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Study on Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa

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Contents

| | |
|---|-----|
| List of Tables..... | III |
| List of Figures | III |
| List of Abbreviations..... | IV |
| Acknowledgements..... | V |
| Disclaimer..... | VI |
| Executive Summary | VII |
| 1. Introduction | 1 |
| 2. Migration Trends in the East and Horn of Africa | 3 |
| 2.1. Drivers of Migration in the Region..... | 3 |
| 2.2. Irregular Migration..... | 4 |
| 2.2.1. Trends in the East and Horn of Africa | 4 |
| 2.2.2 Human Smuggling and Irregular Cross-Border Movements..... | 6 |
| 2.2.3 Trafficking in Human Beings..... | 10 |
| 2.3 Forced Migration/ Displacement | 12 |
| 2.3.2 Refugees from and in the East and Horn of Africa | 13 |
| 2.3.3 Internal Displacement in the East and Horn of Africa | 17 |
| 2.4 Regular/ Labour Migration..... | 19 |
| 2.5 Remittances to the East and Horn of Africa..... | 22 |
| 3 External Migration Routes from the East and Horn of Africa | 24 |
| 2.1. The Northern Route (Also Known as the ‘Central Mediterranean Route’) | 24 |
| 3.2 The Sinai Route (Through Egypt into Israel) | 28 |
| 3.3 The Eastern Route (Between the Horn of Africa and Yemen) | 29 |
| 3.4 The Southern Route (Through Kenya towards South Africa)..... | 31 |
| 4 Policy Responses to Migration in the East and Horn of Africa | 34 |
| 4.2 Relevant National Policies and Stakeholders..... | 34 |
| 4.2.2 Djibouti..... | 35 |
| 4.2.3 Eritrea | 36 |
| 4.2.4 Ethiopia | 37 |
| 4.2.5 Kenya..... | 39 |
| 4.2.6 Somalia | 40 |
| 4.2.7 South Sudan | 41 |
| 4.2.8 Sudan..... | 42 |

| | | |
|-------|---|-----|
| 4.2.9 | Uganda | 43 |
| 4.3 | Relevant Regional Frameworks and Stakeholders..... | 45 |
| 4.3.2 | African Union (AU) | 45 |
| 4.3.3 | Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) | 46 |
| 4.3.4 | East African Community (EAC) | 47 |
| 4.3.5 | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) | 47 |
| 4.4 | Inter-Regional Frameworks..... | 48 |
| 4.5 | Relevant International Frameworks and Stakeholders | 49 |
| 4.5.2 | Multilateral Frameworks..... | 49 |
| 4.5.3 | Activities of International Actors in the East and Horn of Africa..... | 50 |
| 5 | Conclusions and Recommendations | 52 |
| | References..... | 55 |
| | References to Consult Regularly | 74 |
| | Annex A: Glossary of Key Migration Terminology | 76 |
| | Annex B: Key Demographic and Development Statistics..... | 82 |
| | Annex C: Immigration and Emigration Statistics..... | 84 |
| | Annex D: National Policy Responses Regarding Migration..... | 85 |
| | Annex E: Relevant International Conventions | 93 |
| | Annex F: Actions and Programmes of IOM and UNHCR in the East and Horn of Africa | 95 |
| | Annex G: UNHCR and IOM Budget's for the East and Horn of Africa | 100 |

List of Tables

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 1: Summary of Mixed Migration Trends in the East and Horn of Africa | 5 |
| Table 2: Tier Ranking in the TIP Report for Countries in the East and Horn of Africa, 2009-2016..... | 11 |
| Table 3: Refugees in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016 | 13 |
| Table 4: Top Host Countries of Refugees from the East and Horn of Africa, 2016 | 14 |
| Table 5: Internal Displacement in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016..... | 17 |
| Table 6: Relevant Conventions Ratified by the Countries in the East and Horn of Africa | 50 |
| Table 7: Djibouti's Key Migration Policy Responses | 85 |
| Table 8: Eritrea's Key Migration Policy Responses | 86 |
| Table 9: Ethiopia's Key Migration Policy Responses | 87 |
| Table 10: Kenya's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses | 88 |
| Table 11: Somalia's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses | 90 |
| Table 12: South Sudan's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses..... | 90 |
| Table 13: Sudan's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses | 91 |
| Table 14: Uganda's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses | 92 |
| Table 15: Detailed UNHCR Budget (Pillar 1) for the East and Horn of Africa (USD), 2016 | 100 |
| Table 16: IOM Budget for the East and Horn of Africa (USD), 2011-2015..... | 102 |

List of Figures

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 1: Regional Map of the East and Horn of Africa | 1 |
| Figure 2: Refugees and Asylum Seekers Hosted in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016/17..... | 14 |
| Figure 3: Remittances to the East and Horn of Africa, 2001-2016 | 22 |
| Figure 4: The Northern or Central Mediterranean Route..... | 25 |
| Figure 5: The Sinai Route | 29 |
| Figure 6: The Eastern Route | 30 |
| Figure 7: The Southern Route | 32 |

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|--|
| AU | African Union |
| AVR | Assisted Voluntary Return |
| AVRR | Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration |
| CCCM | Camp Coordination and Camp Management |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EU | European Union |
| HoA | Horn of Africa |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PoC | Persons of Concern |
| RMMS | Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| SPLA | Sudan's People Liberation Army |
| TIP | Trafficking in Persons |
| TRQN | Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN DESA | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| VoT | Victim of trafficking |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation & Hygiene |

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Disclaimer

The analysis, results and recommendations in this paper represent the opinion of the authors and are not necessarily representative of the position of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the complex mixed migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa. Based on a desk review of the existing literature and data on the main drivers and trends of migration in the region, the main routes, migrant vulnerabilities and needs as well as policy and programme responses to migration are presented. Specifically, the mixed migration context of eight countries in the East and Horn of Africa is examined: **Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda**. These countries are, to different extents, all origin, transit and/ or destination countries of migrants. In the East and Horn of Africa, asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants move within the region as well as beyond for a variety of different factors, including conflicts, political and socio-economic conditions as well as environmental causes in their respective countries of origin. These migrants often use the same migration routes and modes of travel, including smugglers. In addition, victims of trafficking may also be among these migrants. Overall, this mixed nature of migration in the region makes it a challenge to identify different types of migrants and their specific vulnerabilities and needs.

Drivers of Migration

The factors that lead people to make the decision to migrate through both regular and irregular channels are often called the drivers of migration. This includes both voluntary and forced movements as well as temporary and permanent ones. The countries in the East and Horn of Africa share many characteristics, but differ in others. It can be said that the **region as a whole** faces challenges associated with **low human and economic development**. In addition, violent **conflicts, political oppression and persecution** are or have been main migration drivers in **Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan**. In the case of **Eritrea** the **obligatory national service** requirements present another significant driver of migration. **Environmental factors** are also increasingly affecting countries in the region and impact peoples' livelihoods and migration decisions. Migration from **Uganda and Kenya** is mainly driven by economic factors. Often it is a mix of different factors that lead to the decision to migrate. It is important to keep in mind that even though the eight focus countries share some common drivers of migration the specific country context matters.

Irregular Migration

Irregular movements of migrants in and out of the East and Horn of Africa are diverse and significant in volume. The countries in the region are, at least to some extent, origin, transit and destination countries of irregular – next to forced and regular - migrants. Migration within the region can be described as being traditionally dynamic and highly reactive to the environment in which individuals live. Due to limited options for regular migration as well as the administrative challenges associated with it, migrants often choose irregular channels of migration, many being well aware of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with this. **Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda** can be described as being countries of origin, transit and destination for irregular migration flows in and out of the East and Horn of Africa region. **Eritrea** is mainly a country of origin of irregular migrants since regular channels for leaving the country are extremely limited. **Kenya** and **Sudan** are mainly transit and destination countries for irregular migrants and **Djibouti** is mainly a transit country for people migrating irregularly to Yemen and the Gulf countries. Temporary bans on labour migration, as have

been observed in the cases of Kenya and Ethiopia, increase irregular migration. Rising numbers of **unaccompanied minors** migrating irregularly are especially alarming.

Human smuggling and trafficking in persons contribute significantly to irregular movements in the East and Horn of Africa. Smuggling is defined in the *Smuggling of Migrants Protocol*, which is a supplement to the United Nations Convention on Transitional Organized Crime, as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. Irregular migrants in and from the East and Horn of Africa usually **contract smugglers for at least part, if not all, of their journey**. This exposes migrants to considerable risks, such as neglect, violent abuse and extortion. It also increases their risk of being subjected to **human trafficking**, which is **fundamentally different from human smuggling**. Human trafficking is a **criminal offense** that is of concern in all countries of the East and Horn of Africa. It is defined in the *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons* as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Hence, in contrast to smuggling, **trafficking occurs against the will of migrants**. It is therefore important not to conflate the two phenomena. In the East and Horn of Africa, native as well as migrant children, women and men are subjected to trafficking within the respective country as well as internationally. Main purposes of trafficking include **forced labour and sexual exploitation**. An additional concern, especially in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, are child soldiers that are recruited by governmental as well as opposition forces.

Evidence exists that in many countries in the East and Horn of Africa, government officials are actively or passively engaged in smuggling and trafficking operations. The engagement ranges from occasionally accepting bribes at border crossings or inland checkpoints to officials subjecting victims of trafficking to domestic servitude or sexual exploitation themselves. Furthermore, governments do not seem aware of the crucial differences between human smuggling and trafficking.

Forced Migration/Displacement

Forced displacement is a serious concern to be addressed in the region and presents a significant challenge for achieving peace, security, sustainable development and economic well-being. The countries in the East and Horn of Africa are both countries of origin as well as host countries for forced migrants, including conflict-induced, environment-induced, and development-induced displacement. A complex history of conflicts, weak governance, general insecurity, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty, and a range of persistent development challenges are the main causes of forced migration and displacement in the region. The majority of the displaced individuals are women and children. Many of the displacement situations are protracted and have lasted for more than 20 years at this stage. At the same time, new refugee movements are caused by ongoing conflicts as in the case of South Sudan and environmental disasters such as the current droughts and food insecurity affecting South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. **Somalia and South Sudan** are the main countries of origin in the region, while **Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda** are main host countries with **Uganda currently hosting the largest refugee population** in the region. Not all displacement from the eight focus countries of this report is to other countries in the East and

Horn of Africa. Other African countries, the United States, Canada and European countries are also important host countries for refugees from the East and Horn of Africa.

While the focus of this report is on international migration, **internal displacement** cannot be ignored since internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often future refugees and irregular migrants. While there is a lack of existing data and literature regarding internal displacement in the East and Horn of Africa, it is clear that it is a serious concern in most of the focus countries and especially in Sudan. As in the case of international forced migration, internal displacement is caused by a variety of factors, including conflicts, violence, and environmental factors such as droughts and floods. Moreover, internal displacement can sometimes be induced by development. These instances are often referred to as development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), and indicate when people are forced from their home as result of development projects such as the construction of dams, mines, airports, industrial plants, railways or similar (Stanley, 2004).

Regular/ Labour Migration

The literature on migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa focuses on forced displacement and irregular migration. Regular migration, especially for the purpose of labour, is much less understood. Between 1990 and 2015, the migrant stock in Djibouti, Kenya and – to a lesser extent - Somalia increased, while it decreased in Uganda and Sudan. While the 2015 data presents South Sudan as a prominent destination country, the migrant stock is expected to decrease because of the internal conflict. In terms of emigration, Kenya shows significantly different characteristics compared to the other countries in the East and Horn of Africa. The majority of Kenyan emigration is regular and largely characterized by the migration of skilled Kenyans mainly for educational or work purposes. The Gulf countries are prominent destination countries for labour migrants from the East and Horn of Africa and some countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have negotiated bilateral labour agreements with Gulf countries to protect their nationals abroad which are frequently exploited, abused and subjected to trafficking. No bilateral labour agreements between the focus countries were identified, besides an agreement between Kenya and Ethiopia which provides for visa free movements between the two countries. On the regional level, there are aspirations to introduce the free movement of persons in the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, these aspirations are prevented from being realised because of a lack of political will as well as a lack of awareness regarding the development potentials of migration and free movement.

Remittances – both formal and informal - to the countries in the East and Horn of Africa are significant and therefore have the potential to contribute to development of the countries in the region.

External Migration Routes

Four routes commonly used by migrants leaving the region can be described: the Northern or Central Mediterranean Route, the Sinai Route, the Eastern Route as well as the Southern Route.

The **Northern Route (also known as the ‘Central Mediterranean Route’)** is used by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa and other parts of Africa to get to **Europe**, crossing the Mediterranean Sea mainly departing from **Libya** and trying to reach Italy. The first quarter of 2017 shows a drastic drop in the number of migrants who follow this route. The main reason for this is a significant

decrease of the number of Eritreans using this route. In addition, this route is directly related to the political and security situation in Libya. At this stage it is not clear how the situation in Libya is likely to change in the future and what that will mean for the migrants using this route. What can already be observed is a shift of the route towards Egypt.

The **Eastern Route** moves out of the East and Horn of Africa towards **Yemen and onwards to Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia**. For many years, this route has been widely popular, mostly among Ethiopian and Somali migrants. In more recent years, the numbers of those using this route has been fluctuating, but the arrival numbers reached a peak in 2016 since monitoring missions started in 2006 despite the deteriorating situation in Yemen.

The **Southern Route (through Kenya towards South Africa)** connects the East and Horn of Africa to South Africa, with Kenya as one of the main transit countries. Other transit countries on the route include Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique. The southern route is popular especially among Ethiopians and Somalis, although the most current numbers demonstrate a decrease in the number of migrants following it.

The **Sinai Route** runs from the **East and Horn of Africa through Sudan and Egypt into Israel**. Since 2012 the number of migrants using this route has been significantly lower, to the point of it being almost inoperative. This is the result of restrictive migration policies by both Egypt and Israel, such as the building of a fence along the Sinai-Israeli border, tougher border controls as well as the establishment of a detention centre.

Policy Responses

At the **national level** there are some frameworks in place to address migration issues, however, in most cases they address administration matters and the fight against human trafficking, but do not seem very comprehensive (policies in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are slightly more advanced). Research and data regarding the effectiveness of these policies are scarce. National governments in the region are faced with limited capacities and resources to implement laws and policies, which is the most significant obstacle to proper implementation and enforcement. Another problem is that authorities conflate human trafficking and smuggling and do not understand and/or exploit the development potentials of migration sufficiently.

Addressing migration issues at the **regional level** seems desirable as regional cooperation assumedly increases efficiency while decreasing costs, incoherence and duplication of policies. Besides the active role of the **African Union (AU)** in promoting the integration of regional economic communities (RECs), the free movement of people, and the development potentials of migration, three other regional frameworks are relevant regarding migration in the East and Horn of Africa, namely the **IGAD**, the **EAC** and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (**COMESA**). While these regional frameworks do recognise the importance of migration and have introduced or are planning to introduce the right of free movement within the region, regional cooperation remains a challenge due to a lack of capacities, resources and political willingness on parts of the member states. There are furthermore inter-regional frameworks to address migration, especially between the AU and EU, which cover aspects of migration and development, the fight against human trafficking, and the protection of migrants, including refugees and victims of trafficking.

Several ***multilateral frameworks*** including UN and ILO Conventions address issues of migration. There is not one single country among the eight focus countries, which has ratified all International Conventions relevant to the field of migration; Kenya has ratified most and South Sudan the least. Only three Conventions, namely the *1930 Forced Labour Convention*, the *1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention* and the *1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child*, were ratified by all eight focus countries. **International Actors** in the field of migration, especially the International Organisation for Migration (**IOM**) and the United States High Commissioner for Refugees (**UNHCR**) are very active in the East and Horn of Africa, providing assistance to governments and migrants.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa is diverse, complex and significant in volume. Flows are largely mixed including forced as well as economic migrants and shaped by many different factors. Migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa is associated with many risks and vulnerabilities for the migrants. Due to limited regular migration channels, movements in the region are largely irregular, which is why migrants face significant protection issues, such as abuse and exploitation by smugglers and traffickers. Consequently, there is much that can be done to improve the situation in countries of origin and transit, but also of destination.

The main issues in all countries in the region in dealing with migration management, including irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, is a lack of resources and capacity at the institutional level. It is therefore crucial to strengthen these capacities and step up resources to deal with the identified problems successfully. It is recommended that countries in the East and Horn of Africa work together either bilaterally or - ideally – regionally to address challenges related to international migration since migration naturally crosses international borders, levels of governance and policy domains.

As this report is based on only secondary information and many knowledge gaps have been identified, it is, recommended that GIZ country offices build on this report by cross-referencing its findings with on-the-ground experiences and sources as well as analyse it in light of the existing development portfolio of GIZ in the respective country.

1.Introduction

Migratory movements in and out of the East and Horn of Africa are diverse and significant in volume. The flows of people in, between and from countries in the region can best be characterized as mixed migration flows¹. Forced² migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, and voluntary economic migrants³ move within the region as well as beyond for a variety of different factors, including conflicts as well as socio-economic conditions in their respective countries of origin. These migrants⁴ often use the same migration routes and modes of travel, including smugglers⁵. In addition, victims of trafficking (VoTs)⁶ may also be among these migrants. Overall, this mixed nature of migration in the region makes it a challenge to identify different types of migrants and their specific vulnerabilities and needs.

This report has been commissioned by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH in response to a significant increase in the commissioning of projects related to (irregular) migration in Africa. In order to respond to these requests, which are expected to further increase in the coming years, GIZ aims to better understand the complex dynamics of migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa. In this context, it is particularly important to understand the main drivers of migration as well as the routes on which migrants travel.

Figure 1: Regional Map of the East and Horn of Africa



Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2017.

The aim of this report is to summarize the evidence on the mixed migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa. In the context of this report eight countries from this region are considered, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. In addition, the changing situation in Libya and its potential impacts on migration flows from the region of interest is taken into account.

¹ Mixed flows are defined in the IOM Glossary on Migration as “complex migratory population movements that include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants” (IOM, 2011a).

² Forced migration is “a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes” (IOM, 2011a). This includes environment-, development- and forced or conflict-induced displacement. Forced or conflict-induced displacement “is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict [or] civil unrest” (IOM, 2011a). The form of displacement has consequences for migrants’ and states’ legal rights and obligations, which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation.

³ The Glossary of Key migration terminology provided in Annex A can be consulted to understand the differences between different types of migrants as well as other specific terms mentioned throughout this report.

⁴ The term migrant is used throughout this report in a way that it encompasses different types of migrants, including voluntary and forced, regular and irregular, unless otherwise specified.

⁵ Smuggling is defined as “the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the illegal entry into a state of which that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident” (INTERPOL, n.d.).

⁶ Trafficking in persons is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (IOM, 2011a).

This study builds on a regional study authored by Maastricht University and commissioned by the GIZ programme Better Migration Management (BMM) (Marchand, Roosen, Reinold & Siegel, 2016) last year. Building on that work, this report aims to gather and synthesize the available data and evidence with the aim of identifying particular development needs and challenges in the area of migration in the East and Horn of Africa. This is done based on desk research, which at the same time is the main limitation of the study. The identification of vulnerabilities, needs and challenges of migrants as well as governments in the East and Horn of Africa based on only secondary information means that if things are not well documented in the existing literature and data, they will not be represented here. It is, therefore, recommended that GIZ country offices build on this report by cross-referencing its findings with on-the-ground experiences and sources as well as analyse it in light of the existing development portfolio of GIZ in the respective country.

Due to the mixed, and in many cases irregular⁷, nature of migration movements it is especially challenging to present all trends and issues related to migration in the East and Horn of Africa. It is therefore important to understand that this report is not able to present a comprehensive overview of migration in and from the region, but rather aims at presenting the main drivers and routes of migration and the corresponding policy responses. Where evidence can be identified, information will also be provided on the characteristics of migrants.

Note on Data

It is important to mention at the outset of this report, that data regarding the mixed migration trends and routes in and from the East and Horn of Africa is largely scattered - if available at all. In addition, data published by different sources often provides different numbers on migrant stocks and their composition. Many of the numbers are based on estimates, which are conducted using different methodologies, or on anecdotal evidence. In addition, different organizations use different definitions when measuring migration. It also is important to highlight that the differentiation between involuntary, regular and irregular (labour) migrants is only possible to a limited extent. In particular, data on irregular migration is, due to its nature, hard to come by. While numbers from different sources should not be compared and do not provide a full picture, the collected data still manages to provide an overview of migration to, from and between Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

The rest of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of key migration trends in and from the East and Horn of Africa by looking at different kinds of migration, namely irregular, forced and regular/ labour migration movements. This includes a short section on smuggling as well as trafficking⁸. Section 3 then provides a brief overview of the most prominent routes migrants commonly take out of the region. Section 4 focuses on policy responses to migration at the national, regional as well as international level. Finally, Section 5 concludes with an overview of identified development challenges and needs as well

⁷ Irregular migrants lack legal status for instance because of leaving, entering, residing or working in a country without the required (travel) documents or authorisation (IOM, 2011a).

⁸ There is a “prevailing confusion between smuggling of migrants and concepts such as irregular migration and trafficking in persons” (UNODC, 2011, p. 5). Smuggling is defined in the “Smuggling of Migrants Protocol”, which is a supplement to the United Nations Convention on Transitional Organized Crime, as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. In contrast, trafficking in persons is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

as gaps in the current evidence on migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa. Several annexes complement the main body of the report. In addition, the authors have developed a series of short migration profiles - one each for the eight countries under investigation - which will be accompanying the report.

2. Migration Trends in the East and Horn of Africa⁹

Migration in the East and Horn of Africa is a complex phenomenon. This section of the report aims to summarize the main migration trends in the region. The focus will be on irregular as well as on forced migration movements in the region, but also address labour migration through regular channels. A short section on remittances to the East and Horn of Africa concludes the section.

2.1. Drivers of Migration in the Region

The factors that lead people to make the decision to migrate through both regular and irregular channels are often called the drivers of migration. This includes both voluntary and forced movements, as well as temporary and permanent movements. The countries in the East and Horn of Africa share many characteristics, but differ in others. Before going specifically into the description of the migration situations in these countries, it is therefore important to understand that the **country contexts matter and the drivers of migration are largely related to these different conditions.** Annex B presents a comparison of some basic information and relevant development indicators for the countries in the East and Horn of Africa based on the most recent data available. Overall, it can be said that the region as a whole faces challenges associated with **low human and economic development.** In addition, **violent conflicts, political oppression and persecution** are main migration drivers in some of the relevant countries. **Environmental factors** are also increasingly affecting countries in the region and impact people's food security, livelihoods and migration decisions.

Migration from **Djibouti** is relatively insignificant in numbers and Djiboutian nationals are rarely documented as leaving their country irregularly. This is observed despite high poverty levels, limited employment and livelihood opportunities (RMMS, 2016a). In the case of **Eritrea**, on the other hand, common drivers of migration have been identified. One of the main drivers of migration is the obligatory national service, which all Eritreans between the ages of 18 and 40 must perform for a total of 18 months, including 6 months of military training and 12 months of service in a government-run work unit, which includes the Eritrean Defence Forces. This 18 months limit is, however, often not enforced and the service lasts much longer in practice. Individuals between the ages of 40 and 50 are considered to be on reserve status, if they previously had performed active duty service. Students in their last year of high school have to attend the Sawa military and educational camp in order to graduate. Conditions at the camp are reportedly bad and abuse of both males and females as well as sexual abuse and rape of females appear to occur. As a consequence, irregular migration of Eritreans is dominated by young individuals, and especially men, who are affected by the service requirements (US Department of State, 2016). These prolonged national service obligations, political oppression as well as poor economic conditions are therefore described as the main drivers for migration particularly of young Eritreans, including unaccompanied minors (RMMS, 2016b).

⁹ Migration profiles for each of the eight countries accompany this main report. This section synthesizes the main migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa region. For more details on each individual country, please refer to the respective document.

Drivers for migration from **Ethiopia** are varied, but can be summarized as being socio-economic factors along with ethnic tensions and environmental disasters that impact people's livelihoods. Recently, in 2011 a drought affected Ethiopia and, to different extents, the other countries in the region. Besides Ethiopia, it hit Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti the hardest (RMMS, 2016c). Similar factors drive migration from **Uganda** though the flows are much smaller. Specifically, continuous population growth, high youth unemployment rates and the lack of attractive employment options, environmental risks and problematic ownership of land resources, which are distorted in favour of older generations, have been identified as the main drivers in the Ugandan context. The latter especially encourages emigration of youth (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015).

Somalia has been a major country of origin for mixed migration in the East and Horn of Africa especially in the past 25 years. Factors pushing people to leave the country were and are conflict, chronic insecurity, extreme poverty, famine, and until 2012, the lack of an effective central government (RMMS, 2016d). Migration from **South Sudan** is largely driven by conflicts, the latest of which is displacing millions within the country as well as across borders, which is exacerbated by an increase in food insecurity (UNHCR, 2017p). Migration from **Sudan** is also driven by conflict in addition to factors such as a lack of sustainable livelihoods and employment opportunities as well as a lack of basic infrastructure and social services and food insecurity (IOM, 2011b).

Kenya, on the other hand, shows significantly different characteristics compared to the other countries in the East and Horn of Africa. Kenyans are rarely found among the flows of irregular migrants in or out of the region. Instead Kenyan migrants are largely (highly) skilled workers traveling with documents and visas, which some then fail to renew or overstay and become irregular as a consequence (Horwood, 2015; RMMS, 2017a).

2.2. Irregular Migration

2.2.1. Trends in the East and Horn of Africa

Irregular movements of migrants in and out of the East and Horn of Africa are diverse and significant in volume. Irregular migrants are those that cross "borders without proper authority or violating conditions for entering another country" (Jordan & Düvell, 2002, p. 15). This includes both those migrants that enter a country irregularly and those that enter through regular channels, but then become irregular by overstaying their visa (de Haas, 2008). **Most of the countries in the East and Horn of Africa region are, at least to some extent, origin, transit and destination countries of irregular – next to forced and regular - migrants.** Migration within the region can be described as being traditionally dynamic and highly reactive to political, socio-economic and environmental factors. **Due to limited options for regular migration or the administrative challenges associated with it, many migrants choose irregular channels of migration, many being well aware of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with this type of migration** (Marchand et al., 2016).

Table 1: Summary of Mixed Migration Trends in the East and Horn of Africa

| | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---|------------------|-----------------------|
| Origin | | X | X | x | X | X | x | X |
| Transit | X | | X | X | X | X | X | |
| Destination | | | X | X | x | X | X | |
| Push Factors | Economic factors | Obligatory national service | Socio-economic factors | Economic factors | Conflict & chronic insecurity | Conflict | Conflict | Demographic factors |
| | | Political oppression | Ethnic tensions | | Economic factors | Economic factors | Economic factors | Economic factors |
| | | Economic factors | Environmental factors | | Environmental factors | Lack of infrastructure & social services; food insecurity | | Environmental factors |

Note: Smaller crosses indicate that relative to other countries in the region these flows are smaller.

Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda can be described as being countries of origin, transit and – to a lesser extent - destination for irregular migration flows in and out of the East and Horn of Africa region. Main factors that push migrants to leave Somalia are poverty, insecurity and natural disasters, the terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab and the Kenyan military operations in South Central Somalia. In addition, the Horn of Africa (HoA) famine of 2011 and more recent increases in food insecurity led to migration and displacement in the region (see Section 2.3.2). Irregular migrants from other countries, mainly Ethiopia, predominantly live in Somaliland and it is estimated that there are at least 20,000 irregular immigrants there. Somalia, in particular Somaliland and Puntland, is also a transit country on the way to Yemen and beyond, especially for Ethiopians as well as South Central Somalis. In the case of South Sudan it is likely that the civil war in the country is changing the trends of irregular migration to the country, but evidence on this is lacking at this stage. Earlier reports discuss South Sudan as a destination country for irregular migrant workers, due to its porous borders, weak border management and the perception of economic opportunities (related to the presence of a strong humanitarian aid system in the country) compared to dire realities in other countries in the region. Government estimates state that there are tens of thousands of irregular migrants, mostly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. In addition, South Sudan is also a transit country for migrants trying to reach Europe or Southern Africa. Most migrants that use it as a transit country are from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015, RMMS, 2016d; 2016e). Irregular migration from Uganda is often tied to searching for better economic opportunities abroad, including Europe and Asia. In addition, Uganda is a transit country for those going to South Africa for work (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015; IOM, 2013b). Irregular migration to Uganda seems to have increased over the years despite being difficult to measure. Knowledge on the routes and networks is, however, still very scant, while it is clear that irregular migrants are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking in Uganda.

Sudan and Kenya are mainly considered to be countries of destination and transit for irregular migrants. Sudan is also a country of origin, however, to a much lesser extent. Large numbers of irregular migrants move through Sudan and few decide to settle in the country for longer periods. Many stay only long enough to earn the money to move onwards, as the country has increasingly been becoming a central hub on the northern routes. Hundreds of migrants move through Sudan annually and few decide to settle in the country for longer periods. These flows consist of asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants. A large

percentage is made up of young Eritreans, but there are also other nationalities represented in the flows such as Ethiopians, Somalis, South Sudanese and Sudanese themselves (DAI Europe & EuroTrends, 2015). Kenya is a major transit and destination country for irregular migrants from neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan, and from other countries such as Eritrea, Sudan, the DRC and Rwanda. Compared to its neighbours, Kenya is relatively well developed and politically stable, it has good infrastructure, already established migrant communities and extensive smuggling networks. All these factors make it an important irregular migration hub in the region. In terms of emigration, however, Kenyans are rarely found among the flows of irregular migrants in or out of the region. They usually travel with documents and visas, which they may then fail to renew or overstay and become irregular as a consequence (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2017a).

Djibouti is mainly a transit country for irregular migrants, mainly Ethiopians and to a smaller extent Somalis, on their way to Yemen and the Gulf States. Incidences of abuse and exploitation have been increasingly reported along this route and therefore recently the way through Djibouti is becoming less popular and movements are shifting more towards the Arab Sea coast in Somalia. Only a small share of migrants end up staying in Djibouti. Djiboutian nationals, on the other hand, are seldom documented as leaving their country irregularly despite the potential drivers described above. The reasons for this are not well understood in the literature at this stage (RMMS, 2016a). Concerning irregular emigration, **Eritrea** can easily be described as the opposite of Djibouti. It is a key origin country of origin of irregular migrants. Options for regular emigration are limited as passports or exit visas are generally not issued to those between the ages of 18 and 30 due to the national service obligations. Eritrea is not really used as a transit or destination country by other irregular migrants due to the dangers associated with crossing the country's borders (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016b). Neighbouring **Ethiopia** is also primarily an origin country of irregular migrants and a transit country, mainly for Somalis on the way to Sudan. The significance of Ethiopia as an origin country is highlighted by the fact that Ethiopians represent one of the major groups among the irregular migrants on the move both within and out of the Horn of Africa region (RMMS, 2014a).

2.2.2 Human Smuggling and Irregular Cross-Border Movements

As highlighted above, irregular migration is prominent in the East and Horn of Africa region. To understand these movements, it is important to analyse the initial movements out of the country of origin. While for some migrants this is the main aim of their movement as they leave their home country for safety reasons, others aspire to move beyond the borders of countries in the region. The routes used for such movements will be presented in Section 3 of this report, while this section looks at the initial movements out of the country of origin into and through other countries in the region. Specific focus is on the use of smugglers in these operations. As these movements are largely irregular in nature, they are difficult to measure. Therefore, only anecdotal evidence exists.¹⁰ There are likely many other border crossings and smuggling operations for which evidence is not available at this stage.

¹⁰ For more detailed information on these routes, please refer to Marchand et al. (2016).

Definitions

There is a “prevailing confusion between smuggling of migrants and concepts such as irregular migration and trafficking in persons” (UNODC, 2011, p. 5). Smuggling is defined in the “Smuggling of Migrants Protocol”, which is a supplement to the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. In contrast, trafficking in persons is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

Knowledge of the characteristics of smugglers in the East and Horn of Africa is scattered and still limited. **Trafficking as well as smuggling operations from the region to Europe are usually operated by sophisticated and linked networks that are based in Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Italy.** While it is important not to conflate human trafficking and smuggling, operations are often linked since they involve similar steps like recruiting migrants, obtaining (fake) documents, organising vehicles and drivers, transporting individuals and bribing officials. Shelley (2014) calls traffickers and smugglers “logistics specialists who can move individuals across vast distances” (p.7). In addition, what starts as smuggling can become trafficking during the journey (Lukowiak, 2016). Eritreans appear to the major groups of smugglers and traffickers along the route, but they collaborate with nationals of the other main countries of origin, namely Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. In these networks, the entire journey of migrants is coordinated by members of the networks that facilitate the entire way, including transport, crossings of land borders and of the Mediterranean Sea (Sahan Foundation & IGAD, 2016).

There are a series of abuses migrants reportedly suffer frequently during smuggling operations. First, **land transport is often dangerous since traveling through the hot deserts of the East and Horn of Africa often results in migrants suffering from dehydration and starvation. Migrants are vulnerable to robberies, beatings as well as sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).** Smugglers also are known to crowd migrants into container trucks, which can lead to death by suffocation. Second, the sea passages hold many

additional dangers. **Boats are constantly overcrowded and migrants frequently report abuses such as violence, rape, murder and forced disembarkation in deep water areas.** Men are packed with engine fuel and exhaust fumes, causing burns and suffocation; while women are held on deck frequently subjected to sexual abuse and sometimes murder (Horwood, 2015). Third, once arriving in their destination, smugglers are also known to charge exorbitantly high rents and kidnap migrants, especially children, demanding ransom (US Department of State, 2016). Moreover, many migrants are abducted by gangs and traffickers, once in their destination, demonstrating that smugglers and traffickers regularly work together (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015).

As described above, migration movements from **Eritrea** are largely irregular due to the emigration restrictions. One of the main routes of Eritreans is to cross the border to Ethiopia, a dangerous journey due to risks such as being shot or detained by Eritrean border guards. As a consequence, these border crossings largely take place in the dark and in rural areas away from main roads (Mixed Migration Hub, 2015). Another popular route out of Eritrea is crossing the border with Sudan (RMMS, 2014b). Due to the limited options for regular emigration and the dangers associated with irregular emigration, human smuggling is

prominent in Eritrea. While there is not much information about smugglers' characteristics, it has been reported that often Eritrean border officials or other 'guides' are involved in smuggling activities, which allows avoiding checkpoints and the associated risks of being caught leaving the country illegally (Van Reisen, Estefanos & Rijken, 2012; 2013; GSDRC, 2016). Smugglers work at different stages of the migration process depending on location, time of the year as well as supply and demand, and are not necessarily part of greater criminal networks, but rather can also operate individually (GSDRC, 2016; RMMS, 2014b; Hamood, 2006). Evidence suggests that the costs for smugglers range between \$960 and \$9,600 (RMMS, 2014b). The journey from Eritrea to Khartoum reportedly takes between three and six days and costs the migrants between USD 100 and 150 (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013).

Overall, smuggling is a common feature in **Sudan**, as it facilitates irregular movement in and out of the country. Sudan's geographical location makes it a transit country for smuggling services which often succumb to trafficking operations. Both Eritreans and Ethiopians tend to rely on nationals of their country of origin to guide them through the smuggling process, as it is not manageable to follow the migration route without the help of smugglers. To reach neighbouring countries, such as Libya, migrants often switch between different smugglers. The journey often starts in refugee camps, passing on through Khartoum and onto Sudan's northern border (DAI Europe & EuroTrends, 2015; Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2014b).

Crossing borders out of or into **Ethiopia** is usually done using a combination of walking and vehicles. An extensive network of agents and smugglers exists that facilitate these crossings, and also the transport from different areas within Ethiopia (RMMS, 2016c). The process is usually relatively fast and smooth due to well established smuggling networks. The smugglers either hide the migrants at road blocks and border crossings or bribe the officials posted there. Migrants who travel without smugglers, are more vulnerable and often face many more problems on their way (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016c).

Smuggling is a common feature of irregular migration in **Djibouti**, as networks transport migrants from there to Yemen. Smugglers often operate within refugee camps, trying to recruit clients for the journey (Horwood, 2015). Others transport migrants from Ethiopia directly to Djiboutian coastal cities. Those who cannot afford the service of smugglers must walk long stretches of the journey. This can prove to be critical, as those migrants are the ones most vulnerable to hardships such as lack of food and water, extortion and abuse (RMMS, 2016a). Thus, many migrants see smuggling as a more viable option. Smuggling networks in Djibouti are largely organized as loosely affiliated criminal networks, which often force migrants to pay higher fees for each transfer (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). Reports show that the sea passage from Djibouti costs on average USD 140 per person, amounting to roughly USD 34 million between 2011 and 2015. Considering Djibouti's very low GDP and the underpayment of state officials, bribes are a common practice and the smuggling economy is an attractive enterprise (Horwood, 2015). It has also been reported that there is an increasing number of unaccompanied Ethiopian minors arriving in Djibouti. They mainly aim to make their way to Yemen, but many cannot afford to do so. Nonetheless, it has been estimated that almost one third of the migrants departing from Djibouti towards Yemen are minors. Those that remain stranded in Djibouti Ville often have to resort to activities such as begging, peddling goods, washing cars or shoes and petty crimes to make some income. They are vulnerable to exploitation and face deportation, as round-ups are conducted by Djiboutian authorities regularly (RMMS, 2015).

As the Djiboutian authorities have increased border patrols, smuggling has become even more clandestine and important for migrants to avoid arrests and deportation. This has, however, reportedly led to increased extortion of migrants by smugglers. Abuse of migrants by fellow migrants has also been reported (RMMS, 2016a). It has also been described that smugglers often make additional income, if they cooperate with

criminal extortion gangs in Yemen. The smugglers inform the criminals about arrival locations and times and the gangs then have the chance of abducting new arrivals. Allegedly gangs pay the smugglers up to USD 50 per migrant (Horwood, 2015).

Somalia is a source and transit country for smuggling, which has flourished due to the instability and lack of governmental capacity to address it (DAI Europe & EuroTrends, 2015; UNODC, 2006). The harbour city of Bossaso in Puntland is a main smuggling hub on the eastern route, especially prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen. Smugglers often operate out of Mogadishu and move migrants north with mini-buses or private vehicles. A second route is that through Hiiraan. To avoid road blocks and other risks on the way north, migrants from South Central Somalia have been found to fly from Mogadishu to Hargeisa in the west, which is also a hub for Ethiopian and South Central Somali migrants and smugglers on the eastern route (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016d). An increase in Somali migrants using smugglers to get to Libya has been observed more recently, while this was not really the case before 2013. Somalis traveling to Kenya also use smugglers, which will often take them either just to the border between Somalia and Kenya or drop them off close to the Dadaab refugee camp. As is the case in most countries, smuggling in Somalia is also often associated with abuse and exploitation of migrants. In addition, it has been found that in Puntland business people that are involved in smuggling networks can operate with influential government officials knowing about it (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016d).

Smuggling and trafficking have been found to be one of the most common forms of organized crime in **Kenya** (Gastrow, 2011). While the importance of smuggling in the Kenyan context is therefore clear, evidence on the phenomenon is still somewhat limited. Smugglers in Kenya reportedly operate in the main urban centres Nairobi and Mombasa, but also out of the refugee camps, as well as between these places. Officially, refugees need a pass issued by the Kenyan government to move within the country, but in practice it has been found that they are also able to travel without this document (Gastrow, 2011; RMMS, 2017a). From the camps, migrants pay smugglers to take them to Nairobi, which is a central hub for obtaining travel documents, fake birth and marriage certificates, as well as visas for other countries (often fake). Many of these documents are particularly needed by migrants that aim to move onwards to countries in Europe or North America (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2017a).

Not much is known about the profits of smuggling networks in Kenya. An older estimate by IOM indicates that annual revenue of about USD 40 million is generated by these activities (Hungwe, 2009). More recently the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat estimated an overall sum of USD 47 million each year for 2015/16. It is clear that smuggling operations contribute significantly to the local economy especially in smaller border communities (Frouws & Horwood, 2017). In terms of fees that individuals pay, it has been reported that the costs of being smuggled from the Ethiopian-Kenyan border to Nairobi is between USD 600 and 700 (Marchand et al., 2016). High levels of corruption in the country facilitate the thriving smuggling industry in Kenya. Border officials and police can easily be bribed and protection, information, documentation and power can be bought (Gastrow, 2011). Migrants have reported that it does not seem like officials accept an occasional bribe, but rather are part of the smuggling and trafficking industry (Frouws & Horwood, 2017; Gastrow, 2011; Horwood, 2009).

In the case of **Uganda**, there is a surprising lack of literature about smuggling networks and routes. This is noteworthy as transnational trafficking is extensively analysed in the Ugandan context. Equally, not much is known about smuggling networks operating in **South Sudan**. Crossing the border with the help of smugglers from South Sudan to Sudan, reportedly only costs around USD 32. Migrants then move on from there to the major hub Khartoum. Smuggling networks are furthermore used by irregular migrants to reach

destinations such as Northern Africa and Europe from South Sudan. However, it is likely that these operations changed after the outbreak of civil war, although no information on how they changed is available at this point (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015).

2.2.3 Trafficking in Human Beings

Considering the nature of the mixed migration flows in the East and Horn of Africa, with many irregular migrants among them, **trafficking in human beings is a concern in the region. Irregular migrants, especially those using smugglers, are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking (VoT).** While the true scope of the issue is not known due to the difficulties of measuring this illegal activity, estimates for the period 2009 to 2013 state that 25,000 to 30,000 individuals became victims of trafficking (VoT) in the East and Horn of Africa. Interestingly, the same report indicates that **the majority (95%) of detected cases of trafficking were Eritreans, with only a few Ethiopians and Somalis among the VoTs** (UNHCR, 2014).

The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, published by the US Department of State annually, provides a comprehensive overview of governmental anti-human trafficking efforts by presenting main trends regarding the nature and scope of trafficking in persons and the broad range of government actions to confront and eliminate it. The report is a good tool to understand trafficking in a specific country context as well as to examine where resources to address the challenges associated with trafficking are most needed. In the TIP Report, each country is placed onto one of three tiers based on the extent of their governments' efforts to comply with the "minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking" based on the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. This Act provides the tools to combat trafficking in persons (US Department of State, 2016).

As Table 2 shows none of the focus countries of this report classify as a Tier 1¹¹ country. Instead, in 2016, three of the countries placed as Tier 2 and four as Tier 3, while Somalia is considered as a special case. This is due to the limited influence of Somalia's Federal Government to counter trafficking in the country due to capacity-constraints, a lack of understanding, parts of the country having declared independence, and confrontations with the terrorist group al-Shabaab, leading to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Therefore, verified information about human trafficking in the country is difficult to obtain. It is, however, clear that Somalia is involved in all phases of human trafficking as country of source, transit and destination for children, women and men who are subjected to sex trafficking and forced labour (US Department of State, 2016).

Djibouti, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan are all considered **Tier 3** countries, which means that the governments of these countries do not meet the minimum standards to address trafficking, nor are they showing serious efforts to do so. As can be seen in Table 2, these countries, with the exception of Eritrea, have shown more signs of improvement in previous years, but dropped down to Tier 3 recently (US Department of State, 2016).

The countries ranked at **Tier 2** are **Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda**. This implies that the governments of these countries do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to do so. No change in this ranking over the years indicated can be observed for Ethiopia and Uganda reflecting their

¹¹ The TIP ranks countries whose governments fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards as Tier 1 countries.

constant efforts to address trafficking (US Department of State, 2016). Kenya was ranked lower as being on the Tier 2 Watch List for three years between 2012 and 2014, but moved back up to Tier 2 as the government is making stronger efforts to implement anti-trafficking measures, such as the formation of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Advisory Committee and updating Kenya's National Plan of Action to Counter Human Trafficking 2013-2017 (US Department of State, 2015; Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Service of Kenya, 2013).

Overall, it appears clear that **much remains to be done in the countries of the East and Horn of Africa to address human trafficking and its impacts** not only on a **policy level**, but also in terms of **prevention and protection of victims**.

Table 2: Tier Ranking in the TIP Report for Countries in the East and Horn of Africa, 2009-2016

| Country | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Djibouti | 2WL | 2 | 2 | 2WL | 2WL | 2WL | 2WL | 3 |
| Eritrea | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Ethiopia | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Kenya | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2WL | 2WL | 2WL | 2 | 2 |
| Somalia | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case | Special Case |
| South Sudan | N/A | N/A | N/A | 2WL | 2WL | 2WL | 3 | 3 |
| Sudan | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2WL | 2WL | 3 |
| Uganda | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

Source: US Department of State, 2016.

Looking at the trends in human trafficking in the region, it can be said that **most focus countries of this report are considered to be countries of origin, transit and destination of VoTs**. The main exception is **Eritrea**, where there is no reporting on it being a country of transit or destination, likely due to tight border controls and low rates of immigration described above. It is, on the other hand, a significant country of origin for VoTs as previously mentioned and involvement of Eritrean diplomats and officials, including the military and police, in trafficking operations has been observed (US Department of State, 2016).

In general, the purposes of the trafficking are similar across all eight countries. The evidence shows that children, women and men are all vulnerable to be trafficked for forced labour as well as sexual exploitation in, to or from the eight focus countries. **Girls and women** are arguably more vulnerable to becoming VoTs (Ghosh, 2009; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014), which often results in sex work (Fleury, 2016).¹² **Children** are particularly vulnerable to being forced into begging, street vending, domestic servitude, agricultural work, fishing, herding and sometimes coerced into petty crimes. Research on child trafficking in **Uganda** shows that trafficker profiles vary from transport agencies, bar owners, recruitment agencies, and rebel groups to strangers who steal children. Discussing the means of deceit, the same report also points out the role of parents, who many times force children to move out or engage with traffickers with the hope of receiving remittances or are deceived by the hopes for a better life for their children (UYDEL, 2009). It is likely that similar trends are relevant in other countries in the East and Horn of Africa.

¹² For a more detailed assessment of female migration and gender-sensitive policy recommendations see Fleury (2016) and/or Ghosh (2009).

Evidence suggests that migrants trying to find employment abroad through **recruitment agencies** are at risk of becoming VoTs (Ghosh, 2009). Adults are often recruited through **incorrect promises of employment and education** (abroad), for which they pay exorbitant fees. These VoTs are subsequently subjected to forced labour in countries such as South Sudan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. In these cases of transnational trafficking, exploiters often threaten to demand refund of traveling expenses (tickets, visa, documents, etc.) from adult victims, tying them to **debt bondage**. This shows that in many cases there is a **fine line between voluntary migration and human trafficking** (Ghosh, 2009). For child victims, traffickers exercise control by financially compensating the children's parents and even appealing to religion (Coordination Office to Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2014; US Department of State, 2016).

It is also known that **women and children** are being trafficked from all countries in the East and Horn of Africa for purposes of **sexual exploitation**. In Kenya, for example, this is especially the case in the coastal sex tourism industry or by individuals working in khat cultivation, gold mines, truck drivers and fishermen. However, men have also been subjected to trafficking for sexual exploitation, as is the case for example for Eritrean men in Israel (US Department of State, 2016).

Refugees also seem to be **particularly vulnerable to becoming VoTs**. Reports of Somalis living in Kenya's largest refugee camp, Dadaab, revealed concerns of refugees about a fear of recruitment by the terrorist group al-Shabaab, especially of children. Eritreans living in or near refugee camps in Sudan have also been reported to be abducted and forced into labour or held hostage to extort money from their families (US Department of State, 2016).

Another major problem relating to human trafficking specifically in **Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan** is the issue of **child soldiers**. While the recruitment of children by armed forces is generally prohibited by law in these countries, incidences are still being observed where children are forced to work as child soldiers, and in many cases are abducted from their communities for this purpose. In Somalia this is particularly the case for al-Shabaab, but also for the Somali National Army and the militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a. In South Sudan and Sudan reports also show that all armed groups and militias involved in the respective conflicts, engage in this practice. While it usually affects boys, in South Sudan it has been reported that girls are often forced into marriages with soldiers and subjected to systematic rape (US Department of State, 2016).

2.3 Forced Migration/ Displacement¹³

The East and Horn of Africa region is characterized by a **complex history of conflicts, weak governance, general insecurity, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty, food insecurity and a range of persistent development challenges**. Significant numbers of people are displaced due to such factors both within the borders of their own country, but also across borders to other countries in the region as well as beyond. It is important to point out that the **majority of the displaced** in the region in the context of the East and Horn of Africa are **women and children**, including many female-headed households. Many of the displacement situations are **protracted** and have lasted for **more than 20 years** at this stage. On the other hand, **new refugees continue to arrive** at camps across the region. As a consequence, **forced displacement is a serious concern to be addressed in the region and presents a significant challenge for achieving peace and security as well as reducing poverty and supporting sustainable development in the East and Horn of Africa** (World Bank & UNHCR, 2015).

¹³ The report distinguishes disaster-induced displacement, development-induced displacement and conflict-induced displacement as far as possible since the form of displacement has consequences on migrants' and states' legal rights and obligations which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation.

Definition

Forced migration is “a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes” (IOM, 2011a). This includes **environment-, development- and forced or conflict-induced displacement**. Forced or conflict-induced displacement “is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict [or] civil unrest” (IOM, 2011a). The form of displacement has consequences for migrants’ and states’ **legal rights and obligations**, which are important to consider in the context of development cooperation. Key legal documents in the context of forced displacement are the **1951 Refugee Convention** and the **1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**.

2.3.2 Refugees from and in the East and Horn of Africa

Looking at forced displacement across borders within the region, Table 3 shows that the countries in the East and Horn of Africa are both origin and host countries for refugees from other countries in the region. This data for 2016 also shows that some countries are more affected by forced displacement than others. Particularly **Somalia** and **South Sudan** stand out as **main countries of origin** in the region.


Table 3: Refugees in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016

| | Country of Asylum | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|---------|
| | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
| Origin | | | | | | | | |
| Djibouti | | - | 81 | - | 0 | - | - | - |
| Eritrea | 322 | | 165,548 | 1,081 | 36 | 18 | 103,176 | 4,511 |
| Ethiopia | 516 | 23 | | 19,064 | 3,060 | 4,691 | 3,663 | 2002 |
| Kenya | 10 | - | 3,326 | | 0 | 0 | - | 194 |
| Somalia | 13,021 | 2,244 | 242,014 | 324,448 | | - | 184 | 30,689 |
| South Sudan | 0 | 8 | 338,774 | 87,141 | - | | 297,168 | 639,007 |
| Sudan | 5 | 67 | 39,896 | 2,836 | - | 241,510 | | 2,545 |
| Uganda | - | - | 23 | 631 | - | - | - | |

Source: UNHCR, 2017q.

Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, on the other hand are the **main host countries**, followed by **Sudan** and **South Sudan**. Figure 2, which is based on the most recently available data, shows that when looking at refugees and asylum seekers, **Uganda** is now host to the largest refugee population in the region due to a sharp increase in the arrival of South Sudanese.

Figure 2: Refugees and Asylum Seekers Hosted in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016/17



Sources: UNHCR, 2017a; 2017b; 2017d; 2017j; 2017n; 2017r; 2017s; 2017t.

Note: Data for Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan is for December 2016, while the remaining countries' data is for May 2017.

However, it is also important to mention that not all displacement from the eight focus countries of this report is to other countries in the East and Horn of Africa. Table 4 shows the top five host countries for refugees from each of the eight countries as well as the total stock of refugees with the respective origin as of 2016. These trends reinforce the fact that some of the countries are more affected by forced migration than others. **Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda** are all three relatively stable politically and as such do not have factors driving larger numbers of displacement. As a consequence, refugee numbers are low and host countries are much more likely to be outside Africa, specifically the United States and European countries. While the number of refugees from **Ethiopia** is significantly higher than those of these three countries, relative to the total population of the country, displacement is still insignificant (less than 1% of the population).

Table 4: Top Host Countries of Refugees from the East and Horn of Africa, 2016

| | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Total | 1,417 | 459,390 | 83,894 | 7,506 | 1,012,277 | 1,436,667 | 650,588 | 6,198 |
| Top 1 Host | Canada 41.4% | Ethiopia 36.0% | Kenya 22.7% | Ethiopia 44.3% | Kenya 32.1% | Uganda 44.5% | Chad 48.0% | US 20.5% |
| Top 2 Host | Belgium 18.8% | Sudan 22.5% | S. Africa 21.2% | US 29.3% | Yemen 25.2% | Ethiopia 23.6% | South Sudan 37.1% | UK 18.0% |
| Top 3 Host | US 17.6% | Germany 6.5% | US 12.2% | Canada 6.0% | Ethiopia 23.9% | Sudan 20.7% | Ethiopia 6.1% | Sweden 10.3% |
| Top 4 Host | France 13.7% | Israel 6.1% | Yemen 7.0% | UK 4.0% | Uganda 3.0% | Kenya 6.1% | Egypt 2.1% | Kenya 10.2% |
| Top 5 Host | Ethiopia 5.7% | Switzerland 5.7% | South Sudan 5.6% | Uganda 2.6% | S. Africa 2.8% | DRC 4.6% | UK 1.1% | S. Africa 8.9% |
| Other Countries | 2.7% | 23.0% | 31.3% | 13.8% | 13.0% | 0.6% | 5.5% | 32.1% |

Source: UNHCR, 2017q.

The four other countries considered in this report, on the other hand, face protracted displacement situations that also have wider regional implications. Specifically these are (World Bank & UNHCR, 2015):

1. Eritrean refugees within the significant mixed migration outflows;
2. The displacement of Somali internally displaced persons (IDPs)¹⁴ and Somali refugees due to conflict and violence in areas of origin as well as food insecurity and destruction of shelter due to floods and droughts;
3. The South Sudanese protracted and emergency refugee and IDP situation caused both by internal conflict as well as conflict with Sudan; and
4. The Sudanese protracted and emergency IDP and refugee situations caused by tensions between center and peripheral regions (Darfur, Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State), and significant inequality of both power and wealth.

Forced migration from **Eritrea** has been an issue already since the Eritrean War of Independence, which lasted from 1961 to 1991, and continued with President Isaias Afwerki's authoritarian rule (RMMS, 2016b). It reached another peak during the border conflict with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000. As explained earlier, reasons for fleeing the country are poor economic prospects, political, social and economic oppression and the mandatory military service (GSDRC, 2016). Due to the current situation affecting especially the younger Eritrean population, not only Eritrean adults flee the country, but an increasing number of Eritrean unaccompanied minors and children has also been reported. Children from Eritrea were the largest group of unaccompanied minors arriving in Italy in 2014 and 2015, accounting for approximately 25 per cent (OHCHR, 2016). These trends of forced migration from Eritrea are not expected to decrease in the short- and medium-term (GSDRC, 2016).

The displacement situation of **Somalia** is also significant. The majority of Somali refugees remain in the Horn and East of Africa, primarily in Ethiopia and Kenya. Recently, economic migrants are increasingly found among the mixed migration flows from Somalia (DAI Europe & EuroTrends, 2015). At the same time, there has been an increase in return migration of Somalis to their home country, both from the East and Horn of Africa as well as Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. In November 2013, Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR concluded the *Tripartite Agreement Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya*. Between December 2014 and the end of May 2017, 66,674 Somalis have been returned from Kenya under this agreement (UNHCR, 2017o). The original aim was to have a total of 135,000 returnees by the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2015a). Significant numbers of returns have also been observed from Yemen, from where 31,543 Somalis have returned since the onset of the crisis in March 2015. Smaller numbers have returned from Djibouti, Eritrea and a few other countries (UNHCR, 2017o). Returns to Somalia are, however, problematic as the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) finds that the infrastructure and livelihood opportunities in Somalia are not sufficient to lead to sustainable reintegration of returnees (ReDSS, 2015).

In light of the continuous civil war in **South Sudan**, forced migration has become a massive crisis in the country and the region. While before December 2013, there were 114,470 South Sudanese refugees, 1,753,400 have been registered since (UNHCR, 2017p). Contrary to many migrants in the region, South Sudanese migrants tend to stay in the region instead of engaging in irregular migration to Europe. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat identified a few reasons for that. First, the refugees tend to have close ties to South Sudan and prefer to stay in the region in order to possibly return in the future. Second,

¹⁴ More information on the internal displacement situations in these countries will be provided in the following section of this report.

there is a favourable refugee environment in Uganda as their policy regime is fairly liberal in terms of refugee rights. Third, a general lack of resources tends to discourage refugees from pursuing long distances. Fourth, the demographic profile of South Sudanese refugees shows a majority of women and children as the men tend to stay behind to either fight in the conflict or to tend to material resources. Women and children are therefore not likely to move beyond neighbouring countries on their own. Fifth, resettlement of refugees mainly to United States, Canada, UK and Australia has been occurring for the past two decades and the possibility of family reunification represents a potential legal channel for migration. These factors discourage South Sudanese migrants to engage in irregular channels (RMMS, 2016g).

In **Sudan**, the two Sudanese Civil wars, between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, have caused massive displacement. By 2014, Sudan had 665,908 refugees worldwide (World Bank, 2016) and as of 2016 the stock of Sudanese refugees registered with UNHCR was 650,588. Sudanese refugees are distributed mostly between Chad (48%), South Sudan (37%) and Ethiopia (6%) (UNHCR, 2017q). There are also Sudanese refugees in Egypt; however, they are not required to register as refugees, as the two countries have a free movement agreement, which makes it challenging to estimate the number of Sudanese in Egypt. Estimates therefore vary extremely from 2,000 to millions (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin & Perrin, 2012).

Another factor which is important to consider in the context of displacement in the East and Horn of Africa is food insecurity. As the HoA famine of 2011 has shown, **food insecurity** due to conflict, poor rainy seasons and droughts can cause **new migrant and refugee movements** (Oxfam, 2012). Food insecurity affects the eight focus countries to different extents. While none of the focus countries is officially classified as being in famine at the moment by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, a **risk of famine** exists especially in certain regions of **Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan** and **Somalia**. Already displaced populations including **refugees and IDPs** are especially vulnerable to food insecurity in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, which can lead to onward movements. Food and water shortages have been associated with a increase in **Cholera** outbreaks in Somalia and South Sudan (ACAPS, 2017a, b, c, d, e, f, g; FEWS NET, 2017; UNHCR, 2017x).

It is important that **host countries create more durable solutions for refugees** including opening up **formal labour markets**, as well as encouraging **education** and **entrepreneurship** of refugees. Skills and vocational training offered to refugees should match local needs (Mallett, Hagen-Zanker, Majidi & Cummings, 2017). In addition, **reception conditions** in refugee camps should be improved and protection and humanitarian assistance, including the provision of food, water and sanitation, should be expanded beyond refugee camps.

Women are assumed to be **relatively more affected** by emergencies such as conflict and environmental disasters and to depend more on humanitarian assistance. As the case of Congolese refugees in Rwanda shows, refugee women are more dependent on assistance because of economic inactivity (Bilgili, Loschmann & Siegel, 2017). They are especially vulnerable because they often lack information regarding their rights. Furthermore, limited financial resources and income-generating activities make them vulnerable to sexual exploitation, which can be exacerbated by patriarchal structures, gender discrimination and the fact that it is oftentimes men who deliver basic services (e.g. shelter, food distribution, health services and education). In such circumstances, transactional sex can become a survival strategy for female migrants (Amnesty International, 2016; Chêne, 2009; Ghosh, 2009; UNHCR & Save the Children, 2002). Other possible forms of violence experienced by refugee women are sexual assault, rape, forced marriage, sterilization, forced prostitution, military sexual slavery and human trafficking (Ghosh, 2009).

2.3.3 Internal Displacement in the East and Horn of Africa

In order to provide a complete picture of forced migration movements in the region, it is important to also consider internal displacement. While the focus of this report is on international migrants, evidence has shown that **in many cases IDPs are future refugees and irregular migrants**. This is due to the vulnerabilities that they face while living in IDP status. At this stage it is, however, not well understood under what circumstances IDPs end up crossing borders to search for safety in a country other than their own. In this context, it would be crucial to conduct research into this to understand what percentage of refugees and/or irregular migrants was previously internally displaced and the factors that lead to the decision to leave the country of origin as a consequence of the original displacement and the living conditions of IDPs (IDMC, 2017).

Table 5 shows the (estimated) current stock of internally displaced persons in six of the eight countries and the main reasons for this displacement. In this context, it is important to distinguish between **displacement caused by conflicts and displacement caused by disasters**. Information on development-induced displacement is not available in a comparative form. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also does not provide comparable data on internal displacement for Djibouti and Eritrea. UNHCR, on the other hand, has only registered IDPs in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

Table 5: Internal Displacement in the East and Horn of Africa, 2016

| Country | Number of IDPs (end 2016) | New Conflict- Induced Displacements (2016) | New Disaster- Induced Displacements (2016) | UNHCR registered IDPs |
|-------------|------------------------------|---|---|--------------------------|
| Djibouti | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. |
| Eritrea | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. | n.d. |
| Ethiopia | 258,000 | 296,000 | 347,000 | n.d. |
| Kenya | 138,000 | n.d. | 40,000 | n.d. |
| Somalia | 1,107,000 | 113,000 | 70,000 | 1,562,554 |
| South Sudan | 1,854,000 | 281,000 | n.d. | 1,853,924 |
| Sudan | 3,300,000 | 97,000 | 123,000 | 2,225,557 |
| Uganda | 53,000 | 23,000 | 2,500 | n.d. |

Source: IDMC, 2017; UNHCR, 2017b; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; 2017j; 2017l.

Overall, there is no literature or available data on internal displacement in **Djibouti** and there are no factors to infer that internal displacement is a problem in this country (UNHCR, 2017d). Data on internal displacement in **Eritrea** is equally lacking. It is clear that in the past, Eritreans were displaced internally because of the War of Independence, the border conflict with Ethiopia and environmental issues such as droughts (NRC, 2005). While a large proportion of these IDPs seem to have returned, not much is known about their current status or more recent incidences of internal displacement (GSDRC, 2016; NRC, 2005; RMMS, 2016b).

While numbers of IDPs are available for **Ethiopia** and **Kenya**, internal displacement is overall also not well documented for these countries. For Ethiopia, it is clear that many people are in protracted displacement situations due to inter-communal and cross-border violence. In addition, 18 months of severe drought and food insecurity followed by heavy rains and floods displaced about 300,000 people between April and May 2016 (IDMC, 2017). Internal displacement in Kenya is sometimes induced by development projects such as

the construction of new roads, and hydropower dams, but also by ethnic, political, and land-related violence, and disasters (IDMC, 2014). Not much is known about the situation and protection needs of Kenyan IDPs (Marchand et al., 2016).

In the case of **Uganda**, recent estimates demonstrate that the country has approximately 53,000 IDPs, a number which has declined dramatically from the mid-2000s where this number reached 1.4 million in 2007 (IDMC, 2017; IOM, 2013a). These movements were the result of a civil war and ethnic strife, geographically concentrating most of these cases in the north of the country. The end of the war allowed most of the IDPs living in camps to return to their homes or to be resettled (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015).

Instability and environmental disasters have caused significant internal displacement (about 1.1 million individuals) in **Somalia**. The majority of IDPs are from the South and Central regions, where about 25 per cent of the total population are displaced, due to factors such as forced evictions, drought and food insecurity, abuses in al-Shabaab controlled areas and tribal clashes (Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016d). However, recently numbers of IDPs have been increasing as seen in the UNHCR statistics in Table 5. This is likely due to the increase of returns from Kenya. Somali refugees returning to their country of origin face the risk of entering a new cycle of displacement, including internally, due to the conditions that they encounter upon return that do not facilitate sustainable return (IDMC, 2017; RMMS, 2016d).

Displacement is also a problem within the borders of **South Sudan**. Many factors drive this process: the civil war, widespread hunger and malnutrition, an economic crisis driven by devaluating currency and the outbreak of diseases like malaria and cholera. The latter is especially dangerous for victims of malnutrition and poor immunity, like young children and pregnant women (RMMS, 2016e). UNOCHA estimated in February 2017 that there were close to 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Sudan. In comparison, one year before, in February 2016, South Sudan had 1.6 million IDPs, further demonstrating the escalating nature of the humanitarian crisis (UNOCHA, 2017b).

UNOCHA studies of the IDP population in 2016 show that 320,000 IDPs lived in spontaneous settlements, 80,000 IDPs in collective centres, close to one million IDPs in host communities and 185,000 people sought refuge in UNMISS Protection of Civilians sites¹⁵. In the latter, the majority of people are children; boys and girls together make up 61 per cent, followed by women at 24 per cent (UNOCHA, 2016). This demographic trend may be due to many men being pulled into the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, whereas women and children are displaced from their communities (RMMS, 2016e).

IDPs are found throughout the country, but are mostly concentrated in the Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states (UNHCR, 2017h). Camps and settlements are constantly in need of resources and assistance from humanitarian agencies and international organizations; however, access to these locations is made difficult due to a lack of infrastructure, adverse security conditions and heavy rainfalls (UNHCR, 2017i). Limited resources lead to new conflicts between different groups, worsening the situation at large. Dire conditions often lead to secondary displacement of refugees, increasing the gravity of the situation (Marchand et al., 2016).

¹⁵ 'Protection of Civilian' sites are IDP protection sites located within existing UN mission premises. They are guaranteed by UN legal status and administration and designed to be exclusively an extreme measure to support people who are unsafe outside an UN compound (Briggs & Monaghan, 2017).

However, the most significant internal displacement crisis in the region is that in **Sudan**. The violent conflicts there, in addition to displacing citizens abroad, has been creating significant situations of internal displacement. The latest estimates as of 2016, from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, show that there are 3.3 million IDPs in the country. The majority of these – 1.98 million - live in and outside of camps in Darfur, as a result of the ongoing conflict in that region. The Two Areas conflict has also resulted in significant displacement, with around 230,000 displaced persons in the region of South Kordofan (IDMC, 2017; Strachan, 2016). The security situation is steadily deteriorating and the country's instability makes access to basic human resources unattainable, worsening the situation.

The humanitarian toll on the lives of IDPs is illustrated by the lack of resources they face and the nature of long-term displacement, through the absence of socio-economic opportunities. A third of the camps have less than 7.5 litres of water per person per day, well below the minimum emergency standards. Of the 1.6 million IDPs living in camps, 60 per cent are children. Return to their original area is often infeasible, as population growth and displacement have altered human geography and exert considerable stress on local resources. IDPs may then actually choose to integrate in their host communities. Still, to assume that someone is in need of humanitarian assistance simply for being displaced is a fallacy. UNHCR argues that needs assessments are a necessary tool, to guarantee access to basic public services, prioritizing displaced people living in camps and settlements (UNOCHA, 2017a).

2.4 Regular/ Labour Migration

The literature on migration in and from the East and Horn of Africa tends to focus on forced displacement as well as irregular migration movements, while **regular migration, especially for the purpose of labour, is much less understood**. The total registered immigrant stock excluding refugees for the period 1990 to 2015 steadily increased in **Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia**. In **Uganda**, the trend is opposite and **Sudan** saw a sharp decrease between 2010 and 2015. While **South Sudan** is depicted as a popular destination country up to 2015, it is likely that this will have changed in the meantime due to the internal conflict (UN DESA, 2015a¹⁶).

Annex C provides an overview of some key immigration and emigration statistics. It shows the **difference in destination countries that is mainly related to the main drivers of migration** as described above in a way that **those displaced by conflicts are more likely to stay in the region, while migrants from countries such as Kenya and Uganda are more likely to move further abroad**. As mentioned, the literature on regular migration is limited for many of the focus countries, but some information is available. Maybe the most relevant country in the region in the context of labour migration is **Kenya**. Evidence shows that besides having been a major host of refugee populations, there have been increasing numbers of economic migrants coming to the country. This includes labour migrants from countries like India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. While labour migrants often arrive without proper documentation, they may be able to obtain fake or real ones by paying bribes as well as avoid arrest by paying off immigration and police officers (Horwood, 2015). The Department of Immigration does collect data on these migrants. They do, however, not release this data.

In terms of **emigration, Kenya** does show **significantly different characteristics compared to the other countries in the East and Horn of Africa**. The majority of Kenyan emigration is regular and largely characterized by the migration of skilled Kenyans mainly for educational or work purposes. Main countries

¹⁶ Note that migration statistics from UN DESA (2015a) illustrate mixed migration stocks and may include some, but not all, of refugees in/from a given country. For further information visit: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml>

of destination on the African continent are Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Nigeria. In addition, significant numbers of Kenyans have migrated to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and European countries (RMMS, 2017a). The Gulf States and the Middle East are key destination regions for low-skilled Kenyan labour migrants. While exact numbers on the extent of these flows are lacking, estimates indicate that there were around 100,000 Kenyans working in the Gulf States in November 2014 (RMMS, 2017a). Other estimates indicate that there are 40,000 Kenyan workers in Saudi Arabia alone, with the majority being regular (Horwood, 2015). As described above, recruitment of workers and trafficking for forced labour are closely linked in this context and require a focus on recruitment practices in Kenya and other countries of origin.

Labour immigration in **Uganda** has also been increasing and is expected to do so further, particularly because of the loosening of visa requirements for EAC citizens¹⁷. Uganda's economic growth and sector developments, especially oil and infrastructure, attract labour migrants (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015). Data analysing work permits issued by the government between 2012 and 2013 show that a majority of workers came from Asia, as 38 per cent of all permits were issued to Indian citizens, followed by 15 per cent for Chinese citizens. As for the EAC, citizens from these countries made up 7 per cent of the full sample, with Kenyans having the highest number of permits. An interesting trend shows that 63 per cent of contracts are temporary, demonstrating a working cycle instead of permanent relocation to Uganda (IOM, 2013b).

As previously sketched, main push factors for leaving Uganda surround socio-economic factors, such as population growth and youth unemployment, which encourage Ugandans to search for job opportunities abroad, especially in the health sector. Adding to this trend, problematic ownership of land resources, distorted in favour of older generations, encourages youth emigration (DAI Europe and EuroTrends, 2015). This is reflected by 47 per cent of Ugandan emigrants to OECD countries being tertiary-educated (World Bank, 2016). Main destination countries for these migrants tend to be developed countries like the United Kingdom and the United States. Most recently there has been an increase in Ugandans traveling to the Middle East for employment, with a 95 per cent male incidence (IOM, 2013b).

Labour migration from **Ethiopia** to the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East started in the 1980s and has increased in volume significantly in recent years. Private Employment Agencies facilitated the migration of more than 160,000 Ethiopian domestic workers in the first half of 2012 alone, which was more than 10 times the number of the same flow in the previous year (RMMS, 2013a). It is also clear that there is a significant Ethiopian population in Europe, the United States and other countries in the Global North (World Bank, 2016). Immigration to Ethiopia for labour purposes is, on the other hand, not documented.

Sudan has been a relatively attractive destination for labour migrants, however, data indicates that only a small proportion of foreigners work legally in Sudan. Three broad categories of work permit uses appear: foreigners working in national projects, foreigners employed by international companies and international NGO staff. The main origin countries of the migrants who managed to secure work permits in 2009 were China, Philippines, India, Turkey and Bangladesh, with 98 per cent of those migrants being men (IOM, 2011b). It is safe to assume that the political and security crises that Sudan and its neighbouring countries face have changed some of these labour migration trends. For instance, the current economic crises that the country faces in light of the shortage of oil production directly impacts the number of migrants who are attracted to work in such plants (CIA, 2017g). Labour emigration data for Sudan is a contentious issue for a

¹⁷ For more on free movement in the EAC please see Section 4.2.3.

lack of reliable data from the government; the Gulf States which many of these migrants go to do not share data on their populations by nationality (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012). A crucial problem of labour emigration is the **brain drain** the country suffers in the **health sector**, where the lack of jobs and better opportunities abroad motivate such movements (Darbo, 2015). Remittances make for a considerable effect of this type of migration. In 2013, USD 424 million came into Sudan, making it 0.6 per cent of its GDP. The government, thus, tends to support labour emigration (Strachan, 2016).

Analysis of trends of **South Sudan** tends to focus on the concerning realities of its displacement crisis, both for IDPs and refugees. Therefore, there is only a slim literature on regular labour migration. Before the civil war, South Sudan was a destination country for migrant workers from neighbouring countries, even though many of these were irregular migrants. It had a growing demand for goods and services, and its lack of a local industry and a skilled national workforce attracted entrepreneurial migrants from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, the DRC and Sudan. Contributing to this, the oil-driven economic boom attracted migrants who sought better opportunities. This optimism between independence in 2011 and the war outbreak in 2013 encouraged 500,000 to 1.2 million labour migrants to come to South Sudan. However, after 2013 most of these returned home or moved onwards and many who chose to stay were evacuated in 2016 due to the rekindling of violence, an evacuation orchestrated by their origin governments (RMMS, 2016e). Other reports state that Kenyan and Ugandan migrants tend to stay in the country for longer periods of time and send remittances back (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). In terms labour emigration from South Sudan, it would be irresponsible to assume that this does not exist, but documentation is lacking. Emigration before the civil war had top destinations in the region, like Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan, and in a few developed nations, like the United States and Australia (World Bank, 2016), but it is unclear if this has changed.

In the case of **Eritrea**, labour immigration is negligible and emigration is limited due to the strict emigration rules enforced by the government (GSDRC, 2016; EASO, 2015). According to EASO (2015) regular migration is, however, easier for some groups, even though officials' decisions to issue the required travel documents can be arbitrary: men above 54; women above 47; children up to the age of 13; individuals, who are exempted from national service, for instance for health reasons; individuals seeking health treatments abroad; former freedom fighters and their families; higher ranking government officials and their families; and in some cases, students, businessmen, sportsmen and individuals travelling to conferences abroad are also permitted to exit the country.

Djibouti is not a popular country of destination due to failed economic structures and agricultural fragility, because of droughts and floods. Despite these conditions, Djiboutians are not generally recorded emigrating through regular channels (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015; RMMS, 2016a). Labour migration is not really documented in the **Somali** case, as the literature focuses on the displacement and the high prevalence of irregular movements.

No bilateral labour agreements between the focus countries were identified. The only bilateral agreement that could possibly facilitate labour migration is between Ethiopia and Kenya, which allows their citizens to move between the two countries without visas (RMMS, 2016c). Cooperation between the countries of the East and Horn of Africa is mostly limited to fighting irregular migration and border management.

At regional level, there are attempts to introduce the free movement of people, which would facilitate regular/ labour migration (see Section 4.2). Fioramonti and Nshimbi (2016) argue that "[b]ilateral agreements can be ways to open the door to regional policy or alternatives to it" (p.28). Accordingly,

negotiating and implementing bilateral labour agreements between the focus countries could be useful to realize regional aspirations for free movement, which at the moment seems difficult due to a lack of political will at the national level (Horwood, 2015).


One should note that lines between labour migration and irregular migration, including human trafficking, can be blurred. For instance, migrants looking for employment abroad through recruitment agencies are at risk of being lured by false promises into exploitation, bonded labour and sex trafficking (Ghosh, 2009).

2.5 Remittances to the East and Horn of Africa

The link between migration and development is complex, but one channel through which migrants may contribute to development in their country of origin is through the sending of remittances. These monetary flows that are usually sent to family members or friends have been shown to contribute positively to human and to some extent economic development as well as poverty alleviation (e.g. World Bank, 2011).

Remittances to the countries in the East and Horn of Africa are significant and therefore have the potential to contribute to development of the countries in the region. While data is not available for **Eritrea**, **Somalia** and **South Sudan**, the data for the other five countries shows that the trends differ significantly across them. Figure 3 shows the officially recorded remittance inflows for the period 2001 to 2016. Remittance flows to **Kenya** and **Uganda** have increased more or less steadily between 2003 and 2016. The same applies to **Ethiopia**. In **Djibouti**, on the other hand, due to its limited emigrant stock, remittances are not significant. **Sudan** used to receive large amounts of remittances, particularly between 2007 and 2010, but the inflows have decreased drastically in the past years (World Bank, 2017a).

Figure 3: Remittances to the East and Horn of Africa, 2001-2016¹⁸



Source: World Bank, 2017a.

It is interesting to consider the amount of remittances received relative to the respective country's GDP. The World Bank (2017a) estimates that despite the overall low volume of remittances sent to **Djibouti**, they accounted for 4 per cent of GDP in 2015. They have equal importance in relation to the GDP of **Uganda**. In

¹⁸ Data on formal remittance flows to Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan is not available.

Kenya they account for 2.5 per cent of GDP, while in **Ethiopia** it is only 1 per cent and in **Sudan** 0.2 per cent (World Bank, 2017a).

The actual remittance volume is likely to be much higher due to many migrants sending remittances home through informal channels, and thus not officially recorded. Literature on **informal remittances** in the East and Horn of Africa does not seem to be very up-to-date, however, based on existing older sources, certain patterns can be identified.

Migrants from the East and Horn of Africa informally remit their money using a variety of methods. **Sudanese** migrants may deliver the money themselves when they visit Sudan, or arrange for someone to act as an intermediary. It is common for northern Sudanese migrants to request of someone flying to Khartoum to deliver their money by simply approaching someone at the airport, even if that person was a stranger. Moreover, NGOs and churches facilitate informal remittances (Riak Akuei, 2005). Little is known about remittance practices in **South Sudan**. A study published in 2005 – before South Sudanese independence - differentiated between remittance practices in the north and south of Sudan. In the south, it was common to remit money using a blend of informal and formal methods. The funds would be transferred through a money transfer agency to a relative in a nearby country such as Kenya or Uganda, and then the relative would travel to southern Sudan and deliver the money (Riak Akuei, 2005).

In **Somalia**, remittances are often sent through services referred to as *hawliaad*, in which the migrant pays a foreign agent, who contacts another agent in Somalia. The agent in Somalia then pays the money to the migrant's family. Remittance companies are preferred to banks, as the few remaining conventional Somali banks have become increasingly unreliable. Similarly, informal remittances in **Djibouti** and **Eritrea** are transferred through the *hawala* system, which relies upon two financial intermediaries, one in the destination country and one in the country of origin. It is estimated that informal transfers made up 16.1% per cent of Djibouti's GDP in 2006 (Aman, Nenovsky, & Mahamoud, 2014). In Eritrea, where remittances are likely the main source of income for many (urban) families (Tecle & Goldring, 2015), financial institutions were used in only approximately one third of transfers (Tewolde, 2005). The majority of Eritrean migrants sent their remittances through informal means, either by delivering the money themselves, entrusting it to a friend or carrier.

In **Uganda**, migrants transfer money through taxis and bus companies, traveling business people, family members, and friends or deliver it themselves (Ngugi & Sennoga, 2011). Due to a weak bank infrastructure and a lack of formal remittance services providers in **Ethiopia**, informal remittances are estimated to be extremely high, amounting to 1.8 billion USD in 2011 (Geda, Tafere, & Amedu, 2011).

In contrast to the other countries in the region, informal remittances are less common in **Kenya**, since the bank infrastructure is relatively strong. Informal remittances tend to be used in areas where bank infrastructure is completely absent, weak, or distrusted (World Bank, 2005).

3 External Migration Routes from the East and Horn of Africa

As described above, migration from the East and Horn of Africa is diverse. Routes commonly used by migrants leaving the region can be described as the Northern or Central Mediterranean Route, the Sinai Route, the Eastern Route as well as the Southern Route.

2.1. The Northern Route (Also Known as the 'Central Mediterranean Route')

The Central Mediterranean route brings migrants from the **East and Horn of Africa to Europe**, crossing the Mediterranean Sea, mainly trying to reach Italy. Depending on the source this route is also referred to as the northern or western route, where Europe is the final destination in both cases. The first quarter of 2017 shows a drastic drop in the number of migrants who follow this route, with a reported 1,419 migrants from the Horn arriving in Italy, a decline of 80 per cent from the numbers of the final quarter of 2016. While one may think that this is a seasonal variation, when compared to the same timeframe in 2016 this still represents a decrease of 55 per cent in arrivals (RMMS, 2017b). This dip in the number of arrivals is a new development as up until 2016 the number of migrants following this route kept on increasing. In 2016, 181,436 migrants were counted as following this route, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year (RMMS, 2016h). The main reason for this recent decrease is an extremely low number of Eritrean nationals among the migrants, when they used to represent the majority. In the first quarter of 2017 there were 90 per cent less Eritreans than in the last three months of 2016. For the past five years, Eritreans were always among the top five nationalities arriving in Italy. Other groups using this route are Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese. While the number of migrants from Somalia also decreased over the course of 2016, absolute numbers of Ethiopians and Sudanese have increased (RMMS, 2016h; 2017b).


There are two main possible explanations that experts provide for this trend. Firstly, there has been an increase in the number of interceptions and deportation of Eritrean migrants in transit countries such as Sudan and Egypt. Secondly, there have been reports of Eritrean migrants getting stuck at what they anticipated would be a transit point. This, together, with the risk of being caught, seems to encourage Eritreans to wait in refugee camps and urban centres in transit countries, as a way to buy some time as they wait for the situation to develop further (RMMS, 2016h; 2017b).

In order to reach Libya, and thus Europe, migrants from the East and Horn of Africa follow a series of key hubs and destinations. The main transit country for those following this route is Sudan, and each of its neighbours has different means to reach the country. From Somaliland to Ethiopia, migrants move from Hargeisa to Addis Ababa. From Ethiopia, migrants move on to Sudan, especially Khartoum, and there are three main routes to do so. As described earlier, the first goes from Addis Ababa to Metema, at the border of Sudan, and the second route is from Addis Ababa to Humera, on the border between Sudan and Eritrea. In addition, migrants use a third route by flying from Addis Ababa directly to Khartoum. From Eritrea migrants move from Asmara and Massawa to Khartoum. This has been found to be particularly dangerous due to kidnappings which often occur on these tracks (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013).

In Sudan, there are three main routes that cross the country in order to reach Libya. The first crosses Darfur, the second goes through Dongola in Northern Sudan, and the third route goes through Chad. Khartoum is the main migration hub in the country, where migrants from neighbouring countries often stay

up to two years, working and saving money to continue their journey. In Khartoum, migrants often make contact with smugglers which are instrumental for the rest of the journey (RMMS, 2014b).

Figure 4: The Northern or Central Mediterranean Route



Source: Prepared by the authors using the National Geographic Mapmaker.

From Sudan migrants then aim to reach the Kufra district in Libya. Kufra has become a key hub and transit area for irregular migrants coming into Libya from this route. To reach this area, migrants endure a four to ten day journey through the Sahara desert, significantly increasing the risks on the journey of these migrants. After entering the country migrants tend to head north, towards the coast and urban centres (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013). However, the deteriorating security situation in Kufra shows a drop in the number of migrants harbouring through these destinations. In light of that, smugglers reroute migrants

towards Rebiana and Tazerbo (Kuschminder, de Bresser & Siegel, 2015). Within Libya, main destinations are Tripoli, Benghazi and other coastal towns. Still, the deteriorated situation in Benghazi has deterred many migrants from coming to this city as a transition point. By 2014, the main destination cities were Garabouli and Zuwarah, near Tripoli (RMMS, 2014b).

Migrants leaving Libya take boats to Malta or Lampedusa in Italy. Italy is usually the preferred destination, as it is on the mainland and migrants can move to other parts of Europe more easily. In addition, the country does not have a policy of systematic detention. Boats that do arrive in Malta seem to either get lost on the way to Italy, or are intercepted by the Maltese coast guard (Altai Consulting & UNHCR, 2013).

Recently it has been observed that Egypt is also increasingly becoming a transit country of migrants on the way to Europe. Irregular migrants and asylum seekers cross the Mediterranean Sea towards Italy from there. This trend first emerged in 2016, most likely due to worsening of the security situation in Libya and the difficulties in moving to Israel. The latter is especially observed for Eritreans that increasingly moved to Europe when their way north was blocked. Irregular migrants are increasingly identified in Egypt, which serves to support the fact that it is indeed becoming a popular transit country. The Egyptian government indicated that in 2016 more than 12,000 individuals were caught either irregularly entering or leaving the country. They were mainly from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (RMMS, 2016h).

The increased popularity of Egypt as a transit country towards Europe has led to an increase in smuggling networks operating in the country. The Egyptian government has responded to this by reinforcing its anti-smuggling and –trafficking position. Concretely, the government introduced a new anti-human smuggling law in 2016 to actively fight against such manoeuvres. This law led to the sentencing of 56 people to up to 14 years in prison for overturning boats off the Egyptian coast in September 2016. Generally, the law allows fines for smugglers and those involved in smuggling operations of up to 25,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately EUR 1,230) as well as prison terms of up to 25 years (RMMS, 2016h; 2017b).

It is important to point out that even as arrivals in Italy of nationals from the East and Horn of Africa have decreased, the overall number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving through the Central Mediterranean route is still incredibly high and in fact increasing. This is due to an increase in arrivals of West Africans and Bangladeshis that also follow this route (RMMS, 2017b). Recent UNHCR data from June 2017 demonstrates that so far 82,897 people have arrived in Europe through the Central Mediterranean route so far this year. Nationals from the countries in the East and Horn of Africa are not among the top ten countries of origin of these arrivals (UNHCR, 2017m).

Frontex data assessing the migration flows on this route in 2016 show a record high in the number of detentions, which amounted to 181,459 people. This number demonstrates an 18 per cent increase from the previous year, indicating persistent pressure on the route. The main nationalities represented in detentions of 2016 were Nigeria (37,554), Eritrea (20,721) and Guinea (13,550). At the same time, the number of deaths on this route has also increased, as IOM data show an estimated 4,500 deaths in 2016 compared to 3,175 in 2015 (Frontex, 2017).

A specific concern relating to the movements of migrants on the Central Mediterranean route is the incidence of unaccompanied minors among the overall migrant flows. This had already been highlighted for 2015 and 2016 data shows that this trend has drastically increased. While in 2015 a reported 10,820 unaccompanied minors arrived in Italy via sea, this number rose by 139 per cent to 25,864 in 2016. While the largest group of these children is from Nigeria, Eritreans make up the second largest share. More

concretely, it can be said that of those Eritreans that have arrived in the past year in Italy, 18 per cent were unaccompanied minors. The share of unaccompanied minors among Somalis is even higher, at 22 per cent (RMMS, 2016h).

Developments in Libya

The **Central Mediterranean route** uses **Libya** as the **main gateway country between Africa and the European countries** along the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the fate and condition of this route is directly related to the political and security situation of Libya. Libya has been experiencing a breakdown of its justice system in which armed groups, militias, smuggler groups and traffickers control the flow of migrants. Such context also describes a lack of accountability, which puts migrant in highly vulnerable situations facing possible detention, rape and physical abuse (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).

Facing the increase in the overall number of migrants following the Central Mediterranean route and the continuously deteriorating situation in Libya, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has devised four possible scenarios to understand how changes in the country will potentially affect the migration flows from Libya to Europe and how the emerging humanitarian crisis may develop. To put this in context, Libya and the EU have been in continuous negotiations in order to monitor the migration flows. The Libyan government has requested EUR 800 million to respond to the crisis and to date the EU has allocated EUR 200 million to support the halt of smuggling operations. Italy itself has separately paid EUR 200 million to assist Libya (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).

The first scenario sees a continued increase in migration through North Africa towards the EU. The ICRC considers this scenario as neither likely nor unlikely, with somewhat deteriorating impacts. This would be characterized by the continuous instability of Libya and a failure of European policies to halt smuggling operations. As a consequence, a slightly rising trend in arrivals to Italy would be expected and smuggling operations would continue to be a highly profitable business. The humanitarian consequences involve migrants suffering human rights abuses in Libya and throughout the journey. This problem is exacerbated by the weak communication between migrants and aid organizations, plagued by slow bureaucracies. Policy priorities would then lie with protection measures for migrants in Libya and Italy, especially matters of health, food and legal support (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).

The second scenario encompasses a large increase in migration and readmissions. It is neither likely nor unlikely, and it carries highly deteriorating results. This scenario could become reality through continuously ineffective law enforcement operations in Libya with improved and expanded smuggling operations. The number of migrants flowing out of Libya would then increase, together with the number of deaths at sea. The consequences would encompass a rising number of deaths and cases of missing migrants, together with the migrant abuses previously described. Moreover, an increase in the migrant stock could feed anti-immigrant sentiments in EU countries, leading to pressure to tighten migration control. This would add considerable pressure on already scarce resources for refugee and detention centres (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).

The third scenario describes an enforced closure of the Central Mediterranean route. It is somewhat unlikely and with highly deteriorating consequences. It builds on the idea that in order to prevent a re-escalation of the crisis, the EU and its member-states adopt tougher measures to disrupt smuggling operations and prevent migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Thus, an increased number of migrants would remain in North Africa, vulnerable to become victims of human right abuses. This problem is even worse in areas beyond governmental control. The number of arrivals would substantially decrease, but only

for a limited time as smuggling operation can go around through other North African coastal routes or over land (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).


The fourth and last scenario hopes for improved internal security in Libya; however, it seems to be highly unlikely and with slight improvement of the situation. Following a successful implementation of European assistance, Libya would see an improvement in its security and governance. The number of migrants stuck in Libya would continue to rise, although their conditions would improve. More migrants would want to stay in the country and smuggling operations would, as a consequence, decelerate but would not disappear fully. Thus, the total number of people crossing the Mediterranean would also decrease (ACAPS & ICRC, 2017).

It is, however, at this stage not clear how the situation in Libya is likely to change in the future. All in all, the **Central Mediterranean route** therefore continues to raise **humanitarian concerns** and **close monitoring of the developments must be undertaken**. Though it is important to point out that the migrants following this route do not appear to be coming mostly from the Horn and East of Africa any longer, it is clear that, depending on the situation in Libya and other transit countries, this may change again at any time.

3.2 The Sinai Route (Through Egypt into Israel)

The northern route runs from the **East and Horn of Africa through Sudan and Egypt into Israel**. Since 2012 the number of migrants using this route has been significantly lower, to the point of it being almost inoperative. This is the result of restrictive migration policies by both Egypt and Israel, such as the building of a fence along the Sinai-Israeli border and, tougher border controls, as well as the establishment of a detention centre (Horwood, 2015; Kolmannskog & Afif, 2014). For more information on this route refer to Marchand et al. (2016).

Figure 5: The Sinai Route




Source: Prepared by the authors using the National Geographic Mapmaker.

3.3 The Eastern Route (Between the Horn of Africa and Yemen)

The eastern route moves out of the **East and Horn of Africa towards Yemen and onwards to Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia**. For many years this route has been widely popular, mostly among Ethiopian and Somali migrants (Marchand et al., 2016). In more recent years, the numbers of those using this route has been fluctuating. In the first quarter of 2017, at least 15,498 persons migrated on this route, signifying a decline of 17 per cent from the final quarter of 2016 and a 44 per cent decrease compared to the first quarter of 2016. However, the arrival numbers reached its high point in 2016 since monitoring missions started in 2006. Despite the deteriorating situation in Yemen, more than 117,000 arrivals were registered in the country in 2016. As such this is not a good point for comparison and it is a fact that migration levels on the eastern route remain high (RMMS, 2017b). Deportations of irregular Ethiopian migrants from Yemen to Djibouti first started being reported in September 2016. While the number of counted new arrivals decreased after that, it is not clear in how far the trends really changed or in how far the migrants managed to enter the country undetected (RMMS, 2016h).

Figure 6: The Eastern Route



Source: Prepared by the authors using the National Geographic Mapmaker.

Several factors have been identified as being responsible for the fluctuating numbers of Ethiopians and Somalis crossing to Yemen. The main reason is the **ongoing conflict in Yemen**, which has **made this route less attractive**. At the same time, the conflict has also led to looser monitoring missions in Yemen and as such it might in fact be the case that migration has increased and is just not captured in the statistics. Yet another reason may be the ongoing drought situation in the Horn of Africa which may impact households in a way that they have to use financial resources to sustain themselves, which they would otherwise have used to invest in the migration of a household member. This is especially likely as large shares of Ethiopians that have traditionally been among those arriving in Yemen were from areas with high prevalence of farming households (RMMS, 2017b).

The **situation for migrants in Saudi Arabia has also been impacting the movements on the eastern route** for some time. In March 2017, the Saudi Arabian government announced a shift in policy which might impact the flows on the route again. The Gulf nation has declared a grace period of 90 days during which undocumented migrants are able to regularize their stay without any punishments or fines. If they return voluntarily they will be able to re-enter the country through regular immigration channels. All migrants that fail to pursue this process are subjected to deportation as a consequence. A similar effort was carried out in 2013 and resulted in the deportation of more than 170,000 Ethiopians. It is therefore likely that the threat of deportation might deter potential Ethiopian migrants to follow this route to Saudi Arabia until it is clear how the situation there will develop. Evidence on this is, however, not yet available (RMMS, 2017b).

Of the close to 16,000 migrants arriving in Yemen the first quarter of this year, 78 per cent were Ethiopian and 22 per cent Somalis, with basically no observations of citizens of other countries among these flows. Data shows that between April 2014 and March 2017 there were close to 260,000 Ethiopians registered as arrivals in Yemen. They are mostly of Oromo descent (around 90%), a trend that has developed since 2014 when only about 50 per cent of the arriving Ethiopians indicated having this background. This might be due to the challenges this community faces within Ethiopia as a result of a political crisis and violent anti-government protests. However, when asked, the migrants indicated largely economic reasons and not political ones as the reason for migrating (RMMS, 2016h; 2017b).

Most of the migrants that follow the eastern route from the HoA leave from Obock at the coast of Djibouti, although reports show that smugglers have started to use less populated cities in the vicinities to avoid police patrols. Departures from Bossaso in Somalia are also increasingly recognized and migrants seem to prefer it as departure point due to more recorded incidents of abuse and exploitation during the Red Sea crossing, while no such incidents have been recorded for the Arabian Sea route (RMMS, 2013a; 2016a; 2017b). The journey along the eastern route is full of dangers, such as the smuggling risks to cross Djibouti to reach coastal areas and the boat trip itself (RMMS, 2013a). Migrants that follow this route are known to be vulnerable to abuses from smugglers and traffickers. Overcrowded boats are the norm and violence, rape as well as forced disembarkation at sea are often reported. Women and girls are especially vulnerable as they may be on deck and often subjected to SGBV (Horwood, 2015).

Also, it is important to mention that **due to the Yemeni conflict, the eastern route has seen a bi-directional trend evolving**, where **Yemeni refugees** come to the Horn and East of Africa along with **returnees from the region and other nationals**. After the outbreak of the conflict, more than 50,000 arrivals were registered from Yemen into the HoA between April and June of 2015. Since then they have decreased and arrivals have been relatively stable over the past year at between 2,500 and 3,000 per quarter. In the first quarter of 2017, 2,480 persons arrived from Yemen in the region (RMMS, 2017b). All in all, by 30 April 2017, there were 95,807 Yemeni individuals in the region, concentrated in Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan (UNHCR, 2017v).

3.4 The Southern Route (Through Kenya towards South Africa)

The southern migration route connects the **East and Horn of Africa to South Africa**, with **Kenya** as one of the **main transit countries**. **Other transit countries on the route include Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique**. The southern route is a popular one, although the most current numbers demonstrate a decrease in the number of migrants following it. It was estimated that between 14,750 and 16,850 irregular migrants and asylum seekers leave the Horn of Africa via the southern route each year. Estimates of those arriving in South Africa from the Horn of Africa have consequently also decreased, further underlining the

assumption that the southern route is used slightly less. While estimates of 2009 indicate that 17,000 to 20,000 migrants, mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, entered South Africa, more recent estimates show that it is now between 13,400 and 14,050 individuals annually (Frouws & Horwood, 2017; RMMS, 2016h).

Figure 7: The Southern Route



Source: Prepared by the authors using the National Geographic Mapmaker.

Factors that have contributed to the slightly reduced attraction of South Africa as a destination country include a general attraction to Europe and a perceived ease of entering the continent therefore changing the routes of migrants, continuous 'Afrophobic' attacks faced by migrants (especially Somalis), increased border patrols and worsening of employment conditions. Due to these and growing labour opportunities in

the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors in other countries along the southern route, several migrants chose these as alternative destinations (Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

However, overall the southern route is still an attractive option and **South Africa** an important destination for migrants from the focus region. The main factors that explain this are security, escape from conflict, the possibility of employment and a **legal loophole related to asylum applications**. This loophole makes migration to the country a **very attractive** endeavour, as South Africa has a very long process of refugee status determination where asylum seekers are still allowed to study, work and have access to social services. In 2016, South African government officials estimated that the country had registered 1 million asylum applications in the past 10 years and rejected 90 per cent of these, since they did not qualify for refugee status. Migrants often apply for asylum knowing they will not be granted refugee status, but the prolonged finalization of asylum claims provides them with a *de facto* visa (Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

This loophole is likely to be closed soon. On March 30th of this year, the government of South Africa approved an Immigration White Paper, which will tighten immigration policies and enforce stricter border controls. The Paper proposes to provide “secure detention centres” for asylum seekers, only allowing the integration into the society of people who were granted refugee status. This would constrain the access to work and study that has made South Africa attractive previously. Other asylum seekers are considered to be an “illegal alien”, marking them as stealing economic opportunities from South Africans (South African Government, 2017a; b). This message resonates with many South Africans, as unemployment rose to 26.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2016, at a time where the country struggles with poverty and inequality. A narrative has formed that economic migrants are masking themselves under the asylum seeker umbrella and are competing for already scarce resources and opportunities. High ranking government officials echo this message, for example Home Affairs Minister Hlengiwe Mkhize, who stated in an interview that the “[South African government] cannot be too liberal as though we are not dealing with a real situation that affects people [South Africans] on a daily basis” (Bendile, 2017). These are all very recent developments and it remains to be seen how they will play out in practice, as implementing the plans proposed by the White Paper will demand political and economic capital. Nonetheless, such a change in policy is expected to change South Africa’s pull factors for migrants from the East and Horn of Africa.

In order **to reach South Africa, smuggling is used by virtually all migrants**. Studies conducted by the IOM in the country show that 97 per cent of migrants had used smugglers on at least one of the sections of their journey. A study from 2009 shows that migrants pay between USD 1,000 and 3,000 per person for this journey and evidence indicates that the costs have increased since. Based on that and the number of migrants on the route, estimates indicate that smuggling operations on the southern route amount to being a USD 45-47 million business nowadays compared to around USD 40 million in 2009. There is no large-scale smuggling enterprises, but rather a series of smaller organisations which often rely on corrupt border officials. Trafficking over this long distance, however, is not reported. The practice is more common within the regions and it is unlikely that there are extensive cross-border human trafficking networks from the Horn of Africa to the South (Horwood, 2009; Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

It is also important to point out that the travel experiences of many of the migrants on the southern route are traumatic, filled with abuses and deadly experiences. The **conditions of travel** are **often sub-human** due to a lack of access to water and food, and the journey can last for weeks or even months. Migrants report being robbed, beaten, and arrested and have been witnesses to deaths, disappearances, kidnapping and SGBV. This is supported by data from the 4Mi project that aims to track mixed migration flows and tracks such incidents (Frouws & Horwood, 2017; RMMS, 2017b).

Government officials in many countries along the southern route are often described as having received **bribes to turn a blind eye to smuggling** and, in some cases, even **take part** in these operations. When government officials do not collude with the smuggling schemes, detected irregular migrants face detention and deportation. For example, Zambia identified a group of 147 Ethiopians which they aimed to repatriate in January 2017. Initially, when identified as being in the country irregularly they were facing jail time, but were then pardoned by the Zambian president, leading to the repatriation efforts. At a much smaller scale, Zimbabwe deported six Somalis and Ethiopians that were stopped at a border crossing with Zambia. Increasingly irregular migrants are treated under criminal law in the countries along the southern route, and as these countries have strengthened immigration laws, migrants can be subjected to fines or jail time (Frouws & Horwood, 2017; RMMS, 2016h; 2017b).

4 Policy Responses to Migration in the East and Horn of Africa

Global migration governance is highly complex, can be both formal and informal, and involves actors and institutions at various levels, including, for instance, local, regional, national, bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral levels (Betts, 2011). Different actors are involved in migration management and governance in the East and Horn of Africa. This section aims to provide an overview of the main stakeholders and their actions and policies regarding various forms of migration, including national, regional, and international stakeholders and frameworks. One should note that in addition to these stakeholders, many other actors, for instance from development cooperation, are active in the East and Horn of Africa. It is, however, beyond the scope of this report to also map these.

4.2 Relevant National Policies and Stakeholders

The following section identifies national legislation, policies and key stakeholders in the field of migration as well as gaps and remaining challenges for each focus country. One should note that it is difficult to understand what policies and programmes are in place and whether or not they are effective and/or are implemented properly. This is partly due to a lack of data and limited existing academic literature on national policies and programmes related to migration in the countries of the East and Horn of Africa. While there is more information available regarding some forms of migration such as irregular migration and the fight against human trafficking and smuggling (see for instance IOM, 2015b; US Department of State, 2016; Marchand et al., 2016), there is little to no information on regular migration including for instance labour migration. In addition, existing reports in many cases do not paint a comprehensive picture, but only focus on policy implications for certain migrant groups in certain countries (for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia and/ or Sudan see for instance Mallett et al. (2017) and Horwood & Hooper (2016)). It is clear that **countries “struggle to develop appropriate strategies to respond to the outflow, inflow or transit of rising numbers of migrants”** (Horwood, 2015, p.27). In general, implementation efforts of existing migration legislations seem insufficient (Horwood, 2015).

4.2.2 Djibouti

Laws governing migration in Djibouti focus on administrative procedures regarding **entry** and **residence**, **refugee protection**, and the **fight against irregular migration**, including human trafficking and smuggling (see Table 6/ Annex D). The **fight against human trafficking and smuggling** seems to be a **priority** for Djibouti, as the Country's National Plan of Action for 2014-2020 shows. It is furthermore enshrined in other legislation not primarily focusing on migration, such as the Constitution, the Djiboutian Penal Code and the Djiboutian Labour Code (IOM, 2015b).

The Djiboutian government has taken measures to **assist irregular migrants**; however, these can be improved. The conflict in Yemen increased the inflow of migrants, refugees and return migrants to Djibouti. In cooperation with IOM, the Djiboutian government assisted these migrants and returnees with "documentation, onward transportation to country of origin/destination, and provi[sion of] health assistance, accommodation, food and WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene] services" (IOM, 2015b, p.28).

There are efforts to **improve border management** also in cooperation with neighbouring countries. While no bilateral labour agreement can be identified in the case of Djibouti, Djibouti signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia in 2009 to cooperate in the fight against irregular migration, including smuggling and human trafficking (IOM, 2015b). The countries also issued a Joint Communication in March 2017, expressing their interest in strengthening cooperation, especially in the field of **justice**. The Communication also acknowledges the benefits of **free movement** and improved **cross-border transport** for **economic cooperation** between Djibouti and Ethiopia and stresses the importance of continuing annual Joint Border Commission meetings (Capital, 2017).

Most refugees hosted by Djibouti come from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Yemen. Somali and Yemeni asylum seekers are generally offered *prima facie* refugee status in Djibouti, while refugees from other countries must go through "individual Refugee Status Determination (RSD) by UNHCR and its Government counterpart, ONARS (Office National pour l'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés)" (RMMS, 2016a). Djibouti does not follow a strict encampment policy and recognizes basic rights to refugees (RMMS, 2016a). However, there are few essential services such as health care available to migrants and refugees are encouraged to stay in camps if they want to receive aid (UNHCR, 2010a). This is attributable to an under-resourced Djiboutian government (OHCHR, 2015). Refugees who do not live in camps are hardly integrated and lead a marginal existence (RMMS, 2013b). Recent changes in law ensure refugees and Djiboutian citizens equal right to education, health care, work and movement outside of camps. It remains to be seen if these changes will be effective.

Direct diaspora engagement is minimal due to the authoritarian nature of the Djiboutian government, which makes it difficult for members of the diaspora to effect change (Creates, 2014). In general, information regarding Djiboutian migration policy is scarce.

Key stakeholders involved in formulating, implementing and enforcing migration legislation, policies and programmes are the Office National pour l'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (National Office for Protection of Refugees and Disaster Victims - ONARS), the National Gendarmerie and the Djiboutian Army (RMMS, 2016a).

Gaps

Having reviewed the existing legislation and policies of Djibouti relating to migration, several gaps remain. First, there seems to be a lack of understanding concerning the differences between human trafficking and smuggling. The prosecution of traffickers and smugglers is an issue, not only because identifying them is difficult due to the clandestine nature of their operations, but also because of a **lack of capacities** to support victims of trafficking (VoTs) if the case is brought to court (RMMS, 2015). Second, there is a need to better **protect (irregular) migrant women and minors** who are at particular risk of (sexual) exploitation and do not have **access to health care, social security and education**. In addition, migrant women often work in the domestic sector to resource their journey, where they are “invisible and inaccessible” (RMMS, 2015, p.12 - 15). The health of migrants is a concern because of the harsh environmental conditions and limited drinking water in the country. In case of illness, migrants have to spend large sums of money on health services, which puts them at risk of not being able to continue their journey (RMMS, 2015). Harsh conditions are also reported as being problematic in refugee camps. In addition, there are limited **livelihood and integration opportunities** for refugees in Djibouti (RMMS, 2016a). The police and military are responsible for border management and immigration controls. Due to limited capacities and resources, these operations are ineffective, inefficient and can even increase vulnerability of migrants by causing separation (RMMS, 2015). Labour migration does not seem to play a role in Djiboutian politics since it is mainly a transit country. The **social security system** only covers individuals in formal **employment**, which can be problematic as it excludes large parts of the national and migrant population (AfDB, OECD, UNDP & UNECA, 2012). **Internal migration as a consequence of droughts** also deserves further attention from the government. This brief review shows that there are needs for capacity building in various fields, including knowledge about migration, its different forms, potentials and challenges. In addition, capacity building is needed to facilitate the systematic, effective and efficient responses to migration challenges with the limited resources and facilities available.

4.2.3 Eritrea

Eritrean migration legislation and policies provide mainly for **administrative rules and procedures** regarding entry, registration, residence, exit, rules to obtain work permits, and possibilities for naturalisation. Labour emigration from Eritrea is limited due to **strict emigration rules** enforced by the government (GSDRC, 2016; EASO, 2015). According to EASO (2015), regular migration is easier for some people including men above 54; women above 47; children below 13; individuals exempted from national service; those seeking health treatments abroad; former freedom fighters and their families; and higher ranking government officials and their families. In some cases, students, businessmen, sportsmen and individuals travelling to conferences are also permitted to exit Eritrea. Nevertheless, officials’ decisions to issue the required travel documents can be arbitrary.

Eritrean law also **prohibits human trafficking, slavery and forced labour**. As previous sections of this report show, it is questionable whether the State itself complies with these provisions. According to the US Department of State (2016) the Eritrean authorities fail to sufficiently address human trafficking, including the protection of VoTs and the prosecution of perpetrators. Although the government tries to raise awareness regarding the risks of trafficking, it lacks knowledge to differentiate different forms of migration and/or offences like transnational migration, human trafficking and smuggling (US Department of State, 2016).

Additional information on migration governance as well as remaining policy gaps within Eritrea is scarce and requires further research.

4.2.4 Ethiopia

Migration legislation and policies seem **more advanced and comprehensive** in Ethiopia compared to most of the other focus countries (see Table 9/ Annex D). Existing legislation regulates entry, stay, employment, naturalisation and departure (including deportation) as well as the rules, procedures, and responsible authorities for issuing travel documents, visas, and work permits for regular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Ethiopia. The **Refugee Proclamation** provides for rules regarding asylum applications and procedures and defines rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers. There are also possibilities for irregular migrants to become legal residents and special rights and privileges exist for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin to contribute to Ethiopia's development.

According to the US Department of State (2016), the Ethiopian government is making significant efforts to combat human trafficking. Ethiopian law **prohibits human smuggling and trafficking**, defines high penalties for non-compliance (fines of up to USD 19,500 and even the death penalty in severe cases where VoTs died) and provides for assistance to VoTs. The Government of Ethiopia, in cooperation with IOM, actively tries to prevent irregular migration including human trafficking and smuggling through awareness raising campaigns (IOM, 2017d). In 2009, Ethiopia signed MoUs with Djibouti and Sudan to fight irregular migration including human trafficking and smuggling. There are furthermore various legal instruments not directly related to migration which include provisions for the protection of migrants and the fight on human trafficking, such as the Criminal Justice Policy and the National Human Rights Action Plan (IOM, 2015b; Marchand et al., 2016). Emergency Migrant Response Centers along main migration routes have been established successfully "to provide lifesaving assistance to vulnerable (intercepted or abandoned) migrants" (IOM, 2015b p.32).

Ethiopian legislation and policies are not only focused on administrative rules regarding immigration, but also **regulate labour migration** (management) and **employment of Ethiopians abroad**, mainly to protect them from human trafficking, forced labour, abuse and exploitation. Since 2016, Ethiopia only allows employment of Ethiopian nationals abroad if **bilateral labour agreements** with the destination country are in place, if labour migrants are recruited through governmental agencies. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is responsible for pre-employment and pre-departure awareness raising. **Ethiopia and Kenya have a bilateral agreement allowing their citizens to move between the two countries without visas** (RMMS, 2016c). Ethiopia has agreements related to labour migration, education and training with countries outside the region such as **Algeria, Qatar and Spain**. Ethiopia is also interested in signing bilateral MoUs with the main destination countries of Ethiopian labour migrants such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the UAE. In October 2013, the Ethiopian government passed a **ban on employment abroad by foreign private recruitment agencies** to protect its citizens from human trafficking, abuse and human rights violations. The ban was lifted in 2016 to prevent an increase in irregular migration (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; IOM, 2015b).

The Ethiopian government actively tries to **engage the diaspora** in three ways: 1) politically - through the introduction of special rights; 2) economically – through investment policies; and 3) in terms of identity - through capacity-building that is creating a "communal belonging among expatriate members" (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2010, p.17). Examples of engagement policies are diaspora bonds and facilities for remittances, which are tied to development priorities of the country. In order to ease diaspora

engagement, the Ethiopian government founded the **Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate**, formerly known as the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs General Directorate. It provides updated information on Ethiopia in Ethiopian embassies abroad, organises research on Ethiopian communities abroad, and informs diaspora members about their rights and privileges (Kuschminder & Hercog, 2016).

The government of Ethiopia works with IOM to facilitate the **return of Ethiopian migrants**, who are unable to remain in their country of destination or opt to return. In 2015, both parties evacuated 7,538 Ethiopian migrants fleeing the emergency crisis in Yemen. Most of these were assisted at IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Transit Centre in Addis Ababa and were provided with key resources. Recent developments in prominent destination countries for Ethiopian migrants, like Saudi Arabia, have significantly increased the number of returnees in the past years. In 2015, Ethiopia witnessed a 197 per cent increase in the number of returnees through Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes (Hart, Gravano & Klink, 2015).

However, measures aiming at the **reintegration of returnees** do not seem sufficient. Research from 2015 demonstrates that only 22 per cent of returnees were reintegrated, with the main problem being economic reintegration. Despite being aware of these problems, there seems to be a lack of political willingness to address them (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015).

Ethiopia's borders are open for refugees seeking protection, however, they are supposed to **stay inside refugee camps** and have extremely **limited livelihood opportunities**. Many refugees hence hope for resettlement. **Chances for resettlement are not very high** given the high number of refugees residing in Ethiopia, leading to disillusionment and aspirations to continue the migration process otherwise (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; Mallett et al., 2017). In 2010, the government introduced the '**out of camp**' policy allowing Eritrean refugees to live in urban centres, provided they had necessary means to financially support themselves (RMMS, 2016c).

Key authorities in the field of migration in Ethiopia are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority, the National Anti-Trafficking Council and Task Force, the Immigration Office, Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate and the Ethiopian Federal Police (IOM, 2015b; Ashine, 2017).

Gaps

While the Ethiopian government seems to have an advanced understanding of the challenges and potentials of migration, some gaps remain: The Ethiopian government seems rather **dependent on civil society organisations and international organisations** like IOM in providing assistance to VoTs and vulnerable return migrants. Accordingly, it is recommended that government capacities and enforcement mechanisms are improved (Ashine, 2017). Ethiopian authorities are for instance **not aware of the crucial differences between human smuggling and trafficking** (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016) and fail to address internal dimensions of human smuggling and trafficking in Ethiopia. In addition, existing policies and legislation do not consider gendered dimensions of migration (Kuschminder & Siegel, 2014). Regarding the protection of Ethiopian migrants abroad, existing laws do not seem sufficient, especially for **domestic workers**, which is why they should be strengthened, for instance through further negotiations of bilateral labour agreements (Ashine, 2017). Return migrants should receive **enhanced support for reintegration** (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016). Refugees living in Ethiopia have limited livelihood and employment opportunities which can cause onward mobility (Mallett et al., 2017). Therefore, it is recommended to

improve local integration of refugees and to **expand resettlement opportunities** (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016).

4.2.5 Kenya

As in the case of Ethiopia, Kenyan migration policies seem more advanced and comprehensive compared to most other countries in the region. Existing legislation **regulates immigration** (entry, stay, exit, required travel documents, and naturalisation), **migrant workers' rights and employment**, as well as **rights and protection of refugees and IDPs**. In addition, Kenyan law criminalises human trafficking and smuggling and provides for the **protection of VoTs** (see Table 10/ Annex D). It is remarkable that Kenya is one of the few countries in the region, which also address **labour migration**, mainly to **protect migrants' rights abroad**.

The Kenyan Government acknowledges the multiple dimensions, challenges and potentials of migration. Key policies in the field of migration are the **Kenyan National Migration Policy** and the **Kenyan Diaspora Policy** (IOM, 2015c). The former manages labour migration and return and aims at protecting Kenyans abroad, while the latter is an attempt to “mainstream Kenyan diaspora into national development processes” (IOM, 2015c, p.115). In addition, the Kenyan government drafted a **National Policy on Internal Displacement**. Internal displacement has been an issue since colonisation and deserves further attention from the government, including the protection of IDPs and finding out more about causes and consequences of internal displacement, as well as the profiles of IDPs (IOM, 2015c; RMMS, 2017a). In July 2016, the **Kenyan National Migration Coordination Mechanism** was launched, which is a platform for the coordination of migration management in Kenya that brings together government and non-state actors (RMMS, 2017a).

The Kenyan Government engages in **awareness raising campaigns** regarding the associated risks of various forms of migration including displacement and human trafficking (IOM, 2015c). According to the US Department of State (2016), the Kenyan government is making significant efforts to **combat human trafficking**. However, there is a need to further step up protection and assistance of VoTs as well as government funding and resources for the fight against trafficking.

Kenya has been host to large refugee populations during the past decades. The **Refugee Act 2006** established an **encampment policy** for refugees to qualify for humanitarian assistance. A new bill replacing the 2006 Refugee Act is expected to be introduced soon. The new bill will provide for the protection and recognition of refugees, establish the Kenya Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, and proposes the foundation of a Secretariat of Refugee Affairs (RMMS, 2017a). In May 2016, the government announced to **close Dadaab**, its largest refugee camp, and return refugees to their home countries because members of **Al-Shabaab**, an Islamist armed group, were thought to be among refugees in the camp. This caused concerns as Al-Shabaab is at war with the Somali government and also committed crimes within Kenya. While this is not only against Kenyan legislation and other international commitments, experts and international organisations are concerned about the refugees which are to be returned to their home countries (mainly Somalia) which are still in crisis (HRW, 2016). Other challenges related to hosting refugees are – like in the case of Ethiopia – integration and limited livelihood and employment opportunities (IOM, 2015c).

Kenya signed **bilateral agreements** with Rwanda and Seychelles to address the shortage of teachers in Kenyan schools and an agreement on the recruitment of Kenyan domestic workers to Saudi Arabia (IOM, 2015c; Al-Sulami, 2017). Kenya aims at further enhancing bilateral cooperation with other countries. There

is no evidence for bilateral labour agreements between Kenya and other countries in the East and Horn of Africa.

Key actors in the field of migration include but are not limited to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (including the Directorate of Immigration and Registration of Persons, which is responsible for migration management, border control and refugee welfare supervision), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Central Bank of Kenya, and Counter-Trafficking in Persons Advisory Committee (IOM, 2015c; RMMS, 2017a).

Gaps

Having reviewed existing policies and laws related to migration, several gaps stand out. Firstly, border management needs to be improved, especially in order to combat human trafficking and smuggling (IOM, 2015c). This includes addressing corruption among border officials, improving infrastructure and enhancing capacities and resources (IOM, 2015c; US Department of State, 2016). Similarly, capacities and resources of other authorities responsible for the implementation of migration legislation and policies need to be increased (IOM, 2015c). In addition, IOM (2015c) recommends the development of a “comprehensive migration governance framework” (p.165), the establishment of a “Migration Research Unit” (p.169) and to increase cooperation between the Kenyan government, migrants and the Kenyan diaspora to better harness the development potentials of migration.

4.2.6 Somalia

There are very **few laws directly related to migration** in Somalia and the influence of the Somalian government outside the capital remains extremely limited (IOM, 2015b). Existing migration legislation is **limited to matters of asylum, citizenship, entry, stay, exit and the fight against human trafficking** (see Table 11/ Annex D).

While border management remains a challenge, Somalia has made progress in expanding its **Border Management Information Systems** to process the entry of migrants into the country and to improve training of border management officials (IOM, 2015b). In addition, the government supports **awareness raising campaigns** to inform the population about the risks of **human trafficking** and attempts to improve protection of VoTs in both Somaliland and Puntland (IOM, 2015b; US Department of State, 2016). Besides this, the authorities of both Somaliland and Puntland “[sustain] minimal efforts to combat trafficking” (US Department of State, 2016, p.406).

Somalia and Kenya cooperate in the field of border management to facilitate human mobility after having re-opened the borders after two-and-a-half decades. Open borders are expected to boost trade and allow the flow of people between the two nations. The cooperation also encompasses opening two border posts, in Doble-Liboi and Mandera-Bula Hawa (Yusuf, 2017).

In 2017, the Government of Somalia, in partnership with the EU, IOM, UNHCR and UNOPS, launched the project **“RE-INTEG: Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows”**. It is expected to close existing gaps regarding migration and refugee management, to improve policies and legal frameworks for forced migrants and to increase access to basic services in areas of return and departure (European Commission, 2017a).

While Somalia's **diaspora** is significant and has potential to contribute to the development of the country, independent government activities do not seem to use this potential sufficiently (Shandy & Das, 2016). There are a series of initiatives from international organisations and private individuals, however (Hoehne, Feyissa & Abdile, 2011; Bostrom, Brown & Cechvala, 2016).

Key stakeholders in the field of migration include, but are not limited to, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Somaliland Immigration Department and Puntland's Ministry of Women's Development and Family Affairs.

Gaps

Authorities in Somalia, including both Somaliland and Puntland, are faced with a **lack of capacities and resources** to develop, implement and enforce adequate migration policies (IOM, 2014a; US Department of State, 2016; European Commission, 2017a). This is not only true for government officials and policy-makers, but also for the **police**, which are understaffed and undertrained. This is especially problematic in terms of fighting human trafficking and smuggling, which can be conflated. Accordingly, authorities do not seem able to cope with various forms of migration, including irregular and forced migration (US Department of State, 2016). Somali policies fail to address circular migration (Weiss, 2009), **protect and integrate** return migrants, refugees and IDPs adequately (European Commission, 2017a). This is partly a result of **fragmented responsibilities** of different institutions. It is therefore recommended to strengthen government capacities, data collection and data management (IOM, 2014a; European Commission, 2017a). In addition, assistance to IDPs should be increased to prevent **radicalisation** and human trafficking. Moreover, the government is advised to expand diaspora engagement (IOM, 2014a). As **return migration** is expected to increase since Kenya intends to close **Dadaab** and due to the war in Yemen, reintegration measures should be improved (RMMS, 2016h; Avis & Herbert, 2016).

4.2.7 South Sudan

South Sudan is a rather **young nation** which inherited **few laws and policies related to migration** and which therefore faces many challenges in responding to migration issues. Most activities in the field of migration are organised by **international organisations** such as IOM. There are efforts by the South Sudanese government to improve **border management**, through developing infrastructure and providing capacity training for officials (IOM, 2015b). In 2012, the **Refugee Act** was passed, which outlines the country's duties and responsibilities towards refugees (see Table 12/ Annex D). Refugees in South Sudan are often located in camps; however, the extent of the restrictiveness of its encampment policy is unclear.

According to the US Department of State (2016), efforts by the South Sudanese Government to combat human trafficking, including protection of VoTs and prosecution of perpetrators, are not significant and the **National Plan Against Trafficking** is not adhered to.

A key player in South Sudan's migration policy framework is the **Directorate of Immigration, Passport, Nationality and Identification**. Its mandate encompasses facilitating the legal movement of persons across the country and other nations to foster economic growth. In addition, the Directorate deals with security concerns, which are intertwined with migration issues in South Sudan. An example of such an intention is the desired outcome of raising the percentage of immigration revenue (MFEP, 2011).

Gaps

For the past years, IOM has done continuous trainings with the South Sudanese government and the Directorate of Immigration, Passport, Nationality and Identification to build capacities. Still, the government faces **insurmountable challenges** (IOM, 2014c), which are exacerbated by the **ongoing civil war** and **weak state institutions**. South Sudan therefore fails to address migration, to protect vulnerable individuals and to provide basic services (RMMS, 2016e). According to IOM (2015b; 2016c), South Sudan should strengthen its border management system, improve infrastructure, and capacities of relevant authorities in the field of migration including the police and enhance assistance to IDPs. Moreover, the government is advised to create a partnership with the diaspora (van der Linden, Blaak & Andrew, 2013).

4.2.8 Sudan

Sudanese legislation related to migration provides for matters related to Sudanese **labour migration, irregular migration, employment of foreign nationals, and refugees**. In addition, it prohibits human trafficking (see Table 13/ Annex D). All foreigners, except Egyptians, need a visa to enter Sudan. Labour migrants are required to have a working permit. Moreover, Sudanese citizens are only allowed to leave the country with a valid exit visa (IOM, 2011b). The Sudanese government, in cooperation with IOM, provides **reintegration support to return migrants** (IOM, 2014d). Research on return and reintegration show that only 57 per cent of returnees could be considered reintegrated. The economic dimension remains the main challenge for reintegration, with only 56 per cent of respondents being economically reintegrated (Khosier & Kuschminder, 2015). **No bilateral labour agreements** could be identified for Sudan.

Sudan has a **large diaspora population**, yet it has a lack of policies to engage this potential in a productive manner. Nonetheless, Sudanese diaspora organizations exist and have in the past influenced the peace-making process. Examples are diaspora networks in Darfur identifying contentious and consensual points on peace agreements (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

Looking at **forced migration**, Sudan applies an “open door” policy for asylum seekers providing land for the establishment of camps and access to immediate basic services, such as education and health facilities. Currently, a series of international organizations follow the “**Strategy to Address Human Trafficking, Kidnappings and Smuggling of Persons in Sudan – Strengthening Alternatives to Onward Movements (2015-17)**” developed by UNHCR Sudan, IOM, UNODC, UNICEF and UNFPA. Another priority is the promotion of **self-reliance programme**, aiming at enhancing economic self-reliance and reducing aid dependency (UNHCR, 2017w). Historically the government’s refugee policy is based on assumptions that refugees can represent a threat to social security, and therefore should be placed in spatially segregated areas. This highlights a central priority of the government to keep towns and urban centres clear of refugees, ensuing **encampment policies** (Grabska & Mehta, 2008, p.118, Strachan, 2016). Nonetheless, it has generally failed to achieve this goal as urban centres like **Khartoum** host large numbers of refugees (DAI and EuroTrends, 2015). Another assumption sees refugee status as a temporary approach before a durable solution can be found. This prevents integration of refugees into host communities, for instance by **not granting them access to employment and naturalisation** (Grabska & Mehta, 2008). In 2009, Sudan introduced the **National Policy on Internal Displacement** which establishes the right of freedom of movement for IDPs. Yet, it favours return over other options, like integration or resettlement (Strachan, 2016).

Attempts to **prevent human trafficking** within the country include increased patrols by the police where the Sudanese population seems especially vulnerable to trafficking. The government is aware of capacity building needs, for instance, in the field of human trafficking, and organises trainings and workshops for officials (IOM, 2015b). Nevertheless, the US Department of State (2016) regards efforts by the Sudanese Government to combat human trafficking as insignificant. A reception desk at the border with Eritrea provides assistance to VoTs and other migrants who are victims of exploitation (IOM, 2015b).

Key stakeholders in the field of migration include, but are not limited to the Ministry of Labour, the National Committee to Combat Trafficking, Ministry of Interior, the Commission of Refugees, the Secretariat of Sudanese Working Abroad and the National Security and Intelligence Service (IOM, 2011b).

Gaps

All in all, **Sudan's migration policy does not seem coherent**. The mandates between ministries and agencies often overlap. For instance, three ministries are responsible for foreign workers in Sudan. Gaps in the policy framework also arise from this lack of coherence (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012). Sudan largely **depends on the support of international organisations** regarding the development and implementation of migration policies and programmes as it lacks adequate capacities and resources, for instance to address human trafficking and smuggling (US Department of State, 2016; IOM, 2015b). Authorities often **conflate human trafficking and smuggling**. In addition, Sudan should expand the protection of Sudanese labour migrants abroad, for instance through negotiating **bilateral labour agreements** with prominent destination countries, where migrants are at risk of exploitation (IOM, 2015b). **Assistance to return migrants, IDPs, refugees and host communities should be strengthened** (Di Bartolomeo et al., 2012).

4.2.9 Uganda

As in the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, Ugandan migration policies seem **more advanced and comprehensive** compared to other countries in the region. Existing legislation in the field of migration provides for matters related to **citizenship, immigration, labour migration and recruitment, employment of migrant workers, and refugees**. In addition, **human trafficking** is criminalised (see Table 14/ Annex D). Uganda has created a **favourable environment for refugees** and has recently developed/ begun developing national policies related to migration, national development, internally displaced persons, disaster management, and the Ugandan diaspora (IOM, 2013b; RMMS, 2016f). The Ugandan Government also provides guidelines for the **recruitment** of labour migrants and developed a job-matching database for Ugandan migrants (IOM, 2013b).

The National Migration Policy responds to issues related to socio-economic, cultural and political development (IOM, 2013b). Both the **First National Development Plan for 2010/11-2014/15** and the **Second National Development Plan 2015/16-2019/20 do not acknowledge the development potentials of international migration sufficiently**. The latter mentions rural-urban migration a few times and only in the annex it defines facilitating “orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (Republic of Uganda, 2015, p.275) as a post-2015 goal (Republic of Uganda, 2010; 2015).

Uganda is developing a **National Diaspora Policy** to encourage Ugandans in diaspora to participate more fully in national development. For this purpose the Diaspora Services Department, which deals with matters

related to diaspora, including the facilitation of the diaspora's contribution to the Ugandan society, economy, technology and its political development, has been established (Republic of Uganda, 2017).

Uganda has a positive reputation for its approach to social and economic **integration of refugees**. It allows for freedom of movement, providing land and permission for work to decrease refugees' dependency on aid. Nevertheless, full legal integration in the form of acquiring citizenship is not a possibility and refugees are discouraged from making settling permanently (Kreibaum, 2016).

Uganda's **National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons** from 2004 provides for rights and support of IDPs (IOM, 2013b). In addition, the Ugandan Government provides assistance to VoTs including reintegration and return (IOM, 2013b). The Ugandan Government makes significant efforts to combat human trafficking, for instance, through awareness raising campaigns related to the risks of human trafficking (IOM, 2015b; US Department of State, 2016). There is, however, room for improvement. The US Department of State (2016) recommends Uganda to step up resources and strengthen capacities of officials as well as services available to VoTs within Uganda and abroad. In addition, it emphasises the need to collect data on the prevalence and prosecution of human trafficking and to expand awareness among the Ugandan population about the risks related to human trafficking.

Uganda has signed **bilateral labour agreements** with Saudi Arabia and Jordan (Baikie, 2016). In addition, Uganda is interested in expanding bilateral relations with other prominent destination countries of Ugandan migrants such as the UAE, Oman and Qatar (Manishimwe, 2016). No evidence on bilateral labour agreements between Uganda and other countries in the East and Horn of Africa could be found.

Key Actors in the field of migration include, but are not limited to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Diaspora Services Department, the Ministry for Gender, Labour and Social Development, the External Employment Unit, the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, and the Coordination Office to Combat Trafficking in Persons (IOM, 2013b; Republic of Uganda, 2017; RMMS, 2016f).

Gaps

IOM (2013b; 2015b) recommends that the Ugandan government create **implementation plans** for their migration policies and increases awareness for **existing legal channels** for migration among the Ugandan population. Moreover, regarding immigration and emigration, the IOM (2013b) urges the Ugandan government to increase migrant **protection** measures, particularly for women, as women make up a large percentage of both emigrant and immigrant stocks. Furthermore, the National Development Plans do not exploit the **development potentials of migration** sufficiently. Not only do the plans neglect to mention financial flows such as **remittances**, which would contribute to Uganda's development, but they also neglect to mention any potential development through the **transfer of skills** (IOM, 2013b). Therefore, IOM (2013b) recommends that the Ugandan government increases efforts to strengthen the connection between the Ugandan diaspora and Uganda, since this would contribute positively to Ugandan development. Concerning **irregular migration**, the US Department of State (2016) recommends that the Ugandan government increase resources for combating human trafficking and smuggling, to increase public awareness regarding the risks of irregular migration, to expand assistance to and protection of VoTs and to collect data on the prevalence and prosecution of human traffickers.

4.3 Relevant Regional Frameworks and Stakeholders

In the context of migration in the East and Horn of Africa, it is important to look at relevant regional frameworks and stakeholders because migration crosses national borders and does not only concern single countries, but wider regions. At the same time, migration affects various policy domains simultaneously, which is another reason why regional responses to migration seem ideal (Klavert, 2011; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016). In addition, an advantage of a regional approach is increased efficiency due to arguably lower transaction costs compared to bilateral approaches as well as the avoidance of incoherence and duplication of policies and programmes (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016).

4.3.2 African Union (AU)

The African Union (AU), the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), is a regional inter-governmental organisation uniting all 54 recognised African countries (AU, 2017). The 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community - also known as the Abuja Treaty – calls for the establishment and/or strengthening of existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within the AU (Art. 28(1)). AU Members States and RECs are encouraged to promote the **free movement of people** (Art. 43). “Free movement of persons is also integral to Africa’s vision and action plan as laid out in the Agenda 2063, the continental master plan for development in the 21st century” (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016, p.9). Being aware of the challenges and potentials of migration for its Member States, the AU has formulated several other migration frameworks, among others the **Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA)** and the **African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD)**, which were both adopted in 2006 (Klavert, 2011; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016).

The **MPFA** promotes the formulation of comprehensive policies to better harness the development potentials of migration, taking into account all forms of migration including voluntary and forced migration, regular and irregular migration, as well as internal and international migration. The MPFA also recognizes the importance of border management, regional integration and migration data (Executive Council, 2006a). The AU recently revised the framework and formulated an implementation plan (Journal du Cameroun, 2017). Unfortunately, more concrete information about the revisions has not been published yet.

The **ACPMD** defines eleven priorities for migration policies and recommendations for relevant national, regional and international stakeholders. The eleven priorities include migration and development; human resources and brain drain; labour migration; remittances; diaspora; migration, peace, security and stability; migration and human rights; migration and gender; children and youth; elderly; and regional initiatives. In addition, four cross-cutting themes are identified, namely health, the environment, trade and access to social services (Executive Council, 2006b).

In June 2015, the 25th AU Assembly passed the **Declaration on Migration**, which stresses the need to speed up the implementation of earlier commitments, especially those related to the free movement of persons across the continent and addressing irregular migration (AU Assembly, 2015).

Other policies and instruments which relate to migration, but were not designed for migration specifically are the **1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa**, the **2004 AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation**, the **2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa** (Kampala Convention), the **2009 AU Minimum Integration Programme**, the **2012 AU Plan of Action on Boosting Intra African Trade**, the **Joint**

Labour Migration Programme, and the **AU Border Programme** (AU, 2009; AU Peace and Security, n.d.; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; ILO, 2015; RMMS, 2016a). In addition, the AU is involved in several inter-regional frameworks related to migration, which are further discussed in Section 4.3.

The AU's efforts to govern migration mirror relatively high standards. There is, however, little evidence on whether or not policies and other instruments at the continental or regional level are effective, which is possibly because many instruments have been developed rather recently (Klavert, 2011). A shortcoming of AU migration policies and instruments is that many are only guidelines and not binding (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016). The 1969 Convention and the Kampala Conventions are exceptions.

4.3.3 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the successor of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and was established in 1996. It comprises the eight focus countries of this report: **Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda**. IGAD's vision is to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration by, among other objectives, promoting free movement of persons, goods and services (IGAD, 2017). Based on these objectives and given the many challenges IGAD's Member States experience as origin, transit and destination countries of migrants, and the – for them - largely unexploited potential of migration for development, IGAD created its own Migration Programme: Within this programme IGAD initiated the **Regional Consultative Process (RCP)** on migration in 2008, which provides a regional platform for dialogue and cooperation in the field of migration (IGAD Migration, 2016a). The 2012 **Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF)** is IGAD's centrepiece related to migration governance (IGAD Council of Ministers, 2012). Its main aim is to promote the well-being and protection of migrants, including all migrant groups, and to better harness development potentials of migration. Its four key objectives are to “provide a regional comprehensive approach to migration management; facilitate the harmonization of policies in migration management at a regional and national level; provide a broad range of recommendations on various migration issues as guide to governments and above all to support Member States' efforts in formulating national migration policies that address specific migration related challenges and concerns in a more comprehensive and holistic manner” (IGAD Migration, 2016b). The **Migration Action Plan (MAP) 2015-2020** is a tool for implementing and operationalising the RMPF and consists of 12 strategic priorities such as improving labour migration management; supporting pastoralists' mobility within and across borders; creating migration data systems on the national level; and promoting as well as implementing the free movement of people (IGAD Migration, 2016a; IGAD Secretariat, 2014). Furthermore, IGAD is in the process of developing a protocol for the **free movement of persons** with support of the EU (IGAD, n.d.).

Regional cooperation in the field of migration, however, remains challenging because of a lack of human and financial resources as well as adequate data regarding migration within the individual Member States as well as within the region. In addition, national authorities do not share information sufficiently. This has serious repercussions on improving migration and border management and on harnessing the development potentials of migration for the region and its Member States (IGAD Migration, 2016a; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016).

According to Fioramonti and Nshimbi (2016), IGADs regional response to migration has been weakened through significant security challenges in the region (An overview of recent conflicts and crises can be found in Annex B).

4.3.4 East African Community (EAC)

Three of the countries covered by this report – **Kenya, South Sudan¹⁹ and Uganda** – together with Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania form the East African Community (EAC), a regional inter-governmental organisation founded in 2000, which describes itself as one of the “fastest growing regional economic blocs in the world” (EAC, 2017). With the introduction of the common market in 2010, the EAC introduced free movement of goods, capital, services and persons/workers (Common Market Protocol, Art.5). The **Common Market Protocol** aims at removing “restrictions on movement of labour, harmonis[ing] labour policies, programs, legislation, social services, provid[ing] for social security benefits and establish[ing] common standards and measures for association of workers and employers, establish[ing] employment promotion centres and eventually adopt[ing] a common employment policy” (Art. 5(2)(c)). Furthermore, the protocol aims at introducing a standard system for issuing identification documents (Art. 8), a system of mutual recognition of qualifications (Art. 10) and harmonized education systems (Art. 10), labour policies and social security (Art. 12).

Accordingly, (labour) migration between the Member States of the EAC should be relatively easy and one has to acknowledge that the EAC has already made significant progress in establishing free movement of persons within the region (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016). However, it remains a challenge since it is still subject to national laws, which increase the costs of obtaining work permits (Cronjé, 2015). Besides, the **right to free movement** depends on an individual’s occupation, favours highly-skilled workers, varies and even contradicts across Member States (Basnett, 2013; Cronjé, 2015). In a first step to address these issues, Kenya and Rwanda (and partly Uganda) abolished work permit fees for EAC citizens, who can move within the EAC using their national identification documents (ibid.). Masabo (2015) criticizes the EAC framework for not integrating gender dimensions of migration sufficiently and for focusing on male-biased occupations, which limits opportunities for women to migrate for the purpose of labour. According to Horwood (2015), national governments in the region do not comply sufficiently with regional agreements in terms of proper implementation because of a lack of political will, as national governments fear a drastic increase in migration across the region.

4.3.5 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), founded in 1994, has 19 Member States, among which are **Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda** (COMESA, n.d.). While there are efforts at regional level to implement the free movement of persons, Member States are reluctant to sign and ratify respective agreements such as the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence and the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements (UNECA, n.d.).

IOM supports regional consultative processes in the field of migration in COMESA through the MIDCOM project. This project provides a platform for informal dialogue regarding the challenges and opportunities related to labour, forced and irregular migration in order to improve coordination and cooperation, migration management, policies and systems as well as governments’ capacities (IOM, n.d.).

¹⁹ South-Sudan joined the EAC only recently in May 2016.

4.4 Inter-Regional Frameworks

Many inter-regional or inter-continental frameworks in the field of migration exist which are relevant for migration in the context of the East and Horn of Africa. In the following, frameworks by the most relevant regional stakeholders introduced above are summarised. These are, however, not exhaustive and do not include frameworks promoted by regional actors in cooperation with international stakeholders as this goes beyond the scope of this report.

First of all, it is worth to discuss the extensive cooperation between the AU and EU in the field of migration, which lead to the initiation of various inter-regional frameworks. The 2006 **Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development**, also known as the **Tripoli Declaration**, aims at addressing the challenges and better exploiting the benefits of international migration using a holistic approach. The Declaration defines nine priority areas: 1) migration and development; 2) migration management challenges; 3) peace and security; 4) human resources and brain drain; 5) human rights and individual well-being; 6) sharing best practices; 7) regular migration opportunities; 8) irregular migration; and 9) protection of refugees (AU & EU, 2006a).

At the same Conference in Tripoli the **AU-EU Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children** was passed. It provides for measures to be taken regarding the prevention of human trafficking and the protection of victims of trafficking. In addition, it promotes the development and implementation of legal frameworks and policies as well as cooperation and coordination mechanisms (AU & EU, 2006b).

The conference in Tripoli and the adoption of both the **Tripoli Declaration** and the Ouagadougou Declaration laid the foundation for a series of meetings which is known as the Tripoli Process (IOM, 2017c). This Process led to the initiation of additional agreements further described in the following. Building on the **Joint Africa-EU Partnership**, the Tripoli Declaration and the Ouagadougou Declaration and aiming at further implementing these, the EU Commission and AU Commission initiated the **2007 Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment**, which provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation for the two parties. It aims at creating improved employment opportunities and migration management in Africa in a comprehensive way that serves the interests of both partners (European Commission, n.d.). The platform also includes non-political stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society organisations, youth organisations and academia (Africa EU Partnership, n.d.). According to the European Commission (2017b), the Partnership made significant progress already especially in facilitating remittance flows, monitoring labour migration and building capacities to address human trafficking. The current Roadmap 2014-2017 prioritises the areas of peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues (such as terrorism and migration in response to climate change) (EU-Africa Summit, 2014).

Taking into account earlier commitments described above and the sharp increase in migration and displacement in 2015, the **Valletta Summit on Migration** emphasised the need to better protect migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. The Summit promotes a comprehensive and joint approach to harness the potential benefits of migration and to address challenges related to migration. The latter do not only include common challenges such as irregular migration, the risks associated with it and the causes and consequences of forced migration, but also climate change and terrorism, which have been linked to migration relatively recently. Importantly, the Summit also acknowledges “that further efforts should be

made to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities, [...] as well as encouraging policies that promote regular channels for migration, including labour migration and the mobility of entrepreneurs, students and researchers” (Valetta Summit, 2015a). The Action Plan adopted at the Valetta Summit defines five priority areas which are summarised under the following headings: 1) “development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement”; 2) “Legal migration and mobility”; 3) “Protection and asylum”; 4) “Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings”; and 5) “Return, readmission and reintegration” (Valetta Summit, 2015b).

The so-called **Khartoum Process** is another inter-regional consultation process between the EU and the AU, which developed from the **AU Horn of Africa Initiative** at the initiative of the Italian EU Presidency in 2014 (Khartoum Process, n.d. a). It is also known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or the Rome Declaration, and aims at addressing challenges related to migration and asylum, focusing especially on human trafficking and smuggling in and from the East and Horn of Africa, especially towards Europe. The Khartoum process is responsible for the implementation of the Valetta Summit Action Plan (Khartoum Process, n.d. b). Grinstead (2016) does not expect the Khartoum process to effectively reduce human trafficking and smuggling as long as the causes of migration are not addressed and legal migration channels towards Europe remain limited.

Another inter-regional framework which will possibly gain importance regarding migration in the future is the tripartite cooperation between COMESA, the EAC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) aiming at establishing a free trade area with free movement for business persons. Possibilities to expand the right to free movement to other individuals will be discussed in the second phase of negotiations which are expected to be completed by the end of 2017 (Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; SADC, n.d.).

4.5 Relevant International Frameworks and Stakeholders

4.5.2 Multilateral Frameworks

States and international actors recognize that challenges related to various forms of migration need to be addressed through **international cooperation** (Betts, 2010). Table 6 below provides an overview of relevant multilateral frameworks in the context of migration as ratified by the eight focus countries of this report. Multilateral frameworks related to migration can be broadly categorized as international human rights law, international labour standards (ILO Conventions), refugee and asylum law, consular relations and international criminal law (ILO & OSCE, 2009). A summary of the content of each Convention can be found in Annex E. It is remarkable that only three Conventions, namely the *1930 Forced Labour Convention*, the *1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention* and the *1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child*, were ratified by all eight focus countries. The *1951 Refugee Convention* and *1967 Refugee Protocol* were both ratified by all countries except Eritrea and South Sudan. On the other end of the spectrum, no country has ratified the *2011 Domestic Workers Convention*, and only one country each has ratified the *1949 Migration for Employment Convention* (Kenya) and the *1990 Migrant Workers Convention* (Uganda). There is not one single country among the eight, which has ratified all twelve Conventions or Protocols. In comparison, **Kenya has ratified most Conventions** - all except two - and **South Sudan has ratified the least number** (three out of twelve).

Table 6: Relevant Conventions Ratified by the Countries in the East and Horn of Africa

| | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|--|----------|---------|----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------|----------------------------------|
| 1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029)^a | 1978 | 2000 | 2003 | 1964 | 1960 | 2012 | 1957 | 1963 |
| 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097)^a | | | | 1965 ¹ | | | | |
| 1951 UN Refugee Convention^b | 1977 | | 1969 | 1966 | 1978 | | 1974 | 1976 |
| 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO C105)^a | 1978 | 2000 | 1999 | 1964 | 1961 | 2012 | 1970 | 1963 |
| 1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations^c | 1978 | 1997 | | 1965 | 1968 | | 1955 | |
| 1967 UN Refugee Protocol^b | 1977 | | 1969 | 1981 | 1978 | | 1974 | 1976 |
| 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (ILO C143)^a | | | | 1979 | | | | 1978 |
| 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child^c | 1990 | 1994 | 1991 | 1990 | 2015 ² | 2015 | 1990 | 1990 |
| 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention^c | | | | | | | | 1995 |
| 2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol^c | 2005 | 2014 | 2012 | 2005 | | | 2014 | Signed in 2000, but not ratified |
| 2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol^c | 2005 | | 2012 | 2005 | | | | Signed in 2000, but not ratified |
| 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189)^a | | | | | | | | |

¹ Kenya has excluded the provisions of Annexes I to III

² Somalia does not consider itself bound by Articles 14, 20, 21 of the Convention and any other provisions of the Convention contrary to the General Principles of Islamic Sharia

Sources: ^a ILO, 2017b; ^b UNHCR, 2015b; ^c UN Treaty Collection, 2017.

4.5.3 Activities of International Actors in the East and Horn of Africa

The two most important **international stakeholders** in the field of migration active in the East and Horn of Africa are the **International Organisation for Migration (IOM)** and the **United States High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**²⁰.

IOM was founded in 1951 and since 2016 it is the official UN Migration Agency (IOM, 2017a). IOM has 166 Member States, including all eight focus countries of this report (IOM, 2016b), and works together closely with partners from governments, intergovernmental institutions and NGOs in providing expert services for governments and migrants including refugees to promote “humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all” (IOM, 2017a). This includes for instance research, operational assistance, capacity building and facilitating bilateral and multilateral cooperation. IOM’s work focuses on four areas related to migration management, namely 1) migration and development, 2) facilitating migration, 3) regulating migration, and

²⁰ Other international stakeholders active in the field of migration in the East and Horn of Africa include for instance ILO and UNODC. In addition, there are many international and national relief and development organisations active in the region.

4) forced migration. Other related areas include promoting international law, policy guidance and debate, protecting migrants' rights, migration health and gendered migration (IOM, 2017a). While IOM does not have a mandate for legal protection, the organization's activities are contributing to and promoting the protection of migrant and human rights (IOM, 2017b).

The office of the **UNHCR** and the UN Refugee Agency was created in 1950. "The High Commissioner is primarily mandated to provide international protection and humanitarian assistance and to seek permanent solutions for [refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and stateless persons]" (Division of International Protection, 2013, p.4). Under certain conditions UNHCR also provides protection and assistance to IDPs, for instance in situations related to other (international) refugee flows. UNHCR's core mandate is to act on behalf of refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and returnees, "who lack the protection of their own countries" (Division of International Protection, 2013, p.3). UNHCR's work can be divided into four pillars: 1) refugee programme, 2) stateless programme, 3) reintegration projects and 4) IDP programme (UNHCR, 2016). UNHCR's mandate is not dependent on refugees' location, applies to contexts of emergency and non-emergency as well as camp- and non-camp situations, and includes mixed migration movements (Division of International Protection, 2013). UNHCR's core activities can be divided into ten themes, namely child protection, comprehensive solutions, education, public health, refugee status determination, SGBV prevention and response, settlement and shelter, water and sanitation, statelessness and community-based protection (UNHCR, 2017k). Currently, UNHCR works in 130 countries, including all eight focus countries of this report (UNHCR, 2017u).

Annex F provides an overview of the fields in which IOM and UNHCR are active in the East and Horn of Africa. UNHCR is present in various field-, branch-, and sub-offices across all eight focus countries and IOM has country offices in seven of them. In Eritrea, it does not have a country office, but works closely with UNHCR (IOM Regional Office, 2017b). UNHCR's Regional Hub and IOM's Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa are both located in Nairobi, Kenya. IOM and UNHCR often cooperate in various refugee camps across the East and Horn of Africa in the fields of health, livelihood support, logistics, protection, shelter and transportation (UNHCR, 2017k).

In 2016, UNHCR had a total budget of \$7.510 billion, which is the largest budget in UNHCR's history. The highest share of this budget was allocated to Africa (\$2.672 billion), with the sub-region of the East and Horn of Africa receiving \$1.680 billion or 22 per cent of the total budget. There is only one sub-region worldwide to which UNHCR has allocated an even bigger budget, namely the Middle East with \$1.910 billion (UNHCR, 2016). In comparison, IOM's budget for the East and Horn of Africa amounted to \$195 million in 2015 (IOM, 2016a). Annex G provides a more detailed overview of UNHCR's and IOM's budget for the East and Horn of Africa respectively.

Other relevant actors in the field of migration in the East and Horn of Africa are for instance UNDP and UNODC (Marchand et al., 2016).

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

Migratory movements in and out of the East and Horn of Africa are diverse and significant in volume. They are largely mixed flows of migrants composed of asylum seekers, refugees as well as economic migrants. Many different factors shape the migratory movements in and out of the region and these movements are associated with many risks and vulnerabilities for the migrants. The aim of this report is to summarize and provide an overview of these current mixed migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa. In the context of this report eight countries are considered, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. The study is based on a previous report on irregular migration flows in the region which was authored by Maastricht University and commissioned by the GIZ programme Better Migration Management (BMM) (Marchand et al., 2016).

Building on that work, this report aims to gather and synthesize the available data and evidence with the aim of identifying particular development needs and challenges in the area of migration. This is done based on desk research, which is also the main limitation of the study. The identification of vulnerabilities, needs and challenges of migrants as well as governments in the East and Horn of Africa is based on secondary information, which means that if things are not well documented in the existing literature and data, they have not been presented here or in the migration profiles of the eight countries that have also been prepared by the authors. In addition, existing data on the mixed migration trends in the East and Horn of Africa is largely scattered, not comparable and often not available at all. It is therefore recommended that building on this report and before making any decisions on interventions, more careful analysis of the specific context is conducted.

Overall, it is important to stress that while a large number of documents was consulted during the preparation of this report, evidence on and understanding of most of the migration movements in and out of the East and Horn of Africa region is still limited. Evaluations of policies and interventions are also largely lacking, which makes it difficult to assess what may work and what does not. As such a lot of questions remain open and, besides development and humanitarian interventions, further research is required to broaden the understanding of migration in and from the region.

Throughout the process of reviewing the literature and data for this report, many development challenges and needs related to migration in the countries of the East and Horn of Africa have been identified. These are summarized in a matrix, which has been prepared alongside this report. Following the structure of the report, one can see that one of the main challenges in dealing with migrants, including refugees, is to have a clear understanding of the volume of migratory flows. Increasing the capacity of the countries in terms of data collection and management is therefore key. While it is clear that irregular migration is difficult to measure, in these countries there is largely also no clear indication of numbers of those moving through regular channels. It is therefore important that these capacities are strengthened and that furthermore data which is collected is also shared. It should be made available to other countries, but also to researchers so that the work on migration issues in the East and Horn of Africa can be based on stronger data and allow more rigorous analysis.

The countries in the East and Horn of Africa are all affected by migration and are origin, transit and destination countries for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to different extents. Due to limited regular migration channels, movements in the region are largely irregular. It is clear that mixed migration in and from the region has increased and become more complex in recent years. At the same time, migrants face significant protection issues, such as abuse and exploitation by smugglers and traffickers. As such there is

much that can be done to improve the situation in countries of origin and transit, but also of destination. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa have low levels of human and economic development, exacerbated by violent conflicts, political oppression and deteriorating environmental conditions. These factors are among the main drivers of migration, which need to be understood to effectively address challenges related to migration in the region. It is often a perceived lack of alternatives that leads to the migration decision. Therefore, improving livelihood opportunities, especially in the context of harsh environmental conditions, can help create viable alternatives to migration and enable potential migrants to make more informed choices. This is not only recommended for countries of origin, but also in the context of refugee populations living in host countries. Due to encampment policies and limited work opportunities, refugees often have little perspective which can lead to aspirations of onward migration. Hence, finding more durable solutions for refugees regarding integration into host societies is crucial. In this context, expanding protection and humanitarian assistance beyond refugee camps is only one option. In addition, it is important to inform (potential) migrants about the risks of irregular migration and to raise awareness for existing regular migration channels where those are available.

This report identified a knowledge gap regarding regular/ labour migration in the East and Horn of Africa, which is much less understood than regular and forced migration in the region. It is clear that formal and informal remittances are significant and have the potential to contribute to the development of the region. In terms of emigration, Kenya is the only country in the region characterised by mainly regular emigration. Concerns about the protection of migrants abroad call for negotiation of bilateral labour agreements with prominent destination countries such as the Gulf countries. Negotiating bilateral agreements between the countries within the East and Horn of Africa could furthermore be an option to open up regular migration channels in the region and a first step to realise aspirations to introduce the freedom of movement within the region.

A question that is not answered and may be important to understand is the migration context of Djibouti. Despite it sharing many of the socio-economic and environmental challenges of the neighbouring countries, migration from the country is insignificant. This is not due to a lack of options or awareness as many Djiboutians are frequently in touch with many of the irregular migrants coming through the country. It would therefore be important to understand what is different about the Djiboutians and their common decision not to move.

The report identifies four main external migration routes: the Northern or Central Mediterranean Route, the Sinai Route, the Eastern Route as well as the Southern Route. The numbers of migrants using these routes are fluctuating mainly because of conflicts in transit countries and efforts of governments in transit and destination countries to close the routes, increasing the vulnerability of migrants and forcing them to switch to other arguably more dangerous routes. Along the four routes migrants face several protection issues especially because of harsh environmental conditions and their dependency on smugglers. Migrants often lack access to water, food and health services during a journey which can take months. In addition, the journey can be traumatic as migrants are at risk of being robbed, beaten, arrested, raped, kidnapped and of becoming VoTs and witnesses to deaths. It is noteworthy that the share of unaccompanied minors travelling along the four routes is increasing. In this context, it is important to step up protection and assistance to migrants along migration routes and to introduce more regular options for migration to decrease migrants' dependency on smugglers and their risk of becoming VoTs. The fight against smuggling and trafficking in this context also requires improved border management and fighting corruption among officials.

There are relevant frameworks in place to address migration issues at the national, regional, continental and international level. States in most cases address administrative matters and the fight against human trafficking. However, fail to introduce comprehensive migration policies and to integrate migration into national development strategies. Research and data regarding the effectiveness of existing policies are scarce. A common problem that has been identified is that authorities conflate human trafficking and smuggling and do not understand and/or exploit the development potentials of migration sufficiently. At the continental and regional level, the AU, IGAD, EAC and COMESA are active in promoting the integration of regional economic communities, the free movement of people, and the development potentials of migration. However, regional cooperation remains a challenge due to a lack of capacities and political willingness on parts of the member states. Looking at multilateral frameworks addressing issues of migration, not a single country in the East and Horn of Africa has ratified all International Conventions relevant to the field of migration; Kenya has ratified most and South Sudan the least.

The research has shown that one of the main issues in all countries in the region in dealing with migration management, including that of irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, is a lack of resources and capacity at the institutional level. International organisations such as IOM and UNHCR are contributing in this area and working with national actors to address this issue. However, staff turnover rates are high in most of the countries, which often means that this built capacity is not retained within an institution. It is therefore important to investigate and find ways how any capacity building initiatives can be made more sustainable.

Specifically, the findings of this report highlight the importance of working together with other actors in the region that also work on migration-related issues in one way or another. Besides bilateral work, there are several relevant regional frameworks dealing with the context of migration in the East and Horn of Africa. A topic like migration, which naturally crosses national borders and does not only concern single countries, but wider regions, is especially important to be looked at from a regional perspective. At the same time, migration affects various policy domains simultaneously, which is another reason why regional responses to migration are important. In addition, an advantage of a regional approach is increased efficiency due to arguably lower transaction costs compared to bilateral approaches as well as the avoidance of incoherence and duplication of policies and programmes. The potential for this in the East and Horn of Africa is so far largely unexploited and a potential point of focus for any future interventions, especially on the policy and management level. However, while it is important that governments in the East and Horn of Africa region start working together more closely, the role of the international community in migration should also be emphasized. Many organisations are working with governments to build capacity and support migrants of different types either directly or indirectly. In order to avoid replicating other organizations' work and to start the process a better understanding of other actors is necessary. An idea to get this process started, would be to put together a conference (e.g. the East African Migration and Development Days) bringing together the different actors. This would allow to have targeted talks about specific issues, but could also be a platform to learn about additional trends and needs.

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References to Consult Regularly

This list aims to present an overview of different sources of information and data that were used by the authors of this report. This list is by no means exhaustive, but these sources are the ones that are updated on a more or less regular basis, therefore always providing the most recent information on issues relating to migration in the East and Horn of Africa.

| Source | Link | Description | Update Frequency |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|------------------|
| 4mi | http://4mi.regionalmms.org/4mi.html | The 4mi project managed by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat aims at monitoring mixed migration flows in the region. Through a network of 30 monitors in main migration hubs along the main migration routes, the project currently tracks people from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia moving along these routes. While the project is still growing, it promises to provide updated data on migratory trends. | Monthly |
| Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat | http://www.regionalmms.org/ | In general, data on the irregular migration flows in the East and Horn of Africa is limited and few sources provide information at more than one point in time. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat publishes on the most recent trends in the region regularly and also has an expansive, growing library of own research and other publications on topics of interest. | Frequently |
| Trafficking in Persons Report | https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/ | The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report is the world's most comprehensive resource of governmental anti-human trafficking efforts. It represents an updated, global look at the nature and scope of trafficking in persons and the broad range of government actions to confront and eliminate it. The report is used by international organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations alike as a tool to examine where resources are most needed. Freeing victims, preventing trafficking, and bringing traffickers to justice are the ultimate goals of the report. | Annually |

| | | | |
|---|---|--|------------|
| UNHCR Global Focus | http://reporting.unhcr.org/ | Global Focus is UNHCR's main operational reporting portal for donors and other key partners. This site provides an overview of the protection risks that refugees and other populations of concern to UNHCR face across the world, including in the East and Horn of Africa, as well as regularly updated information about the organization's operations. | Frequently |
| UNHCR Operational Portal - Refugee Situations | http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations | The Refugee Operational Portal is a platform provided by UNHCR to act as a coordination tool for refugee situations, tracking different crises globally. Of special interest are the South Sudan situation, Horn of Africa situation (focusing on Somali refugees), Yemen and Burundi situation. The latter two are relevant for the influx of refugees from these nations to many countries in this report. | Monthly |

Annex A: Glossary of Key Migration Terminology

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Assisted Voluntary Return | "Administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support to rejected asylum seekers, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals and other migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country who volunteer to return to their countries of origin." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Asylum Seekers | Persons "who seek safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than [their] own and await a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the persons must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Border Management | "Facilitation of authorized flows of persons, including business people, tourists, migrants and refugees, across a border and the detection and prevention of irregular entry of non-nationals into a given country. Measures to manage borders include the imposition by States of visa requirements, carrier sanctions against transportation companies bringing irregular migrants to the territory, and interdiction at sea. International standards require a balancing between facilitating the entry of legitimate travellers and preventing that of travellers entering for inappropriate reasons or with invalid documentation." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Brain Drain | "Emigration of trained and talented individuals from the country of origin to another country resulting in a depletion of skills resources in the former." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Circular Migration | "The fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Country of Destination | "The country that is a destination for migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Country of Origin | "The country that is a source of migratory flows (regular or irregular)." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Country of Transit | "The country through which migratory flows (regular or irregular) move." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Deportation | "The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a non-national from its territory to his or her country of origin or third state after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Detention | "Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority. There are two types of detention: criminal detention, having as a purpose punishment for the committed crime; and administrative detention, guaranteeing that another administrative measure (such as deportation or expulsion) can be implemented. In the majority of countries, irregular migrants are subject to administrative detention, as they have violated |

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| | immigration laws and regulations that are not considered to be crimes. In many States, a non-national may also be administratively detained pending a decision on refugee status or on admission to or removal from the State." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Diaspora | "Broadly defined as individual and member or network, association and community, who has left their country of origin, but maintains links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Displacement | "A forced removal of a person from his or her home or country, often due to armed conflict or natural disasters." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Durable Solutions | "Any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved to enable them to lead normal lives. Traditionally this involves voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Economic Migrant | "A person leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her country of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely used to distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution, and is also similarly used to refer to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons leaving their country of origin for the purpose of employment." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Emigration | "The act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settling in another." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Environmental and Disaster Displacees | "Persons who are displaced within their country person of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Family Reunification | "Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Forced Displacement | "In the law of armed conflict, the individual or collective movement of civilians in the interior of an occupied territory. In the terms of Art. 49, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 and Art. 85, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, forced displacement constitutes a war crime, unless it is justified by imperative military reasons. In a more general sense, forced displacement – or displacement – is the involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community, notably for reasons of armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural or man-made catastrophes." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Forced Migration | "A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)." (IOM, 2011a) |

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| Highly-Skilled Migration | "While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of postsecondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level education or occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Human Smuggling | "People smuggling implies the procurement, for financial or material gain, of the illegal entry into a state of which that person is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident. A broad distinction can be made between people smuggling and human trafficking. In general, the individuals who pay a smuggler in order to gain illegal entry to a country do so voluntarily whereas the victims of human trafficking are often duped or forced into entering another country." (INTERPOL, n.d.) |
| Human Trafficking | "'The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation' (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Immigration | "A process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Integration | "While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, 'integration' can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose. Local integration is one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees. It may also be applied to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied children." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Internal Migration | "A movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration)." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Internally Displaced Persons | "Persons or groups of persons who have been forced IDPs or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on Internal |

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| | Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.)." (IOM, 2011a) |
| International Migration | "Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Irregular Migration | "Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term 'illegal migration' to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Labour Migration | "Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Less/ low skilled and Semi-skilled Migrant Worker | "There is no internationally agreed definition of a less skilled migrant worker or low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called 'manual workers' (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semiskilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Long-Term Migration | "[When] a person... moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure, the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival, the person will be a long-term immigrant." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Low-Skilled Migration | "No single definition of low-skilled migration exists. 'Low-skilled' can refer to people with few formal qualifications, people working in jobs that do not require such qualifications, or people working in low-wage positions regardless of their own educational background." (COMPAS, 2017) |
| Mass/ collective Migration | "The sudden movement of large number of persons." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Migration | "The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of |

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| | movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Mixed Migration | "The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved. Mixed flows have been defined as 'complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants'. Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow." (IOM, 2008) |
| Net Migration | "Difference between the number of persons entering the territory of a State and the number of persons who leave the territory in the same period. Also called 'migratory balance.' This balance is called net immigration when arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Permanent Migration | "The term 'permanent' is applied essentially to reflect movements that the receiving country considers are for the long term, although they may not turn out to be so in practice, because of changes in intentions. It does not mean that the person is necessarily granted a permit of unlimited duration, but rather that he/she is on a 'migration track' that normally leads to permanent residence in the host country." (Fron, Lemaitre, Liebig & Thoreau, 2008) |
| Readmission Agreement | "International agreement which addresses procedures, on a reciprocal basis, for one State to return nonnationals in an irregular situation to their home State or a State through which they have transited." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Refugees | "Person[s] who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, [are] outside the country of [their] nationality and [are] unable or, owing to such fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country.' (Art. 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country 'owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.' Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country 'because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.'" (IOM, 2011a) |
| Regular Migration | "Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Reintegration | "Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Remittances | "Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their |

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| | country of origin." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Resettlement | "The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Return Migration | "The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Temporary Migration | "Migration of workers who enter a foreign country for migration a specified limited period of time before returning to the country of origin." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Transnationalism | "The process whereby people establish and maintain socio-cultural connections across geopolitical borders." (IOM, 2011a) |
| Unaccompanied Minors | "Persons under the age of majority in a country other than that of their nationality who are not accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other adult who by law or custom is responsible for them. Unaccompanied children present special challenges for border control officials, because detention and other practices applied to undocumented adult non-nationals may not be appropriate for children." (IOM, 2011a) |

Annex B: Key Demographic and Development Statistics

| Indicator | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|---|------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| Total area, <i>in sq km</i> ^a | 23,200 | 117,600 | 1,104,300 | 580,367 | 637,657 | 644,329 | 1,861,484 | 241,038 |
| Population (2015), <i>in million</i> ^b | 0.89 | 5.23 | 99.39 | 46.05 | 10.79 | 12.34 | 40.24 | 39.03 |
| Urban Population (2015), <i>% of total</i> ^c | 77.3 | 22.6 | 19.5 | 25.6 | 39.6 | 18.8 | 33.8 | 16.1 |
| Population Growth Rate, <i>annual %</i> ^d | 1.3 | n.d. | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 3.3 |
| Ethnic Groups ^a | Somali 60% Afar 35% Other 5% | Tigrinya 55% Tigre 30% Other 15% | Oromo 34.4% Amhara 27% Somali 6.2% Other 32.4% | Kikuyu 22% Luhya 14% Luo 13% Other 51% | Somali 85% Bantu and other non-Somali 15% | Dinka 35.8% Nuer 15.6% Other 48.6% | Sudanese Arab 70% Other 30% | Baganda 16.5% Banyankole 9.6% Basoga 8.8% Other 65.1% |
| Human Development Index (2015) <i>Country rank out of 188</i> ^e | 0.473 172 | 0.420 179 | 0.448 174 | 0.555 146 | n.d. | 0.418 181 | 0.490 165 | 0.493 163 |
| GDP Based on PPP per Capita, <i>current international dollars per capita</i> ^f | 3369.58 | 1410.33 | 1945.89 | 3361.02 | n.d. | 1657.08 | 4446.76 | 2068.23 |
| Life Expectancy at Birth (2015), <i>years</i> ^e | 62.3 | 64.2 | 64.6 | 62.2 | 55.7 | 56.1 | 63.7 | 59.2 |
| Unemployment (2015), <i>% of labour force</i> ^e | 53.9 | 8.4 | 5.5 | 9.2 | 7.5 | n.d. | 13.6 | 3.6 |
| Youth Unemployment (2015), <i>% ages 15-24</i> ^e | n.d. | 13.0 | 7.6 | 17.6 | 11.7 | n.d. | 22.5 | 6.0 |
| Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2006-2014), <i>%</i> ^e | 26.9 (2006) | n.d. | 88.2 (2011) | 36.0 (2014) | 81.8 (2006) | 89.3 (2010) | 53.1 (2010) | 70.3 (2011) |
| Gini Coefficient (2010-2015) ^e | 44.1 | n.d. | 33.2 | 48.5 | n.d. | 46.3 | 35.4 | 41.0 |
| Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), <i>current USD millions</i> ^d | 124.00 | 49.32 | 2,167.60 | 1,437.00 | 516.00 | -277.00 | 1,736.76 | 1,057.30 |
| Net Official Development Assistance Received (13), <i>current USD millions</i> ^d | 169.56 | 92.11 | 3233.99 | 2473.78 | 1253.55 | 1674.83 | 899.90 | 1628.25 |
| Personal Remittances Received (2015), <i>current USD millions</i> ^d | 0.63 | n.d. | 624.37 | 1,560.42 | n.d. | n.d. | 151.39 | 1,049.32 |

Sources: ^a CIA 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; ^b UN DESA, 2015b; ^c UN DESA, 2014; ^d World Bank, 2017b; ^e UNDP, 2016; ^f IMF, 2017.

| | Conflicts | Environmental Disasters |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Djibouti | None | Drought 2016 - present Drought and famine 2008-2011 |
| Eritrea | Gov't vs. gov't of Ethiopia 1998-present (interstate) | Drought and famine 2008-2011 |
| Ethiopia | Anuak vs. Nuer 2002-present (non-state) Murle vs. Nuer 2006-present (non-state) gov't vs. ONLF 1994-present (non-state) gov't vs. OLF 1989-present (non-state) gov't vs. civilians 1989-present (one-sided) | Drought 2016 - present Drought and famine 2008-2011 |
| Kenya | al-Shabaab vs. civilians 2008-present (one-sided) gov't vs. civilians 1990-present (one-sided) gov't of Kenya vs. al-Shabaab 2011-present (intrastate) Marakwet vs. Pokot 2001-present (non-state) Orma vs. Pokomo 2012-present (non-state) Pokot vs. Turkana 1995-present (non-state) Samburu vs. Turkana 1996-present (non-state) | Drought 2016 - present Drought 2011-2012 Earthquake 2007 |
| Somalia | gov't vs. al-Shabaab 2008-present (intrastate) al-Shabaab vs. civilians (intrastate) gov't vs. civilians 1989-present (one-sided) | Drought 2016 - present Drought and famine 2010-2011 |
| South Sudan | gov't vs. SSDM/A and SSLM/A 2011-present (intrastate) Maban vs. Uduk 2016-present (non-state) Panyar Dinka vs. Waat Dinka 2016-present (non-state) Panyar Dinka, Rek Dinka vs. Waat Dinka 2016-present (non-state) gov't vs. civilians 2012-present (one-sided) SPLM/A In Opposition vs. civilians 2013-present (one-sided) gov't vs. SPLM/A In Opposition 2013-present (intrastate) Bor Dinka vs. Murle 2007-present (non-state) Lou Nuer vs. Murle 2006-present (non-state) | Drought and famine 2017 |
| Sudan | gov't vs. civilians 1989-present (one-sided) Awlad Omran clan vs. Awlad Serur (Misseriya) 2016-present (non-state) Awlad Zeid vs. Zaghawa 2001-present (non-state) Falata vs. Salamat Baggara 2015-present (non-state) LRA vs. civilians 1989-present (one-sided) Habaniya vs. Rizeigat Baggara 2006-present (non-state) Misseriya vs. Salamat Baggara 2013-present (non-state) Misseriya vs. Ngok Dinka 2011-present (non-state) Masalit vs. Rizeigat Baggara 2016-present (non-state) Masalit vs. Rizeigat Abbala 1998-present (non-state) Mahadi vs. Rizeigat Abbala 2016-present (non-state) Ma'aliya vs. Zaghawa 2008-present (non-state) Ma'aliya vs. Rizeigat Baggara 2002-present (non-state) | Drought 2011 |
| Uganda | Bakonzo vs. Bamba 2016-present (non-state) | Landslide 2010 |

Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, n.d.; Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, n.d.; Gov.uk, n.d.; Hamid & Eltayeb, n.d.; NASA Earth Observatory n.d.; Plaut, 2011; Rukundo et al., 2014; UNEP, 2017; UCDP, 2016.

Annex C: Immigration and Emigration Statistics

| | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Immigration | | | | | | | | |
| Stock of Immigrants (excl. Refugees), 2015 | 91,21 | 13,043 | 41,3425 | 533,005 | 22,789 | 583,449 | 298,303 | 391,018 |
| Top origin countries, 2015 | Somalia Ethiopia | Somalia DRC Mozambique | Somalia South Sudan Eritrea | Somalia Tanzania Uganda | Ethiopia Eritrea Yemen | Ethiopia Sudan Kenya | Eritrea South Sudan Chad | DRC Sudan Rwanda |
| Women as percentage of all immigrants, 2015 | 47.4 | 44.6 | 49.0 | 50.0 | 45.6 | 48.9 | 50.0 | 49.4 |
| Emigration | | | | | | | | |
| Stock of emigrants, 2015 | 15,927 | 499,916 | 753,492 | 455,889 | 1,998,764 | 634,613 | 1,890,861 | 736,017 |
| Top destination countries, 2015 | France Ethiopia Canada | Sudan Ethiopia Europe | Europe US & Canada Gulf States | UK US Tanzania | Kenya Ethiopia Yemen | Sudan Uganda DRC | South Sudan Saud Arabia Chad | Sudan Uganda DRC |
| Tertiary-educated as a percentage of total emigrants in OECD countries, 2011 | 31.1 | 21.3 | 23.7 | 42.7 | 13.8 | 15.1 | 31.7 | 47.1 |
| Tertiary-educated women as a percentage of total women emigrants in OECD countries, 2011 | 27.2 | 17.5 | 19.7 | 40.2 | 11.1 | 6.2 | 28.9 | 43.9 |
| Second generation diaspora in Australia, Europe and the US, 2012 (in thousands) | n.d. | 12.5 | 52.7 | 124.1 | n.d. | n.d. | 18.8 | 42.6 |

Sources: UN DESA, 2015a; World Bank, 2016.

Annex D: National Policy Responses Regarding Migration

Table 7: Djibouti's Key Migration Policy Responses

| Law/Policy | Content |
|---|---|
| Loi n°201/AN/07/5ème | Defines rules and procedures regarding entry to and residence in Djibouti; it prohibits irregular migration (lack of valid travel documents, not having sufficient resources to live) |
| Ordinance n°77-053/PR/AE | primary law on refugees, in line with international and continental conventions, Art.7 refugees have the same rights as other foreigners in Djibouti |
| Loi n°210/AN/07/5ème | <p>Aims at combating human trafficking; prohibits forced labour and sex trafficking; covers women, minors and physically or mentally challenged persons as possible victims of trafficking (VoTs);</p> <p>Penalties for traffickers: 2-5 years imprisonment plus fine of 2,500 to 5,600 USD; in severe cases 10-15 years + 2500 – 25000 USD; penalties are doubled when VoTs disappeared or died; defines penalties for any person engaged in, or an accomplice to a person engaged in, trafficking in human beings</p> |
| Loi n°133/AN/16/7ème | Aims at combating trafficking in persons and illicit smuggling of migrants |
| Loi n°111/AN/11/6ème | Aims at fighting terrorism and other crimes, including human trafficking. |
| National Action Plan against Trafficking in Persons | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishes inter-ministerial committee to coordinate fight against human trafficking - Stresses the need for regional, multilateral, bilateral and international cooperation - Provides for protection of and assistance to VoTs, - Acknowledges need for capacity-building |
| Program to grant residency status to undocumented Ethiopian migrants | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation of residency status for undocumented Ethiopian migrants (vulnerable to trafficking in Djibouti) - No formal legal alternatives were offered to foreign trafficked victims who may face hardships or retribution |

Sources: IOM, 2015b; Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2015, 2016a; US Department of State, 2016.

Table 8: Eritrea's Key Migration Policy Responses

| Law/Policy | Content |
|--|--|
| Proclamation Issued to Amend Proclamation No. 24/1992 Enacted to Regulate the Provision of Travel Documents, the Entry Into and Exit from Eritrea and Residence of Foreigners in Eritrea (2011-04-01) | Amendments concern fines imposed on migrants who stay in Eritrea after their visa expired and who do not obtain/possess a valid residence permit; in addition, the types and durations of residence permits are defined. |
| Regulations to Issue Work Permit to Non-Nationals (Legal Notice No. 80/2003). | Defines the duty to obtain a work permit for non-Eritreans, the rules and procedures concerning the application and issuance of work permits |
| Proclamation to provide for the Requirement of Registration of Foreigners who reside, work or engage in Business in Eritrea (No. 127/2002). | Defines the requirement of registration and penalties for non-compliance. |
| Proclamation No. 24 of 1992 Issued To Regulate The Issuing Of Travel Documents, Entry And Exit Visa From Eritrea, And To Control Residence Permits Of Foreigners In Eritrea | Defines the rules and procedures regarding entry into, residence in and exit from Eritrea, as well as the registration and expulsion of foreigners |
| Eritrean Nationality Proclamation, No. 21/1992. | Defines conditions under which individuals receive the Eritrean nationality as well as possibilities for naturalization, |
| Eritrean Transitional Criminal Code, Art. 65 | Prohibits trafficking in women and youth for sexual exploitation |
| Eritrean Transitional Criminal Code Art. 565 | Prohibits slavery |
| Labour Proclamation 118/2001 | Prohibits forced labour |

Sources: ILO, 2017a; RMMS, 2016b.

Table 9: Ethiopia's Key Migration Policy Responses

| Policy | Content |
|---|---|
| Proclamation to Regulate the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia (No. 271/1969). | "Regulates the entry to and departure from Ethiopia by foreigners. Requires, inter alia, that foreigners be issued with entry visas, transit visas or tourist visas and provides for the appointment of immigration officers" |
| Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas Regulations 1971 (No. 395/1971). | "Provides requirements for obtaining travel documents for including emergency travel documents and documents for refugees." |
| Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority Establishment Proclamation (No.6/1995) | "Provides for the organization of the Authority as well as the powers and duties of the head of the Authority." |
| Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with certain Rights to be Exercised in their Country of Origin Proclamation (No. 270/2002) | Provides for various rights and privileges for foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin to enable them to contribute to Ethiopia's development and prosperity. |
| Labour Proclamation (No.691/2003) | Defines employment of Ethiopian and foreign nationals. |
| Immigration Proclamation (No. 354/2003) | Defines conditions for entry into and departure (including deportation) from Ethiopia as well as requirements regarding travel documents, visas, registration and residence permit. |
| Proclamation on Ethiopian Nationality (No. 378 of 2003) | Defines how Ethiopian nationality is acquired and lost as well as rights of nationality. |
| Directive Issued to Determine the Residence Status of Eritrean Nationals Residing in Ethiopia | "The objective of this Directive is to provide the means to any person of Eritrean origin who was a resident in Ethiopia when Eritrea became an independent State and has continued maintaining permanent residence in Ethiopia up until this Directive is issued to confirm whether he or she has acquired Eritrean nationality, and to determine his or her status of residence in Ethiopia." |
| Refugee Proclamation (No. 409 of 2004) | Provides for rules regarding asylum application and procedure and defines rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers. |
| Employment Exchange Services Proclamation (No. 632/2009) | Strengthens labour migration management, expands oversight of private employment agencies and provides for placement of labour attachés in Ethiopian embassies abroad. |
| Work Permit and Private Employment Agency Licence Fees Council of Ministers Regulation No. 282/2013. | Defines work permit fees and private employment agency license fees. |
| Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons | Defines human trafficking and smuggling, penalties for the offences to strengthen the existing penal code (fines of up to |

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| and Smuggling of Migrants Proclamation (No.909/2015) | 19,500 USD; severe cases: death penalty) and procedures for investigations; Provides for the assistance, protection and rehabilitation of VoTs and establishes a fund to combat trafficking and smuggling as well as a national committee to monitor the implementation of the law |
| Overseas Employment Proclamation (No. 923/2016) | Defines recruitment and placement procedures, conditions and costs through governmental organisations and agencies in countries with bilateral labour agreement and prohibits direct recruitment; it introduces pre-departure awareness raising through the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; includes provisions on how to solve disputes, welfare services and assistance to workers as well as conciliation and repatriation |
| 2012 Law Requiring Registration of All Births Nationwide | - Continuous efforts to implement a uniform national identity card |
| Criminal Code | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Art. 596 prohibits slavery - Art. 597 and 653 prohibit Trafficking of women and children |
| National Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5 year plan - Drafted in cooperation with IOM |

Sources: Marchand et al., 2016; ILO, 2017a; RMMS, 2016c; US Department of State, 2016.

Table 10: Kenya's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

| Policy | Content |
|--|--|
| The Immigration Regulations, 1967 | "Pursuant to the Immigration Act, No. 25 of 1967, regulates entry and departure from Kenya, issuance of proper passes." |
| The Immigration Act 1967 | "Requires certain non-citizens of Kenya to apply for entry permits and dependent's passes." |
| The Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act (Chapter 257) [consolidated to 1977] | "Act establishes a council for the supervision and regulation of nurses, midwives and health visitors. Includes provisions pertaining to registration, training, certification and discipline. Consolidates text from 1965 to 1977." |
| Employment Act (Exemption of Provisions) (Amendment) Order, 1978 [L.N. No. 246] | Act covers various aspects of employment, including the employment of migrant workers. |
| Refugees Act, 2006 (No. 13 of 2006) | "Contains provisions concerning the granting of refugee status, the establishment of a Commissioner for refugee affairs and a Refugee Appeal Board, rights and duties of refugees, provisions with respect to families, and special provisions concerning women and children." |
| The Employment Act, 2007 (No. 11 of 2007). | Defines the fundamental rights of employees, provides for basic conditions of employment, including migrant workers. |
| Counter-Trafficking In | Prohibits trafficking in persons and related offences and provides |

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| Persons Act (Act No. 8 of 2010) (Cap. 61). | for the prosecution and punishment of non-compliance, assistance and protection of VoTs. In addition, it establishes the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Committee and a National Assistance Trust Fund for VoTs. |
| Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service Act(No. 31 of 2011). | Establishes “the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service; to provide for the creation and maintenance of a national population register and the administration of the laws relating to births and deaths, identification and registration of citizens, immigration and refugees; administration of the laws relating to marriages and for connected purposes.” |
| Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Act No. 12 of 2011) (Cap. 172). | Provides for “matters relating to citizenship; issuance of travel documents; immigration and for connected purposes” |
| Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act, 2012 (No 56 of 2012) | provides “for the prevention, protection and provision of assistance to internally displaced persons and affected communities and give effect to the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and for connected purposes.” |
| National Social Security Fund Act, 2013 (No. 45 of 2013). | Establishes a national Social Security Fund; provides for coordination between social security schemes of individual East African Community Member States for migrant workers; introduces an emigration benefit if a citizen migrates permanently |
| Kenya National Qualifications Framework Act, 2014, No. 22 of 2014 | “Establishes the Kenya National Qualifications Authority, which among other things, is responsible to establish standards for harmonisation and recognition of national and foreign qualifications” (Art. 8(n)) |
| Victim Protection Act (September 2014) | Provides for support to VoTs |
| National Employment Authority Act, 2016 (No. 3 of 2016). | “An Act of Parliament to establish the National Employment Authority; to provide for a comprehensive institutional framework for employment management; to enhance employment promotion interventions; to enhance access to employment for youth, minorities and marginalized groups and for connected purposes.” |
| The Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities (IDP Act) | Comprehensive approach to addressing internal displacement |
| National Plan of Action to Counter Human Trafficking (2013-2017) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developed to comprehensively address issues regarding human trafficking - Put in place measures to combat human trafficking |

Sources: ILO, 2017a; Marchand et al., 2016.

Table 11: Somalia's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

| Policy | Content |
|--|--|
| Presidential Decree No. 25 of 2 June 1984, on Determination of Refugee Status | Defines the requirements for recognition of refugee status, the asylum procedure and the admission of asylum seekers. |
| Pre-1991 Penal Code | Prohibits human trafficking, slavery and forced labour |
| SOMALILAND | |
| Somaliland Immigration Law (Law No. 72/1995) | Defines powers and duties of immigration officers, conditions for entry, stay and work in the territory of Somaliland. |
| Republic of Somaliland Citizenship Law (Law No. 22/2002) | Provides for matters related to citizenship. |
| Somaliland Refugee Law | n/a |

Sources: ILO, 2017a.

Table 12: South Sudan's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

| Policy | Content |
|--|--|
| Nationality Act, 2003 | Provides for matters related to nationality and naturalisation. |
| Penal Code, 2008 | Prohibits human trafficking |
| Child Act | Protects children, including refugees and internally displaced minors |
| Passports and Immigration Act, 2011 | Provides for matters related to nationality, identification documentation, and immigration including entry, departure, registration and deportation. |

Sources: ILO, 2017a; Marchand et al., 2016; RMMS, 2016f.

Table 13: Sudan's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

| Policy | Content |
|---|---|
| 1990 Regulation of the Employment of Sudanese Abroad | Provides for matters related to Sudanese labour migration. |
| Criminal Procedures Act, 1991 | Provides for matters related to the detention of irregular migrants and punishments for facilitating irregular migration. |
| 1994 Passports and Immigration Act | Regulates admission, stay and the deportation of foreign nationals. Replaced the previous Act from 1960. |
| 1997 Labour Law | Provides for right of Sudanese citizens to work abroad. |
| 2000 Regulation of Employment of Non-Sudanese Act | Regulates the employment of foreign nationals. |
| Penal Code 2003 | Prohibits human trafficking. |
| Child Act 2004 | Prohibits trafficking of children. |
| Combating of Human Trafficking Act (2014) | Criminalises human trafficking. |
| Asylum Regulation Act (2014) | Provides for matters related to refugees including their rights and duties in Sudan. |
| Joint Partners Strategy to Address Trafficking, Kidnapping, and Smuggling in Persons (2015-2017) | Joint Strategy by UN agencies and the government aimed at providing support to the government to ensure the safe entry of asylum seekers and migrants to its territory, their secure residence and the protection and rehabilitation of identified victims of trafficking throughout Sudan. |

Sources: ILO, 2017a; Marchand et al., 2016.

Table 14: Uganda's Key Migration Legislation and Policy Responses

| Law/Policy | Content |
|---|---|
| Aliens (Registration and Control Act) 1985 | Provides for matters related to registration of non-Ugandans. |
| Employment (Recruitment of Ugandan Migrant Workers Abroad) Regulations, 2005 (2005 No. 62) | Provides for licensing, inspection and services of recruitment agencies, defines fees, documentary processing, employment standards and welfare and employment services. |
| The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act, 2000 | Provides for matters relating to citizenship, travel and identification documents, immigration control and registration of foreigners. |
| Refugees Act 2006 (Act No. 21 of 2006) | Provides for matters relating to refugees including rules regarding asylum application and procedure as well as rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers. |
| The Employment Act, 2006 (Act No. 6) | Provides for general principles related to employment, employment relationships, rights and duties as well as wages. It prohibits discrimination against migrant workers and prohibits the employment of irregular migrants. |
| Equal Opportunities Act, 2007 | Provides for matters related to equal opportunities in in line with the Consitution "to eliminate discrimination and inequalities against any individual or group of persons on the ground of sex, age, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, health status, social or economic standing, political opinion or disability, and take affirmative action in favour of groups marginalized on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason created by history, tradition or custom for the purpose of redressing imbalances which exist against them; and to provide for other related matters." |
| Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2009 | Prohibits human trafficking, defines penalties for non-compliance and provides for the protection of VoTs. |

Sources: ILO, 2017a; IOM, 2013b.

Annex E: Relevant International Conventions

| Short Name | Official Name | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 1930 Forced Labour Convention (ILO C029) | Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour | "Undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period." (ILO, 1930) |
| 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (ILO C097) | Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) | "Constitutes a comprehensive international treaty regarding the protection of human rights of migrants and members of their families." (GMG, n.d.) |
| 1951 UN Refugee Convention | 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees | "Defines the term 'refugee' and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them." (UNHCR, n.d.) |
| 1957 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO C105) | Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour | Aims "to suppress... any form of forced or compulsory labour" and "to take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour." (ILO, 1957) |
| 1963 UN Vienna Convention on Consular Relations | Vienna Convention on Consular Relations | "Consists of 79 articles, most of which provide for the operation of consulates; outline the functions of consular agents; and address the privileges and immunities granted to consular officials when posted to a foreign country." (Gómez Robledo, n.d.) |
| 1967 UN Refugee Protocol | 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees | "The 1951 Convention, as a post-Second World War instrument, was originally limited in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and thus gave the Convention universal coverage." (UNHCR, 2010) |
| 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (ILO C143) | Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers | "Undertakes to respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers." (ILO, 1975) |
| 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child | Convention on the Rights of the Child | Defines the term "child" and defines the rights of children including non-discrimination and freedom of expression. (UNICEF, n.d.) |
| 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention | International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families | "Does not create new rights for migrants but aims at guaranteeing equality of treatment, and the same working conditions for migrants and nationals." (UNESCO, 2005) |
| 2000 UN Human Trafficking Protocol | Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime | Defines "trafficking in persons" and "contains provisions on a range of issues, including criminalisation, assistance to and protection for victims, the status of victims in the receiving states, repatriation of victims, preventive measures, actions to discourage the demand, exchange of information and training, and measures to strengthen the effectiveness of border controls. The protocol |

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| | | stipulates that states parties must adopt or strengthen legislative or other measures to discourage the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children that leads to trafficking." (European Commission, 2003) |
| 2000 UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol | Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime | "Provides an internationally recognized definition of human smuggling which focuses on procuring the illegal entry of a foreign national into the territory of a State Party in exchange for financial or other material benefit. The Protocol requires State Parties to establish criminal liability for human smuggling and to adopt other cooperative and preventative measures to deter it." (UNHCR, 2008) |
| 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (ILO C189) | Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers | "Provide the basis for ensuring that under the law, domestic workers have the respect and rights that workers in the formal economy have long fought for and acquired." (ILO, 2011) |

Annex F: Actions and Programmes of IOM and UNHCR in the East and Horn of Africa

| Country | IOM Actions & Programmes ¹ | UNHCR Actions & Programmes |
|-----------------|--|--|
| Djibouti | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational support <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resettlement/ Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) Pre-Departure Orientation Migration Health Mixed Migration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Favourable protection environment (law and policy; access to territory) Fair protection processes and documentation (reception; registration; status determination; individual and civil status documentation) Security from violence and exploitation (SGBV prevention and response; child protection) Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) Durable solutions (solutions strategy; voluntary return, integration; resettlement) Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; donor relations) Logistics and operations support |
| Eritrea | <p><u>Actions & Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health Assessments Resettlement/ AVR Pre-Departure Orientation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocating ratification of the OAU Convention Advocating the inclusion of refugees in national development plans and systems (health, education, water and sanitation) Strengthening child protection and protection of people with specific needs Refugee community mobilization Food assistance for camp-based Somali refugees, as well as monthly cash grants to Sudanese and South Sudanese urban refugees Expanding opportunities for durable solutions, including voluntary repatriation, resettlement and local integration Encouraging the Government to engage further in the Khartoum process |
| Ethiopia | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity building Operational support Logistical support | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Favourable protection environment (international and regional instruments; law and policy; legal remedies and assistance; access to territory; public attitudes towards persons of concern (PoC)) Fair protection processes and documentation (reception; registration; status determination; individual and civil status documentation; family re-unification) Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime; SGBV prevention and |

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|--------------|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness raising • Shelter and livelihood support • Promotion of bilateral, regional, inter-regional and multilateral cooperation in the field of migration <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief Assistance and Coordination of Humanitarian Responses • Migration Health/ Health Assessments • Pre-Departure Orientation • Emergency Response • Migration Crisis-Mitigation Assistance • Resettlement/ AVR/ Reintegration/ Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) • Consular Services: Immigration and Visa Support • Diaspora Engagement and Support • Migration for Development (MIDeTh) • Strengthening and Facilitating Labour Migration • Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) | <p>response; non-arbitrary detention; child protection)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, integration; resettlement) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; CCCM; donor relations) • Logistics and operations support |
| Kenya | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building • Research • Awareness raising • Operational support | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favourable protection environment (international and regional instruments; administrative institutions and practice; legal remedies and assistance; access to territory; public attitudes towards PoCs) • Fair protection processes and documentation (reception; identification of statelessness; registration; status determination; individual and civil status documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime; SGBV prevention and response; non-arbitrary detention; child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and |

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|----------------|---|---|
| | <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resettlement/ AVR/ Reintegration • Emergency Response • Migration Health • Gender Dimension • Mixed Migration • Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) • Consular Services • Strengthening and Facilitating Labour Migration | <p>domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, integration; resettlement; reduction of statelessness) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; CCCM; donor relations) • Logistics and operations support |
| Somalia | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building (e.g. migration and border management) • Coordination • Awareness raising and information dissemination • Livelihood support and infrastructure development <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration Health • Mixed Migration • Migration and Development • Diaspora Engagement • Counter Human Trafficking • AVR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favourable protection environment (law and policy; legal remedies and assistance; access to territory; public attitudes towards PoCs) • Fair protection processes and documentation (registration; status determination) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from effects armed conflict; SGBV prevention and response; non-arbitrary detention; child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (solutions strategy; voluntary return, (re-) integration; resettlement) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; donor relations) • Logistics and operations support |

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| South Sudan | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building and policy guidance (e.g. migration and border management) • Logistics support • Shelter and livelihood support <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CCCM • Migration Health • Emergency Response • Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) • AVR • DTM | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favourable protection environment (law and policy; public attitudes towards PoCs) • Fair protection processes and documentation (registration; status determination; individual documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime; protection from effects armed conflict; SGBV prevention and response; non-arbitrary detention; child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (voluntary return, integration) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; CCCM donor relations) • Logistics and operations support |
| Sudan | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building (e.g. border management) • Shelter and livelihood support • Infrastructure support • Awareness raising • Orientation • Research <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTM • Emergency Response • Migration Health • WASH • Counter Trafficking • Resettlement/ AVR/ Reintegration • TRQN • Transition recovery | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favourable protection environment (law and policy; legal remedies and assistance; access to territory; public attitudes towards PoCs) • Fair protection processes and documentation (reception; registration; status determination; individual and civil status documentation; family re-unification) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime; protection from effects of armed conflict; SGBV prevention and response; non-arbitrary detention; child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (solutions strategy; voluntary return, integration; resettlement) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships; CCCM; donor relations) • Logistics and operations support |

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|---------------|---|--|
| Uganda | <p><u>Actions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical cooperation and capacity building • Consular services • Awareness raising campaigns • Infrastructure support • Research <p><u>Programmes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration Health • Resettlement • Counter Trafficking • Emergency Response • Humanitarian Assistance • Labour Migration • Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARTP) • Migration and Development | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Favourable protection environment (international and regional instruments; law and policy; administrative institutions and practice; legal remedies and assistance; access to territory) • Fair protection processes and documentation (reception; registration; status determination; individual and civil status documentation) • Security from violence and exploitation (protection from crime; SGBV prevention and response; child protection) • Basic needs and essential services (health; reproductive health and HIV/Aids; nutrition; food security; water; sanitation and hygiene; shelter and infrastructure; energy; basic and domestic hygiene items; services for persons with specific needs; education) • Community empowerment and self-reliance (community mobilization; co-existence with local communities; natural resources and shared environment; self-reliance and livelihoods) • Durable solutions (solutions strategy; voluntary return, integration; resettlement) • Leadership, coordination and partnerships (Coordination and partnerships) • Logistics and operations support |
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¹ Websites of IOM regional and country offices are not always consistent in dividing their activities into actions and programmes as well as into certain action and programme categories. The authors of this report reviewed IOM activities in the East and Horn of Africa, and summed them up under similar headings to present them in a consistent way to facilitate comparisons across the eight focus countries.

Sources: IOM Regional Office, 2017a,b,c,d,e,f; IOM Ethiopia, 2017a,b,c,d,e,f; IOM Kenya, 2017; IOM South Sudan, 2017; IOM Sudan, 2017a,b,c,d,e; IOM Uganda, 2017; UNHCR, 2017b; 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; 2017j; 2017l.

Annex G: UNHCR and IOM Budget's for the East and Horn of Africa

Table 15: Detailed UNHCR Budget (Pillar 1) for the East and Horn of Africa (USD), 2016

| | Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Favourable Protection Environment, Total | 388,154 | 2,183,366 | 4,421,638 | 1,274,022 | 3,358,434 | 1,395,484 | 3,608,638 |
| International and regional instruments | n/a | 96,321 | 0 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 323,199 |
| Law and policy | 121,305 | 26,627 | n/a | 409,466 | 2,589,059 | 238,629 | 283,199 |
| Legal remedies & assistance | n/a | 1,316,493 | 3,900,985 | 520,256 | n/a | 723,368 | 2,854,035 |
| Access to territory | 266,849 | 75,861 | 187,279 | 200,256 | n/a | 194,859 | 148,206 |
| Public Attitudes towards PoC | n/a | 668,063 | 333,374 | 144,045 | 769,375 | 238,629 | n/a |
| Fair Protection Processes & Documentation, Total | 1,270,332 | 14,466,493 | 18,269,399 | 1,764,763 | 6,505,341 | 12,417,765 | 9,912,790 |
| Reception conditions | 235,105 | 5,784,871 | 646,026 | 646,026 | n/a | 2,963,933 | 2,104,317 |
| Registration & Profiling | 288,918 | 4,633,537 | 9,808,079 | 626,499 | 3,392,260 | 3,368,243 | 4,509,722 |
| Status determination | 253,447 | 407,857 | 6,665,988 | 1,138,264 | 1,054,706 | 3,233,486 | 433,199 |
| Individual documentation | 48,052 | 1,789,450 | 410,503 | n/a | 2,058,375 | 1,423,346 | 416,099 |
| Civil Status documentation | 444,809 | 1,484,820 | 738,803 | n/a | n/a | 741,899 | 2,449,453 |
| Family re-unification | n/a | 365,959 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 686,858 | n/a |
| Security from violence and exploitation, total | 847,023 | 18,735,411 | 20,812,538 | 2,503,876 | 12,819,479 | 8,397,535 | 13,496,496 |
| Protection from crime | n/a | 1,102,231 | 7,870,030 | 0 | 1,485,457 | 3,158,677 | 2,868,744 |
| Protection from effects armed conflict | n/a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 534,577 | n/a |
| SGBV prevention and response | 640,918 | 7,248,181 | 5,762,941 | 2,306,787 | 6,213,171 | 1,947,041 | 5,666,340 |
| Non-arbitrary detention | n/a | 88,554 | 561,626 | 96,045 | n/a | 248,629 | n/a |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Child protection | 206,105 | 10,296,446 | 6,617,941 | 101,045 | 5,120,852 | 2,508,612 | 4,961,412 |
| Basic Needs and Essential Services, total | 10,418,639 | 168,014,051 | 119,818,673 | 3,503,155 | 90,855,637 | 50,263,883 | 141,079,164 |
| Health | 1,780,210 | 23,676,754 | 24,984,339 | 1,017,982 | 11,395,312 | 11,789,824 | 21,690,373 |
| Reproductive health and HIV/ Aids response | 228,581 | 5,818,558 | 5,585,590 | n/a | 3,604,389 | 1,357,654 | 6,370,036 |
| Nutrition | 422,157 | 7,465,826 | 5,751,826 | n/a | 4,588,695 | 3,903,583 | 4,216,355 |
| Food security | 56,813 | 970,127 | 365,906 | n/a | 1,138,615 | 244,859 | 393,236 |
| Water | 848,710 | 21,319,750 | 8,192,900 | n/a | 9,504,615 | 3,782,218 | 7,953,491 |
| Sanitation and hygiene | 365,157 | 13,179,915 | 7,641,307 | n/a | 7,795,531 | 4,226,725 | 5,012,619 |
| Shelter and infrastructure | 2,807,210 | 24,708,100 | 15,323,664 | 0 | 19,957,508 | 5,219,718 | 27,303,079 |
| Energy | 760,762 | 16,274,070 | 7,411,935 | 0 | n/a | 4,389,435 | 3,933,279 |
| Basic and domestic and hygiene Items | 418,753 | 17,658,089 | 10,639,182 | 538,088 | 12,657,233 | 3,066,438 | 10,668,631 |
| Services for persons with specific needs | 330,052 | 5,991,136 | 5,615,811 | 379,045 | 2,703,938 | 2,215,681 | 5,443,816 |
| Education | 2,400,233 | 30,951,725 | 28,306,212 | 1,568,042 | 17,509,803 | 10,067,748 | 48,094,250 |
| Community Empowerment and Self Reliance, total | 2,220,412 | 25,660,758 | 26,637,008 | 2,325,936 | 16,601,419 | 26,008,359 | 41,689,200 |
| Community mobilization | 146,105 | 2,742,086 | 2,351,077 | 235,256 | 2,589,519 | 579,088 | 1,838,894 |
| Co-existence with local communities | 0 | 2,141,501 | 8,521,063 | 844,211 | 6,026,750 | 10,235,206 | 4,249,879 |
| Natural resources and shared environment | 161,866 | 5,222,593 | 1,739,138 | n/a | 1,955,244 | 2,089,718 | 5,295,017 |
| Self-reliance and livelihoods | 1,912,441 | 15,554,579 | 14,025,730 | 1,246,469 | 6,029,907 | 13,104,347 | 30,305,409 |
| Durable Solutions, total | 660,420 | 5,191,290 | 15,490,425 | 11,072,124 | 3,831,440 | 2,836,633 | 6,790,451 |
| Solutions strategy | 77,052 | n/a | n/a | 0 | n/a | n/a | 368,199 |
| Voluntary return | 280,158 | 1,682,706 | 11,985,666 | 10,718,075 | 2,753,447 | 600,346 | 1,950,474 |
| Integration | 60,052 | 28,160 | 1,132,277 | 0 | 1,077,993 | 148,859 | 1,764,519 |
| Resettlement | 243,157 | 3,480,423 | 2,372,482 | 354,049 | n/a | 2,087,427 | 2,707,260 |
| Leadership, Coordination and Partnerships, total | 257,210 | 1,764,505 | 1,694,017 | 364,599 | 5,917,472 | 980,777 | 845,012 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Coordination and partnerships | 192,157 | 1,398,739 | 212,612 | 140,045 | 0 | 619,718 | 845,012 |
| Camp management and coordination | n/a | 163,663 | 1,202,677 | n/a | 4,718,722 | 361,059 | n/a |
| Donor relations | 65,052 | 202,104 | 278,728 | 224,555 | 1,198,750 | 0 | n/a |
| Logistics and Operations Support, total | 3,925,641 | 33,635,931 | 19,135,186 | 1,171,382 | 27,868,530 | 5,977,872 | 25,301,362 |
| Supply chain and logistics | 363,210 | 11,971,858 | 7,289,839 | 101,045 | 18,315,282 | 2,090,024 | 8,617,820 |
| Operations management, coordination and support | 3,562,431 | 21,664,073 | 11,845,347 | 1,070,337 | 9,553,248 | 3,887,847 | 16,683,542 |

Sources: UNHCR 2017b; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; 2017j; 2017l.

Note: A detailed budget for Eritrea is not available.

Table 16: IOM Expenditure for the East and Horn of Africa (USD), 2011-2015

| Year | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda | Total |
|-------------|-----------|---------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| 2015 | 5 187 835 | n/a | 23 231 621 | 33 764 486 | 30 033 460 | 77 406 785 | 16 214 412 | 9 250 267 | 195 088 866 |
| 2014 | 1 828 136 | n/a | 26 683 575 | 32 589 004 | 29 476 736 | 73 308 162 | 15 579 547 | 9 388 010 | 188 853 170 |
| 2013 | 2 895 094 | n/a | 25 416 952 | 33 716 781 | 25 973 597 | 49 804 883 | 15 121 419 | 8 420 883 | 161 349 609 |
| 2012 | 1 732 303 | n/a | 14 877 756 | 29 678 932 | 25 630 888 | 52 052 455 | 26 958 890 | 6 373 512 | 157 304 736 |
| 2011 | 2 733 | n/a | 12 180 532 | 42 680 032 | 5 692 997 | 1 214 781 | 42 192 884 | 5 404 112 | 109 368 071 |

Source: IOM, 2012; 2013a; 2014b; 2015a; 2016a.