Sudan

MIGRATION PROFILE

Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa

August 2017
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1. Introduction

The Republic of Sudan is a country in north-eastern Africa, on the banks of the Red Sea between Egypt to the northwest and Eritrea to the southeast. It also borders Chad and Libya to the west, Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan to the south; and Ethiopia to the east. As it stretches through the Sahara, it is sparsely populated focusing the population in areas with broader access to water like the South and the Nile regions (CIA, 2017). Sudan has low levels of human development, with its HDI at 0.490 ranking it as 165th worldwide. Still, it ranks third if compared to the other countries in this study (UNDP, 2016).

Table 1: Sudan’s Key Demographic and Development Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total area, in sq km</td>
<td>1,861,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (2015), in million</td>
<td>40.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (2015), % of total</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate, annual %</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese Arab</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (2015), country rank out of 188</td>
<td>0.490 (165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Based on PPP per Capita, current international dollars per capita</td>
<td>4446.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth (2015), years</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (2015), % of labour force</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Unemployment (2015), % ages 15-24</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2010), %</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Coefficient (2010-2015)</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), current USD millions</td>
<td>1,736.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Official Development Assistance Received (13), current USD millions</td>
<td>899.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Remittances Received (2015), current USD millions</td>
<td>151.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: CIA, 2017; UN DESA, 2015b; UN DESA, 2014; World Bank, 2017; UNDP, 2016; IMF, 2017.*

Sudan has experienced conflict throughout the past decades, by its two civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) and the conflict that broke out after South Sudan’s independence in 2011 between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This conflict has resulted in 1.1 million internally displaced people (IDPs), while the Darfur conflict of 2003 has resulted in 2 million
displaced people and thousands of deaths. South Sudan’s independence also meant the loss of a quarters of Sudan’s oil production, a driving power of Sudan’s economy. This shock has exacerbated the fragile structure of Sudan’s economy, which, tied to the lack of infrastructure and reliance on subsistence agriculture, keeps almost half of the population below the poverty line (CIA, 2017).

In terms of migration, Sudan is an origin, destination and most importantly a transit country. As its conflicts displace Sudanese citizens, it has seen refugee influxes from neighbouring countries, especially Eritrea and South Sudan. Nonetheless, a pilot study by IOM has demonstrated that Sudan is primarily a transit country, with 55 per cent of respondents expressing no intention of living in Sudan and 70 per cent planning to move on to another country, not Sudan, when leaving their origin country. As such, Sudan stands as a transit country along several migration routes, especially for migrants from the East and Horn of Africa. Furthermore, immigrants in Sudan have identified push factors from their country of origin as the lack of economic opportunities, followed by safety, security and freedom reasons (IOM, 2017b).

Still, Sudan does not have a consistent migration policy. Several ministries overlap in their actions and responsibilities, whilst essential features like statistical data on migration is missing. Of special importance are the Sudanese Commission for Refugees (COR) and the Secretary of the Sudanese Working Abroad (SSWA). COR is the special government body that coordinates refugee assistance and registration, whilst SSWA defines the rights and duties of Sudanese labour migrants such as special taxes (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin & Perrin, 2012).

Sudan’s migrant stock, as estimated by UN DESA in 2015, is 503,477. The main origin countries of migrants in Sudan are Eritrea, South Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia as Figure 1 demonstrates (UN DESA, 2015a). This number is expected to increase in light of the continuously increasing number of South Sudanese refugees, due to the rekindling of violence in this country in 2016 (UNHCR, 2017b).

Measuring the number of Sudanese emigrants is a complicated exercise as government statistics provided by SSWA underestimate the number of Sudanese living abroad as they do not include non-workers or people who left for reasons other than work (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012). Still, if we rely on UN DESA data of 2015 we see that the migrant stock is 1,890,861. The main destinations are South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Chad and Uganda as shown in Figure 2 (UN DESA, 2015a). Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are popular destinations for labour migrants, whilst neighbouring countries harbour many Sudanese refugees (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012).
Comparing the population pyramids of Sudan’s population and its migrant stock, differences arise. Sudan’s population pyramid based on UN DESA data of 2015 shows a typical pyramid structure with a large base, narrowing as it increases, as demonstrated in Figure 3. Differently, the population pyramid of the migrant stock demonstrates an outward projection on the “5-9” age group. This is consistent with the refugee movements, which are less likely to travel with children of “0-4” and appear to have a comparatively low fertility rate (UN DESA, 2015a).
2. Forced Migration/ Displacement

Sudan has had a long history of forced migration, in light of the many conflicts it has faced and the instability of its neighbouring countries. Refugees from and in Sudan and internally displaced people have been deprived of their humanitarian needs, many for years. The independence of South Sudan in 2011, and the consequent conflict in 2013, have increased the stocks and flows of refugees in Sudan.

2.1. Refugees in Sudan

Refugees in Sudan make up for the most relevant aspect of immigration in Sudan, as by December 2016 over 793,700 asylum seekers and refugees were hosted in Sudan (UNOCHA, 2017b). Yet, acquiring data on this group can be a challenge. Estimates by UNHCR and COR can significantly differ, as the COR reports that 82 per cent of refugees in Sudan, in 2010, were living outside camps, which goes against government policy. Sudan has legislation on asylum based on its own procedure of refugee status determination, which derives from the 1969 OAU Convention. This makes for a protection area for refugees, yet Sudan imposes strong encampment policies limiting refugees’ freedom of movement. Still, UNHCR denounces the deportation of refugees, especially Eritrean ones. Sudan hosts mostly refugees from neighbouring countries, and data shows that Eritreans dominated this trend up until 2014, when South Sudanese refugees became the majority (Figure 5) (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012; UNHCR, 2017c).

![Figure 5: Refugees residing in Sudan by nationality, 1980-2010](source: UNHCR, 2017c).

The demography of Eritrean refugees changed over time, where arrivals in 2013 demonstrate a new type of migrant. They are mostly young, educated and urban refugees fleeing compulsory indefinite military service. As Eritrea has strict exit requirements and visa qualifications, most asylum seekers...
resort to smuggling networks and 80 per cent of new arrivals leave camps within two months to avoid Sudan’s encampment policy (UNHCR, 2013). Sudan’s encampment policy restricts freedom of movement, as refugees are not allowed to leave camps without travel permits. This encourages constant departures from camps, resulting in the numbers being generally static. It also emboldens many migrants to bypass the camps altogether as they try to reach the capital Khartoum and not apply for refugee status. Khartoum has a large Eritrean community, which makes up as much as 25 per cent of its population (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015).

Durable solutions for refugees are hard to implement in Sudan, thus many communities find themselves in protracted displacement. Estimates demonstrate that, by 2015, Sudan had 74,000 protracted refugees in camps in East Sudan, 58 per cent of which were born in Sudan (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). In Darfur, people have reported to have been in protracted displacement for 14 years (UNOCHA, 2017b).

Most recent data shows that Sudan hosts refugees from the CAR, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen, mounting up to 793,700 asylum seekers and refugees. This number is actually a probable underestimation as the large majority of refugees are yet unregistered and the Sudanese government does not require Syrian and Yemeni refugees to register upon arrival. With that in mind, COR estimates that Sudan hosts roughly 1.3 million refugees (UNOCHA, 2017b). By 2016, Sudan has received an estimated 100,000 Syrian refugees, as the government is open to all Syrian nationals not requiring visa for entries. They are granted access to health and education services and tend to stay in Khartoum with an already existing Syrian community (UNOCHA, 2016).

The new main influx of refugees in Sudan comes from South Sudan, as the civil war of 2013, the rekindling of violence in 2016 and critical food insecurity has pushed 399,827 refugees into the country by May 2017 (UNHCR, 2017b). Even with such high numbers, the Sudanese government has kept an open-border policy, recognizing their status as refugees in August 2016 (UNHCR, 2017a). Arrivals keep on progressing month after month, and as of May 2017 almost 137,000 refugees had entered Sudan; more than the whole of 2016 (UNOCHA, 2017a). Figure 6, from a UNHCR memo, demonstrates the arrival trends of South Sudanese refugees in Sudan from 2014 and 2017. It shows how the current trend is higher than that in previous years as UNHCR predicts an influx of 180,000 South Sudanese refugees in 2017 (UNHCR, 2017a).

Figure 6: Arrival Trends of South Sudanese Refugees into Sudan, 2014-2017

As Sudan is a poor and fragile country, these staggering numbers have added considerable stress to the country’s resources and capabilities. UNHCR estimates that there are 4.8 million people in Sudan in need of humanitarian assistance, and refugees make up 16 per cent of that contingent and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) 48 per cent. Of this group, children make up 62 per cent of refugees and 60 per cent of IDPs. The main humanitarian problems Sudan faces are food insecurity,
malnutrition and propensity to natural disasters (UNOCHA, 2017b). These are exacerbated by the presence and activities of armed groups, which impede access to humanitarian resources (IDMC, 2016).

In order to address this issue, UNHCR partnering with the World Food Programme, has launched a revised Regional Refugee Response Plan for South Sudan seeking USD 1.4 billion to provide aid to six neighbouring countries, including Sudan (UNOCHA, 2017a). IOM, for its part, has scaled up its registering field missions, having registered 92,239 individuals in May 2017 alone (IOM, 2017a).

### 2.2. Refugees from Sudan

The two Sudanese civil wars, between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, have caused massive displacement of Sudanese citizens. By 2014, Sudan had 665,908 refugees worldwide (World Bank, 2016) and as of 2016 the stock of Sudanese refugees registered with UNHCR was 650,588. Sudanese refugees are distributed mostly between Chad (48%), South Sudan (37%) and Ethiopia (6%) (UNHCR, 2017c). There are also Sudanese refugees in Egypt, however they are not required to register as refugees as the two countries have a free movement agreement, which makes it challenging to estimate the number of Sudanese in Egypt. Estimates therefore vary extremely from 2,000 to millions (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012).

Reintegration and return migration in Sudan are filled with challenges. Security concerns have long been a main deterrent for returning to Sudan (Wood & Phelan, 2006). Moreover, research on the Sudanese population in Egypt has demonstrated how political and socioeconomic instability is a main deterrent against return. 78 per cent of participants reported to prefer a third country resettlement and 19 per cent preferred a return to Sudan. Reasons for that lie in the dire development condition of the country and the political and security instability that the country has long faced (Ahmed, 2009).

However, return is still a reality which the authorities on the ground often struggle to cope with. A surge in return happened after the 2005 peace agreement, which promised to bring stability to the nation. Estimates from 2005 show 500,000 refugees returned to Sudan in that year. This flow was slowed down by the deteriorating security situation in other areas of the country, especially Darfur. In 2006, as a contrast, only 25,811 refugees returned to Sudan (UNHCR, 2006; Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2015). This echoes the security concerns that dampen return.

Later research on return and reintegration show that 57 per cent of returnees could be considered reintegrated. The economic dimension still remained as the main challenge for reintegration, with only 56 per cent of respondents economically reintegrated. Returnees had a high rate of reintegration in social-cultural and security dimensions. Interestingly enough, several examples in this research show a positive relation between AVRR programs and positive economic reintegration. Comparing these recent trends to the reality of the country before CPA, one can see how economic and labour concerns are more relevant than security ones. Thus, economic support and development are key concerns in reintegration matters in Sudan (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015).
2.3. Internal Displacement in Sudan

Violence in Sudan, in addition to displacing citizens abroad, creates situations of internal displacement. Latest estimates as of 2016, from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre show that there are 3.3 million IDPs in the country. The majority of these – 1.98 million – live in and outside of camps in Darfur, as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region. The Two Areas conflict has also resulted in significant displacement, with around 230,000 displaced persons in the region of South Kordofan (IDMC, 2017; Strachan, 2016). The security situation steadily deteriorates and the country’s instability makes access to basic human resources unattainable, worsening the situation.

The humanitarian toll on the lives of IDPs is illustrated by the lack of resources they face and the nature of long-term displacement, through the absence of socio-economic opportunities. A third of the camps have less than 7.5 litres of water per person per day, well below the minimum emergency standards and of the 1.6 million IDPs living in camps, 60 per cent are children. Return to their original area is often unfeasible, as population growth and displacement have altered human geography and exert considerable stress on local resources. IDPs may then actually choose to integrate in their host communities. Still, to assume that someone is in need of humanitarian assistance simply for being displaced is a fallacy. UNHCR argues that needs assessments are a necessary tool, to guarantee the access to basic public services, prioritizing displaced people living in camps and settlements (UNOCHA, 2017b).

3. Regular/ Labour Migration

3.1. Immigration

Sudan does not produce regular statistics on international migration, thus data is often outdated and misrepresentative of the population. Nonetheless, if we compare the migrant stock of 2010, as reported by UN DESA, and the work permits issued by Sudan a few trends emerge. UN DESA estimated around 750,000 migrants in 2010 while only 2,150 work permits were issued, in the year 2009. This major discrepancy shows that only a small proportion of foreigners work legally in Sudan. Of those work permits, three broad categories appear: foreigners working in national projects, foreigners employed by international companies and international NGO staff. The main origin countries of the migrants who managed to guarantee work permits in 2009 are from China, Philippines, India, Turkey and Bangladesh, of which 98 per cent were men (IOM, 2011).

It is safe to assume that the political and security crises that Sudan and its neighbouring countries face have changed some of these labour migration trends. For instance, the current economic crises that the country faces in light of the shortage of oil production directly impacts the number of migrants who are attracted to work in such plants (CIA, 2017). A recent IOM study corroborates this image. The study covered 308 migrants in Khartoum and half of these left their country of origin for lack of jobs and economic opportunities. Considering these motivations, life in Sudan did not represent an improvement, as the majority of respondents were unemployed at the time of the survey and jobs were hard to come by. In terms of migration intentions, 55 per cent of respondents expressed no intention of living in Sudan for longer and 70 per cent of them did not intend to stay in Sudan even when leaving their country of origin. Tied to this, the study also uncovered that asylum
seekers and refugees are just as likely to migrate once more for economic and financial reasons, even if they attain protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention (IOM, 2017b).

### 3.2. Emigration

Labour emigration data in Sudan is a contentious issue for a lack of reliable data from the government, and the Gulf States which many of these migrants go to do not share data on their populations by nationality (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012). To add to that problem, data prior to 2011 considers the Sudanese as those who we would now divide between Sudanese and South Sudanese. Government estimates of 2011 count between 880,000 and 1,338,000 labour migrants abroad, half of which were in Saudi Arabia. Numbers from the SSWA of registered economic migrants show that 98 per cent of these work in Gulf countries, with the majority of males in low-skill jobs. SSWA data, however, misses considerable groups, such as irregular migrants, Sudanese who went abroad through non-work related visas but found employment, Sudanese under international protection (refugees) and Sudanese born abroad who may not need to be registered for labour (IOM, 2011).

A crucial problem of labour emigration is the brain drain the country suffers in the health sector, where the lack of jobs and better opportunities abroad motivate such movements (Darbo, 2015). Remittances make for a considerable effect of this type of migration. In 2013, USD 424 million came into Sudan, making it 0.6 per cent of its GDP. The government, thus, tends to support labour emigration (Strachan, 2016).

### 4. Internal Migration

Internal migration in Sudan mostly follows a rural-urban route, which has been happening since the 1970s. In the past, people were reported to leave rural areas due to conflict and natural disasters like droughts. This trend has had many consequences on both settings. In urban settings, an increase in population has been observed, which relates to an increase in urban poverty. ILO reports suggest that this trend has influenced the growth of the informal sector in these cities, where these sectors do not have informal social security services, whereas rural areas do. Moreover, this urban increase also relates to large numbers of IDPs moving to cities, through pull factors such as better access to services and greater economic opportunities (Strachan, 2016; Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith, Metcalfe, Pavanello & Martin, 2011). In rural settings, this migration has resulted in seasonal labour shortages which increased the cost of agricultural production, and thus of food (Darbo, 2015).

Government policies have not kept pace with this urbanisation rate and Sudan’s development strategy does not attain to urbanisation as a separate point of concern. Its strategy is to make the countryside a more appealing place to live and work, in an attempt to reduce rural-urban migration (Pantuliano et al., 2011).
5. Irregular Migration

Irregular migration is of high importance in Sudan, as most movement in and out of the country is of irregular nature using smugglers and brokers throughout the journey (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015).

5.1. Human Smuggling

Smuggling is a common feature in Sudan, as it facilitates irregular movement in and out of Sudan every year. Eritreans often turn to this modality, in light of Sudanese encampment policies and the strict exit requirements the Eritrean government has. Eritreans and Ethiopians tend rely on members of their country of origin to guide them through the smuggling process, as it is not manageable to follow the migration route without the help of smugglers. In order to reach neighbouring countries, such as Libya, migrants often change between different smugglers. The journey tends to happen in refugee camps, passing through Khartoum and onto Sudan’s borders (Marchand, Roosen, Reinold & Siegel, 2016).

Sudan’s geographical location makes it a transit country for smuggling services which often succumb to trafficking operations. Reports show that, up until 2008, irregular migrants, especially Eritreans, used Sudan as a route to seek refuge in Israel and Europe. However, after 2008, there has been an increase in demand of smuggling services, making the Sudan-Israel trafficking business much more lucrative, characterized by abduction, displacement, captivity, extortion, torture, and sexual violence, among others. It is very likely that this turning point came from the approval of the Israeli-Egypt fence and the growing of xenophobic discourse in the country. Such changes indicate a change in flows from Sudan-Egypt-Israel to Sudan-Libya-Europe (Malk, 2016).

5.2. Trafficking in Human Beings

Sudan is a Tier 3 country under the US Department of State classification of trafficking classifications. It is a source, destination and transit country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking. Trafficked children tend to work in brick-making factories, gold factories and agriculture. It is common for these children to be exposed to threats, physical and sexual abuse. Children are also vulnerable to being recruited as child soldiers, even though Sudanese law prohibits this recruitment. Still, reports announce that armed groups and militias like the Sudanese Armed Forces continue to recruit boys. In addition, South Sudanese rebels have been reported to abduct children from West Kordofan. Girls and women are especially vulnerable to trafficking for domestic servitude and sex trafficking (US Department of State, 2016).

A considerable amount of Filipina women are subjected to trafficking to do domestic work in Sudan. Other vulnerable groups are Bangladeshi adults who migrate for work, South Sudanese citizens who lack formal immigration papers and migrants fleeing from conflict in East Asia and the Middle East (such as Yemeni and Syrians) who use Sudan as a transit country to reach Europe. Abductions have been reported in refugee camps and border crossings, especially for Ethiopians and Eritreans. The government denies the existence of sex trafficking and does not report forced labour or child soldier recruitment. The government lacks capacity and resources to provide adequate protective services to VoT (US Department of State, 2016). Reports also show complicity of Sudanese police officials in the abduction of Eritreans (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015).
The highest incidence of trafficking happens along the borders with Eritrea and Ethiopia, where the Rashaida tribes have been associated with hostage-taking, ill treatment and extortion (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). UNHCR data from 2013 shows a significant number of refugees and asylum seekers being abducted and held ransom, with significant concern for the great number of unaccompanied minors and their high vulnerability to trafficking (UNHCR, 2013). In order to curb this trend, UNHCR recommends programs to strengthen alternatives to onward movement, including self-reliance programs in refugee camps and urban programs for asylum seekers (IOM & UNHCR, 2015).

6. Migrants’ Vulnerabilities and Protection Issues

The following vulnerabilities and protection needs have been identified for migrants moving to or in transit through Sudan:

- Sudan is a transit country for Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants and the number of migrants has increased in recent years. A significant problem during transit is abduction from refugee camps (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013), especially in Eastern Sudan, as well as different forms of exploitation and extortion (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015). Communities nearby the refugee camps have been associated with aiding traffickers and abductors in order to make a living (IOM & UNHCR, 2015). Women are especially vulnerable, since they are often subject to forced prostitution. For this reason, many migrants started organizing their journeys to Khartoum independently, avoiding refugee camps (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013).

- Compared to other transit countries in the region, Sudan offers more employment opportunities for migrants. As a result, some migrants choose to stay in Sudan, at least for a few years. These migrants mostly come from Eritrea and Ethiopia. Both nations have large diaspora communities in Khartoum. Migrant workers from Eritrea and Ethiopia are involved in unskilled work, sometimes as irregular migrants. Even though most asylum seekers (97%) are granted refugee status in Sudan, a significant portion of migrants never applies for asylum (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013). These workers are therefore subject to different forms of abuse and domestic servitude (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015).

- In Khartoum, there are two shelters, for Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals, respectively. The shelter for Ethiopians is run by the diaspora and the Ethiopian Embassy. As for the shelter for Eritreans, it is run by the diaspora, but does not receive support from the Eritrean Embassy due to perceptions that Sudanese and Eritrean security services cooperate, enabling kidnapping and forced return of refugees to Eritrea.
7. Relevant National Policies and Stakeholders

Sudanese legislation related to migration provides for matters related to Sudanese labour migration, irregular migration, employment of foreign nationals, and refugees. In addition, it prohibits human trafficking (see Table 2). All foreigners, except Egyptians, need a visa to enter Sudan. Labour migrants are required to have a working permit. Moreover, Sudanese citizens are only allowed to leave the country with a valid exit visa (IOM, 2011). The Sudanese government, in cooperation with IOM, provides reintegration support to return migrants (IOM, 2014). No bilateral labour agreements could be identified for Sudan.

Table 2: Sudan’s Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 Regulation of the Employment of Sudanese Abroad</td>
<td>Provides for matters related to Sudanese labour migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Procedures Act, 1991</td>
<td>Provides for matters related to the detention of irregular migrants and punishments for facilitating irregular migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Labour Law</td>
<td>Provides for right of Sudanese citizens to work abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Regulation of Employment of Non-Sudanese Act</td>
<td>Regulates the employment of foreign nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Regulation Act (2014)</td>
<td>Provides for matters related to refugees including their rights and duties in Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Partners Strategy to Address Trafficking, Kidnapping, and Smuggling in Persons (2015-2017)</td>
<td>Joint Strategy by UN agencies and the government aimed at providing support to the government to ensure the safe entry of asylum seekers and migrants to its territory, their secure residence and the protection and rehabilitation of identified victims of trafficking throughout Sudan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sudan has a large diaspora population, yet it has a lack of policies to engage this potential in a productive manner. Nonetheless, Sudanese diaspora organizations exist and have in the past influenced the peace-making process. Examples are diaspora networks in Darfur identifying contentious and consensual points on peace agreements (Brinkerhof, 2011).

Looking at forced migration, Sudan applies an “open door” policy for asylum seekers providing land for the establishment of camps and access to immediate basic services, such as education and health facilities. Currently, a series of international organizations follow the “Strategy to Address Human
Trafficking, Kidnappings and Smuggling of Persons in Sudan – Strengthening Alternatives to Onward Movements (2015-17)” developed by UNHCR Sudan, IOM, UNODC, UNICEF and UNFPA. Another priority is the promotion of self-reliance programme, aiming at enhancing economic self-reliance and reducing aid dependency (UNHCR, 2017d). Historically the government’s refugee policy is based on assumptions that refugees can represent a threat to social security, and therefore should be placed in spatially segregated areas. This highlights a central priority of the government to keep towns and urban centres clear of refugees, ensuing encampment policies (Grabska & Mehta, 2008; Strachan, 2016). Nonetheless, it has generally failed to achieve this goal as urban centres like Khartoum host large numbers of refugees (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). Another assumption sees refugee status as a temporary approach before a durable solution can be found. This prevents integration of refugees into host communities, for instance by not granting them access to employment and naturalisation (Grabska & Mehta, 2008). In 2009, Sudan introduced the National Policy on Internal Displacement which establishes the right of freedom of movement for IDPs. Yet, it favours return over other options, like integration or resettlement (Strachan, 2016).

Attempts to prevent human trafficking within the country include increased patrols by the police where the Sudanese population seems especially vulnerable to trafficking. The government is aware of capacity building needs, for instance, in the field of human trafficking, and organises trainings and workshops for officials (IOM, 2015). Nevertheless, the US Department of State (2016) regards efforts by the Sudanese Government to combat human trafficking as insignificant. A reception desk at the border with Eritrea provides assistance to VoTs and other migrants who are victims of exploitation (IOM, 2015).

Key stakeholders in the field of migration include, but are not limited to the Ministry of Labour, the National Committee to Combat Trafficking, Ministry of Interior, the Commission of Refugees, the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad and the National Security and Intelligence Service (IOM, 2011).

Gaps

All in all, Sudan’s migration policy does not seem coherent. The mandates between ministries and agencies often overlap. For instance, three ministries are responsible for foreign workers in Sudan. Gaps in the policy framework also arise from this lack of coherence (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012). Sudan largely depends on the support of international organisations regarding the development and implementation of migration policies and programmes as it lacks adequate capacities and resources, for instance to address human trafficking and smuggling (US Department of State, 2016; IOM, 2015). Authorities often conflate human trafficking and smuggling. In addition, Sudan should expand the protection of Sudanese labour migrants abroad, for instance through negotiating bilateral labour agreements with prominent destination countries, where migrants are at risk of exploitation (IOM, 2015). Assistance to return migrants, IDPs, refugees and host communities should be strengthened (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012).
References


