doing exactly what it was meant to (*ibid.*).

But with the decline in Mediterranean crossings have come reports and allegations of corruption, abuse, extortion, torture, violence, sexual assault, trafficking, and other human rights abuses perpetrated by Sudanese security forces (Buxton & Akkerman, 2018; Chandler, 2018; Davy, 2017; Kingsley, 2018b; Jérôme Tubiana et al., 2018). Sudan is reportedly relying on militias, not regular security forces, for border control (Tubiana et al., 2018). Most notorious are the Rapid Security Force, or the *Janjaweed*, a former militia group implicated in war crimes from the Darfur conflict and Sudan's acting border security force since 2015. The Rapid Support Force (RSF) intercept 'illegal migrants' and confiscate smugglers' vehicles.

Yet this is not the extent of their activities; as one RSF member puts it, “Officially, our orders are to drive the migrants back toward their country of origin. So, from time to time, we intercept migrants and transfer them back to Khartoum, in order to show the authorities that we are doing the job. We’re not supposed to take money from the migrants to let them escape or to transport them to Libya... but the reality is rather different...,” a phenomenon confirmed by several smugglers and migrants in the CRU Report (Tubiana et al., 2018).

RSF are increasingly operating as smugglers themselves as well (*ibid.*, Kingsley, 2018). According to the CRU Report, migrants who were smuggled to Libya by the RSF were also ‘sold’ to Libyan traffickers by the RSF. Libyan traffickers are known to enslave and/or torture migrants until they’ve repaid the debt (or now a ransom) formerly owed to their RSF smugglers, which has been assumed by their new Libyan traffickers. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is also involved in trafficking between Eritrea and Egypt across eastern Sudan, as well as from Sudan to Libya, sometimes through Darfur. Furthermore, a study from RMMS reports that government officials, whether directly or indirectly, are said to be involved in migrant smuggling operations to the point of facilitating the industry’s very existence (Davy, 2017).

In the words of Rifat Makawi, a lawyer in Khartoum, “There is a lack of political will from the Sudanese government to fight trafficking. Creating new policies and drafting laws is just done by the government to please Western countries. On the ground, nothing changes” (Chandler, 2018). The EU has stated that the aid to Sudan is not direct, but instead funneled through UN agencies and other international organizations. Indeed, the EU maintains that its policy is “not to work with neither the RSF, nor the army, nor the NISS,” and maintains an awareness of the risks associated with cooperating with Sudanese Police and Security authorities (Tubiana et al., 2018). However, the EU acknowledges the difficulty in preventing ‘dual-use’ of equipment that it provides to the Sudanese. For a more detailed look at smuggling operations in Sudan, see the full CRU Report.

## 6.2. EU Policy Responses

In response to peak arrivals in Europe in 2015, the EU, along with other international organizations and partner countries, have developed a number of policy tools for managing migration flows from the African continent. These initiatives range from capacity building of migration management actors in the region, provision of skills training, as well as integrated service delivery to migrant and host communities. An overview of the major EU policies at play in the region can be found in Table 3.

**TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF EU POLICIES IMPLEMENTED IN EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA**

Policy	Starting year	Description	Implementing partners
<a href="#">EUTF</a>	2015	<p>4 thematic pillars:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Greater Economic and employment opportunities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Regional Development and Protection programme in Sudan: Enhancing alternatives to first and secondary Movement from Sudan.</i></li> <li>This project aims to create alternatives to irregular primary and secondary movement for refugees and host communities in Sudan.</li> <li>Utilises an evidence-based, innovative, sustainable, and protection based solution.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>Strengthening resilience <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South Sudan Rural Development: Strengthening Smallholders' Resilience</li> <li>Enhance and diversify food production, market access, and work opportunities.</li> <li>Ensuring communities have improved livelihoods and are less vulnerable to conflict and climate change.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>Improved migration management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aim to fulfil 2030 SDG goals amongst other international agreements on migration and mobility.</li> <li>Supporting comprehensive migration policies.</li> <li>Project Example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sustainable Reintegration support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe.</li> <li>Aims to help established a comprehensive reintegration support to return migrations.</li> <li>Build capacities of government institutions to implement reintegration programmes and develop a reintegration system.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>Improved governance and conflict prevention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region</li> <li>Based upon the premise that peace and stability can be achieved through utilising and strengthening existing resources and programmes.</li> <li>Particular focus on Early Warning Systems to allow governments to respond to threats more quickly and effectively.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<p>Implementation Partners for the regional Development and Protection programme in Sudan: GIZ, RVO, UNIDO, Italian Development Cooperation, UNHCR.</p> <p>Implementation Partners for South Sudan Rural Development: Food and Agriculture Organisation</p> <p>Implementation Partners for Sustainable Reintegration Support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe: ARRA</p> <p>Implementation Partners for Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region: ADA, Intergovernmental Authority on Development</p>
<a href="#">EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration</a>	2016	<p>Funded by the EUTF the EU-IOM Joint Initiative is a programme designed to save lives through protecting and assisting migrants along key routes in Africa. The main objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve protection, provide direct assistance, and assist voluntary return of migrants on migration routes.</li> </ul>	IOM

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Support the reintegration process of returning migrants in a holistic manner.</li> <li>o Collect better data on migration data and communication.</li> <li>o Capacity building of state- and non-state actors in migration governance and protection.</li> <li>o Stabilise communities through revitalising local economies, improving basic infrastructure, strengthening social cohesion.</li> </ul> <p>Project focus in the Horn of Africa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional Data Hub to expand and better utilise data on migration in the region and enhance migration governance.</li> <li>• Inter-regional and cross-regional knowledge exchanges. In particular focus on return and reintegration approaches.</li> <li>• Consular Visits by government representatives to countries where their nationals are stranded. Purpose being to assess and assist in these situations.</li> </ul>	
<a href="#">Common agenda on migration and mobility (CAMM)</a>	2015	<p>Building on direct migration compacts with specific partner countries the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) furthers existing partnerships to create a framework that harmonises joint objections and actions between the EU and national governments. The intention is to better organise legal migration and mobility whilst at the same time combating irregular migration and human trafficking.</p> <p>In East Africa a CAMM has been signed with Ethiopia.</p>	
<a href="#">Migration Partnership Framework (EUTF)</a>	2016	<p>Framework which fully integrates migration into the foreign policy of the European Union. There are various Regional focus' and the framework builds upon previous migration partnership pacts. The priority country in East Africa is Ethiopia.</p> <p>The approach includes attention to short- and long-term measures.</p> <p>Short term measures include saving lives at sea, shutting down trafficking and smuggling networks; increasing returns, addressing why migrants and refugees leave their homes, and creating legal channels of migration for those in need.</p> <p>Long term means include addressing the underlying factors that contribute to irregular migration and forced displacement. This is through supporting the political, social, and economic development of partner countries. Also included is improving available opportunities and sustainable development for individuals in their countries of origin.</p>	
<a href="#">The Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative)</a>	2012	<p>The Khartoum Process is a consultation framework between EU member states and African Partner countries.</p> <p>The frameworks aims at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishing a continuous dialogue for cooperation on migration and mobility.</li> <li>• Identifying and implementing projects addressing human trafficking and smuggling of migrants.</li> <li>• Stimulating regional collaboration between all migration affected countries on the route from the Horn of Africa to Europe.</li> </ul> <p>The Key objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To generate a common understanding of human trafficking and migrant smuggling.</li> <li>• Creating opportunities for balanced Partnerships.</li> <li>• Generating a spirit of shared responsibility and enhanced cooperation.</li> </ul>	AU, ICMPD
<a href="#">Better Migration Management (BMM) Programme</a>	2016	<p>The overarching goal of the BMM Programme is to improve migration management in the region. Particular focus is on human trafficking and smuggling of migrations within and from the Horn of Africa.</p>	GIZ


		<p>Specific Objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the development and implementation of legislation, policy and practice relating to migration and boarder management by national authorities in line with international standards and with harmonisation and identification of best practices.</li> <li>• Institutional and agency capacity building and strengthening including through improved collection, utilisation and sharing of data.</li> <li>• Protection of victims of human trafficking and other groups of vulnerable migrants.</li> <li>• Awareness of the risks of irregular migration and benefits of other options.</li> </ul>	
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### 6.3. Borders and Routes

Migration movements across borders in the East and Horn of Africa region are truly mixed; motivations and push/pull factors are often plural and overlapping. This makes disaggregating the different flows of migrants rather difficult, especially in a region where migratory movements are a regular phenomenon. This section, complementary to [Section 4.1](#), will shed further light on the major routes in the region (seen in [Figure 10](#)), significant changes to them, and major border crossing points between the countries of interest.

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FIGURE 10: MAJOR MIGRATION ROUTES IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA




Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

IOM's bi-annual reports on mixed migration in the region offers a useful overview of the region in terms of trends but are still limited as the scope of their coverage is non-exhaustive and does not replace official estimates for border crossings. Based on the observation of 444,490 migration movements in the first six months of 2018, IOM reports that 45% of these movements were towards or within the Horn of Africa, 43% on the Eastern Route, 7% on the Southern Route, and 5% on the Northern Route, as seen in Figure 11. (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2018, p. 1). These movements were observed across 42 Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) in Ethiopia (9), Djibouti (14), Somalia (12), and Yemen (7). IOM notes that the location of the FMPs varied during the 6-month period as per the volume of flows.



FIGURE 11: MIGRATION MOVEMENTS OBSERVED BY IOM FMPs, BY ROUTE



Note: map adapted from (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2018) This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG), nor the sources upon which this map is based.

Based on the 94,565 observed movements in Ethiopia through flow monitoring in the first six months of 2018, most of these were outgoing (56.4%), and internal movements were negligible (0.1%). FMPs in the north mostly captured a balance of incoming and outgoing movements, while FMPs in the north-east saw higher shares of outgoing movements, as was the FMP on the southern border with Kenya.

FMPs in Somalia observed 170,577 movements in the same period, most of which were incoming (60.2%), and small share were internal (3.3%). The largest share of incoming movements was observed in Zeylac (15%), near the border with Djibouti, while high shares of incoming movements were also observed on the border with Ethiopia in the Galguduud region (22% across three FMPs). FMPs along the border with Kenya in Lower Juba also reported high volume of movements; Kenya was also the top reported intended destination.

Djibouti is distinguished from the previous two countries by the high share of outgoing movements observed (92.1%). Most of these were observed at FMPs along the coast of the Gulf of Aden, while a majority of the incoming movements were observed near the southern borders with Ethiopia and Somalia. Djibouti is a key transit country for those heading to Saudi Arabia, which was the intended destination of 95% of outgoing migrants.

Between June and December 2017, IOM conducted a similar flow monitoring operation, but across fewer flow monitoring points (FMPs), yielding fewer observations: 174,654 movements/migrants at 25 flow monitoring points in Yemen (7), Somalia (12), and Djibouti (6) (IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 2017). Compared to the 2018 report, the one from 2017 mainly focused on two trends: movements to KSA or other Gulf countries (46%), and movement to and from Somalia (20.3%) and Kenya (14.1%). Given the differences in location and number of FMPs between the two reports, it is difficult to draw conclusive differences. While these routes largely mirror those discussed in Section 4.1, the FMP data adds scale to these routes. That being said, both reports make clear the sustained use of two routes or ‘migration arenas,’ meant to describe zones of movement instead of just linear movement:

- the prevailing use of the Eastern Route through Yemen, despite the conflict there, and onward to other Gulf states for economic migration
- migration within the Horn of Africa

In addition to these two routes/arenas, there are two other recognized major routes leading out of the region (as described in [Section 4.1](#)), although used to lesser extents:

- The Northern Route, transiting Sudan to Libya and onward to Europe via the Mediterranean
- The Southern Route, exiting the region from Kenya or Somalia, and heading towards South Africa via land or sea

Also mentioned in [Section 4.1](#), there are reports of a new route to Europe that through takes a detour through Yemen (Research and Evidence Facility (REF), 2017; UNODC, 2018). Migrants cross from Somalia into Yemen, make their way up the coast and then cross the Red Sea into Sudan or Egypt before heading to Libya, from where they will try to reach Europe, highlighted along the Eastern Route in Figure 10.

## 7. Conclusions

### 7.1. Summary

In the time since the last desk review on the countries of interest across West, Central, East and the Horn of Africa, a number of trends and events have distinguished themselves. Firstly, in West and Central Africa, efforts to halt irregular migration from reaching Europe seem to be yielding results; arrivals through the Mediterranean routes have returned to pre-2015 levels. This is due to a myriad of societal factors, among which the role of EU policies and multilateral agreements is non-negligible. Nevertheless, irregular migration flows have not ceased and smuggling remains a prevalent issue. Instead, routes between smuggling hubs have adapted, diversified, and ‘clandestinized’, especially for those to and from Agadez, Niger. Spain is now the top country of destination for Mediterranean crossings in 2018.

Secondly, there have been large internal displacements in East and the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia in the first half of 2018, further compounding difficult humanitarian assistance and stressing host communities. At the same time, many of the same drivers of displacement have driven refugees and asylum seekers into neighboring countries, several of which are already dealing with separate IDP and/or refugee situations. While conflicts and climate disasters across the East and Horn of Africa continue to displace populations, a potential bright spot is the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, given the continued exodus of Eritreans into Ethiopia and still into Europe, it is clear that open borders between the two countries will not eliminate the drive to leave Eritrea.

The EU’s efforts to externalize its borders beyond the Mediterranean have taken shape at waypoints for smuggling routes, specifically in Niger and Sudan. The funding and partnerships for migration management and securitization have certainly played a role in decreasing the number of irregular entries into Europe through the Central Mediterranean Route, but reporting from a variety of sources suggests this has not been without its drawbacks. Namely, documentation of human rights abuses and corruption perpetrated by Sudanese security forces, who apparently are even facilitating the smuggling of migrants from the East and Horn of Africa.

All in all, migration in both African regions remains a very complex and dynamic phenomenon. The analysis of the most recent trends in African migration indicates that underneath small shifts in routes and flows, long-established trends prevail. Trans-Saharan “irregular” migration is a historically-rooted phenomenon which can only be addressed with very long-term and comprehensive policies.

## 7.2. Revisiting Recommendations

- **Regular migration channels**

Making regular migration opportunities more accessible in origin countries is key to prevent irregular migration in the forms of smuggling and trafficking. Indeed, **broadening the opportunities for regular migration and increasing the accessibility of regular travel documents greatly limits the demand for migrant smuggling services.** Additionally, there is evidence that more open migration systems tend to produce circulatory movements, which in turn reduce overstaying or protracted situations (de Haas, 2018). “Mobility and legal migration” is the first and main pillar of the Mobility Partnership and Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility. All parties involved shall continue working on this priority, in parallel to the fight against irregular migration. Policy-makers ought to take into account that as the region develops aspirations for migration increase (Kirwin & Andersson, 2018).

- **Towards better migration data**

**Enhancing data collection and analysis systems at the regional level is essential in order to get a clearer overview of the routes and flows of regular and irregular migration.** While specialized UN agencies have solid data collection and data reporting systems, enhancing the capacity of national and regional institutions (e.g. ECOWAS) to collect and analyse migration data is essential in order to enrich the availability of data on topics such as intraregional labour migration. This can contribute to enhance the ownership of migration issues by national and regional authorities.

- **Finding durable solutions for refugees**

Due to encampment policies and limited work opportunities, refugees often have little future perspectives, which can lead to aspirations of onward migration. Hence, finding solutions that are more durable for refugees regarding integration into host societies, resettlement, as well as voluntary repatriation is crucial. In this context, expanding protection and humanitarian assistance beyond refugee camps is one of these options. Another would be to consider the concept of labour migration for refugees.

- **Focus on hubs**

According to this review of evidence, smuggling routes change rapidly while hubs remain relatively stable. Therefore, when possible, anti-smuggling policies shall focus on interventions at a reduced number of hubs (Gao, Arlit, Agadez, Qatrun, Edjabia, Khartoum etc.).

- **Balanced interventions**

Several reports argue that EU’s efforts to contain irregular migration in key countries of transit such as Niger or Sudan can have far-reaching socio-economic consequences on trans-Saharan communities. Some argue these could lead to further inter-tribal conflicts in these communities. While the EUTF contains livelihood and development projects to address these effects and tackle the root causes of migration, **stakeholders acting for change in this fragile region have to be careful to always balance out their interventions.**

## Part III: Overview of Sources

This report is based on desk research and aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the most up-to-date evidence on migration routes and trends in East and West Africa. The report thus combines qualitative accounts – from investigative journalism and specialized organization's reports – with quantitative data from primary and secondary sources. All quantitative data sources in this report are presented in more detail in the table below as well as in an excel file attached to the report.

It is important to mention that data on mixed migration in and from these regions are largely scattered. Indeed, different sources apply different methodologies and focus on different groups of concern. For instance, some sources are based on estimates (in the case of IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix), while others provide absolute figures (in the case of UNHCR Population Statistics). While this means that comparison between sources is limited, these can be used to complement each other in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of migration trends. It also is important to highlight that firm differentiation between involuntary, regular, and irregular (labour) migrants is quite limited extent in the context of Africa's mixed migration trends.

Specialized UN agencies are a good starting point for updates and data on migration trends. Concerning forced displacement, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for refugees and other displaced persons. It employs full time statisticians in their Field Information and Coordination Section to track the number of displaced persons globally. Both the operations portal and the population statistics are essential in understanding the size and location of forcibly displaced groups and are often accompanied by data visualizations.

With regards to mixed migration, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) provides several relevant datasets. First, the Displacement Tracking Matrix is an ambitious data project; it tracks and monitors human displacement almost on a daily basis at key transit points (flow monitoring points). As such, DTM is useful not only as a tool to measure events in the moment, but as a preparedness tool to identify emerging trends. Data collection is implemented in 40 countries, 18 of which are countries in West, Central and East Africa. Second, DTM data can also be visualized through IOM's flow monitoring website. Third, IOM's missing migrants project generates estimates of migrant deaths in transit across the Mediterranean, the Sahara and the Middle East and provides downloadable data sets.

Additionally, other specialized organizations publish monthly or weekly reports on mixed migration in both regions. The Mixed Migration Centre is an initiative of the Danish Refugee Council and provides monthly snapshots of migratory trends in the region accompanied by analysis. Their publications draw upon much of the available secondary data referred to above. In a similar vein, the Mixed Migration Hub publishes monthly bulletins informing on mixed migration to, from, and through North Africa. Included in each bulletin are regional and country specific highlights and updates concerning the available data on migration movements, policy and political developments related to (irregular) migration. Like the MMC monthly updates, these are useful to keep track of the current situation and relevant policy developments. There are also region-specific information sources such as the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) in the case of East and the Horn of Africa, and the Freedom of Movement and Mobility initiative (FMM), for instance, in the case of West Africa. The latter is focused on relevant policy developments rather than data.



Organisation	Geographic Focus	Summary	Resource(s)	Evaluation
The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS)	East and Horn of Africa	The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat is a partnership between 13 NGOs operating in the East and Horn of Africa. It acts as a coordination and information hub for forward thinking and policy development regarding durable solutions for displacement affected communities. Their overall goals include research and knowledge management; programme support and capacity development; coordination; and policy dialogue.	<a href="#">bi-monthly updates</a>	The bi-monthly updates provide information on ReDSS' ongoing projects, activities and upcoming events. They present links to the most recent figures on displacement in the region and other relevant data as well as recently published reports by other organisations that may be relevant. In terms of keeping track of the most recent displacement related developments in the East and Horn of Africa, this is a key source.
			<a href="#">publications</a>	ReDSS publish a number of research studies and reports concerning displacement in the East and Horn of Africa. They are published on a roughly annual basis. For the most part the reports take stock of the current situation with a particular element being the main point of analysis. Some reports also present solutions. There are often published in conjunction with organisations with extensive experience such as Samuel Hall and the DRC.
			<a href="#">solutions analysis</a>	The ReDSS has utilised the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) framework to develop their own solutions framework. Using 28 outcome indicators they have produced Solutions analysis for Ethiopia, Somali, Somaliland, Tanzania, and Uganda. For Ethiopia and Somalia, the frameworks are further specialised by region. These reports provide a basis for programming and action-based plans. They act as a useful point of departure for implementing displacement related projects in the region according to the represented parties.
Mixed Migration Centre (MMC)	East Africa and Yemen	The Mixed Migration Centre markets itself as an eminent source for quality and independent data on Mixed Migration. By mixed migration, the centre refers to the cross-border movements of people for	<a href="#">data &amp; trends</a>	The MMC publishes monthly trend analysis bulletins for the East Africa and Yemen region. They draw upon the available secondary data at the time of publication. In this way they provide an up to date

		various differing reasons along the same routes. This includes refugees, victims of trafficking, and those migrating for other reasons. The aim of the MMC is to collect and provide data, and analysis to support agencies, policy makers and practitioners in making well informed decisions with positive impacts on migration policy and support for migrants. The MMC was previously known as the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS).		monthly snapshot of migratory trends in the region accompanied by analysis. A sufficient degree of data is presented however the analysis is largely superficial commentary. These reports should be considered the equivalent of extended monthly newsletters.
	West Africa		<a href="#">data &amp; trends</a>	The MMC publishes monthly trend analysis bulletins for the West African region. They follow largely the same format as those of for East Africa and Yemen, however there is less content and the same limitations apply.
	Global		<a href="#">Resources</a>	The MMC publishes a number of research reports, briefing, discussion and policy papers, and articles. They are usually based on research undertaken by the MMC with the support on international government agencies. They provide good insight into various topics related to mixed migration.
	Horn of Africa	The 4Mi project was established in 2014 to develop a network for the purposes of providing regular and standardised quantitative primary data on mixed migration flows. The project employs field monitors along frequently used mixed migration routes to continuously conduct in-depth interviews. They also interview those involved with the facilitation of migration along these routes such as smugglers.	<a href="#">4mi</a>	Various 4Mi data derived publications are available on the MMC publications website where an archive of trend reports can be accessed. They often publish two or three reports a month consisting of overall trends as well as snapshots of specific elements like routes, individuals such as smugglers, or migrant's motivations. On the 4Mi website directly they present visualised data useful for gaining an overall understanding of movements in the region.
UNHCR	Global	The United Nations Refugee Agency is the UN Agency responsible for refugees and other displaced persons. It employs full time statisticians in their Field Information and Coordination Section to track the number of displaced persons globally. They use publications to spread awareness of refugees and other people of concern and report on their global operations. They have two flagship annual publications, the Global Appeal and Global Report. The former is a comprehensive view of the	<a href="#">operations portal</a>	The Operations portal provides a guide to ongoing UNHCR and W3 partner operations in select countries globally, but a focus on West, Central and East Africa. The map provides links to country profiles which present a breakdown of the relevant PoC statistics. A vast amount of official UN data is available, some of which with visualised summaries.
			<a href="#">population statistics</a>	The Population statistics database contains UNHCR's data on PoC from 1951 until the present date with roughly a one-year time lag. It disaggregates the data



		achievements and challenges of the Agency whilst the latter is a general guide to their world wide operations.		globally into seven categories and all data is downloadable in CSV format. Whilst not conclusive this data is useful for general overviews of the size and locations of PoC.
IDMC	Global	The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre positions itself as the authoritative source on internal displacement data and analysis. It has been operating for 20 years as part of the Norwegian Refugee Council. Their chief aims are to collect verified and consolidated estimates for the number of IDPs, conduct interdisciplinary research into the drivers, impacts, and patterns of internal displacement, as well as to provide advice to policy makers.	<a href="#">country profiles</a>	The country profiles provide information on displacement in nearly every country in the world. However, the amount and detail vary drastically. In particular the IDMC say they focus on countries with large numbers of new and protracted situations of internal displacement and there are 20 priority countries for which there is extensive information.
			<a href="#">publications</a>	A range of publications are available from IDMC in the form of Research reports, case studies, snapshots, and analysis. The rate of publication is very high, with at least one if not two or three documents made available each month. This includes the Annual Global Report in Internal displacement and the Mid-Year figures reports which outline the current figures, trends, and commentary. They are of high quality, well presented, and have in-depth but accessible analysis.
US Department of State	Global	The US State Department is responsible for the United States' foreign policy and diplomacy. Their publications are tools for engaging with US Citizens and foreign Governments.	<a href="#">TIP reports</a>	The <i>Trafficking in Persons</i> (TIP) report is the key tool the US government uses to fulfil their self-stated role of leading enforcement of human trafficking. Each year the report classifies countries within three tiers depending on a judgement of their commitment to minimum standards on the prevention of Human Trafficking. The basis of this classification is the USDoS' perception of the efforts made by foreign governments. It is also used as a tool to engage in dialog and put pressure on governments, which should be kept in mind when reading the reports.

Frontex	Mediterranean & Europe	Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Their mission is to ensure the function of the European Union's Borders with a focus on security.	<a href="#">Publications</a>	Frontex produce a number of publications taking the form of handbooks and guides, reviews, and evaluations. The focus is often on enforcement and practice with little reflection on root causes or understanding trends.
	Europe		<a href="#">Migratory Map</a>	The Migratory Map visualises data on migration routes into the EU, predominantly via the Mediterranean and Turkey. The Migratory Routes page elaborates on the visualised data. Both focus on illegal border crossings and present some superficial data.
	Routes to Europe		<a href="#">Migratory Routes</a>	Frontex publishes quarterly Risk Analysis for their specific networks or regions as well as an annual risk analysis report. They provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the external borders of the EU.
	Europe			
Humanitarian Response (UNOCHA)	Global	Humanitarian response is a service provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). It is intended to be a central repository for the management of information tools and services for the benefit of those responding to protracted or sudden onset emergencies. The intention is that as much relevant information as possible can be found in this location regarding the information and coordination of resources, including policies and guidance, on responding to humanitarian events.	<a href="#">Eastern Africa</a>	Under the operations section a collection of information is available disaggregated by region. From here a wide range of information is available on the region and individual countries within it. Available documents include maps, response planning documents, analysis and outlooks, outlines and details of operational organisations. It is a useful tool to understand the current situation in a particular region or country and which stakeholders and organisations are involved.
			<a href="#">West and Central Africa</a>	
MHUB Mixed Migration Hub	Africa	The Mixed Migration Hub operates on behalf of the North Africa Mixed Migration Task Force which consists of a number of IGOs and NGOS. MHUB's mission is to promote a human right-based approach to protecting migrants on mixed routes. This is fulfilled through informing advocacy, policy, and programme development.	<a href="#">Monthly Trend Bulletins</a>	MHUB publishes monthly bulletins informing on mixed migration to, from, and through North Africa. The data is collected from a variety of sources including governments, civil society and Media. Included in each bulletin are regional and country specific highlights and updates concerning the available numbers of migrant movements, and policy and political developments related to (irregular) migration. These are useful to keep track of the current situation and relevant policy developments.

<b>IOM - DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix</b>	Global, East and West Africa	The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system designed by the IOM to monitor human displacement and mobility. It has been utilised in a number of conflict and disaster settings to identify, track, and measure human movement and needs. It is useful not only as a tool to measure events in the moment, but as a preparedness tool to identify emerging trends and in the recovery period.	<a href="#">Country Profiles and situation reports</a>	The DTM is currently active in 41 countries for which visualised profiles of the most recent and historic data is available to compare flows of displaced persons. In some cases, the DTM collected data is supplemented by national administrative data if available. A large number of reports are published, often specific to regions within countries to allow in depth understanding of specific cases. As the DTM expands and generates a more data over time it will likely become a powerful tool for tracking displacement related migration flows.
<b>IOM Flow Monitoring</b>	Mediterranean & Europe	IOM's flow monitoring website presents enhanced information derived from DTM data. In this case the focus on Europe, specifically flows from North Africa across the Mediterranean and in South Eastern Europe.	<a href="#">Data Visualization</a>	The visualised data and downloadable data sets contain the results of flow monitoring through selected transit points. Data is collected on flows and basic characteristics. This is used a baseline data which is then used to determine is multi- layered and themed data should be collected through Flow Monitoring Surveys. The data is updated very frequently and can be broken down by week or year.
<b>IOM Missing Migrants Project</b>	Global (Mediterranean Focus)	Missing Migrants Project counts migrants who have died at the external borders of states, or in the process of migration towards an international destination, regardless of their legal status. The project started in 2014 and aims primarily to record migrant deaths in transit and to improve the collection of data on the topic. They believe the actual numbers of deaths are far higher than recorded.	<a href="#">General Publications</a>	The Missing migrants project generates estimates of migrant deaths in transit across the Mediterranean and provides downloadable data sets. The spotlight is on the Mediterranean and Middle East, but they do have a global focus. Available publications include a series on improving data collection and availability on missing migrants, commentary on migration policy practice, analysis on flows and trends, and briefings.
<b>IOM Regional Office for East and Horn of Africa</b>	East and Horn of Africa	The IOM has a regional office for the East and Horn of Africa based in Nairobi. Their main aim is to implement and fulfil the Regional Strategy for East and Horn of Africa on behalf of IOM. As such detailed migration related information is available that is specific to the region.	<a href="#">Data Hub</a>	The data hub makes available regional data to support evidence-based, strategic, and policy-level discussion on migration. It is specific to the region and is one of the best sources of IOM and DTM data related to it.
			<a href="#">Publications</a>	The publications available are also useful as a source of information, bulletins, analysis and reviews for the East and Horn of Africa regarding migration and IOM

				policy and programmes. Monthly bulletins are available as well as twice yearly reviews.
<b>IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa</b>	West and Central Africa	IOM's regional office for West and Central Africa is based in Dakar. They coordinate the implementation and operation of IOM programmes in the West and Central African Region. Their website is a collection of relevant region-specific information.	<a href="#">Publications</a>	A range of region and country specific publications are available from IOM Dakar. There are annual country reports, commentary on specific trends, and DTM reports.
<b>FMM West Africa</b>	West Africa	FMM works to improve free movement rights for migrants in West Africa. They are primarily focused on labour migration however take a holistic approach to the topic and are aware of the intricacies of mixed migration. FMMs focus is on better data collection, boarder management, migration policy, and combating human trafficking. It is jointly funded by the EU and ECOWAS.	<a href="#">Resources</a>	FMM West Africa's Resources are divided into Infosheets, Reports, and a range of other publications. The Reports mainly comprise of baseline assessments for certain regions and guides on the use of data comprise most of the other publications available. Considering the focus on forced displacement related and irregular migration in the region this is a useful source for more labour related migration.
<b>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations' Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)</b>	Global	Set up to support a coordinated and quicker response to disasters both inside and outside Europe using resources from 34 countries participating in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the ERCC collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, monitors hazards, prepares plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment, and works with Member States to map available assets and coordinate the EU's disaster response efforts by matching offers of assistance to the needs of the disaster-stricken country.	<a href="#">ECHO Daily Flash Archive</a>	The ERCC publishes daily flashes giving updates on humanitarian disasters and coordination efforts. In the context of irregular migration from North Africa and across the Mediterranean they provide timely records of notable developments.

<b>USAID</b>	Global	USAID is the International Development Agency of the United States. Their mission is to promote US values internationally, support their foreign policy, and implement development and disaster assistance.	<a href="#">Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)</a>	The Famine Early Warning System Network provides early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity on more than 36 of the world's most food-insecure countries. There is a particular focus on Central, the East and Horn of Africa. As food insecurity is a leading driver of displacement this is an important source for identifying future trends.
<b>KNOMAD</b>	Global	The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is a partnership for the global migration community. It draws experts and the wider community to generate knowledge on migration to aid policy decisions, evaluation and analysis, data gathering, and peer reviewed quality control. They coordinate with the Global Forum on Migration and Development as well as UN migration related agencies. A trust fund drawing on many donors is used to implement the programme. They focus on 11 thematic groups related to migration, with four cross cutting themes.	<a href="#">Publications</a>	Publications available from the Knomad project include Board papers, briefs, books, reports, data sets, and working papers. Their outputs include one World Bank Board paper as well as a number of other notable contributions to the body of work on migration. Their funding, partnerships, and network allows them to undertake good quality, relevant research on migration.
			<a href="#">Data</a>	Knomad's data portal covers Migration, Remittances, and Migration and Remittance Cost Surveys undertaken in cooperation with the ILO. Country specific data is available at a glance as well as a downloadable Bilateral migration matrix.



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## Annexes

### Annex A: Refugee situations

Table A.1. Number of refugees in West Africa, by country of asylum, 2016

Origin	Country of Asylum												
	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CAR	228	-	70223	-	109	34	266	986	528	67	166	-	-
Chad	116	163	-	-	14	*	*	7	*	165	77	17	-
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	-
Guinea	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	*	8	-	17	14	-
Côte d'Ivoire	*	9	*	192	6453	4504	-	923	261	55	118	45	21
Mali	32017	-	*	-	-	*	5	-	46644	60154	137	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15298	-	-	-	13683	-
Niger	-	-	447	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	7777	-	11	7	*	-	16	105501	-	7	0
Senegal	-	-	-	7470	-	-	-	-	53	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	*	-	120	77	169	*	-	*	-	21	-	-
Total	32361	179	78447	7782	6664	4714	271	17214	47510	165942	536	13862	21

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

Table A.2. Number of refugees in West Africa, by country of asylum, 2017

Origin	Country of Asylum												
	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso		0	*	0	*	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	-
CAR	167		76653	-	107	37	332	809	555	65	403	289	-
Chad	82	3184		-	30	*	*	*	*	165	87	18	-
Gambia	-	-	-		0	*	0	-	*	0	*	44	-
Ghana	-	-	0	-		-	0	-	0	0	*	*	0
Guinea	-	7	-	-	*		0	*	8	0	17	10	-
Côte d'Ivoire	*	9	*	188	6687	4539		614	269	51	122	39	17
Mali	23766	*	*	-	0	6	5		49829	56838	137	0	*
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	15319		0	-	13779	-
Niger	-	-	495	-	*	*	0	-	0		-	0	-
Nigeria	-	-	9541	-	9	7	*	-	17	108470		7	-
Senegal	-	*	-	7557	-	-	0	-	70	-	0		-
Sierra Leone	-	*	-	119	87	202	*	0	*	-	21	0	
Total	24015	3200	86689	7864	6920	4791	337	16742	50748	165589	787	14186	17

Source: UNHCR Data Portal, Series 2017

Table A.3. Number of refugees in East Africa, by country of asylum, 2016

Origin	Country of Asylum								Total
	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda	
Djibouti		-	81	-	0	-	-	-	
Eritrea	322		165,548	1,081	36	18	103,176	4,511	274,692
Ethiopia	516	23		19,064	3,060	4,691	3,663	2,002	33,019
Kenya	10	-	3,326		0	0	-	194	3,530
Somalia	13,021	2,244	242,014	324,448		-	184	30,689	612,600
South Sudan	0	8	338,774	87,141	-		297,168	639,007	1,362,098
Sudan	5	67	39,896	2,836	-	241,510		2,545	286,859
Uganda	-	-	23	631	-	-	-		654
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,874</b>	<b>2,342</b>	<b>789,662</b>	<b>435,201</b>	<b>3,096</b>	<b>246,219</b>	<b>404,191</b>	<b>678,948</b>	<b>2,573,452</b>

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

Table A.4. Number of refugees in East Africa, by country of Asylum, 2017

Origin	Country of Asylum							
	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Djibouti		-	76	*	*	-	-	-
Eritrea	406		164605	702	49	32	-	4566
Ethiopia	527	30		17873	3608	4555	4273	4273
Kenya	10	-	3459		0	-	*	193
Somalia	13108	2286	253779	281692		*	208	25011
South Sudan	0	9	421373	111510	-		772715	1037412
Sudan	6	67	43892	2922	*	261983		2355
Uganda	-	-	18	626	0	*	*	
<b>Total</b>	<b>14057</b>	<b>2392</b>	<b>887202</b>	<b>415325</b>	<b>3657</b>	<b>266570</b>	<b>777196</b>	<b>1073810</b>

Source: UNHCR Data Portal



Table A.5. Top host countries of refugees from West Africa, 2017

	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
<b>Total</b>	<b>2679</b>	<b>545498</b>	<b>16295</b>	<b>14539</b>	<b>16929</b>	<b>20313</b>	<b>39939</b>	<b>150285</b>	<b>36495</b>	<b>1343</b>	<b>238942</b>	<b>26559</b>	<b>4436</b>
<b>Top 1 Host</b>	United States of America 43%	Cameroon 46%	Sudan 46%	Italy 71%	Togo 57%	France 38%	Liberia 28%	Niger 38%	Mali 42%	Chad 37%	Niger 45%	Guinea-Bissau 38%	Germany 13%
<b>Top 2 Host</b>	Italy 38%	Dem. Rep. of the Congo 33%	Central African Rep. 20%	United States of America 10%	Italy 29%	Italy 17%	Ghana 17%	Mauritania 33%	Senegal 38%	Italy 32%	Cameroon 36%	Gambia 28%	France 12%
<b>Top 3 Host</b>	France 7%	Chad 14%	Cameroon 9%	United Kingdom 9%	France 3%	Belgium 13%	Italy 16%	Burkina Faso 16%	France 15%	United States of America 10%	Italy 8%	Italy 23%	Italy 12%
<b>Top 4 Host</b>	Canada 4%	Congo 5%	France 9%	Germany 4%	Germany 3%	United States of America 11%	Guinea 11%	Italy 9%	United States of America 3%	Belgium 7%	Chad 4%	France 4%	United States of America 12%
<b>Top 5 Host</b>	Belgium 3%	France 0%	Gabon 3%	France 2%	United States of America 2%	Germany 8%	France 8%	France 3%	Italy 1%	France 5%	Canada 2%	Belgium 2%	Netherlands 12%
<b>Other Countries</b>	5%	2%	13%	4%	6%	12%	20%	2%	2%	9%	5%	5%	40%

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

Table A.6. Top Host Countries of refugees from West Africa, 2016

	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
<b>Total Stock</b>	2,357	416,400	14,146	11,641	15,507	17,526	46,741	156,390	36,228	1,210	229,255	23,019	4,628
<b>Top 1 Host</b>	USA -43.3%	Cameroon 68.1%	Sudan -60%	Italy -66.30%	Togo -62.20%	France 38.9%	Liberia 39.7%	Niger -38.50	Mali -42.20%	Chad -36.90%	Niger -46.00%	Guinea-Bissau 36.4%	Netherlands 13,0%
<b>Top 2 Host</b>	Italy 39.3%	DRC -24.6%	Cameroon 10.4%	USA 12.2%	Italy -24.3%	Belgium 15.3%	Ghana 13.8%	Mauritania 29.8%	Senegal 37.8%	Italy 29.6%	Cameroon 38.7%	Gambia 32.5%	USA 11.9%
<b>Top 3 Host</b>	France 5.9%	Congo 5.9%	France 9.3%	UK 11.9%	France 3.3%	USA -14.10%	Italy 12.4%	Burkina Faso 20.5%	France 14.3%	USA -11.10%	Italy -6.20%	Italy -20.70%	France 11.0%
<b>Top 4 Host</b>	Canada 3.9%	France 0.6%	Gabon 4.6%	Germany 2%	USA -2.30%	Italy 13.3%	Guinea 9.6%	Italy 7.2%	USA 2.7%	Belgium 7.5%	Chad 3.4%	France 4.1%	Italy 9.9%
<b>Top 5 Host</b>	Belgium -3.30%	Mali -0.2%	Italy -3%	France 1.80%	Germany -1.80%	Germany -4.30%	France -6.20%	France -2.70%	Italy 0.90%	Canada -4.50%	Canada -1.80%	Belgium 1.9%	Liberia 8.1%
<b>Other Countries</b>	4.30%	0.60%	12.70%	5.80%	6.00%	14.00%	18.30%	1.30%	2.00%	10.40%	3.90%	4.50%	46.10%

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

Table A.7. Top Host Countries of refugees from East Africa, 2017

	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
<i>Total</i>	<b>1741</b>	<b>486169</b>	<b>87388</b>	<b>7547</b>	<b>986356</b>	<b>2439868</b>	<b>694506</b>	<b>6369</b>
<b>Top 1 Host</b>	Canada 46%	Ethiopia 34%	Kenya 20%	Ethiopia 46%	Kenya 29%	Uganda 43%	Chad 47%	United States of America 20%
<b>Top 2 Host</b>	United States of America 16%	Sudan 22%	South Africa 20%	United States of America 28%	Yemen 26%	Sudan 32%	South Sudan 38%	United Kingdom 18%
<b>Top 3 Host</b>	Belgium 15%	Germany 10%	United States of America 11%	Canada 6%	Ethiopia 26%	Ethiopia 17%	Ethiopia 6%	Sweden 11%
<b>Top 4 Host</b>	France 15%	Switzerland 6%	Yemen 7%	United Kingdom 4%	South Africa 3%	Kenya 5%	Egypt 2%	Kenya 10%
<b>Top 5 Host</b>	Ethiopia 4%	Sweden 6%	South Sudan 5%	Uganda 3%	Uganda 3%	Dem. Rep. of Congo 4%	France 2%	South Africa 9%
<b>Other Countries</b>	3%	22%	36%	14%	14%	0%	5%	32%

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

Table A.8. Top Host Countries of refugees East Africa, 2016

	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
<i>Total</i>	<b>1417</b>	<b>459390</b>	<b>83894</b>	<b>7506</b>	<b>1012277</b>	<b>1436667</b>	<b>650588</b>	<b>6198</b>
<b>Top 1 Host</b>	Canada 41%	Ethiopia 36%	Kenya 23%	Ethiopia 44%	Kenya 32%	Uganda 45%	Chad 48%	US 21%
<b>Top 2 Host</b>	Belgium 19%	Sudan 23%	S. Africa 21%	US 29%	Yemen 25%	Ethiopia 24%	South Sudan 37%	UK 18%
<b>Top 3 Host</b>	US 18%	Germany 7%	US 12%	Canada 6%	Ethiopia 24%	Sudan 21%	Ethiopia 6%	Sweden 10%
<b>Top 4 Host</b>	France 14%	Israel 6%	Yemen 7%	UK 4%	Uganda 3%	Kenya 6%	Egypt 2%	Kenya 10%
<b>Top 5 Host</b>	Ethiopia 6%	Switzerland 6%	South Sudan 6%	Uganda 3%	S. Africa 3%	DRC 5%	UK 1%	S. Africa 9%
<b>Other Countries</b>	3%	23%	31%	14%	13%	1%	6%	32%

Source: UNHCR Data Portal

## Annex B: Internally Displaced People

Table B.1. IDPs in West and Central Africa, 2017

Country	Number of IDPs (end 2017)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (2017)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (2017)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (mid-year 2018)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (mid-year 2018)	UNHCR registered IDPs
Burkina Faso	4900	4900	8200	-	-	2350
Central African Republic	689000	539000	2900	232000	-	688700
Chad	158000	5800	-	-	-	99983
Gambia	0	162000	880	-	-	-
Ghana	-	-	23000	-	-	-
Guinea	-	-	710	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	16000	5500	-	-	-	-
Mali	38000	35000	6800	-	-	38172
Mauritania	-	-	2900	-	-	-
Niger	144000	40000	189000	-	-	129015
Nigeria	1707000	279000	122000	417000	-	1704080
Senegal	22000	-	630	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	12000	-	-	-

Source: UNHCR Data Portal, Series 2017

Table B.2. IDPs in East Africa, 2017

Country	Number of IDPs (end 2017)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (2017)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (2017)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (01-06/2018)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (01-06/2018)	UNHCR registered IDPs
Djibouti	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Eritrea	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
Ethiopia	1078000	725000	434000	1391000	171000	1078429
Kenya	159000	24000	35000	n.d.	326000	n.d.
Somalia	825000	388000	899000	341000	456000	2116705
South Sudan	1899000	857000	75000	215000	n.d.	1903953
Sudan	2072000	17000	54000	n.d.	n.d.	1997022
Uganda	24000	1300	95000	n.d.	150000	n.d.

Source: UNHCR Data Portal, Series 2017

## Annex C: Trafficking in Persons (TIP)

Table C.1. TIP report West and Central Africa 2010-2018

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Burkina Faso	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2	2WL	2
Central African Republic	2WL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2WL
Chad	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL
Gambia	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	3	2WL	2WL
Ghana	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2
Guinea	2WL	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL
Côte d'Ivoire	2WL	N/A	2	2	2	2	2WL	2	2
Mali	2WL	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL
Mauritania	3	3	2WL	3	3	3	3	3	3
Niger	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL
Nigeria	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2WL
Senegal	2WL	2	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL
Sierra Leone	2	2	2WL	2	2	2	2	2	2WL

Source: US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons report

Table C.2. TIP report East and Horn of Africa 2010-2018

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Djibouti	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL	2
Eritrea	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ethiopia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Kenya	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2
Somalia	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case	Special Case
South Sudan	N/A	N/A	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	3	3
Sudan	3	3	3	3	2WL	2WL	3	3	2WL
Uganda	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Source: US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons report

#### Scaling system:

- **Tier 1** The governments of countries that fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.
- **Tier 2** The governments of countries that do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.
- **Tier 2 Watch List** The government of countries that do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, and for which: What you earned belongs to me, I gave you the job, and I can kick you out." - Human trafficker to a Chinese victim in Malta Hereditary slavery still exists in some parts of the world despite laws prohibiting it. Said and Yarg's mother was a slave in Mauritania when they were born, so they became the property of the same family.
  - the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
  - there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecution, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of trafficking by government officials; or
  - the determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional steps over the next year.
- **Tier 3** The governments of countries that do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.



## Annex D. Summary tables: drivers of migration

Table D.1. Drivers and summary of mixed migration trends in West and Central Africa

Country	Burkina Faso	CAR	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Origin	++	++		++	++	++	+	+			++	++	++
Transit	+		+		+		++		+	++		+	
Destination			+		+	+	++		++	+	++		+
Drivers	Climate Change Limited Resources Conflicts	Conflicts	Climate Change Limited resources Economic reasons Conflicts Traditions/ livelihood strategy	Persecution Limited resources Economic reasons	Economic Reasons	Economic reasons Food insecurity Climate change Ebola	Economic reasons Conflicts Persecution	Conflicts Strong climate Traditions/ livelihood strategy Demographic pressures	Limited opportunities Economic reasons Climate change Conflicts	Economic reasons Conflicts Traditions/ livelihood strategy	Conflicts Persecution Economic reasons	Economic reasons Traditions/ livelihood strategy	Conflicts Limited resources Economic reasons

Table D.2. Summary of Mixed Migration Trends in the East and Horn of Africa

	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Origin		++	++		++	++	+	++
Transit	++		++	++	++	+	++	
Destination			++		++	++	+	+
Drivers	Economic factors	Obligatory national service Political oppression Economic factors	Socio-economic factors Ethnic tensions Environmental factors	Economic factors	Conflict & chronic insecurity Economic factors Environmental factors	Conflict Economic factors Lack of infrastructure & social services; food insecurity	Conflict Economic factors	Demo-graphic factors Economic factors Environmental factors

Note: Two '+' indicate that relative to other countries in the region these flows are bigger. Categories under the "push factors for emigrants" column are not mutually exclusive and often overlapping.

## Annex E: Glossary of Key Migration Terminology

Assisted Voluntary Return	"Administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support to rejected asylum seekers, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals and other migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country who volunteer to return to their countries of origin." (IOM, 2011)
Asylum Seekers	Persons "who seek safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than [their] own and await a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the persons must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds." (IOM, 2011)
Border Management	"Facilitation of authorized flows of persons, including business people, tourists, migrants and refugees, across a border and the detection and prevention of irregular entry of non-nationals into a given country. Measures to manage borders include the imposition by States of visa requirements, carrier sanctions against transportation companies bringing irregular migrants to the territory, and interdiction at sea. International standards require a balancing between facilitating the entry of legitimate travellers and preventing that of travellers entering for inappropriate reasons or with invalid documentation." (IOM, 2011)
Brain Drain	"Emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills resources in the former." (IOM, 2011)
Circular Migration	"The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Destination	"The country that is a destination for migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Origin	"The country that is a source of migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Transit	"The country through which migratory flows (regular or irregular) move." (IOM, 2011)
Deportation	"The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a non-national from its territory to his or her country of origin or third state after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain." (IOM, 2011)
Detention	"Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority. There are two types of detention: criminal detention, having as a purpose punishment for the committed crime; and administrative detention, guaranteeing that another administrative measure (such as deportation or expulsion) can be implemented. In the majority of countries, irregular migrants are subject to administrative detention, as they have violated immigration laws and regulations that are not considered to be crimes. In many States, a non-national may also be administratively detained pending a decision on refugee status or on admission to or removal from the State." (IOM, 2011)
Diaspora	"Broadly defined as individual and member or network, association and community, who has left their country of origin, but maintains links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants." (IOM, 2011)
Displacement	"A forced removal of a person from his or her home or country, often due to armed conflict or natural disasters." (IOM, 2011)
Durable Solutions	"Any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved to enable them to lead normal lives. Traditionally this involves voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement." (IOM, 2011)
Economic Migrant	"A person leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her country of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely used to distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution, and is also similarly used to refer to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons leaving their country of origin for the purpose of employment." (IOM, 2011)
Emigration	"The act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settling in another." (IOM, 2011)

Environmental and Disaster Displacees	"Persons who are displaced within their country person of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one." (IOM, 2011)
Family Reunification	"Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin." (IOM, 2011)
Forced Displacement	"In the law of armed conflict, the individual or collective movement of civilians in the interior of an occupied territory. In the terms of Art. 49, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Art. 85, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, forced displacement constitutes a war crime, unless it is justified by imperative military reasons. In a more general sense, forced displacement – or displacement – is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural or man-made catastrophes." (IOM, 2011)
Forced Migration	"A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)." (IOM, 2011)
Highly-Skilled Migration	"While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of postsecondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level education or occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession." (IOM, 2011)
Human Smuggling	"People smuggling implies the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the illegal entry into a state of which that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident. A broad distinction can be made between people smuggling and human trafficking. In general, the individuals who pay a smuggler in order to gain illegal entry to a country do so voluntarily whereas the victims of human trafficking are often duped or forced into entering another country." (INTERPOL, n.d.)
Human Trafficking	"'The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation' (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character." (IOM, 2011)
Immigration	"A process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement." (IOM, 2011)
Integration	"While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, 'integration' can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose. Local integration is one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees. It may also be applied to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied children." (IOM, 2011)
Internal Migration	"A movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration)." (IOM, 2011)
Internally Displaced Persons	"Persons or groups of persons who have been forced IDPs or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.)." (IOM, 2011)
International Migration	"Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed." (IOM, 2011)

Irregular Migration	"Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term 'illegal migration' to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons." (IOM, 2011)
Labour Migration	"Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad." (IOM, 2011)
Less/ low skilled and Semi-skilled Migrant Worker	"There is no internationally agreed definition of a less skilled migrant worker or low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called 'manual workers' (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semiskilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job." (IOM, 2011)
Long-Term Migration	"[When] a person... moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure, the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival, the person will be a long-term immigrant." (IOM, 2011)
Low-Skilled Migration	"No single definition of low-skilled migration exists. 'Low-skilled' can refer to people with few formal qualifications, people working in jobs that do not require such qualifications, or people working in low-wage positions regardless of their own educational background." (COMPAS, 2017)
Mass/ collective Migration	"The sudden movement of large number of persons." (IOM, 2011)
Migration	"The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification." (IOM, 2011)
Mixed Migration	"The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved. Mixed flows have been defined as 'complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants'. Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow." (IOM, 2008)
Net Migration	"Difference between the number of persons entering the territory of a State and the number of persons who leave the territory in the same period. Also called 'migratory balance.' This balance is called net immigration when arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals." (IOM, 2011)
Permanent Migration	"The term 'permanent' is applied essentially to reflect movements that the receiving country considers are for the long term, although they may not turn out to be so in practice, because of changes in intentions. It does not mean that the person is necessarily granted a permit of unlimited duration, but rather that he/she is on a 'migration track' that normally leads to permanent residence in the host country." (Fron, Lemaitre, Liebig & Thoreau, 2008)
Readmission Agreement	"International agreement which addresses procedures, on a reciprocal basis, for one State to return nonnationals in an irregular situation to their home State or a State through which they have transited." (IOM, 2011)
Refugees	"Person[s] who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, [are] outside the country of [their] nationality and [are] unable or, owing to such fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country.' (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.' Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee

	their country 'because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.'" (IOM, 2011)
Regular Migration	"Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels." (IOM, 2011)
Reintegration	"Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence." (IOM, 2011)
Remittances	"Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin." (IOM, 2011)
Resettlement	"The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized." (IOM, 2011)
Return Migration	"The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation." (IOM, 2011)
Temporary Migration	"Migration of workers who enter a foreign country for migration a specified limited period of time before returning to the country of origin." (IOM, 2011)
Transnationalism	"The process whereby people establish and maintain socio-cultural connections across geopolitical borders." (IOM, 2011)
Unaccompanied Minors	"Persons under the age of majority in a country other than that of their nationality who are not accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other adult who by law or custom is responsible for them. Unaccompanied children present special challenges for border control officials, because detention and other practices applied to undocumented adult non-nationals may not be appropriate for children." (IOM, 2011)