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**Introduction**

*Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko*

Welcome to the new issue of Migration Policy Practice! This issue covers a range of policy areas, including on new methods for processing and enhancing census data in Australia; the role of the business sector in encouraging more proactive migration policies in the interest of economic growth; new approaches to measuring the costs of brain drain; a review of the Second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy of the Republic of Korea; and the effects of female emigration on children and the elderly left behind.

The lead article in this issue of MPP, by Andrew Middleton and David Smith of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection, respectively, discusses the results of a new project that aims to enhance census data by using sophisticated data-matching algorithms, or “probabilistic linking,” to link migrant records from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s Settlement Database to the corresponding migrant records from the 2011 census. The project opens up new opportunities to analyse migrant settlement outcomes by migration/visa stream using the depth and breadth of the Census of Population and Housing. The article also describes future plans to link data from successive censuses through the Statistical Longitudinal Census Dataset being developed by the ABS. This data set will provide insights into family formation among newly arriving migrant groups and enable the assessment of improvement in income, English language acquisition and labour market outcomes over time.

The second article, by Khalid Koser, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration, provides a variety of examples from around the world of business sector’s initiatives to promote selective labour mobility. According to a 2012 World Economic Forum report, one of the main impediments to talent markets is private and public constraints on mobility. The article discusses a range of case studies from different regions of the world showing how the private sector can articulate a powerful business case for migration, which may, in turn, provide a lever for governments to reassert control over the migration discourse. The article also discusses the ways in which public–private partnerships around migration are benefiting local and national economies, business interests, and migrants and their families, as well as the potential to scale these up and expand their global coverage.

The third article, by George Joseph and Quentin Wodon, both from the World Bank, shows that while most of the gains from international migration accrue to migrants (through higher wages) and their families (through remittances), skilled migration may also represent a loss in a country’s education investment, which, for the most part, remains publicly financed in developing countries. The article proposes a very simple method for estimating an upper bound for this potential loss using benefit incidence analysis techniques that combine data on public spending for education and household surveys that identify the educational attainments of international migrants. The results of this method show that in the case of Ghana, 8 per cent of public investment in education may be lost due to international migration.

The fourth article, by June Lee of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), discusses the Second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2013–17) of the Republic of Korea, and its five policy goals, which are: (a) to support economic vitalization and attract global talents; (b) to integrate immigrants and pursue common Korean values; (c) to prevent discrimination and foster greater appreciation of cultural diversity; (d) to promote a safe and orderly society for nationals and non-nationals; and (e) to prosper with countries of origin through international cooperation.

The fifth article, by Michaella Vanore and Melissa Siegel, from the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, outlines the results of a research funded by the European Commission entitled “The Effects of Migration on Children and the Elderly Left Behind in Moldova and Georgia.” This project sought to explore the ways in which the growing emigration of women, who are often the primary caregivers of children and the elderly in the household, can leave those left behind devoid of care and protection. The article shows that the “left behind,” as such, are not automatically more vulnerable simply by merit of having a migrant household member abroad, nor do they necessarily experience enhanced vulnerabilities across all domains of well-being. However, young children in large households with high dependency ratios are at particular risk of facing material poverty. Similarly, it is clear that older individuals living independently or in single-generation households are more likely to face material poverty and limited social well-being.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of Migration Policy Practice and encourage readers to contact us with suggestions for future articles.
Understanding migrant outcomes: Enhancing the value of census data in Australia

Andrew Middleton and David Smith

Introduction

It has now been more than two years since the night of 9 August 2011, when almost 22 million Australians filled out either a printed or online form to reveal much about themselves through the 2011 Census of Population and Housing. Conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the census is the largest data-gathering exercise in Australian history to date.

The Australian Census of Population and Housing has been providing a wealth of information about migrants living in Australia. Until now, however, the only migrant-related data items on the census have been country of birth, year of arrival in Australia, English language proficiency, citizenship and ancestry. There were certain questions that census data and other sources alone did not answer. In the most recent census, however, a number of key questions were included which pertained to the relationship between a migrant’s visa status and other entry conditions, as well as the quality of their outcomes after arrival.

For those working on migration and settlement policy in Australia, the most exciting development from the 2011 census goes by the very unexciting name, “Migrants Census Data Enhancement” (CDE). This project is the result of many years of collaboration between ABS and the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection. CDE uses sophisticated data-matching algorithms, or “probabilistic linking,” to enable migrant records from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s Settlement Database to be linked to the corresponding migrant record from the 2011 census.

The resulting Migrants Census Data Enhancement Integrated Dataset contains almost 1.3 million joined-up or linked records. The records are of people who responded to the 9 August 2011 Census of Population and Housing and of persons who had records on the Settlement Database and were granted permanent residency between 1 January 2000 and 9 August 2011. Excluded were individuals whose census records indicated that they were overseas visitors, people who were out of the country on Census Night, non-visa settlers (e.g. some New Zealand citizens who had migrated to Australia) and deceased persons. Further details can be obtained from Understanding Migrant Outcomes – Enhancing the Value of Census Data, Australia, 2011 (ABS cat. no. 3417.0).

This article takes a step on the path to sharper policy-thinking by drawing on the findings of the first published report from the Migrants Census Data Enhancement project. It will now be possible to answer questions about migrants with evidence-based data that up until now have not been available.

By Census Night 2011, there were 1.3 million permanent migrants who had arrived in Australia since 1 January 2000, according to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s Settlement Database, 716,793 (56%) through the “Skill Stream,” 418,553 (33%) via the “Family Stream,” and 138,355 (11%) under Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Programme (the “Humanitarian Stream”).

What are the entry characteristics of permanent migrants settling in Australia?

Onshore/offshore applicant status

A migrant to Australia can apply for permanent residency either as an onshore or offshore applicant. Onshore applicants generally are people currently on temporary visas who seek to remain in Australia on a permanent basis. Onshore applicants usually have benefitted from living in Australia for several years and thus have a better understanding of local labour markets and have better social networks. This project allows an analysis of the settlement outcomes of migrants in light of these differences.

Over two thirds (67%) of all migrants who had arrived since 1 January 2000 were offshore applicants, with onshore applicants making up the remaining third (33%). Of the 1.3 million permanent arrivals during this time, 22 per cent were Skill Stream onshore migrants; 8.2 per cent were Family Stream onshore migrants; and 1.9 per cent were Humanitarian Stream onshore migrants. Offshore arrivals through the Skilled, Family and Humanitarian Streams accounted for 34 per cent, 25 per cent and 9.0 per cent, respectively, of all arrivals.

1 Andrew Middleton is Director, Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; David Smith is Director, Surveys and Reporting, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Three quarters (75%) of migrants who had arrived in Australia since 1 January 2000 were from non-main English-speaking countries (offshore, 51%; onshore, 24%), with the remaining quarter (24%) from main English-speaking countries (offshore, 15%; onshore, 8.8%). Most Humanitarian Stream applicants were from non-main English speaking countries (offshore, 97%; onshore, 98%).

**Main/secondary applicant status**

The main applicant is generally the person whose skills or proposed activities in Australia are assessed by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection as part of their visa application. Main applicants are usually specifically identified on the application form as such.

The secondary applicant, or “dependant,” is a person whose visa is granted on the basis of being a family member (e.g. spouse or dependent child) of the main applicant. Secondary applicants are included in the same visa stream as the main applicant (e.g. if the main applicant is granted a Skill Stream visa, then the secondary applicant will also enter Australia on a Skill Stream visa and count towards Australia’s Skilled Migration Programme).

Main applicants accounted for over half (59%) of all migrants who arrived in Australia permanently between 1 January 2000 and Census Night 2011, while the remaining (41%) were secondary applicants. Out of all arrivals, 28 per cent entered Australia as main applicants through the Family Stream, 26 per cent as main applicants through the Skill Stream and 4.2 per cent as main applicants through the Humanitarian Stream.

While the proportions of main applicants in the Skill and Family Streams were comparable, there were quite pronounced differences in the context of secondary applicant arrivals. Secondary visa applicants in the Skill Stream accounted for 30 per cent of all arrivals, while secondary visa applicants in the Family Stream accounted for only 4.9 per cent. Secondary applicants in the Humanitarian Stream accounted for 6.6 per cent of all arrivals during the reference period.

**Age by applicant status and visa stream**

The Skill Stream of Australia’s Migration Programme pre-selects main applicants who are of working age. In the Skill Stream, 66 per cent of onshore applicants and 50 per cent of offshore applicants were in the 25–44 year age group. In the Family Stream, 73 per cent of onshore applicants and 57 per cent of offshore applicants were in the same age group. In contrast, 57 per cent of onshore and 35 per cent of offshore applicants in the Humanitarian Stream were in this age group.
There was a greater proportion (33%) of permanent migrants in the Humanitarian Stream in the younger age groups (0–14 and 0–19 years of age) than in the other visa streams. In addition, there was quite a contrast in the proportions of onshore and offshore visa Humanitarian Stream applicants in the 0-19 age range, with 14 per cent of onshore applicants in that stream being 0 to 19 years of age, as opposed to 36 per cent for offshore applicants. Overall, 24 per cent of Skill Stream and 11 per cent of Family Stream arrivals were in the 0-19 year age group.

The age profile of main applicants who arrived in Australia between 1 January 2000 and the time of the census shows a very different picture from that of secondary applicants. For main visa applicants, the majority of all migrants, regardless of visa stream, fell within the 25–44 age range. Specifically, 25- to 44-year-olds accounted for 80 per cent of Skill Stream main applicant arrivals, compared with 69 per cent for main applicants in the Family Stream and 61 per cent for those in the Humanitarian Stream.
On the other hand, there were observable differences between the visa streams for secondary applicants. For Skill Stream secondary applicants, 44 per cent were between 0 and 19 years of age, and 36 per cent were aged 25 to 44, suggestive of family units arriving in Australia. This compares with the Family and Humanitarian Streams, where the 0–19 age group accounted for 52 and 51 per cent, respectively, while the 25–44 age group accounted for 11 per cent of Family Stream secondary applicants and 25 per cent of Humanitarian Stream secondary applicants.

**How well are migrants settling in Australia?**

**English proficiency**

The single most important measure of successful settlement into Australia is the ability to communicate in English. Without this basic skill, migrants will find it extremely difficult to undertake even the sort of day-to-day activities that are normally taken for granted. Over one third (35%) of Skill Stream migrants aged 5 years and over spoke only English, compared with the slightly lower 29 per cent of Family Stream migrants and a mere 4.9 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants.

Almost 60 per cent of Skill Stream migrants who spoke another language spoke English either well or very well. This is not surprising given the English language proficiency requirements of a main applicant’s application for an Australian Skill Stream visa.

Possibly more surprising is that while the proportion of Humanitarian Stream migrants speaking only English was low, almost 62 per cent indicated that they spoke English either well or very well. This highlights the fact that although most Humanitarian Stream migrants come from non-main English speaking countries, it cannot be assumed that they are not proficient in English.

Of the migrants who arrived in the past 10 years, 12 per cent spoke little or no English. These people are widely dispersed across the streams, with the 12 per cent distributed as follows: 3 per cent in the Skill Stream, 6 per cent in the Family Stream and 3 per cent in the Humanitarian Stream. These figures do, however, mask the wide diversity of English abilities across the different migrant groups and the extent to which English proficiency improves over time.

**Figure 4: Proportion of poor English speakers by visa stream and length of stay in Australia, 2011**

![Figure 4](image)

Figure 4 reveals these more significant variations:

**Substantial improvements in English proficiency within the Skill Stream.** Among the more recent arrivals (i.e. the last 5 years) there is a considerable gap in the English language skills between the main applicant – the person selected for skilled migration – and his/her secondary applicant. Around 10 per cent of secondary applicants who arrived during this period reported that they spoke poor English, compared with just 5 per cent of main applicants. In the more “established” cohort – those who had been in Australia 6 to 10 years – secondary applicants have “caught up,” and the gap has become negligible.

**A persistent pattern of poor English among other migrants.** While English ability does improve markedly with increasing length of stay in Australia, there were still substantial numbers of Humanitarian Stream entrants and family migrants who had been in Australia more than five years but were still hampered by poor English. This finding is especially significant, given that eligibility...
for the Australia’s Adult Migrant English Programme provided by the Government generally stops after five years.

There is also a relationship between the age of a migrant and his/her English ability. A young migrant, regardless of his/her migration pathway, either has very good English to begin with or quickly picks up English at school. This appears to be why the English ability of secondary applicants in the Family Stream (most of whom are children) is so much better than that of main applicants.

Similarly, proficiency in English can have a bearing on a migrant’s ability to enter the labour force. Migrants who are employed get the opportunity to interact with Australians in the workplace and, therefore, develop better English skills. While the Skill Stream pre-selects main applicants who can speak English, 76 per cent of Skill Stream migrants aged 15 years and over who spoke English either well or very well, in addition to another language, were employed; the same can be said of 40 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants.

These percentages contrast with the employment levels of migrants in the same streams but who did not speak English well or at all. Within the Skill Stream, 41 per cent of migrants who did not speak English well or at all were employed, compared with just 16 per cent of their counterparts in the Humanitarian Stream. In addition, 75 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants who did not speak English well or at all were not in the labour force.

Of concern, though, are migrants from older cohorts. With age, and with fewer chances to engage with people from outside the family and local community, migrants’ opportunities to learn English become more limited (Graph 5). This situation is especially pronounced for Humanitarian Stream entrants due to their far lower rates of employment.

Figure 5: Proportion of poor English speakers by visa stream and age, 2011

Two or three languages are dominant among the poor English speakers in each stream. More than two thirds of poor English speakers in the Skill Stream spoke Mandarin (39%), Korean (17%) or Cantonese (12%) at home. The situation for the Family Stream was similar, with Mandarin, Vietnamese and Cantonese being the main language for 23 per cent, 18 per cent and 11 per cent of poor English speakers, respectively. Arabic and Karen – 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively – were the main languages spoken at home by poor English speakers in the Humanitarian Stream.

How are permanent migrants performing in the labour market?

Employment outcomes

There were observable differences in employment outcomes at the macro level depending on the migrant’s visa stream and whether he/she was a main applicant or a secondary applicant. Within the Skill Stream, 87 per cent of main applicants were employed, while 8.6 per cent were not in the labour force and only
In some respects, Table 1 corroborates what is already known from previous research. For example, it shows that Skill Stream main applicants had a rate of unemployment of just 3.8 per cent, a figure consistent with findings from other migrant surveys and slightly below the Australian unemployment rate of 5.2 per cent at the time of the census. It also shows that experience counts, with older, more experienced skilled migrants having lower rates of unemployment than those aged less than 25. With an employment to population ratio of close to 90 per cent, workforce participation is highest among skilled migrants aged 25 to 54, and far higher than the 58 per cent employment to population ratio for the general population. Workforce participation remains high up to the age of 64, before falling as migrants turn 65.

Table 1 allows employment outcomes for Skill Stream secondary applicants and for Family Stream main applicants to be compared. On face value, these two groups seem to experience similar outcomes, with identical unemployment rates and near-identical employment-to-population ratios of 61 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. There is, however, more to these figures than meets the eye. When the data in each age category is examined, it will be observed that the employment-to-population ratios are consistently higher and unemployment rates are generally lower for Skill Stream secondary applicants. The reason for this apparent paradox between the overall and age-specific findings can be put down to compositional effects. As

Figure 6: Labour force status of permanent migrants 15 years and older by visa stream, 2011

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Table 1 allows employment outcomes for Skill Stream secondary applicants and for Family Stream main applicants to be compared. On face value, these two groups seem to experience similar outcomes, with identical unemployment rates and near-identical employment-to-population ratios of 61 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. There is, however, more to these figures than meets the eye. When the data in each age category is examined, it will be observed that the employment-to-population ratios are consistently higher and unemployment rates are generally lower for Skill Stream secondary applicants. The reason for this apparent paradox between the overall and age-specific findings can be put down to compositional effects. As
the Family Stream main applicant cohort is younger on average than the Skill Stream secondary applicant cohort, a greater share of the former group will be found in the 25–44 age range associated with higher rates of labour market engagement.

Another insight relates to poor employment outcomes for those coming to Australia through the Humanitarian Stream. Less than 4 in 10 of these main applicants are employed and 2 in 10 are unemployed. However, these figures mask variations in the composition of the Humanitarian Stream group. More established refugee cohorts, such as the Sudanese and the Croatians, have had more time to adjust to life in Australia, resulting in higher employment rates.

The improvements in outcomes over time are supported elsewhere in the data. For example, Humanitarian Stream entrants who have been in Australia for 6 to 10 years have an employment-to-population ratio of 41 per cent, a figure substantially higher than the 25 per cent rate for those who have been in Australia for five years or less. The lower rate of employment among more recent migrant groups may also be due to a deliberate decision to learn English or undertake further study before actively seeking employment. This appears to be a worthwhile use of their time – Humanitarian migrants who speak English well and have been in Australia for 6 to 10 years have an employment-to-population ratio of 47 per cent, far better than the 22 per cent ratio for those who have been in Australia for a similar length of time but who speak English poorly. Similarly, Humanitarian Stream entrants with a degree have an employment-to-population ratio of 54 per cent, slightly higher than the 52 per cent for diploma or certificate holders, and well ahead of the 25 per cent for those without a post-school qualification.

### Occupation and industry

The data supports the accepted view that Skill Stream migrants are generally employed in managerial, professional and technical positions, while Humanitarian Stream entrants occupy many of the lower skilled occupations. The broad-level data reveals some interesting observations. Occupational profiles for the four main migrant categories – Skill Stream main applicants, Skill Stream secondary applicants, Family Stream main applicants and Humanitarian Stream main applicants are shown in Figures 7 and 8.

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<thead>
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<th>Skill Main applicant</th>
<th>Employment-to-Population Ratio</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>90.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>England</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<th>Humanitarian Main applicant</th>
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<td>China</td>
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Figures 7 and 8 contain a substantial amount of information, but there are two very striking observations. The first is that the occupational profiles of Skill Stream secondary applicants and Family Stream main applicants are very similar, and that these distributions also align quite closely with that of the general population. In terms of industry of employment, there is an overrepresentation of these migrants in health, accommodation and food services, and an underrepresentation in public administration and safety (probably because of the Australian citizenship requirements for many public-sector jobs), transport, construction and in the regionally based industries of agriculture and mining.

Figure 7: Occupational distribution of Skill Stream secondary applicants and Family Stream main applicants among permanent migrants 15 years and older, 2011

The second noteworthy observation is that the Humanitarian Stream and Skill Stream main applicants have occupational distributions that are very different from each other and from the general population. Compared with skilled migrants and the general population, those who come to Australia through the Humanitarian Stream and have found employment are far more likely to be working in low-skill jobs involving labour, community and personal services and the operation of machinery. They are also overrepresented in the manufacturing, health, construction and transport industries. For Skill Stream main applicants, the profile is even more concentrated in certain areas of work, although this is not surprising considering the stream’s selection criteria. Management and professional jobs account for almost 60 per cent of total employment. Skill Stream main applicants are also overrepresented in the professional and technical services industries and in the finance and insurance sectors.

Figure 8: Occupation distribution of Skill Stream and Humanitarian Stream main applicants among permanent migrants 15 years and older, 2011
Return on education

On Census Night 2011, higher proportions of Skill Stream and Family Stream migrants aged 15 years and over reported having completed a postgraduate degree (18% and 8.0%, respectively), compared with those in the Humanitarian Stream (1.3%). A similar distribution across the visa streams was observed for migrants who had completed a bachelor’s degree. Almost a third of Skill Stream migrants had completed a bachelor’s degree (31%) compared with 23 per cent of Family Stream migrants and 6.5 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants.

Figure 9: Educational attainment of permanent migrants aged 15 and over by visa stream, compared with the general population, 2011

It appears that both Skill Stream and Family Stream migrants are substantially better educated than the general population. They are more likely to have post-school qualifications, with the overall standard of these qualifications being higher as well. For instance, a skilled migrant is two and a half times more likely to possess a degree than someone from the general population, but is only half as likely to have a certificate.

In the Humanitarian Stream, 12 per cent of migrants had completed a certificate-level qualification; however, the highest proportion (63%) reported “Not applicable” for their level of non-school qualification. The “Not applicable” category included persons who had a qualification that was out of the scope of the classification, persons with no qualifications and persons still studying for a first qualification.

Income

Given the particularly high level of human capital in the Skill Stream, these migrants are expected to be paid more for the work they do. This certainly appears to be the case with Skill Stream migrants aged 15 years and over, who have higher weekly incomes than migrants in either the Family or Humanitarian Streams. Almost 21 per cent of Skill Stream migrants had incomes exceeding AUD 1,500 per week before tax, compared with 8.3 per cent of Family Stream migrants and only 1.3 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants. In comparison, only 14 per cent of the general population had this level of weekly income.

Humanitarian Stream migrants aged 15 years and over generally had lower weekly incomes than people in the other two streams. Over 72 per cent of Humanitarian Stream migrants had incomes of less than AUD 600 per week, compared with 58 per cent of Family Stream migrants and 38 per cent of Skill Stream migrants.

The most common (21%) weekly income range for Skill Stream migrants was AUD 600–999. Most Family Stream migrants (22%) had a negative or nil income, with another fifth in the lowest income group (AUD 1–299). Of the Humanitarian Stream migrants, almost 42 per cent were in the lowest weekly income group (AUD 1–299) while 21 per cent earned between AUD 300 and 599 per week.
When the level of education is taken into account, a different story unfolds, however. Figure 14 shows that without a post-school qualification, anyone, regardless of whether they are a migrant or not is highly unlikely to have an income in excess of AUD 1,500 per week. If they do have a qualification then their earnings would improve substantially. The extent of this improvement, however, does vary markedly.

Individuals from the general population appear to be getting the best return on their advanced education, with 43 per cent of those with a postgraduate qualification earning in excess of AUD 1,500 per week. In comparison, only 32 per cent of Skill Stream migrants, 23 per cent of Family Stream migrants and 8 per cent of Humanitarian Stream entrants with similar qualifications are getting this level of return on their education.

For those coming to Australia through the Family and Humanitarian Streams, lower returns on education are likely to be associated with poorer English and reluctance by Australian employers to recognize overseas qualifications – particularly if they have not had their skills assessed by an approved assessing authority. For all migrant groups, regardless of skill level and educational background, there is also the fact that it can take several years for some migrants to adjust to a new, unfamiliar labour market.
Where to from here?

This paper has described a few of the analytical insights that the Migrants Census Data Enhancement project offers. The project opens up new opportunities to analyse migrant settlement outcomes by visa stream using the depth and breadth of data from the Census of Population and Housing.

While the project represents a substantially larger collection of data than is available from conventional surveys, in the longer term the project will have even more to offer, with plans to link data from successive censuses through the Statistical Longitudinal Census Dataset being developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. This data set will provide insights into family formation among newly arriving migrant groups and enable assessment of improvements in income, English language acquisition and labour market outcomes over time. The data set is one of many similar projects that are planned between different Australian Government agencies and fits within the broader directive of making better use of existing administrative data.

FURTHER INFORMATION

For further information about these and related statistics, contact the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ National Information and Referral Service at client.services@abs.gov.au or the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection at research@immi.gov.au.
The business case for migration: Engaging with the private sector to encourage more proactive migration policies in the interest of economic growth and prosperity

Khalid Koser

Introduction

Over the last two years, the Global Agenda Council on Migration of the World Economic Forum (WEF) has been engaging with the private sector to better understand the intersections between business and migration. We have found the private sector to be far more forthcoming about the merits – indeed, the imperatives – of migration, than most government stakeholders. One reason is that businesses are accountable to shareholders – not voters – and understand that migrants and migration generate profit. Another is that for global corporations in particular, intra-company transfers are a fundamental human resource strategy – human mobility is their lifeblood. Corporate social responsibility also extends to an interest in the rights of workers, many of whom are migrants.

While there are examples of government programmes to facilitate labour mobility, for example, in the European Union, the business sector is increasingly taking its own initiatives as well. Sometimes these initiatives are for direct commercial gain, but often they also make a wider community contribution. This article provides a variety of examples from around the world, drawing on a recent publication by the Global Agenda Council on Migration. The article concludes by asking how more creative alliances can be forged between these business and government initiatives, in order to strike a more objective and positive public perspective on migration, and encourage more proactive migration policies in the interest of economic growth and prosperity.

Migrants and the global competition for talent

Despite lingering high levels of unemployment in many markets, organizations around the world report that they cannot find the talent they need, when they need it. Shortages exist at all skill levels, hindering efficiency and competitiveness. According to a 2012 World Economic Forum report, one of the main impediments to talent markets is private and public constraints on mobility. At the same time, it is often reported that migrants work in jobs that are not commensurate with their skills. This comprises a “brain waste”: destination countries require skills but are not taking advantage of the skills that are already present in their societies in the form of migrants.

One example of an innovative response is a joint project between Manpower Group and the Viet Nam Government’s Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs to implement a strategy for integrating Viet Nam’s workforce into the global talent marketplace. Manpower Group specializes in providing people and services to raise the productivity of organizations’ workforces worldwide, including through recruitment and assessment, training and development, and career management. The joint project is based on an annual survey on the domestic supply of candidates available for overseas assignments, and matches this against existing demand among global employers; drawing on insights from other strategies for job placement and matching, for example, in Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea. It includes a training component to upgrade workers’ skills before and during the overseas assignment. The project also has a strong emphasis on protecting the rights of migrants overseas, as well as on enhancing their return and reintegration for the benefit of the Vietnamese economy.

Migration and competitiveness: The case of Africa

Once derided as the “Hopeless Continent,” analysts now fete “Africa Rising.” The reality, however, is far more nuanced. Still, many companies have solid reasons for feeling bullish about the prospects for growth in African economies in the years ahead. Indeed, many of the early movers have already done extremely well. Companies that know Africa well say that talent pools are broad but shallow, and deepening them is a strategic priority for many companies with long-term plans to be in Africa. Doing so means moving African talent around the continent (and beyond) to provide them with a range of experiences in different markets. Yet many companies report that African governments place more restrictions on the mobility of Africans across the continent than they do non-Africans. Large companies also rely on thousands of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to supply inputs and distribute their products and services. These SMEs also struggle with skills shortages and lack
the resources or clout of larger companies to solve the problem.

While there are examples of innovative national and bilateral talent mobility programmes, these remain few. Indeed, many companies operating in Africa are addressing skills development challenges themselves, whether through bespoke educational initiatives or in cooperation with existing institutions. Some companies are going beyond investing in the skills development of their own talent, to launching broader skills development initiatives that target entire communities.

Nevertheless, there are three particular obstacles to businesses’ interests that risk sub-optimal results.

First, policymakers often lack awareness of the scale and impact of these companies’ skills development initiatives. This, in turn, leads to a second problem, which is that businesses are largely acting in isolation rather than in concert with other businesses with common interests. Third, businesses are, in effect, foregoing opportunities to secure political and financial gain from these all-important skills development investments. Instead, these investments that businesses make in local talent to fill future skills gaps should be earning business considerable credit, for example, in the form of concessions from governments for short-term easing of restrictions of talent mobility to fill immediate skills gaps.

Migration generates business opportunities

Migrant markets are proving to be important opportunities for industries as diverse as financial services, telecommunications, media and entertainment, travel and tourism, consumer goods, and the hotel/restaurant/catering (HORECA) sector. Migrant consumers shopping for specialized services, such as telephone cards, or goods such as familiar cooking spices, have found more and more businesses willing to meet their needs. There have been concerns that companies may have an outsized advantage over their migrant client base. In response, more and more companies targeting migrant markets are developing innovative relationships with their customers.

One example is Univision Communications, the leading media company serving Hispanic (Spanish-speaking) America. The Univision audience is large and growing fast: the 2010 US census showed that Hispanics surpassed 50 million. Interacting with Hispanics in the United States of America is central to Univision’s business, which believes in the principle that what is good for their clients is good for their business. As a result, it operates a number of social initiatives that target the key needs of the Hispanic community, focusing on providing information and outreach on education, voting and citizenship, health and financial empowerment.

Another example of business engagement to support a client base is the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), whose primary markets include the link between overseas Filipino Workers and their families at home. Through the SMART Pinoy Store, products like appliances and electronic gadgets may be bought online for family members in the Philippines without being subject to freight charges that are usually charged on packages sent home. Migrants can also subsidize their families’ daily needs through the online payment of utility bills or direct purchases at family-owned sari-sari and neighbourhood thrift stores, which sell basic commodities like food, beverages and mobile phones and accessories.

Demographics, migration and business

The interplay between ageing and migration results in diverse implications for business. One company that has been impacted directly by this intersection is Home Instead Senior Care, which provides non-medical home care and elder companionship services to help seniors live independently at home.

Migration has impacted on Home Instead in six main ways:

First, global migration trends are creating new and specific care needs, where clients’ cultural backgrounds and language limitations drive the selection and assignment of caregivers.

Second, an increasing number of professional migrants are taking advantage of the Home Instead franchise model to develop their own businesses in countries where they have settled.

Third and combining the first two strands, the migration-driven need for a diverse network of caregivers is being satisfied by migration as more migrants become franchise-holders and employ migrant workers.

Fourth, skilled migrants have helped diversify the company’s global reach and develop global business opportunities.

Fifth, Home Instead increasingly sources its caregivers from around the world. Sometimes this takes the form of public–private partnerships. In Canada, for example, Home Instead franchises are taking advantage of a work programme developed by the Canadian Government in cooperation with the Governments of Ireland and Jamaica. These countries train caregivers, after which Canadian employers (including Home Instead) hire
them for an agreed-upon number of work-hours over a specified period.

Finally, migration has also posed challenges to the Home Instead business model. An influx of Eastern European workers into Western Europe, for example, has created competition in the homecare business. Families may choose to pay for the services of the less expensive individual caregivers, who may be untrained and unsupervised, instead of caregivers supervised by a home care company.

**Engaging diasporas in economic development**

Connecting businesses to diaspora investors and markets is a new frontier for migration and development policy. The Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) provides a good model. Established in 2007, it seeks to facilitate the economic engagement of overseas Indians and persons of Indian origin with India. It is intended to be a focal point, particularly for professionals and SMEs, to expand their economic integration in India. Specifically, OIFC has been mandated to: (a) promote overseas Indian investments into India and facilitate business partnerships; (b) establish and maintain a Diaspora Knowledge Network; (c) function as a clearing house for all investment-related information; (d) assist Indian States to project investment opportunities to overseas Indians; and (e) provide advisory services to persons of Indian origin and non-resident Indians.

OIFC responds to the needs of overseas Indians in two main ways. One is to provide information. A significant component of OIFC services has been answering queries from overseas Indians in areas ranging from foreign investment consulting, regulatory approvals, market research, joint venture partner identification, project financing, accounting, taxation, legal enquiries and portfolio investments. OIFC fields these enquiries with the help of “knowledge partners” such as banks and private sector firms.

A second main service provided by OIFC is facilitation. For example, OIFC provides opportunities for face-to-face connection through its “Diaspora Engagement Meets.” OIFC organizes these “Meets” in regions with large numbers of overseas Indians, to apprise them of opportunities for investment and business engagement in India and provide a platform for business facilitation in India. OIFC has established contacts with over 6,000 overseas Indians through various roadshows and business forums conducted in the Caribbean, Europe, North America, the Middle East, South Africa and South-east Asia.

**Cities, migrants and integration**

Studies demonstrate that well-integrated migrants are comparatively more successful in their host societies. Speaking the language, understanding local administration, and developing contacts and support networks are vital skills for migrants seeking employment or starting businesses. This is where local governments and the private sector can play an essential role to shore up integration policy. Research indicates that the employment environment is a site of critical learning, networking and knowledge transfer for migrants, not just about a particular trade or business, but also about the host society.

In the United States, while the Federal Government can facilitate the integration of new arrivals, it is city leaders – in both public and private sectors – who are on the frontline of crafting policies that best understand their particular immigrant populations. Local leaders can uniquely create policies to ensure that their communities maximize the potential contributions of an increasingly diverse and innovative labour force. Mayors, whose charge is to put in place policies to create local jobs, are also at the forefront of recognizing the role of the nation’s over 40 million immigrants in their future economic competitiveness.

One example comes from Minneapolis, a historically important gateway for northern Europeans, where the composition of the immigrant population has changed dramatically in the last two decades, with proportionally more Asians and Africans now immigrating to the state of Minnesota. A particular challenge that has arisen is how to facilitate opportunities for the many new Muslim immigrant entrepreneurs who operate their businesses under sharia law, which provides restrictions on loans that collect interest. Beginning in 2006, the city of Minneapolis, in partnership with the African Development Centre, began giving out loans at a fixed rate, rather than a variable interest rate, so that the loan mechanism would be compliant with Islamic law. The length of the loan and the interest over the borrowing period is determined prior to issuing the loan, with that amount then added to the original total loan cost. This makes the loan sharia-compliant while giving small business owners the necessary funding to expand and create more American jobs.

**Conclusion**

Around the world, governments are finding it increasingly hard to make the case for migration, for a range of reasons. There is often a correlation between recession and anti-immigration sentiment, generated by public concerns about competition from migrants for scarce jobs. In many countries, minor political parties have successfully adopted a xenophobic platform in
order to elevate their political standing. Media coverage of immigration has become overwhelmingly critical. Political leaders find it hard to swim against this rising tide, especially given the relatively short timespan of electoral cycles.

Yet most governments also acknowledge that well-managed migration can be beneficial. The evidence is clear that migration contributes to economic growth and development, helps address demographic decline, and generates social and cultural diversity. Some governments either have or are planning to introduce labour mobility schemes, but these are often hindered by political obstacles. Greater impetus is required to scale-up these schemes and realize their full potential.

The case studies in this article indicate the potential for a creative alliance between the private sector and government. The private sector can articulate a powerful business case for migration, which may provide a lever for governments to reassert control over the migration discourse. Already public–private partnerships around migration are benefiting local and national economies, business interests, and migrants and their families, and there clearly is potential to scale these up and expand their global coverage. Equally the private sector requires support from governments, particularly in the form of more flexible immigration procedures to facilitate the movement of highly skilled workers between countries and business venues.

The WEF Global Agenda Council on Migration continues to work on developing constructive engagement between governments and the private sector, in order to realize the mutual benefits discussed in this article, among others. Over the next year it will focus on four strategic goals. The first is to complement ongoing multilateral processes, for example, the Global Forum on Migration and Development; following a successful round table event at this year’s High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development, a second round table between business and government is planned for early 2014, co-hosted by the Government of Sweden and WEF. Second, synergies are being developed with other WEF Global Agenda Councils, including, for example, the Global Agenda Council on Africa, and cross-council meetings will take place at the WEF Summit on the Global Agenda in Abu Dhabi in November to initiate a series of joint projects. Third, the Council is planning a series of regional initiatives, including a joint meeting with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and a round table event at the 2014 WEF regional meeting in the Philippines. Finally, the Council is supporting innovation, for example a new project focusing on the role of corporations in protecting migrants in crisis situations.
International migration and potential losses in a country’s education investment

George Joseph and Quentin Wodon

Most of the gains from international migration accrue to the migrants through higher wages and to their families through remittances sent back. International migration may bring some positive externalities for sending countries, through brain circulation and the gains associated with a successful diaspora, but it may also represent a loss in a country’s education investment, which, for the most part, remains publicly financed in developing countries. This article proposes a very simple approach for estimating an upper bound for this potential loss using benefit incidence analysis techniques that combine data on public spending for education and household surveys that identify the education level of international migrants. The results suggest that for Ghana (the country selected for the illustration), 8 per cent of public investment in education may be lost due to international migration—this, again, is an upper bound for such losses, as it does not factor in gains from brain circulation and the diaspora.

Introduction

Despite physical, cultural and economic obstacles to migration, recent decades have witnessed an increase in migration flows across national borders, especially those fuelled by the search for better employment. It is estimated that in 2005 around 195 million people—2.9 per cent of the world’s population—were living in countries in which they were not born (Docquier and Rapport, 2011 and subsequent UN estimates). The stock of migrants in high-income countries has been increasing at a higher pace in the last two decades, and migration pressure is expected to intensify in the coming years due to widening wage gaps and diverging demographic structures between developed and developing countries.

Most of the gains from international migration accrue to migrants through higher wages, and to their families through remittances sent back. However, migration, especially of skilled migrants, may also have adverse effects on the home economy due to the loss in educated workforce. The problem is likely to be more severe if the home country is already suffering from low levels of human capital. This phenomenon is often referred to as “brain drain,” although much of the literature now also refers to “brain circulation,” which emphasizes that there are also some potential gains from international migration for the home country.

A number of theoretical models on brain drain and brain circulation have been developed (for a review, see, for example, Angel-Urdinola et al., 2008), but while there have been many attempts to assess the magnitude of migration flows by education level and their impact on countries, most estimates have limitations, including the fact that much of available data are based on migration to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries only. Putting together internationally comparable migration data sets that correctly assess the education levels of migrants and where their education was obtained remains a challenge. This does not mean, however, that estimates of international migration that factor in the education levels of migrants cannot be obtained for specific countries using country-specific data sets.

Methodology and data

In this article, we are concerned with measuring a specific aspect of potential brain drain—the potential loss in education investment due to international migration—and showing how this can be done at the country level using simple approaches. We combine household survey data from Ghana that provide detailed information on international migrants and their education level with administrative data on public spending on education, in order to compute the share of a country’s total education investment that could be lost due to migration outside of the country. Specifically, we apply traditional techniques of benefit incidence analysis to assess the share of national education spending that may not benefit the country due to international migration.

Benefit incidence analysis is typically achieved by combining data on the use of government services obtained from household surveys with data on the cost to government budgets of providing those services. The technique essentially involves three steps. First, the unit cost of providing a particular service is estimated using government budget data. Second, household survey data are used to allocate the benefits of public spending for specific services to households using the services. Third, data at the household level are aggregated

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1 The authors are both with the World Bank. The opinions expressed in the paper are however only those of the authors and need not represent those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
into benefit incidence statistics for subgroups of the population, in order to compare how the subsidy is distributed across those groups. The most common way of grouping households is on the basis of indicators, such as income or consumption per equivalent adult, in order to assess the share of public spending benefitting households or individuals by quintile of well-being. In this study, we instead group individuals who have benefited from education spending by attending schools in their countries of origin according to whether they have migrated internationally or not.

In such an analysis, if the information on migrants is collected through a nationally representative household survey implemented in the home country, with the remaining household members responding to the survey questions, the approach overcomes issues of underreporting in census-type data due either to illegal migration or migration to non-OECD countries (most analyses of international migration have been based on census data for OECD countries). This does not mean, of course, that household surveys are not subject to their own sources of bias, as is the case when there are no remaining household members in the country of origin to trace the migration of individuals (this would happen if a migrant takes his or her entire family along, but this seems to be the exception rather than the rule).

Other potential problems with household surveys include the risks of non-response and inappropriate thresholds used to define international migration in terms of the length of the migration by migrants (e.g. if the period of absence used in the survey is too short, and the survey considers relatively short stays abroad as mid- to long-term international migration, even if this were not appropriate). To address all those issues, the data used for this article are sufficiently well designed to avoid the risk of substantial bias. In addition, the size of the survey and the frequency of international migration are also large enough to avoid another potential problem with surveys — that of international migration being a “rare event,” which leads to a potentially large measurement error. None of these means that surveys are necessarily better for measuring international migration than other data sources, such as censuses in destination countries. They do represent, however, an interesting alternative to those data sources.

In practice, we use a special migration module added to the fifth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey for 2005–2006 (GLSS-5) to estimate the extent of international migration from Ghana by education level. The special migration module in that survey collected detailed information on all migrants’ socioeconomic characteristics, including the education they obtained in Ghana prior to their departure. According to Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009), given that it has the third highest rate in the world of high-skilled migration as a proportion of the national high-skilled labour force, including in crucial fields such as healthcare professionals, Ghana is an interesting country to study to learn about the potential losses from international migration in terms of public education spending. This is especially the case now, given the substantial improvements in education attainment, as well as pressures on the education budget (for Ghana’s education system and policies, see World Bank, 2010).

It is important to emphasize that the use of the measure proposed in this article (which is detailed in the box entitled “Methodology”) does not imply that we believe that all international migration necessarily represents a loss for the country of origin. We are well aware of the concept of brain circulation and of the potential gains from migration through the diaspora, or, more generally, of the positive externalities that international migration may provide. We are also well aware of the fact that in Ghana, as in many other African countries, it is not necessarily easy for graduates to find employment in their country that makes proper use of their qualifications, and this should be taken into account when assessing the pros and cons for a country of international skilled migration. At the same time, however, we believe that the simple measure proposed here has some merit as a descriptive statistic of what could be referred to as an upper bound of the losses in a country’s education investment that international migration might entail for a developing country.

### Methodology

We define \( I_{ij} \) as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the individual \( i \) has level of education \( j \) (e.g., primary, junior secondary, senior secondary or tertiary, with all the levels of education attended by the individual yielding a value of 1 for the indicator) and \( n_{ji} \) as the number of years taken by individual \( i \) to complete education level \( j \). If the unit cost of one year of education at level \( j \) is \( c_j \) (for simplicity, these unit costs are estimated at the time of the survey) then the total investment made by the country in the education of individual \( i \), denoted by \( C_i \), is estimated as follows:

\[
C_i = \sum_j c_j I_{ji} n_{ji} \tag{1}
\]
If \( N \) denotes the total number of individuals in the country between 25 and 60 years of age (a few international migrants leave before they reach their 25th birthday; after the age of 60, migrants are both less likely to migrate and less likely to continue to work full time); \( D_i \) is a variable taking a value of 1 for an individual who has not migrated (hence, has stayed “domestic”) and zero otherwise; and \( M_i \) is a variable taking a value of 1 if the individual has migrated abroad and zero otherwise, the potential loss in public education investment as a share of total education spending is estimated as follows:

\[
BD = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i M_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i (M_i + D_i)}
\]

(2)

Results

Table 1 provides information on the highest level of education completed by international migrants before they migrated. We compute for the cumulative investment in education received by each migrant by summing over the educational cost of each level of education the person has obtained. Out of the population of individuals between the ages of 25 and 60 at the time of the survey (7.7 million individuals), 381,709 individuals, or 4.96 per cent, were international migrants according to the data. However, as expected, the rate of migration is higher among individuals who are better educated. According to the survey, between 10 per cent and 13 per cent of those with a secondary or post-secondary education had migrated internationally. Note that among those with at least some education, a vast majority of international migrants (319,529 persons out of 345,252 individuals with at least some education) had completed their education in Ghana; for those who did not complete all of their prior education in Ghana, we do not know which part of their education was completed in the country and which part was completed abroad, so that for simplicity we assume that all their education was completed in Ghana.

When estimating the amount of investment in education for each individual, we do not take into account grade repetition, so our estimate of the investment may be lower than the true investment made. In addition, we consider only the direct cost of education, that is, public unit costs, which do not take into account the out-of-pocket costs for households or opportunity costs. On both of these counts, however, because we express estimates of the potential losses in education investments in percentages, the bias (in percentage terms) may not be large. In addition, due to data limitations, we consider the public unit cost of schooling by level of education for the estimations, with this cost applied to all students, regardless of whether they went to a public or private school. This may contribute to reducing the estimate of the share of the investment in education potentially lost due to international migration to the extent that international migrants are more likely to have attended (more expensive) private schools.

As Table 1 shows, the total investment in education made in individuals who have migrated internationally comes up to 4,312 billion Ghana cedis (this was before the shift to the new cedi [GHS] in 2007). When compared to the estimate of the investment in education for the total population, that is, including international migrants, the figures suggest that 8.07 per cent of the country’s total investment in education could be lost to international migration. Some of this investment may be recouped if migrants return to Ghana, but evidence from the survey is that the number of return migrants is fairly small. As mentioned previously, this estimate, however, does not account for potential benefits to the country from the diaspora.
Table 1: Estimates of total education investment in Ghanaian international migrants, 2006*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Total number of migrants</th>
<th>Cumulative number of migrants (inversed)</th>
<th>Standard number of years of education per cycle</th>
<th>Unit cost</th>
<th>Total estimated education investment (in billions of GHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>17,588</td>
<td>339,199</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>698,077</td>
<td>1420.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior secondary school (JSS)</td>
<td>162,818</td>
<td>321,611</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,043,523</td>
<td>1006.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and vocational education and training (TVET)</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,935,256</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Level</td>
<td>50,208</td>
<td>50,208</td>
<td>3 years of JSS</td>
<td>1,043,523</td>
<td>157.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior secondary school (SSS)</td>
<td>34,943</td>
<td>34,943</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,612,625</td>
<td>273.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Level</td>
<td>17,463</td>
<td>17,463</td>
<td>3 years of JSS</td>
<td>1,043,523 and</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+2 years of SSS</td>
<td>2,612,625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ training college</td>
<td>12,797</td>
<td>12,797</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,552,318</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical professional (TVET)</td>
<td>11,987</td>
<td>11,987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,935,256</td>
<td>1045.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>25,084</td>
<td>25,084</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,421,595</td>
<td>4312.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in the education of migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated total investment in education (for the whole population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in migrants as a share of the total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53429.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The figures are authors’ estimates using data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005–2006 (GLSS-5).

Conclusion

This article has suggested a very simple method, inspired by traditional benefit incidence analysis, for estimating the potential losses in a country’s education investment due to international migration. The estimated loss for Ghana, a country with one of the highest rates of skilled migration in the world, is 8.07 per cent of the total education investment made in the population aged 24 to 60. This share is substantial. A number of assumptions have been made to explain this figure, including the survey’s lack of distinction between students who attended public schools and those who attended private schools, which may lead to an underestimation of the losses (the costs for private schools tend to be higher than for public schools, and the likelihood of international migration is probably higher among those who attended private schools).

Further research in this area could factor in that distinction between public and private schools in order to refine the estimates. It would also be interesting to consider other expenditures incurred by parents to send their children to school (the out-of-pocket schooling costs and opportunity costs, both of which are not included here). This will not only increase the total value of the loss further, but also perhaps the estimate of the share of the total investment in education of a country potentially lost due to international migration (to the extent that international migrants tend to come from households that are better educated and thus can afford higher out of pocket and opportunity costs for the education of their children).

Finally, in much the same way that the review of brain drain literature was expanded to take brain circulation into account, the estimates provided here may be revised with data on return migrants or positive externalities from an educated and successful diaspora, which would then reduce the estimate of the potential losses in a country’s education investment due to international migration. As a method to come up with an initial estimate of the magnitude of the potential loss in education investment due to international migration, the approach suggested here is hopefully informative.

References


Migration policy development in the Republic of Korea: Progress qualified


June Lee

The Republic of Korea (“South Korea” hereafter) has become one of the favoured destinations of (mainly Asian) migrants over the years. Compared to other OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, however, it still has a small foreigner population, with even fewer permanent residents. Today South Korea remains over 97 per cent ethnic Korean and is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world.

Figures for South Korea are alarming in regard to low fertility and rapid ageing; Korea has perhaps the lowest fertility rate among OECD countries, and possibly the most rapidly ageing population as well. The average age of a Korean today is about 38, and the US counterpart is approximately 37. Average ages are anticipated to be in the mid-50s in Korea and about 38 in the United States of America in 2050. If current trends persist, it is possible that in a worst-case scenario, the South Korean population will decrease by thirty per cent from the over-50-million population in 2012 to about 35 million in 2060.

Anticipating the dramatic demographic challenges over the next several decades, the Government of South Korea started paying more attention to its immigration policy, as it could be one policy option out of many that may help achieve more advantageous population characteristics. This is a clear shift from immigration policy being understood as mainly a security concern and narrowly defined as border control, to it being viewed as a socioeconomic policy matter, with integration as an important new component.

In 2007 South Korea enacted the Act on the Treatment of the Foreigners in Korea and established its First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2008–2012). Four major policy goals were set to enhance national competitiveness and social integration, and to establish systemic immigration administration and human rights advocacy for foreigners. A detailed action plan was established to achieve such policy goals with over a hundred concrete programmes. The most notable of the achievements might well be the legislation of the Refugee Act, which is a first among Asian nations.

The South Korean Government confirmed its Second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2013–17) through the Immigration Policy Commission of the Prime Minister’s Office, which is the highest policymaking body within the South Korean Government. The way the Second Basic Plan was developed was a marked improvement from the first. The IOM Migration Research and Training Centre was commissioned to evaluate the First Basic Plan’s achievements. Several rounds of consultations with government stakeholders and migration experts, as well as a public hearing, were then held.

It is notable that concrete programmes included in the Second Basic Plan reflect repeated calls for a whole-of-government approach and for a reduction of overlapping programmes among ministries which deal with migrants’ issues. Even though this is not unique to South Korea, government coordination on migration matters among ministries has nevertheless been identified as one of the most detrimental challenges to progress in migration management. For example, 14 ministries and four agency-level government entities participate in the Immigration Policy Commission. Through consultations, programmes which required interministerial collaboration were developed and included in the Plan. The Justice Ministry, as the focal point for the Immigration Policy Commission, was in charge of Second Basic Plan’s drafting and will be collaborating with the Ministry of Employment and Labor on labour migration; with the Ministry of Gender

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2 As of December 2012, the population of the Republic of Korea was 50,948,272, with 1,445,103 resident foreigners (2.8% of the total population). The number of foreigners with permanent residency status totals 84,140 and consists mostly of spouses and children of South Korean nationals, with only a modicum of highly skilled or investment immigrants.
3 Article 5 (“Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, hereafter referred to as “the Basic Plan”) of the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea states that the Ministry of Justice shall establish a basic plan for policy on foreigners every five years in consultation with the head of the relevant national-level organizations.
4 Participating South Korean Government entities were: the Prime Minister’s Office (convener); Ministry of Strategy and Finance; Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning; Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Security and Public Administration; Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism; Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery; Ministry of Knowledge Economy; Ministry of Health and Welfare; Ministry of Employment and Labor; Ministry of Gender Equality and Family; Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs; Ministry of Oceans and Fishers; Korea Communications Commission; National Police Agency; Small and Medium Business Administration; and the Korea Coast Guard.
Equality and Family, on marriage migrants’ integration issues; with the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, on most migrants’ integration issues through its local government network; and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on issues pertaining to overseas (ethnic) Koreans.

Over the years, different ministries have led the development and implementation of the migration-related policies and programmes mentioned above. At the national policy level, this coordination challenge has been manifested with South Korean migration policies not being sufficiently articulated into achieving South Korea’s overall population goals, that is, a population with the size and sufficient labour force equipped with the types of skills needed to maintain or improve South Korea’s global economic standing.

In short, demographic changes in South Korea are certainly influencing the country’s migration policies. However, whether or not its migration policies are affecting its basic demographic situation remains to be seen.

In addition to the collaborative programmes listed in the Second Basic Plan, further strategic links (as well as better articulation of such links in a national plan) are needed between immigration policy and broad human resource or population policy, inclusive of migrant workers, students, and even women and older, ageing populations.

Specifically, an important first step should be to establish a clear path from temporary to permanent status, and then to naturalization, for migrants and migrant workers that South Korea wishes to attract and retain. Immigrants such as students and skilled migrants, for instance, can be provided with easy access to permanent residency. The nationality system can also be clearly designed to attract and retain the permanent immigrant groups, including highly skilled ones. Strengthened integration programmes should furthermore target more diverse groups and include migrant workers in this path.

Each of the five policy objectives of the Second Basic Plan has four or five sub-objectives with two or three detailed action plans. Each action plan will be the basis for the 14 government ministries’ and 4 agencies’ immigration programming. The five policy objectives of the Second Basic Plan are listed below, followed by descriptions of the main programmes that indicate how they lead to action plans for the different parts of the Government:

1. Support economic vitalization and attract global talents;
2. Integrate immigrants and pursue common Korean values;
3. Prevent discrimination and foster greater appreciation of cultural diversity;
4. Foster a safe and orderly society for nationals and non-nationals; and
5. Prosper with countries of origin through international cooperation.

Under Policy Objective No. 1 (Support economic vitalization and attract global talents), South Korea will upgrade its visa system in order to facilitate the entry of various types of tourists (especially medical tourists), students and investors. To increase tourism, an automatic entry–exit system using fingerprints and facial recognition technologies will be adopted and a visa-free transit tour will also be offered for certain neighbouring countries. Limited electronic visas can be directly issued to highly skilled migrants in coordination with the Korea Trade Associations’ foreign branch offices, while the Global Korea Scholarship will be expanded. One notable programme under this objective will focus on improving low-skilled migrant human resources, easing some migrant workers’ visa status changes, and further collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Employment and Labor on cost–benefit analyses of foreign labour.

Per the Policy Objective No. 2 (Integrate immigrants and pursue common Korean values) programmes will be developed emphasizing the self-sufficiency and responsibilities of immigrants. In an effort to balance the openness toward more immigration (characteristic of the First Basic Plan) and the need for social coherence, the South Korean Government decided, for example, to strengthen the requirements for acquiring citizenship. Naturalization now has to be preceded by permanent residency. In addition, the existing social integration programme is to be expanded and diversified for various migrant groups such as migrant workers, students, ethnic Koreans and refugees. The plan also includes capacity-building programme for marriage migrants to support their successful integration through employment. Increasing the number of children with a migration background, such as children with dual mother tongues, will also be accommodated through various education support programmes.

Policy Objective No. 3 (Prevent discrimination and foster greater appreciation of cultural diversity) includes establishing an anti-discrimination law while promoting cultural diversity. The safeguarding of rights for migrants such women, children and those in detention, as well as humanitarian cases, received particular attention.

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5 Migration alone cannot solve the problems created by a demographic transition such as population ageing. Various measures addressing such issues are now actively being considered and debated, with some developed for implementation, such as delaying the retirement age, a salary peak scheme, among others.
under this Basic Plan. Promoting cultural diversity is a new element targeting Korean nationals. The relevant programme includes applicable legislation, educational programmes and media guidelines.

**Policy Objective No. 4** (Foster safe and orderly society for nationals and non-nationals) intends to strengthen the regulatory aspect of migration management. Border security and information systems on foreign residents will be strengthened, while crackdowns on overstay and illegal employment will become more structured and professionalized. Stronger emphasis on migration regulation reflect the changes among public perception based on increased criminality among non-Koreans, as well as the Korean Government’s emphasis on the rule of law.

The **Policy Objective No. 5** (Co-prosper with countries of origin through international cooperation) is the new element in the Second Basic Plan. It is clearly an effort to further enlarge the scope of work under Korean immigration policy and the recognition of the international relations aspect of immigration policy. The three major sub-objectives and pertinent tasks are:

*a.* **Strengthen cooperation with countries of origin and various international organizations.** This is to be achieved by linking official development assistance (ODA) with the migrant workforce — using ODA-funded training centres in the origin countries; by participating actively in international channels, such as those organized by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Asia–Europe Meeting, PACRIM, the Bali Process, and the UN Global Forum; and by providing education and training opportunities for origin country government officials and students.

*b.* **Pursue respectable refugee policies.** This is to be achieved by establishing a concrete plan for refugee resettlement and safeguarding the procedural rights of the asylum seekers during the refugee claim.

*c.* **Strengthen the exchange and cooperation with Korean diaspora communities.** This is to be achieved by making efforts to increase F-4 visa holders among South Korean diaspora communities in China and in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States; supporting Korean adoptee groups and their parents through various exchange programmes; and establishing a Koreans Abroad Human Resource Database.

South Korea’s newly launched Second Basic Plan is a response to demographic change, specifically, the anticipated reduction in the labour force after 2016. The current composition of foreign labour, mainly consisting of low-skilled and temporary migrant workers, has clear limitation and will not improve South Korea’s population outlook in the future. Further steps need to be taken to build a sufficient work force to ensure the country’s continued growth. This will be achieved, in part, through migration, and this permanent population of migrants can make a positive contribution to South Korea’s sustained growth.

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6 The overall population of the Republic of Korea was over 50 million as of June 2012. The labour force will peak at 37,040,000 in 2016 (72.9% of the total population) and is expected to decline afterwards. By 2040 the labour force is forecasted as 28,870,000 (or 80% of the 2016 labour force).
Migration and its impact on those staying behind: New evidence from Georgia and the Republic of Moldova

Michaella Vanore and Melissa Siegel

In many countries with rapidly increasing rates of female emigration, families left behind by migrants are increasingly identified and targeted by policy initiatives that intend to address the perceived vulnerabilities that migration introduces. Much policy has arisen following concerns that the emigration of women, who are often the primary caregivers of children and the elderly in the household, will leave those left behind devoid of care and protection. While the concerns raised in policy may indeed be merited, policy in this area tends to be based on limited empirical evidence that cannot appropriately guide the design and targeting of policy.

In the Republic of Moldova, for instance, most past research on the effects of migration on those left behind was small in scale and qualitative in nature (Gavriliuc, Platon and Afteni, 2006; UNICEF/CRIC, 2008), with some studies focusing on children in extraordinary situations of vulnerability (HAI, 2008) that are not representative of the general circumstances that families left behind experience. While such studies provide valuable insights into potential problems that may be faced by children and the elderly left behind, they neither document the scope of such problems nor provide any sense of how unique these problems are to families of migrants.

This, in turn, leaves policymakers with very little evidence on which to base the design of appropriately encompassing policies. These studies highlight the need to holistically assess how migration can affect the well-being of those left behind through the addition or subtraction of different types of monetary and non-monetary resources, a gap which the recently concluded research initiative, The Effects of Migration on Children and the Elderly Left Behind in Moldova and Georgia, sought to close.

Coordinated by Maastricht University and funded by the European Commission, the research initiative explicitly assessed the consequences of migration for two of the most vulnerable subsets of the population: (a) children under the age of 18 and (b) elderly individuals above the age of 60. Two contrasting case studies (Republic of Moldova and Georgia) were chosen for the exploration of the “left behind” phenomenon. While on the surface the countries share many commonalities – a shared Soviet history, similar experiences with the post-Soviet “triple transition” (Offe, 1991), and large-scale emigration – their unique emigration profiles and contrasting State-level responses to migration have shaped very different post-migration realities for those left behind. Both States are among the top emigration countries in the world: as of 2010 it was estimated that the emigrant stock represented 25.1 per cent of the total population of Georgia and 21.5 per cent of the total population of the Republic of Moldova.

As the sizes of these emigrant stocks suggest, the remittances received by either State are significant, accounting for over 23 per cent of the Republic of Moldova’s and 6.4 per cent of Georgia’s GDP in 2009, respectively (Ratha et al., 2010). Despite the significant scale of emigration and its tangible manifestation in the form of remittances, Georgia has, until very recently, expressed only limited recognition of the scope and scale of the phenomenon. In general, State statistics on migration are limited and outdated, and there is very little discussion of those left behind.

In contrast to Georgia, the Republic of Moldova actively incorporated issues of migration and the maintenance of “the left-behind” in many of the key strategic planning documents it introduced in the last decade, such as the National Action Plan for the Protection of Children without Parental Care (2010–2011) and the National Strategy in the Migration and Asylum Domain (2011–2020). Both of these plans address migration management and the strengthening of legal migration mechanisms towards the end of supporting circularity among current migrants, encouraging education among current and potential migrants and their families, and enhancing the capacities of public service providers (such as teachers, police officers and psychologists) who work with those left behind (MPC, 2013).

The Republic of Moldova’s policy initiatives signal a growing interest in shaping the migration process and its outcomes; however, the effectiveness and efficiency of such policy interventions may be dampened by an incomplete understanding of the way families cope with migration. Much public discourse reveals deep-seated discomfort with migration and skepticism about its potential positive consequences, particularly when it

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comes to children. A particularly illustrative example is a photo narrative of children left behind that begins with the words “The first victims of migration are children.” The normatively charged sentiment is not an uncommon one; unfortunately, it is not particularly well informed either.

The migration of a household member seldom lends itself to a simple cost–benefit analysis in which a consequence of absence can be easily categorized as a “positive” or “negative” outcome. This is especially true if no attempt is made to recognize the inherently multidimensional nature of well-being, which makes it impossible to monitor the many avenues through which migration has the potential to affect well-being outcomes.

The project The Effects of Migration on Children and the Elderly Left Behind was explicitly designed to provide the evidence necessary to craft well-informed policy for the left-behind by monitoring the multiple domains of an individual’s life that may be impacted by the migration of a household or family member.

The first step in this process is collecting appropriately detailed data. Within this project a nationally representative household survey was implemented in both the Republic of Moldova and Georgia that collected information on the demographic profiles of household members, households’ material living conditions, migration histories of all household members, and specific information on the daily lives of children and elderly individuals within the households. In each country, the survey sampled households with members currently living abroad and those without, to ensure that a counterfactual group existed for comparison with the migration-affected population.

The surveys were implemented across all regions in both countries, with the exception of the breakaway territory of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova and the de facto independent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. In the Republic of Moldova, data was collected from over 3,500 households, containing a total of 12,250 individuals; over 30 per cent of these households had a current or return migrant. In Georgia over 4,000 households containing 16,200 individuals altogether were surveyed, with 51 per cent of the households having a current or return migrant member.

The detailed household survey data provides a rich chronicle of the daily lives of individuals in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia which has been used to assess the relationship between migration and well-being. The collection of data from individuals in households with different migration experiences enabled a clear comparison of the outcomes of different groups, facilitating the identification of systematic variance between groups that can be attributed to migration. Analysis of the survey data has taken several forms, the most important of which are a series of multidimensional well-being indices that enable children and the elderly affected by migration to be compared to members of their cohorts without migration experiences. The methodology varies by country and by sample group, but all forms of analysis involve the construction of a well-being index composed of “domains” or dimensions disaggregated into indicators that signal a specific vulnerability or achievement. An example of indices and their components can be seen in Table 1, which presents the well-being indices that were developed to compare the left-behind of the two study countries.

The choice to measure and compare well-being in a multidimensional way arises from the recognition that migration bears consequences for many aspects of an individual’s life. Some of these consequences are more immediate and measureable than others. Household income or expenditure, for instance, are classic areas in which migration – through the receipt of remittances – can introduce systematic differences among households within a relatively short time. The emotional health of those left behind, however, is a very different kind of “consequence” to measure. Many studies on the emotional well-being of the left-behind rely on the reported perceptions, feelings of emotional distress and loneliness that most family members of migrants experience.

This experience of emotional disruption, however, is not in and of itself a problem if it does not translate into disruptive outcomes measured against an objective standard or threshold (such as the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire in this case). Using clear indicators of well-being in different domains that are connected to clear thresholds for wellness/deprivation, the project has revealed a picture of the relationship between migration and the well-being of the left-behind that is not as dire as past studies predicted.

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1 The photo narrative may be viewed at www.demotix.com/news/1137423/left-behind-moldova#media-1137229.
Table 1: Comparative Well-Being Indices, Republic of Moldova and Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Comparison Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHILDREN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Child attends school at an appropriate grade.</td>
<td>Children in households with a current migrant (compared to children in households without a migrant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical health</td>
<td>Child has received all vaccinations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional well-being</td>
<td>Child attains normal scores on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material well-being</td>
<td>Child is living in a non-poorest household.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Child lives in a household with a cell phone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Child is not physically abused.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELDERLY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical health and independence</td>
<td>Individual has retained essential mobility functions.</td>
<td>Elderly individuals with adult children living abroad (compared to elderly individuals with children living in the same country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional well-being</td>
<td>Individual is satisfied with current life.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material well-being</td>
<td>Individual is living in a non-poorest household.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social well-being</td>
<td>Individual has regular contact with family or friends.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While results of these comparisons differ by analytical method and indicator mix, the results for all comparisons find that having a migrant household member does not guarantee universally worse outcomes among the left-behind. Migration plays a nuanced and specific role in the lives of the left-behind that varies with the characteristics of the household, characteristics of the migrant, and characteristics of the individual left behind. For instance, when comparisons are made among individuals in different household types, it becomes clear that children in the Republic of Moldova living in households with a return migrant meaningfully outperform members of their age cohorts from other household types in several dimensions of well-being (Gassmann et al., 2013). Children in households with a return migrant are predicted to be more likely to attain well-being in the dimensions of material and emotional well-being by nine percentage points, as compared to children in households. In contrast to the strong statistical effect associated with a household member being a return migrant, a household member being a current migrant did not bear any statistical significance for the prediction of well-being outcomes.

The analysis finds that other factors or characteristics of a child’s life are much stronger predictors of (multidimensional) well-being: having more children living in the same household corresponds to lower probabilities of a child being considered multidimensionally well. Similarly, living in a poor household (i.e. a household with expenditures below 60 per cent of the sample median) decreases the probability that a child will be considered multidimensionally well by between 16 and 20 percentage points, while the likelihood of being considered multidimensionally well increases with the highest level of educational achievement in the household. With the addition of these covariates, whether or not a household currently has a migrant loses much significance, indicating that it is a relatively weak predictor of a child’s well-being compared to other aspects of a child’s daily context (Gassmann et al., 2013).

The analyses conducted among the elderly provide another poignant example of the need to understand the role of migration within a very refined context. For the elderly in both countries, having a migrant adult child plays a significant role in influencing well-being outcomes. Elderly individuals in both the Republic of Moldova and Georgia who have children living abroad are much more likely to be considered well in the dimension of physical health, which include indicators of mobility and functional independence. At the same time, they are less likely to do well in the domains of social contact and material well-being.

Migration is not the only significant factor that influences well-being outcomes, however. Individuals in the oldest age cohort (those ages 70 and older) are much less likely to attain well-being, while elderly individuals living in more complex households containing other adults and children are more likely to attain well-being (see Gassmann, Siegel, Vanore and Waidler, 2012 for the Republic of Moldova; see Siegel et al., forthcoming).
for Georgia). These well-being outcomes likely reflect underlying mechanisms by which individuals self-select into migration: individuals with physically and emotionally unwell parents or parents who have no other sources of support may be less likely to enter migration, while individuals in need of greater material resources are more likely to enter migration. Without the ability to disentangle the directionality of effects, inferring causality is impossible. That said, it is clear that migration can represent a challenge to the ability of particular members of the elderly population to attain well-being – namely, those already in situations of vulnerability given older age and limited informal support networks.

The insights from the study The Effects of Migration on Children and the Elderly Left are useful in informing more responsive and holistic policy responses to the “left behind” phenomenon in two ways that mutually reinforce each other. The first insight is that the left-behind are not one homogenous population with identical needs and vulnerabilities. The second is that the identification of the risk factors that enhance the vulnerabilities of particular populations can increase the targeting efficiency and eventual effectiveness of policy interventions.

The left-behind are an incredibly diverse population: as migration becomes a cheaper and more accessible strategy that households employ to enhance their livelihood opportunities, households with different socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are caught up in the migration phenomenon. This implies less commonality among the left-behind and, thus, more opportunities for the misidentification of the vulnerabilities of this population. While members of this group may be unified by the absence of a household or family member through migration, there are many other (and arguably more important) components of an individual’s life that translate different resources (or the lack thereof) into well-being (or vulnerability). The results of the analysis revealed, for instance, that for children, age, the number of other children in the household, and the household’s expenditure level significantly influence well-being (Gassmann et al., 2013; Waidler et al., forthcoming).

This suggests that certain risk factors enhance the vulnerabilities faced by children left behind; however, they are not necessarily unique to those individuals in migrant households: higher dependency ratios (the number of non-economically active household members to economically active members) are strongly associated with a household’s poverty risk, regardless of whether that household has a migrant or not. The same lesson emerges from the analysis of the elderly population. An individual’s age and the composition of the household in which he/she lives are both significant factors in predicting well-being. The enhanced vulnerability experienced by the oldest members of the elderly population—particularly those who do not co-reside with younger adults or children—represents a significant cross-section of the population that may require targeted policy interventions to ensure at least minimal levels of well-being.

In recognizing that the left-behind population is heterogeneous, with unique needs and constraints, policy has an enhanced capacity to target those individuals most at risk of falling below acceptable standards of well-being. People, as such, are neither automatically more vulnerable simply because they have been “left behind,” nor do they necessarily experience enhanced vulnerabilities across all domains of well-being. Rather than designing all-encompassing policies that address the entire population of children left behind without identifying the different risks that subsets of that population face, they could better target specific aspects of well-being through pre-identified risk factors. For example, young children in large households with high dependency ratios are at particular risk of facing material poverty; targeting these households would likely serve as a more efficient strategy for reducing existing protection gaps. Similarly, it is clear that older individuals living independently or in single-generation households are more likely to face material poverty and limited social well-being. This signals a need to enhance existing social protection mechanisms for the elderly, to reduce their reliance on informal forms of support mobilized along kinship and social network lines.
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In 2013, a second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) will be held, presenting the international community with a critical opportunity to focus its attention on how to make migration work for development and poverty reduction. The HLD takes place at an important time, as the international community is seeking to formulate a new agenda for global development as we approach the target year of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015.

The World Migration Report 2013 contributes to the global debate on migration and development in three ways: First, the focus of the report is on the migrant, and on how migration affects a person’s well-being. Many reports on migration and development focus on the impact of remittances: the money that migrants send back home. This report takes a different approach, exploring how migration affects a person’s quality of life and their human development across a broad range of dimensions. Second, the report draws upon the findings of a unique source of data – the Gallup World Poll surveys, conducted in more than 150 countries, to assess the well-being of migrants worldwide for the first time. Third, the report sheds new light on how migrants rate their lives, whether they live in a high-income country in the North, or a low or middle-income country in the South. Traditionally the focus has been on those migrating from lower income countries to more affluent ones; this report considers movements in all four migration pathways and their implications for development i.e. migration from the South to North, between countries of the South or between countries of the North, as well as movements from the North to the South.

The first three chapters of the World Migration Report 2013 provide an introduction to the chosen theme ‘Migrant Well-being and Development’, present the current global migration situation across four migration pathways and review existing research on the emerging field of happiness and subjective well-being.

Chapter four presents original findings on migrant well-being from the Gallup World Poll, looking at outcomes on six core dimensions of well-being across the four migration pathways.

The final part draws conclusions and makes recommendations for future initiatives to monitor migrant well-being and the impact of migration on development, with reference to the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 global development framework.
More than 2 million Southerners have returned to South Sudan since 2005, following the end of the North–South civil war. Building on research conducted in South Sudan, as well as Egypt and northern Uganda, Ensor examines the process of reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons returning to South Sudan since the signing of the 2005 Peace Agreement. The study focuses on the role played by displaced youth as they find themselves differentially situated vis-à-vis the various determinants of sustainable return and reintegration. The research finds that intergenerational tensions are a result of many displaced youths’ aspirations to a “modern” – often meaning “urban” – way of life perceived as incompatible with traditional livelihoods and social relations. In turn, these dynamics are impacting the way in which access to material assets, education, employment opportunities, political participation and other key resources is negotiated among displaced groups and those who stayed behind. The study also finds evidence of significant gender differences.

As the pressures of responding to the complex needs of the vast numbers of returning individuals continue to mount, reintegration remains a loosely defined concept among government officials and external assistance agencies and, furthermore, understandings of what constitutes “sustainable return” differ markedly among the various stakeholders. Intergenerational differences regarding reintegration needs and aspirations, and even the very desirability of return, are rarely considered. This report shares primary research findings that may support return and reintegration programming so as to better respond to the age- and gender-differentiated needs and aspirations of diverse migrant groups in South Sudan.

This publication has been prepared by the UN system organizations and related international entities as input to the second UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development on 3 and 4 October 2013. The individual chapters illustrate the work undertaken by the various contributors in support of migrants, their families, and societies touched by migration. The agency chapters draw the attention of policymakers and practitioners to tools, guides and good practices in the area of international migration and development.

The book also offers some unique insights into the growing coherence of action among these key international players in the migration field. The collaboration among the agencies represented in this book reflects ongoing efforts to advance global understanding and inter-agency cooperation on migration. The book thus helps to fill a gap in knowledge about the “international system” around migration.

This is a publication of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, coordinated by UNFPA and IOM, in collaboration with the Global Migration Group and other members of the Chief Executives Board, as well as the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the NGO Committee on Migration. The book includes a preface by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
Migration Initiatives 2014: Health of Migrants
2013/288 pages
English
Available for PDF download and e-Book format

The Migration Initiatives 2014 provides a summary of IOM’s regional strategies and an overview of IOM’s current and intended responses to the wide range of evolving global, regional and national migration needs and pressures.

Migration and the United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda
2013/144 pages
English
USD 20.00

Migration and the United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda gathers together recent research findings outlining the links between migration and development and proposing how migration can best be factored into the future development framework, offering a timely contribution to the argument for migration’s inclusion in the coming development agenda.

Global Migration Issues, Vol. 2 - People on the Move in a Changing Climate (The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration)
2013/253 pages
ISBN 978-94-007-6984-7
English
Available in hardcopy and e-Book format
To order, click here

Policymakers around the world are increasingly concerned about the likely impact of climate change and environmental degradation on the movement of people. This book takes a hard look at the existing evidence available to policymakers in different regions of the world. How much do we really know about the impact of environmental change on migration? How will different regions of the world be affected in the future? Is there evidence to show that migration can help countries adapt to environmental change? What types of research have been conducted, how reliable is the evidence? These are some of the questions considered in this book, which presents, for the first time, a synthesis of relevant research findings for each major region of the world.

Written by regional experts, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the key findings of existing studies on the linkages between environmental change and the movement of people. More and more reports on migration and the environment are being published, but the information is often scattered between countries and within regions, and it is not always clear how much of this information is based on solid research. This book brings this evidence together for the first time, highlighting innovative studies and research gaps. In doing this, the book seeks to help decision-makers draw lessons from existing studies and to identify priorities for further research.