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Study on Migration Routes in West and Central Africa

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Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
ACPMD	African Common Position on Migration and Development
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AU	African Union
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAR	Central African Republic
CARIM	Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European Union External Action/European External Action Service
EPSC	European Political Strategy Centre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRFMA	Inter-Regional Forum on Migration in Africa
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
MPC	Migration Policy Centre
MPFA	Migration Policy Framework for Africa
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTM	Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PoC	Persons of Concern
REC	Regional Economic Community
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
SGBV	Sexual- and Gender-Based Violence
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VoT	Victim of trafficking
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene

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Disclaimer

The analysis, results and recommendations in this paper represent the opinion of the authors and are not necessarily representative of the position of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the complex migration trends in West and Central Africa. Based on a desk review of the existing literature and data, the report presents the main drivers and trends of migration in the region, the main routes migrants take to move from the region to get to Europe, migrant vulnerabilities, and the policy and programme responses to migration (multilateral and inter-regional frameworks, regional organizations, and bilateral agreements). The migration contexts of thirteen countries in West and Central Africa are examined: **Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.** These countries are, to different extents, all origin, transit, and/or destination countries of migrants. In West and Central Africa, asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants move within the region and beyond it, motivated by different and often overlapping factors, including conflicts, political and socio-economic conditions, and environmental causes. Economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, tend to use similar migration routes and modes of travel. Among the group of migrants originating from the focus countries there are also irregular migrants and victims of human trafficking. For most "irregular" West-African migrants, migration is "regular" in the sense that movements of citizens of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are prescribed by the freedom of movement protocols of ECOWAS. However, while citizens in this region have the right to free movement, they often lack the correct or recognised documents for movement, making them "irregular" migrants in the region. Even with the ECOWAS free movement protocol in place, there are many barriers to regular migration for prospective migrants, including administrative and bureaucratic challenges and a lack of governmental ability to implement ECOWAS legislations. Corruption is also a major impediment to regular migration, as paying bribes to border patrols is, in many countries, an institutionalised norm. Bribes are often required even when migrants are in possession of proper documentation. Most migrants in the West and Central African region move within the region, and they largely do so by travelling by highways in private cars or buses. Contrary to popular belief, the minority of people that migrate from the region seek to reach Europe. Among those migrants that seek to reach Europe, most rely for the last part of their journey on smugglers that will bring them from some northern Nigerien or Malian cities to either Algeria or, more commonly, Libya. Generally, the complex nature of migration in the region makes it a challenge to identify different types of migrants and their specific vulnerabilities and needs. For these reasons, the flows of migration in the region are often referred to as mixed or complex migration.

Drivers of Migration

The factors that lead people to make the decision to migrate are often called the drivers of migration. Such drivers apply to situations of voluntary and forced as well as temporary and permanent movements happening through regular and irregular channels. Very generally, it can be said that the West and Central African region faces challenges associated with **low human and economic development**. However, despite the common view that migration in the region is primarily driven by poverty, conflicts, and harsh climate, these push factors are negligible next to economic reasons, family reunification, employability, and education. Compared to other parts of Africa, a **'culture of migration'** is an important driver in a number of countries and it can be argued that it is an underling driver for migration in the whole region.

Migration from the countries of analysis, and especially from **Chad, Gambia, Niger, Mauritania, Ghana,** and **Senegal,** is largely driven by economic factors. Additionally, **climate conditions (droughts and flooding), food insecurity,** and **health epidemics** (especially the 2013-2015 Ebola crisis) have been important drivers of migration from the West and Central Africa region and are still important in many countries of analysis,

notably **Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone,** and **Mali.** In addition, **violent conflicts, political oppression, and persecution** are also important drivers of migration. This is especially true for the **Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone,** and **Côte d'Ivoire.** Moreover, violence inflicted by the terrorist group Boko Haram has been an important driver of migration from **Niger** and **Nigeria.** Overall, demographic pressures due to high population growth are an underling cause for migration in the whole region.

Often, it is a mix of different factors that lead to the decision to migrate and the factors mentioned above are overlapping. Drivers of migration from **Mali**, for example, are especially diverse. Migration is promoted as a rite of passage for young men, but it is also an important livelihood strategy, as circular and seasonal migration are crucial for Malian nomadic pastoral groups. Moreover, migration from the country is also driven by political instability and violent conflicts, droughts, and desertification. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that within the literature, the reasons for which individuals decide to migrate from the thirteen focus countries of these report are similar, yet very diverse. Each country has a specific context that determines different reasons and motivations of migration.

Irregular Migration

In contradiction of the common perception that African migration is largely irregular and facilitated by smuggling, much literature and data on migration from West and Central Africa demonstrates that most movement is in fact regular. Thanks to ECOWAS, most African migrants in the region migrate with valid passports and other travel documentation. Their movements can be characterised as irregular if these migrants cross the border with Libya or Algeria without a proper visa. Alternatively, an individual may be considered an irregular migrant if s/he lacks the documentation defined in the ECOWAS free movement protocol. Challenges to regular movement can be attributed to a multitude of factors that will be referred to as **'barriers to free movement**,' among which the most prominent are low levels of development, widespread corruption, lack of administrative services, and ill-functioning bureaucratic systems. Most irregular migrants moving within the West and Central Africa region are not criminals who surreptitiously pass border as direct security threats, and they do not necessarily rely on smugglers. Rather, many such migrants are common people that migrate for many, often overlapping reasons related to employability, family reunification, education, and lifestyle choices. These 'irregular migrants' largely move openly in, between, and from Africa on air-conditioned buses or with private cars. While there is limited data on size of the irregular migrant population as a share of the total migrant population, it is important to note that, in many cases, there is nothing "irregular" about the movements of such migrants because they are entitled to move freely within the ECOWAS region. As such, in the context of West and Central Africa, it is considered key to tackle the 'barriers to free movement' to reduce irregular migration.

Given the above discussion, it is nonetheless relevant to address human smuggling, as it still occurs in the focus countries, especially in the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), Nigeria, and Libya. Specifically, smuggling often occurs from few northern Nigerien and Malian cities onwards because the free movement protocol of ECOWAS entitles West and Central African migrants to move without visas within the region and eliminate the need for smugglers in the first part of the journey. Migrants would only need a smuggler to reach Libya or Algeria, and therefore they would usually travel with their own means for the first leg of the journey. The most prominent cities for human smuggling identified within the literature are Agadez, Madama, Arlit, and Seguedine in Niger and Bamako, Gao, and Timbuktu in Mali. In these particular cities and in the countries previously mentioned, smuggling networks have evolved over the past 5 to 10 years and currently represent the biggest source of income for criminal

organizations. In these irregular migration hubs, human smuggling and human trafficking often occur with the knowledge and compliance of government authorities, reflecting systemic corruption. Smuggling networks often involve different independent actors with various degrees of flexibility that may be part of a broader, transnational chain. Given the multiple actors involved in smuggling and trafficking, identifying and arresting smugglers and disrupting their business models can be challenging. Moreover, there are low barriers to entry to become a smuggler; often the only prerequisites to become a smuggler are access to a vehicle and the ability to travel in the desert. For these reasons, policy operations that aim to stop irregular migration on a particular route by disrupting a human smuggling hub may simply result in a redirection of smuggling operation away from current routes, pushing migrants to use potentially more expensive, dangerous, and less visible routes.

Despite policy support of freedom of movement in the ECOWAS region, trafficking of persons in the region nevertheless occurs, stemming from the fact that trafficking can occur with legal documents but will always end up in an exploitative situation for the migrant upon arrival. In West and Central Africa, native and migrant children, women, and men are subjected to trafficking within the respective country as well as internationally. The main purposes for which individuals are trafficked in the region include **forced labour, domestic servitude, and sexual exploitation**. The most vulnerable populations to trafficking in the region are women and children, who are the predilected victims of traffickers. Specifically, **Nigerian women and girls** are considered the most at risk of international trafficking, with the final destination of exploitation being Europe. Internal trafficking of men, women, and children is more prevalent in **Mauritania**, where the slavery and trade of human beings for the purpose of exploitation occurs at a very high rate. Lastly, European sex tourism is a major issue in some of the countries of analysis. For instance, child sex tourism is predominant in **Gambia**, where children from poor families are often sexually exploited by wealthy Europeans.

Forced Migration/Displacement

Forced displacement is also a serious concern to be addressed in the region and presents a significant challenge for achieving peace, security, sustainable development, and economic well-being. The countries in the West and Central Africa region are often simultaneously countries of origin as well as host countries for forced migrants, including those displaced by conflict and those displaced by environmental shocks. A complex history of inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts, weak governance, chronic insecurity, increasing environmental degradation, and other persistent development challenges contribute to forced migration and displacement in the region. New refugees continue to arrive at camps across the region as a direct consequence of Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area, but also as a result of the ongoing violence in the CAR and northern Mali. **Nigeria, the CAR, and Mali** are the main countries of origin for forced migrants in the region, while **Chad, Niger, and Mauritania** are main host countries. **Chad currently hosts the largest refugee population** in the region. Not all displacement from the thirteen focus countries of this report is to other countries in the West and Central Africa. Other African countries, the United States, Canada, and European countries are also important host countries for refugees from the West and Central African region.

While the focus of this report is on international migration, **internal displacement** is nevertheless an important trend, as internally displaced persons (IDPs) may become future refugees and ir/regular migrants. While there is limited data and literature regarding internal displacement in West and Central Africa, it is clear that it is a serious concern in most of the focus countries, especially in Nigeria. As in the

case of international forced migration, internal displacement is supported by a variety of often overlapping factors, including conflicts, violence, and environmental factors such as droughts, floods, and soil erosion.

Regular/ Labour Migration

The literature on regular migration in and from West and Central Africa is scarce. Generally, migration literature on this region predominately focuses on forced displacement as well as irregular migration movements, and regular migration, especially for the purpose of labour, is much less studied. The structure and policies of ECOWAS are key to understand mobility in West Africa. With the exception of **Mauritania**, **Chad**, and the **CAR**, the other focus countries of this report are ECOWAS members and have ratified ECOWAS' protocol for free movement of persons, which entails a visa-free regime for its members.

ECOWAS member states adopted the first protocol related to migration in 1979 (ECOWAS, 2016a). This protocol involved three phases: right of entry and abolition of visa; Right of Residence, and; Right of Establishment. The Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa, which has been implemented, establishes the right of an ECOWAS citizen to travel freely through the region without a visa, although member states still reserve the right to refuse entry to "inadmissible immigrants" based on the laws of that member state. The second phase, Right of Residence, has also been implemented. However, the third phase, which deals with the right of establishment in another member state, is still being implemented in most member states. Different focus countries have ratified this protocol differently, which has consequences for the mobility patterns within these countries. Importantly, regular and labour migration particularly in the West African region is the highest in all of Africa, mainly because of ECOWAS. The Central African country **Chad** has an agreement on the free movement of persons within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) rather than within ECOWAS.

Bilateral agreements by countries in this region are also important in facilitating regular labour migration both within the region and internationally. **Burkina Faso** has old bilateral agreements with Côte d'Ivoire (1960), Niger (1964), and Mali (1969), though these are generally no longer considered to be valid. **Gambia** has bilateral agreements with Spain (2006), Italy (2010), Qatar (2010), and Taiwan (2010) on migrant employment, irregular migration, and trafficking. **Guinea** has bilateral agreements with Spain (2006) and Switzerland (2011), while **Côte d'Ivoire** has a bilateral agreement with France (1992) on the circulation of migrants and matters of social security. Moreover, **Mali** is party to bilateral agreements with Burkina Faso (1969), Ghana (1977), Guinea (1964), Mauritania (1973), Niger (1964), Cameroon (1964), and Libya (1980). Mali has also agreed to enter visa-free regimes with Morocco (2006), Algeria (2006), and Tunisia (2006). Such agreements also exist with France (1994) and Spain (2007). **Mauritania** has bilateral agreements with France (1992), Spain (2007), Mali (1963), Senegal (1972), Algeria (1996), Tunisia (1964), and Gambia (1966). **Senegal** has agreements with France (2008), and Spain (2008), on addressing irregular migration and supporting means of regular labour migration. Finally, **Sierra Leone** has drafted readmission agreements with the UK and the Netherlands and is party to agreements that allow for labour market access without work permits with Cuba, China, and India.

Despite the perception of Africa as a continent of mass migration driven by conflicts, poverty, and harsh climate, the literature reveals more nuanced realities of migration in the region. Even if West African migration has recently increased, the trend has been fostered by processes of development and social transformation rather than by increased poverty or conflicts. In 2016, migration flows from West and Central Africa were estimated around 12 million, and refugee movements represented only a small fraction

of the total. Moreover, it is estimated that between 2 per cent and 3 per cent of the West and Central African population are international migrants, a figure which is slightly below the world average.

Similarly, although it is generally assumed that African migration flows are mainly directed toward Europe, existing evidence strongly indicates that most migration in West and Central Africa happens within the region and remains extensively intra-African. Some estimates, for example, indicate that migration flows within West Africa are ten times higher than those toward Europe. Similarly, other sources indicate that intra-regional migration in the West African region accounts for 75 per cent of all moves, with migration to Europe accounting for only 15 per cent. Migration in West and Central Africa should primarily be considered an intra-African livelihood strategy, which is generally of a temporary and circular nature. For some countries, such as Mali and Senegal, it is also considered a rite of passage to adulthood. For some others, like Chad and Mauritania or in northern parts of Niger, seasonal mobility is linked to long-standing livelihood strategies, especially for herders and other pastoral groups that need to move with their livestock seasonally in order to survive. For these reasons, the visa-free regime of ECOWAS - even if constrained by challenges to capacity - is crucial in facilitating the West and Central African population to move.

External Migration Routes

There are four routes commonly used by migrants leaving West and Central Africa: the Central Mediterranean Route, the Western Mediterranean Route, the Western African Route, and the Air Route.

The **Central Mediterranean Route** is currently the most used by West and Central African migrants who try to reach North Africa and, to a lesser extent, Europe. This route connects Niger, Libya, and Italy. Irregular maritime border crossings directly from North Africa to Italy and Malta are also referred to broadly as belonging to the Central Mediterranean Route. In 2014, an estimated 83 per cent of boat arrivals in Italy departed from Libya. Only 20 per cent of migrants who follow the Central Mediterranean route ultimately depart to Europe. The remaining 80 per cent stay in Africa, and their migration should be considered as trans-Saharan, temporary, and mostly circular tied to livelihood strategies.

The **Western Mediterranean Route** connects West and Central Africa with Morocco and Spain. For many years, this route has been widely popular, mostly among Guinean, Ivorian, and Gambian migrants. In more recent years, the numbers of migrants using this route has fluctuated while generally increasing. The number of migrants using this route peaked in 2016. As Mali is the main transit country for people using this route, this figure may reflect the lawlessness experienced in Northern Mali. The situation has brought increasing involvement of terrorists and armed groups into human trafficking and especially human smuggling business along this route. This instance has led to the development of more, better, and increasingly specialised smuggling services, which explain the growing popularity of the western Mediterranean route.

The **Western African Route** connects West and Central Africa with the Spanish Canary Islands, with Mauritania being one of the main transit countries on this route. The Western African Route is especially popular among Moroccans and Senegalese. It is not a fully active smuggling route at present, as only 671 irregular border crossings were registered in 2016. However, the existing literature remarks that this route could be easily re-activated by either regional instability and conflicts or by a drop in vigilance and border management efforts.

The **Air Route** comprises all possible flights originating from West and Central Africa to destinations in Europe**.** From the perspective of European states, operations related to air routes present unique challenges, particularly as most migrants using air routes enter Europe with a valid visa. Such migrants may then lapse into irregularity if and when they overstay their visas.

Policy Responses

At the **national level,** there are some frameworks in place to address regular migration, forced migration, and irregular migration, but most address only administrative matters and the fight against human trafficking without directly linking migration to a broader development strategy. Policies in Ghana and Nigeria, are an exception, and have a slightly clearer link between migration and development. Research and data regarding the effectiveness of these policies are generally scarce, however. National governments in the region are faced with limited capacities and resources to design, implement, and evaluate laws and policies related to migration management. Additionally, authorities in the region may conflate human trafficking and smuggling, and many do not understand and/or exploit the development potential of migration sufficiently.

On a **regional level**, the **African Union (AU)** promotes the integration of regional economic communities (RECs), the free movement of people, and the development potentials of migration. Other regional frameworks relevant to migration in West and Central Africa include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States **(CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the G5 Sahel,** and **the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).** As previously discussed, ECOWAS is especially relevant in shaping the freedom of movement regime in the West African region. The Central African country Chad also has an agreement on the free movement of persons within ECCAS and CEMAC. Furthermore, multiple inter-regional frameworks to address migration exist, especially between the AU and EU. These frameworks address aspects of migration and development, such as visa facilitation, and visa free regimes, but also the fight against human trafficking, and the protection of migrants, including labour migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and victims of trafficking.

Moreover, several **multilateral frameworks** including UN and ILO Conventions address issues of migration. No country among the thirteen focus countries has ratified all international conventions relevant to the field of migration[1], although Burkina Faso has ratified eleven out of twelve. Five conventions, namely the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol, and the 2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol, have been ratified by all thirteen focus countries. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by twelve of the thirteen countries; this excludes Guinea, which has only acceded to the 1989 Convention. **International Actors** in the field of migration, especially the International Organisation for Migration **(IOM)** and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees **(UNHCR)** are active in providing assistance to governments and migrants in the region.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The aim of this report is to gather and synthesize the available data and evidence on migration within West and Central Africa in order to identify particular development needs and challenges in the area of migration. The report indicates that migratory movements in and out of West and Central Africa are diverse

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[1] For a comprehensive view of these policies see table 6, pg. 73.

and significant in volume, particularly in comparison to other African regions. Nevertheless, migration in the region is still slightly lower than the world average. Migration in West and Central Africa is characterized by largely complex flows of migrants comprised of asylum seekers, refugees, and especially regular migrants that move for economic reasons, study and family reunification purposes. Moreover, the flows are driven by a range of different factors: low human and economic development, strong climate conditions, demographic pressures, health epidemics (such as Ebola), violent conflicts, political oppression, persecution, employment possibilities, and family reunification.

Considering the lack of data on migration trends and patterns in the West and Central African region, future efforts should be made to increase the capacities for data collection, especially in distinguishing between regular and irregular migration. This distinction is crucial to enable evidence-informed policy making and to support more informed debates on migration in this region. In terms of national migration policies, existing frameworks in West and Central Africa tend to only address administration matters and the fight against human trafficking, with states failing to introduce comprehensive migration policies and to integrate migration into national development strategies. Moreover, serious implementation problems constrain existing policy frameworks. These issues seem less relevant in the contexts of Ghana and Nigeria, which have the most advanced migration policies in the region. Future efforts should ensure that drafted national migration policies have the resources, capacity, and support at the political level to be implemented. Efforts to understand the effectiveness of these policies must also be made.

Despite existing frameworks, including national policies, bilateral agreements and ECOWAS, regional cooperation remains a challenge due to corruption as well as a lack of capacities and political willingness on part of the member states. None of the thirteen focus countries in West and Central Africa has ratified all International Conventions relevant to the field of migration. Even in ECOWAS, for example, many member states have not yet implemented the free movement of persons, despite ratification of the majority of the other protocols. Greater commitment to bilateral labour agreements and regional cooperation instruments could support the regular movements of citizens within the region. Moreover, a full implementation of the free movement in person protocol would enhance the positive outcome of migration on development by increasing seasonal and circular migration and supporting the sending of remittances. To reduce irregular migration, the countries of analysis and the international community should focus on governance interventions and anti-corruption reforms, especially in Niger, Mali, and Libya. In addition, in the context of irregular migration to EU countries in pursuit of economic and livelihood opportunities, bilateral agreements with EU countries that facilitate and regularize seasonal labour migration should also be considered. Imposing increasing barriers could, instead, result in more permanent settlement, increases in irregular migration, and a weakening of the positive effects of migration such as skill transfers, the sending of remittances, and impacts on development.

In the West and Central African region, finding more durable solutions for refugees and IDPs remains a challenge. Expanding protection and humanitarian assistance beyond refugee camps is one option to support displaced populations. Another option would be to develop labour migration regimes for refugees, or regular migration to countries beyond the region could be facilitated by the opening of more humanitarian corridors. Creating more regular options for migration, perhaps through increased regional cooperation and improved bilateral labour agreements, is also considered key to addressing many of the vulnerabilities faced by forced migrants in West and Central Africa.

To reduce human smuggling toward Europe from West and Central Africa, the focus should not be on curbing irregular migration along a particular route but instead on curbing criminal activity in all of the G5

Sahel countries. Additionally, promoting development and the creation of livelihoods opportunities in the Sahel, particularly through capacity building, education, and the creation of durable livelihoods solutions, is advised. As such, intra-African circular and seasonal migration should be encouraged. Additionally, efforts to promote and develop regular intraregional mobility should be given particular attention. Similarly, by acknowledging that there is no single solution to the complex issues in Libya, the EU plan to crackdown on smuggling and trafficking activities should be accompanied by other initiatives to strengthen governance capacities and the rule of law. Interventions should address building state institutions, reducing insecurity and impunity, engaging communities and stakeholders in the development process, providing alternatives to smuggling, and mobilizing political will to cease migrant exploitation.

Africa's population is expected to double by 2050, and African development is predicted to increase in the future. According to migration transition theories, expected demographic pressures, social transformations, and increased development will foster migration streams by increasing the capabilities and aspirations of individuals to migrate. Migration flows within the region and beyond are therefore expected to increase. Despite EU policies and the possible developments in Libya, migrants will continue to seek safety and new opportunities in and beyond Europe. Migration will continue beyond any restrictions, push-backs, or border controls. Therefore, going forward, a more realistic, informed, and long-term approach toward migration in the future is vital to better manage human migration flows within and outside of West and Central Africa.

1. Introduction

This report has been commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH as part of a series of projects that explore (irregular) migration in Africa. Through these projects, GIZ aims to better understand the complex dynamics and realities of migration in and from West and Central Africa. In this context, it is particularly important to understand the main drivers of migration as well as the routes migrants use in their journeys.

The report focuses on thirteen countries in the region, namely Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Libya is also included given its potential impacts on migration flows from the region.

Figure 1: Regional Map of West and Central Africa

Source: Authors with National Geographic Map Maker

Migratory movements in and out of West and Central Africa are diverse and significant in volume. The flows of people in, between, and from countries in the region can best be characterized as mixed in nature[2]. Forced[3] migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, as well as voluntary migrants[4] move within and beyond the region based on a mix of factors, including conflict, political and socio-economic conditions, persecution, health epidemics, and environmental stresses in their

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[2] Mixed flows are defined in the IOM Glossary on Migration as "complex migratory population movements that include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants" (IOM, 2011).

[3] Forced migration is "a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes" (IOM, 2011). This includes environment-, development- and forced or conflict-induced displacement. Forced or conflict-induced displacement "is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict [or] civil unrest" (IOM, 2011). The form of displacement has consequences for migrants' and states' legal rights and obligations, which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation.

[4] The Glossary of Key migration terminology provided in Annex A can be consulted to understand the differences between different types of migrants as well as other specific terms mentioned throughout this report.

countries of origin. These migrants[5] often use similar migration routes and modes of travel. Sometimes smugglers[6] facilitate migration from and within the region. Migration flows can also include victims of trafficking (VoTs)[7] and irregular migrants[8]. Note, however, that migrant categories are non-exclusive, sometimes are overlapping, and are subject to change over time. For instance, an irregular migrant might have been forced to migrate and labour-seeking. Similarly, a regular migrant might overstay its permit and became irregular. Categorization is therefore a challenge, yet is crucial under a policy perspective. Different types of migrants might have specific vulnerabilities and needs, and categorization, together with its flaws and conceptual and practical challenges, is essential to find adequate policy responses.

This report gathers and synthesizes available data and evidence on migration flows within and beyond West and Central Africa to identify particular development needs and challenges in the area of migration in West and Central Africa. The report has been compiled based on desk research. Given its reliance on secondary data sources, the report is only and detailed and nuanced as its source materials. It is therefore recommended that GIZ country offices build on this report by cross-referencing its findings with on-the-ground experiences and sources, and it should be read in conjunction with the existing development portfolio of GIZ in the respective country.

Note on Data

Data on mixed migration trends and routes in and from West and Central Africa is largely scattered, if available at all. Different data sources may provide different numbers on migrant stocks and flows and their composition given differences in estimation methodologies, reliance on anecdotal evidence, and different operational definitions of concepts. Furthermore, the differentiation between involuntary, regular, and irregular (labour) migrants is only possible to a limited extent. In particular, data on irregular migration is, due to its nature, difficult to measure. These caveats imply that data presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the full picture of the migration situation in the countries of analysis. Yet, with this data is still possible to provide an overview of migration trends to, from and between Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of key migration trends in and from West and Central Africa by looking at different kinds of migration, namely irregular, forced, and regular/labour migration movements. This includes a short section on smuggling as well as trafficking[9]. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the most prominent routes migrants commonly take out

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[5] The term migrant is used throughout this report in a way that it encompasses different types of migrants (including voluntary and forced, regular and irregular) unless otherwise specified.

[6] Smuggling is defined as "the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the illegal entry into a state of which that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident" (INTERPOL, n.d.).

[7] Trafficking in persons is defined as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" (IOM, 2011).

[8] Irregular migrants lack legal status, for instance, because of leaving, entering, residing, or working in a country without the required (travel) documents or authorisation (IOM, 2011).

[9] There is a "prevailing confusion between smuggling of migrants and concepts such as irregular migration and trafficking in persons" (UNODC, 2011, p. 5). Smuggling is defined in the "Smuggling of Migrants Protocol", which is a supplement to the United Nations Convention on Transitional Organized Crime, as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident". In contrast, trafficking in persons is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons as "the

of the region. Section 4 focuses on policy responses to migration at the national, regional, and international levels. Finally, Section 5 concludes with an overview of identified development challenges, needs, and gaps in the current evidence on migration in and from West and Central Africa. Several annexes complement the main body of the report; a series of short migration profiles for each of the thirteen focus countries are included in the annexes.

2. Migration Trends in West and Central Africa

Migration in West and Central Africa is a complex phenomenon. This section of the report summarizes the main migration trends in the region. The section provides in-depth review of irregular and forced migration movements in the region. The section also addresses labour migration through regular channels. A short analysis of remittances to West and Central Africa concludes the section.

2.1. Drivers of Migration in the Region

The factors that lead people to make the decision to migrate through both regular and irregular channels are often called the **drivers of migration.** This includes both voluntary and forced movements, as well as temporary and permanent movements (Van Hear, Bakewell, & Long, 2012). Though the drivers of migration in West and Central African countries share similarities, different conditions and contexts in each country strongly influence individual decisions to migrate. Annex B presents a comparison of the focus countries in terms of basic country indicators and relevant development indicators (e.g. Human Development Index, unemployment levels, Multidimensional Poverty Index headcount) based on the most recent data available. As a review of this information reveals, the region as a whole faces challenges associated with low human and economic development (UNDP, 2016). Mobility within the region often occurs as a response to these challenges. Violent conflicts, political oppression, and persecution also contribute to forced migration from and within specific countries in the region, as so environmental factors that impact people's food security and livelihoods. Nevertheless, migration in West and Central Africa is foremost voluntary and driven by development, education, employment, and economic growth (Flahaux & de Haass, 2016, Unicef, 2016). An additional underlying driver of migration in the region is the 'culture of migration,' which may position international migration as a rite of passage into adulthood and as a normal part of the life trajectory. This 'culture of migration' is particularly prominent in some rural communities in Chad, Mali, Niger, and Senegal. Importantly, smuggling of migrants in West and Central Africa only occurs from some key cities of northern Niger and Mali onwards. Prior to these smuggling hubs, both regular and irregular migrants may simply have travelled from their country's capital to their destination using the transportation provided by bus companies or by taking private cars (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

Migration in and out of the **Central African Republic (CAR)** is largely forced and highly linked to perpetuated conflicts. Since its independence from France in 1960, the CAR has suffered from multiple coups d'état, conflicts, and weak leadership (Dukhan, 2016). The most recent coup d'état happened in March 2013, and violence and armed conflict have been devastating the country ever since (Mangan & Murray, 2017). Conflicts between armed groups have resulted in massive human rights violations, and

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recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation."

conflicting parties have participated in massacres, torture, looting, and the destruction of entire villages (Isaacs-Martin, 2016). The current situation of violence in the CAR has escalated rapidly, and it is considered to be worse now than in 2016 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2017; Invisible Children, 2017).

Outbreaks of intra-state violence have similarly compelled significant migration from **Nigeria**. The Boko Haram crisis, which started in 2009, has seen campaigns of terror, forced recruitment, suicide bombings, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) waged by Boko Haram against local residents (BBC, 2016). The crisis has been further complicated by the region's fragile socio-economic context, chronic poverty, harsh climate conditions, health epidemics, and limited access to basic services (UNHCR, 2017k). Additionally, unemployment and low per capita income are also linked to high emigration from Nigeria. Employment-driven migration from Nigeria tends to be highly selective to educated and skilled professionals, who may be attracted to more developed regions (IOM, 2014a; Afolayan, Ikwuyatum, & Abejide, 2009).

Little is known about drivers of migration from **Niger**, at least in comparison to the literature on transit and migration routes through the country. There is some indication that since 1990, emigration from Niger has been led by economic factors, largely related to the difficulties of the Nigerien agricultural sector (CARIM, 2011; ICMPD & IOM, 2015). There are few refugees that originate in Niger, and most forced migration in Niger happens within the borders of the state (REACH, 2017; UNHCR 2017c). However, like northern Nigeria, migration from southern Niger is also driven by the violent extremism of Boko Haram. Internal displacement in Niger, especially in the Diffa region, has become a major issue since 2015, when Boko Haram started to attack civilians in the country (IDMC, 2017d).

The factors that support migration from **Chad** are rather mixed. The country is one of the poorest in the world, ranking 186/188 on the Human Development Index (HDI) (World Bank, 2017a), and economic factors, such as poverty and lack of economic opportunities, are a major push factor for Chadian emigrants. Violence, conflicts, and persecution also compel some movement, however (Rodrigues & Tòmas, 2017). Historically, Chad has also experienced emigration related to transhumance and the movements of pastoral groups. Among these factors, climate change factors have also played a role in motivating emigration (IOM, 2007).

Migration from **Mauritania** also is largely economically driven. The majority of forced migration occurred as a result of the 1989 Senegal-Mauritania conflict (MPC, 2013b). Labour emigration of the unskilled and unemployed youth, however, is driven by the few and decreasing opportunities in Mauritania's national economy and an overloaded informal sector (Saleh, 2009). Significant emigration from Mauritania dates back to the 1970s and has been driven by "degradation of the agro-pastoral system caused by severe and frequent droughts … [and] high levels of poverty and unemployment" (MPC, 2013, p. 1).

Similarly, migration from **Gambia** is also highly driven by economic factors. The country has a low HDI (ranking 173/188) and high rates of unemployment (54%)[10], especially among the young population (44.4%)[11] (UNDP, 2017). Large-scale migration from Gambia began with the economic crisis that followed Gambia's 1965 independence from the United Kingdom. The crisis hit the agricultural sector, a major pillar of Gambia's economy; scarcity of land for the agricultural sector simultaneously hit rural areas, contributing

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[10] This indicates the percentage of the labour force population ages 15 and older that is not in paid employment, but has taken steps to seek paid employment or self-employment (UNDP, 2017).

[11] This indicates the percentage of the labour force population ages between 15 and 24 that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and has taken steps to seek paid employment or self-employment (UNDP, 2017).

to significant rural unemployment. Rural-to-urban migration then peaked between 1993 and 2010. The mass emigration of Gambians due to economic instability has included various segments of the population, especially doctors and nurses (Kebbeh, 2013). Additionally, around 76,000 Gambians were recently forced to flee the country as a result of political turmoil starting at the end of 2016 (Caux, 2017).

A similar economic situation has befallen **Ghana**. In 2013, the country's economy began to falter as Ghana endured a public deficit, weakening currency, and high inflation rates (BBC Monitoring, 2017). The economic downturn has contributed to high emigration amongst the highly-skilled as well as higher unemployment amongst youth and those with no schooling (IOM & ICMPD, 2015, p. 15). Moreover, the evolution of Ghana's political situation has shaped migratory movements in the post-independence era. Military rule coupled with harsh economic policies that were introduced in the 1990s pushed many highly-trained scholars and professionals to emigrate from Ghana between 1980 and 1990. In the same period, Lecturers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, and students left Ghana in greater numbers to seek more fruitful economic opportunities elsewhere (CIA, 2017; SIHMA 2014). This trend continued in the coming years, and between 1995 and 2002 around 70 per cent of trained medical officers, 40 per cent of pharmacists, and almost 20 per cent of nurses emigrated (Bump, 2006).

Drivers of migration from **Mali** are especially diverse. A 'culture of migration' is well rooted in the Malian heritage; as in other countries in the West and Central African region, migration in Mali is promoted as a rite of passage for young men, but it is also an important livelihood strategy. Circular and seasonal migration are very important for Malian nomadic pastoral groups (Merkle, Reinold, & Siegel, 2017; IOM, 2014c; IOM, 2013a; CARIM, 2010; ICMPD, 2010). Other factors that contribute to emigration among Malians include political instability, lack of economic opportunities, droughts, desertification, and demographic pressures in the form of high population growth (ICMPD, 2010). Despite having a longer history of violent conflicts and coups d'état, these circumstances only recently became a major push factor for Malian migration. The armed rebellion in Northern Mali and the coup d'état of 2012 caused major waves of both internal displacement and outside of Mali's borders (Merkle, Reinold, & Siegel, 2017; IOM, 2013a).

Emigrants from **Guinea** have similarly left the country due to recurring food insecurity, droughts, and flooding, as well as following the outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus between 2013 and 2015 (USAID, 2017). Additionally, circular and seasonal migration between Guinea and Senegal is common among workers within the agriculture industry. However, this pattern has evolved into increased movements towards urban areas and has contributed to permanent settlement abroad, with many individuals working in small businesses and trade (Lefebvre, 2003; ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Migrants from **Senegal** are largely driven to move by high unemployment rates. Yet, unemployment figures for Senegal reduced over time, from 48% in 2007 (CIA, 2017) to 26% in 2013 (World Bank, 2017a) and 9.3% in 2015 (UNDP, 2016). Congo and Gabon are becoming popular destinations for Senegalese emigrants (UNICEF & WCARO, 2016). Emigration is especially common among Senegalese youth and has even become institutionalized in some communities, where migration is expected and valued as part of the life trajectory (RMMS West Africa, 2017). Moreover, the conflict in the Casamance region that started in 1982 and still ongoing is an important push factor for migration. This conflict has created numerous flight and return refugee movements from Casamance to The Gambia that happened cyclically when the conflict would escalate. Since 2006, permanent settlement has replaced the circular movement described above and now there is a situation of protracted displacement of Senegalese refugees in The Gambia (Manby, 2015; Hopkins, 2011).

Sierra Leone faced a brutal civil war between 1991 and 2002 that devastated the country's socioeconomic structure and contributed to massive displacement. Civilians were often targeted in hostilities, with different parties using torture, murder, rape, abduction of children, and mutilation as fighting tactics (ACAPS, 2014). The conflict weakened the country's civil structure, destroying education facilities and hospitals and thus encouraging professionals and skilled workers to migrate. Even after the cessation of conflict, the country is still characterised by poor socioeconomic conditions, unemployment, and low wages. These factors encourage labour emigration from the country (European Commission, 2007).

Historical drivers of emigration from **Côte d'Ivoire** similarly include political instability between 1999 and 2000 and a civil war that started in 2002. This protracted violence spiked in 2010 following a contested presidential election; since then, arbitrary arrests and killings, torture, and SGBV have escalated (UNHCR, 2016e) and contributed to migration out of Côte d'Ivoire (CIA, 2017). Skilled migrants also leave Côte d'Ivoire in search of better occupational opportunities abroad. Particularly, nurses and medical doctors frequently emigrate (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Cote d'Ivoire and **Burkina Faso** exchange migrant populations and constitute a significant mobility corridor within the West African region. Almost 90 per cent of Burkinabe emigrants (stock) is residing in Côte, while a similar number of Ivorian emigrants have moved to Burkina Faso (UN DESA, 2015a). Migration from Burkina Faso to Cote d'Ivoire reflects historical ties, as both territories were previously part of France's West Africa. Regular, seasonal migration is also common between the two countries (Konseiga, 2003). Migration from Burkina Faso is also driven by post-election violence and by (extremist) conflicts that have contributed to deteriorating security in the northern region of the country (IDMC, 2017c).Table 1 provides a concise overview of the mixed migration trends for the focus countries.

Table 1: Summary of Mixed Migration Trends in West and Central Africa

Country	Origin	Transit	Destination	Push Factors for Emigrants
Burkina Faso	++	+		• Strong climate • Limited resources • Conflicts
Central African Republic	++			• Conflicts
Chad		+	++	• Strong climate • Limited resources • Economic reasons • Conflicts • Traditions/livelihood strategy
Gambia	++			• Persecution • Limited resources • Economic reasons
Ghana	++		+	• Economic reasons
Guinea	++	+	+	• Economic reasons • Food insecurity • Strong climate • Ebola
Côte d'Ivoire	+		++	• Economic reasons • Conflicts • Persecution

Mali	+	++		• Conflicts • Strong climate • Traditions/livelihood strategy • Demographic pressures
Mauritania		+	++	• Limited opportunities • Economic reasons • Strong climate • Conflicts
Niger		++	+	• Economic reasons • Conflicts • Traditions/livelihood strategy
Nigeria	++		++	• Conflicts • Persecution • Economic reasons
Senegal	++	+		• Economic reasons • Traditions/livelihood strategy
Sierra Leone	++		+	• Conflicts • Limited resources • Economic reasons

Note: Two '+' indicate that relative to other countries in the region these flows are bigger. Categories under the "push factors for emigrants" column are not mutually exclusive and often overlapping.

2.2. Irregular Migration

2.2.1. Trends in West and Central Africa

Irregular migration in and out of West and Central Africa reflects diverse mobility trajectories and is considered significant in volume. Most West and Central African migrants are entitled to move across borders, and their migration is legitimised by the normative framework of ECOWAS or ECCAS. While popular discourses characterise irregular migration in the region as criminal and violent, much irregular movement in the region occurs because of administrative disconnects. Most irregular migrants are in fact ECOWAS or ECCAS citizens with the right to free movement who lack legal travel documents; overlapping factors, including weak bureaucracy, corruption, and low levels of development, prevent many migrants from acquiring the documentation they need to travel "legally". Irregular migrants can be broadly defined as individuals who cross "borders without proper authority or violating conditions for entering another country" (Jordan & Düvell, 2002, p. 15). Both migrants who have entered a country irregularly as well as those who enter through regular channels but become irregular by overstaying their visa are considered irregular migrants (de Haas, 2008). Irregular migrants are not per definition criminals, do not necessarily migrate irregularly with the help of criminal organizations, and do not migrate to participate in illicit activities (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). On the contrary, many migrate for economic reasons, as migration is an important way to diversify income and secure livelihoods for many people in West and Central Africa. Nevertheless, most of the countries in this region are, at least to some extent, simultaneously countries of origin, transit, and destination for irregular migrants (Altai, 2015). Migration within the region has been traditionally dynamic and reactive to political, socio-economic, and environmental factors.

Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and **Sierra Leone** can be described as origin countries for irregular migration flows in and out of the West and Central Africa region, while **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Mali** are relatively smaller countries of origin. Despite ECOWAS free movement provisions, irregular movements nevertheless occur when immigration rules are unclear, badly articulated, and/or poorly implemented, challenging adherence to administrative regimes. Irregular migration may also occur more to places where the majority of employment is within the informal sector (Ratha & Shaw, 2007), which is indeed the case for the countries under study. In spite of the visa-free regime prescribed by ECOWAS, it is not surprising that irregular migration still occurs. In the **CAR** informal cross-border trade represent an estimated 200% of total (formal) foreign trade (UNECA, 2013), and this ample informal sector is highly correlated to irregular migration (Ratha & Shaw 2007). In recent years, persistent poverty and economic downturns in countries such as the CAR and Gambia have supported irregular migration to North Africa and Europe. (Kebbeh, 2013). Gambia is among the top five countries of origin for individuals crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Italy or Spain (Hunt, 2017). En route to Europe, Gambian migrants generally travel through **Senegal** and other West African States, eventually passing from Libya to Italy through the Mediterranean.

Senegalese authorities are principally concerned with irregular migration when it involves the irregular movement of Senegalese nationals and other transit migrants on their way to EU member states, with whom the Senegalese state has implemented different strategies (SEA HORSE, HERA) to address irregular migration (IOM & ICMPD, 2015). Irregular migration is also common in **Sierra Leone**. The country is only able to control one-fifth of the crossing points on its south-eastern border. Guinea similarly secures only 37 crossing points on its more than 1,400 km-long borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone (European Commission, 2007). As a coastal country with porous borders, high rates of poverty, and poor infrastructure, **Guinea** also functions as both a point of origin and transit for irregular migrants (IOM, 2017l). Migrants from **Nigeria** also migrate to the EU irregularly, and in 2016 they represented the biggest share of irregular entries by sea (21%) (RMMS, 2017a). According to ICMPD and IOM (2017): "While a minority is able to enter the EU by plane, most irregular migrants [from Nigeria] travel towards Europe through the Sahara and eventually by ship. In 2008, Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs estimated that at least 59,000 nationals seeking to enter Europe were stranded in North Africa" (p. 259).

The main countries through which irregular migrants transit on their way to North Africa and Europe include **Mali** and **Niger** and, to a lesser extent, **Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Guinea**, and **Senegal**. **Niger** is an important hub for irregular migration in West Africa, and smuggling networks are well rooted in the Northern city of Agadez (Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Niger is the main transit country used by West and Central African migrants who want to reach Libya, Algeria, and to a lesser extent Europe (UNHCR, 2017r; IOM, 2017m). In 2016, an estimated 300,000 people transited into Niger on their way North (Micallef, 2017; UNHCR, 2017s); by May 2017, over 60,000 migrants were estimated to have entered the country (UNHCR, 2017r). It is estimated that more than half of all West African migrants who arrived by sea to the Italian island of Lampedusa in 2014 transited through Niger (Wittenberg, 2017). The country's geopolitical orientation makes Niger a key area for irregular migration, as it is located between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, with Libya being the most important transit country for people trying to reach Europe (UNHCR, 2017r). Since 2000, **Mali** has also become an important transit country for irregular migrants trying to reach North Africa, mainly Algeria, Libya, Morocco, or Tunisia (Urso, 2017; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2013a; CARIM, 2010; ICMPD, 2010). Similarly, since 1990, **Chad** has been and continues to be an important transit country for migrants trying to reach Libya and Europe (UNHCR, 2017r; de Haas, 2007). The Chadian route into northern Libya is often used by Chadian, Sudanese, and Cameroonian migrants

(Wittenberg, 2017). Moreover, due to its long border (3,200km) with six neighbouring countries, **Burkina Faso** has become an important transit country. Irregular migrants passing through Burkina Faso who take the Western Mediterranean Route generally originate from Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire, whereas migrants who take the Central Mediterranean Route through Burkina Faso mostly originate from Ghana. Both routes finally end in Tripoli, Libya. Burkinabe, namely the Bissa ethnic group who live in the Centre-Est region, also migrate irregularly to Europe (Reitano, Adal & Sha, 2014).

While most migration is regularly administrated by the regulations of ECOWAS, **Côte d'Ivoire** is a country of destination for irregular migration flows in and out of the West and Central Africa region. Other key destinations are **Nigeria** and **Chad**, in which the free movement of persons is prescribed by ECOWAS and ECCAS respectively, assuring that most migration, at least in principle, should happen regularly. **Mauritania** is also a destination country for irregular movements, and it has no regional agreements on visa-free regimes. Despite their membership in ECOWAS, **Ghana, Guinea, Niger,** and **Sierra Leone** are also countries of destination for irregular migrants, though to a lesser extent. Between 2000 and 2006, a significant number of irregular migrants were thought to live and work in **Côte d'Ivoire,** as only 4,833 stay permits were issued during that time, yet there were more than 2 million immigrants (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UN DESA, 2015a). Based on Ordinance No. 2007-604 on the Suppression of the Stay Permit, however, citizens of ECOWAS states have been able to reside regularly in Côte d'Ivoire without a residence permit since 2007 (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Most emigration from Côte d'Ivoire is assumed to take place through regular channels due to the lack of well-established smuggling networks in the country and to the accessibility of regular, cheap, and safe migration channels granted by ECOWAS agreements (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). **Mauritania** is another key destination country for irregular migrants in the West and Central Africa region. Border management in the country is an ongoing issue as there are only 47 border posts along the 5,000km of land borders and 800km of coastline (IOM, 2016a).

2.2.2   Human Smuggling and Irregular Cross-Border Movements

As previously highlighted in Section 2.2.1, irregular migration is prominent in many countries in West and Central Africa despite the free movement protocol of ECOWAS. To better understand these movements, it is important to analyse the initial movements out of the country of origin. As such, this section describes initial movements out of the origin countries into and through other countries in the region. Section 3 elaborates on the routes used for movements beyond the country of origin and the region of West and Central Africa. While these migratory movements are largely irregular in nature, they are difficult to measure. Consequently, there are likely many other border crossings and smuggling operations for which evidence is not available, and knowledge of the characteristics of smugglers in West and Central Africa is scattered and still limited.

It is important to distinguish between human trafficking and smuggling (see the definition text box on this page), but it is worth noting that trafficking and smuggling operations are often linked since they involve similar steps such as recruiting migrants, obtaining (fake) documents, organising vehicles and drivers, transporting individuals, and bribing officials. Shelley (2014) calls traffickers and smugglers "logistics specialists who can move individuals across vast distances" (p.7), yet as reported in the table, there are essential differences between the two phenomena. These differences are not always easy to discern, however. Smuggling can become trafficking during the journey (Lukowiak, 2016), for example. Once en route, migrants may lose their contacts, suffer from heat, experience famine or water scarcity, and may

face violence and abuse by security forces, terrorist groups and/or border patrols. This increased vulnerability en route may exacerbate the risk of being trafficked.

Smuggling differs from human trafficking in three principle ways: consent, exploitation, and transnationality. Migrants engage with their smugglers in a consensual manner; smuggling also occurs transnationally and ends upon arrival at the destination. Victims of trafficking, however, are typically moved against their will or have been coerced into giving consent, and many must endure ongoing exploitation. Moreover, trafficking can occur both internally and internationally (UNODC, 2017c). By definition, trafficking never ends upon destination and continues with the exploitation of the migrant upon destination.

Even without the help of smugglers, borders in West and Central Africa are porous and are irregularly crossed in a variety of ways. While most irregular migration in the region does not happen with the help of smugglers and criminal networks, these actors may nevertheless play an important role in facilitating irregular movements. For instance, non-ECOWAS citizens can obtain forged passports by smugglers to enter the visa-free ECOWAS area. Short-term visas are also often obtained from smugglers, even if direct snuggling services are not used. Unauthorized crossings to Algeria and Niger are also often facilitated by these networks (e.g., via trucks crossing the Sahara desert); such networks often ease movement between Libya and Europe through bribery and unauthorized boat crossings.

The approximate costs of smuggling from West and Central Africa to the North African coast can vary enormously, with some journeys costing several hundred dollars and other costing thousands. Throughout these journeys, migrants may be extremely vulnerable, they face high risks of robberies, injuries, fatalities, lack of adequate nutrition, and water (Carling, 2016b). Smuggling

> **Definitions**
>
> There is "prevailing confusion between smuggling of migrants and concepts such as irregular migration and trafficking in persons" (UNODC, 2011, p. 5). **Human smuggling** is defined in the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol (2000), a supplement to the United Nations Convention on Transitional Organized Crime, as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident". In contrast, **trafficking in persons** is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000) as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, **for the purpose of exploitation**" (UNODC, 2017a).
>
> Child trafficking is slightly different from trafficking in persons and is defined as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of children for the purpose of exploitation" (UNODC, 2017a). The presence or absent of consent of the transportation is totally irrelevant. According to UNICEF (2007), "A child has been trafficked if he or she has been moved within a country, or across borders, whether by force or not, with the purpose of exploiting the child."

services are rarely needed within ECOWAS, with most smuggling activities taking place in key hubs close to northern Africa. These hubs include Agadez, Madama, Arlit, and Seguedine in Niger and Bamako, Gao, and Timbuktu in Mali. From these hubs, migrants often embark on dangerous journeys toward Algeria and Libya, with some seeking to eventually reach Europe.

Human smuggling is rampant in **Mali** (RMMS, 2017; Urso, 2017; Carling, 2016a; Frontex, 2016; IOM, 2013a). The capital Bamako is probably the most important centre for human smuggling of the country (Carling, 2016a). Gao has also become an important centre for irregular migration and a prominent hub for smuggling and trafficking activities (Merkle, Reinold, & Siegel, 2017; RMMS, 2017; IOM, 2013a). It is estimated that around 900 irregular migrants pass through the city each month on their way north (Merkle, Reinold, & Siegel, 2017). The actors involved in the Malian smuggling business include individual entrepreneurs, ethnic clans, extremist and terrorist groups, and members of political parties (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Frontex, 2016a). Furthermore, Malian networks are highly transnational and coordinated beyond Mali's borders. Most of the individuals involved in the Malian smuggling network are of Tuareg ethnicity. Given its geography and porous borders, **Mauritania** has been a long-standing transit point for migrants, especially those who were smuggled, who are trying to reach Europe. According to a recent report from UNODC (2013), Nouakchott was, at least until 2006, an important city along the migration route to northern destinations in Western Sahara, Morocco, and the Spanish-African enclaves (UNODC, 2013). Nouakchott is also connected to Gao in Mali along a major connecting land route for irregular and mixed migration flows.

Ghana is a source, transit, and destination country for migrant smuggling (SIHMA, 2014). Between 2010 and 2012, 124 cases of migrant smuggling were handled by immigration officers, many of which were identified following entry via Kotoka airport. In 2012 Ghana officially made migrant smuggling an illegal practice (SIHMA, 2014). **Guinea** acts as a country of origin and transit for both the Western and Central route to Europe, and these migrants often engage with smugglers on the routes to Europe (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The map of migratory routes by Frontex (2017e) indicates that Guineans having primarily taken the Central Mediterranean route (8,833), with smaller numbers taking the Western Mediterranean (1,590) or Western African (37) routes to Europe between January and August 2017.

Human smuggling in and from **Sierra Leone** is strongly connected to the the high costs of regular means of travel. By 2007, the main smuggling routes were through land routes around the Sahara Desert and by sea. The lack of regulated maritime routes in Sierra Leone and neighbouring Guinea facilities the existence and use of ghost vessels (European Commission, 2007). Most smuggled migrants from **Senegal** have Italy as a preferred non-African final destination. Between January and March of 2015, an estimated 1,200 Senegalese made the Mediterranean crossing into Italy, many of whom were in search of economic opportunities beyond what was available Senegal (Köpp & Diallo, 2015). Fraudulent documents are often identified in Dakar among migrants trying to reach the EU; as such, Frontex identified Senegal as a key country of origin for irregular migration to Europe in the region (Frontex, 2016b, p. 24, 36).

Human smuggling is also rampant in **Niger**, especially in the Sahara and Sahel regions, with the northern cities of Agadez, Madama, Arlit, and Seguedine being the most important centres for human smuggling in the country and wider region. Given the magnitude of smuggling in these cities, smuggling has become vital to the political economy of the country (Diallo, 2017; Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Smuggling networks are affiliated on ethnic lines, with the groups Tebou and Tuareg managing most human smuggling in Niger (Frontex, 2016a). These transnational ethnic groups can encompass Nigerien borders and create networks across countries; in fact, the Tuareg and Tebou can be found both in Libya and Algeria (Frontex, 2016a; Micallef, 2017; Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Specifically, the Tebou mainly control the route going into Libya, while the Tuareg control the route into Algeria. In this context, displacing the routes through border security measures could eventually push these tribes into each other's territories, causing ethnic clash and violent conflicts. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that facilitating the movement of people across the Sahara has been part of their traditional livelihoods for centuries (Tinti & Westcott, 2016; Frontex, 2016a).

These Saharan tribal smugglers, who are also active in the northern part of the **Chad** (particularly, the Tebou), are considered to orchestrate the smuggling activities between Chad, Niger, and Libya (RHIPTO, 2015; Micallef, 2017). Most Tebou smugglers argue that they are freelance and not part of any broader organisation (Micallef, 2017; Frontex, 2016a). Plausibly, the most prominent hubs for human smuggling activities in Chad are Abéché, Zouar, and Faya Largeau (RHIPTO, 2015; UNHCR, 2017r).

Despite this available information for some of the focus countries, data on **Burkina Faso**'s human smuggling is consistently lacking. However, Burkinabe, specifically the Bissa ethnic group who live in Centre-Est region, migrate irregularly to Europe, often with the use of a smuggler. While the majority of the Burkinabe people returns to Burkina Faso with nothing after having paid between $6,000 to $10,000 to a smuggler, migration facilitated by smuggling continues to be attractive; this is largely because between 5 and 10 percent of irregular migrants return 'wealthy' according to the average standards. It should be noted that travel documents, air tickets, and support with job hunting are often included in the total sum paid to the smuggler (Reitano, Adal & Sha, 2014). Data on human smuggling in **Gambia** also remains very scarce. Moreover, there is little to no information on smuggling practices and networks in **Nigeria**, although it is expected that it plays a role in trafficking operations.

Human smuggling does not seem to be prominent in the **Côte d'Ivoire**, and there seems to be a lack of well-established smuggling networks in the country (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Similarly, human smuggling does not appear a common instance in the **CAR**. Indeed, no article about or reference to human smuggling within the CAR was retrieved in the literature review for this analysis. This is not surprising because, by looking at the nationalities of sea arrivals to Europe, it stands out that only a minority of people comes from countries that are located more south than the CAR (UNHCR, 2016f). Additionally, the small numbers of migrants from southern African countries that try to reach North Africa, or to a lesser extent Europe, do not pass through the CAR on their journeys (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014).

2.2.3   Trafficking in Human Beings

When trying to distinguish between human trafficking and human smuggling, it is relevant to keep in mind the definitions of trafficking and smuggling given in the previous section. Moreover, it should also be noticed that trafficking has three main components: the act, the means, and the purpose. The act is the recruitment, transport, and transfer of the trafficked person. The means refer to the methods used to conduct the act; these means include use of coercion, threat, force, abduction, deception, fraud, and abuse of power. The purposes include various kinds of exploitation upon arrival such as prostitution, forced labour, and slavery (UNODC, 2017d).

In addition to human smuggling, **trafficking in persons is a major concern in the West and Central Africa region. Irregular migrants, especially those using smugglers, are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking (VoTs)**. This is mainly due to the harsh conditions of the journey and the increased vulnerability of migrants en route. While the true scope of the issue is not known due to the difficulties of measuring this illegal phenomenon, estimates indicate that the criminal activity is prominent in West and Central Africa. Moreover, human trafficking is considered to be happening both within, across, and outside of the borders of states in the region. Despite the common perception that trafficking instances happen within the realm of irregular migration, this is very often not the case. For instance, intra-state trafficking in some states is even bigger than international trafficking, even if the victims have legal documents. Additionally, it is key to notice that, because of ECOWAS, international human trafficking also largely

happens in the realm of regular migration. Future VoTs often migrate regularly to other ECOWAS countries, either through coercion or with the deception of a job opportunity. However, upon arrival they often do not find the promised job and are instead exploited for different purposes (US Department of State, 2017a).

The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, published annually by the US Department of State, provides a comprehensive overview of governmental anti-human trafficking efforts by presenting main trends regarding the nature and scope of trafficking in persons and the broad range of government actions to confront and eliminate it. The report is a valuable tool for understanding trafficking in a specific country context as well as for examining where resources to address the challenges associated with trafficking are most needed. In the TIP Report, each country is placed onto one of three tiers based on the extent of their governments' efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. These standards are based on the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 (US Department of State, 2000), which provides the tools to combat trafficking in persons (US Department of State, 2017a).

As shown in Table 2, none of the focus countries of this report are classified as a Tier 1[12] country. Instead, in 2017, two of the countries were categorized as Tier 2, seven as Tier 2 Watch List, and four as Tier 3. Given this situation, it can be inferred that the countries of this analysis are amongst the least performing globally (US Department of State, 2017). The **CAR, Guinea, Mali,** and **Mauritania** are **Tier 3** countries, which means that the governments of these countries do not meet the minimum standards to address trafficking nor are they making significant efforts to do so. In the last seven years, the CAR and Mauritania have almost always scored Tier 3, indicating that human trafficking is a chronic problem for these states. Instead, **Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria,** and **Senegal** are ranked **Tier 2 Watch List**. This implies that they do not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking but are making significant efforts to do so. However, these countries are also the first candidates for becoming future Tier 3 countries. The focus countries ranked at **Tier 2** are **Sierra Leone** and **Cote d'Ivoire**. This implies that the governments of these countries do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts to do so (US Department of State, 2017a).

According to the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, all the **countries of this report can be considered countries of origin, transit and destination of VoTs.** Moreover, it appears clear that **much remains to be done in the Central and West African countries** to **address human trafficking and its impacts**; actions must be taken on a **policy level** and also in terms of the **prevention of trafficking** and the **protection of victims**.

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[12] The TIP ranks countries whose governments fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards as Tier 1 countries. Tier 2 countries are defined as those whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts in bringing themselves into compliance with those standards. The Tier 2 Watch List includes countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards but are making significant efforts in bringing themselves into compliance with those standards AND: a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year. Lastly, countries whose governments do not fully meet the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so, are considered Tier 3.

Table 2: Tier Ranking in the TIP Report for Countries in West and Central Africa, 2009-2016

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Burkina Faso	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2	2WL
Central African Republic	2WL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Chad	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2WL
Gambia	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	3	2WL
Ghana	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL
Guinea	2WL	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3
Côte d'Ivoire	2WL	N/A	2	2	2	2	2WL	2
Mali	2WL	2WL	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3
Mauritania	3	3	2WL	3	3	3	3	3
Niger	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL
Nigeria	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2WL
Senegal	2WL	2	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL
Sierra Leone	2	2	2WL	2	2	2	2	2

Source: US Department of State, 2017a

Without doubt, gender plays a significant role in the context of human trafficking (UNODC, 2014; Ghosh, 2009). According to UNODC (2014) and the European Parliament (2016), an estimated 70% of the victims of trafficking are women (49%) and girls (21%), and human trafficking mostly occurs for the purposes of forced labour and sexual exploitation. In specific terms, "child trafficking is defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of children for the purpose of exploitation"; it does not matter if the transportation is voluntary or not, and this phenomenon should not be confused with trafficking of adults (UNODC, 2017a). An estimated 65% of the people trafficked for forced labour are men and boys, while 97% of the individuals trafficked for sexual exploitation are women and girls (European Parliament, 2016). Feminist theorists argue that gender imbalance among trafficked victims has its roots in a cultural, political, and economic environment that privileges male power and pleasure (Barnett, 2011). These theories are in line with other findings, which illustrate that female migrants generally have lower education as well as fewer opportunities for regular migration than male migrants. This situation increases the risk for female migrants of being trafficked (O'Neil, Fleury, & Foresti, 2016). Importantly, many VoTs are, at the beginning of their journey, willing to migrate and believe that they will work in legal occupations. However, they may find themselves trafficked and forced into a given kind of slavery and exploitation upon destination (European Parliament, 2016). This can happen for various reasons but often occurs because traffickers in the origin country trick victims with the deception of a better future and a legal occupation elsewhere.

In general, the purposes of trafficking are similar across all focus countries of this analysis. The evidence shows that children, women, and men are all vulnerable to be trafficked for purposes of forced labour as well as sexual exploitation in, to, or from the thirteen focus countries. As mentioned previously, **girls and women** are more vulnerable to becoming VoTs than men (European Parliament, 2016; O'Neil, Fleury, & Foresti, 2016; UNODC, 2014; Ghosh, 2009). **Children** are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, and they are forced into a series of activities including begging, street vending, domestic servitude, agricultural work, fishing, herding, petty trading, street crimes, and mining, especially in the diamond and artisanal sector. Sometimes, as in the case of Chad and Niger, recruitment happens through family lines, meaning that parents entrust children to other relatives in exchange for promises related to apprenticeships, education, or money. More often, however, children in West and Central Africa are recruited from their families by non-family members with the fake promises of receiving a job or education (US Department of State, 2017a). Specifically, poor parents often entrust their children to local imams or *marabouts (*Muslim religious teachers*)* in the hope that they will receive a Quranic education and be cared for by the religious leaders. However, in this traditional practice of caregiving and education, children have become subject to abuse at the hands of their guardians, as they are often forced to beg and serve as income generators for the *marabouts* (Manby, 2015, p. 78). Ivorian boys, in addition to boys from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, for example, are often forced into begging by corrupt *marabouts* (US Department of State, 2017a). Similarly, Nigerien women and children are often trafficked into Algeria and forced into begging, forced labour, and prostitution (US Department of State, 2017a).

Given the thin line between human smuggling and human trafficking, **smuggled migrants are considered at great risk of trafficking**. For instance, in the context of human trafficking in Niger, smuggled women and children from Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali are considered the most in danger (US Department of State, 2017a). Indeed, the link between smuggling and trafficking in Niger is clear and, for many smuggled migrants, smuggling in Niger becomes trafficking. This is a rather common instance as trafficking patterns commonly follow ones of smuggling (UNICEF, 2017a). Among the different migrants transiting in Niger, women and children from Nigeria are considered the most in danger (US Department of State, 2017; IOM, 2017n). According to IOM (2017n), around 80 per cent of Nigerian women that arrive in Italy by sea are victims of human trafficking, and most of them transit in Niger.

Refugees and IDPs also seem particularly vulnerable to trafficking. For instance, a refugee camp in Mauritania was found to be the site of forced prostitution and sexual slavery in 2016. In 2016, NGOs reported 7,100 cases of child domestic workers in forced labour conditions, and police found 649 child victims in slavery and forced begging. However, the Mauritanian government neither investigated these cases nor removed the victims from their exploited state. Moreover, in the CAR, IDPs have been trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation by criminal groups and even peacekeeping troops (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2016; UN Security Council, 2016b). In Nigeria, there have also been reports of forcing IDPs into sexual exploitation in exchange for food. Being in a condition of displacement either inside or outside the border of the state of origin, increases the vulnerability of individuals toward trafficking crimes (US Department of State, 2017a).

Another major problem relating to human trafficking in the West and Central Africa region (specifically in the CAR, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria) is the issue of **child soldiers**. In these countries, the presence of terrorists, militias, and armed group increases the scope of trafficking activities beyond any prediction. Particularly concerning is the situation in the CAR, where militias and armed groups continue to adopt practices of compulsory recruitment of child soldiers (UN General Assembly Security Council, 2016; UN Security Council, 2016b). In the CAR, it is estimated that between 6,000 and 10,000 children are used by

these non-state armed groups to serve as combatants, cooks, and concubines (US Department of State, 2017a). Similarly, in Mali, terrorists and armed groups systematically recruited Malian children to serve as combatants, to carry weapons, or to engage in related activities (US Department of Labour, 2017). There is also evidence of militias recruiting Mauritanian children to serve as child soldiers in Mali. These terrorist groups used girls for sexual exploitation, forced marriages, and sex slavery. Additionally, of increasing concern in Nigeria is the continued forceful recruitment of children as young as twelve years of age for purposes of being children soldiers by Boko Haram, civilian vigilante groups (like the Civilian Joint Taskforce), and the Nigerian Security forces (US Department of State, 2017a).

Importantly, **migrants, and especially migrant women, are not only trafficked within West and Central Africa but also to Europe**, particularly along the smuggling routes that will be analysed in Section 3. For this reason, efforts to combat human trafficking should be made also inside the European Union, as trafficking, by definition, continues with the exploitation of the victim upon destination. Moreover, the European Union should try to discourage sex tourism in the countries of analysis, which is a major issue in some cases. For instance, child sex tourism is predominant in Gambia, where children from poor families are often sexually exploited. Notably, many of these children are exploited by child sex tourists from the UK, Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Canada. These sex tourism activities mostly take place outside of urban centres, so they are more difficult for authorities to detect (US Department of State, 2017a). According to the TIP Report, "observers believe organized sex trafficking networks use European and Gambian travel agencies to promote child sex tourism" (US Department of State, 2017, pp. 177).

2.3 Forced Migration/ Displacement[13]

The West and Central Africa region has long been characterized by forced displacement caused by multiple, often overlapping, factors (Fresia, 2014). These include **poverty, chronic instability, poor governance, and complex and numerous inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts, which are aggravated by increasing environmental disasters such as floods, droughts, and soil erosion.**

Definition

Forced migration is "a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes" (IOM, 2011). This includes environment-, development- and forced or conflict-induced displacement. Forced or conflict-induced displacement "is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict [or] civil unrest" (IOM, 2011). The form of displacement has consequences for migrants' and states' legal rights and obligations, which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation. Key legal documents in the context of forced displacement are the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

Significant numbers of people are displaced both within the borders of their own country but also across borders to other countries in the region and beyond (UNAI, 2016; Fresia, 2014). New refugees continue to

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[13] The report distinguishes between disaster-induced displacement and conflict-induced displacement as far as possible, since the form of displacement has consequences on migrants' and states' legal rights and obligations which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation.

arrive at camps across the region as direct consequence of Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria and Lake Chad area and as a result of ongoing violence in northern Mali and in the CAR. Hence, **forced displacement is a serious concern to be addressed in the region and presents a significant challenge for achieving peace and security, reducing poverty, and supporting sustainable development in the West and Central Africa Region**.

2.3.1   Refugees from and in West and Central Africa

Looking at forced displacement across borders within the region, Table 3 shows that, despite some exceptions, the countries in West and Central Africa are both origin and host countries for refugees from other countries in the region. These 2016 data also show that some countries are more affected by forced displacement than others (UNHCR, 2017b). Particularly, the top source countries for refugees in West and Central Africa were **the CAR** (416,400); **Nigeria** (229,255); and **Mali** (156,390). **Côte d'Ivoire** (46,741) and **Mauritania** (36,288) are also sources for a considerable number of refugees in the region (UNHCR, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017b).

Table 3: Refugees in West and Central Africa, 2016

Origin	Country of Asylum												
	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso		-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central African Republic	228		70,223	-	109	34	266	986	528	67	166	-	-
Chad	116	163		-	14	*	*	7	*	165	77	17	-
Gambia	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	*	-
Guinea	-	7	-	-	-		-	*	8	-	17	14	-
Côte d'Ivoire	*	9	*	192	6,453	4,504		923	261	55	118	45	21
Mali	32,017	-	*	-	-	*	5		46,644	60,154	137	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,298		-	-	13,683	-
Niger	-	-	447	-	*	*	-	-	-		-	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	7,777	-	11	7	*	-	16	105,501		7	0
Senegal	-	-	-	7,470	-	-	-	53	-	-	-		-
Sierra Leone	-	*	-	120	77	169	*	-	*	-	21	-	

*Source: UNHCR, 2017b // Note: * indicates between 1 and 4 refugees.*

Figure 2 shows the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in West and Central Africa and is based on December 2016 figures from UNHCR (UNHCR, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017b). Particularly, **Chad, Niger,** and **Mauritania** are the **main host countries**, followed by **Senegal** and **Burkina Faso**. When looking at refugees and asylum seekers, it is important to consider that Chad's stock increased to more than 400,000 in 2017. This has been due to the numerous attacks of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, in southern CAR, and in the Diffa region in south-eastern Niger (UNHCR, 2017d).

Figure 2: Refugees and Asylum Seekers Hosted in West and Central Africa, December 2016

*Sources: Data for Gambia and Sierra Leone were retrieved from UNHCR, 2017b, while the data for the other countries were retrieved from UNHCR, 2017a. // *This figure includes 26,000 people in refugee-like status.*

Table 4 shows the total stock of and top five host countries for refugees from each of the thirteen focus countries for the end of 2016 (UNHCR, 2017b). At this point, it is relevant to mention that not all displacement from the thirteen focus countries of this report is directed toward other countries in West and Central Africa. These trends reinforce the fact that some of the countries are more affected by international forced migration than others. **Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger,** and **Sierra Leone** are all relatively stable, at least compared to the other countries of this report. As such, these countries do not have factors driving large numbers of displacement. As a consequence, refugee numbers are low and host countries are much more likely to be outside Africa, specifically the United States and European countries. In addition, **Chad, Mauritania**, and **Senegal** are also the source of relatively low numbers of refugees. However, refugees from these three countries mostly reside in countries within the African continent. While the top source countries for refugees in West and Central Africa were the CAR, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mauritania in 2016, the top destination countries for refugee movements were **Chad** (393,160); **Niger** (166,158); **Mauritania** (74,735); **Burkina Faso** (32,676); and **Mali** (17,813) (UNHCR, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017b).

Table 4: Top Host Countries of Refugees from West and Central Africa, 2016

	Total Stock	Top 1 Host	Top 2 Host	Top 3 Host	Top 4 Host	Top 5 Host	Other Countries
Burkina Faso	2,357	USA (43.3%)	Italy (39.3%)	France (5.9%)	Canada (3.9%)	Belgium (3.3%)	4.3%
Central African Republic	416,400	Cameroon (68.1%)	DRC (24.6%)	Congo (5.9%)	France (0.6%)	Mali (0.2%)	0.6%
Chad	14,146	Sudan (60%)	Cameroon (10.4%)	France (9.3%)	Gabon (4.6%)	Italy (3%)	12.7%
Gambia	11,641	Italy (66.3%)	USA (12.2%)	UK (11.9%)	Germany (2%)	France (1.8%)	5.8%
Ghana	15,507	Togo (62.2%)	Italy (24.3%)	France (3.3%)	USA (2.3%)	Germany (1.8%)	6.0%
Guinea	17,526	France (38.9%)	Belgium (15.3%)	USA (14.1%)	Italy (13.3%)	Germany (4.3%)	14.0%
Côte d'Ivoire	46,741	Liberia (39.7%)	Ghana (13.8%)	Italy (12.4%)	Guinea (9.6%)	France (6.2%)	18.3%
Mali	156,390	Niger (38.5%)	Mauritania (29.8%)	Burkina Faso (20.5%)	Italy (7.2%)	France (2.7%)	1.3%
Mauritania	36,228	Mali (42.2%)	Senegal (37.8%)	France (14.3%)	USA (2.7%)	Italy (0.9%)	2.0%
Niger	1,210	Chad (36.9%)	Italy (29.6%)	USA (11.1%)	Belgium (7.5%)	Canada (4.5%)	10.4%
Nigeria	229,255	Niger (46.0%)	Cameroon (38.7%)	Italy (6.2%)	Chad (3.4%)	Canada (1.8%)	3.9%
Senegal	23,019	Guinea-Bissau (36.4%)	Gambia (32.5%)	Italy (20.7%)	France (4.1%)	Belgium (1.9%)	4.5%
Sierra Leone	4,628	Netherlands (13,0%)	USA (11.9%)	France (11.0%)	Italy (9.9%)	Liberia (8.1%)	46.1%

Source: UNHCR, 2017b

Burkina Faso has hosted a relatively small group of refugees coming from neighbouring countries in the past, but the country currently hosts a large group of refugees from Mali. As of May 2017, Burkina Faso is hosted approximately 33,000 people of concern (see Tables 2 & 3). The majority of these refugees came from Mali (98%), but they also originated from the Central African Republic (CAR) (1%) and Chad (1%) (UNCHR, 2017). The main cause of their displacement is the ongoing conflict in the Sahel region, which is also faces other challenges such as poverty, climate change, and a demographic explosion (Lanzer, 2016; UNOCHA, 2017). Burkina Faso, however, is not a major source country for refugees, as its stock is just around 2,300 (see Table 4).

Considering its geographical position in the midst of surrounding countries with prolonged instances of violence, civil war, and persecution, the **CAR** has hosted refugees from these countries for many years (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). However, the CAR should be considered a source of refugees rather than a destination for refugees, since the figures of refugees from the CAR are much higher than of those hosted in the CAR. The CAR has a long history of forced migration caused by violent conflicts and coup d'états. According to Vinck & Pham (2010), four out of five people in the CAR were forced to leave their place of usual residence at some point between 2002 and 2010. Moreover, the stock of CAR's refugees has increased remarkably over the last four years. In 2013, there were around 9,000 refugees from the CAR, but this number rose exceptionally to 140,000 in January 2014. Following this, the number of refugees reached 308,000 in 2015 and more than 400,000 in 2016 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2017; Invisible Children, 2017; UNHCR, 2017e). These steep increases among the refugee population are considered direct consequences of the 2013 coup d'état and of the ensuing civil war. Indeed, since 2013, systemic violations of human rights, SGBV, and the destruction of markets and economic activities by armed groups have led to major population displacement (IOM, 2017g). Figures of refugees are still growing because the situation of violence in the CAR continues to rapidly escalate (Global Conflict Tracker, 2017; Invisible Children, 2017). As of July 2017, estimates from UNHCR (2017e) indicate that the number of the CAR refugees is around 480,000. Currently, these refugees are mainly hosted in Cameroon (57%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (21%), Chad (15%), and the Republic of Congo (6%). Women and girls represent the majority of them (52.4%), while men and boys represent the minority (47.6%). An estimated 60 per cent of the total are minors (UNHCR, 2017e).

During the last thirteen years, **Chad** has become an important destination country for refugees from bordering nations (UNHCR, 2017d). Indeed, geographical proximity and displaced conflict are the main reasons behind the decision of these refugees to flee into Chad. In 2016, the refugee stock in Chad was predominantly composed by refugees from Sudan (312,468), the CAR (70,223), and Nigeria (7,777), that made up more than 99.5 per cent of the total refugee population (UNHCR, 2017b). In the same year, 99 per cent of refugees in Chad were hosted in refugee camps, while only 1 per cent lived in urban areas (UNHCR, 2017d). The Sudanese refugee population lives in a protracted situation in Chad, since they arrived in 2002 as direct consequence of the conflicts that took place in the Darfur region of Sudan (UN News Centre, 2016). In addition to the vulnerabilities faced by the rest of the refugee population, they are at risk of statelessness. The overall refugee population in Chad is vulnerable toward many abuses (including rape and SGBV) and has limited access to basic services. Moreover, 43 per cent of the refugees continue to face high levels of food insecurity (UN News Centre, 2016). In 2015, in three camps, acute levels of malnutrition reached critical levels, while around 40 per cent of the refugee population was food insecure (Boyce & Hollingsworth, 2015). At present, chronic malnutrition is above the emergency threshold in 14 camps out of 19 and above the normal threshold in all camps (UNHCR, 2017d).

As of mid-2017, in **Niger**, the refugee population stock was 162,473, while there were only 98 asylum seekers hosted in the country. The main countries of origin of the refugee population in Niger are Nigeria

(106,146) and Mali (55,892). Together, refugees from Mali and Nigeria represent 99.7 per cent of the total refugee population in Niger (UNHCR, 2017f). Both Nigerians and Malians migrated to Niger in search of peace and security after the outbreak of violent conflicts in their home countries (ACAPS, 2016; Dobbs, & Gaynor, 2015). Niger has also a consistent at-risk population of returnees that often lives in the same sites and conditions of refugees. Due to the situation of civil war in Libya since 2011, a high number of Nigeriens returnees, as well as returnees from other ECOWAS countries, arrived in Niger from Libya (IOM, 2013c). Similarly, due to the violence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, there has been an increase in the number of returnees that now are mostly dispersed in the Diffa region, stressing the capabilities of Nigerien reception centres even further (UNHCR, 2017f). The majority of refugees (65%) live in spontaneous sites along the main road of the Diffa region close to the border with Nigeria. This area is characterized by a semi-desert environment, where shelters are made of straw, sanitation is lacking, and children do not have access to education (UNHCR, 2016a). Moreover, food scarcity, insecurity, and increasing violence by Boko Haram challenge refugees living in these sites (UNHCR, 2016a).

Outbreaks of intrastate violence have been the main push factor for migration from **Nigeria**. Boko Haram activities since 2009 have caused massive displacement and humanitarian crises in the Lake Chad Basin region, which is located between (northern) Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Estimates show that, throughout the region, over 2.5 million people have been forcibly displaced. This trend is expected to continue as Boko Haram continues engaging in terror, forced recruitment, suicide bombings, and SGBV in the region. The situation is further complicated by the region's fragile socio-economic context, chronic poverty, harsh climate conditions, health epidemics, and limited access to basic services (UNHCR, 2017k). The majority of refugees in the region come from Nigeria, escaping Boko Haram captivity and others fleeing deplorable conditions (UNHCR, 2017m). UNHCR data of June 2017 showed 207,227 Nigerian refugees abroad, spread through Niger (51%), Cameroon (45%), and Chad (4%) (UNHCR, 2017l). The effect of the crisis has devastated north-eastern Nigeria, continuously aggravating food security and malnutrition levels (UNHCR, 2017o). Furthermore, funding for humanitarian assistance is far from required levels.

Similarly, the history of **Mali** has long been characterised by violent conflicts and coups d'état. However, these circumstances only recently became a major push factor for Malian migration. Specifically, the armed rebellion in Northern Mali and the coup d'état of 2012 caused major displacement of people both inside and outside Mali (IOM, 2013a). As a result, the stock of Malian refugees skyrocketed from 11,000 to 150,000 in 2013 as direct result of ongoing violence. In total, the conflict displaced more than 450,000 people, mainly from the northern cities of Timbuktu and Gao (UNHCR, 2017n; UNHCR, 2016c; IOM, 2013a). By the end of 2016, due to a 2015 peace deal and consequent increases in personal security, a large population of refugees (56,729) was able to return to live in their place of usual residence (UNHCR, 2016c). However, as of July 2017, the stock of Malian refugees is still high and has increased in comparison with 2016 (UNHCR, 2017n). However, the 2015 peace deal between the Malian government and the rebel groups is very fragile; the two coalitions have clashed numerous times since then, and a re-escalation of the conflict is very possible. Moreover, the number of attacks conducted by Islamist armed groups are increasing in the northern and central regions of Mali; in fact, they more than doubled from 2015 to 2016. Consequently, Mali is expected to experience high food and personal insecurity, and the displaced population both internally and externally is extremely likely to increase (ACAPS, 2016).

In 2016, **Mauritania** hosted over 70,000 refugees (see Figure 2), with the majority being Malian. Ongoing instability, caused by armed rebellion in northern Mali and a military coup there in 2012, is the primary driver of Malian refugees into the country (IOM, 2013a). As of July 2017, the Mbera refugee camp hosted upwards of 51,000 Malian refugees, with 365 new arrivals registered in June of the same year (UNHCR,

2017i). These figures fluctuate: there were 69,221 Malian refugees present in Mauritania in early 2013 (IOM, 2013a), 77,380 at the start of 2016, and 68,574 mid-2016 (UNHCR, 2017g). As of September 2017, UNHCR (2017j) indicates that the priority in the Mbera camp is the construction of latrines and the implementation of plans to reduce the dependence of refugees on food assistance. The largest city in southeastern Mauritania, Bassikounou, which neighbours the Mbera refugee camp, has almost doubled in population with the inflow of Malian refugees (IOM, 2016a). Resources were already in short supply and are further strained by these inflows; this has caused ecological and humanitarian issues to threaten stability in the area (UNHCR, 2017h).

After this analysis we may conclude that risks and vulnerabilities of refugees are context-specific and differ between and within countries. However, famine, lack of sanitation, SGBV, and personal insecurity are recurrent features in refugee camps in West and Central Africa. Additionally, to better protect the refugee population in this region, the international community should focus its efforts in the Lake Chad Basin. In fact, **migration is a global phenomenon with local effects: in West and Central Africa, these are largely localized in the Lake Chad area** (Oxfam, 2017; Skinner, & Begun, 2016). In this region, over 2.6 million people have been forcibly displaced by the high levels of human rights abuses, sexual violence, and recruitment of young children to serve as combatants by Boko Haram. Moreover, famine in the area has reached unprecedent levels and is predicted to cause the death of 187 children under the age of five each day in 2017. This situation is aggravated by the lack of resources (Skinner & Begun, 2016). By July 2017, only 23 per cent (USD 40.6 million) of all funds required to provide humanitarian assistance were received (UNHCR, 2017p). The main aim of the international community should, therefore, be to increase the financial support delivered to the Lake Chad Basin crisis. Following, a series of policies should be implemented to provide for food assistance and livelihood support; access to basic services such as water, healthcare and education; and the protection of women and girls against rape, sexual abuse, and sexual exploitation (Skinner & Begun, 2016).

This last point about the situation of women deserves particular attention. There is important evidence indicating that **female refugees are significantly subject to gender inequalities, discrimination, SGBV, and abuses** when compared to the rest of the population (UNHCR, 2015b). Women and girls in refugee camps face serious risks of SGBV from both other refugees and aid workers (Naik, 2002). Moreover, in refugee camps, domestic violence usually increases as a result of family psychosocial trauma and when male refugees struggle with the changing roles within refugee camps (UNHCR, 2015b). Early and forced marriages are commonly used as coping mechanism by families in refugee camps (Mixed Migration Platform, 2016). Furthermore, modern warfare uses sexual violence as war tactic and further aggravates these instances (UNHCR, 2015b). Other possible violence experienced by female refugees are sexual assault, rape, forced marriage, sterilization, forced prostitution, military sexual slavery, and human trafficking (Ghosh, 2009). As forced displacement increases the vulnerability of women on the move to various forms of SGBV, gender should always be taken into account when considering refugees (De Berry & Petrini, 2011).

2.3.2   Internal Displacement in West and Central Africa

Although the focus of this report is on international migrants, evidence has illustrated that, **in many cases, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are future refugees and irregular migrants.** Hence, to provide a comprehensive outlook of forced migration movements in the region, it is key to also consider internal displacement. Estimates indicates that the number of IDPs in Africa is twice as high the number of refugees. Nevertheless, there are still insufficient data to assess which percentage of IDPs will cross an international

border and become a refugee. Given this situation, it is vital to conduct further research on IDPs to discover what percentage of refugees and/ or irregular migrants was previously internally displaced as well as to determine the factors that lead to the ultimate decision to leave the country of origin (IDMC, 2017b).

Table 5 illustrates the (estimated) current stock of internally displaced persons in eleven of the thirteen countries of analysis as well as the main reasons for this displacement. In this context, it is important to distinguish between **displacement caused by conflicts and displacement caused by disasters**. Moreover, it is relevant to acknowledge that the figures for disaster-induced displacement only include IDPs when displacement is caused by "sudden onset hazard events"; these figures exclude IDPs pushed to move by droughts or slower climatic events. Therefore, these data underestimate the actual number of IDPs that are resettling due to climate (IDMC, 2017b). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) does not provide comparable data on internal displacement for **Sierra Leone** and **Mauritania**. Interestingly, as shown in Table 5, there has been an increase in conflict-induced displacement in 2017, while disaster-induced displacement seems to be less relevant.

Table 5: Internal Displacement in West and Central Africa, 2016 & mid-year 2017 (January-June)

Country	Number of IDPs (end 2016)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (2016)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (2016)	New Conflict-Induced Displacements (mid-year 2017)	New Disaster-Induced Displacements (mid-year 2017)	UNHCR registered IDPs
Burkina Faso	700	700	18,000	3,800	4,500	-
Central African Republic	412,000	46,000	7,500	206,000	-	411,785
Chad	108,000	36,000	5,700	-	-	124,342
Gambia	-	-	4,600	162,000	-	-
Ghana	-	-	7,900	5,700	-	-
Guinea	-	-	490	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	301,000	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	37,000	6,300	8,000	42,000	-	36,690
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-
Niger	136,000	166,000	46,000	5,800	2,300	121,391
Nigeria	1,955,000	501,000	78,000	142,000	2,000	2,219,272
Senegal	2,4000	-	24,000	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-

Sources: IDMC, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017a

Despite the limited existence of information on the situation and protection needs of **Burkina Faso**'s internally displaced persons (IDPs), the causes of internal displacement by (extremist) conflict include the deteriorating security situation in the northern region of Burkina Faso and post-election violence (IDMC, 2017c). Also, since 2013, more Burkinabe have been affected with disaster displacement each year. This general trend is likely to continue based increases in the IDP stock from 1,800 in 2013, to 3,700 in 2015, and to 18,000 IDPs in 2016 (IDMC, 2017a).

As mentioned already, conflicts have long characterized the history of the **CAR** and have displaced people both inside and outside the borders of the state. Indeed, internal displacement is not a new issue for this country (IOM, 2014b). The number of IDPs in CAR rocketed from 130,000 to 935,000 in 2013. In just one year, almost one person out of four was forced to leave their place of usual residence (IDMC, 2017a). This was a direct consequence of the clashes that took place after the coup d'état, which displaced people mainly in Bangui and in the western and central regions of the country. During the following two years, the number of IDPs decreased and stabilized between 400,000 and 450,000 (UNHCR, 2017e). This sizable reduction in the number of IDPs was caused, in part, by the many peace agreements and the consequent relaxation of the conflict that lasted until the elections of 2016 (Mangan, & Murray, 2017). Starting in January 2017, however, the stock of IDPs in the CAR increased again; as of July 2017, it is estimated that there were 600,000 IDPs in CAR (UNHCR, 2017e). This increase is likely due to the new conflicts ongoing in the eastern regions of the country, in which civilians are experiencing increasing violence and attacks by armed groups (Global Conflict Tracker, 2017). Importantly, this situation is in continual evolution and should not be considered static. Most recent reports indicate that, in May 2017, violent clashes among four different armed groups have risen dramatically to affect the north-western and south-eastern areas. At the same time, violence has reduced in the capital and in the surrounding areas. Hence, while some 100,000 people were forcibly displaced, some others were spontaneously returning to their homes (UNHCR, 2017q; FAO, 2017). IDPs is CAR are particularly vulnerable, facing food scarcity, limited access to drinking water, and constrained humanitarian assistance (European Commission, 2017c; FAO 2017; UNHCR 2017q).

Similarly, **Chad** has always experienced high numbers of IDPs due to both conflicts and environmental disasters. Out of the total IDP population in the country, 71,000 are in a protracted situation. Moreover, new conflict related displacement started in 2015, with Boko Haram attacks in the Lake Chad region directly displacing an estimated 40,500 people (IDMC, 2017e). Specifically, as of June 2017, it is estimated that 118,804 IDPs and returnees are hosted in the Lake Chad Region, while 106,048 returnees from the CAR are settled in southern Chad (UNHCR, 2017z). Importantly, these figures do not include the people that have been displaced due to floods and natural hazards. These individuals, though, represent a large majority of the IDP population. In fact, each August, southern Chad is affected by heavy rains (IRIN, 2013; UN OCHA, 2012). In 2012, half a million people were forced to leave their homes due to floods. This represented the highest per capita disaster-induced displacement worldwide that year. Moreover, in 2013, an additional 133,000 people were forcibly displaced for the same reason. However, by looking at Chad's IDP figures, it stands out that these IDPs were able to come back to their place of usual residence as soon as the rainy season was over (IDMC, 2017e).

Weather related disasters are also significant drivers of internal displacement in **Ghana**. Since 2011, there have been 97,200 displacements caused by natural disaster. In 2016 alone, flooding and torrential rains displaced 7,918 people across several regions. As of June 2017, 5,700 people have been displaced by natural disasters (IDMC, 2017a). Similarly, IDMC (2017a) notes that wildfires and flooding led to the internal displacement of 490 citizens from **Guinea** in 2016. Besides the number of IDPs generated by the Ebola epidemic, however, the trends in the numbers of IDPs in Guinea have remained rather stable and low in the

last years. Instead, the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic led to the high number of IDPs, namely 34,000 in 2015. As such, most IDPs in Guinea are displaced due to disasters and epidemics, rather than being displaced due to conflict or violence (NRC & IDMC, 2016; IDMC, 2017a).

Similarly, flooding and storms displaced 24,192 people in **Senegal** in the summer of 2016 (IDMC, 2017a). Ongoing violence and weather-related disasters have contributed to protracted IDP situations since 2009 (IDMC, 2017a). Additionally, sporadic conflict in the southern region of Casamance, caused by the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces, has left 24,000 people displaced, with ongoing instability disallowing return (IDMC & NRC, 2017; Some & IOM, 2009). While there is a lack of comprehensive data on the characteristics of Senegalese IDPs, there are observable "pendular pattern[s]" to the displacement: people shelter near their homes and are able to return to them once clashes die down on a daily, weekly, or seasonal basis (IDMC, 2013c).

Though information about internal displacement in **Gambia** is limited, it can be inferred that, until recently, internal displacement in the country, similarly to Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, and Chad, has been driven by natural disasters, such floods, droughts, wildfires, and landslides (CIA, 2017; Shout-Africa, 2011). Instead, the most recent displacement resulted from political upheaval and violence following the political elections in December 2016 through the first months of 2017. This regional crisis led to mass displacement of Gambians internally, but also to the neighbouring countries of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (Caux, 2017). During this period of unrest, large parts of the population were displaced and fled the capital. In total, a report number of 200,000 people fled the capital, with around 160,000 being internally displaced. By the end of January 2017, mediation efforts by ECOWAS countries succeeded and former president Jammeh ceded power (IRIN, 2017). Therefore, most IDPs reportedly returned to their homes after the crisis was resolved (IDMC, 2017a).

Internal displacement due to such violence and conflicts has also long characterized **Côte d'Ivoire**, particularly in the early and late 2000s, when conflicts displaced approximately 1.1 million. This happened between 2002 and 2007, specifically in Northern and Central Cote d'Ivoire (IDMC, 2017f). Moreover, inter-communal conflicts, robberies, abuses by security forces, and government-sanctioned evictions in the west of the country caused more displacement (IDMC, 2013b). Nevertheless, it is estimated that the majority of the individuals displaced in Côte d'Ivoire in the last decade and a half had returned to their homes by 2014; consequently, little research has been done on IDPs in the country since this time (IDMC, 2017a). It is, therefore, unclear how many Ivorian IDPs have found durable solutions (IDMC, 2013b). Moreover, as of 2016, 301,000 IDPs displaced by violence and conflict were living in Côte d'Ivoire and still had not yet returned to their homes (CIA, 2017; IDMC, 2017a).

The causes for internal displacement in **Mali** are strictly linked to the situation of civil war experienced in the country since 2012 (Dobbs & Gaynor, 2015). In fact, the 2012 conflict resulted in an IDP stock of 230,000 people (IDMC, 2017a). Overall, the IDP stock in Mali has decreased significantly since then. Specifically, already in 2014, it was estimated that 60% of IDPs were able to return (IDMC, 2014b). The estimated stock of IDPs was 37,000 in 2016 (IDMC, 2017a), a sizeable reduction due to the increased security situation in northern Mali and to the peace agreement signed in 2015. Nevertheless, between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, the IDP stock increased to around 55,000 (IDMC, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017ab). This upward trend can be attributed to a re-escalation of violence in northern Mali. The peace agreement of 2015 was broken many times during 2016, and the numbers of attacks from terrorist groups to civilians more than doubled from 2015 to 2016. Hence, there are good reasons to believe that the

presence of IDPs in Mali will not come to an end in the coming years; on the contrary, their number will probably increase (ACAPS, 2016).

Forced displacement in **Niger**, and especially in the Diffa region, started in 2013. However, it has become a major issue since 2015, when Boko Haram began to attack civilians in the Niger territory, triggering large scale displacement (IDMC, 2017g). According to REACH (2017), 93 per cent of Nigerien IDPs have fled their homes due to insecurity in their villages. As such, disaster-induced displacement is not a major concern. Importantly, many IDPs are former labour migrants to Nigeria that forcibly return to Niger and become IDPs due to violence in north Nigeria caused by Boko Haram (IDMC, 2017g). As of May 2017, Niger had a stock of 127,391 IDPs, mostly living in spontaneous sites along the eastern part of the *Route Nationale 1*, which connects Niamey with the city of Diffa. A minority of IDPs have settled in towns and villages also located in the Diffa region (REACH, 2017). In total, 140 IDPs locations have been identified in Niger (IDMC, 2017g). IDPs face major risks, and their situation continues to deteriorate due to repeated attacks by Boko Haram on IDP locations (UN OCHA, 2016a). The most prominent examples include robberies, physical violence, and clashes between armed groups. Moreover, the IDP situation has worsened by widespread insecurity due to a lack of access to basic services, such water or sanitation. Women and girls avoid using latrines for security concerns, and children do not go to school because of the high risks of abduction. Lastly, prostitution and forced labour are common instances among the IDP population, including among IDP children. Yet, few IDPs reported the desire to return to their contexts of origin due consistent levels of insecurity in their villages of origin (REACH, 2017).

Like Niger, **Nigeria** has a total of 1,884,331 IDPs also displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency (UNHCR, 2017m). Between 2015 and 2016, Nigerian IDPs flows accounted for more than 30 per cent of all conflict-induced displacements in Africa (IDMC, 2016). The large majority of IDPs in Nigeria flees to urban centres for relative safety, causing overcrowding in already poorly managed urban situations and straining basic services. Certain urban centres such as Maiduguri saw their population double in size from one million to two million people over the extent of the crisis, leading the local government to encourage people to leave the city and return to their places of origin (UNOCHA, 2016b). Data show that the largest populations of IDPs are concentrated in three main regions: Borno (79%), Adamawa (8%), and Yobe (6%) (IOM, 2017p). The majority (63%) of IDPs tend to stay with host communities, with friends and relatives, or in abandoned housing, while a minority (37%) lives in camp-like displacement settings; most wish to return home but are hindered by a lack of safety (IOM, 2017p). Vulnerabilities faced by the IDP population include food insecurity, security attacks by insurgents in camp, health concerns (such as a hepatitis E outbreak), as well as limited availability of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services (Al Jazeera, 2017b; Borno Health Sector, 2017; IOM, 2017p; MSF, 2017; UNOHCA, 2016b).

2.4 Regular/ Labour Migration

The literature on regular migration in and from West and Central Africa is scarce. Generally, migration literature about the region is predominately focused on forced displacement as well as irregular migration movements. Regular migration, especially for the purpose of labour, is much less studied. Despite Africa being seen as a continent of mass migration driven by conflicts, poverty, and harsh climate conditions, this perception does not reflect reality (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). In fact, refugees represent only a small fraction of the over **12 million West and Central African migrants estimated in 2016** (UNICEF, 2016). Moreover, even if West African migration has recently increased, this trend has been fostered by processes of development and social transformation rather than by increased poverty or conflicts. Accordingly, it is

exactly through development and social change that the West African population has increased capabilities and aspirations to migrate, especially for purposes of work (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). Currently, this African region is the one that is experiencing the highest population movements (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016), and it is estimated that between 2 per cent and 3 per cent of West and Central African population is an international migrant (UNICEF, 2016; UNHCR, n.d., a). These relatively high migration levels in West Africa are probably linked to the fact that many ethnic groups have a transnational nature, with their networks being connected across borders. Another factor might be the existence of ECOWAS' free movement regime since 1979 and the reduction of barriers to regular migration (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that barriers to regular migration still exist (and include corruption and the increasing securitization of borders), while the ECOWAS freedom of movement regime is differently implemented in the different countries. These differences are amongst the main reasons behind the variety of the migration patterns that distinguish the countries of analysis.

Annex C provides an overview of some key immigration and emigration statistics; it shows the differences in destination countries of migrants originally from the countries of analysis. What stands out is that most migrants from West and Central Africa migrate within the region, also for purposes of labour migration. This fact is also widely supported by existing literature, which generally pictures West and Central African migration as extensively intra-continental (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; UNICEF, 2016; UNHCR, n.d., a). Some estimates, for example, indicate that migration flows within West Africa are ten times higher than these toward Europe (UNHCR, n.d., a). Similarly, others indicate that intra-regional migration in the region accounts for 75 per cent of the total, with migration to Europe accounting for only 15 per cent (UNICEF, 2016). Hence, the migratory phenomenon in West and Central Africa should be primarily be considered an intra-African livelihood strategy, which temporary and circular in nature (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). In the following, an analysis of regular labour migration in and from the thirteen focus countries will be given.

Due to a lack of government data and records on migration in the **CAR**, not much is known about labour *immigration* to the country and about its impact on the economy. Additionally, widespread violence and low economic performances have generally discouraged foreigners from migrating to the CAR. Nevertheless, regular labour migration is considered to have increased between 1993 and 2013, thanks to a facilitated procedure to obtain labour visas that was implemented during the years (IOM, 2014b). In 2015, the number of immigrants in the CAR was estimated around 81,500, and most of them were originally coming from bordering countries (UNDESA, 2015a). Immigrants in the CAR are considered to be mostly uneducated and their decision to migrate to the CAR is generally related to professional reasons and to opening an independent business activity in the country (IOM, 2014b). Data on labour *emigration* from the CAR are almost inexistent (IOM, 2014b). Estimate from the World Bank (2016) indicate that the emigrant stock was 342,000, or 7.3 per cent of the CAR's total population in 2016. Most of these emigrants migrated toward Chad, Cameroon, France, the Republic of the Congo, Mali, USA, Canada, and other European states (World Bank, 2016).

Similarly, due to poverty, a lack of economic opportunities, and political instability, **Chad** also has never been an attractive destination for labour migrants. The extent to which labour *immigration* is functional to the country economy is unknown (IOM, 2007). In 2015, the estimated immigrant population was 147,428 and the main countries of origin were CAR, Sudan, and Cameroon (UN DESA, 2015a). Historically, Chad has experienced emigration related to transhumance and the movements of pastoral groups; political, economic, and climate change factors have also played a role. The scope of *emigration*, as well as the importance of remittances for Chad's economy, is also mostly unknown. Overall, Chad is not considered a

country of significant emigration (IOM, 2007). In 2015, the share of Chadian emigrants as percentage of the total population was less than 1.5 per cent (UN DESA, 2015). Importantly, Chad's emigration is largely seen as a gendered phenomenon, since men of working age represent the large majority of the emigrant population (IOM, 2007). Much of their emigration appears to be seasonal and directed toward neighboring countries (Micallef, 2017; Tubiana & Gramizzi, 2017).

Existing data on regular and labour *immigration* to **Niger** is scarce. International migrants represent less than 1 per cent of Niger's total resident population and have an ambiguous impact on the country's economy. It seems that immigration for labour purposes is not relevant in the context of Niger (IOM, 2009a). Particularly since it is the poorest and least developed country in the region, Niger is not an attractive destination for migrants (UNDP, 2016). According to UN DESA (2015a), the main countries of origin of economic migrants are Mali (47%), Benin (10%), and Burkina Faso (10%). Furthermore, it is challenging to consider Niger an immigration country, as most foreigners are nationals of ECOWAS states and benefit from free circulation. Hence, given the short-term nature of their movements, they cannot be considered permanent migrants (CARIM, 2011). Data on Nigerien *emigration* are also very scattered as there is no entity or service entrusted with collecting data on Nigeriens abroad. Similarly, in Niger's population census, there is no question regarding emigration (IOM, 2009a). In 2015, the stock of Nigerien emigrants was estimated to be 356,793 people, representing 1.8 per cent of the country's total population (UN DESA, 2015a). The main destination countries of Nigerien emigrants were Nigeria (32%), Benin (21%), and Togo (18%), while less than 3.5% of Nigerien emigrants migrated outside of the African continent (UN DESA, 2015a). Since 1990, emigration has been led by economic factors, largely related to the difficulties of the Nigerien agricultural sector (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; CARIM, 2011) Generally, Nigerien migrants are low-skilled, and the risk of brain drain has stayed limited in Niger. Moreover, Nigerien emigration is considered a gendered phenomenon, in which males are highly overrepresented and female migration is constrained (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

There is also little to no information on labour *immigration* to **Sierra Leone**. In 2015, the international migrant stock in Sierra Leone was 90,453, reflecting 1.2 per cent of the total population (UN DESA, 2015a). The most common origin countries were Guinea, Liberia, and Gambia. The difficulty in assessing labour immigration stems from the fact that the country does not have a comprehensive labour migration policy that regulates and governs this trend nor is there public disclosure on the information of work permits for foreign nationals (ICPMD & IOM, 2015). Following Sierra Leone's civil war, the country still lacks economic development opportunities and is plagued by poor socioeconomic conditions, unemployment and low wages. These factors encourage labour *emigration* (European Commission, 2007), and the country has developed a sizeable diaspora, primarily in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and United States. This diaspora group contains a great number of highly-skilled migrants (particularly physicians and nurses), since 53 percent of tertiary-educated Sierra Leoneans live abroad (World Bank, 2016).

Moreover, data on **Guinea's** *immigration* patterns are limited. Besides the 1996 General Population and Housing Census, there are few recent and reliable sources on immigration and the presence of foreigners in Guinea (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). According to the World Bank (2016), Guinea's immigrant stock consisted of 378.5 thousand people, accounting for 3.2% of its population, in 2013. According to the same statistics, they were mostly from other West and Central African countries. In 2015, there were an estimated 219,500 immigrants in Guinea (UN DESA, 2015a). As it the case with research on immigration, data on the *emigration* of Guinean nationals is outdated and incomplete (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). According to the World Bank (2016), Guinea's emigrant stock consisted of 398.5 thousand people, accounting for 3.3% of its population, in 2013. Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, and Sierra Leone have become the top destination countries

(UN DESA, 2015a). Emigration to the United States or Europe was, and still is, far lower and remains limited (IOM, 2008). Interestingly, emigration from Guinea to Senegal, and vice versa, happens on a seasonal basis within the agriculture industry. However, this pattern has evolved into increased movements towards urban areas and has, thus, resulted into permanent settlements abroad (Lefebvre, 2003; ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

In this regard, most *immigration* to **Senegal** is from neighbouring West African countries, which is unsurprising given that Senegal is a member of ECOWAS. Mauritanians, Malians, and Guineans account for about half of the 248,850 immigrants in Senegal (UN DESA, 2015a). Foreign workers overwhelmingly find low-skilled positions in the informal sector and tend to work in labour market niches determined by country of origin: Guineans work in the fruit and vegetable trade and transportation; Malian women specialize in paintings; and Malian men work in the cola nut industry (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Higher-skilled immigrants are commonly from Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, and Togo. According to the 2001 Senegalese Household Survey, many immigrants (51.4%) were in Senegal for family reunification, while about one third of respondents cited economic and job-related reasons (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 25). Additionally, 34.2% of the foreigners in the survey were engaged in trade, 26.4% in agriculture, and 15.4% in production and processing, while 55.5% were illiterate (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 25). *Emigration* for labour purposes is a common pursuit of the Senegalese**,** especially among the youth. It has even become institutionalized in some communities, where it is expected and valued as part of a life trajectory (RMMS West Africa, 2017b). Senegal's emigrant stock abroad represents about 4% of the country's population. Over the past few decades, preferred destinations have shifted to non-African countries (Bartolomeo et al., 2010), which account for about 50% of Senegalese abroad in 2015 (UNDESA, 2015a).

Labour *immigration* is functional to the Gambian economy. In 2015, **Gambia's** total stock of immigrants amounted to 192,540, or almost 10 per cent of the total population. Most immigrants to Gambia arrived from Senegal (62%), Guinea (21%), Guinea-Bissau (6%), and Mali (5%) (UN DESA, 2015a). Most of them are settled in the country's urban and coastal areas (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Moreover, as estimated by the 2003 and 2010 Household Poverty Surveys, Gambia's immigrants are 57% male and 43% female. Interestingly, labour immigrants living in Gambia are also employed in different economic sectors than Gambian nationals. Specifically, migrants living in Gambia typically find jobs in retail, wholesale, and tourism (43% together); other important sectors include agriculture, mining, and fishing (16%), manufacturing (10%), and finance or business (5%) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). *Emigration* for economic and labour-related reasons due to economic instability is also relevant. Gambia's skilled emigration rate – 63% in 2000 – has been ranked second highest among African countries and among the top 20 worldwide (Kebbeh, 2013). As shown in Annex C, the main destinations of Gambian emigrants are outside Africa, namely USA, Spain, and UK. Moreover, based on 2009 data, an estimated 78% of Gambian emigrants was male and an estimated 22% female (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Although remittances have an important positive impact on Gambian economy, mass emigration of skilled workers may also have long-term development consequences on Gambia, and the risk of brain-drain should be addressed (Kebbeh, 2013).

Labour *immigration* in **Ghana** has become more important since the introduction of constitution rule in 1992, that gave way to economic and political stability, which has attracted migrants from within and without the ECOWAS region (SIHMA, 2014). Most immigrants in Ghana come from nearby African countries, especially ECOWAS member states (UNDESA, 2015a). While the Ghanaian Statistical Service tracked a drop in foreigners between 2000 (740,191) and 2010 (600,049) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015), the foreign-born population nearly doubled from 191,601 in 2000 to 337,701 in 2010. In 2010, 46.1% of the immigrants in Ghana were women, and by 2015, that figure slightly dropped to 45.5% (UNDESA, 2015a). Immigrants in Ghana are employed in the following sectors: agricultural, forestry and fisheries; wholesale

and retail; repairing motor vehicles; and informal, self-employed (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). In terms of *emigration*, the 801,710 Ghanaians abroad represent about 3% of Ghana's population (UN DESA, 2015a). Ghanaian emigrants are known to work in retail and sales, construction and agriculture, as mechanics, electricians, carpenters, and most significantly, in the medical sector (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). About 30% of these emigrants are in the US and UK alone, but the most popular destination is Nigeria (UN DESA, 2015a). There has been a shift in preferences towards Europe over ECOWAS countries for Ghanaian emigrants who, before the 1990s, largely favored ECOWAS countries (SIHMA, 2014). While most Ghanaian emigrants have a low to medium level of skills, the emigration rate of skilled Ghanaians is very high at 46% (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). This has left sectors of the Ghanaian labour market grossly under-supplied, specifically for doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and those in higher education institutes (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, pg. 165).

Mali is not generally considered a country of *immigration* (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2013a). The immigrant stock in Mali was estimated to be around 347,228, representing 2% of the total population, in 2015 (UN DESA, 2015a). The overwhelming majority of foreign residents in Mali is originally from other West African countries (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2013a; UNICEF, 2013d). Specifically, the main countries of origin of foreign residents in Mali are Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Niger (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2013a; UNICEF, 2013d). According to the 2009 census, most of the foreign population was male (52.5%), did not have any formal education (60%), and was mainly living in the capital Bamako (27.9%) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). However, their impact on Malian economy as well as their occupational sectors are almost impossible to determine. In this regard, it is estimated that 70% of the Malian labour market is in the informal economy, and most migrants are considered to be working within it (CARIM, 2010). Mali, however, has always been a country of *emigration*, and it can be said that this phenomenon is a vital component of Malian society. In 2015, the stock of Malian emigrants was estimated to be slightly higher than 1 million, representing 6% of the total population (UN DESA, 2015a). Malians emigrate for a variety of reasons, including poverty, unemployment, a harsh climate, demographic pressures, and a cultural heritage that sees migration as rite of passage for young men before they are allowed to marry. Moreover, migration is a livelihood strategy for nomadic pastoral groups that migrate seasonally with their livestock (IOM, 2014c; IOM, 2013a; CARIM, 2010; ICMPD, 2010). Most emigrants (60%) come from rural areas and are employed in low-skilled (60%) jobs in the informal economy of ECOWAS states (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Like Mali, Mauritania is characterized by emigration rather than immigration. *Immigration* to **Mauritania** for labour purposes is not an extensive phenomenon. In 2015, the stock of immigrants was 60,768, representing just 1.4 per cent of the total population (UN DESA, 2015a; IOM, 2010b). The majority of the country's immigrants are originally from Senegal, Mali, and Guinea. Of the foreigners working in the cities of Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, and Rosso, an estimated 87% are employed in the service sector working as domestic workers, petty traders, drivers. Others work in the agriculture, fisheries, or food catering industries. These immigrants have filled labour shortages caused by Mauritanian emigration, specifically in the fishing, building, services, and education sectors, and have been key contributors to the country's development (Saleh, 2009). *Emigration* is a vital feature of Mauritanian economy and development. In 2015, the estimated stock of emigrants from Mauritania was 119,334, representing around 3% of the total population (UN DESA, 2015a). Emigration of the unskilled and unemployed youth is driven by the few and decreasing opportunities in Mauritania's national economy and an overloaded informal sector (Saleh, 2009). Most emigrants are in neighbouring countries, mainly Mali and Senegal, but a significant number are also in France and Spain (UN DESA, 2015a). Highly skilled migrants account for 11.8% of Mauritanian emigrants worldwide (IOM, 2016a); these movements are a handicap in certain Mauritanian industries, notably the health sector (Saleh, 2009).

Immigration also does not seem a relevant feature in the context of **Nigeria.** As of 2015, there were more than 1 million immigrants in the country, representing only 0.6% of the total population (UN DESA, 2015a). The most common origin countries are Benin, Ghana, and Mali, and the majority of immigrants are employed in the informal sector. However, professions that migrants may occupy also include general managers, corporate managers, physical science, clerical staff, and jobs in the mining, construction, and transport industries (IOM, 2014a). Moreover, data on *emigration* is difficult to collect due to the problematic techniques to assemble data from destination countries. Still, labour migrants from Nigeria tend to go to developed countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and Nigerian migration to less developed countries has slowed (Afolayan, Ikwuyatum & Abejide, 2009; IOM, 2014a). Emigration is key to the development of Nigeria, which has by far the highest inflow remittances in the region. According to the World Bank, 51 per cent of Nigerian emigrants have tertiary education (World Bank, 2016). This often follows sector specific migration which can lead to brain drain and be damaging for local communities. In Nigeria, the medical sector suffers from this deficiency, with a high migration of physicians, especially to oil-producing countries such as Gulf States of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (MTM i-Map, 2011; IOM, 2014a).

Moreover, the relevance of labour *immigration* in the context of **Burkina Faso** is limited. While the incidence of foreigners in Burkina Faso remains low, foreigners residing in the country are mostly from other ECOWAS member states such as Mali, Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Most labour immigrants are employed in the agricultural sector and, to a lesser extent, in the trade and craft sectors (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 2013). However, even though there are no exact figures on the number of Burkinabe abroad, *emigration* has always been an important component of the country's demography (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). In 2013, Burkina Faso's migrant stock was approximately 1.6 million people, representing almost 10% of total population (UNICEF, 2013b). The main countries of destination of Burkinabe migrants on the African continent are located nearby; specifically, they include Ghana, Mali, Benin, and Niger (World Bank, 2016). Most people from Burkina Faso (1.5 million of 1.6 million), however, migrate to one country of destination in particular: Cote d'Ivoire (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNICEF, 2013b). Emigration to states outside of the ECOWAS community remains statistically insignificant (Aghazarm, Quesada & Tishler, 2012).

Since its colonization by France, **Cote d'Ivoire** has been highly dependent on a migrant workforce, particularly that of Burkina Faso, and from countries with an excess of laborers. *Immigration* to Côte d'Ivoire for labour purposes was promoted by the Ivorian government, especially in times of economic downturn from the 1960s to 1980s, and continues at relatively high rates to this day (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). An estimated 2,175,399 immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Liberia were living in Côte d'Ivoire in 2015 (UN DESA, 2015a). The majority of foreign workers are employed in low-skilled jobs in the agriculture sector with responsibilities also extending into fishing, herding, trade, and industry (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Due to a lack of research, however, there is very little information about the *emigration* trends from Côte d'Ivoire; this is likely because emigration from Côte d'Ivoire is seen as a more limited phenomenon compared to immigration into the country (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). According to ICMPD & IOM (2015), emigrant flows from Côte d'Ivoire are mostly comprised of lower-educated (47.6%) and high-educated (30.7%) persons. Sectors that employ Ivorians abroad, particularly those residing in OECD countries, include manufacturing, distribution, and services activities, hotel industry, agriculture, etc. (IOM Dakar, 2009).

2.5   Remittances to West and Central Africa[14]

Migrant remittances are considered crucially important for the development of migrant-sending societies. Evidence indicates that, at the macro-level, remittances act as insurance against adverse events and economic shocks. Moreover, they are more stable than FDI and private debt, as they are based on a logic of sharing resources within a household rather than on a logic of profit. Through remittances, migrant households can support their consumption in periods of economic downturn or similar scenarios. In addition, by raising consumption and expenditure of migrant households, remittances are also believed to be directly linked with economic growth. At the micro-level, remittances have been proven to effectively reduce poverty levels, and this has been shown to be the case for Africa. However, the counter-effect of remittances is that they generally increase the inequality of households, especially when the migrants reside outside of the African continent (World Bank, 2011).

It is important to note that, given the mostly micro- and community-level effects of remittances, the scope for remittances policies is restricted by definition. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that, even if remittances may play an important and vital role in development, this is not always the case. The extent to which they achieve a positive developmental outcome is largely related to the existing development situation in the sending and receiving countries of migrants. Overall, it appears that the linkage between migration and development policies lies in circular migration and in a liberal approach toward labour immigrants for which there is a real demand. For this reason, restrictive policies at both ends of the migration journey have the negative effect of encouraging permanent settlement, while constraining circular migration. To efficiently link migration and development, sending countries should try to create a favourable environment that encourages migrants to circulate, return, and

Figure 3: Remittances to West and Central Africa, 2001-2016 (in millions)

Source: World Bank, 2017b. // *Note:* Data on formal remittance flows to Central African Republic, Chad, and Mauritania are not available.

make investments. On the other hand, immigration policies in receiving countries should allow for more free (but also regulated) migration in order to increase migration control, promote the circulation of migrants, and enhance the contribution of migrants to their home countries (De Haas, 2005).

In broad terms, **remittances in West Africa are considered to be increasingly significant.** In 2014, they were estimated around USD 26 billion, of which 87 per cent (USD 20.9 billion) were sent to Nigeria alone. Total remittances amounted to 3.2 per cent of the region's GDP, and the scope of these remittances make

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[14] Since that there are no data on remittances inflows to the CAR and Chad in the Central African region, this section will entirely focus on countries in West Africa.

West Africa the second biggest remittances recipient of the African continent (Fonta, Nwosu, & Onyukwu, 2016). Importantly, the actual remittance volume is estimated to be much higher than the one reported, as many migrants send remittances home through informal channels where they cannot be officially recorded (World Bank, 2017c; Oluwafemi & Ayandibu, 2014; World Bank, 2011).

Figure 3 shows inflow remittances to the focus countries of this report in absolute terms. It is not surprising that Nigeria is an outlier compared to the other countries. This situation can be easily explained by the fact that Nigeria has, by far, the largest economy and the biggest population of the region. In relative terms, however, remittances in Nigeria are not as important as they are in Gambia or Senegal, for instance. In fact, in 2016, it was estimated that remittances reflected 18.8 per cent of the Gambian GDP and 13.6 per cent of the Senegalese GDP but only 4.7 per cent of the Nigerian GDP. More similar to Nigeria, remittances represented 5.7 per cent of the GDP in Mali, 4.8 per cent in Ghana, 3.3 per cent in Burkina Faso. As a much smaller proportion, remittances have a more marginal role in other focus countries. Remittances in Sierra Leone, for example, only accounted for 1.6% of the GDP, 1.5 per cent in Guinea, 1.4% in Niger, and 0.9% in Cote d'Ivoire (World Bank, 2017a). Due to their significance of remittance inflows, we consider the individual cases of Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Burkina Faso in more detail.

In 2016, **Nigeria** received about USD 19 billion in remittances. As such, the country was the top remittance receiver in the West Africa region and on the entire African continent. However, this number represented a decline compared to 2015, when remittances received amounted to USD 21 billion. Specifically, tighter capital controls by the Nigerian government pushed a large share of remittances to informal channels (World Bank, 2017c). In the Nigerian context, remittances play a pivotal role in reducing poverty levels. However, these remittances simultaneously increase household inequality (Fonta, Nwosu, & Onyukwu, 2016). Moreover, remittances received are not used to their full potential. Specifically, there are many barriers to the full enhancement of the positive outcome of remittances in Nigeria. Corruption, political instability, an unattractive business climate, ineffective bureaucracy and non-implementation of remittances policies constitute major constraints to the positive impact of remittances on Nigerian development (Oluwafemi & Ayandibu, 2014).

The impact of inward remittances sent by **Gambia** emigrants is also relevant, considering that remittances as a share of GDP has been among the highest in Africa (Kebbeh, 2013). In 2016, incoming remittances amounted to USD 181 million and represented almost 19 per cent of Gambian GDP (World Bank, 2017a). Although remittances are integral part of Gambian economy, mass emigration of skilled workers may also have long-term development consequences on Gambia. In this regard, the effects of a potential brain drain are not yet known. In addition, skilled workers migrating to Western countries may face difficulties in having their Gambia diplomas recognized and may, therefore, experience deskilling. Nonetheless, the vital development benefits of remittances in Gambia include poverty alleviation. Particularly, remittances facilitate the livelihoods of households that do not have access to government support (Kebbeh, 2013).

Inward sent personal remittances received in **Senegal** have grown exponentially since 2000, leaping from USD 233.5 million to USD 2 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 2017a). In terms of share of the GDP, remittances received from emigrants abroad have shot from 2.97% of GDP in 1996 to 13.6% in 2016. During this time, remittances increasingly became a more common part of communities' survival strategies (Some & IOM, 2009; World Bank, 2017a). At present, remittances are important supplements to household incomes for Senegalese with expatriate family members (Some & IOM, 2009). For instance, in 2010, households that received remittances were able to save an average of almost twice as much when compared to non-

recipient households (Orozco, Burgess, & Massardier, 2010). Recognizing this, there are several initiatives the Senegalese Government has undertaken to link migration to development efforts:

- Migration for Development in Africa Programme (MIDA–Senegal), in partnership with IOM;
- the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme; and
- the Co-development Initiative by the Senegalese President's Office (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 29).

However, the volume of remittances formally recorded in the case of Senegal likely underestimate the phenomenon, as an estimated one third of remittances to the country are sent through informal channels (Orozco, Burgess, & Massardier, 2010).

Though to a lesser extent than in Senegal, Gambia, and Nigeria, personal remittances are also a crucial component of the **Malian** economy. In 2015, they represented 7% of the Malian GDP (World Bank, 2017a). The biggest share of remittances is sent from France, while just a small portion is sent from other African countries. However, as is also the case in Senegal, these estimate of remittances to Mali surely underestimate the phenomenon, since three quarters of the total remittances are sent through informal channels (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Importantly, most of these remittances are used for consumption: to buy foods and goods or to fulfil other essential needs. However, in some instances, they are used for community projects having to do with water supplies and education (ICMPD, 2010). Additionally, in 2013, it was estimated that as much as 14% of remittances to Mali were invested into business activities (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Additionally, the Malian government, and specifically the Malian Ministry of Economy and Finance, plays an important role in engaging the skilled Malian diaspora (ICMPD, 2010). Moreover, local authorities in migrant-sending regions play an important role in incentivizing the financing of community projects through remittances. Indeed, Mali was one of the first African countries where the EU aimed to realize migration-development initiatives through diaspora engagement (Trauner & Deimel, 2013; Newland & Patrick, 2004).

According to the Bank of **Ghana**, remittances have grown from USD 479 million in 1999 to USD 2.14 billion in 2010. These figures, however, are also acknowledged to be underestimates (GSS, 2016). This growth is largely due to increased emigration from Ghana and has improved private-sector growth through financing small- and medium-scale enterprises (Quartey, 2009). As of 2016, personal remittances received (USD 2.04 billion) account for 4.78% of Ghana's GDP, up from 0.42% in 2010 (World Bank, 2017a). Similarly, data from the World Bank (2017a) show a significant increase of inflow remittances in **Burkina Faso**: USD 57 million in 2005, USD 120 million in 2010, and a total of USD 392 million in remittances in 2015. Looking at this general trend, it is likely that the inflow of remittances is going to continue and be even more important for Burkina Faso's economy. Though most Burkinabe emigrants live in Africa, the majority of remittances sent by emigrants back to Burkina Faso come from people outside of the continent (World Bank, 2011).

3   External Migration Routes from West and Central Africa

As shall be explained in the next sections, there are three main routes used by West and Central African migrants to reach North Africa and, though to a lesser extent, Europe. Specifically, there is **the Central Mediterranean Route**, that goes from Niger and Libya to Italy; **the Western Mediterranean Route**, going through Mali, Algeria, and Tunisia or Morocco to Spain; and **the West African Route**, that connects Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco to the Canary Islands. In

Figure 4: Irregular and Mixed Migration Routes in West and Central Africa

Source: UNODC, 2012 // Note: this map is of 2012, and while it is still up to date, the routes in Chad recently lost importance.

addition, this report will also stress another route, the **Air Route**, which comprises all the possible flights that migrants can use to get to Europe. Many of the migrants travelling along this route eventually overstay their permits after reaching Europe.

While reading the next sections, the reader should bear in mind two limitations. First, there is never a clear cut between routes. For instance, it happens frequently that migrants transiting in Mali on the Western Mediterranean Route choose to go to Niger to continue the journey on the Central Mediterranean Route, and vice-versa. Second, due to its nature, collecting data on irregular migration flows is generally rather challenging, and systematic assessments of mobility throughout West and North Africa are very complex. For these reasons, even though the presented data are considered to be the most accurate, they do not reflect the overall situation. The main take away of the next sections should be that migration routes are fluid and that their popularity varies at any given point, depending on characteristics that are context- and time-specific.

3.1 The Central Mediterranean Route

The **Central Mediterranean Route** is currently the most used by West and Central African migrants that try to reach North Africa, and to a lesser extent Europe. In Figure 5, this route is indicated by the orange dotted line (Micallef, 2017; Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; IOM, 2017m; UNHCR, 2017r). In a broader sense, references to arrivals from the Central Mediterranean Route generally intend to describe irregular maritime border crossings directly to Italy and Malta, however estimates indicate that only 20 per cent of migrants using this route ultimately depart to Europe. The remaining 80 per cent stays in ECOWAS and

Figure 5: The Central Mediterranean Route

Source: Tinti & Westcott, 2016

North-Africa, and their migration should be seen as trans-Saharan, temporary, and (mostly) circular migration that is part of an intra-African livelihood strategy (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

As is reported in Figure 6 below, the Central Mediterranean Route gained most of its popularity during the last three years (Frontex, 2017a). Several factors can explain this situation, but two are considered the most important (Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Firstly,

by passing through Niger, migrants can avoid the conflicts in northern Mali between Tebou and Tuareg. Tebou and Tuareg are the two ethnic groups that orchestrate most of the human trafficking and smuggling across the Sahel (Micallef, 2017; Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Secondly, by using this route, migrants can circumvent the border controls and the administrative challenges related to transiting in Algeria. In fact, Niger is part of ECOWAS, and migrants from West Africa can enter the country without a visa for as long as 90 days. Migration becomes irregular only when migrants cross the Libyan border without documents (Carling, 2016a). This implies that the risks related to irregular migration are reduced, since a smuggling service would only be needed to go from the northern Nigerien city of Agadez to Libya (Tinti & Westcott, 2016). For the rest, migrants regularly move in Niger and through ECOWAS using private cars or on air-conditioned buses (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

Generally, the Central Mediterranean Route is identified as the route going from Agadez in Niger, to Sabah and Tripoli in Libya, and then to Italy or Malta (Tinti, & Westcott, 2016). It is also common that migrants join this route from multiple places including Mali, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, as shown in Figure 5. However, there is evidence to suggest that most migrants traveling along this route transit through Niger. In 2016, mixed migration flows in Niger were estimated around 300,000 people (UNHCR, 2017s). In May

2017, this number was already over 60,000 (UNHCR, 2017t). Niger's geopolitical situation makes the country a sensitive area for irregular migration out of the ECOWAS region towards Europe as it is located right between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. In this regard, Libya is the most important transit country for people trying to reach Europe (UNHCR, 2017r). Specifically, the Nigerien city of Agadez is considered the most important smuggling hub in the Sahel. In 2016, an estimated 170,000 migrants transited through this city alone on their way north (Micallef, 2017).

In Agadez, the human smuggling industry is articulated though all levels of society and is a vital part of the economy of the city and of the country (Diallo, 2017; Tinti & Westcott, 2016). The economic situation in northern Niger, coupled with high corruption levels have established this 'migration economy', from which a multitude of actors (including state personnel and border officials) benefit (Tinti & Westcott, 2016). From Agadez, migrants generally continue their journey either west (passing through Arlit and crossing the Algerian border) or north (passing Seguedine and crossing the Tummo border with Libya) (IOM, 2017m). These are the same ancient and established trading routes that rural tribes of the Sahara used for centuries to trade goods and to transport people from north to Sub-Saharan Africa, and vice versa. Human smuggling in Agadez was recently curbed due to the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, a plan that established tight cooperation between the EU and Niger on matters of irregular migration (Diallo, 2017). Specifically, since September 2016, stronger and more repressive measures against smugglers transporting migrants from Agadez to Libya or Algeria have been taken. Smugglers have been arrested and the cars used to smuggle

Figure 6: Irregular Border Crossings on the Central Mediterranean Route

Source: Frontex, 2017a

migrants confiscated. These efforts have brought the number of migrants travelling along those routes to a remarkable decrease (IOM, 2017m; Diallo, 2017). However, many experts argue that smuggling in Niger has not stopped, and data on arrivals in Italy show that the smuggling business continues in these areas (Frontex, 2017a; UNHCR, 2017r; UNHCR, 2017t). Micallef (2017), for example, suggests that smuggling has just become harder to track (Micallef, 2017). Indeed, there are reports of smugglers using different routes which are riskier and two to three times more expensive (Diallo, 2017; IOM, 2017m; Micallef, 2017; Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Tinti, & Westcott, 2016).

According to the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) (2017), around 630,000 refugees and irregular migrants arrived to Europe using the Central Mediterranean Route between 2011 and 2016. As of August 2017, 99,127 people arrived in Italy by sea using this route, representing a 14 per cent decrease compared to the same period of the previous year (UNHCR, 2017t). In 2016, the majority of people that used this route were African migrants, mainly from Nigeria (21%), Eritrea (11%), Guinea (7%), Côte d'Ivoire (7%), Gambia (7%), Senegal (6%), Mali (6%), Sudan (5%), and Somalia (4%). Interestingly, Bangladesh (4%) is

among the top ten nationalities of migrants that used the Central Mediterranean Route in 2016 (EPSC, 2017). According to RMMS (2017a), an estimated 82-88% of individuals using this route are males, whereas females account for the remaining 12-18%.

Migrants smuggled through Niger to Libya are considered highly vulnerable. Indeed, the Central Mediterranean Route is not only the most used by migrants trying to reach Europe: it is also the deadliest. Estimates from IOM (2016a) indicate that, in 2016, one person out of every twenty-three that used this route died. Indeed, travelling through the desert generally implies exposure to heat, cold, and dust as well as to food and water scarcity. Even if there are no data available on the people who perished during the smuggling in the Sahara, estimates indicate that more than 130,000 people have died in the desert along this route in the last six years (EPSC, 2017). Sailing in the Mediterranean Sea, in addition, is associated with high risk of drowning. Moreover, from Agadez onward, people are exposed to abuses, beatings, and torture by militias, security forces at checkpoints, and border police at the Libyan border (UNICEF, 2017a).

As subset of the smuggled population, women (especially from Nigeria) and children (especially if unaccompanied) are considered particularly vulnerable as they face great risk of sexual abuse and abduction for trafficking purposes (IOM, 2017n; RMMS, 2017a; UNICEF, 2017a). Estimates indicate that nearly half of the women and children along this route experienced sexual abuse multiple times and in multiple places. Furthermore, sexual abuses appeared systematic and widespread at security check points and at the border with Libya. However, men are also sometimes victim of sexual violence and are often killed if they try to prevent it (UNICEF, 2017a). This situation of widespread abuses and rapes is concerning as it highly damages migrants on the move, causing mental and physical trauma, communicable disease infections (such as HIV/AIDS), as well as unwanted pregnancies.

The number of Nigerian women and children that used the Central Mediterranean Route to get to Europe remarkably increased since 2011. According to IOM (2017n), around 80% of these Nigerian women are trafficking into of sexual exploitation in Europe (IOM, 2017n). This situation is quite concerning, especially given that, in Italy alone, there has been a 600% increase in the number of potential victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation coming from the Central Mediterranean Route. This upward trend continued in the first six months of 2017 (IOM, 2017n). Younger girls are increasingly involved in this business, and minors are at great risk of abuses along the route (IOM, 2017n; RMMS, 2017a; UNICEF, 2017a). Recently, there has been an upward trend in the number of unaccompanied minors along this route as well. From 2015 to 2016, the number of unaccompanied minors more than doubled. Precisely, these minors represented 92% of the 28,223 children who reached Italy through the Central Mediterranean Route in 2016. Particularly, they are considered at high risk of violence, exploitation, and trafficking (RMMS, 2017; UNICEF, 2017a).

Importantly, the abuses previously reported, as well as the trafficking and smuggling along this route, only happens once migrants moved toward Libya or Algeria (through the Sahara) after reaching the city of Agadez. The reason behind this situation is that most origin countries of migrants using the Central Mediterranean Route are member states of ECOWAS, which allow for the freedom of movement of persons in Niger. As such, migrants usually reach Agadez without major risks using public transportation. Depending on their country of origin, migrants can buy bus tickets from their country capital to Agadez, paying between 50 and 100 euros for this leg of the journey (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

From Agadez, most migrants (300,000 in 2016) use a smuggling service directed north to Dirjou, Seguedine, Madama, Tummo, and Sebah in Libya. The average fee for this part of the journey is between 150 and 200 USD. Instead, a minority of migrants (30,000 in 2016) use the route going east to Arlit in Niger, which

continues toward Assamaka, In-Guzzam, and Tamanrasset in Algeria. This route is cheaper, costing around 100 USD (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Altai, 2015). Eventually, both routes merge in Libya, which is the main crossing point to Italy. In 2014, 83 per cent of boat arrivals in Italy departed from Libya (Altai, 2015). Through the Sahara, transportation occurs mostly via Toyota Hilux cars or large trucks. While the trip on the Western Mediterranean Route takes an average of 10 days, the one on the Central Mediterranean Route as will be discussed has a shorter average duration of around 3-6 days (Frontex, 2016a; Tinti & Westcott, 2016).

The smuggling network that manages migration on the route through Arlit is primarily composed by Tuareg. However, this route is not as popular as the route through Seguedine that directly connects Niger to Libya. In fact, the conflicts that started in 2016 between Tuareg and Tebou near the city of Ghat made the route through Arlit very dangerous. Instead, the Seguedine route is safer and is governed by the Tebou ethnic group; the Tebou with their militias and parts of the Nigerien National army have high influence in northern Niger and southern Libya (Micallef, 2017; Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). Their network, which now has recruiters and brokers throughout West and East Africa, has grown rapidly (Micallef, 2017). Particularly, the smuggling networks that operate along the Central Mediterranean Route are affiliated along ethnic lines, with the groups Tebou and Tuareg managing most of this business (Frontex, 2016a; Micallef, 2017). These transnational ethnic groups can indeed encompass Nigerien borders and create networks across countries. In fact, despite nationality, the Tuareg and Tebou group can be found in Libya, Niger, Mali, Algeria, and Chad (Frontex, 2016a; Micallef, 2017; Tinti, & Westcott, 2016). In addition, facilitating the movement of people and goods across the Sahara and the Sahel has been the most important source of income for the traditionally marginalised tribes of the Sahara for centuries (Tinti, & Westcott, 2016; Frontex, 2016a).

Although human smuggling networks are generally imagined as centralized, this is not the case. For the Central Mediterranean route, there is not a defined group or centralized authority that controls smuggling activities. Instead, smugglers are consistently reported to be proud freelancers rather than part of a broader organisation. Different actors operate largely independently, while part of a transnational chain that acts with different levels of flexibility (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Micallef, 2017; Frontex, 2016a). This situation brings important policy implications, as it implies that networks are able to respond quickly to interdictions by rearranging their routes and operations. Moreover, given the multiple actors involved in this business, it is rather challenging from a policy perspective to arrest smugglers and to put an end to irregular immigration. Paradoxically, everything that a smuggler needs to operate is a car and the ability of travelling in the desert. As such, there are many drivers that move in and out of this business (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). For these reasons, operations aimed at stopping smuggling with restrictive measures often do not measure up to their objectives. Rather, they deviate current routes into other ones. For instance, securitization measures of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) to curb human smuggling in Niger (and particularly in Agadez), by criminalising transport of migrants through the desert, were able to do so. However, these efforts were unable to stop smuggling entirely. In fact, this policy pushed migrants and smugglers into other more (figuratively) underground routes. It is possible that many of these new routes pass into the conflict zones of northern Mali with dire consequences for migrants (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). Moreover, another expected consequence of this criminalization is the escalation of violent ethnic conflicts between Tebou and Tuareg. The former are currently operating in Niger, while the latter are active in Mali. Given the current shift in smuggling routes, an escalation of violent conflicts over a shrinking and evolving market is very probable (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). Note, however, that these unwanted consequences are primarily related to the portion of the EUTF that is

concerned with border management and securitization. Other spending of the EUTF related, for instance, to development initiatives, empowerment, capacity building, and poverty alleviation is considered key in positively addressing most issues that are currently affecting northern Niger and in providing people residing in this area with adequate livelihood alternatives.

Situation in Libya and Possible Developments

It should be noted that the last part of the Central Mediterranean Route is in Italy. After the Nigerien cities of Agadez and Seguedine, the journey along the Central Mediterranean Route usually continues toward Sabah and then Tripoli in Libya (IOM, 2017o). Subsequently, migrants eventually embark on a dangerous journey toward Europe across the Mediterranean on boat. Typically, these boat trips cost between 1,500 and 1,900 USD per person. Moreover, this money is usually extorted by force (RHIPTO, 2015). Interestingly, most migrants on the Central Mediterranean Route develop the desire to move further to Italy and Europe only once they arrive in Libya. This situation can be explained by the violence and abuses that migrants face in the country. Particularly, these threats often push migrants to migrate further towards Europe (MEDMIG, 2016; Svoboda, 2016).

Since the beginning of the Libyan civil war in 2011, Libya has been unstable (Amnesty International, 2017). No Libyan authority or institution is able to exercise any control over the militias which act with impunity, causing a general situation of civil war (ECFR, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017). This situation of violence and instability brought major changes in the migratory patterns of the country (Migration Policy Centre, 2013c). For instance, before the civil war, Libya was prominently characterized by South-South and circular labour migration. Moreover, migrants have been attracted to Libya to work in the oil sector since 1960 (UNHCR, 2017w; Migration Policy Centre, 2013c). Prior to the 2011 crisis, it was estimated that 2.5 million migrants were living in Libya, largely making it a destination country (Migration Policy Centre, 2013c). Nowadays, however, Libya is mostly a transit country and acts as the main gateway to Europe (UNHCR, 2017w).

The Libyan political situation caused a remarkable increase in human smuggling and trafficking operations in the country. In Libya, the industry that gravitates around these businesses acts with varying degrees of fluidity and efficiency, and it has fully developed since 2013. At present, it is suggested that human smuggling and human trafficking are the most lucrative businesses of the country (Micallef, 2017). In 2015, the revenues raised from migrants smuggling and trafficking in Libya were estimated between USD 155 and 323 million. In comparison, revenues were USD 15-20 million for drugs trade and USD 15-30 million for arms trade (RHIPTO, 2015). The revenues raised from the trade in human beings fills the economy of local institutions and state functions, such as military and police. Moreover, it constitutes an integral part of the Libyan political economy (Micallef, 2017; Tinti & Westcott, 2016). According to OHCHR (2016), the Government Department for Combatting Illegal Immigration runs twenty-four of the thirty-four detention centers identified in Libya (UNICEF, 2017a). Indeed, Libyan police and security forces are believed to have fully penetrated this business, and corruption is now systemic and institutionalized (Micallef, 2017; UNHCR, 2017w; OHCHR, 2016).

Libya is able to raise such high revenues through trafficking and smuggling, particularly because migrants are exploited as a natural resource (Micallef, 2017). The techniques of Libyan police and security forces include torture, beatings, sexual exploitation, forced labor, and slavery (OHCHR, 2016). In these Libyan camps and prisons, human rights abuses (affecting women, men, and children) are the norm (UNICEF, 2017). Once in Libya, most migrants are reported to be captured and abused by security forces or militias;

others are held for ransom in either camps or prisons (Amnesty International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; UNHCR, 2017w; UNICEF, 2017a; UNICEF-REACH, 2017; Micallef, 2017; Amnesty International 2016; OHCHR, 2016; Tinti & Westcott, 2016; Amnesty International, 2015). Specifically, once in those camps, men are often used for forced labour or held for ransom. Ransoms gravitate between 2,000 and 10,000 dollars. They are paid through the hawala system or money transfers agencies such as the West Bank (Micallef, 2017; UNHCR, 2017w). Moreover, women and girls are reportedly used for forced prostitution and sexual exploitation, sometimes for even for periods of years (Micallef, 2017; UNHCR, 2017w; UNICEF, 2017a; UNICEF-REACH, 2017; OHCHR, 2016).

Future developments of the Libyan context are considered key in predicting future migration trends along the Central Mediterranean Route. The situation in Libya is deteriorating, and the number of migrants transiting in the country peaked in the last three years (see Figure 6). To stem human smuggling business and prevent migrants from travelling on to Europe, the Libyan Government has requested EUR 800 million. In this regard, the EU has currently allocated EUR 200 million, while Italy alone has paid an additional EUR 200 million (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017). In the following paragraphs, some speculations will be made regarding possible future scenarios in Libya. Nonetheless, "Libya's future seems more uncertain than ever at the moment" (Micallef, 2017. p. 50).

What is almost certain about the mid-term outlook of Libya is that violent conflicts will continue, as the numerous local conflicts prevent the development of a lasting solution (Mitchell, 2017; Pusztai, 2014). Only small and slow progresses can be expected. In the coming years, the security situation will, at best, remain the same (Pusztai, 2014). These predictions are strengthened by the most recent developments in Libya. As of August 2017, the security situation continued to degrade, and clashes between militias and tribal armed groups have worsened in many areas of the country (UN Security Council, 2017). Governance and economic outlooks are predicted to improve slowly over time. However, this is likely only to be possible if the oil sector recovers without major setbacks. Alternatively, the Libyan government will lack the monetary resources to pay state employees and militias, causing even higher incidences of poverty, instability, and conflicts (Pusztai, 2014). In this landscape, the plan by EU and Italy to reduce migration flows from Libya risks to destabilize the country even further. The crackdown of smuggling activities could potentially lead to major fights for control over resources, eventually increasing the power of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel (Micallef, 2017). In addition, investing, and cooperating with a government with such high levels of corruption should carefully be considered. At best, in the future, the short-sighted efforts of the EU in Libya will result temporary reductions of migrations streams from Libya. At worst, they will cause violent conflicts between groups to gain control over a shrinking market (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017).

At this stage, is important to point out that Africa's population is expected to double by 2050, and African development is predicted to increase (Dadush, Demetrzis, & Wolff, 2017). For these reasons, migration in and out of Africa is likely to increase in the future. This is in line with the migration transition theories, which illustrate how development, demographic pressures, and social transformations foster migration streams by increasing the capabilities and aspirations of individuals to migrate (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Skeldon, 2012; Zelinsky, 1971). Hence, despite the possible developments in Libya, people will continue to seek safety in Europe. Migration will continue beyond any restrictions, push-backs, or border controls (UNHCR, 2017x).

3.2   The Western Mediterranean Route

The **Western Mediterranean Route** connects Morocco to Spain. Migrants on this route can reach the Spanish enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) via land or continental Spain via sea (Urso, 2017). Since 2005, this route has been an important entry point to Europe (Frontex, 2017c). However, since 1990, irregular migration to Spain via this route has started (Carling, 2007). The growing importance of this transit path can be partially attributed to the development of better and more specialised smuggling services that evolved during the years (Carling, 2007). Historically, the Western Mediterranean Route was mostly used

Figure 7: Irregular Maritime Crossings on the Western Mediterranean Route

Source: Frontex, 2017c

by economic migrants from Morocco and Algeria. However, with the increasing violent conflicts in Mali, Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, and CAR, the number of West African migrants using the Western Mediterranean Route has increased. In 2015, Syrians represented the biggest share of irregular crossings on this route (Frontex, 2017c). In 2017, however, the most common origin countries of land and sea arrivals in Spain were Guinea (21.6%), Côte d'Ivoire (19.3%), Gambia (11.6%), Syria (10.2%), Morocco (9.5%), and Algeria (7.7%) (UNHCR, 2017v). Almost all migrants irregularly crossing these borders are men (Urso, 2017).

Generally, migrants enter Algeria and move into the Western Mediterranean route either from Niger or Mali. However, given that human mobility in Niger has already been addressed in the section on the Central Mediterranean Route, this chapter will focus on Mali. Since 2000, Mali has become an important transit country for migrants trying to reach North Africa and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Urso, 2017; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2013a; CARIM, 2010; ICMPD, 2010). The northern part of the country is lawless, and the state's administration is absent. Since a rebellion and a military coup in 2012, the Malian government lost control over the northern cities of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao, which are also amongst the most prominent hubs for irregular migration in the country (Altai, 2015).

Figure 8: Routes through Mali

Source: Frontex, 2016

In this regard, human smuggling is rampant in Mali, which has become an important transit country for West African migrants (RMMS, 2017; Urso, 2017; Frontex, 2016a; Carling, 2016a; IOM, 2013a). As shown in Figure 8, the capital Bamako is the most important centre for human smuggling in the country (Carling, 2016a). From there, migrants head either north or east toward Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, and then on to Niger's capital, Niamey (Frontex, 2016; Carling, 2016a; RMMS, 2017). Going north means that migrants continue their journey on the Western Mediterranean Route, ending up in the cities of Gao or Timbuktu (RMMS, 2017).

The journey towards Gao and Timbuktu is usually legal, as most migrants transiting in Mali are citizens of an ECOWAS member state. These migrants usually use commercial bus companies, and depending on the country of origin, they can reach Gao on air-conditioned buses for between USD 50 and 100 (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). Migration becomes irregular only when migrants cross the Algerian border without the needed documentation. Quite frequently, though, ECOWAS migrants transiting in Mali do not have the proper documentation (e.g. ECOWAS passport), in which case their migration is already irregular within Mali (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Carling, 2016a). This can happen for many reasons, among which administrative and bureaucratic challenges are amongst the most prominent. Importantly, Malian nationals do not need a visa to enter Algeria. As such, their migration becomes irregular only when they cross the border with Libya or Morocco without the required documents (Carling, 2016a).

Once in Gao and Timbuktu, migrants rely on smuggling services to move further, particularly because commercial bus companies do not go any further north (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). In this regard, Gao is currently a prominent human smuggling and human trafficking hub (Carling, 2016a; Smith, 2015 IOM 2013; UNODC, 2012). In 2016 alone, between 30,000 and 40,000 migrants were estimated to have travelled from Gao to Algeria (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). Estimates also indicate that around 900 irregular migrants pass through this city each month on their way north (Smith, 2015). From Gao, migrants generally travel on to Sabha in Libya, thus entering the Central Mediterranean Route, or to Tamanrasset in Algeria to continue their journey along the Western Mediterranean Route (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). This latter part of the journey is expensive, costing an average of USD 1,500. A minority of migrants transiting in Mali on their way north does so through Timbuktu. From there, they continue their journey on the ancient salt route through Algeria (Frontex, 2016a). However, this route has been detected only recently, and information about it is limited (Urso, 2017).

The Malian human smuggling network is fluid. It includes a variety of actors and individuals linked by tight business relationships. The stakeholders involved in this business vary from individual entrepreneurs, to ethnic groups, extremist and terrorist groups, and members of political parties (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Frontex, 2016a). Furthermore, Malian networks are transnational, and their influence extends beyond Malian borders to ensure the highest possible success rate of the network. People from this human smuggling network contact migrants in focal points, such as markets or bus stops. It is predominantly in the city of Gao that they offer their services to migrants. However, from Timbuktu and Gao, the journey across the Sahara Desert is very dangerous, and smuggled migrants face high risks of kidnap, violence, abuses, and trafficking (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Frontex, 2016a; IOM, 2013a). Particularly, the desert that divides northern Mali from southern Algeria and Libya is mostly controlled by extremist groups that collect their revenues from human smuggling and human trafficking activities (Frontex, 2016a). Geographically, most human trafficking in Mali happens in the northern cities of Gao, Meaka, and Kindal. Another strategic point was identified in the city of Tessalit, close to the Algerian border (RHIPTO, 2015). In this regard, smuggled migrants are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. For them, the risks of becoming VoTs are considerably high in comparison to the rest of the population (IOM,

2013a). Particularly, women on the move have high risks associated with becoming trafficking for sexual exploitation (US Department of State, 2017a).

3.3   The Western African Route

The **Western African Route** connects Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco to the Spanish Canary Islands. Historically, this has been one of the most popular routes for irregularly entering Europe (Frontex, 2017b; Altai, 2015; UNODC, 2010). Specifically, it has mostly been used by Moroccans and Senegalese but also by Nigerien, Malian, and Nigerian nationals. The journey along the Western African Route is particularly dangerous, and it is travelled by migrants on long wooden fishing boats (*cayucos*) or smaller fishing boats (*pateras*) (Frontex, 2017b). However, an estimated 40% of boats crossings on this route are unsuccessful. In 2006 alone, at least 1,035 people died on this route (UNODC, 2010).

Figure 9: The Western African Route

Source: Altai, 2015

The primary transit country for this route is Mauritania. In fact, its porous borders surely facilitate irregular crossings. In 2016, in Mauritania, there were only 47 border posts along the 5,000km of land borders and 800km of coastline (IOM, 2016a). Moreover, the capital Nouakchott is a key city for irregular migration. From there, migrants reach northern destinations in Western Sahara, Morocco, and the Spanish African enclaves Ceuta and Melilla (UNODC, 2013). Nouakchott is also connected to Gao in Mali, along a major connecting land route for irregular and mixed migration. Nouadhibou, a northern Mauritanian

Figure 10: Irregular Borders Crossings on the Western African Route

Source: Frontex, 2017b

coastal city, was designated as a migration hub along minor routes to the same northern destinations (UONDC, 2013). Similarly, Saint Luis in Senegal was a major departing point for the Spain's Canary Islands (UNODC, 2012).

As showed in Figure 10, the number of irregular crossings along this route peaked in 2006 at almost 32,000. This figure, however, has dropped steeply in the years following and was at just 170 irregular crossings in 2012. The latest figures of 2016 also report low numbers, stabilizing around 670 irregular crossings (Frontex, 2017b). This sizable decrease is largely due to coordinated border management efforts like SEA HORSE or Operation Hera (Frontex, 2017b; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2013). Given these low numbers, the Western African Route is not a fully active migration route at present. However, according to UNODC (2012), it could be re-activated by either regional instability and conflicts or by a drop in vigilance and border management efforts.

3.4   The Air Route

Amongst the possible routes connecting West and Central Africa to Europe, there is the **Air Route**, which is mostly used by migrants that can afford it (Altai, 2015). This route particularly comprises all the possible flights that migrants from West and Central Africa can use to reach Europe. According to Frontex (2017d), operations related to air routes presents unique challenges from the perspective of European states (Frontex, 2017d). Most migrants using air routes enter Europe with a valid visa. Hence, there is nothing irregular about their migration in the beginning, and it is only after the overstay of their permit that they move into an irregular status (Frontex 2017a; Frontex, 2016; Altai, 2015). For this reason, irregular migration along air routes is hard to detect. However, in some instances, migrants might use false travel documents, in which cases prevention is easier (Frontex, 2016).

Asides from the concern of regular or a fake travel documents, it is very likely that migrants get their passports and visas with the help of criminal organisations in their country of origin (Frontex 2017a; Frontex, 2016; Altai, 2015). For instance, in Ghana, there are well-organized smuggling groups that facilitate irregular migration through air routes to Europe. They are able to forge embarkation/disembarkation stamps, biodata pages, and visas (Frontex, 2016). Similarly, in Nigeria, smuggling services provide forged passports, visas, flight tickets, and even advisory services for border-crossing (Altai, 2015). These smuggling services are able to organize irregular air departures for multiple destinations and to provide nationals and internationals forged passports in less than three weeks. Fees for Nigerian passports can reach prices up to USD 1,000 (Altai, 2015). In 2015, more than 500 Nigerians were detected with fraudulent

Figure 11: The Air Route

Source: Frontex, 2016

documents, representing the second biggest group reported for document fraud in the Schengen area. However, these numbers are a decrease from 2014; this trend is mostly attributed to the suspension of flights between Rome Fiumicino and Lagos (Frontex, 2016).

As shown in Figure 11, there are many airports of concern. Above all, Dakar International Airport in Senegal is the most used by migrants that try to reach the Schengen area with forged documents. Following, a high number of Moroccans have recently travelled with fraudulent documents from the airport of Casablanca in Morocco, with the main destination being Rome Fiumicino (Frontex, 2016). In total, around 1,500 West, Central, and North African migrants traveling into the Schengen area with fraudulent documents were identified in 2014. In 2015, this figure reduced by 14%, dropped to 1,340 migrants. Similarly, there has been a declining trend in the first half of 2016 (Frontex, 2016a). The most commonly forged documents were Senegalese, Guinean, and Nigerian passports. However, passports from Congo, Morocco, and Ghana have also been abused frequently (Frontex, 2016a).

4 Policy Responses to Migration in West and Central Africa

4.1 Relevant National Policies and Stakeholders

Global migration governance is highly complex, can be both formal and informal, and involves actors and institutions at various levels, including, for instance, local, regional, national, bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral levels (Betts, 2011). Different actors are involved in migration management and governance in West and Central Africa. This section aims to provide an overview of the main stakeholders and their actions and policies regarding various forms of migration; the discussion includes national, regional, and international stakeholders and frameworks. One should note that in addition to these stakeholders, many other actors, for instance from development cooperation, are active in West and Central Africa. It is, however, beyond the scope of this report to also map these.[15] Good practices in West and Central African migration governance are detailed in Annex H.

4.1.1 Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso's migration policy framework is rather limited. A lack of comprehensiveness in addition to limited supplementary policy developments hinder the establishment of an official national migration policy. However, a National Migration Strategy covering the years 2014-2025 was drafted in order to fill the missing gaps (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The document still has to be formally adopted by the Council of Ministers of Burkina Faso (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Generally, Burkina Faso has ratified the majority of international conventions which protect human rights and migrants' rights (see Table 6). Besides these global conventions and UN protocols, the country is also bound by African legislation, such as ECOWAS' founding treaty (1975) and all subsequent protocols concerning residence and the free movement of persons. Old bilateral agreements with Cote d'Ivoire (1960), Niger (1964), and Mali (1969) are no longer regarded as valid (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Burkina Faso's institutional framework on migration is foremost undertaken by the following governmental stakeholders: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (which develops emigration policy);

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[15] For more details in this regard, it may be useful to further consult ICMPD & IOM (2015).

the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security (which in charge of management of immigration); the Ministry of Public Employment, Labour, and Social Security (which provides certification of work contracts of foreigners); the Ministry of Economy and Finances (which oversees the development of the National Migration Strategy); the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity, and Family (which is responsible for anti-trafficking efforts); as well as the Ministry of Women and Gender Affairs (which promotes women and gender rights) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). It should be noted that Art. 596 of Burkina Faso's penal code prohibits slavery, whereas Art. 597 and 653 prohibit the trafficking of women and children. Also, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, Burkina Faso is said to accept the resettlement of refugees as part of "burden sharing in the framework of inter-African solidarity to which it has constantly been attached" (Government of Burkina Faso, 2002). Lastly, dual citizenship is permitted in Burkina Faso (Bronwen, 2010).

Gaps

There is lack of (recent) data on Burkina Faso's migration patterns (particularly in terms of emigration, internal migration, and internal displacement), thus limiting the extent of the country's evidence-based migration policies. As previously mentioned, the national government of Burkina Faso is currently trying to fulfil its obligations stemming from its migration policy framework. However, it has not done so sufficiently and needs to do so to a greater extent. The signing of the UN Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling Protocol, for example, does not prevent irregular migration from happening as long as the 3,200km long border of Burkina Faso is only protected by 19 border control posts and 300 border employees (Reitano, Adal, & Sha, 2014; IOM, 2017j). The national government of Burkina Faso tried to halt (forced) child labour by adopting a national plan; however, there was no efficient the allocation of funding, so a plan could not be effectively implemented. Moreover, while an overarching migration policy is missing, the existing legislation lacks a link to migration and development and emigration policies.

4.1.2 The Central African Republic

According to C. T. Call (2011), a "failed state" has three gaps that it is unable to fill: capacity (when the state is incapable of delivering basic goods and services); security (when the state loses the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence); and legitimacy (when a significant portion of society rejects the regulating power). The CAR is generally unable to fill any of these three gaps, therefore resulting in a "failed" or "fragile" state (IDMC, 2014a). Given this situation, it is not surprising that most of the efforts by the UN, IOM, and UNHCR in the CAR are not related to migration management, or legislative frameworks per se, but are instead centred around the reduction of violence and peace building (IOM, 2017k; UN Security Council, 2016a). Additionally, this situation can explain, at least partially, why there is no migration management plan in the CAR. Dialogues in this regard started in March 2017, and it is too early to talk about any results or future developments.

However, the Migration EU Expertise (MEUX) team identified the Ministry of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration, and Central Africans Abroad; as well as the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization as key stakeholders for future migration policy management (ICMPD, 2017). Together with other IOs, these ministries will be involved in developing a multi-stakeholder migration management plan for the CAR. In fact, non-governmental actors have vital functions in many areas related to migration management in CAR. With IOM and UNHCR being the most prominent in this regard, non-governmental stakeholders are essential and have a monitoring role in the development and implementation of migration-related policies, especially related to IDPs and refugees (UN Security Council, 2016a).

The CAR is part of ECCAS, and ECCAS' protocol for the free movement of persons prescribes freedom of residence and establishment for all ECCAS citizens in any country of the region. However, this is effective only in Cameroon, Chad, Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In CAR, visas are still required and the free movement protocol is not yet implemented (UNECA, n.d., d). Moreover, the CAR's government has not yet ratified any of the most important ILO conventions regarding labour migration. In fact, none of the following conventions has been ratified nor have actions been taken in their regard (OHCHR, 2017b; ILO, 2017a).

- 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (no. 97) – ILO
- 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (no. 143) – ILO
- 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
- 1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (no.181) – ILO

Though CAR allows for double citizenship (Bronwen, 2010), little is known about the country's diaspora (IOM, 2014b). Indeed, there are no data on such remittances. Moreover, the legislative framework in this regard appears lacking, as also illustrated by the non-ratification of the previously mentioned conventions (IOM, 2014b; World Bank, 2017).

The CAR government has instead ratified both the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2015a), indicating a good practice with respect to refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, as prescribed by the 1990 Constitution and the 2007 Refugee Law, refugees enjoy freedom of movement as well as equal access to the labour market, to schools, and to services such as healthcare (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). Similarly, the CAR government shows a good legislative framework in respect to trafficking and smuggling, as it has ratified both the 2000 UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (UNODC, 2017b; US Department of Labor, 2017). Moreover, Article 151 of the country's penal code criminalizes all instances of trafficking, and offences can be punished with life imprisonment and hard work. To investigate and coordinate the efforts to address human trafficking, an inter-ministerial Committee to Combat Human Trafficking, overseen by the Ministry of Public Security, is in place. Nonetheless, this legislative framework is almost never implemented, the previously mentioned administrative organ is not making any noticeable effort to fight trafficking. As such, human traffickers act by large with impunity (US Department of Labor, 2017; US Department of State, 2017a).

Gaps

The main gap in the CAR regards data collection and statistics. Indeed, there are no data on legal labour immigration and emigration (IOM, 2014b), and the latest figures on private remittances are from 1993 (World Bank, 2017a). Similarly, data are lacking on irregular migration, and the scope of human smuggling and human trafficking in the country is unknown (US Department of State, 2017a; IOM, 2014b). This lack of data highly constrains any possible effort in developing ad-hoc policies for the achievement of regular and orderly migration in the CAR. A second gap arises within the existing policy framework for migration. Particularly, the CAR has not ratified any of the most important international conventions for labour immigration and emigration (OHCHR, 2017a; ILO, 2017a). Therefore, the most important legal instruments for regular migration are missing. As identified by Ratha & Shaw (2007), this situation naturally pushes migrants to move and work irregularly.

Another gap in the CAR migration management context is linked to the non-implementation of existing laws and policies (IOM, 2014b). Specifically, the legal framework to combat trafficking and smuggling and to defend the rights of children is fully developed, though nearly never implemented. Therefore, human traffickers and exploiters act with law impunity in the CAR, and this business is considered to be prominent (US Department of State, 2017a). Lastly, due to the continuous attacks of armed groups to UN, IOs, and NGOs in the region, delivering humanitarian aid is increasingly challenging (FAO, 2017; UNHCR, 2017q). Moreover, this gap in the aid delivering system is worsened by the fact that most of the projects and mission within CAR are underfinanced and lack the economic resources needed to work efficiently.

4.1.3   Chad

Chad has no overarching policy framework linking migration and development (IOM, 2007). Moreover, little is known about relevant stakeholders in regards to migration in Chad. However, the country has different legislations regarding migration management. Regarding regular immigration, the government of Chad has regulations related to entry, stay, and permanence of foreigners, which can happen only to prior visa release (US Department of State, 2017b). Moreover, in principle, foreign workers are subject to the same rights and duties of Chad nationals (CARIM, 2009a). Foreigners can be naturalized after 15 years of residence in Chad, but only if they have good health and good morals (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007). In the writing of this report, nearly no information could be found regarding Chad's emigration and diaspora policies. Apparently, there are no policies nor legislative frameworks linking emigration and development. This could be partially related to the fact that Chad is not a country of significant emigration (IOM, 2007). Importantly, Chadians do not enjoy the right of dual citizenship (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007).

At present, the Chadian government has not ratified any of the most important ILO conventions regarding labour migration. This instance indicates a gap, specifically related to the lack of regulations for regular labour immigration and emigration, in the migration management context. In fact, none of the following conventions has been ratified nor have actions been taken in their regard (ILO, 2017a; OHCHR, 2017b).

- 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (no. 97) – ILO
- 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (no. 143) – ILO
- 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (signed in 2012, but not yet ratified)
- 1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (no.181) – ILO

At the regional level, the most important regulations for regular immigration and emigration are those settled by the ECCAS and the CEMAC. In fact, these two communities were created to enhance cooperation and exchange among their members. In this context, Chad is one of the few countries of these communities that fully implemented the stipulations regarding the free movement of persons (UNECA, 2017).

Regarding the protection of IDPs, Chad has ratified the 2011 Kampala Convention and has started to develop a framework to ensure the protection and the assistance of IDPs (IDMC, 2013a). In this respect, the most important stakeholder is the National Commission for the Reception and Reinsertion of Refugees and Repatriation, which has played an important role in assisting IDPs in the last years (ICRC, 2015). At the end of 2013, however, the framework to protect and assist IDPs as prescribed by the Kampala Convention had yet to be developed (IDMC, 2013a). Moreover, at the national level, Chad has no existing law to describe the granting of asylum and refugee status. Yet, the government has a system for the protection of refugees;

Chad has also ratified both the 1951 Convention relating the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2015a; US Department of State, 2013).

Chad, however, does not display good practice with respect to human smuggling and human trafficking. Specifically, the country's government has ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, but the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air remains unratified (UNDOC, 2017b). At the national level, there are no laws that criminalize and punish trafficking offences, indicating another significant gap in the Chadian legislative framework. Furthermore, the various articles of the Labour Code and the country's 1996/2005 Constitution that prohibit crimes related to trafficking (such as forced labour, slavery, and labour exploitation) do not entail sufficiently stringent punishments to deter such crimes from happening (US Department of State, 2017b).

Gaps

Firstly, it stands out that a gap in the context of Chad's migration is related to data collection (IOM, 2007). This lack of information on the scope of immigration or emigration (also irregular migration) in Chad highly constrains opportunities for evidence-based policymaking. Additionally, in the last 10 years, only one migration profile on Chad has been made, and the most recent information available on remittances sent to and from Chad dates back to 1994 (IOM, 2007; World Bank, 2017a). Moreover, several gaps have been identified in relation to Chad's legal framework of migration. Firstly, there is no national regulation to grant status to refugees and asylum seekers (US Department of State, 2013). Additionally, although Chad is an important transit country for migrants, the government has not signed any international conventions against smuggling (UNODC, 2017). Similarly, the Chadian government has not signed any of the most important ILO conventions concerning labour immigration and labour emigration (ILO, 2017a; OHCHR, 2017b). Lastly, there are no national legislations in Chad that prohibit or criminalize trafficking in human beings (US Department of State, 2017a).

4.1.4   Gambia

Though Gambia lacks a comprehensive national migration framework, the government has passed a number of policies and created significant plans related to migration. The country's National Development Agenda includes a section that links migration and development. Relevant governmental stakeholders include the Gambia Immigration Department (issues visas and passport, manages naturalization); the Gambia Bureau of Statistics (publishes migration statistics); the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons (investigates trafficking); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Gambians Abroad (provides consular assistance, manages international migration agreements); the Department of Social Welfare (assists child VoTs); the Department of Labour Employment Unit (manages the foreign workforce); the Ministry of Youth and Sports (raises awareness of risks of irregular migration, runs youth programs); as well as the Central Bank of Gambia (publishes statistics on remittances) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Gambia's national legal framework for migration includes the Immigration Act, the Nationality & Citizenship Act, the Payroll and Labour Acts, the Trafficking in Persons Act, the Refugee Act, the Children's Act, and the Tourism Offences Act. The Nationality & Citizenship Act, in addition to the Immigration Act, are the two main policies addressing immigration to Gambia. The Immigration Act creates the regulations related to entry and residence for both ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS nationals, while the Nationality & Citizenship Act describes the naturalization process for becoming Gambia. The 2008 Refugee Act created the Gambia

Commission for Refugees and provides provisions for managing refugees. Moreover, Gambia has regulations on foreign labour. In particular, the Labour Act defines the legislation for labour immigration and the migrant workforce, while the Payroll Act determines the tax rate for employers of migrant workers. Finally, Gambia has protections against trafficking in persons, especially children. The 2007 Trafficking in Persons Act defines trafficking in persons, criminalizes offenses by between fifteen years to life in prison, and provides protections for VoTs. In terms of the protection of children, the 2004 Children's Act especially prohibits and criminalizes the trafficking of children. Moreover, Gambia's 2003 Tourism Offences Act addresses offenses made by tourists to the country (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The act is a response to the country's high rates of sex tourism by child sex tourists from the UK, Germany, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Canada (US Department of State, 2017a). Particularly, it criminalizes children trafficking and sexual offences made against children on behalf of tourists to Gambia, especially for purposes of sex tourism (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

In terms of international agreements, Gambia is party to ECOWAS regulations and its 1975 Treaty. The country has also signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children and against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. The country has also ratified the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights; the 1966 International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; as well as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Additionally, Gambia is party to a number of bilateral agreements:

- With Spain (2006), on irregular migration and protection of irregular migrants
- With Italy (2010), on irregular migration and protection of irregular migrants
- With Qatar (2010), on regulating employment, the provision of labour-related information, and the sending of remittances
- With Senegal, on fighting instances of cross-border trafficking
- And with Taiwan (2012), on the prevention of trafficking in persons (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Gaps

The analysis of migration-related situations in Gambia demonstrates a lack of detailed information and research, especially in areas such as internal migration, internal displacement, and irregular migration. This could negatively impact the prospects of evidence-based policymaking for Gambia. In addition to this, a review of Gambia's existing policies and laws related to migration reveals significant gaps in the country's migration management. Since human trafficking remains a serious problem, the US Department of State (2017a) recommends that Gambia investigate and prosecute traffickers with severe sentences. Enforcement especially remains a challenge. Largely due to inadequate training on human trafficking issues, authorities often consider alleged sex trafficking cases as rape and investigate them as such. Corruption of law enforcement agencies also remains a problem. Improvements would require adequate trainings for law enforcement officials. In addition, Gambia should amend its labour laws, extending it to also include domestic workers (US Department of State, 2017a). Finally, the country lacks clear policies related to the protection of migrant workers, the criminalization of forced labour, the regulation of domestic labour, or the diaspora relations. The IOM also recommends that policymakers coordinate with researchers in order to ensure that migration policies are oriented at migrant wellbeing (Carling, 2016b).

4.1.5 Ghana

The Ghanaian Government recently presented its approach to migration management in the National Migration Policy for Ghana (Ministry of the Interior, 2016), which provides a fairly comprehensive approach to migration policy and integrates it with the country's development policy. The National Migration Policy (NMP) explicitly connects the different kinds of migratory movements and their impacts with development issues like urbanisation and socio-economic inequality. Notable is Ghana's attention to the effects of emigration on the human capital of the emigrants and their home country (in terms of brain drain/gain/waste). The institutional framework outlined by the NMP is quite extensive in terms of the scope of government agencies and organisations it involves across each strategic area of concern (Ministry of the Interior, 2016).

The Ministry of Interior acts as a key stakeholder in migration governance in Ghana as it is responsible for the formulation of policies and the regulation of the large bulk of migration problems and issues within Ghana. Services, groups, and boards such as the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the Ghana Refugee Board (GRB), and the Migration Unit all work and operate under the Ministry of Interior, which supervises the activities of the agencies. The Ghana Refugee Board works in collaboration with UNCHR and is responsible for the management of refugee and asylum related issues within the country, in accordance with the UN convention on refugees as well as the ECOWAS protocol on refugees (SIHMA, 2014).

The Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB) operates as part of the legal branch in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. DAB is a collaboration from the IDF, the German Development Cooperation, and the Government of Ghana. It has two support units – the Diaspora Support Unit and the Migration and Development Unit (MDU). These units are tasked with managing a databank on the diaspora in combination with promoting policies that encourage diaspora investment within Ghana (SIHMA, 2014). Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration is the ministry responsible for Ghanaians that live abroad as all Ghanaian embassies that are in foreign nations operate under the Ministry and Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. The embassies also manage and operate a database of Ghanaians who live abroad in combination with a DAB for Ghanaians who are living in the diaspora.

The mandate of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) covers the regulation and monitoring of entry, departure, residence, and employment of foreigners inside Ghana. Additionally, GIS also advises the Ghanaian government on migration related issues such as passport, visa, and dual citizenship concerns. There is one branch of the GIS, namely the Migration Information Bureau, which merges new sections of the GIS. The first section includes the Anti-Human Trafficking Desk, which organises campaigns and programmes against illegal migration and trafficking. The Refugee Desk works in concert with the Ghana Refugee Board and the UNHCR providing services and legal advice (SIHMA, 2014). Ghana also has several inter-institutional coordination mechanisms in place: the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Migration develops the NMP; the Immigrant Quota Committee which handles work permit applications; and the Human Trafficking Board (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

IOM, which has operated in the country for over 25 years, also works with the Ghanaian government on a number of migration-related issues. Specifically, IOM supports the local government through the following projects/programmes:

- Budgeted for 2016, ongoing: Assistance for Child Victims of Trafficking in Ghana; Integrated Migration Management Approach in Ghana (IOM, 2015c)

- Budgeted for 2017: Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health; Engaging the Diaspora for Institutional Development in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Somalia; Strengthening National and Regional Mechanisms in Benin, Ghana, and Togo (IOM, 2016d)

Regarding Ghana's policy toward refugees, it interprets the definition of a refugee according to the definitions set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 2017aa). All refugees in Ghana are granted the freedom of movement, the right to work, and opportunities for legal integration including that of residency and naturalisation (SIHMA, 2014).

Concerning human trafficking, Ghana has had a Human Trafficking Act in place since 2005; a Fund and Board were respectively established in 2006 and 2008. More recently, a major effort began in 2012 when Ghana commenced an operation in collaboration with Nigeria's agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons. The operation managed to save 82 Nigerian and 41 Ghanaian individuals from being trafficked, in combination with detaining 16 suspects of human trafficking and smuggling offenders (US Department of State, 2017a). However, the US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report (2017a) is critical of Ghana's legislation in that it does not receive adequate resources to be fully implemented, relevant statistics are not shared by the government, and punishments are not always adequate for the level of crimes committed e.g. there are less severe consequences in the case of when a parent or guardian takes part in trafficking a child in their care (pg. 182).

As a member state of the ECOWAS community, Ghana has ratified free movement protocols for member state citizens, implemented an ECOWAS passport and travel certificate, and abolished visa and entry requirements for stays of 90 days or less (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 45). However, Ghana does not grant ECOWAS citizens specific residence permits, nor does its national labour legislation specifically address access to labour for ECOWAS citizens. Despite ratification of ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols, Ghana still applies legal restrictions on foreigners across a number of sectors (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, pg. 46). Central to Ghana's NMP is the Common Approach on Migration of the ECOWAS community, which sets out a policy framework for transition "to move beyond migration control and exclusion to migration management and opportunity" (Ministry of the Interior, 2016, p. 29).

In addition to ECOWAS, Ghana is a part of the following pan-African migration agreements: Migration Policy Framework for Africa in Banjul (2006); the Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation within the ECOWAS Region; and the 2000 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement, revised 2005), which "strengthens the international development agenda while countering international terrorism, conflicts, illicit trafficking, irregular migration, and global environmental threats" (Ministry of the Interior, 2016, p. 31). Ghana has also signed or ratified 55 international protocols and conventions related to migration; the full list can be found in in Appendix 1 of the NMP (Ministry of the Interior, 2016, p. 104).

Gaps

A number of gaps exist in Ghana's migration policy. With regards to its immigration scheme, the conditions for granting residence are inadequately defined; detention can result from an immigration officer doubting a person's right of entry; and the resulting detention period has no maximum set nor any juridical guarantees (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Ghana continues to struggle to have a significant impact on human trafficking within its borders even though it has anti-trafficking policies in place. A lack of resources to support these policies has resulted in "inadequate evidence collection and hindered prosecution efforts" (US Department of State, 2017a, p. 182). Victims of trafficking have limited access to protection services,

and Ghana is in its third year on the Tier 2 Watch List of the US Department of State (2017a) Trafficking in Persons Report.

4.1.6   Guinea

Because Guinea is more a country of origin or transit than a destination country concerning migration, the country lacks a comprehensive national migration policy. Some legislation on immigration exists, but emigration legislation is lacking. In order to fill this gap, an inter-ministerial commission was created to develop a national migration policy for Guinea; these policies have currently been drafted (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Generally, Guinea has ratified all the main international conventions which protect human rights and migrants' rights more specifically. Included are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 8 ILO Conventions including the specific ILO Convention on migrant workers C143 (1975), the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and the United Nations Human Trafficking Protocol as well as the United Nations Human Smuggling Protocol (2000) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Besides these global conventions and UN protocols, the country is also bound by African legislation, such as ECOWAS' founding treaty (1975) and all subsequent protocols concerning the residence and free movement of persons. Additionally, Guinea has signed bilateral agreements with Spain (2006) and Switzerland (2011). Remarkable is the lack of such an agreement with France, which is an important country of destination for many Guinean citizens (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Guinea's institutional framework on migration is undertaken by the following governmental stakeholders: the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection (against trafficking in persons); the Ministry of Employment, Vocational, and Technical Education (delivery of work authorisation to foreign workers); and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Guineans Abroad (protection of nationals abroad and contact with diaspora). It should be noted that little cooperation between the public institutions and ministries exists (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Additionally, several NGOs are involved, namely Sabou Guinée, Le Monde des Enfants, Réseau Afrique Jeunesse de Guinée (RAJGUI), and Réseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano pour la Paix (REFMAP) (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

While little legislation exists on Guinea's national policy framework, some specific policies should be mentioned. First, the new 2014 Labour Code specifically provides for free access by citizens of other ECOWAS member states to the labour market of Guinea and elaborates on the work authorization requirements for employers of foreign workers in the country. The country's law on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Foreigners elaborates on the requirements for entry and stay in Guinea, particularly regarding visas and residence cards. Second, despite the existence of strict regulations on irregular migration, migrants in such a situation are tolerated in Guinea and are not likely to be deported or imprisoned. Especially nationals from other ECOWAS member states are exempted from the rule. Third, the Government of Guinea has yet to adopt legislature on the trafficking in persons. Still, all forms of forced labour are prohibited by its Labour Code. Moreover, Guinea's Penal Code condemns any deprivation of liberty, and the country's Child Code bans child trafficking (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Gaps

Foremost, it should be noted that (recent) data on Guinea's migration profile is lacking. No insights on the current status of Guinean emigration or immigration patterns, as well as the profiles of these individuals, exist. Moreover, there is little to no current information available on instances of internal displacement and smuggling with Guinea. This could negatively impact the prospects of evidence-based policymaking for the country. In addition to these data gaps, there are also few national migration-related policies in Guinea. The existing legislation largely deals with the immigration of foreigners to Guinea for purposes of work; there are no national policies in Guinea dealing with emigrants, IDPs, or refugees and their rights. There has not been an establishment of a migration and development policy nor has the issue of an existing brain drain been addressed on a political level. Moreover, Guinea does not provide significant aid to their nationals residing abroad. Finally, limited to no results have been achieved by the Government of Guinea on the prosecution of traffickers, and the country remains on Tier 3 in the US Department of State's (2017a) Trafficking in Persons Report.

4.1.7   Côte d'Ivoire

On an international level, Côte d'Ivoire is party to various UN legal instruments (see Table 6) (UNODC, 2017a; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNICEF, 2013a; Council of Europe, n.d.; UNICEF, n.d.). In addition to this, Côte d'Ivoire has ratified a total of forty ILO conventions, thirty-six of which are in force (ILO, 2017c). Côte d'Ivoire, however, has not ratified the 1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention, the 1975 ILO Migrant Workers Convention, the 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention, nor the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol (ILO, 2017d; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; UNICEF, 2013a).

Key national stakeholders for future migration policy management in Côte d'Ivoire include various distinct ministries: the Ministry of Interior of Security; the Ministry of Planning and Development; the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs, and Vocational Training; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of African Integration and Ivorians Abroad; the Ministry of Solidarity, Family, Women, and Children; the Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims; the Ministry of Justice; and the Ministry of African Integration (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM Dakar, 2009). The Department of Aid and Assistance to Refugees and Stateless Persons (SAARA) is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). There is also the Joint Ministerial Committee on the Fight against Trafficking, Exploitation, and Child Labour. These ministries are responsible for managing immigrants to Côte D'Ivoire as well as those abroad (maintaining relations with the diaspora, organizing work permits for migrant workers, etc.), working towards the elimination of trafficking, and creating population policies (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Côte d'Ivoire is also a member state of ECOWAS. As such, the country remains an important destination country for citizens of other ECOWAS member states who reside in Côte d'Ivoire. Citizens of ECOWAS states are able to stay in Côte d'Ivoire for without a residence permit for three months and must only maintain their identification documents from their origin country (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). Those staying for six months with a valid (renewable) residence permit are eligible to apply for a work permit from Côte d'Ivoire's Ministry of Labour, SAARA, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like other foreigners, refugees with valid residence permits are able to apply for work permits. Côte d'Ivoire's new 2000 Constitution does not guarantee the freedom of movement for refugees, but refugees are able to apply for international travel documents if needed (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). According to the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2009), the "2000 Constitution extends the rights to property; to work, including in the public sector; and the right to organize and strike to all persons [including migrants and refugees], but reserves to citizens the right to run businesses." Refugees

are also able to access basic services, such as health care and education, in the same was as citizens (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009).

Côte d'Ivoire has also established a number of policies regarding migration, and the country's plans for national development include the creation of a national migration policy and of a National Migration Office (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Despite the existing legislation, the country has no comprehensive national framework for refugee and asylum laws (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009). Côte D'Ivoire's current national migration policy framework covers different aspects of the entry and stay of foreigners and migrant workers, the criminalization of human trafficking and the protection of VoTs, as well as irregular stays within the country. In terms of statelessness, Côte d'Ivoire has also taken policy-oriented action. In 2013, the country ratified international statelessness conventions and reformed its nationality laws (CIA, 2017). Along with the other ECOWAS members, Côte d'Ivoire adopted the 2015 Abidjan Declaration, which aims to get rid of statelessness in the region. By its first anniversary, the Declaration allowed more than 22,000 individuals in West Africa to gain identity documents. More specifically, Côte d'Ivoire has passed an additional law allowing stateless people to more easily acquire nationality (UNHCR, 2016g). Moreover, there are few bilateral agreements on migration of which Côte d'Ivoire is part. The country's main bilateral agreement is the one with France: the 1992 Convention on Circulation and Stay of Persons between Côte d'Ivoire and France; there is also an agreement on social security between the two countries. Another is the convention signed with Burkina Faso (at the time still Upper Volta) in 1960 that described recruitment and employment conditions for migrant workers arriving to Côte d'Ivoire; this agreement, though, was ended in 1974 (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Gaps

Despite Côte d'Ivoire existing legislation related to migration on an international and national level, there are still gaps that are remain unaddressed. Specifically, despite there being the Ministry of African Integration and Ivorians Abroad, there are very few policies that deal with the emigration of Ivorians abroad (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Moreover, Law No. 2016-111 is the country's first law that addresses both the trafficking of adult and children (US Department of State, 2017a). Still, the trafficking of adults also remains under-addressed to a large extent, and the focus is still largely on child VoTs. There are also limited Ivorian laws that deal with the rights and protections of IDPs and refugees. In addition to changes in Ivorian nationality laws and the 2015 Abidjan Declaration, more steps need to be taken to reduce statelessness within Côte d'Ivoire and the rest of West Africa (UNHCR, 2016g). There are also significant data gaps when considering migration in and out of Côte d'Ivoire. There is little data, for example, on emigration out of Côte d'Ivoire (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Moreover, more research is needed to determine estimates of the number of stateless persons, refugees, and IDPs in Côte d'Ivoire that face risks of trafficking. Leaving these data gaps unaddressed could negatively impact the prospects of evidence-based policymaking for the country.

4.1.8   Mali

In Mali, the national development plan deals with most migration management related issues. However, there is no formal and overarching migration policy; though a policy draft was initiated in 2006/2007, this is yet to be finalised (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Emigration is central to the Malian policy circle and is by far the most regulated migration phenomenon. Generally, two priorities concerning emigration management are highlighted: the protections of Malian emigrants and their involvement in the development of the country (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The National Population Policy is the main regulating framework for Malian

emigration. It highlights the importance of the link between emigration and development and defines the strategy to follow to strengthen this link (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; ICMPD, 2010). The most prominent stakeholder involved in emigration management is the Ministry for Malians Abroad and African Integration – Directorate General for Malians Abroad (DGME), along with its different agencies. Specifically, it is responsible for protecting Malian emigrants, enhancing emigrant involvement in development projects, reintegrating returnees and deportees, and facilitating the transmission of social remittances and skills. To effectively achieve this responsibility, the DGME is further divided into four agencies, each endorsed with various yet similar duties (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; ICMPD, 2010). Additionally, an inter-institutional coordination framework headed by the DGME is in place to provide the basis for coordination and dialogue between different stakeholders. Indeed, there are many actors, including UNDP, IOM, and EU representatives, involved in these consultations (ICMPD, 2010). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is also endorsed with some responsibilities regarding emigrant communities. It provides assistance, consultancies, and orientations to Malians abroad as well as all the embassy-related services (ICMPD, 2010).

Mali is a member of the ECOWAS community, and the Protocol relating to Free Movement, Residence, and Establishment is fully implemented in the country. However, as widely supported by the literature, immigration in Mali is less regulated than emigration (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; ICMPD, 2010; CARIM, 2010). The most important stakeholder involved in immigration management is probably the Ministry of Domestic Security and Civil Protection, which is responsible for border management and immigration. Also, the Ministry of Labour, Public Service, and Institutional Relations is responsible for guaranteeing the respect of the labour code (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The policy framework in place in Mali formally regulates the entrance, stay, and establishment of foreign nationals, and it gives various regulations regarding foreign labour. Specifically, in order to work in Mali, a migrant is required to have a work contract approved by the National Labour Directorate. In practice, this authorization is not really required and foreigners can freely access the Malian labour market (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). This is not surprising, as most of the Malian economy is unregulated and happens in the informal sector (CARIM, 2010). Malian authorities are liberal towards irregular migration and expel or deport foreigners based on their committed offences or when deemed dangerous to public order, rather than based on their irregular status (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Moreover, despite the relatively small number of refugees hosted in Mali, the Malian government has ratified both the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2015a), indicating a good practice in respect to refugees and asylum seekers.

Regarding human trafficking and human smuggling, Mali has ratified the Palermo Protocol and indicates a good practice in this respect (UNODC, 2017b). Moreover, in 2012, the Malian Government adopted Law No. 2012-023, which criminalizes trafficking in persons and similar practices. This law prescribes between ten- and twenty-year imprisonments, which are considered commensurate with those of other serious crimes, for trafficking offenders (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; US Department of State, 2017a). Overall, Law No. 2012-023 is considered comprehensive and is able to cover all forms of trafficking in persons (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Together with the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family, the Ministry of Justice is a key actor in combating trafficking in persons; additionally, NGOs play a crucial role in identifying, protecting, and assisting VoTs (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; US Department of State, 2017a).

Mali has bilateral agreements with Burkina Faso (1969), Ghana (1977), Guinea (1964), Mauritania (1973), Niger (1964), Cameroon (1964), and Libya (1980). Additionally, agreements for visa free regimes have been concluded with Morocco (2006), Algeria (2006), and Tunisia (2006). Similarly, agreements have been made

with France (1994) and Spain (2007), with the latter being more comprehensive (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, IOM, 2009c).

Gaps

One of the main obstacles to the successful implementation of Malian migration policies is related to data collection (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Specifically, the lack of data on emigration limits the possibilities for evidence based policy making, and Malian national statistics in this regard are far from reality. Moreover, the DGME lack funds and resources to develop and implement its policies (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Hence, the opportunities to enhance Malian remittances spending in development projects are constrained. -Other gaps appear from the inability of the Malian government to efficiently control its borders. This situation is especially true in the northern territories of Mali, where most smuggling and trafficking activities happen. Borders are oftentimes controlled by armed ethnic groups, militias, and terrorists, creating a situation which actively fosters irregular migration into and out of Mali (Molenaar & El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017; Frontex, 2016a). A third and last gap arises from the non-implementation of the existing framework to fight human trafficking. Indeed, even though Mali has ratified the most important international conventions and has a comprehensive law to combat trafficking, its efforts in implementation are very low. This situation partially explains why Mali is ranked Tier 3 in the 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, after being ranked Tier 2 for four years in a row (US Department of State, 2017a).

4.1.9   Mauritania

Situated at the crossroads of the Sahel and West and North Africa, Mauritania's migration agenda is a convergence of immigration, emigration and transit migration. Recently, immigration (mostly refugees), transit migration, and return policy have become the key areas of attention in Mauritania (MPC, 2013b). Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart (2010), however, characterize the government of Mauritania as taking a rather passive stance towards issues associated with Mauritania's "transit country" status. Thus, a number of international organisations play significant roles in shaping policy frameworks, including IOM, UNHCR, ILO, the Arab League, the Organisation of African Unity, and others (MPC, 2013b). But these parties are sometimes at odds with each other over the illegalities of migration, i.e. an IOM official cited a case where smugglers were charged by Mauritanian authorities with forgery instead of human trafficking (Poutignat & Streiff-Fénart, 2010, p. 3). Further concerning international cooperation, Mauritania holds membership with the Union for the Mediterranean and the 5+5 Dialogue (MPC, 2013b).

Concerning immigration, the following governmental institutions are relevant: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development. There are also several committees involved: the inter-ministerial committee, the study group on the management of migratory flows (GEFM), and the Consultative Committee on Asylum (MPC, 2013b). Mauritania's immigration strategy aims to formulate economic immigration schemes for the services, fishery, and education sectors in order to contribute to local economic development (MPC, 2013b). There are also efforts to reinforce border management and develop policy frameworks to deal with irregular and transit migration, the reduction of undocumented immigrants through apprehension, and regularization or deportation procedures. With regards to refugees and asylum seekers, the government seeks to identify those on Mauritanian soil; define their status, rights and conditions of stay; and allow UNHCR to operate refugee camps for the Malians. Lastly, Mauritania's government aims to cooperate with international and external parties on improving border management,

increasing the capacity of the government to handle migration issues, and work with UNHCR towards sensitizing Mauritanian society and government to the rights of refugees in the country.

While UNHCR is primarily involved in refugee management in Mauritania, IOM actively assists the Mauritanian Government in migration management affairs at a number of levels. IOM is particularly active in increasing the government's capacity in border management and security (IOM, 2016a), counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking efforts, as well as return migration. More broadly, IOM works with G-5 countries in the Sahel "through an initiative funded by the Government of Japan […], The 'Coordinated Border Management in Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Burkina Faso'" (IOM, 2016a).

Concerning emigration, the following ministries and committees are relevant: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development, the inter-ministerial committee overseeing the return and repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from Mali and Senegal, and the study group on the management of migratory flows (GEFM) (MPC, 2013b). Mauritania's emigration strategy involves maintaining a strong connection with its diaspora as well as encouraging remittances and investment in the country (MPC, 2013b). There is also a maintenance and promotion of bilateral economic migration agreements, mainly with European and Gulf countries. Notable bilateral agreements include those with France, Spain, Mali, Senegal, Algeria, Tunisia, and Gambia (MPC, 2013b; CARIM, 2009c). Additionally, the return and repatriation of Mauritanian refugees is being planned for, especially those from the 1989 Senegal-Mauritania conflict. Mauritania also aims to increase its bi- and multilateral cooperation frameworks related to migration for the benefit of local economic and human development.

Gaps

Several policy gaps emerge from the above review of Mauritania's migration framework. Probably one of the most significant is the challenge posed by the geography of the country: the massive border matched with the incapacity of the government to secure it leaves border areas open to illicit activities like smuggling, trafficking, and terrorism (IOM, 2016a). These activities take place despite Mauritania's existing migration policies that criminalize trafficking and smuggling. Another pressing issue is the government's motivation and capacity to act on hereditary slavery so that is not eliminated in just a legal sense but also in a practical one (US Department of State, 2017a).

4.1.10   Niger

Niger's efforts of making a national migration policy started in 2007, with the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee tasked with linking migration and development. This unit was established under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, but it comprises officials from other ministries, IOM and EU representatives, as well as representatives from civil society organisations. However, even though this committee was able to draft a first policy document in 2014, a national migration policy has not been adopted yet. Indeed, as shall be explained below, despite the efforts of the Nigerien government to link migration and development, its initiatives are rarely implemented. In practice, immigration in Niger is mostly treated in a "laissez-faire" manner (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

While many Nigerien ministries are concerned with migration issues, the four most prominent stakeholders involved in migration management are the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance. Specifically, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the entry,

stay, and repatriation of foreigners. The Ministry of Employment delivers work authorisations to foreign workers, implements strategies to enhance remittances, and plays an intermediary role between international employers and Nigerien jobseekers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for maintaining relationships with Nigeriens emigrants, and the Ministry of Finance oversees policies on remittances. The latter task is accomplished with the help of another inter-ministerial committee created in 2013 to enhance diaspora engagement. This committee includes people from the main ministries, IOM and UNDP staff members, and representatives from civil society and the private sector (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

Overall, Nigerien policy framework on immigration is considered well-balanced but lacking regarding family migration and types of stay permits (which are too short in duration). Moreover, even if there is a national legislation to regulate labour immigration, it is rarely enforced and there are serious implementation problems. Importantly, as a principle, foreigners in Niger benefit from all the rights and obligations of the labour legislation, regardless of their status. Indeed, the Nigerien approach toward irregular migration is rather relaxed. Foreigners are removed from the country based on the criminal offences that they may commit, rather than due to their irregular status (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Nevertheless, following the EU Trust Fund for Africa, which contributes to criminalising smuggling and the transport of migrants through the desert, the Nigerien government started to pay more attention to irregular migration and especially to the issues of human smuggling and human trafficking (Diallo, 2017). Indeed, the number of border officials and police to curb these criminal activities in Niger has increased. Furthermore, national authorities have made significant improvements to combat trafficking in persons by creating awareness campaigns, by persecuting and convicting offenders, and by providing training to staff working in key positions (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). However, at the same time, this criminalization of the transport of people in the Sahara Desert is controversial, as legally no smuggling crimes are committed. This transport of people only becomes smuggling after the irregular border crossing (without proper documentation) to Libya. The most prominent agreement that was ratified by Niger for the protection of trafficking is the Palermo Protocol, which aims to suppress and punish trafficking, especially when related to women and children (CARIM, 2011).

Emigration is also increasingly receiving attention by Niger, yet there is no labour emigration policy nor have activities started to enhance legal labour emigration opportunities. Moreover, even though a Ministry of African Integration and Nigeriens Abroad was created in 2007, a lack of financial resources coupled with limited data on Nigerien emigrants largely constrains the ministry's functioning ability (IOM, 2010a). The only efforts have been put into bilateral agreements which, however, cannot be considered labour agreements per se. Furthermore, the capacity of the Ministry of Employment in developing those policies is quite limited. This situation is worsened by the fact that Nigeriens are denied rights of dual nationality; because of this, diasporas often lose their Nigerien nationality. Furthermore, even if they do have the nationality, they are excluded from national politics as they do not have the right to vote. These are considered major impediments to diaspora engagement policies (ICMPD & IOM, 2015; IOM, 2010a).

In addition to these policies, Niger has signed the following international conventions protecting human rights (ICMPD & IOM, 2015):

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966);
- International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966);
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979);
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989);

- 36 ILO Conventions, though Niger has not ratified the two specific ILO conventions on migrant workers: C97 (1949) and C143 (1975);
- Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990);
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and its protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

Gaps

According to IOM (2009), a first gap in Nigerien migration management regards statistics and data collection. Particularly, there is little data on immigration (especially regular and labour migration) into Niger, emigration out of Niger, and internal migration within Niger. There is not enough information on the country's migration issues, and the data that exist are collected in an old-fashioned manner and typed by hand. This situation highly constrains the capabilities of building adequate migration policies, especially regarding Nigerien emigrants (IOM, 2010a). Hence, there is a pressing need to modernize the ways in which these data are collected and to increment the amount of this data as well. Accordingly, IOM (2009) suggests including more questions on migration issues in the population census.

Other problems arise from the policy implementation side. Indeed, despite the overall well-designed national policies and the many international conventions ratified, Niger struggles in effectively enforcing these acts. This situation results in a weak migration governance, in which the rights of foreign workers and Nigeriens abroad are not adequately protected. Similarly, the rights of IDPs and refugees are not satisfyingly defended, and these populations are extremely vulnerable (CARIM, 2011; ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Thus, implementation is probably the main constraint of Nigerien migration governance.

4.1.11 Nigeria

Nigeria has an extensive law and policy framework that manages migration. In 2015, Nigeria made remarkable progress in migration management by approving its National Migration Policy (NMP). This document provides an appropriate legal framework for monitoring and regulating internal and international migration as well as data collection. The NMP addresses issues of diaspora mobilization, decent treatment of migrants, border management, and forced displacement management of IDPs, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Moreover, the document spans several themes such as the intersections of migration and poverty, gender, human security, smuggling, human trafficking, return, re-admission, reintegration, border management, health, education, data, and more (IOM, 2015a). A distinctive feature is the stress that the NMP places on migration administration structure, guaranteeing effective governance structure, and a coherent migration policy. Under the coordination of the Technical Working Group on Migration and Development, the government is able to establish a structure where actors can work together, thereby reducing overlaps and encouraging collaboration (Hilary-Ogbonna, 2015).

Nigeria has also ratified a number of international conventions, such as the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and a number of ILO conventions. Moreover, it has incorporated the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol) into legislation through its Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law, Enforcement and Administration Act of 14 July 2003. This act extends the powers of NAPTIP to cover internal trafficking and exploitive child domestic labour. Other important pieces of legislation are the Child Rights Act of 2003 prohibiting child exploitation and trafficking

and the Labour Act CAP L1, LFN, 2004 prohibiting child labour. Moreover, Nigeria is an active member of ECOWAS, of which freedom of movement is a guiding principle (IOM, 2014a).

To combat human trafficking on a national level, the Nigerian government amended the 2003 Trafficking in Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act in 2015, increasing penalties for offenders. This anti-trafficking prohibits all forms of trafficking in Nigeria and prescribes minimum penalty of five years for offenders. The main government actor who responds to trafficking is the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP); the agency provides police, immigration, and social services personnel with specialized treatment. NAPTIP further conducts extensive national and local programming through local and national media, warning about dangers of trafficking (US Department of State, 2017a).

Gaps

Nigeria's migration policy has made progress since the approval of NMP in 2015, yet several gaps still stand out. First, the implementation of the NMP in its totality is a great challenge due to the complexity of the policy's mandate. Capacity-building is vital to approach all the different spheres of migration management and reap the potential development benefits of migration (Hilary-Ogbonna, 2015). Second, recent developments of the trafficking issue have put Nigeria on the Tier 2 Watch List by the US Department of State in 2017. Despite its existing anti-trafficking legislation, Nigeria must make more significant efforts to halt the recruitment of child soldiers and forced labour by, for example, strengthening NAPTIP (US Department of State, 2017a). Third, the forced displacement crisis that sweeps the country must be better managed. Millions of Nigerians are displaced in the country or to neighbouring nations and are in need of humanitarian assistance. Coordination with humanitarian agencies is underway, but the funding gap gives a crucial blow and must addressed on an international level (UNHCR, 2017p).

4.1.12   Senegal

As Toma (2014) describes it, "International migration has become a central feature of Senegalese identity and the standard model of social advancement" (p. 7). That being said, the Senegalese state has become increasingly concerned and occupied with managing irregular and illegal migrant flows, adopting a rather European perspective on the issue as well its solution, whereby development in the country of origin will curb irregular flows.

Regarding outward migration, the following government institutions are involved: the Higher Council of Senegalese Abroad; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry of the Youth and of Employment for the Young; the Ministry of the Senegalese Abroad; the Ministry of Labour and Public Service; and the National Commission for Managing and Following Up on Employment Offers (Bartolomeo et al., 2010). However, out-migration of Senegalese citizens and foreigners is unregulated since the elimination of exit visas in 1981 (Toma, 2014).

The Senegalese Government has aimed to improve local development by encouraging investment or permanent return of the Diaspora (Bartolomeo et al., 2010). That being said, the country lacks a coherent strategy for mobility management, instead opting for ad-hoc measures which are developed in response to matters that are more urgent or on a case-by-case basis (Toma, 2014). According to Toma (2014), Senegal's migration management is focused on the following:

- "raising awareness among youth to the dangers of clandestine migration;

- controlling the maritime borders to stop clandestine migration;
- managing the legislative setting of legal migration;
- engaging with the diaspora in order to stimulate migrant investments in Senegal;
- engaging with the high-skilled diaspora in an effort to transfer knowledge;
- accompanying the reinsertion of repatriated migrants;
- researching and producing data on migration flows and the diaspora;
- reinforcing legislation against human trafficking" (p. 7).

There are several recent bilateral agreements between Senegal and European destination countries that primarily concern management of legal migration, measures against illegal migration, and co-development (Toma, 2014, p. 9). Senegal signed an agreement with France in 2006 (ratified in 2008), which focuses on "training and education, the return of highly skilled migrants and co-development programs." Agreements with Spain (signed in 2006 and 2007), on the other hand, emphasize border security and measures against illegal migration (Panizzon, 2008, as cited by Toma, 2014). These agreements, along with one with Italy (2008), also address the readmission of irregular migrants. Other bilateral labour agreements, mainly with other African nations, are notably older.

Regarding inward migration, the following government institutions are involved: the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, and Public Service; the General Directorate of National Security; the Directorate of Air and Border Police; and the Directorate of Foreigners Police (Bartolomeo et al., 2010; ICMPD & IOM, 2015). The entry and stay of foreign nationals in Senegal is governed by the law of 25 January 1971. It establishes family reunification and sanctions for irregular entry/stay (strengthened in 1978), but there are gaps in its coverage for stay permits of certain categories of foreigners, on protections against expulsion, and on judicial and procedural guarantees (Bartolomeo et al., 2010; ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 280).

IOM is a key stakeholder in the effort of linking migration and development in Senegal, working with the government to increase its capacity in the management of labour migration and towards the expansion of legal labour migration opportunities. Additionally, IOM is implementing programs that aim to harness the investment and participation of the diaspora for the benefit of development in Senegal (IOM, 2015b). While the Senegalese government has its own procedure for processing refugees, it abides by international standards (1951 and 1961 Conventions ratified) and permits UNHCR to participate in proceedings as an observer (Bartolomeo et al., 2010). UNHCR funds and manages protection measures for refugees in Senegal.

To encourage diaspora participation in Senegalese development, the government established the programme, "Diaspora Estates (*Cités de la diaspora*)," which "offers land for construction purposes to migrants who are organized in associations that agree to pay 20% of the total construction cost and the rest as a 5-year loan" (Toma, 2014, p. 13). Migrant Associations and The Housing Bank of Senegal are non-state actors which are also involved in the mobilization of remittances for local development (Toma, 2014). International organisations also play a role in migration-related Senegalese development project: IOM in the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) project and UNDP in the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project (Some & IOM, 2009).

Gaps

The Senegalese government's absence of effort in the gathering of migration-related data has forced this profile to rely heavily on dated and incomplete information. The *Global Report on Internal Displacement* (GRID) scored Senegal on the lowest tier for data sharing on internal displacement, saying that there was

"no evidence of systematic collection or sharing of displacement data by the government" (IDMC & NRC, 2017). The most recent household level survey (ESAM II) is from 2001, which provides the data for much of IOM's migration profile of the country from 2009 (Some & IOM, 2009). Specifically, the lack of data on migration limits the possibilities for evidence based policy making.

In addition to the data gaps, Senegal's migration policy is also lacking: "Senegal has neither a formal migration policy nor a structure dedicated to the migration issue for determining and implementing the national migration policy" (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 28); "Senegal has yet to adopt a formal migration policy" (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 278); and "one cannot talk of a global emigration or diaspora policy framework in Senegal" (Toma, 2014, p. 7). Toma (2014) and Some & IOM (2009) both point to a lack of coordination between the separate agencies and ministries involved in migration management.

Moreover, VoTs, especially children, are not provided with insufficient protections by the government. Even when VoTs are identified, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions are commonly absent due to government authorities' lack of understanding of trafficking and political will to bring about change. Additionally, the Senegalese government fails to maintain or publish statistics on anti-trafficking efforts (US Department of State, 2017a).

4.1.13 Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone lacks a comprehensive migration policy. There are a number of recent initiative in the field of migration and development and the risks of trafficking, however existing legislation on immigration is obsolete and is poorly enforced (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Current key policies and laws that govern migration in Sierra Leone include the 2008 National Registration Act, the 1965 Non-Citizens Act, the 2007 General Law (Business Start-up) Amendment Act, the 2007 Refugees Protection Act, the 2005 Anti-Human Trafficking Act, the 2007 Child Rights Act, the 1973 Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, and the 2001 Resettlement Strategy (ILO, 2017b; European Commission, 2007; ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Moreover, in the past few years, a labour migration policy has been drafted and sustained several reviews, hoping to strengthen legal framework and enhance stakeholder capacity to promote orderly regular migration (Milton, 2016). The document addresses issues such as treatment of migrants and contribution to national development. This project comes in line with funds of the EU through the Valetta Summit in 2015, which hopes to address challenges in the area of migration between Europe and Africa (Sesay, 2016).

Stakeholders on migration governance are the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of Labour and Social Security; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Presidency; the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs; as well as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Under the Presidency stands the Office of Diaspora Affairs which attempts to strengthen diaspora engagement, especially in the United Kingdom and United States. Through migration legislation, there are three main inter-ministerial institutions in the country: the Work Permit Committee, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Trafficking, and the National Task-Force on Human Trafficking (ICPMD & IOM, 2015).

In terms of bilateral agreements, Sierra Leone has understandings with Cuba, China, and India, allowing labour market access without a work permit. Readmission agreements have been drafted with the United Kingdom and Netherlands, whist it hold several agreements with private companies in the Middle East. For multilateral agreements, Sierra Leone is a member state of ECOWAS and provides special treatments (e.g. reduced work permit fees) to migrants from other member states. Moreover, it is a part of the Multipartite Agreement for the Local Integration of Liberian and Sierra Leonean Refugees in Nigeria in 2007 (ICPMD &

IOM, 2015). Sierra Leone is also party to a number of international conventions and instruments that govern migration in the country. These are the 1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention, the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the 1975 ILO Migrant Workers Convention, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention, the 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol, and the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol (UNICEF, 2013c).

A key issue Sierra Leone faces in terms of migration governance is the risk of statelessness and the negative outcomes that spur out of this situation. Statelessness can occur in many ways, particularly if nationality laws do not grant men and women equality in conferring nationality to their children. This gender inequality in nationality laws leads to thousands of children being stateless (UNHCR, 2017y). Sierra Leone has had this issue for many decades, although a 2006 review attempts at remedying this situation by determining that a child born in Sierra Leone after 1971 may acquire Sierra Leonean citizenship by birth if their father, mother, or grandparent is born in Sierra Leone and is of "negro African descent" (UNHCR, 2016d). Still, a loophole arises as children born abroad can only be granted Sierra Leonean citizenship through their father, although Sierra Leonean law has a safeguard for these children if they are not granted any other nationality. Work continues to be done in Sierra Leone since, as of 2017, a Constitutional Review Committee is reviewing the 1991 Constitution and proposes a gender-neutral provision of acquisition of nationality (UNHCR, 2017y). Sierra Leone also acceded to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in May 2016 (UNHCR, 2016d). The risk of statelessness is still prevalent today, and UNICEF denounces that there are over 40 million children who are unregistered in West Africa. The consequences of this lack of registration and statelessness leads to children being invisible in the eyes of the law, deprived of fundamental rights, and vulnerable to violations such as child labour and child marriage (UNICEF, 2017b).

On another note, in light of the large scale displacement the country witnessed through its civil war, Sierra Leone developed a Resettlement Strategy in 2001. It designed and implemented a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, which was crucial for the return of these migrants. A second key policy was the Recovery Strategy for Newly Accessible Areas in 2002, which hoped to consolidate peace and lay development foundations (Ferris & Stark, 2012; Ferris & Winthrop, 2010). Moreover, Sierra Leone has a tolerant approach to irregular migration, at least in practice. ECOWAS nationals tend to be tolerated and possibilities to regularise their stay are generalised. Border management is a constant struggle, as the country only controls a handful of its hundreds of crossing points. Even though policies such as the Anti-Human Trafficking Act of 2005 and the Child Rights Act of 2007 are in place, capacity to enact these policies is limited. There is a lack of specialised training and of public information campaigns in Sierra Leone, and NGOs and international organisations tend to pull the weight for victim protections (ICPMD & IOM, 2015).

Gaps

There is limited data especially in regards to labour immigration in Sierra Leone; these data gaps limit evidence-based policy making in this regard. Sierra Leone also has several policy gaps as it lacks certain laws to regulate forms of migration and, when it has these laws, lacks the capacity to implement them. First, a comprehensive labour migration policy needs to be developed to provide proper treatment of its migrants whilst channelling the development potential it has (Sesay, 2016). Second, the country needs to develop its capacity to govern irregular migration and minimize cases of human trafficking. In particular, border management needs to be strengthened, as reports show that Sierra Leone can only control a small portion of its crossing points (European Commission, 2007; US Department of State, 2017a). Third, Sierra Leone has

a continuous issue of internally displaced people who have been invisible to the state since the end of the voluntary repatriation program. These migrants have particular vulnerabilities and remain in the blind spot of the management of forcibly displaced migrants (Maconachie, Binns, Tengbe, & Johnson, 2007).

4.2   Relevant Regional Frameworks and Stakeholders

In the context of migration in West and Central Africa, **it is crucial to consider relevant regional frameworks and stakeholders**. Importantly, **migration crosses national borders and concerns wider regions rather than single countries.** At the same time, migration affects various policy domains simultaneously, which is another reason why regional responses to migration seem ideal (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; Klavert, 2011). In addition, an advantage of a regional approach is increased efficiency due to arguably lower transaction costs (compared to bilateral approaches) as well as the avoidance of incoherence and duplication of policies and programmes (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016).

4.2.1   African Union (AU)

The **African Union (AU),** the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), is a regional inter-governmental organisation uniting all 54 recognised African countries (AU, 2017). The 1991 Treaty establishing the African Economic Community – also known as the Abuja Treaty – calls for the establishment and/or strengthening of existing **Regional Economic Communities (RECs)** within the AU (Art. 28(1)). Moreover, AU Members States and RECs are encouraged to promote the free movement of people (Art. 43). "Free movement of persons is also integral to Africa's vision and action plan as laid out in the Agenda 2063, the continental master plan for development in the 21st century" (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016, p. 9). Being aware of the challenges and potentials of migration for its member states, the AU has formulated several other migration frameworks including the **Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA)** and the **African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD)**, both of which were adopted in 2006 (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; Klavert, 2011).

The MPFA promotes the formulation of comprehensive policies to better harness the development potentials of migration, taking into account all forms of migration including voluntary and forced migration, regular and irregular migration, as well as internal and international migration. The MPFA also recognizes the importance of border management, regional integration, and migration data (Executive Council, 2006a). The AU recently revised the framework and formulated an implementation plan (Journal du Cameroun, 2017). Unfortunately, more concrete information about the revisions has not been published yet.

The ACPMD defines eleven priorities for migration policies and recommendations for relevant national, regional and international stakeholders. The eleven priorities include migration and development; human resources and brain drain; labour migration; remittances; diaspora; migration, peace, security and stability; migration and human rights; migration and gender; children and youth; elderly; and regional initiatives. In addition, four cross-cutting themes are identified, namely health, the environment, trade, and access to social services (Executive Council, 2006b). In June 2015, the 25th AU Assembly passed the Declaration on Migration, which stresses the need to speed up the implementation of earlier commitments, especially those related to the free movement of persons across the continent and addressing irregular migration (AU Assembly, 2015).

Other policies and instruments which relate to migration, but were not designed for migration specifically, are the 1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the 2004 AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation, the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), the 2009 AU Minimum Integration Programme, the 2012 AU Plan of Action on Boosting Intra African Trade, the Joint Labour Migration Programme, and the AU Border Programme (AU, 2009; AU Peace and Security, n.d.; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; ILO, 2015; RMMS, 2016). In addition, the AU is involved in several inter-regional frameworks related to migration, which are further discussed in Section 4.3. The AU's efforts to govern migration mirror relatively high standards. There is, however, little evidence on whether or not policies and other instruments at the continental or regional level are effective, which is possibly because many instruments have been developed rather recently (Klavert, 2011). A shortcoming of AU migration policies and instruments is that many are only guidelines and not binding (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016). The 1969 Convention and the Kampala Conventions are exceptions.

4.2.2   Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

The **Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)** was established on February 4, 1998 and became a regional economic community in July 2000. Its twenty-four member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo and Tunisia. Of these, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone are focus countries of this report. Entities of CEN-SAD include the Conference of Heads of State/Government, the Executive Council, the Peace and Security Council, the Council in charge of Sustainable Development, the Committee of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives, the General Secretariat, the Economic Social and Cultural Council, as well as the Sahel-Saharan Bank for Investment and Trade (UNECA, n.d., b).

According to UNECA (n.d., b), CEN-SAD has "initiated cooperation agreements with numerous regional and international organisations with the purpose of consolidating collective work in the political, cultural, economic and social fields." The community's objectives include establishing an economic union with investments in the areas of agriculture, industry, culture, society, and energy; allowing for freedom of movement and residence for individuals; improving foreign trade and transportation within member states; coordinating the education systems of member states; and renewing the focus on sustainable development and security (UNECA, n.d., b). Article 1 of the CEN-SAD treaty includes an emphasis on the free movement of persons, which entails that the member state citizens have the same rights and obligations as those of other signatory states. Though implementation of this article by members of CEN-SAD is slow, "a number of CEN-SAD member States have been increasingly liberalizing their policies and have successfully implemented schemes to foster the intraregional movement of people. The primary reason for the success is overlapping memberships with ECOWAS that are far along in liberalizing cross-border mobility restrictions" (UNECA, n.d., c).

4.2.3   Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** is a major regional stakeholder. Established on May 28, 1975, ECOWAS consists of fifteen members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. Of

these, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal are also focus countries of this report. Notably, Morocco has a history of engagement in migration and development activities. The country, though not located in West Africa, has recently sought to increase its involvement in the economic community and become a member state of ECOWAS (BBC, 2017; Hilse, 2017). A BBC (2017) publication explains that the "West African regional group ECOWAS has in principle approved Morocco's membership application despite the country being in North Africa. But ECOWAS leaders meeting in Liberia said the implications of its membership still needs to be considered before Morocco could formally join. […] Morocco's application comes after it rejoined the African Union in January [2017]."

ECOWAS was created "to foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its member states," in part through the establishment of a trading union (ECOWAS, 2016a). Specialized agencies of ECOWAS include the West African Health Organisation (WAHO), the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), the Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA), the ECOWAS Gender and Development Centre, the ECOWAS Youth and Sports Development Centre, the ECOWAS Water Resources Coordination Centre, the West African Power Pool, the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE), the ECOWAS Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERERA), the ECOWAS Infrastructure Projects Preparation and Development Unit (PPDU), and the ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme (ECOWAS, 2016a).

ECOWAS member states adopted the first protocol related to migration in 1979 (ECOWAS, 2016a). This protocol "stipulated the right of ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in the territory of other member states and offer[ed] a three-step roadmap of five years each to achieve freedom of movement of persons after fifteen years" (UNECA, n.d., a). The protocol involved three phases: the first phase, Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa; the second phase, Right of Residence; and the third phase, Right of Establishment. Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa, which has been implemented, establishes the right of an ECOWAS citizen to travel freely through the region without a visa, although member states still reserve the right to refuse entry to "inadmissible immigrants," based on the laws of that member state (ECOWAS, n.d.). The second phase, Right of Residence, has also been implemented. However, the third phase, which deals with the right of establishment in another member state, is still being implemented in most member states (UNECA, n.d.,a). ECOWAS has also established a common passport, implemented in 2000, to function as an international travel document for citizens of member states (UNECA, n.d., c). Moreover, the ECOWAS brown card, established in 1982, seeks to "guarantee to the victims of road accident a prompt and fair compensation of damages caused by non resident motorist[s] from ECOWAS member states visiting their territory" (ECOWAS, 2016b).

4.2.4   Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The **Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)** was established on October 18, 1983, and its member states include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe (UNECA, n.d., d). Angola only became a full member in 1999, until when it was an observer. Of focus for this report are the Central African Republic and Chad. Financial difficulties caused by members states not paying membership fees as well as conflicts in the Great Lakes area prevented ECCAS from fully functioning until 1985 (AU, n.d.). The community "aims at promoting and strengthening a harmonious cooperation in order to realize a balanced and self-sustained economic development, particularly in the fields of industry, transport and communications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, trade, customs, monetary and financial matters,

human resources, tourism, education, culture, science and technology and the movement of persons with a view to achieving collective self-reliance, raising the standards of living, maintaining economic stability and fostering peaceful relations between the member States and contributing to the development of the African continent" (UNECA, n.d., d).

The entities of ECCAS include the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, the General Secretariat, the Advisory Commission, and Specialized Technical Committees. Moreover, the objectives of ECCAS are to reduce trade barriers and eliminate customs duties on imports and exports between member states; to establish a Cooperation and Development Fund; engage in development of land-locked or island- member states; and to promote ECCAS through national policies related to industry, trade, transportation, energy, natural resources, tourism, education, etc. Especially important in regards to migration, another objective of ECCAS is to allow for the right of establishment and free movement persons, good, services, and capital between member states (UNECA, n.d., d).

4.2.5 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)

The **Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)** was established in 1999, and its member states include Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea (IDW, 2012); the Central African Republic and Chad are focus countries of this report. CEMAC consists of multiple institutional entities including the Executive Secretariat, the Councils of Ministers, the Conference of Heads of State, the Monetary Union (UMAC), the Economic Union (UEAC), as well as the Parliament and the Court of Justice. The main objectives of CEMAC are "to converge and monitor national economic policies, to coordinate sectoral policies and to progressively create a single market" (IDW, 2012).

CEMAC's treaty established three stages through which the outlined objectives are to be achieved. Specifically, the first step entails the "harmonization of national and elaboration of common economic legislations," the second entails "the establishment of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons," and the third deals with the evaluations of the results of this process (IDW, 2012). According to International Democracy Watch (2012), however, many challenges have arisen in this regard: "Despite a very comprehensive body of legislations, UEAC's development has so far been slower than expected. It currently lags behind the plan. The implementation of common legislations on the national level has for instance taken longer than scheduled. […] the agreement on the free movement of citizens has not been put into reality. Most States still require visa from CEMAC citizens entering their territory. […] many tariff and non-tariff barriers still exist and largely explain the low level of intra-regional trade."

4.2.6 G5 Sahel

The **G5 Sahel** was established in December 2014, and its member countries include Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, all of which are focus countries of this report. The regional organisation's presidency was passed from Chad to Mali in February 2017 (EEAS, 2017a). The objective of the G5 Sahel is to coordinate the development and security policies and strategies of the five states (Secretariat Permanent due G5 Sahel, 2015). Recently, the G5 and the EU have been increasingly engaging in a partnership: "The first high-level meeting between the High Representative/Vice –President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini and the governments of the Member States of the G5 Sahel took place in Brussels, 17

June 2015. Discussions showed a converging analysis of the challenges faced by the region, ranging from security threats and organised crime to irregular migration, the humanitarian situation and the consequences of climate change. Sahel ministers strongly welcomed EU engagement, and the EU Regional Action Plan for the Sahel was seen as highly relevant and as a useful reference for further cooperation" (EAAS, 2017).

A second ministerial meeting in June 2017 between EU and G5 Sahel officials discussed matters related to "the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali, the need to push for stabilisation of Libya, the common fight against terrorism, the mutual responsibility for tackling irregular migration, and the need for creating appropriate conditions for youth" (EEAS, 2017a). At this time, in June 2017, a joint force of the G5 Sahel was deployed in order to address issues of terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel region (UN, 2017). As part of this, EUR 50 million have been made available by the EU to the G5 Sahel countries in order to boost security in border regions as well as promote cross-border cooperation (European Commission, 2017a).

Further considering collaboration between the G5 Sahel and the EU, the Alliance for the Sahel is a joint initiative of the EU, France, and Germany that was launched in July 2017 by Emmanuel Macro and Angela Merkel to support development in the G5 Sahel region. According to a publication by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (2017b), "The newly established alliance, open to all Member States, aims to enhance the stability and development of the region. With the support of the EU which is pioneering an integrated approach to address the development and security challenges of the Sahel region, the initiative will focus on rural development, job creation for youth, improving energy infrastructure and strengthening good governance and security."

4.2.7 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

The **Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)** was established in 1989, and its current member states include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia (UNECA, n.d., e; MPC, 2013a). Of special importance for this report is Mauritania. Upon the AMU's establishment, the member states "agreed to coordinate, harmonize and rationalize their policies and strategies to achieve sustainable development in all sectors of human activities"; as such, the objectives of the AMU lie in "strengthen[ing] the ties of brotherhood" between member states; pursing progress, prosperity, and peace; and establishing diverse common policies (UNECA, n.d., e). Moreover, the aim of the AMU includes establishing the free movement of people, services, good, and capital between member states (UNECA, n.d., e). In this regard, the Migration Policy Centre (2013) suggests that the AMU "remains a rather dormant organisation, especially concerning the movement of people, which is regulated primarily through bilateral accords" (p. 7).

4.3 Inter-Regional Frameworks

There are many inter-regional and inter-continental frameworks in the field of migration which are relevant for migration in the context of West and Central Africa. Discussed here are the inter-regional and inter-continental frameworks which incorporate the most relevant regional stakeholders introduced above. The frameworks summarized here are, however, not exhaustive and do not include frameworks promoted by regional actors in cooperation with international stakeholders, as this goes beyond the scope of this report.

Firstly, it is important to discuss the **Intra-Regional Forum on Migration in Africa (IRFMA),** also known as the Pan-African Forum. Established in 2015, participants include (but are not limited to) ECOWAS, CEN-SAD,

AMU, ECCAS, and IOM. Regional institutions from the eastern, central, and southern regions of Africa are also participants in the Forum. The IRFMA aims to create a platform for regional institutions across African to collaborate and share information on migration trends and dynamics (IOM, 2017f). According to IOM (2017f), the objective of IRFMA "is to enhance capacities of the Africa regional frameworks on migration to facilitate intra-regional migration and human mobility, free movement of persons and integrated border management through sharing of knowledge, information, good practices, experiences and lessons learnt." In this regard, interest areas of the Forum include establishing visa regimes and integrated border management, promoting migration governance, facilitating trade and free movement of persons, and eliminating irregular migration (IOM, 2017f).

Also notable in regards to inter-regional and inter-continental frameworks is the extensive cooperation between the AU and EU in the field of migration, which led to the initiation of various inter-regional frameworks. The **Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development**, also known as the Tripoli Declaration, was established at a conference in Tripoli in 2006. It aims to address the challenges of international migration as well as to better leverage the benefits of international migration using a holistic approach. The Declaration defines nine priority areas: 1) migration and development; 2) migration management challenges; 3) peace and security; 4) human resources and brain drain; 5) human rights and individual well-being; 6) sharing best practices; 7) regular migration opportunities; 8) irregular migration; and 9) protection of refugees (AU & EU, 2006a). At this same 2006 conference, the **AU-EU Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children** was ratified. This declaration provides for measures to be taken regarding the prevention of human trafficking and the protection of victims of trafficking, specifically that of African women and children. In addition, it promotes the development and implementation of legal frameworks and policies, as well as cooperation and coordination mechanisms between member states (AU & EU, 2006b). It specifically urges a "a three-pronged strategy of prevention, provision and prosecution" in the fight to eliminate trafficking (AU & EU, 2006b).

The adoption of both these declarations, namely the Tripoli Declaration and the Ouagadougou Declaration, laid the foundation for a series of meetings known as the Tripoli Process (IOM, 2017a). This Process led to the initiation of additional agreements. Specifically, the EU Commission and AU Commission initiated the 2007 **Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment**, which provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation for the two parties in the areas of migration, mobility, and employment. It aims to create improved employment opportunities and migration management in Africa. It aims to do this in a comprehensive way that serves the interests of both the EU and the AU (European Commission, n.d.). The platform also includes non-political stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society organisations, youth organisations, and academia (Africa EU Partnership, n.d.). According to the European Commission (2017b), the Partnership has made significant progress already, especially in facilitating remittance flows, monitoring labour migration, and building capacities to address human trafficking. The current Roadmap 2014-2017, established at the 2014 EU-African Summit in Brussels, prioritises the areas of "Peace and security"; "Democracy, good governance, and human rights; "Human development"; "Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration"; and "Global and emerging issues" (such as terrorism and migration in response to climate change) (EU-Africa Summit, 2014).

Moreover, taking into account earlier commitments described above and the sharp increase in migration and displacement in 2015, the 2015 **Valletta Summit on Migration** emphasised the need to better protect migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. The Summit promotes a comprehensive and joint approach to harness the potential benefits of migration and address challenges related to migration. The

latter do not only include common challenges such as irregular migration, the risks associated with it and the causes and consequences of forced migration, but also climate change and terrorism, which have been linked to migration relatively recently. Importantly, the Summit also acknowledges "that further efforts should be made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities, […] as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration, including labour migration and the mobility of entrepreneurs, students and researchers" (Valetta Summit, 2015a). The Action Plan adopted at the Valetta Summit defines five priority areas which are summarised under the following headings: 1) "Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement"; 2) "Legal migration and mobility"; 3) "Protection and asylum"; 4) "Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings"; and 5) "Return, readmission and reintegration" (Valetta Summit, 2015b).

Other inter-regional forums on migration between Africa and the EU include the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean, the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, as well as Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue. The **5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean** was established in Rome in 1990. Members include Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and focus country Mauritania. The Dialogue's current focuses for joint cooperation efforts and management include, but are not limited to, irregular migration, human trafficking, migration and development, migrant rights, and migrant integration (IOM, 2017b). The **Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development**, also known as the Rabat Process, was established in 2006 and is comprised of European and African countries, including member states of ECOWAS. All of the thirteen focus countries of this report are members of this Dialogue (IOM, 2017c). The Rabat Process "was founded based on the acknowledgement that finding a response to the increasing number of migrants wishing to cross the Straits of Gibraltar or to reach the Canary Islands, the gateway to Europe, was not exclusively the responsibility of Morocco and Spain. From this arose the need to link the countries of origin, transit and destination affected by the migration routes linking Central, West and Northern Africa with Europe. A balancing point was sought between the countries which consider development to be a priority to reduce migration flows, and those which see the fight against irregular migration as a priority" (ICMPD, n.d.). The Dialogue aims to create a framework for the cooperation of member states in addressing the challenges related to migration. Focus areas include preventing irregular migration and facilitating regular migration, promoting the connections between migration and development, as well as providing protections to asylum seekers as well as for migrant rights (IOM, 2017c). Moreover, the **Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) Dialogue** was established in 2003 and focuses on preventing irregular migration, smuggling, and trafficking as well as on protecting refugees, asylum seekers, and VoTs. Of the focus countries included in this report, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana participate in the MTM (IOM, 2017d). Though not inclusively limited to African and European countries, also important to note is the **African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP)-EU Dialogue on Migration.** The ACP-EU Dialogue was established in 2000 and was created following the 2010 revisions of the Cotonou Agreement. All of the thirteen focus countries of this report are members of this Dialogue. The aims of the ACP-EU Dialogue are to support governments of member states in areas of migration, specifically visas, remittances, readmission, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling (IOM, 2017e).

4.4 Relevant International Frameworks and Stakeholders

4.4.1   Multilateral Frameworks

States and international actors recognize that challenges related to various forms of migration need to be addressed through **international cooperation** (Betts, 2010). Table 6 provides an overview of relevant multilateral frameworks in the context of migration as ratified by the thirteen focus countries of this report. **Multilateral frameworks related to migration** can be broadly categorized as international human rights law, international labour standards (ILO Conventions), refugee and asylum law, consular relations, and international criminal law (ILO & OSCE, 2009). Relevant to this report are the 1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029), the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097), the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (C105), the 1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol, the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (ILO C143), the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention, the 2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol, the 2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol, and the 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189). A summary of the content of each Convention can be found in Annex E.

Table 6: Relevant Conventions Ratified by Countries in West and Central Africa

	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire
1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029)[a]	1960	1960	1960	2000	1957	1959	1960
1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097)[a]	1961						
1951 UN Refugee Convention[b]	1980	1962	1981	1966	1963	1965	1961
1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO C105)[a]	1997	1964	1961	2000	1958	1961	1961
1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations[c]	1964	Signed in 1963, but not ratified		Accession in 2013, but not ratified	1963	Accession in 1988 but not ratified	Signed in 1963, but not ratified
1967 UN Refugee Protocol[b]	1980	1967	1981	1967	1968	1968	1970
1975 Migrant	1977					1978	

Workers Convention (ILO C143)[a]							
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child[c]	1990	1992	1990	1990	1990	Accession in 1990, but not ratified	1991
1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention[c]	2003		Signed in 2012, but not ratified		Accession in 2000, but not ratified	Accession in 2000, but not ratified	
2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol[c]	2002	2006 a	2009 a	2003	2012 a	2004 a	2012 a
2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol[c]	2002	Accession in 2006, but not ratified		2003	Accession in 2012, but not ratified	Accession in 2005, but not ratified	Accession in 2017, but not ratified
2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189)[a]						2017[2]	

	Mali	**Mauritania**	**Niger**	**Nigeria**	**Senegal**	**Sierra Leone**
1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029)[a]	1960	1961	1961	1960	1960	1961
1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097)[a]				1960[1]		
1951 UN Refugee Convention[b]	1973	1987	1961	1967	1963	1981
1957 Abolition of Forced Labour	1962	1997	1962	1960	1961	1961

Convention (ILO C105)[a]						
1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations[c]	Accession in 1968, but not ratified	Accession in 2000, but not ratified	1966	Accession in 1968, but not ratified	Accession in 1966, but not ratified	Accession in 2016, but not ratified
1967 UN Refugee Protocol[b]	1973	1987	1970	1968	1967	1981
1975 Migrant Workers Convention (ILO C143)[a]						
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child[c]	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1990
1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention[c]	Accession in 2003, but not ratified	Accession in 2007, but not ratified	Accession in 2009, but not ratified	Accession in 2009, but not ratified	Accession in 1999, but not ratified	Signed in 2000, but not ratified
2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol[c]	2002	2005 a	2004	2001	2003	2014
2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol[c]	2002	Accession in 2005, but not ratified	Accession in 2009, but not ratified	2001	2003	2014
2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189)[a]						

[1] Nigeria has excluded the provisions of Annexes I to III, [2] Convention will enter into force in 2018 // Sources: [a] ILO, 2017c; [b] UNHCR, 2015a; [c] UN Treaty Collection, 2017

As can be seen in Table 6, five of the previously mentioned Conventions were ratified by all thirteen focus countries; these Conventions include the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol, and the 2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol. The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by twelve of the thirteen countries; this excludes Guinea which has only acceded to the 1989 Convention. On the other hand, the 2011 Domestic Workers Convention has only been ratified by Guinea, the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention only by Burkina Faso and Guinea, and the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention

only by Burkina Faso and Nigeria. There is no single country among the thirteen that has ratified all twelve Conventions or Protocols. Of the thirteen countries, Burkina Faso has ratified the most Conventions and Protocols (all except for the 2011 Domestic Workers Convention).

4.4.2   Activities of International Actors in West and Central Africa

The two most important international stakeholders in the field of migration active in West and Central Africa are the **International Organisation for Migration (IOM)** and the **United States High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**. Other relevant international stakeholders active in the field of migration in West and Central Africa include, for instance, ILO and UNODC. In addition, there are many international and national relief and development organisations active in the region.

IOM was founded in 1951 and, since 2016, it is the official UN Migration Agency (IOM, 2017h). IOM has 166 Member States, including all thirteen focus countries of this report (IOM, 2016a). The organisation works together closely with partners from governments, intergovernmental institutions, and NGOs in providing expert services for governments and migrants (including refugees) to promote "humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all" (IOM, 2017h). These activities include, for instance, research, operational assistance, capacity building, and the facilitation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. IOM's work focuses on four areas related to migration management, namely 1) migration and development, 2) facilitating migration, 3) regulating migration, and 4) forced migration. Other related areas include promoting international law, policy guidance and debate, protecting migrants' rights, migration health, and gendered migration (IOM, 2017h). While IOM does not have a mandate for legal protection, the organisation's activities contribute to and promote the protection of migrant and human rights (IOM, 2017i).

The office of the **UNHCR** and the UN Refugee Agency was created in 1950. "The High Commissioner is primarily mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance and to seek permanent solutions for [refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and stateless persons]" (Division of International Protection, 2013, p.4). Under certain conditions UNHCR also provides protection and assistance to IDPs, for instance, in situations related to other (international) refugee flows. UNHCR's core mandate is to act on behalf of refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and returnees who "who lack the protection of their own countries" (Division of International Protection, 2013, p.3). UNHCR's work can be divided into four pillars: 1) refugee programme, 2) stateless programme, 3) reintegration projects and 4) IDP programme (UNHCR, 2016b). UNHCR's mandate is not dependent on the location of refugees, applies to contexts of emergency and non-emergency as well as camp- and non-camp situations, and includes mixed migration movements (Division of International Protection, 2013). UNHCR's core activities can be divided into ten themes, namely child protection, comprehensive solutions, education, public health, refugee status determination, SGBV prevention and response, settlement and shelter, water and sanitation, statelessness, and community-based protection (UNHCR, 2017ad).

Currently, UNHCR works in 130 countries, including all thirteen focus countries of this report (UNHCR, 2017ac). Annex F provides an overview of the fields in which IOM and UNHCR are active in West and Central Africa. UNHCR is present in various field-, branch-, and sub-offices across all thirteen focus countries and IOM has country offices in all of them (IOM, 2017q; IOM, 2017k). UNHCR's Regional Office and IOM's Regional Office for West and Central Africa are both located in Dakar, Senegal. For 2017, UNHCR has a total budget of $7.44. The highest share of this budget is allocated to Africa ($2.93 billion), with the sub-region of West Africa receiving $309.2 million and the sub-region of Central Africa and the Great Lakes

receiving $685.6 million (UNHCR, 2017ae). In comparison, IOM's total operational budget for 2017 is $1.034 billion, with Africa receiving $242.97 million (IOM, 2016d). Annex G provides a more detailed overview of UNHCR's and IOM's 2016 budget and expenditures for West and Central Africa.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Migratory movements in and out of West and Central Africa are diverse and significant in volume. They are largely mixed flows of migrants composed of asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants. Based on a desk review of the existing literature and data, the main drivers and trends of migration in West and Central Africa, the main routes, migrant vulnerabilities and needs, and policy and programme responses to migration are presented. Specifically, the context of thirteen countries in West and Central Africa is examined: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. These countries are, to different extents, all origin, transit and/or destination countries of migrants and are all affected by forced migration and flows of asylum seekers and refugees.

Drivers of migration in West and Central Africa for asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants to move within the region as well as beyond include low human and economic development, strong climate conditions, demographic pressures, health epidemics (such as Ebola), violent conflicts, political oppression, as well as persecution. Irregular movements of migrants in and out of West and Central Africa are also diverse and significant in volume. Human smuggling and trafficking in persons significantly contribute to irregular movements directed toward North Africa and Europe, which are a small fraction of total in the region. Most irregular movements happen within West Africa and are simply due to a lack of proper documentation. It is reasonable to assume that most irregular migrants in the region are regular in theory. However, due to the many barriers to free movement explored in this analysis – securitization of borders, low development, lack of administrative and bureaucratic services – not all migrants are able to fully benefit from ECOWAS.

Movements to, from, and through West and Central Africa tend to occur across similar migration routes and modes of travel. In particular, the report identifies four main external migration routes, namely the Central Mediterranean Route, the Western Mediterranean Route, the Western African Route, and the Air Route. Generally, along these routes, migrants face several protection issues especially because of harsh environmental conditions and their dependency on smugglers. Migrants often lack access to water, food, and health services during a journey. In addition, they are at risk of being robbed, beaten, arrested, raped, kidnapped, and trafficked. Along the Western Mediterranean Route in northern Mali, for example, there has been an increasing involvement of terrorists and armed groups in the human trafficking and human smuggling business. The situation in Libya has deteriorated, yet the number of migrants transiting in the country increased in the last three years. In Libya, the human smuggling and trafficking industry run by or in compliance with state authorities, systematically preys migrants, who are often held in captivity and suffer from dire human rights abuses. This business has become one of the biggest sources of revenue for the country, and it is now part of the political and economic situation in Libya.

The Air Route differs from the land and sea routes, and migrants face other vulnerabilities. Irregular migrants taking the Air Route, for example, heavily rely on smugglers, and it is very likely that they get their passports and visas with the help of criminal organisations in their country of origin.

It is especially important to note that all possible routes to Europe are constantly evolving as they are context and time-specific. The numbers of migrants using these routes fluctuate because of conflicts in transit countries and because of juridical interdictions. For instance, policies that aim to curb human smuggling in a given route generally result in an increased vulnerability of migrants, who are forced to switch to other arguably more dangerous routes.

In terms of the policy response in West and Central Africa, there are relevant frameworks in place to address migration issues at the national, regional, continental and international level. At the national level, states generally address administrative matters and the fight against human trafficking, though they are not generally otherwise comprehensive. At the continental and regional levels, the AU, CEN-SAD, ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEMAC, G5 Sahel, and AMU are active in promoting the integration of regional economic communities, the free movement of people, and the development potential of migration. Furthermore, multiple inter-regional frameworks exist to address migration, especially between the AU and EU, in aspects of migration and development, the fight against human trafficking, and the protection of migrants, including regular/labour migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and victims of trafficking. Moreover, several multilateral frameworks including UN and ILO Conventions address issues of migration. However, there is no country among the thirteen focus countries, which has ratified all International Conventions relevant to the field of migration, although Burkina Faso has ratified the most.

Knowledge and data gaps

The aim of this report is to gather and synthesize the available data and evidence on migration within West and Central in order to identify particular development needs and challenges in the area of migration. The identification of vulnerabilities, needs, and challenges of migrants as well as of the governments in West and Central Africa is based on secondary information uncovered during desk research. This, however, means that if the current situation is not well documented in existing literature and data, it can neither be presented to the fullest extent in this report nor in the migration profiles of the thirteen focus countries that accompany the full report.

While though this report consulted a significant volume of reputable sources, a comprehensive understanding of most of the mixed migration movements in and out of West and Central Africa is still lacking and several knowledge and data gaps were found. Evidence on and understanding of most of the migration movements in and out of West and Central Africa is still limited. This is particularly the case for regular/labour migration, which is much less understood than forced migration in the region. In addition, due to its often clandestine nature, irregular migration is difficult to measure. Consequently, there are likely many other border crossings and smuggling operations, in addition to those identified in this report, for which evidence is unavailable. In this regard, most of the focus countries of this report have not recently carried out a national census (or other similar exercise) identifying numbers of immigrants and emigrants.

Moreover, there has been little to no research that evaluates existing migration policies and interventions in West and Central Africa. This means that data regarding the effectiveness of existing policies are scarce. As a result of these knowledge and data gaps, there are many open questions that remain regarding migration-related issues in West and Central Africa. As such, this report makes a number of

recommendations related to, for example, data collection, national migration policies, bilateral and regional cooperation, durable solutions for refugees, and migrant protection.

Recommendations

Data collection: Considering the lack of data on migration trends and patterns in the West and Central African region, future efforts should be made to increase the capacities for data collection, especially in regard to regular migration. Moreover, collected data should publicly available and easy to access.

National migration policies: Of the existing national migration policies in the report's thirteen focus countries, those in Ghana and Nigeria are the most advanced. More countries, however, have drafted a national migration policy. Generally, though, existing national policies tend to only address administrative matters and the fight against human trafficking, with states failing to introduce comprehensive migration policies and to integrate migration into national development strategies. A common problem that has been identified is that authorities conflate human trafficking and smuggling and do not sufficiently understand and/or exploit the development potentials of migration. National governments in the region are also faced with limited ability to implement laws and policies, which is the most significant obstacle to proper implementation and enforcement. Future efforts should ensure that drafted national migration policies have the resources, capacity, and support at the political level to be implemented. Efforts to understand the effectiveness of these policies must also be made.

Bilateral agreements and regional cooperation: There are several relevant regional frameworks and bilateral agreements that address the context of migration in West and Central Africa. It is especially important to consider migration from such perspectives because it is a topic that crosses national borders and concerns multiple countries simultaneously. At the same time, migration affects various policy domains simultaneously. In this regard, cooperative approaches offer increased efficiency due to arguably lower transaction costs as well as the avoidance of incoherence and duplication of policies and programmes. The potential for this in West and Central Africa remains largely unexploited and could be a focus for future efforts. Despite existing frameworks, regional cooperation remains a challenge due to a lack of capacities and political willingness on part of the member states. None of the thirteen focus countries in West and Central Africa has ratified all International Conventions relevant to the field of migration. Within ECOWAS, many member states have not yet implemented the free movement of persons, despite ratification of the majority of these protocols. In this regard, a higher degree of effectiveness of these bilateral labour agreements and regional cooperation could help to enable more regular migration within the region. In the context of irregular migration to EU countries in pursuit of economic and livelihood opportunities, bilateral agreements with EU countries which facilitate and regularize seasonal labour migration should also be considered.

Durable solutions for refugees: Due to encampment policies and limited work opportunities, refugees often have little future perspectives which can lead to aspirations of onward migration. Hence, finding more durable solutions for refugees regarding integration into host societies, resettlement, as well as voluntary repatriation is crucial. In this context, expanding protection and humanitarian assistance beyond refugee camps is one of these options. Another would be to consider the concept of labour migration for refugees.

To better protect the refugee population in this region the international community should focus its efforts in the Lake Chad Basin. Migration is a global phenomenon with local effects that, in the case of West and Central Africa, are largely localized in the Lake Chad Basin area. This area is now affected by high levels of

human rights abuses, sexual violence, and recruitment of young children to serve as combatants by the terrorist group. Moreover, famine has reached unprecedented levels, and the situation is aggravated by the lack of resources. As such, the international community should increase support delivered to the Lake Chad Basin crisis. A series of policies should be implemented including food assistance and livelihood support, access to basic services such as water, healthcare and education, and protection of women and girls against rape, sexual abuse, and sexual exploitation.

Migrant protections: Considering that migrants in West and Central Africa may face vulnerabilities (e.g. trafficking, abuse, kidnapping, SGBV, food insecurity) on their journeys, it is important to inform potential migrants (especially those engaging in irregular movements) of the risks of migration and of channels available for regular migration. Moreover, it is necessary to introduce more regular options for migration, perhaps through increased regional cooperation and improved bilateral labour agreements. In this regard, improving livelihood opportunities for potential migrants can help create viable alternatives to migration and enable such individuals to make more informed decisions. Such measures could be used to help decrease the dependency of migrants on smugglers and the risks of trafficking for migrants. The fight against smuggling and trafficking in this context also requires improved border management and fighting corruption among officials. Particularly, the protections and assistance available to migrants in this regard must also be increased.

Reducing smuggling: To reduce human smuggling toward Europe from West and Central Africa, the focus should not be on curbing irregular migration in a particular route but instead to curb this criminal activity in the G5 Sahel countries. The development and creation of livelihoods opportunities in the Sahel and increased intra-African circular and seasonal migration should be fostered. Additionally, efforts to promote and develop regular intraregional mobility should be given attention.

The situation in Libya: In this landscape, the plan by the EU and Italy to reduce migration flows from Libya risks further destabilizing the country. The crackdown of smuggling and trafficking activities could lead to more conflict for control over resources if other policies are not set into motion at the same time, which would likely increase the power of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel. Nevertheless, a plan to reduce smuggling and trafficking should be matched with various activities, including capacity building at community levels. Moreover, acknowledging that there is no single solution to human smuggling in Libya, a multi-layered solution is preferred. This shall include: building state institutions, reducing insecurity and impunity, engage communities and stakeholders, providing alternatives, and mobilizing political will.[16]

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[16] For more information on the integrated response to human smuggling, visit: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/global-initiative-human-smuggling-from-the-horn-of-africa-may-2017-web.pdf

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This list aims to present an overview of different sources of information and data that were used by the authors of this report. This list is by no means exhaustive, but these sources are the ones that are updated on a more or less regular basis, therefore always providing the most recent information on issues relating to migration in West and Central Africa.

Source	Link	Description	Update Frequency
4mi	http://www.westafrica.regionalmms.org/index.php/4mi-page	The 4mi project managed by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat aims at monitoring mixed migration flows in the region. While the project is still growing, it promises to provide updated data on migratory trends through its monthly 4mi Trends Reports.	Monthly
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat	http://www.regionalmms.org/	In general, data on the irregular migration flows in West and Central Africa are limited. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat publishes on the most recent trends in the region regularly and also has an expansive, growing library of own research and other publications on topics of interest.	Frequently
Trafficking in Persons Report	https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/	The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report is the world's most comprehensive resource of governmental anti-human trafficking efforts. It represents an updated, global look at the nature and scope of trafficking in persons and the broad range of government actions to confront and eliminate it. The report is used by international organisations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organisations alike as a tool to examine where resources are most needed. Freeing victims, preventing trafficking, and bringing traffickers to justice are the ultimate goals of the report.	Annually

UNHCR Global Focus	http://reporting.unhcr.org/	Global Focus is UNHCR's main operational reporting portal for donors and other key partners. This site provides an overview of the protection risks that refugees and other populations of concern to UNHCR face across the world as well as regularly updated information about the organisation's operations.	Frequently
UNHCR Operational Portal - Refugee Situations	http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations	The Refugee Operational Portal is a platform provided by UNHCR to act as a coordination tool for refugee situations, tracking different crises globally. Of special interest for this report are the Nigeria situation, the Mali situation, the Mediterranean situation, the CAR regional refugee response, the voluntary return of Ivorian refugees, and statelessness in West Africa.	Monthly
Mixed Migration Hub (MHub)	http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/	Supporting the North Africa Mixed Migration Task Force, MHub "provides information on routes, flows, and trends in mixed migratory movements in North Africa." MHub publishes Monthly Trend Bulletins, research publications, and survey snapspots. Though MHub is focused on North Africa, publications also cover mixed migration trends in countries in West and Central Africa, e.g. Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Senegal.	Frequently

Annex A: Glossary of Key Migration Terminology

Assisted Voluntary Return	"Administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support to rejected asylum seekers, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals and other migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country who volunteer to return to their countries of origin." (IOM, 2011)
Asylum Seekers	Persons "who seek safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than [their] own and await a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the persons must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds." (IOM, 2011)
Border Management	"Facilitation of authorized flows of persons, including business people, tourists, migrants and refugees, across a border and the detection and prevention of irregular entry of non-nationals into a given country. Measures to manage borders include the imposition by States of visa requirements, carrier sanctions against transportation companies bringing irregular migrants to the territory, and interdiction at sea. International standards require a balancing between facilitating the entry of legitimate travellers and preventing that of travellers entering for inappropriate reasons or with invalid documentation." (IOM, 2011)
Brain Drain	"Emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills resources in the former." (IOM, 2011)
Circular Migration	"The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Destination	"The country that is a destination for migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Origin	"The country that is a source of migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011)
Country of Transit	"The country through which migratory flows (regular or irregular) move." (IOM, 2011)
Deportation	"The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a non-national from its territory to his or her country of origin or third state after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain." (IOM, 2011)
Detention	"Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority. There are two types of detention: criminal detention, having as a purpose punishment for the committed crime; and administrative detention, guaranteeing that another administrative measure (such as deportation or expulsion) can be implemented. In the majority of countries, irregular migrants are subject to administrative detention, as they have violated immigration laws and regulations that are not considered to be crimes. In many States, a non-national may also be administratively detained pending a

decision on refugee status or on admission to or removal from the State." (IOM, 2011)

Diaspora	"Broadly defined as individual and member or network, association and community, who has left their country of origin, but maintains links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants." (IOM, 2011)
Displacement	"A forced removal of a person from his or her home or country, often due to armed conflict or natural disasters." (IOM, 2011)
Durable Solutions	"Any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved to enable them to lead normal lives. Traditionally this involves voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement." (IOM, 2011)
Economic Migrant	"A person leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her country of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely used to distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution, and is also similarly used to refer to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons leaving their country of origin for the purpose of employment." (IOM, 2011)
Emigration	"The act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settling in another." (IOM, 2011)
Environmental and Disaster Displacees	"Persons who are displaced within their country person of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one." (IOM, 2011)
Family Reunification	"Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin." (IOM, 2011)
Forced Displacement	"In the law of armed conflict, the individual or collective movement of civilians in the interior of an occupied territory. In the terms of Art. 49, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Art. 85, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, forced displacement constitutes a war crime, unless it is justified by imperative military reasons. In a more general sense, forced displacement – or displacement – is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural or man-made catastrophes." (IOM, 2011)
Forced Migration	"A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)." (IOM, 2011)
Highly-Skilled Migration	"While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of postsecondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level

education or occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession." (IOM, 2011)

Human Smuggling	"People smuggling implies the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the illegal entry into a state of which that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident. A broad distinction can be made between people smuggling and human trafficking. In general, the individuals who pay a smuggler in order to gain illegal entry to a country do so voluntarily whereas the victims of human trafficking are often duped or forced into entering another country." (INTERPOL, n.d.)
Human Trafficking	"'The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation' (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character." (IOM, 2011)
Immigration	"A process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement." (IOM, 2011)
Integration	"While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, 'integration' can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose. Local integration is one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees. It may also be applied to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied children." (IOM, 2011)
Internal Migration	"A movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration)." (IOM, 2011)
Internally Displaced Persons	"Persons or groups of persons who have been forced IDPs or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.)." (IOM, 2011)
International Migration	"Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed." (IOM, 2011)
Irregular Migration	"Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid

	passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term 'illegal migration' to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons." (IOM, 2011)
Labour Migration	"Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad." (IOM, 2011)
Less/ low skilled and Semi-skilled Migrant Worker	"There is no internationally agreed definition of a less skilled migrant worker or low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called 'manual workers' (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semiskilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job." (IOM, 2011)
Long-Term Migration	"[When] a person... moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure, the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival, the person will be a long-term immigrant." (IOM, 2011)
Low-Skilled Migration	"No single definition of low-skilled migration exists. 'Low-skilled' can refer to people with few formal qualifications, people working in jobs that do not require such qualifications, or people working in low-wage positions regardless of their own educational background." (COMPAS, 2017)
Mass/ collective Migration	"The sudden movement of large number of persons." (IOM, 2011)
Migration	"The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification." (IOM, 2011)
Mixed Migration	"The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved. Mixed flows have been defined as 'complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants'. Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow." (IOM, 2008)
Net Migration	"Difference between the number of persons entering the territory of a State and the number of persons who leave the territory in

	the same period. Also called 'migratory balance.' This balance is called net immigration when arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals." (IOM, 2011)
Permanent Migration	"The term 'permanent' is applied essentially to reflect movements that the receiving country considers are for the long term, although they may not turn out to be so in practice, because of changes in intentions. It does not mean that the person is necessarily granted a permit of unlimited duration, but rather that he/she is on a 'migration track' that normally leads to permanent residence in the host country." (Fron, Lemaitre, Liebig & Thoreau, 2008)
Readmission Agreement	"International agreement which addresses procedures, on a reciprocal basis, for one State to return nonnationals in an irregular situation to their home State or a State through which they have transited." (IOM, 2011)
Refugees	"Person[s] who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, [are] outside the country of [their] nationality and [are] unable or, owing to such fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country.' (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.' Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country 'because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.'" (IOM, 2011)
Regular Migration	"Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels." (IOM, 2011)
Reintegration	"Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence." (IOM, 2011)
Remittances	"Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin." (IOM, 2011)
Resettlement	"The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized." (IOM, 2011)
Return Migration	"The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation." (IOM, 2011)
Temporary Migration	"Migration of workers who enter a foreign country for migration a specified limited period of time before returning to the country of origin." (IOM, 2011)

Transnationalism	"The process whereby people establish and maintain socio-cultural connections across geopolitical borders." (IOM, 2011)
Unaccompanied Minors	"Persons under the age of majority in a country other than that of their nationality who are not accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other adult who by law or custom is responsible for them. Unaccompanied children present special challenges for border control officials, because detention and other practices applied to undocumented adult non-nationals may not be appropriate for children." (IOM, 2011)

Annex B: Key Demographic and Development Statistics

Indicator	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea
Total area, *in sq km*[a]	274,200	622,984	1,284,000	11,300	238,533	245,857
Population (2015), *in millions*[b]	18.11	4.456	14.009	1.978	27.583	12.092
Urban Population (2014), *% of total*[c]	20.9	39.8	22.3	59	53.4	36.7
Population Growth Rate (2016), *annual %*[d]	2.9	1.1	3.1	3	2.2	2.5
Ethnic Groups[a]	Mossi 52.5% Fulani 8.4% Gurma 6.8% Bobo 4.8% Gurunsi 4.5% Senufo 4.4% Bissa 3.9% Other 19.1%	Baya 33% Banda 27% Mandjia 13% Sara 10% Mboum 7% M'Baka 4% Yakoma 4% Other 2%	Sara 29.9% Kanembu/Bornu/Buduma 9.7% Arab 9.6% Wadai/Maba/Masalit/Mimi 7.5% Gorane 5.8% Masa/Musseye/Musgum 4.9% Other 32.6%	Mandinka/Jahanka 33.8% Fulani/Tukulur/Lorobo 22.1% Wolof 12.2% Jola/Karoninka 10.9% Serahuleh 7% Serer 3.2% Manjago 2.1% Bambara 1% Creole/Aku Marabout 0.8% Other 0.9% non-Gambian 5.2%	Akan 47.5% Ewe 13.9% Mole 16.6% GaDangme 7.4% Gurma 5.7% Guan 3.7% Grusi 2.5% Mande 1.1% Other 1.4%	Fulani 33.9% Malinke 31.1% Susu 19.1% Other 15.9%
Human Development Index (2015)	0.402	0.352	0.396	0.452	0.579	0.414
HDI Rank, out of 188[e]	185	188	186	173	139	183
GDP Based on PPP per Capita, *current international dollars per capita (2015)*[f]	1720.1	684.53	664,3	1,700.0	4,293.0	1,310.7
Life Expectancy at Birth (2015), *years*[e]	59	51.5	51.9	60.5	61.5	59.2

Unemployment (2015), *% of labour force*[e]	2.9	7.6	5.6	30.1	6.3	1.8
Youth Unemployment (2015), *% ages 15-24*[e]	4.7	12.3	8.3	44.4	12.2	1.2
Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2015), %[e]	82.8	76.3	86.9	57.2	32.4 (2014)	73.8 (2014)
Gini Coefficient (2015)[e]	35.3	56.2	43.3	47.3 (2003)	42.8	33.7
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), *current USD millions*[d]	167.4	3	600.2	10.59	3,192.0	85
Net Official Development Assistance Received (2015), *current USD millions*[d]	997.050	486.940	606.219	107.850	1,768.290	538.450
Personal Remittances Received (2015), *current USD million*[d]	395.780	0.159 (1993)	0.724 (1994)	180.692	2,041.692 (2016)	93.01

Indicator	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Total area, *in sq km*[a]	322,463	1,240,192	1,030,700	1,267,000	923,768	196,722	71,740
Population (2015), *in millions*[b]	23.108	17.468	4.182	19.897	181.182	14.977	7.237
Urban Population (2014), *% of total*[c]	53.5	39.1	59.3	18.5	46.9	43.4	39.6
Population Growth Rate (2016), *annual %*[d]	2.5	3	2.8	3.8	2.6	2.9	2.2
Ethnic Groups[a]	Akan 28.8% Voltaique/Gur 16.1% Northern Mande 14.5% Kru 8.5%	Bambara 34.1% Fulani (Peul) 14.7%	Black Moors 40% White Moors 30% Sub-Saharan	Hausa 53% Zarma/Songhai 21% Tuareg 11%	Hausa & the Fulani 29% Yoruba 21% Igbo (Ibo) 18%	Wolof 38.7% Pular 26.5% Serer 15% Mandinka 4.2%	Temne 35% Mende 31% Limba 8%

	Southern Mande 6.9% Non-Ivorian 43.3% Unspecified 0.9%	Sarakole 10.8% Senufo 10.5% Dogon 8.9% Malinke 8.7% Other 12.2%	Mauritanians 30%	Other 15%	Ijaw 10% Kanuri 4% Ibibio 3.5% Tiv 2.5%	Jola 4% Soninke 2.3% Other 9.3%	Kono 5% Kriole 2% Mandingo 2% Loko 2% Other 15%
Human Development Index (2015)	0.474	0.442	0.513	0.353	0.527	0.494	0.42
HDI Rank, out of 188[e]	*171*	*175*	*157*	*187*	*152*	*162*	*179*
GDP Based on PPP per Capita, *current international dollars per capita (2015)[f]*	1,526.2	2,177.2	5,092.0	978.4	596 000	2,600.0	496.05
Life Expectancy at Birth (2015), *years[e]*	51.9	58.5	63.2	61.9	53.1	66.9	51.3
Unemployment (2015), % of labour force[e]	9.5	8.5	31.1	2.8	5.8	9.3	3.4
Youth Unemployment (2015), % ages 15-24[e]	13.7	10.7	47.3	3.9	8.6	13.1	5.3
Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2015), %[e]	59.3	78.4 (2013)	55.6 (2011)	58.4 (2014)	50.9	51.9	77.5 (2013)
Gini Coefficient (2015)[e]	43.2	33	32.4	34	43	40.3	34
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), *current USD millions[d]*	430.16	152.9	501.7	524.9	3,128.5	345.2	518,7
Net Official Development Assistance Received (2015), *current USD millions[d]*	653.400	1,200.000	318.110	865.870	2.431.600	879.200	946.390
Personal Remittances Received (2015), *current USD million[d]*	384.67	894.509	2.21 (1998)	145.870	21,059.700	1,614.00	66.198

Sources: [a] CIA 2017, [b] UNDESA 2015b, [c] UNDESA, 2014, [d] World Bank, 2017a, [e] UNDP, 2016; [f] IMF, 2017

Annex C: Immigration and Emigration Statistics

	Burkina Faso	Central African Republic	Chad	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone
Immigration													
Stock of Immigrants (exl. Refugees), 2015	670,659	81,598	147,428	192,540	399,471	219,574	2,175,399	347,228	60,768	64,534	1,197,720	248,850	90,453
Top origin countries, 2015	Cote d'Ivoire	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Sudan	Senegal	Togo	Mali	Burkina Faso	Gabon	Senegal	Mali	Benin	Mauritania	Guinea
	Mali	Chad	CAR	Guinea	Nigeria	Liberia	Mali	Congo	Mali	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Guinea-Bissau	Liberia
	Ghana	France	Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Burkina Faso	Senegal	Guinea	Burkina Faso	Guinea	Nigeria	Mali	Mali	Gambia
Women as percentage of all immigrants, 2015	52,4	47,1	53,9	47,3	45,6	50,7	44,6	48,8	41,9	52,6	45,1	46,9	45,2
Emigration													
Stock of emigrants,	1.453.378	440.745	208.137	89.639	801.710	426.941	850.105	1.005.607	119.334	356.793	1.093.644	586.870	145.003

2015													
Top destination countries, 2015	Côte d'Ivoire	Cameroon	Sudan	USA	Nigeria	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Senegal	Nigeria	USA	Gambia	USA
UK	Ghana	Chad	Cameroon	Spain	US	Sierra Leone	France	Nigeria	France	Benin	UK	France	UK
	Mali	DRC	Nigeria	UK	UK	Gambia	Liberia	Niger	Mali	Togo	Ghana	Italy	Guinea
Tertiary-educated as a percentage of total emigrants in OECD countries, 2011	21,5	31,9	37,9	19,2	35,2	20	27,3	13,4	16,6	35,9	51,2	19,3	33,7
Tertiary-educated women as a percentage of total women emigrants in OECD countries, 2011	22,7	26,3	33,1	18,9	31,7	16,8	23,8	13	13,4	37,4	47,4	21,8	31,9
Second generation diaspora in Australia, Europe and the US, 2012 (in thousands)	6,5	N/A	N/A	0,8	61,5	10	35,3	39,8	N/A	8,5	158	64,2	4,7

Sources: World Bank, 2017a; UNDESA, 2015a

Annex D: National Policy Responses Regarding Migration

Table 7: Burkina Faso's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Ordinance No. 84-49 of 4 August 1984 setting conditions of entry, residence, and exit for Burkina Faso citizens and foreign nationals	Stipulates that immigration to Burkina Faso is subject to the delivery of a visa and a stay permit, with the exception of nationals from certain states that enjoy preferential treatment (Art. 3; Art. 5). The stay permit is to be requested after entry on the national territory, within the first 15 days of stay (Art. 6).
Labour Code (2008)	Sets forth the regulations concerning a migrant's work contract. Moreover, stipulates the equal treatment of foreign workers with Burkinabe nationals, excluding this handling concerning trade unions.
Law No. 029-2008 on Trafficking in Persons and Assimilated Practices	Defines trafficking according to the Palermo Protocol, provides regulation and punishments for "classical trafficking" and exploitation of begging, and acknowledges the possibility to obtain residence in Burkina Faso when being a victim of trafficking. Also, defines punishment of falsification of travel documents and/or visas.
Regulation No. 98 of 15 February 1967 on conditions of employment and modalities of declaration of workers movements	Defines the regulations for foreign workers and sets forth legislation concerning irregular stay and deportation.
ZATU (Law) ANV No 28/FP/PRES of 3 August 1988 on the status of refugees in Burkina Faso	Sets forth the regulations related to the granting of and loss of refugee status.
Loi N°042-2008/An Portant Statut Des Refugies Au Burkina Faso	Defines refugee rights in Burkina Faso. (Note: Document is in French)
Règlement intérieur de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés 1997	Prescribes the function of the Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés. (Note: Document is in French)
Law on the Fight Against Trafficking Of Persons and Similar Practices No. 029-2008/AN	Defines human trafficking and exploitation; lays out the penalties for trafficking offences to strengthen the existing penal code (5-10 years imprisonment, 10-20 years imprisonment or life imprisonment for severe cases); defines exploitation for begging and penalties for the offences to strengthen the existing penal code (2-5 years imprisonment and/or fines

Policy	Content
	of up to 2,000,000 francs CFA); defines illicit trafficking in migrants and the penalties for the offences to strengthen the existing penal code (5-10 years imprisonment); provides rules for the procedure and protection of victims and witnesses.
Constitution Burkina Faso 1991 (rev. 2012)	Article 2 prohibits slavery.
Penal Code	Art. 596 prohibits slavery, while Art. 597 and 653 prohibit the trafficking of women and children.
Coordinated Border Management	Seeks to coordinate border management between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso; contributes to "the welfare and safety of cross border populations and migrants". Drafted in cooperation with IOM, funded by the Government of Japan

Source: ICMPD & IOM, 2015

Table 8: Central African Republic's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Article 151, 262 Penal Code	Criminalizes all instances of human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children, and pescribes penalties from 10 years imprisonment to life sentence with heavy work.
1990 Constitution	Provides that ratified treaties are a higher source of authority than local laws. E.g. 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
2007 Refugee Law	Defines the procedure to follow to become a refugee. Additionally, prescribes various rights and duties of refugees hosted in CAR. On principle, refugees in CAR are allowed to join the labour market and to use social services, hospitals, and education facilities just as CAR's nationals.

Sources: ILO, 2017a; OHCHR, 2017; US Department of Labour, 2017; US Committee for Refugees and Migrants, 2008

Table 9: Chad's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Ordinance n°33 of 14 August 1962 on Chadian Nationality	The main framework for Chadian nationality and for the naturalization of foreigners. Citizenship is given only to those children whose parents are both Chadian. Alternatively, if only one parent is from Chad, citizenship is given if the child is in risk of statelessness. Naturalization can occur only if a person has lived in Chad for at least 15 years and has good health and morals. Dual citizenship is not addressed by this law, and Chadian nationality is lost upon acquisition of another.
Penal Code: Articles 5, 279, and 280	These articles of the Penal Code punish crimes related to trafficking in persons. Article 5 punishes forced and bounded labour, while articles 279 and 280 prohibit servitude and prostitution of children.
Labor Code, Law Nr. 038/PR/96 of 11 December 1996 (See articles 1 to 67)	Provides various rights and privileges for foreign and national workers. In principle, the Labour Code prescribes the same rights and duties to both foreigners and nationals.
Constitution of 31 March 1996, revised on 15 July 2005	Article 15 prescribes equal treatment between nationals and foreign nationals. Article 44 describes the liberty of movement for Chadian nationals, and article 46 elaborates on the right of asylum.

Sources: US Department of State, 2017a; ICRC, 2015; IDMC 2013; CARIM, 2009a; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2007

Table 10: Gambia's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Labour Act (2007)	Defines legislation for labour immigration and the migrant workforce.
Payroll Act	Determines the tax rate (and additional yearly tax) for employers of migrant workers; employers are largely forbidden from hiring more than 20% non-Gambians.
Trafficking in Persons Act (2007)	Defines and criminalizes trafficking in persons. Trafficking of a person under 18 is punished by life in prison, while that of an adult is punished by at least 15 years in prison. Includes provisions for the protection and support of VoTs.
Refugee Act (2008)	Creates provisions for managing refugees; established The Gambia Commission for Refugees
Children's Act (2004)	Prohibits and criminalizes the trafficking of children
Tourism Offences Act (2003)	Prohibits the trafficking of children and criminalizes sexual offences made by tourists to Gambia
Immigration Act	Creates Gambia's legal framework for immigration. Describes the various provisions related to entry and residence permits for ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS nationals. Specifically discusses visas, Residence Permit A (for students and retired civil servants), Residence Permit B (for skilled workers), and Residence Permit B Gratis (for foreigners invited by the Gambian government). Also has various previsions for the acquisition of citizenship through naturalization.
Nationality & Citizenship Act	Creates provisions for acquiring Gambian citizenship. Regulates the naturalization of aliens as Gambian citizens as well as the deprivation and renouncement of citizenship by Gambians.

Sources: ICMPD & IOM, 2015.

Table 11: Ghana's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
1992 Constitution of Ghana[1]	Grants citizenship by birth and marriage. Amended in 1996 to grant dual citizenship
Immigration Act (Act 573)[2]	*Residence permit* **Act, Sect. 13:** Applications for a resident permit are to be submitted to the Director of Immigration after entry in Ghana. *Indefinite residence status* **Act, Sect. 15.1:** The main conditions of delivery are the following: residence of 12 months in Ghana before the application; residence of five years in Ghana during the past seven years preceding the aforementioned 12 months period; intention to reside permanently in Ghana; and capacity, "in the opinion of the Minister [of Interior] of making a substantial contribution to the development of Ghana" **Act, Sect. 16.1:** The spouse of a Ghanaian national is entitled to indefinite residence under the following main conditions: residence of 12 months in Ghana before the application; residence of two years in Ghana before the aforementioned 12 months period; and intention to reside permanently in Ghana. It must be highlighted that contrary to the mere possibility for the spouse to obtain a residence permit as a dependent, the granting of indefinite residence status is in this case a right of the individual. **Act, Sect. 18.1:** The indefinite resident status allows to engage in professional activities without the need to obtain a work permit. **Act, Sect. 15.3:** residence abroad for more than 12 consecutive months leads to the loss of the status. **Act, Sect. 18.2:** Children and "other dependents" of individuals who have been granted indefinite residence status or right of abode (see

after) are eligible for a dependency permit.

Right of abode

The legislation foresees a right of abode, which entails the same rights as that of the indefinite residence status.

Act, Sect. 17.1: The status applies to those individuals who have lost Ghanaian nationality due to the acquisition of a foreign nationality (when the legislation of the country of nationality does not allow for multiple citizenship) as well as to persons "of African descent in the Diaspora". Those individuals are understood as those "whose immediate forebears have resided outside the African Continent for at least three generations but whose origin, either by documentary proof or by ethnic characteristics is African" (Act, Sect. 56).

Act. Sect.17.3: Among the conditions for persons of African descent in the diaspora to obtain the right of abode, mention can be made of their financial independence and their capacity to make substantial contribution to the development of Ghana.

Access to the national labour market

Act, Sect. 27: The Immigrant Quota Committee, an inter-ministry institution, considers work permit applications and submits its recommendations to the Minister of Interior who issues the permit.

Act, Sect. 27.3: The delivery of a work permit is based on the following conditions: the considered individual is not a "prohibited immigrant, a visitor, tourist, transit passenger or student"; he/she resides either abroad or legally in Ghana; he/she is qualified for the considered position; and his/her employment "will be to the benefit generally of Ghana".

Irregular migration

Sect. 35 to **Sect. 41** set procedural steps for deportation of foreigners whom are in an irregular situation, pose a threat to public order, etc.

Immigration Regulations (LI 1691), 2001²	*Residence permit*
	Reg. 9.3: The resident permit is first granted for a maximum period of four years.
	Reg. 9.5: The spouse and children of a resident permit holder may also obtain a residence permit. Dependents are not authorised to engage in a professional activity.
	Access to national labour market
	Reg. 16.1: The potential employer is requested to submit an application for a work permit through the Director of Immigration.
	Irregular migration
	Reg. 18: "(1) a person shall not employ a foreigner except in accordance with the provisions Act. (2) any body corporate which employs a foreigner in breach of the provisions of section 24 of the act shall pay to the Immigration Service a penalty in the sum of ten million Cedis and any individual who fails to comply with the provisions of section 24 shall pay a penalty in the sum of five million Cedis. (3) a body corporate which fails to pay the prescribed penalty within seven days commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to pay a fine of 700 penalty units and any individual who fails to pay the prescribed penalty commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to pay a fine of 350 penalty units".
Immigration (Amendment) Act (Act 848), 2012	**Sect. 52A:** "(1) a person shall not engage in migrant smuggling. (2) a person who engages in migrant smuggling commits an offense and is liable on conviction to a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five penalty units and not more than one thousand, two hundred and fifty penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than ten years or to both. (3) for the purposes of this section, migrant smuggling: means the facilitation of the unlawful entry or departure from the country of a person in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. (4) For the purposes of this section, "facilitation" includes: (a) producing, procuring, providing or processing a travel or identity document by fraudulent means; (b) procuring by unlawful means other documentation in support of the

	processing of a travel or identity document; and (c) enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent resident to remain in the country without complying with the requirement for legally remaining in the country by any of the means mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b)".
Citizenship Act, 2000 (591), and the Citizenship Regulations (LI 1690)[1]	"This Act seeks to consolidate the laws on Citizenship in Ghana and clarifies as well who a Ghanaian citizen is. The Act also provides for the major means by which a person may become a citizen of Ghana other than by birth; that is citizenship by naturalization and registration. Under the Act, a Ghanaian may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition. This is in conformity with the constitutional provisions on citizenship. The Citizenship Regulations also provide that a citizen who holds the citizenship of any other country in addition to the citizenship of Ghana shall register as a dual national in Ghana."
Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) & Labour Regulations, 2007 (LI 1833)[1]	"The Labour Act, is the primary labour legislation in Ghana. In so far as foreign immigrants may work in Ghana, the Act equally applies to them. Essentially, the Act provides for the establishment of public employment centres and their functions, the rights and duties of both employers and employees, the conditions of employment, remuneration, termination of employment, employment of persons with disability, employment of women, trades unions and employer organisations, labour inspection, the establishment of a National Labour Commission and its functions. It also provides for the settlement of industrial disputes."
Refugee Act, 1992[1]	"The Refugee Law provides for the status of refugees in Ghana and incorporates the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees into domestic law. The Law addresses the definition of a refugee; matters relating to the presence of refugees in Ghana, either legally or illegally; the granting of refugee status; and the rights and duties of refugees as well as the detention and expulsion of refugees. The Law also establishes the Ghana Refugee Board with the task of managing all activities relating to refugees in the country. The Board is responsible for interviewing asylum seekers, and granting of refugee status."
	The Act includes the definition of the crime of trafficking, procedural steps regarding its prosecution, penalties (a minimum of five years' imprisonment), and provisions dedicated to the protection of victims.

Human Trafficking Act (Act 694), 2005[2]	**Art. 20** to **art. 27** foresee the institution of a Human Trafficking Fund for the implementation of protection measures. **Art. 28** to **art. 33** foresee the institution of a Human Trafficking Management Board, an inter-ministerial institution which is assigned the responsibility of providing policy guidance and assistance with regard to prevention, prosecution and protection. **Art. 34** provides for the possibility to allow foreign victims in an irregular situation to stay in Ghana during investigation, and beyond this period, when it is in their best interest.
Human Trafficking Act, 2005 (Act 694) and Human Trafficking (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act 784)[1]	"The Act prohibits human trafficking and other offences related to human trafficking and provides for the arrest and prosecution of offenders. The Act also establishes a Human Trafficking Management Board to oversee to the implementation of the Act."
The Children's Act, 1988 (Act 560)[1]	"The Children's Act aims to reform and consolidate the laws relating to children; to provide for the rights of the child; maintenance and adoption; to regulate child labour and apprenticeship; for ancillary matters concerning children generally and to provide for related matters. At the institutional level, the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection coordinates the activities of inter-agency groups working to combat human trafficking, especially children. It also monitors and evaluates the effects of migration activities on the welfare of women and children. "
Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 (Act 478)[1]	"The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, establishes the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) as an agency of the Government of Ghana for the encouragement and promotion of investments. The Act has several provisions that deal directly and or indirectly with foreign investors. In direct relation to labour migration, the Act provides for immigrant quotas, the eligibility of foreign participation in certain business segments in Ghana and for personal remittances. The Act covers all investment activities except free zones, minerals and mining, and petroleum. (check on the new Act)"
Free Zone Act, 1995 (Act 504)[1]	"The Free Zone Act provides for the establishment of free zones and for the promotion and development of these zones. Work and resident permits are required for foreign nationals who wish to live in Ghana and

	work in a free zone."
Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703)[1]	"The Minerals and Mining Act seeks to consolidate laws relating to minerals and mining. The holder of a mineral right in Ghana may be granted an immigrant quota with respect to the approved number of expatriate personnel, as well as personnel remittance quotas; for expatriates free from tax on money transfers out of Ghana."
Foreign Exchange Act 2006 (Act 723)[1]	"The Foreign Exchange Act provides for the exchange of foreign currency, for international payment transactions and foreign exchange transfers. It also regulates foreign exchange businesses. The Act gives the Bank of Ghana responsibility for its implementation and issuing of licenses for operating business in foreign exchange and the conditions relating to the conduct of foreign exchange business."
Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2006, (Act 669)[1]	"The Representation Act allows Ghanaian emigrants to participate in the democratic process through voting in the general elections. This law states, among other things, that: 'A person who is a citizen of Ghana but resident outside the republic is entitled to be registered as a voter if the person satisfies the requirements for registration prescribed by the law other than those relating to residence in a polling station'. "
The Revised 1994 Population Policy[1]	"The revised 1994 National Population Policy of Ghana acknowledges the role of migration in development. It draws attention to the need for incentives to facilitate the voluntary return of highly skilled Ghanaian emigrants for brain gain. The Policy urges the creation of migration laws and regulations that do not adversely affect the domestic workforce and development goals. It also outlines the costs and benefits of internal migration. "
National Youth Policy[1]	"The National Youth Policy recognises the youth of Ghana as the true wealth and future of the country. It outlines the challenges facing youth in realizing their full potential. These include relatively high unemployment and adverse effects of urbanization, which is spurred by massive migration from rural areas. Although not specified within the Policy, barriers to youth migration impact the ability of the government to achieve the full potential of the NMP. "
Ghana National Climate Change Policy, 2013[1]	"The National Climate Change Policy (2013) acts as a guide to the management of climate change and migration related processes and

	consequences."
National Ageing Policy, 2010[1]	"The National Ageing Policy (2010) provides for the effective management of ageing issues in relation to migration. "
National Urban Policy Framework, 2012[1]	"The National Urban Policy provides a comprehensive framework to facilitate and promote the sustainable development of Ghanaian urban centres."
ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols[2]	1979 Protocol, 1985 Suppl. Protocol, 1986 Suppl. Protocol, 1990 Suppl. Protocol *Specific actions taken on provisions for ECOWAS nationals* Abolition of visa and entry requirements for stays up to 90 days ECOWAS travel certificate ECOWAS passport

Sources: This table has been adapted from [1] (Ministry of the Interior, 2016); [2] (ICMPD & IOM, 2015)

Table 12: Guinea's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Law L/94/019/CTRN of 13 June 1994 on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Republic of Guinea	Foreigners require an entry visa, which must be delivered upon entry; the visa is valid for 90 days and may be extended once. Longer stays require a different visa or a residence card. Deportation may be the result of irregular entry and stay, especially when the individual is a threat to public order.
Labour Code (2014)	Provides work authorisation requirements for an employer of foreign workers and provides for equal treatment of foreign workers; all foreign workers may join trade unions, however only those who have been in the country for more than three years can assume leadership positions.

Sources: ICMPD & IOM, 2015

Table 13: Côte d'Ivoire'sKey Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Law No. 90-437 of 13 May 1990 Regarding Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire	Distinguishes between foreigners (including those from ECOWAS member states) who need valid passport vs. visa to enter the country. Creates unique one-year stay permit for ECOWAS nationals. Foreigners without the needed documentation are subject to deportation.
1992 Convention on Circulation and Stay of Persons between Côte d'Ivoire and France	Provides family members with permits for family reunification. Creates opportunity to apply for ten-year residence permit after a three-year stay.
Regulations and Circulars of 1993 and 1995 Regarding Conditions of Entry of Foreigners for a Stay of Less than 90 Days in Côte d'Ivoire	Distinguishes between which consular posts receive visas by the competent consular post and which must contact the Ministry of Interior.
Law No. 2002-03 Regarding Identification of Persons and Stay of Foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire	Extends stay permit for foreigners to up to five years, and requires that a stay permit is required to engage in work.

Law No. 2004-303 of 3 May 2004 Modifying the Law No. 2002-03 of 3 January 2002 Regarding Identification of Persons and Stay of Foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire	Distinguishes between foreigners (including those from ECOWAS member states) who need valid passport vs. visa to enter the country. For ECOWAS members, a permit of free circulation may also be used. Foreigners without the needed documentation are subject to imprisonment and, if a threat to public order, also deportation. Facilitation of irregular stay is also a criminal offence.
Ordinance No. 2007-604 of 8 November 2007 Regarding the Suppression of the Stay Permit	ECOWAS nationals no longer need to obtain a residence permit (must only maintain valid identification from the country of origin).
Regulation No. 64-21 of 15 June 2004 modifying Regulation No. 1437 of 19 February 2004 Relating to the Regulation of Recruitment and Visa Fees for Work Contracts of Non-Nationals	Employers must advertise the offer of employment publicly for one month to Ivorian nationals before recruiting foreign labour. The employment contract must be approved by the public employment service (AGEPE). Within three months of being hired, a foreign worker must request a work card.
Labour Code	Foreign workers must be treated equally to nationals under labour legislations. Foreigners are able to join trade unions, but must be living in Côte d'Ivoire for three years before assuming administration or leadership positions. The employer must pay for the worker's cost of travel to and from Côte d'Ivoire.
Penal Code	Forced labour (of children and adults) is a criminal offence that comes with a punishment of one to five years in prison. Exploitation (of children and adults) in prostitution using force, violence, or abuse is punishable by a one- to ten-year prison sentence.
Law No. 2010-272 pertaining to the Prohibition of Child Trafficking and the Worst Forms of Child Labour	Remains the main law used to prosecute the trafficking of children and does not address adult trafficking. Convicted traffickers face a penalty of up to twenty years in prison and a fine between $800 and $79,982. Local and state communities are responsible for the protection of VoTs.
Law No. 2016-111 on the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons	Aims to eliminate both adult and child trafficking in Côte d'Ivoire. Punishment for trafficking and forced labour comes with a prison sentence of five to ten years and a fine between $7,998 and $15,996.

Sources: US Department of State, 2017a; ICMPD & IOM, 2015

Table 14: Mali's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Investment Code	Grants a series of benefits and incentives to encourage emigrants and foreigners to invest in Mali. This includes tax exemption of companies and corporations, fiscal advantages for implementing projects, and exemption of taxes for the importation of material used for investment projects.
Law No, 62-18 of 1962 & Law No. 95-75 of 1995	Define the procedure for the naturalization of foreigners and prescribe the right to hold dual citizenship to Malians residing abroad.
Decree No. 00-046/P-RM of 2000	This decree created the DGME, which was then elevated to become a full ministry. Moreover, it elaborates the organisational and operational structure of the DGME, by dividing it in different agencies with various duties. This includes an office for migration statistics and forecasting, a department for consular affairs to coordinate diplomatic and consular Malian missions, and a department for the promotion and reintegration of Malians abroad which in charge of designing return programmes.
Law No. 04-058 relating to the Conditions of Entry, Stay and Establishment of Foreigners in the Republic of Mali, 2004 **Decree No. 05-322/P-RM, 2005**	Defines the conditions of entry, stay, and establishment of foreigners in Mali. Moreover, it regulates some of the matters related to irregular migration. Entry in Mali happens after the delivery of an entry visa, which includes purpose and conditions of the stay. The maximum duration of the visa is 90 days, and it can be renewed once. To obtain the visa, a guarantee of return is necessary, which may take the form of a deposit, a guarantee from a bank, or a return ticket to the country of origin. Mali distinguishes foreigners into immigrants and non-immigrants. The first are those people that enter Mali to establish themselves in the country permanently, while the latter are visitors, tourists, students, or temporary workers. The difference between immigrants and non-immigrants also reflects the difference between residence (or establishment) and stay.

	Stay in Mali is possible only through a temporary stay authorization, which lasts a maximum of one year and is renewable. This authorization will be made after the entry of the foreigner in Mali. The visa for temporary stay can also be delivered to other family members of the applicant.
	To reside in Mali, foreigners must request a resident card within 15 days of entry. Once obtained, the resident card will last for five years, with possibility for renewal. The conditions necessary to apply for the resident card are the same as those to apply for a temporary stay authorization. In addition, to obtain a resident card, a work authorization is required, though this authorization is never requested in practice.
	Illegal entry and irregular stay in Mali are punishable by deportation. Any violation to immigration legislations can be punished by the withdrawal of the visa. Expulsion and deportation are also prescribed, in case the immigrant is a considered a threat to public order. Additionally, people involved with facilitating irregular migration can be punished with 3 months to 3 years imprisonment.
Labour Code, 1992 **Regulation No. 1566/MEFPT-SG, 7 October 1996**	Regulates all instances related to labour immigration. In principle, benefits and obligations of the Labour Code are the same for foreigners (regardless of their status) and national workers. Foreign workers enjoy the freedom of association and the possibility of joining trade unions. They can also cover administrative and executive roles within them. The Labour Code also prescribes that the costs related to the transportation to Mali, as well as the cost of return to the place of origin, should be covered by the employer of the foreign worker.
Law n°98-040 of 20 July 1998 on refugee status.	This is the main regulatory framework for asylum seekers and refugees. Accordingly, they must present an application to the Ministry of Territorial Administration. This application can also be presented by the UNHCR on behalf of the petitioner.
Law No. 62-18 of 1962 (FR), amended by Law No. 95-70 of 1995 (FR)	Defines the right of double citizenships for Malian emigrants. Moreover, illustrates the procedures for non-Malians to be naturalized.
The Malian Custom Regulations on the Conditions to Import and Export Goods into Malian Territory (FR)	Prescribes a series of incentives for Malian emigrants to return permanently in Mali, including tax exemption on the importation of household goods and on the importation of selected goods for Malian

Policy	Content
Law No. 2012-023	Criminalizes trafficking and similar practices. Prescribes between 10 and 20 years of imprisonment for trafficking offenders, which are considered commensurate with those of other serious crimes. Overall, this law is considered comprehensive and able to cover all forms of trafficking in persons.

Sources: US Department of State, 2017a; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; ICMPD, 2010; CARIM, 2010

Table 15: Mauritania's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
2010 Law of 10 February 2010[1]	*Entry, Exit and Stay* Related to efforts against the smuggling of migrants
Decree n° 65-110 of 8 July 1965 amending Decree n° 64-169 of 15 December 1964 on the immigration regime in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania[2]	"This text repeals and replaces Article 3 of the Decree of 15 December 1964 on the general regime of immigration. It establishes the conditions for the entry of non-immigrant foreigners into Mauritania and the nationals of States which have signed with the country the settlement agreements, as well as the rules applicable to traffic and other categories Foreign categories" (Translation by authors)
2005 Decree of 3 March 2005[1]	Mauritania's implementation of international conventions concerning refugees
2003 Law 25-2003 of 17 July 2003[2]	"The Act deals with the suppression of trafficking in persons. It defines the concept of trafficking in persons and punishes the acts of interference, transaction of movement and exploitation which contribute to it. It lays down the penalties applicable in this respect" (Translation by authors)
1991 Mauritania Constitution of 12 July 1991[2]	"This text defines the fundamental freedoms, the mode of evolution and the exercise of power, the separation of powers. It establishes the functioning and powers of the Executive, parliament and judicial authority,

	etc. In particular, it prescribes that the main subjects, in particular the rules relating to work, nationality and the regime of foreigners, are legislative competence. Moreover, the Constitution provides that treaties have an authority superior to that of laws" (Translation by authors)
1965 Law 65-046[2]	"This law defines the penalties incurred by irregular migrants, their potential employers and those who assist them, in order to violate the applicable legislation. It provides for a repressive mechanism, modulated according to the gravity of the acts attributed to irregular migrants. It includes, inter alia, illegal work and residence, false information and documents" (Translation by authors)
Article 10, 1991 Constitution[1]	Grants the right to leave the country to Mauritanian citizens.
2009 Decree n° 224 repealing and replacing Decree No. 92 of 19 April 1974[1]	*Access to Employment and Studies* Established conditions for employment of foreign labour and work permits for foreign workers
Decree of 16 April 2008 fixing employment conditions of foreign national manpower and establishing a working license for foreign workers (unpublished version)[2]	"This text repeals the Decree of 19 April 1974 on the use of foreign labor and the work permit. It establishes the conditions of employment and establishes the work permit for the employment of foreign employees. It provides for three different types of permits, which may be issued to migrant workers. It also deals with the conditions for the renewal and withdrawal of a work permit or the authorization to occupy a foreign worker and the conditions for appeal against decisions of refusal or withdrawal" (Translation by authors)
Labour Code 2004[2]	"This law establishes the rules applicable in labour relations, including the procedure for drawing up contracts and their termination, provisions applicable to collective agreements, relations between employer and employee, work of women and children, the penalties applicable in the field of labour law. It requires foreigners to obtain a work permit and a legal entry. It recognizes that migrant workers have the benefit of trade union rights and, in particular, access to posts of representation" (Translation by authors)
1961 Law n°1961-112 of June 20, 1961 enabling the Mauritanian Nationality Code, modified in 1962 and 1976[1]	*Nationality* *Jus sanguinis* by descent of the father or mother. Those born with

Policy	Content
	Mauritanian mothers have the right to repudiate their Mauritanian citizenship when they come of age, but can claim it through their mother if born abroad when they come of age. *Jus soli*, by declaration at age (birth + five years of residency); and double right of soil. Marriage to a male Mauritanian grants automatic acquisition of nationality, though none for marriage with a female Mauritanian. Naturalization without past residency prerequisite is possible. Dual nationality is prohibited.
The Contonou Agreement (2000) [1]	*Irregular Migration* Concerns the agreed readmission of EU and EU nationals illegally present in each other's territories, including that of third-country nationals if necessary.

Sources: 1 - MPC, 2013b; 2 – CARIM, 2009

Table 16: Niger's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
ECOWAS, 1979	Free circulation of ECOWAS citizens in Niger without a visa requirement and free circulation of Nigerien in ECOWAS countries. The stay in an ECOWAS country without a visa is prescribed to 90 days max.
Ordinance No. 81-40 on Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Niger, 1981 **Decree No. 87-076 on Entry and Stay Conditions of Foreigners in Niger, 1987**	These acts define the Nigerien immigration legislation framework. Specifically, they prescribe the possible entries and stays of foreigners in Niger and include some specific regulations for foreign workers. Regarding entry in Niger, they prescribe that it should only happen through the delivery of a visa and stay permits which are usually delivered in advance, but can also be delivered upon arrival. Furthermore, entry in Niger is subject to a guarantee of return, meaning that foreigners need to hold a ticket to return to the country of origin to obtain a visa. However, as guarantee of return, a deposit or a bank guarantee are also accepted. Entry visas do not exceed three months, and if a foreigner wants to reside longer in Niger, they must apply for a stay permit at the Ministry of

	Interior. Indeed, irregular stay in Niger is considered a criminal offence. To obtain a stay permit, a medical certificate and a proof of regular entry are required. Additionally, students need to present a guarantee of sufficient financial means, while workers must provide a work authorisation. Once the permit is delivered, it has a validity of 2 years, after which it can be renewed under the same circumstances of its first delivery. Importantly, if the holder of the permit leaves Niger for more than 6 consecutive months, its permit might be revoked. Foreign workers can enter in Niger only with a work authorization that must be delivered before their entry in the Country. ECOWAS citizens are excluded from this process and have preferential treatment regarding labour opportunities in Niger, for which the principle of reciprocity applies. Workers without a work authorization must be deported, and can be sanctioned with fines of 4,000 to 50,000 CFA francs (7.5 to 95 USD). Moreover, they can be imprisoned up to 15 days. Similarly, smugglers that facilitate irregular migration are subject to fines and up to 2 years of imprisonment. Lastly, any foreigner that constitutes a threat to public order must be deported.
Labour Code, 2012	The labour code is the main regulating framework for foreign workers. By principle, it declares equal treatment of national and foreign workers. However, only nationals or foreigners that resided in Niger for at least three years can work in administrative and executive functions. Moreover, the labour code specifies that the admission of foreign workers should be based upon the absence of "national competences" in that field, and that the work permit should be delivered within 30 days. Lastly, it prescribes that an employer that employs a foreign worker is obliged to organize training for national staff to replace foreign workers.
Ordinance No. 2010-86 on Combatting Trafficking in Persons	This is the main regulating framework to fight human trafficking, and it states that protection and assistance to human trafficking victims will equally apply to national and foreigners. It foresees between 5 and 10 years imprisonment for trafficking offences. Moreover, in aggravating circumstances, it foresees between 10 to 30 years imprisonment, while in case of death of the victim, it prescribes life imprisonment. This ordinance also foresees the establishment of a National Commission to fight against trafficking in persons with the responsibility of collecting and sharing information, training public services staff members, and preventing trafficking activities.

	This ordinance prescribes that the state should give protection and assistance to the victims of human trafficking with medical, psychological, and legal support. This assistance will also be given to victims in an irregular situation who will obtain a temporary stay permit, which under some circumstances might become permanent. Instead, in case of repatriation, the security of the victim must be taken in consideration.
Convention with Burkina Faso 1964 **Convention with Mali, 1964**	"Nationals from the considered countries can enter and reside on the territory of the other state party without the need for a visa or a stay/resident permit. The only requirement is the possession of an identity document from the country of nationality. Not only are these provisions more favourable than those foreseen by the ECOWAS texts but they are also easier to implement as they do not impose on the states obligations to be carried out but rather a duty to abstain." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 253)
Convention with Tunisia, 1966	"Its content is similar to the agreements with Burkina Faso and Mali and foresees the entry, stay and residence without the requirement of a visa or a permit. It also specifically mentions the principle of access to the labour market on an equal footing with nationals." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015. p. 253)
Convention with Morocco, 1967	"This foresees the removal of visa requirements for nationals of the state parties." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 253)
Convention with Algeria, 1981	"Foresees the removal of visa requirement for nationals of the state parties. While the agreement with Morocco has been in force since the 1990s, visas are still required for nationals of Algeria to enter Niger and vice-versa. The agreement includes a provision on readmission of migrants in an irregular situation (art. 5) which remains applicable today." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 253)
Conventions with Libya, 1971	"The 1971 convention foresees a specific legal regime for Nigerien seasonal workers in Libya. It sets up cooperation mechanisms between the competent authorities of the two states for the recruitment of workers, foresees the delivery of a three-month visa, and a stay permit valid for one year, which is renewable up to a limit of two years." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 253)

Conventions with France: **Social security, 1973** **Agreement on circulation and stay of persons, 1994**	"The 1994 convention includes the following derogation to the common French immigration legislation: Nigerien nationals have the possibility to obtain a 10 year residence permit after three years of stay in the country (instead of five years under French administrative law)." (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 253)
Agreement with Italy, 2010	This agreement foresees cooperation activities between Niger and Italy in the area of trafficking in persons and irregular migration, focusing particularly on security issues.

Sources: ICMPD & IOM, 2015; CARIM, 2011

Table 17: Nigeria's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Immigration Act, 2015 (Act No. 8 of 2015)	"This Act [which repeals Immigration Act, Cap. I1, LFN, 2004, and the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Cap. P1, LFN, 2004]. sets out the provisions for matters relating to immigration, passports, visas, resident permits, work permits, and the prohibition of smuggling of migrants into and from Nigeria, and for the protection of and provision of remedies and assistance to, objects of smuggling of migrants offences in Nigeria. This Act also gives effect in the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the provisions of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime"
National Commission for Refugees, Etc. Act (No. 52 of 1989)	Prohibits of expulsion of refugees. Establishes the functions of the National Commission for Refugees, the Federal Commissioner for Refugees, and the Refugee Appeal Board. Determines procedures for seeking refugee status, for treatment of members of the family of a refugee, and for rights and duties of refugees.
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition), Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015 (Act No. 4 of 2015).	Establishes the national agency for the prohibition of trafficking in persons, prohibits acts of trafficking in persons, offences and penalties, as well as determines jurisdiction, financial provisions, search, arrest and

	seizure, attachment and forfeiture of assets, treatment of trafficked persons, victims of trafficking trust, mutual legal assistance, exchange of information and extradition.
National Policy On Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) In Nigeria – 2012	Outlines rights and obligations of IDPs, government, humanitarian agencies, and host communities. Develops policy implementation framework, funding, monitoring and evaluation of these policies.
Labour Act (Cap L1 LFN 2004)	Prohibits child labour and forced labour
Nigeria National Employment Policy NGA-1998-M-90973)	4.4 Ensuring Supportive Population, Migration and Regional Development Policies – special focus on rural-urban migration and its development impact. 4.7.4 Development of Human Resources for Occupational Health – in response to brain drain of health workers. 4.8 Strengthening of Labour Market Information Systems and Monitoring – encourages federal office of statistics to "carry out specific ad hoc household-based surveys on key employment and labour issues of national concern such as child labour, women labour migration, etc."
Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education Act, 2004	"Every Government in Nigeria shall provide free, compulsory and Universal basic education for every child of primary and junior secondary, school age", including migrant children whilst exuding Sections 2 and 3 to a child resident outside Nigeria.
Nigeria: Act No. 26 of 2003, Child's Rights Act, 2003	Prohibits child labour, child marriage, forced begging, child soldier recruitment, and child trafficking.
Nigeria Vision 20: 2020 – Drafted in 2009	Development strategy for Nigeria, which is relevant to migration for trying to slow rural-urban migration by developing rural areas and control emigration of highly skilled nationals

Sources: Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2003, 2009, 2012; IOM, 2014a, MTM i-Map, 2011; NATLEX, 2014a,b,c,d; 2015a,b; OHCHR, 2017a

Table 18: Senegal's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
Law No. 61-10 of 7 March 1961 on Senegalese nationality (amended in 1992)[1]	*Nationality* "*Jus sanguinis* by father's descent. Discrimination: children born to a Senegalese mother and a foreign father are not nationals of origin, they can opt for the Senegalese nationality when they come of age. *Jus soli*: double, without any discrimination - nationality of origin for a child born in Senegal to a parent also born there. A foreign woman getting married to a Senegalese man obtains his nationality unless she renounces that right. The delay of access to naturalization is reduced for a foreign man married to a Senegalese woman. A naturalized Senegalese citizen must renounce the nationality of origin. There is then the principle of exclusive allegiance, but dual citizenship is possible when there is access to another nationality."
Law No. 71-10 of 25 January 1971 on the conditions of entry, stay and establishment of foreign nationals[2]	*Stay* "A distinction is made between two legal statuses: non-immigrant and immigrant **Law, Art. 3:** Non-immigrant status applies notably to foreigners who do not seek to engage in a remunerative activity, as well as those who intend to work temporarily in specific fields, such as journalism, research, and art. **Law, Art. 2; Art. 3:** Non-immigrants are required to request the delivery of a stay authorisation before entry on the national territory. This authorisation is valid for a period of four months." **Law, Art. 4:** "Immigrant status applies to foreigners who "have the intention to establish their residence in Senegal, engage in a lucrative activity in a permanent manner, or exercise a profession"." **Law, Art. 4:** "Immigrant stay in Senegal is subject to the delivery of a residence authorisation, which is to be delivered before entry on the national territory."

	Law, Art. 4: "Foreigners holding a stay authorisation who wish to change their legal status can request the delivery of a residence authorisation on the territory."
	Family migration
	Law, Art. 4: "A specific provision regarding family migration that applies to the spouse, ascendants, dependent minor children and adult unmarried children of the migrant. The law does not recognise a right of the individual to be accompanied by his/her family members but simply foresees this possibility."
Decree No. 71-860 of 28 July 197on the conditions of entry, stay and establishment of foreign nationals[2]	*Entry* Decree, Art. 1; Art. 39 to Art. 74: "Admission on the national territory is subject to the delivery of a visa, and the production of a guarantee of return, which may take the form of a return ticket to the country of origin, a deposit or a bank guarantee." *Stay* Decree, Art. 13: Delivery of the residence authorisation leads to the issuance of a foreigner identity card, which is to be requested within fifteen days of entry."
Labour Code, 1997[2]	*Access to the national labour market* Art. L 33; L 34: "Work contracts that include "the establishment of the worker outside of his/her place of habitual residence" are to be approved by the General Direction of Labour and Social Security within the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, Social Dialogue and Professional Organisations." Art. L 224 "foresees the possibility to adopt secondary legislation to "forbid or limit the employment of foreigners for specific occupations or professional qualification levels" in order to ensure full-employment of the national workforce. Such secondary legislation has yet to be adopted." *Rights within employment* Art. L 1 "provides for equal treatment between foreigners and nationals.

	Foreigners, regardless of their legal status, bene t, as a principle, from all obligations and rights from the labour legislation."
	Art. L 9 "includes an exception to the principle of equal treatment. While all foreigners can join a trade union, only those who have stayed in Senegal for a minimum of five years can fulfill administrative and executive functions, provided that their country of nationality grants similar rights to Senegalese nationals."
	Art. L 156 "states that the cost of transportation from the country of origin to the place of employment must be undertaken by the employer. This principle does not only apply to the migrant worker but also to the spouse and minor children."
	Art. 106: "Housing must be provided by the employer."
Law No. 71-10 of 25 January 1971 on the conditions of entry, stay and establishment of foreign nationals[2]	*Irregular migration* **Law, Art. 10; Decree, Art. 34** to **Art. 38** "foresee expulsion of those who have committed a criminal offence or pose a threat to public order." **Law, Art. 11; Art. 12: "**irregular stay and irregular employment constitute a criminal offence, which expose the individual to a ne and imprisonment for one month to two years."
Decree No. 71-860 of 28 July 1971 on the conditions of entry, stay and establishment of foreign nationals[2]	**Decree, Art. 32; Art. 33** "foresee deportation of foreigners who are not in possession of the documents required to enter the country."
Law No. 2005-06 of 10 May 2005 on Trafficking in Persons and Assimilated Practices and Victims' Protection[2] **Law No. 2005-06 on Trafficking in Persons and Assimilated Practices and Victims' Protection[2]**	**Art. 4; Art. 5:** "Smugglers, and those who falsify visas, travel documents and stay permits are subject to fines comprised of between 1,000,000 and 5,000,000 CFA francs (USD 1,895 to 9,480), as well as penalties of five to ten years' imprisonment." *Migrants at risk* **Art. 1:** "Penalties foreseen range from five to ten years' imprisonment and 5 to 20 million CFA francs (USD 9,480 to 37,920). In case of aggravating circumstances, such as the use of torture or barbaric acts, penalties rise to 10 to 30 years in prison."

	Art. 15: "Foreign victims have a right to stay in the country during penal proceedings. They can also apply for temporary or permanent stay in Senegal."
Decrees, 2008[3]	*Emigration and Diaspora* "Creating a fund for the investment of Senegalese expatriates" Establishing the National Commission for the Management of Legal Labour Migration
Bilateral Agreements[1,2,3]	**EU** France (1974; 1980; 1995; 2000; 2000; 2001; 2006; 2007), Germany (1977), Spain (2006; 2006), Italy (2007) **Neighbouring States** Egypt (1998), Mauritania (1972; 2007), Morocco (1964) **Other** Canada (1983), Djibouti (2001), Gabon (1979; 1982), Saudi Arabia (1988), Kuwait (1992)

This table has been adapted from: (Bartolomeo et al., 2010)[1]; (ICMPD & IOM, 2015)[2];and (CARIM, 2009b)[3]

Table 19: Sierra Leone's Key Migration Policy Responses

Policy	Content
The National Registration Act, 2008	"Being an Act to provide for the compulsory registration of citizens and non citizens resident in Sierra Leone and the issue of Identity Cards to such persons and for the use of public bodies; and to provide for other related matters."
The Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration and Expulsion) Act, 1965	"Determines registration of non-citizens, disembarkation and examination, conditions of entry, prohibited immigrants, expulsion and deportation, Seamen regulation, jurisdiction over it."
General Law (Business Start-up) Amendment Act, 2007	"Art. 34 institutes a Work Permit Committee, consisting of representatives from the Ministries of Labour and Social Security, Internal Affairs, and Finance and Economic Development"
The Refugees Protection Act, 2007 (No. 6 of 2007)	"Provides for the recognition and protection of refugees. Gives effect to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on the 28th July, 1951, to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of the 31st January, 1967 and to the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, done at Addis Ababa on the 10th September, 1969."
The Anti-Human Trafficking Act, 2005 [No. 7 of 2005]	"Being an Act to suppress the trafficking in persons and to provide for other related matter. Measures to combat human trafficking, financial provisions and prosecution of trafficking offences."
Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, 1973	Describes citizenship by birth in and outside of Sierra Leone. Does not provide for dual citizenship. Also describes the deprivation of citizenship of persons acquiring foreign citizenship/residence
The Sierra Leone Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2006	"Being an Act to amend the Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, 1973 so as to grant the right of dual citizenship and citizenship by birth directly through the mother."

Resettlement Strategy 2001		"To support the resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced, refugees and ex-combatants with their dependants back into their communities, strengthen their livelihood security and promote reconciliation."

Sources: ILO, 2017b; ICMPD & IOM, 2015; European Commission, 2007

Annex E: Relevant International Conventions

Short Name	Official Name	Summary
1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029)	Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour	"Undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period." (ILO, 1930)
1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097)	Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949)	"Constitutes a comprehensive international treaty regarding the protection of human rights of migrants and members of their families." (GMG, n.d.)
1951 UN Refugee Convention	1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees	"Defines the term 'refugee' and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them." (UNHCR, n.d., b)
1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO C105)	Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour	Aims "to suppress... any form of forced or compulsory labour" and "to take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour." (ILO, 1957)
1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations	"Consists of 79 articles, most of which provide for the operation of consulates; outline the functions of consular agents; and address the privileges and immunities granted to consular officials when posted to a foreign country." (Gómez Robledo, n.d.)
1967 UN Refugee Protocol	1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees	"The 1951 Convention, as a post-Second World War instrument, was originally limited in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and thus gave the Convention universal coverage." (UNHCR, 2010a; UNHCR, 2010b)
1975 Migrant Workers Convention (ILO C143)	Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of	"Undertakes to respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers." (ILO, 1975)

	Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers	
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child	Convention on the Rights of the Child	Defines the term "child" and defines the rights of children including non-discrimination and freedom of expression. (UNICEF, n.d.)
1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families	"Does not create new rights for migrants but aims at guaranteeing equality of treatment, and the same working conditions for migrants and nationals." (UNESCO, 2005)
2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime	Defines "trafficking in persons" and "contains provisions on a range of issues, including criminalisation, assistance to and protection for victims, the status of victims in the receiving states, repatriation of victims, preventive measures, actions to discourage the demand, exchange of information and training, and measures to strengthen the effectiveness of border controls. The protocol stipulates that states parties must adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children that leads to trafficking." (European Commission, 2003)
2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol	Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	"Provides an internationally recognized definition of human smuggling which focuses on procuring the illegal entry of a foreign national into the territory of a State Party in exchange for financial or other material benefit. The Protocol requires State Parties to establish criminal liability for human smuggling and to adopt other cooperative and preventative measures to deter it." (UNHCR, 2008)
2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189)	Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers	"Provide the basis for ensuring that under the law, domestic workers have the respect and rights that workers in the formal economy have long fought for and acquired." (ILO, 2011)

Annex F: Actions and Programmes of IOM and UNHCR in West and Central Africa

Country	IOM Actions & Programmes[1]	UNHCR Actions & Programmes[2]
Burkina Faso	Actions: • Migration and Development • Regulating Migration • Facilitating migration (IOM, 2009b) Programmes: • Coordinated Border Management in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (2016) • Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c)	• Fair protection processes and documentation (registration and profiling, status determination, individual documentation, civil status documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime, SGBV prevention and response, child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health, reproductive health and HIV/Aids response, nutrition, food security, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and infrastructure, energy, basic and domestic hygiene items, services for persons with specific needs, education) • Community empowerment and self reliance (co-existence with local communities, natural resources and shared environment, self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, resettlement, greater reduction of statelessness) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (coordination and partnerships, camp management and coordination, donor relations) • Logistics and operations support (supply chain and logistics, operations management, coordination and support) (UNHCR, 2017af)
Central African Republic	Actions & Programmes: • SIRIRI – Support for the Stabilization and Immediate Recovery of Communities at Risk in CAR (2015-2017) • Reducing Community Violence in CAR (2016-	• Favourable protection environment (administrative institutions and practice, access to territory) • Fair protection processes and documentation (registration and profiling, status determination, individual documentation, civil status

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2017)
- Strengthening Intercommunity Dialogue and Nonviolent Conflict Resolution in Ouham Pende, CAR (2017)
- Strengthening National Response and Awareness Capacities to Combat Human Trafficking and Other Forms of Exploitation in CAR (2017)
- Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees and Host Communities (2017)
- Humanitarian Emergency Assistance for Displaced Populations in the Central African Republic (2016)
- Reintegration Support for Chadian Returnees from the Central African Republic (2016) (IOM, 2017k, 2015c)

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documentation)
- Security from violence and exploitation (protection from effects of armed conflict, SGBV prevention and response, child protection)
- Basic needs and essential services (health, reproductive health and HIV/Aids response, nutrition, food security, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and infrastructure, basic and domestic hygiene items, services for persons with specific needs, education)
- Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization, co-existence with local communities, self-reliance and livelihoods)
- Durable solutions (voluntary return, reintegration, integration, resettlement)
- Leadership, coordination and partnerships (coordination and partnerships, camp management and coordination)
- Logistics and operations support (operations management, coordination and support) (UNHCR, 2017ag)

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Chad

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Actions:
- Movement, emergency and post-crisis migration management
- Migration health
- Migration and development
- Regulating migration
- Migration policy and research (IOM, 2010c)

Programmes:

- Reintegration Support for Chadian Returnees from the Central African Republic (2016)
- Capacity-building Project on Integrated Border Management in Chad (2016)
- Social Stabilization through Youth Empowerment in Chad (2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c)

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- Favourable protection environment (law and policy, legal remedies and legal assistance)
- Fair protection processes and documentation (registration and profiling, status determination, individual documentation, civil status documentation)
- Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime, SGBV prevention and response, child protection)
- Basic needs and essential services (health, reproductive health and HIV/Aids response, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and infrastructure, energy, basic and domestic and hygiene items, services for persons with specific needs, education)
- Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization, co-existence with local communities, natural resources and shared environment, self-reliance and livelihoods)

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		• Durable solutions (solutions strategy, voluntary return, resettlement, greater reduction of statelessness) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (coordination and partnerships, camp management and coordination, donor relations) • Logistics and operations support (supply chain and logistics; operations management, coordination and support) • Headquarters and regional support (global strategic direction and management) (UNHCR, 2017d)
Gambia	IOM does not report actions & programmes for Gambia.	• Status determination • Right to freedom of movement • Access to documentation • Basic social services (UNHCR, 2016h)

Ghana	Actions:
	• Facilitating migration
	    o Labour migration
	    o Migrant support
	    o Pre-departure cultural orientation
	• Forced migration
	    o Emergency response and post-conflict
	    o Resettlement
	    o Voluntary repatriation
	• Migration health
	• Migration and development
	• Regulating migration
	    o Counter-trafficking
	    o Assisted voluntary return and reintegration (IOM, 2015e)
	
	Programmes:
	
	• Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017)
	• Engaging the Diaspora for Institutional Development in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana,
		While UNHCR does not report on its actions and programmes in detail on the Ghana operations webpage, the country office webpage reports that the agency is involved in:
		
		• Capacity building
		• Durable solutions
		• Education
		• Protection (UNHCR, 2017aa, 2017an)

	Morocco, Sierra Leone and Somalia (2017) • Assistance for Child Victims of Trafficking in Ghana (2016, 2017) • Strengthening National and Regional Mechanisms in Benin, Ghana and Togo (2017) (IOM, 2016d) • Integrated Migration Management Approach in Ghana (2016, 2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c)	
Guinea	Actions: • Movement, emergency and post-crisis migration management • Migration health • Migration and development • Regulating migration • Facilitating migration • Migration policy and research (IOM, 2010d) Programmes: • Support for Ebola Response in Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Neighbouring Countries (2016) • Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017) • Countering Epidemic-prone Diseases along Borders and Migration Routes in Guinea (2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c)	▪ Durable solutions (voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement) ▪ Self-reliance programmes ▪ Prevention and reduction of statelessness (UNHCR, 2017aa)

Côte d'Ivoire	Actions: • Emergencies and post-crisis operations • Migration health • Immigration and border management • Migrant assistance • Labour migration (IOM, 2014d) Programmes: None described in 2016 or 2017 budgets.	• Education • Health (reproductive health and HIV/Aids response) • Reintegration • Self-reliance and livelihoods • SGBV prevention and response • Voluntary return • Child protection • Civil status documentation • Greater reduction of statelessness • Public attitudes towards persons of concern (UNHCR, 2017ah)
Mali	Actions: • Humanitarian Response: tracking and monitoring of IDPs, protection assistance, emergency assistance • Early recovery and community stabilization • Migration management • Border management • Migration and climate change (IOM, 2017r) Programmes: • Contributing to the Achievement of Durable Solutions in Mali (2016, 2017) • Support for Ebola Response in Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Neighbouring Countries (2016) • Coordinated Border Management in Burkina Faso,	• Fair protection processes & documentation (registration and profiling, status determination, individual documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from the effects of armed conflict, SGBV prevention and response) • Basic needs and essential services (health, services for persons with specific needs, education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization, co-existence with local communities, self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, integration, resettlement) • Logistics and operations support (operations management, coordination and support) (UNHCR,

	Mali, Mauritania and Niger (2016) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c)	2017g)
Mauritania	Actions: • Immigration and Border Management in Mauritania - IBM Mauritania • Immigration and Border Management in the Sahel - IBM in the Sahel • Community Stabilization and Conflict Prevention • Countering Trafficking in Persons • Diaspora Engagement (IOM, 2016a) Programmes: • Strengthening border management in Mauritania – The involvement of the Gendarmerie (Dec. 2013 – July 2016) • Countering irregular migration, organized crime and terrorism in Mauritania (May 2016 – May 2017) • Enhancing security in the Sahel (March 2015 – September 2016) • Immigration and border management between Mauritania and Mali (March 2015 – March 2017) • Community stabilization and conflict prevention: humanitarian assistance to host communities and refugees (August 2015 – August 2016) • Countering in trafficking persons (November 2015 – February 2017) • Mapping the Mauritania Diaspora (November 2015 – February 2017) • Coordinated Border Management in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (2016) • Strengthening Border Management in Mauritania (2016, 2017) • Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017) • Counter-trafficking Activities in Mauritania (2017)	• Basic assistance and protection • Self-reliance • Education • Livelihood support • Income-generating activities • Preventing SGBV • Peaceful coexistence with the host community (UNHCR, 2017aj)

157

	(IOM, 2016a, 2016d, 2015c)	
Niger	Actions: • Data collection and analysis • Border management • Assistance and protection • Assisted voluntary return • Reintegration (IOM, 2016e) Programmes: • Humanitarian Assistance for Populations Fleeing from Nigeria to the Diffa Region in Niger (2016) • Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (2016, 2017) • Reintegration and Psychosocial Support for Returnees to Niger (2016) • Counter-trafficking Activities in Niger (2016) • Coordinated Border Management in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (2016) • Enhancing Migration Management in Nigeria (2016, 2017) • Supporting Border Management in Niger (2017) • IOM transit centres • Orientation office (IOM, 2016d, 2016e, 2015c)	• Favourable protection environment (law and policy, administrative institutions, legal remedies and legal assistance, access to territory) • Fair protection processes and documentation (reception conditions, registration and profiling, status determination, individual documentation, civil status documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (SGBV prevention and response, child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and infrastructure, energy, basic and domestic hygiene items, education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization, co-existence with local communities, self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, integration, resettlement) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (coordination and partnerships, camp management and coordination, donor relations) • Logistics and operations support (supply chain and logistics; operations management, coordination and support)(UNHCR, 2017ak)
Nigeria	Actions: • Migration management capacity building • Advisory services to the Government of Nigeria • Migration health • Assisted voluntary return • Counter-trafficking (IOM, 2015f) Programmes: • Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria • Support to the Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM West Africa) • Strengthening Humanitarian Response Capacity in the North East through Displacement Tracking,	• Durable solutions • Statelessness • Shelter and infrastructure • Services for survivors of SGBV • Repatriation, resettlement • Livelihood assistance • Access to justice • Protection (UNHCR, 2017al)

	• Monitoring and Information Dissemination • Emergency Mental Health and Psychosocial Support for Affected Populations in North East of Nigeria • Expanding Emergency Psychosocial Support for Conflict-induced Displaced Population in Maiduguri camps • Psychosocial Support and Community Mobilization for Conflict-induced Populations in North East of Nigeria • Strengthening the Delivery of Reintegration Assistance to Returning Nigerian Migrants from Europe under the Auspices of AVRR Programmes • Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) from Switzerland to Nigeria, Phase 10 (2015) • Migration Health Assessment Centre • Humanitarian Assistance for Populations Fleeing from Nigeria to the Diffa Region in Niger (2016) • Reintegration Assistance for Migrants Returning to Nigeria (2016) • Enhancing Migration Management in Nigeria (2016, 2017) • Psychosocial Support for Populations Affected by Conflict in Nigeria (2017) • Awareness-raising to Combat Irregular Migration from Nigeria (2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015c, 2015f)	
Senegal	Actions: • Movement, emergency and post-crisis migration management • Migration and development • Regulating migration • Facilitating migration • Migration policy and research • Migration, climate change and environmental degradation (IOM, 2015b) Programmes:	• Basic needs and essential services (education, health) • Durable solutions (naturalisation of mixed couples) • Protection (UNHCR, 2017am, 2017h, 2017ao)

	• Joint Migration and Development Initiative (2016) • Training Centre for Entrepreneurship in Senegal (2016) • Enhancing the Sustainability of Reintegration Schemes for Migrants Returning to Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal (2016) • Supporting Border Management in Senegal (2016, 2017) • Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017) (IOM, 2016d, 2015b, 2015c)	
Sierra Leone	Actions: • Migration and development • Facilitating migration • Regulating migration • Forced migration (IOM, 2015g) Programmes: • Global Health Security Partnership Engagement: Expanding Efforts and Strategies to Protect and Improve Public Health (2017) • Engaging the Diaspora for Institutional Development in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Sierra Leone and Somalia (2017) (IOM, 2016d)	• Favourable protection environment (law and policy, administrative institutions, legal remedies and legal assistance) • Capacity building and advocacy • Livelihood support (UNHCR, 2017am, 2016h)

[1] Most of the websites for IOM regional and country offices have not been updated as of 2017, so the budget and programme documents for 2016 and 2017 were also consulted for programmes in the focus countries.

[2] UNHCR does not uniformly present information on their actions and programs on their operations webpages, thus, this list is neither necessarily comprehensive nor complete.

Annex G: UNHCR and IOM Budgets & Expenditures for West and Central Africa

Table 20: Summarized UNHCR (Pillar 1) Budget & Expenditures for West and Central Africa (USD), 2016

	Budget	Expenditure	Notes
Burkina Faso	20,971,553	14,061,463	1
Central African Republic	13,828,750	10,971,168	2
Chad	159,841,543	64,079,411	3
Côte d'Ivoire	10,072,402	10,072,402	1
Ghana	9,444,755	5,072,948	1
Guinea	7,463,159	3,128,511	1
Mali	27,088,674	7,040,851	1
Mauritania	19,532,361	14,176,433	4
Niger	48,986,938	20,997,499	1
Nigeria	1,821,559	1,188,093	1
Senegal (RO)	36,931,623	17,320,542	1

Sources: UNHCR, 2016h; UNHCR, 2016i, UNHCR, 2016j; UNHCR, 2016k

Table 21: Detailed UNHCR Pillar 1 Budget & Expenditures for West and Central Africa (USD), 2016

Objective:	Burkina Faso		Chad		Central African Republic	
	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure
Total	20,971,553	14,061,463	159,841,543	64,079,411	13,828,750	10,971,168
Favourable Protection Environment, total	n/a	n/a	1,770,510	1,015,187	318,009	325,493
Administrative Institutions and Practice	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	318,009	315,663
International and regional instruments	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Law and policy	n/a	n/a	87,329	22339	n/a	n/a
Legal remedies & assistance	n/a	n/a	1,683,181	992848	n/a	n/a
Access to territory	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	9,830
Public Attitudes towards PoC	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fair Protection Processes & Documentation, total	957,310	1,478,555	5,432,485	3,649,869	1,009,741	1,462,118
Reception conditions	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Registration & Profiling	319,953	910,116	2,125,462	1,753,360	256,017	474,551
Status determination	77,619	99,569	52,918	22,051	141,377	172,581
Individual documentation	404,953	302,622	1,017,623	1,321,903	381,329	423,373
Civil Status documentation	154,786	166,249	2,236,482	552,554	231,017	391,613
Family re-unification	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security from violence and exploitation, total	651,297	749,035	9,696,060	4,922,214	350,329	451,760
Protection from crime	166,167	260,884	886,177	342,703	n/a	n/a
Protection from effects armed conflict	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	1,303
SGBV prevention and response	368,501	422,932	5,443,484	3,112,854	258,009	250,366
Non-arbitrary detention	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Child protection	116,629	65,220	3,366,399	1,466,657	92,320	200,091

Basic Needs and Essential Services, total	**12,445,652**	**5,863,331**	**85,474,764**	**26,594,242**	**4,348,263**	**5,947,263**
Health	2,037,778	1,387,809	14,771,994	6,138,097	898,697	962,790
Reproductive health and HIV/ Aids response	453,501	473,340	4,549,110	1,743,586	333,009	489,226
Nutrition	704,887	481,403	5,719,301	2,755,027	157,320	214,972
Food security	520,052	214,738	n/a	n/a	214,640	265,267
Water	868,720	231,230	5,201,422	2,329,825	267,537	573,330
Sanitation and hygiene	678,258	154,958	3,142,675	1,083,358	457,848	161,731
Shelter and infrastructure	3,504,858	609,502	7,717,206	1,367,136	238,520	420,095
Energy	1,609,311	1,178,334	10,931,314	2,441,533	n/a	n/a
Basic and domestic and hygiene Items	361,629	478,960	8,229,351	1,758,517	313,656	1,013,280
Services for persons with specific needs	214,248	268,908	5,391,110	2,313,434	608,009	897,743
Education	1,492,412	384,148	19,821,281	4,663,729	859,026	948,830
Community Empowerment and Self Reliance, total	**3,249,773**	**2,501,342**	**58,627,920**	**9,594,587**	**584,386**	**482,294**
Community mobilization	n/a	n/a	500,092	312013	55,689	52,645
Co-existence with local communities	458,258	158,286	6,833,427	1,194,679	0	0
Natural resources and shared environment	216,629	84,900	4,278,723	1,097,631	n/a	n/a
Self-reliance and livelihoods	2,574,887	2,258,157	47,015,678	6,990,264	528,697	429,649
Durable Solutions, total	**625,415**	**286,900**	**10,555,210**	**4,004,253**	**1,010,074**	**384,697**
Solutions strategy	n/a	n/a	1151889	693667	n/a	n/a
Voluntary return	466,629	119,271	7,378,638	870,010	818,697	287,447
Integration	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	91,377	48,795
Greater reduction of statelessness	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Resettlement	158,786	167,629	2,024,683	2,440,577	100,000	48,454
Leadership, Coordination and Partnerships, total	**894,887**	**702,524**	**2,439,716**	**1,120,120**	**0**	**0**

	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure	Budget	Expenditure
Coordination and partnerships	166,629	191,728	n/a	n/a	0	0
Camp management and coordination	591,629	445,450	1,941,669	679,618	0	0
Donor relations	136,629	65,346	498,046	440,502	n/a	n/a
Logistics and Operations Support, total	**2,147,220**	**2,479,776**	**26,180,827**	**13,160,903**	**n/a**	**1,917,543**
Supply chain and logistics	1,644,887	1,699,619	11,640,397	6,412,965	n/a	n/a
Operations management, coordination and support	502,334	780,157	14,540,430	6,747,937	n/a	1,917,543

	Côte d'Ivoire		Mali		Niger	
Objective:	*Budget*	*Expenditure*	*Budget*	*Expenditure*	*Budget*	*Expenditure*
Total	**10,072,402**	**10,072,402**	**27,088,674**	**7,040,851**	**48,986,938**	**20,997,499**
Favourable Protection Environment, total	**98,203**	**98,203**	**0**	**0**	**2,377,447**	**1,271,828**
Administrative Institutions and Practice	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	227,585	261,756
International and regional instruments	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Law and policy	31,102	31,102	0	n/a	895,359	289,005
Legal remedies & assistance	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,071,729	377,701
Access to territory	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	182,774	343,366
Public Attitudes towards PoC	67,101	67,101	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Fair Protection Processes & Documentation, total	**1,288,163**	**1,288,163**	**1,861,539**	**863,975**	**3,364,796**	**3,044,107**
Reception conditions	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	255,915	926,391
Registration & Profiling	61,087	61,087	1,407,466	610,435	1,206,498	1,047,504
Status determination	69,008	69,008	100,524	68,954	638,956	379,957
Individual documentation	n/a	n/a	353,549	184,587	678,512	101,252
Civil Status	880,143	880,143	n/a	n/a	584,916	589,002

documentation						
Family re-unification	277,925	277,925	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Security from violence and exploitation, total	**105,787**	**105,787**	**11,209,956**	**1,695,821**	**3,538,135**	**1,304,135**
Protection from crime	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Protection from effects armed conflict	n/a	n/a	7,421,358	794,500	n/a	n/a
SGBV prevention and response	74,816	74,816	3,185,997	638,445	1,395,215	803,100
Non-arbitrary detention	24,438	24,438	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Child protection	6,534	6,534	n/a	n/a	2,142,920	501,034
Basic Needs and Essential Services, total	**568,751**	**568,751**	**1,456,932**	**543,923**	**25,307,281**	**8,950,524**
Health	0		494,547	191,951	3,382,550	1,521,881
Reproductive health and HIV/ Aids response	340,521	340,521	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Nutrition	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,201,713	368,940
Food security	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Water	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	4,343,970	943,800
Sanitation and hygiene	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,051,171	200,675
Shelter and infrastructure	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	5,547,783	1,313,674
Energy	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2,655,775	1,495,568
Basic and domestic and hygiene Items	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	4,013,475	2,309,420
Services for persons with specific needs	228,230	228,230	490,299	160,479	n/a	
Education	0	n/a	472,085	191,492	3,110,843	796,565
Community Empowerment and Self Reliance, total	**251,159**	**251,159**	**3,289,067**	**1,047,129**	**6,018,153**	**1,277,848**
Community mobilization	n/a	n/a	150,997	114,163	247,957	59,119
Co-existence with local communities	31,231	31,231	1,095,761	414,306	442,054	180,753
Natural resources and shared environment	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Self-reliance and livelihoods	219,927	219,927	2,042,309	518,660	5,328,141	1,037,976
Durable Solutions,	**5,876,219**	**5,876,219**	**7,642,048**	**2,156,008**	**2,489,705**	**517,885**

total						
Solutions strategy	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Voluntary return	5,856,042	5,856,042	6,338,552	1,667,445	2,163,790	416,812
Integration	7,159	7,159	1,221,472	441,523	197,957	25,485
Greater reduction of statelessness	0	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Resettlement	13,017	13,017	82,024	47,040	127,957	75,588
Leadership, Coordination and Partnerships, total	**423,031**	**423,031**	**0**	**0**	**1,138,133**	**1,975,268**
Coordination and partnerships	277,925	277,925	0	n/a	272,774	259,702
Camp management and coordination	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	672,774	1,463,291
Donor relations	145,106	145,106	n/a	n/a	192,585	252,276
Logistics and Operations Support, total	**1,461,089**	**1,461,089**	**1,629,132**	**733,996**	**4,753,290**	**2,655,906**
Supply chain and logistics	578,073	578,073	n/a	n/a	2,443,946	1,096,164
Operations management, coordination and support	883,016	883,016	1,629,132	733,996	2,309,344	1,559,742

Sources: UNHCR, 2016h; UNHCR, 2016i, UNHCR, 2016j; UNHCR, 2016k

Note: The above details were not available for Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, or Sierra Leone.

Table 22: IOM Operational Programs Expenditures for West and Central Africa (USD), 2011-2015

	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011
Burkina Faso	325,174	419,941	239,853	756,302	173,193
Central African Republic	7,499,020	14,390,200	5,914	n/a	n/a
Chad	8,015,288	7,619,720	5,212,250	7,757,437	6,734,091
Côte d'Ivoire	1,298,885	3,797,783	4,672,058	4,009,479	2,276,734
Gambia	130,536	138,256	105,363	51,289	39,098
Ghana	5,802,846	5,654,395	7,520,959	7,766,137	4,986,516
Guinea	7,880,486	2,470,584	1,635,887	1,255,221	1,958,584
Mali	3,743,712	5,685,075	3,936,565	853,227	596,836
Mauritania	2,399,341	1,627,017	2,356,629	951,520	1,002,211
Niger	6,677,037	7,040,937	5,399,468	3,029,144	2,375,748
Nigeria	14,288,085	7,701,075	7,195,122	4,005,996	3,964,519
Senegal (RO)	3,004,763	2,097,023	2,070,269	2,154,047	1,878,544
Sierra Leone	9,642,172	917,669	2,459,799	1,332,451	758,598

Sources: IOM, 2016b; IOM, 2015d; IOM, 2014d; IOM, 2013b; IOM, 2012

Note: IOM does not provide annual budget data per country as they do for annual expenditures.

Annex H: 'Good Practices' in West and Central African Migration Governance

Many of the national migration policies (NPM) in West and Central Africa are in their infancies. For the most part, those countries which have NPMs are either still drafting or have only recently ratified them (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). On the one hand, intraregional migratory movements in West and Central Africa, regardless of legality, are locally normalized to such a degree that many newly adopted policies are merely formalizing the regularity of mobility. On the other hand, certain policies (i.e. concerning smuggling, trafficking, border management, free movement), and often the more progressive ones, are at best symbolic since they lack the political backing and resources needed to implement them in affecting ways. A majority of the ECOWAS member states have ratified all the free movement protocols, yet many lack reference to ECOWAS nationals in their own legislation (ICMPD & IOM, 2015). Nevertheless, there are a number of exemplary migration-related policies in the region worth highlighting, many of which are cooperative. The following policies were selected from each focus country's corresponding country profile.

Intra-regional Mobility

Of the countries of interest in this report, all are **ECOWAS** member states with the exception of Mauritania (a former member), the Central African Republic, and Chad. For ECOWAS nationals, visa free travel is permitted within the region for stays of up to 90 days (ICMPD & IOM, 2015).

While Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Nigeria permit **dual-citizenship**, Ghana takes one step further with its 'right of abode' policy, which allows those who have lost their Ghanaian citizenship in acquisition of a foreign one the same rights granted to those with indefinite residence status in the country. The policy is also applicable to those "of African descent in the diaspora" (ICMPD & IOM, 2015, p. 160). Similarly open to its regional neighbours, Côte d'Ivoire even allows ECOWAS nationals to reside in the country without a local residence permit as long as they are in possession of a valid ID from their origin country.

Migration and development

While Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone have all integrated development with their national migration policies (ICMPD & IOM, 2015), some key practices of Ghana, Mali, and Senegal are worth highlighting:

- Ghana:
    - The Revised 1994 Population Policy: recognizes the link between migration and development and calls for facilitation of voluntary return of the highly skilled through incentives

- National Youth Policy: highlights the challenges faced by local youth and the youth's potential for the country
  - National Climate Change Policy, 2014: guides management of migration-related consequences to climate change
  - National Ageing Policy: addresses the issues of ageing in relation to migration
  - Representation of the People Act of 2006: permits the participation of emigrants in general elections
- Mali: local authorities help development through incentivizing remittance investment in community projects.
  - A notable actor in the linkage between migration and development is the Ministry for Malians Abroad and African Integration – Directorate General for Malians Abroad (DGME), which not only involves emigrants in development projects but reintegrates returnees and deportees and facilitates the transmission of other capital gained from emigration, i.e. skills and social remittances.
  - Additionally, the Investment Code offers benefits and incentives for Malian emigrants to invest in their country.
- Senegal:
  - Initiatives linking migration and development:
    - Migration for Development in Africa programme (MIDA–Senegal), in partnership with IOM;
    - the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme; and
    - the Co-development Initiative, by the Senegalese President's Office (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 29).
    - Diaspora Estates (*Cités de la diaspora*)
  - To curb labour emigration and illegal migration, the Senegalese Government has implemented the following programmes with the hopes of increasing youth employment:
    - the National Action Fund for Employment (FNAE);
    - the National Fund for Youth Promo on (FNPJ);
    - the Agency for the Execution of Works of Public Interest (AGETIP);
    - the Project for the Promo on of Rural Micro-businesses (PROMER); and
    - the Labour Service within the Directorate of Employment (Some & IOM, 2009, p. 28).

Protection and Assistance

Concerning the assistance and support given to migrants, especially the most vulnerable, by the countries in this study, several policies and practices stand out. Burkina Faso distinguishes itself for its acceptance of the refugee resettlement burden-sharing out of inter-African solidarity. Ghana practices a relatively generous interpretation of who it determines to be a refugee. Moreover, UNHCR is a part of tripartite agreements between Nigeria and Cameroon, Mauritania and Senegal, as well as Chad and Sudan, all of which facilitate the voluntary return of refugees.

Another key agreement in the ECOWAS region is the Abidjan Declaration of 2015, which commits signatories to the eradication of statelessness within ten years of the agreement's signage. Additionally, the smallest country on the continent, Gambia, is in bilateral agreements with Spain and Italy concerning irregular migration and the protection of irregular migrants. In an effort to reduce the number of *enfants talibés,* the Gambian Ministry of Education provides monthly assistance to Quranic schools which have been verified not to exploit the children in their care as forced beggars. Through the Spain/ECOWAS Fund on Migration and Development, Gambia has also helped to re-integrate return migrants and improve the human capital of the country's youth. Moreover, Mali has a ministry dedicated, in part, to the protection of Malian emigrants.

Looking forward, while there is considerable room for improvement for the national migration policies of West and Central Africa, migration governance in the region will be an important factor in the region's overall development. Specific policy recommendations are discussed in the conclusion of this paper. For further reading and a deep-dive look into West African migration governance, consult the reference for ICMPD & IOM (2015), often cited in this report.