

# Aid, Institutions and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

## Heterogeneous Donors and Heterogeneous Responses

Hassen A. Wako

Maastricht University  
&

United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on  
Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT)

*wako@merit.unu.edu*

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# 1. Introduction

## Justifications for Development Aid

Focus on development aid as opposed to military or humanitarian/disaster aid, though the borders are blurred.

Aid for:

- Physical Capital
- Human Capital
- Governance, Institutions
- Trade

In general, aid is needed to give LDCs a 'big-push' out of poverty-trap.

In practice, recipient needs, donor political & commercial interests, shared benefits of development in LDCs and recipient performance, all matter.

# The Effectiveness Debate

Debate goes back to its early days.

Generations of the aid-effectiveness debate:

- Aid  $\rightarrow$  Saving/Investment ( $\rightarrow$  Growth): Cross-sectional; Linear relationship; aid taken as exogenous.
- Aid  $\rightarrow$  Growth: similar to the first
- Aid  $\rightarrow$  Growth (but also (rarely) Education, Infant Mortality): Panel data; endogeneity; non-linearity; deep parameters (policy, institutions, geography).
- Aid  $\rightarrow$  Intermediary variables  $\rightarrow$  Growth: 'Opening the black box'.

# The Effectiveness Debate

## Unconditionally effective:

Crosswell (1998), Blair et al. (2005), Karras (2006), Tarp (2006), Minoiu & Reddy (2010), Arndt et al. (2010, 2011)

## Conditionally effective:

World Bank (1998), Burnside & Dollar (2000), Denkabe (2004), Radelet (2006), Collier (2006), Alvi et al. (2008), Ghimire (2013), Bearce et al. (2013)

## Ineffective

Kanbur (2000), Easterly (2003, 2005), Ranis (2006), Rajan & Subramanian (2008), Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2012)

## Harmful

Moss et al. (2006), Fielding (2007), Killick & Foster (2007), Moyo (2009).

# Research Gaps

Three (3) issues:

- Aid (donor) heterogeneity,
- Recipient heterogeneity,
- Institutional intermediation: Aid → Institutions → Growth

# Research Gaps

## i) Aid (donor) heterogeneity:

Differences in the nature of aid:

- Clemens et al. (2004): 'short-impact' & 'long-impact' aid

Differences between donors:

- Heterogeneity within the 'traditional' donors
  - Wako (2011): Bilateral vs. Multilateral Donors
  - Okada & Samreth (2012): US, UK, Japan, France & multilateral aid
  - Brazys (2013): Aid for Trade (AfT) from 19 OECD-members. No recipient from SSA
- Differences between 'Old' and 'New' donors
  - McCormick (2008): China & India vs. 'Old' donors (Potential!)
  - Moyo (2009): Compares China & the West

# Research Gaps

## ii) Recipient heterogeneity:

- Common practice: including regional dummies.
- Heterogeneity in slope parameters:
  - Tan (2009), Asteriou (2009), Ndambendia & Njoupouognigni (2010)
    - Aid  $\rightarrow$  Income, not interested in the reverse relationship
    - not interested in the role of institutions.
    - ignored order of integration of variables – possibility of spurious results.

## iii) Intermediary variables:

- Bourguignon & Sundberg (2007): Aid  $\rightarrow$  Policy, governance, institutions  $\rightarrow$  Growth – Theoretical!
- Arndt et al. (2011): considered investment and human capital, not seen the roles of policy, institutions and governance.



## 2. Methodology

### Model Specification

ARDL: a dynamic relationship

$$\text{gGDPPC}_{it} = \alpha_{0i} + \sum_{l=1}^p \alpha_{1li} \text{gGDPPC}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \alpha_{2li} \text{Aid}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \alpha_{3li} \text{Inst}_{it-l} + \eta_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Inst}_{it} = \beta_{0i} + \sum_{l=1}^p \beta_{1li} \text{Inst}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \beta_{2li} \text{gGDPPC}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \beta_{3li} \text{Aid}_{it-l} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Aid}_{it} = \gamma_{0i} + \sum_{l=1}^p \gamma_{1li} \text{Aid}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \gamma_{2li} \text{gGDPPC}_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^p \gamma_{3li} \text{Inst}_{it-l} + \zeta_{it} \quad (3)$$

# Model Specification

Rearranging Equation 1 gives an ECM representation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta gGDPPC_{it} &= \gamma_{0i} + \alpha_j (gGDPPC_{it-1} - \beta_{2i}Aid_{it-1} - \beta_{3i}Inst_{it-1}) \\ &+ \sum_{l=1}^{p-1} \gamma_{1li} \Delta gGDPPC_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^{p-1} \gamma_{2li} \Delta Aid_{it-l} + \sum_{l=0}^{p-1} \gamma_{3li} \Delta Inst_{it-l} + \mu_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

The *Aid* and *Institution* equations are similarly reparameterized.

# Estimation Techniques

- Three techniques for non-stationary, cross-sectionally dependent dynamic panels:
  - ① Dynamic Fixed Effects – all parameters assumed homogenous
  - ② Pooled Mean Group – short-run parameters and error-correction coefficient are heterogenous
  - ③ Mean Group – all parameters heterogenous (not much better than running separate time-series)
- Hausman test applied to the pairs: MG & DFE, and MG & PMG.
- Dynamic Common Correlated Effects estimator also used to better account for CD.

### 3. Data

#### 1. Definition of Variables and Data Source:

- Economic Growth:

$$\text{grGDPPC}_t = 100 * [\text{Real GDPPC}_t - \text{Real GDPPC}_{t-1}] / \text{Real GDPPC}_{t-1}.$$

World Bank: WDI

- Aid: NAT = NODA - Interest repayments - Cancellation of Non-ODA loans.  
(Share of GDP).

Roodman (2005)

- Institutional Quality: Average of Civil Liberties & Political Rights.

Freedom House

#### 2. Coverage: 1980-2013, 43 SSA countries

## 4. Results

### Stationarity & Cointegration Tests


Stationarity:

- grGDPPC, NAT & Institution are mix of  $I(0)$  &  $I(1)$ .
- RGDPCC is a mix of  $I(1)$  &  $I(2)$ .

Cointegration:

- grGDPPC, NAT & Institution are cointegrated.
- The use of GDPPC in level entails spurious results!

# Aggregate Aid from DAC-Donors



From 'Poverty-Trap' to 'Aid-Poverty Trap'

# Heterogeneity within DAC-Donors

<i>Donor</i>	<i>grGDPPC</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Total Effect*</i>
France	—	—	—
Canada	—	—	—
Germany	—	—	—
Italy	—	0	—
Finland	—	0	—
Japan	—	0	—
Luxembourg	0	—	—
Austria	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0
Sweden	+	—	?
Belgium	+	—	?
Australia	+	—	?
Portugal	—	+	?
UK	+	0	+
USA	+	0	+
Netherlands	0	+	+
Norway	0	+	+
Switzerland	0	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+

## Heterogeneity within DAC-Donors

These results are related to the following 'aid quality' donor ratings:

- Birdsall et al. (2010): maximizing efficiency, transparency & learning, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on recipients.
- Ghosh and Kharas (2011): Transparency
- Knack et al. (2011): selectivity, alignment, harmonization, specialization
- Easterly and Williamson (2011): Aid agency practices
- CGD: Commitment to Development Index (CDI)



# Heterogeneity within DAC-Donors

Highly consistent with donor-quality literature:

- Ireland, Netherlands, Norway
- France, Canada, Italy, Finland

Less clear but reconcilable:

- UK, Australia, Portugal, Sweden, New Zealand, Switzerland
- Japan, Luxembourg, Germany,
- Spain, Austria, Belgium

Difficult to reconcile:

- Denmark, USA


# Chinese Aid

Data:

- From media reports, not from official sources
- Not NAT
- Ambiguity in what constitutes aid
- Short time span (2000-2012)
- Small sample size (10 recipients).

Source: Strange et al. (2013).

# Chinese Aid



## 5. Conclusion

1. Aggregate aid from 'traditional' donors has:
  - a robust non-positive growth effect.
  - a robust negative institutional quality effect.
2. Disaggregation reveals mixed results:
  - + Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, USA
  - - France, Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Germany
  - 0 Denmark, Spain and Austria
  - ? Sweden, Australia, Portugal, Belgium
3. Chinese aid: positive growth effect, negative institutional effect. Similar to Australian, Swedish and Belgian aid.

**A universal/outright praise or disapproval of aid is wrong!**

# Policy Implications

- Generally, smaller donors performed better than the bigger ones.  
⇒ Quality matters more than quantity
- Comparing performances of donors with mixed quality scores, **specialization** and **alignment** seem to matter more than other dimensions of quality.

# Thank You!