Chad

MIGRATION PROFILE

Study on Migration Routes in West and Central Africa

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1. Introduction

Chad is a landlocked country with a surface of 1.284 million sq kilometres. Despite the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Chad is the biggest country of the Central and West African region. It shares its southern border with Central African Republic (CAR), its western border with Cameron, Nigeria, and Niger, its northern border with Libya, and its eastern border with Sudan. The population of Chad is growing rapidly, and it is currently estimated to be around 14.9 million (UNDESA, 2017). This population is unevenly distributed across the country, and while the northern regions of Chad are largely unpopulated, most of the population is settled around Lake Chad in the south-west, which is the most significant water supply in the Sahel (CIA, 2017). Although unemployment and youth unemployment rates are rather low, 5.8 per cent and 9 per cent respectively, Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 2017). The Human Development Index of Chad is 0.396, indicating that it is the least develop country in the world but two, namely Niger and CAR. In 2010, it was estimated that 87% of the Chadian population was in multidimensional poverty, while 67% was facing severe levels of multidimensional poverty (UNDP, 2016). In 2006, the biggest share of the Chadian population was working in the agricultural sector (80%), while the rest was employed in the industry and service sector (CIA, 2017).

Table 1: Chad Key Demographic and Development Indicators

Indicator	Chad
Total area, *in sq km*[a]	1,284,000
Population (2015), *in million*[b]	14.035
Urban Population (2016), *% of total*[c]	22.6
Population Growth Rate, *annual (2016) %*[c]	3.1
Ethnic Groups[a]	Sara 29.9% Kanembu/Bornu/Buduma 9.7% Arab 9.6% Wadai/Maba/Masalit/Mimi 7.5% Gorane 5.8% Masa/Musseye/Musgum 4.9% Other 32.6%
Human Development Index (2015), *country rank out of 188*[d]	0.396 186
GDP Based on PPP per Capita, *current international dollars per capita*[c]	664.30
Life Expectancy at Birth (2015), *years*[d]	51.9
Unemployment (2016), *% of labour force*[c]	5.8
Youth Unemployment (2016), *% ages 15-24*[c]	9

|	
Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2010), %[d]	87.0
Gini Coefficient (2010-2015)[d]	43.3
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2016), *current USD millions*[e]	560.00
Net Official Development Assistance Received (2015), *current USD millions*[c]	606.670
Personal Remittances Received (1994), *current USD millions*[c]	724.057

[a] CIA, 2017; [b] UN DESA, 2015b; [c] World Bank, 2017; [d] UNDP, 2016; [e] UNCTAD, 2017.

Regarding population movements, Chad is an important origin, transit, and destination country for migrants. Surely, economic factors such as poverty, and lack of economic opportunities are a major push factor for Chadian out-migration. However, Chadian emigration can also be attributed to violence, conflicts, and persecution (Rodrigues, Tòmas, 2017). In 2015, the stock of Chad's emigrants was estimated to be around 208,000, and they were mostly living in Sudan (36%), Cameroon (26%), Nigeria (14%), Congo (5%), CAR (5%), and France (4%). This latter figure can be plausibly explained by the colonial ties between France and Chad. Moreover, French is the official language of both countries (CIA; 2017).

Since 1990, Chad has been an important transit country for migrants that try to reach North Africa and, to a lesser extent, Europe (de Haas, 2007; UNHCR, 2017a). Although the most frequent routes used by migrants to reach north Africa and eventually Europe go through Mali and Niger, the Chadian Route is still to some extent popular for Chadians, Sudanese, and Cameroonians (Wittenberg, 2017). Saharan tribal smugglers are active in the northern part of the country. The Tebou, in particular, are considered to orchestrate the smuggling activities between Chad, Niger, and Libya (Rhipto, 2015; Micallef, 2017).

Chad is an important destination country, especially for refugees coming from neighbouring states. In fact, as shall be explained in the next sections, forced displacement is the kind of movement that mostly characterizes Chad, as instability, civil war, and terrorist attacks drove hundreds of thousands of refugees into Chad during the last thirteen years (UNHCR, 2017b). As of May 2017, it was estimated that, in Chad, there were 624,312 people of concern, including 400,264 refugees, and 224,000 Chadian returnees and IDPs (UNHCR, 2017c).

Figure 1: Origin of Migrants in Chad, 2015

Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Figure 2: Destination of Migrants from Chad, 2015

Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

By comparing the 2015 population pyramids of the Chadian population and of the migrant stock population (Figures 3 and 4, respectively), interesting similarities and differences appear. The population pyramid of the Chadian population has a usual shape, and high concentration of people in young age groups. In fact, in 2015, 47.6 per cent of the Chadian population was aged between 0 and 14 years old, while 67.9 per cent was younger than 25 years old (UN DESA, 2015b). This clustering can be partially explained by the fact that Chad is one of the countries with the highest total fertility rates, and one of the countries with the lowest life expectancies (World Bank, 2017). The population pyramid of the migrant stock in Chad is also clustered among young age groups but it has, however, a very unusual shape. This particularity could be attributed to the fact that the migrant stock comprises data of both refugees and other migrants, which are two very different groups under many aspects, and in terms of age and gender distribution as well.

Figure 3: Total Population in Chad by Age Group, 2015

Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

Figure 4: Migrant Stock in Chad by Age Group, 2015

Source: UN DESA, 2015a.

2. Forced Migration/ Displacement

2.1. Refugees in Chad

During the last thirteen years, Chad has become an important destination country for refugees of bordering nations (UNHCR, 2017b). However, though there is a system for the protection of refugees, the national legislation does not provide for the granting of refugee and asylum status (US Department of State, 2013). In 2016, the refugee stock in Chad was 386,050, and refugees from Sudan (306,718), the CAR (72,037), and Nigeria (6,518) made up 99.8% of the total refugee population (UNHCR, 2017). At present, this stock has increased to more than 400,000, probably due to the numerous attacks of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and in southern Niger's Diffa region (UNHCR, 2017c). UNHCR (2017b) suggests that the difficult environment in Chad is expected to extend into 2018, with the biggest threats being civil unrest as well as terrorism, especially that of Boko Haram. Geographical proximity is the main reason behind the decision of these refugees of fleeing into Chad.

In fact, most refugees from Sudan are settled into refugee camps close to the border with the Sudanese region of Darfur (US Department of State, 2013). Instead, refugees from the CAR and Nigeria, are mostly settled in the Lake Chad area, which is close to the borders of the two countries. In 2016, 99 per cent of refugees were hosted in refugee camps, while only 1 per cent were living in urban areas (UNHCR, 2017b). The refugee population in Chad is vulnerable toward many abuses, including rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). They lack an adequate access to basic services, and 43 per cent of the refugees continue to face high levels of food insecurity (UN News Centre, 2016). Chronic malnutrition is above the emergency threshold in 14 camps and above the normal threshold in all camps (UNHCR, 2017b). Nevertheless, when compared to the native

Chadian population, some refugees have better access to education and health services, wood, water, and grazing land (US Department of State, 2013). This situation is leading to increasing tensions between refugees and the hosting community, and it is harmful to the integration of refugees.

Refugees from the CAR arrived in Chad in seven major population movements that took place between 2002 and 2014. The last wave was the biggest and happened as direct consequence of the 2013 coup d'état and of the violent conflicts that the CAR has experienced since then (UNHCR, 2016a). In 2015, most of the CAR's refugees (66,000) were living in six camps and host communities in the Lake Chad area, while as many as 8,500 refugees were resettled in the capital and in 19 host villages to follow an out-of-camp policy (UNHCR, 2016a). The CAR refugees have limited access to basic needs and services, and food security remains a priority. Furthermore, constant prevention of human rights abuses is needed especially in relation to child protection and SGBV. As subset of the total refugee population, those that are living in cities are experiencing particularly high levels of depravation as humanitarian operation are constrained due to bad connections (UNHCR, 2016a).

In Chad, the Sudanese refugee community represent 80% of the total refugee population (UNHCR, 2017). They are in a protracted refugee-like situation as they arrived in Chad in 2002, as direct consequence of the conflicts that took place in the Darfur region of Sudan (UN News Centre, 2016). Specifically, between 2002 and 2003, Sudanese militia used mass population displacement as war tactic, and this caused the displacement of more than 2 million people both inside and outside Sudan (Forced Migration, 2006). Delivering aid to these refugees has been recently constrained by lack of security, since that terrorists and armed groups occasionally target NGO workers and international organizations (IOs) (US Department of State, 2013). Sudanese refugees also face challenges related to food insecurity and to lack of livelihood opportunities. This problematic situation is partially a consequence of the 2014 World Food Programme Plan. The WFP strategy aimed to enhance self-resilience and integration of Sudanese refugees into Chad's economy by reducing their dependence on humanitarian aid. To achieve this goal, food rations were cut by 50 and 60 per cent. However, since there are not many livelihoods opportunities, these ration cuts have been simply devastating to the already vulnerable Sudanese refugee population. In three camps, acute levels of malnutrition reached critical levels, while around 40 per cent of the refugee population is food insecure (Boyce, & Hollingsworth, 2015).

Table 2: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Chad, Mid 2016

Country of Origin	Refugees	Asylum Seekers
Sudan	306,718	23
Central African Republic	72,037	839
Nigeria	6,518	819
Niger	436	0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	263	49
Cameroon	0	516
Other	78	17
Total	386,050	2,263

Source: UNHCR, 2017.

2.2. Refugees from Chad

The number of Chadians refugees reduced remarkably over the years, especially since 1990 when Chad started to experience a period of relative stability (Rodrigues, & Tòmas, 2017). For instance, in 2013, the stock of Chadian refugees was more than 32,000, while as of mid-2016, this stock reduced to 14,334 (UNICEF, n.d.). In the same year, the stock of asylum seekers was 3,085 (UNHCR, 2017). By comparing these figures with those of refugees in Chad reported in the previous section, it is clear that Chad is mostly a destination country for refugees rather than a source. As shown in Table 3, the overwhelming majority of refugees from Chad found refuge in neighbour states. In 2016, almost 60 per cent were settled in Sudan, 10 per cent in Cameroon, 9 per cent in France, 4 per cent in Gabon, 3 per cent in Canada, and 3 per cent in Italy (UNHCR, 2017). Regarding future trends, the stock of Chadian refugees is expected to decrease. This can be fostered by an agreement on voluntary return was signed in May 2017 between UNHCR, Chad, and Sudan (RMMS, 2017). This agreement is supposed to facilitate the return of the Chadian refugees hosted in Sudan and vice-versa.

Table 3: Chad's Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Country of Asylum, 2016

Country of Destination	Refugees	Asylum Seekers
Sudan	8,502	0
Cameroon	1,480	198
France	1,284	468
Gabon	646	82
Canada	415	630
Italy	414	0
Angola	0	780
Other	1,593	932
Total	*14,334*	*3,085*

Source: UNHCR, 2017d.

2.3. Internal Displacement in Chad

Chad has always experienced high numbers of IDPs due to both conflicts and environmental disasters (Forced Migration, 2006). Specifically, between 2006 and 2008 armed conflicts and violence displaced some 181,000 people. However, as security increased during the years, an estimated 110,000 people were able to return to their homes, while 71,000 are now in a protracted IDPs situation (IDMC, 2017). Evidences indicate that most of them prefers to resettle and integrate in host communities rather than go back to their place of usual residence (IDMC, 2017; IDMC, 2013). New conflict-related displacement started in 2015 with Boko Haram attacks in the Lake Chad region directly displacing 40,500 people (IDMC, 2017). Importantly, the figures just shown do not include the people that have been displaced due to floods and natural hazards, which represent the wide majority of the IDPs population. In fact, each year during August, southern Chad is affected by heavy rains, with different degrees of intensity (IRIN, 2013; UN OCHA, 2012). In 2012, half a million people were forced to leave their homes due to floods, representing the highest per capita disaster-induced displacement worldwide that year. Moreover, in 2013, an additional 133,000 people were forcibly displaced for the same reason (IDMC, 2017). However, by looking at Chad's IDP figures, it stands out

that these IDPs were able to come back to their place of usual residence as soon as the rainy season was over.

Currently, the stock of IDPs in Chad is 124,000 people (UNHCR, 2017b). In 2016, this stock was 108,000 (IDMC, 2017a). This increase in the IDP stock is probably due to the multiple attacks of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad area, which is also the region with the biggest community of IDPs (Amnesty International, 2017). Specifically, as of June 2017, it is estimated that 118,804 IDPs and returnees are hosted in the Lake Chad Region, while 106,048 returnees from CAR are settled in southern Chad (UNHCR, 2017c). In fact, given the geographical position of Chad in the midst of countries that in the last years have experienced various violent conflicts, the number of returnees in Chad is always been very high. For instance, in 2012, 120,000 returnees arrived in Chad from Libya. Recently, more than 105,000 came back from CAR and, in 2013, 40,600 returnees also arrived in Chad from CAR. Additionally, some other returnees arrived in Chad from Nigeria and Niger (UNHCR, 2017c; UNICEF, 2014; UN OCHA, 2012) This situation created additional pressures on Chad's reception centres, which are already stressed by IDPs and refugees. However, the Chadian government has always been coherent in helping Chad's returnees. For instance, it created a humanitarian air corridor from CAR as soon as the 2013 conflict started to repatriate Chad's citizens. Moreover, the Chadian government is now working on the distribution of documents to returnees to reduce the risk of statelessness and to enhance the integration of returnees into Chadian society (Khelifi, 2017; UNICEF, 2014).

3. Regular/ Labour Migration

3.1. Immigration

Chad has never been an attractive destination for labour migrants due to poverty, lack of economic opportunities, and political instability. The extent to which labour migration is functional to the country economy is unknown, as well as the precise number of labour migrants (IOM, 2007). According to some estimates of UN DESA (2013), the stock of international migrants in Chad in 2013 was 429,000, representing 3.3 per cent of the total population (UN DESA, 2013). Men represented the majority of this stock (52%), and women the minority (48%). The top source countries were South Sudan, Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, and Nigeria (World Bank, 2016). This fact indicates that geographical proximity is key in explaining immigration into Chad.

3.2. Emigration

Historically, Chad has experienced emigration related to transhumance and movements of pastoral groups, but also to political, economic, and climate change factors (IOM, 2007). However, the scope of emigration, as well as the importance of remittances for Chad's economy is mostly unknown. Overall, it is considered that Chad is not a country of significant emigration (IOM, 2007). For instance, the latest figures on personal remittances received are of 1994 and indicate that, at the time, remittances represented only 0.06 per cent of the GDP (World Bank, 2017).

Chadian emigration is largely seen as gendered phenomenon as men in working age represent the wide majority of the emigrant population (IOM, 2007). Much of this emigration appears to be seasonal and directed toward neighbor countries, as transhumance pastoralists have a cross-border

conception of livelihoods. In fact, the homelands of many of those nomadic groups have been separated by borders, like is the case for the Tebou divided between Chad, Niger, and Libya (Micallef, 2017; Tubiana, & Gramizzi, 2017).

According to UN DESA (2013), the 2013 stock of Chadian emigrants was 310,796, representing 2.4 per cent of the total population. The most common destinations for Chadian emigrants were bordering nations, with Cameroon (105,049) being the most recurrent, followed by Sudan (75,799), the CAR (66,690), and Nigeria (52,251). Study purposes can also be considered an important reason for Chadian emigration. In 2013, there were 1,000 tertiary students abroad, and more than 50% were studying in France (UN DESA, 2013).

4. Internal Migration

Most migration in Chad is considered to be happening within the borders of the state, and it is mainly characterized by rural-to-urban movements (IOM, REP). Since 1960, an increasing share of the Chadian population is residing in cities. In fact, in 1960, the share of urban population as percentage of the total was 6.6 per cent. In 2016, this share reached 22.6 per cent (World Bank, 2017). Hence, long term rural-to-urban movements are prominent in explaining Chad's internal migration. However, intra-rural migration and inter-city migration are also common patterns. Even if the scope of internal migration is unknown, it has been found that political, ecological, and economic factors pushed many people towards the suburbs of the capital N'Djamena (IOM, 2007).

As mentioned in the previous section, there are many nomadic pastoral groups in Chad. These groups migrate seasonally in search of grazing land, both inside and outside the borders of the state (IOM, REP). However, this instance brought noticeable conflicts over resources between nomadic groups and sedentary farmers. To reduce these instances, the Chadian government set the 1959 Law on Nomadism. This law prescribes annual meetings with the chiefs of different regions to set the date for the beginning of the transhumance period and to create a grazing corridor for transhumance groups. Moreover, this commission also includes notables, breeders, and elected representatives and is responsible of designing the itineraries of transhumance pastoralist. Accordingly, sedentary farmers are required to allow migrants to pass freely on their fields with their livestock. In practice, the lack of natural resources highly constrains this law to work efficiently, and conflicts over resources between farmers and pastoralists are still a very common issue (IOM, 2007).

5. Irregular Migration

Since 1990, Chad has been an important transit country for migrants that try to reach North Africa, particularly Libya, and to a lesser extent Europe (Hein de Hass, 2007; UNHCR, 2017a). Specifically, the Chadian Route into northern Libya is considered to be used mostly by Chadians, Sudanese and Cameroonians (Wittenberg, 2017). However, information on irregular migrant flows in Chad are scarce and uncomplete (UNHCR, 2017a). Similarly, the scope of human trafficking in Chad is unknown (US Department of State, 2017). Therefore, little is known about irregular migration in the context of Chad. Additionally, Chad is a member of ECCAS and CEMAC, and it enforce the free movement of

people within its borders. Hence, much of the irregular migration that happens in Chad is actually regular and becomes irregular only when migrants cross the border with Libya (UNECA, 2017).

According to the EU, Chad is a key country to fight irregular migration to Europe and therefore, 33 million euros of the EU Trust Fund for Africa have been given to Chad in order to curb this phenomenon. Specifically, two measures will be implemented with this investment:

- "**Support for training and public security in Chad** will serve to improve internal security by building the capacity of the security forces to perform their day-to-day mission (through training and improved working conditions) and improving relations with the local population. This measure will improve security, fostering access to farmland, pastures and natural resources and thereby contributing to stability and economic development" (European Commission, 2016).

- **"Support for mine-clearance, social protection and the development of vulnerable groups** will contribute to regional stability and improved management of migration. For instance, specific mine-clearance activities are aimed at increasing the number and total area of plots cleared and at making land safe" (European Commission, 2016).

5.1. Human Smuggling

Although the most frequent routes used by migrants to reach north Africa and eventually Europe are those going through Mali, Mauritania, Niger, or Sudan, the Chadian Route is still to some extent popular for Chadians, Sudanese, and Cameroonians (Wittenberg, 2017). In fact, some migrants that use the Khartoum Route through Sudan might chose to deviate and transit through Chad in order to reach Libya (Frontex, 2016). Similarly, according to a statement of Chadian President Deby, as much as 90 per cent of the refugees that transited in Niger on their way to Italy in the beginning of 2017 also transited through Chad to apparently evade blockages by militia groups in northern Niger (ANSA, 2017). However, there are good evidences that irregular flows in Chad, as opposed to Niger, Mali, and Sudan, are negligible. For instance, in 2016, only between 400 and 700 people reported transiting through Chad on their way to Libya (UNHCR, 2017a).

Behind human smuggling in Chad, there are Saharan tribal smugglers who are active in the northern part of the country. The Tebou, in particular, are considered to orchestrate the smuggling activities between Chad, Niger, and Libya (Micallef, 2017; Rhipto, 2015). Their smuggling network operates with different degrees of cohesiveness. In fact, most Tebou smugglers argue that they are freelance and that they are not part of any broader organization (Micallef, 2017; Frontex, 2016). However, it is not clear which cities are key for smuggling activities in Chad, and different reports illustrate different possibilities. Plausibly, the most prominent hubs for human smuggling activities in Chad are Abéché, Zouar, and Faya Largeau (Rhipto, 2015; UNHCR, 2017a).

5.2. Trafficking in Human Beings

Chad is ranked Tier 2 Watch List by the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, meaning that Chad does not meet the minimum standards for the cancellation of human trafficking activities. Apparently, the Chadian government did not take enough actions to combat trafficking, given that it has been ranked

Tier 2 Watch List since 2010 with only some minor improvements in 2014, 2015, and 2016 (US Department of State, 2017a).

Currently, human trafficking in Chad is a problematic phenomenon, as Chad is source, transit, and destination of victims of human trafficking (VoTs). Trafficking is mostly internal but it can be international as well, and it especially affects women and children. Recruitment usually happens through family lines, meaning that parents entrust children to other relatives in exchange of promises related to apprenticeship, education, or money. However, children will find themselves involved into involuntary domestic servitude or involuntary herding. Women and girls are often trafficked for the purposes of domestic work and sexual exploitation. Instances of forced marriages are also common (US Department of State, 2017a; IOM, 2011). People that are trafficked internationally are usually brought to Cameroon, the CAR, Nigeria, and Sudan (US Department of State, 2017). As specific sub-set of the Chadian population, refugees and IDPs are considered particularly vulnerable toward trafficking. The most vulnerable among them include female-headed households, unaccompanied and separated children, and pregnant women. Traffickers exploit the vulnerability of these individuals and travel regularly to transit and refugee sites to find potential victims (US Department of State, 2017a; IOM, 2011).

Chad's governmental efforts in fighting human trafficking have decreased over time. Additionally, there is no law that prohibits or criminalizes trafficking. Instead, there are some laws against prostitution, labor exploitation, slavery, and servitude. However, the penalties related to these crimes are not always sufficiently stringent. Moreover, these laws are not enough to combat human trafficking issues. Therefore, the main recommendations for Chad would include filling the existing legislative gap by creating a law that criminalizes trafficking of human beings; increasing penalties of existing laws to act as deterrent possible offenders; and working closely with NGOs and IOs to protect former VoTs (US Department of State, 2017a; IOM, 2011).

6. Migrant's Vulnerabilities and Protection Issues

Even if it is one of the least developed countries in the world, Chad is one of the top destination countries for refugees in West and Central Africa (UNDP, 2016). Additionally, Chad has always had high numbers of IDPs, and as shall be explained, the refugee and IDP population in Chad are considered extremely vulnerable. The refugee and IDP population in Chad is vulnerable toward violence and abuses, including rape and SGBV (UNHCR, 2016a). Constant prevention of human rights abuses is therefore needed, especially in the Lake Chad area where attacks of Boko Haram on refugee and IDP centres are increasing (Amnesty International, 2017; UNICEF, 2017). Additionally, refugees and IDPs in Chad lack an adequate access to basic services, and 43 per cent of the refugees continue to face high levels of food insecurity (UN News Centre, 2016). In fact, malnutrition and food scarcity is the biggest problem faced by the refugee and IDPs population in Chad. Chronic malnutrition is above the emergency threshold in 14 camps and above the normal threshold in all camps (UNHCR, 2017b; UNICEF, 2017). As subset of the total refugee population, those that are living in cities are experiencing particularly high levels of depravation as humanitarian operation are constrained due to difficulties in reaching them (UNHCR, 2016a).

7. Relevant National Policies and Stakeholders

Chad has no overarching policy framework linking migration and development (IOM, 2007). However, the country has different legislations regarding migration management.

Regarding regular immigration, the government of Chad has regulations related to entry, stay and permanence of foreigners (US Department of State, 2017). Moreover, by principle, foreign workers are subjects to the same rights and duties of Chadian nationals (CARIM, 2009). Foreigners can be naturalized after 15 years of residence in Chad, but only if they have "good health" and "good morals" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007).

During the literature review of this paper, nearly no information was found regarding Chad emigrants, and diaspora policies. Apparently, there are no Chadian policies nor legislative frameworks linking emigration and development. This could be partially related to the fact that Chad is not a country of significant emigration (IOM, 2007). Importantly, Chadians do not enjoy the right of dual citizenship (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007).

At present, the Chadian government has not ratified any of the most important ILO conventions regarding labour migration. This instance indicates a first gap in the migration management context which is related to the lack of regulations for regular labour immigration and emigration. In fact, none of the following conventions has been ratified nor actions have been taken in their regards (OHCHR, 2017; ILO, 2017).

- 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (no. 97) – ILO
- 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (no. 143) – ILO
- 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Signed in 2012 but not ratified yet)
- 1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (no.181) – ILO

At the regional level, the most important regulations for regular immigration and emigration are those settled by the ECCAS and the CEMAC. In fact, these two communities aim to enhance cooperation and exchange among its members. Chad is one of the few countries of these communities that fully implemented the free movement of persons (UNECA, 2017).

Regarding the protection of IDPs, Chad has ratified the 2011 Kampala convention and started to develop a framework to ensure the protection and the assistance of IDPs (IDMC, 2013). In this respect, the most important stakeholder is the National Commission for the Reception and Reinsertion of Refugees and Repatriation, which was able to play an important role in assisting IDPs in the last years (ICRC, 2015). At the end of 2013, however, the framework to protect and assist IDPs prescribed by the Kampala convention had yet to be developed (IDMC, 2013). At the national level, Chad has no law to provide the granting of asylum and refugee status. Yet, the government has a system for the protection of refugees and have ratified both the 1951 Convention relating the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2015; US Department of State, 2013).

Chad does not follow good practices in respect to human smuggling and human trafficking as it has ratified only the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air remains unratified

(UNDOC, 2017). At the national level, there are no laws that criminalize and punish trafficking offences, indicating a major gap in the Chadian legislative framework. Furthermore, the various articles of the Labour Code and Constitution that prohibits crimes related to trafficking (such as forced labour, slavery, labour exploitation) do not have sufficiently stringent punishments to deter these crimes from happening (US Department of State, 2017a).

Table 4: Chad's Key Migration Policy Response

Policy	Content
Kampala Convention	It is the main regulatory framework for IDPs. It remarks that the National Government has the primary responsibility toward IDPs.
	The convention extensively addresses the multiple causes of internal displacement, including conflict, violence, disasters, development induced displacement, and natural hazards.
	Moreover, it recognizes the central role of NGOs and host communities in assisting IDPs, and it prescribes that the Government has to cover the needs of both IDPs and host communities.
Ordinance n°33 of 14 August 1962 on Chadian nationality	It is the main framework for Chadian nationality, and naturalization of foreigners. Citizenship is given only to those children whose parents are both Chadian. Alternatively, if only one parent is from Chad, the citizenship is given if the child is in risk of statelessness.
	Naturalization can occur only if a person has lived in Chad for at least 15 years, and have good health and morals.
	Dual citizenship is not addressed by this law, and Chadian nationality is lost upon acquisition of another.
Penal code article 5; 279 and 280	These are the articles of the penal code that punish crimes related to trafficking in person. Article 5 punishes forced and bounded labour, while articles 279 and 280 prohibit the prostitution of children and servitude.
Labor Code, Law nr 038/PR/96 of 11 December 1996. See articles 1 to 67	Provides for various rights and privileges for foreign and national workers. On principle, the Labor Code prescribes the same rights and duties to both foreigners and nationals.
Constitution of 31 March 1996, revised on 15 July 2005.	Art.15 prescribe equal treatment between nationals and foreign nationals.
	Art.44 liberty of movement for Chadian nationals
	Art.46 elaborates the right of asylum.

Sources: CARIM, 2007, US Department of State, 2017a; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007; ICRC, 2015; IDMC 2013.

Gaps

During the analysis of this paper, it stood out that a first gap in the context of migration in Chad is related to data collection (IOM, 2007). This lack of information on the scope of immigration or emigration in Chad highly constrain the opportunities for evidence based policymaking. Additionally,

in the last 10 years, only one migration country profile on Chad has been made, and the most recent information on remittances are those of 1994 (IOM, 2007; World Bank, 2017).

Several gaps have been identified in relation to the legal framework of migration. Firstly, there is no national regulation to grant refugee and asylum seeker status (US Department of State, 2013). Additionally, although Chad is an important transit country for migrants, the government has not signed any international convention against smuggling (UNODC, 2017). Similarly, the Chadian government did not sign any of the most important ILO conventions concerning labour immigration and labour emigration (ILO, 2017; OHCHR, 2017). Lastly, there are no national legislations prohibiting and criminalising trafficking in human beings (US Department of State, 2017).

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