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Ayokunu Adedokun

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Ayokunu Adedokun, Ph.D.*

Maastricht University Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) & UNU-MERIT,
Netherlands.

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Abstract

How and why do some civil wars end in a peace that endures while other civil wars re-ignite? The existing literature comes to contradictory and puzzling conclusions. For example, while some scholars and development practitioners argue that differences in post-conflict peace-building outcomes were to be explained by the intervention of the international community, other scholars focus on how a civil war ends —whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement. By contrast, more recent studies find that states' attributes such as the level of economic development; pre-war level of democracy; the degree of ethnic fractionalisation; and state dependence on oil exports influence the outcomes of post-conflict peacebuilding. Although these explanations focus on different aspects and use different explanatory variables to explain the variation in post-conflict peacebuilding, they are complementary and overlapping in many important ways. This paper presents an in-depth review of a wide body of theoretical and empirical research on post-conflict peacebuilding. The review covers three stands of literature on peace and conflict research which include: (1) those that focus on the root causes of the initial conflict, (2) those that focus on how the original war was fought, and finally, (3) those that focus on post-conflict peacebuilding. The insights from this literature reveals that while existing studies on the transition from civil war to peace have yielded considerable insights, there are a number of weaknesses and gaps. Some policy conclusions are drawn and directions for future research are suggested.

Key words: Civil war. Peacebuilding. Post-conflict relapse. International community.

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* E-mail addresses: a.adedokun@maastrichtuniversity.nl

1. Introduction: The Puzzle of Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Building a lasting peace in the aftermath of a civil war is one of the biggest development challenges of our time. By most accounts, more than 50 per cent of countries emerging from civil war revert to violent conflict after a brief period of peace[2]. A recent article by Barbara Walter (2014) indicates the surge in post-conflict relapse to be even greater. The article shows that 90 per cent of conflicts initiated since the 2000s were in countries that had already had a civil war, compared to 67 per cent in the 1990s, 62 per cent in the 1980s and 57 per cent in the 1970s[3]. This means that countries mired in war tend to find themselves in a situation known as the 'conflict trap'. That is, societies that have experienced one civil war are more likely to experience a second or third war than are societies with no prior history of war (Collier *et al.*, 2003; Walter, 2004; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Call, 2008; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2008; Hegre *et al.*, 2011).

Yet, despite the 'virus' of post-conflict relapse, a systematic analysis of the literature and empirical evidence show that there is a remarkable variation in the fates of states following civil war. While some became "trapped" in an intractable cycle of war and lawlessness, others have managed to sustain peace and even experience democratic consolidation after the end of conflicts[4]. What explains this variation? In other words, how and why do some civil wars end in a peace that endures while other civil wars reignite?

For almost half a century, scholars, policymakers as well as journalists have attempted to unpack the puzzle of why post-conflict peace 'sticks' in some countries but not in others, relying on statistical as well as qualitative methods. These efforts, however, have not produced a satisfactory and conclusive answer. For example, while some studies relate the sustainability of the peace after civil war to the outcome of the war, that is, whether it ended in a negotiated settlement or a decisive military victory by one side or the other (see Luttwak, 1999; Quinn *et al.*, 2007; Gurses and Mason, 20008; Cockayne,

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[2] Note that across cases, there was no consistent pattern in the timing of post-conflict relapse. Some countries experienced renewed civil war as soon as two years after one war ended, as was the case in Iran, three years as was the case in Angola, 10 years as was the case in Haiti and as long as 33 years later, as was the case in Iraq (Collier and Sambansis, 2002; Walter, 2004; Call, 2012). The average post-conflict time at peace was 10.6 years and the median time was 6 years for conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2009 (see Hegre et. al, 2011). This means that even after a decade of peace a country might still experiences a post-conflict relapse.

[3] Also see World Bank Report (2011).

[4] Examples include Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Macedonia, to name only a few.

Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010; Toft, 2010), other scholars have examined how the sustainability of the post-war peace created by a negotiated settlement is affected by the presence or absence of third party security guarantees (Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2004), United Nations peacekeeping forces (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Collier, 2007; Fortna, 2008) and the degree of power-sharing institutions included in the peace agreement (Mukherjee, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Norris, 2008; Joshi and Mason, 2012).

Meanwhile, more recent studies argue instead that the durability of post-civil war peace is determined by state attributes' such as the level of economic development (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier *et al.,* 2008); pre-war level of democracy (Hartzell *et al.,* 2001; Hegre *et al.,* 2001); the degree of ethnic diversity (Horowitz, 1985; Reynol-Querol, 2002) and state dependence on oil exports (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross, 2004). It is also frequently suggested that - disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants (Annan, Blattman, Mazurana and Carlson, 2011; Berdal and Ucko, 2009), security sector reform (SSR) (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005), good governance (Walter, 2014; Kauffmann *et al.* 2009), transitional justice (Arthur, 2011; Williams, Nagy, and Elster, 2012) and rule of law (Kritz, 2007) are "sure guarantees" to sustainable peace after civil war. However, notwithstanding the immense contributions of existing studies, the "jury is still out on the question and a verdict is yet to be heard."

Perhaps one of the central reasons why our knowledge regarding the processes of transition from war to peace remains not only fragmented and incomplete (Cramer, 2006), but also poorly understood is that the strands of literature on civil war on the one side, and peacebuilding on the other, have largely lost sight of each other. Explanations of civil war, for instance, have frequently focused on variables such as low-level of economic development (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2008; Kreutz 2010), greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), while approaches to peacebuilding seem to favour explanations based on good governance (Walter, 2014), inclusive political settlements (Call, 2012), 'local ownership' (Richmond, 2011; Autessere, 2010; MacGinty, 2008) and 'hybrid political orders' (Adedokun, 2016; MacGinty, 2010; Boege *et.al.,* 2009). However, understanding the transition from war to peace as a multifaceted, and nonlinear process is analytically meaningful and promises to grasp the civil war -to-peacebuilding continuities (Autessere, 2009; CSRC, 2005[5]).

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[5] Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2005), "War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme CSRC Working Paper Series (Vol. 1). London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

A second and related reason why our knowledge regarding the processes of transition from war to peace remains blurred is that a large number of the studies on civil war and peace studies have relied largely on quantitative approaches. That is, the causes of civil war and the conditions for peace tend to be studied and understood at the country level. What is often lost in such studies is information about causal pathways that link outcomes with causes as well as important local patterns and dynamics (Newman and DeRouen, 2014; Sambanis, 2005). Moreover, the findings of quantitative studies are largely sensitive to coding and measurement procedures (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006); they also suffer from endogeneity (Miguel *et al.*, 2004); and they lack clear micro-foundations (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007)[6]. All these limitations inevitably cast doubt on the reliability of existing findings.

My goal in this paper is to provide a critical review of the literature on transition from civil war to peacebuilding, outlining their core arguments, strengths and limitations. Because the literature on civil war and peacebuilding is enormous, I focus on studies that are widely cited and regarded as especially rigorous. For analytical purposes, I organise the diverse explanations on the transition from war to peacebuilding into three broad categories: (1) those that focus on the root causes of the initial conflict (that is, civil war onset), (2) those that focus on the manner in which the original war was fought (that is, civil war recurrence), and finally, (3) those that focus on post-conflict settlement or peacebuilding strategies.

Importantly, the review in this paper is in line with useful recent reviews by scholars such as Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Walter (2004; 2014)[7]. However, Blattman and Miguel focus their review on civil war onset and Walter's reviews target civil war recurrence and post-conflict peacebuilding. This paper brings in a fresh and broader perspective by integrating the literature both on civil war and peace studies. By adopting a broader, unifying approach, this paper departs from, but contributes to, the work of my predecessors.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the root causes of the initial conflict. In section 3, I turn to the literature that focuses on the manner in which the original war was fought. Section 4 discusses the literature that

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[6] See Kalyvas (2008:397)

[7] Also see Sambanis (2002) and Dixon (2009)

focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding. Section 5 provides a summary of the key weaknesses and gaps in the literature. Finally, in section 6, I wrap up the discussions with avenues for future research.

2.1 Inherited Risk Factors Influencing Civil War Onset

A number of studies have identified risk factors that make nations susceptible to civil war onset. Some of these same factors have been associated with post-conflict relapse. The five most commonly discussed factors here are: (i) the degree of ethnic divisions, (ii) the level of economic development, (iii) the structure and distribution of income (i.e. inequality), (iv) the availability of natural resources (i.e. resource curse or abundance), and (v) the type of political regime. I present the main theoretical arguments and empirical results of each of these factors below.

2.1.1 Civil War and Ethnicity[8]

A large number of studies since the 1990s have argued that ethnic based civil wars are more difficult to resolve than others and thus more likely to lead to post-conflict relapse (Sambanis, 2001; Ross, 2000; Kaufman, 2001, 2006; Horowitz, 1985). Here, the central claim is that because ethnicity is a major determinant of a group's security, status, material well-being and access to political power (Ostby, 2013), it is likely to have identifiable characteristics that allow outsiders to be excluded from public goods and a mobilising agent that can lead to political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, 2005; Miguel and Blattman, 2010). Denny and Walter (2014) provide a useful review of three key mechanisms linking ethnicity to civil war: "Rebel movements are more likely to organise around ethnicity because ethnic groups are more apt to be aggrieved, better able to mobilise, and more likely to face difficult bargaining challenges compared to other groups (in Cunningham and Seymour, 2016)".

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[8] Here, "ethnicity" refers to a category of identification that is based on a belief in shared kinship ties. These ties are manifested in shared characteristics such as language, religion, culture, geographic origin, physical attributes, or any combination of these factors (Horowitz, 2000). But while ethnicity may be defined as "a label for social groups who feel a distinct sense of difference by virtue of common culture and descent (Glazer and Moynihan 1975)", it is the belief in shared kinship ties that is important, and not the objective reality of such ties (Anderson 1983). As Max Weber observed, ethnicity is based upon a "subjective belief" in "common descent…whether or not an objective blood relationship exists (Weber 1968)." Thus, collective identities are central to the definition of ethnic groups.

Several other scholars have expressed similar views. Gurr (1994), for example, argues that compared to civil wars motivated by political and economic reasons, ethnic wars are harder to resolve by compromise because identity cannot be changed easily. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) also claim that civil wars are often fought between groups defined by non-economic markers, such as ethnicity or religion. Likewise, Horowitz (1985) writes, "if group members are potential kinsmen, a threat to any member of the group may be seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the family". In a similar vein, Esteban and Ray (2008) emphasise that ethnic alliances have a distinct advantage over class alliances in mobilising for conflict. Moreover, once war breaks out, ethnic identities and hatreds tend to become cemented in ways that make a return to a peaceful co-existence difficult, and these are the wars that are likely to recur over time (Rothchild, 1995).

On the face of it, the evidence seems to suggest that the proportion of civil wars that can be described as ethnic has been rising. For example, there have been series of violent conflicts and three coups d'état in Fiji since 1987, all of which were related to the political imbalance of power between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians. The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan followed a civil war that pitted the Urdu-speaking Muslims of West Pakistan against the Bengalis who comprised the vast majority of the population of East Pakistan. One of the most extreme examples is Rwanda, where it is estimated that the Hutu ethnic group murdered three-quarters of the Tutsi population during the 1994 genocide. In Syria, the conflict between Alawis and Sunnis has spilled over to the neighbouring countries and undermined stability and security in the Middle East (see Human Rights Watch, 1999; Miedema, 2010; Cunningham and Seymour, 2016)

Indeed, of all 240 armed conflicts between 1945 and 2005, there were 122 ethnic ones. Likewise, the number of war-related deaths due to ethnic conflicts increased in the 20th century to over 70 million (Mann, 2005). As Wimmer (2004) succinctly puts it, "the overwhelming majority of civil wars in the post-Cold War era were fought in the name of ethnicity"[9]. But is it true? Does ethnicity inevitably generate violence and post-conflict relapse? The literature on ethnicity and conflict is vast and impossible to comprehensively review here. But there are three main variants of ethnicity-based arguments that have played an important role in explanations for how civil wars begin,

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[9] Also see (Denny and Walter 2014).

persist and recur: *(i) ethnic diversity, (ii) ethnic polarisation,* and; *(iii) ethnic discrimination or exclusion.*

Ethnic Diversity: A first argument holds that ethnicity per se is not conflictive; rather it is ethnic diversity that is responsible for political instability and conflict (Buhaug, 2006; Easterly, 2001), low economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004), high inequality (Milanovic, 2003) and low provision of public goods (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Ethnic diversity as a source of conflict is based on the assumption that the more ethnic groups there are in a society, the higher the probability of a conflict. In other words, increased diversity makes it difficult to create a unified community, due to people having alternative allegiances. There are two prominent schools of thoughts here: (i) perennialist, and; (ii) modernist. While the perennialist emphasises the primordial nature of ethnic differences and suggests that these make political stability difficult to achieve (Huntington, 1996; Moynihan, 1993), modernist theories argue that it is the advent of the modern state that leads to the politicisation of cultural difference and the rise of destabilising ethnic nationalism(s) (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983).

Nevertheless, systematic empirical evidence (as measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index –ELF[10]) does not support these conclusions. On the one hand, some scholars express the views that establishing peace and sustaining stable political institutions in ethnically diverse societies is a difficult task (Horowitz, 1985; Welch, 1993). For example, Almond (1956) finds that the probability of conflict rises with increasing ethnic diversity. Likewise, Powell (1982) publishes statistical analyses that show a negative relationship between ethnic diversity, on the one hand, and governmental stability on the other. Furthermore, Mauro (1995) and Annett (1999) find that linguistic or religious diversity leads to greater political instability, which Annett finds in turn leads to higher government expenditure. Svensson (1998) finds that more foreign aid proceeds are diverted into corruption in more ethnically diverse societies. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that higher ethnic heterogeneity makes participation in social clubs less likely in the US, which is consistent with the idea that there is not much association across groups. Easterly and Levine (1997) also note that compared to

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[10] The index of fractionalisation (ELF) is defined as the probability that two randomly chosen individuals from a given country do not speak the same language or will be from different ethnic groups. At first researchers used data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) but the use of the fractionalisation data by Alesina et al (2003) is more common in recent studies.

other regions of the world, Africa suffers a much higher incidence of civil war because of ethnic diversity.

On the other hand, other scholars have found that, though ethnic diversity seems to be a powerful explanatory variable for low economic growth, it is not significant in the explanation of civil wars and other kinds of violent conflicts. This is because in an ethnically diverse society, a single ethnic group is less likely to dominate all other groups politically or economically since there usually are not enough members of a single group to establish and maintain a monopoly on power. Moreover, elites in diverse or fractionalised societies generally need to draw support from outside their own ethnic groups in order to have a realistic chance of obtaining and retaining power. Thus, elites have inherent incentives to adopt more moderate, non-ethnic positions and strategies. Brown and Boswell (1997) empirically show that nations characterised by a high level of ethnic diversity are less prone to civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) also find that neither ethnic diversity nor religious diversity has any statistically significant effect on the probability of civil wars. Likewise, Hegre and Sambanis (2006)[11] conclude that the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil war onset is not robust[12]. In fact, recent studies have found that ethnic diversity does not create an increased risk of violent conflict. Instead, most multi-ethnic societies are peaceful (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). This negative finding in the relationship between ethnic diversity and the risk of civil war has led scholars to propose a new measure of potential conflict in heterogeneous societies based on the index of ethnic polarisation.

Ethnic polarisation: A second argument claims that the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil wars is non-monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more conflicts in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority (Horowitz, 1985). This line of argument was initially developed by Horowitz (1985) and has been integrated into quantitative civil war models using a measure of *ethnic polarisation index*[13]; it measures the probability that two

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[11] However, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) argue that while ethnic fractionalisation remains mostly insignificant, it is clearly important in explaining a broad category of armed conflict that includes minor-scale insurgency – a result that is underscored in a more recent 'sensitivity analysis'.

[12] Similarly, writing on the duration of large economic declines, Bluhm and Thomsson (2015) find that the adverse effects of ethnic diversity may only be relevant in weakly institutionalised societies where political leaders often abuse ethnic and other divisions in their favour.

[13] Ethnic polarisation index states that countries with a bipolar distribution of ethnic groups (1/2, 0, ... 0, 1/2) have the highest level of conflict.

randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups weighted by the relative size of each group (Reynal- Querol, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a, 2005b, 2010; Esteban and Ray, 2008). The reasoning here is that the higher the degree of polarisation, the greater the risk of civil war.

However, contrary to expectations, empirical evidence fails to establish a clear association between ethnic polarisation and civil wars. On the one hand, Montalvo and Reynal (2005a) find that ethnically polarised societies (that is, those divided between two ethnic groups) have a greater risk of experiencing civil war. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b) further find that an increase in polarisation has a negative but indirect effect on economic growth by increasing the incidence of conflict and consumption and lowering investment.

On the other hand, Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2006) empirically show that the risk of civil war is not substantially higher in ethnically polarised countries. Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) argue that ethnic dominance, defined as a society where the largest ethnic group makes up between 45 and 90 per cent of the population, is more associated with a higher risk of conflict. Meanwhile, other scholars come to the opposite conclusion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Ellingsen (2000), in particular, finds that societies that were divided among a relatively small number of relatively large groups were more likely to experience civil war. The findings of Cederman and Girardin (2007) suggest otherwise. They found that governments controlled by ethnic minorities are more likely to experience civil war, and the smaller the ratio of the dominant ethnic group's size to a challenger group's size, the more likely civil conflict is to arise between those two groups. As single fractionalisation or polarisation indexes cannot meaningfully capture the complexity of the relationship between ethnicity and war, other scholars have argued that ethnic political competition/discrimination goes a long way toward providing a useful explanation of civil war onset or recurrence. The next section looks closely at this hypothesis.

Ethnic discrimination: Adopting an alternative approach, Ted Gurr and colleagues (1993)[14] collected data on discrimination against ethnic minorities, their grievances, levels of political mobilisation, and rebellious activities. Using their Minorities at Risk

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[14] Also see Gurr and Moore 1997; Gurr 2000

(MAR) dataset, Gurr *et al. (1993)* claim that political discrimination against ethnic minority is a major predictor of low- and high-intensity conflicts.

However, the empirical findings are mixed. While some studies find robust evidence that (minority) ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of civil war (Regan and Norton, 2005), others come to the opposite conclusion (Fearon, 2003; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Hug, 2011). Moreover, the Minorities at Risk dataset's focus on only ethnic minorities' limit its scope and applicability. For example, it does not include majority ethnic groups, some of which may even be at risk of being challenged by disadvantaged minorities or are indeed discriminated against themselves in regimes of ethnic minority rule. Furthermore, the Minorities at Risk dataset remain incomplete because it does not fully capture the dynamics of political exclusion at the level of the state (Wucherpfennig, 2011).

Inspired by the pioneering approach of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset – while also recognising the weaknesses, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010)[15] developed the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which provides a more comprehensive selection of politically relevant ethnic groups, including minority and majority, and discriminated as well as state-controlling groups (Vogt *et. al.,* 2015). Here, the central argument is that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly and significantly associated with civil war, with violent conflicts in the name of excluded ethnic groups being much more likely than violent conflict in the name of included groups.

Drawing on the EPR dataset, several recent studies have generated new empirical evidence that state-induced ethno-nationalist policies that exclude and discriminate against specific ethnic groups can increase the probability of conflict (see Wucherpfennig, 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Girardin, and Wucherpfennig, 2014). Because those in power aim to secure their political, cultural and economic interests by selectively excluding parts of the population from access to valuable political and economic goods on ethnic grounds (Wucherpfennig *et.al,* 2012). But such exclusion comes at a substantial cost, as it often invites strong reactions from potential challengers, and those affected may even resort to violent challenges against the state (Wucherpfennig, 2011).

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[15] Also see Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009)

Although the EPR dataset is undoubtedly the strongest quantitative evidence to date that supports the argument that ethnic discrimination/exclusion can increase the probability of conflict, yet, it is important to keep in mind that ethnicity is only one source of social fragmentation along with religious, regional or class cleavages. More importantly, the EPR dataset relies only on expert estimates of ethnic inclusiveness rather than on qualitative, primary data detailing the nature, character and actual distribution of access to state power. Perhaps what is needed to understand the causes of civil war versus political stability in divided societies is a more qualitative research that traces how social fragmentation was forged under different historical episodes.

2.1.2   Civil War and Low-level of Economic Development

A different set of perspectives downplay the role of ethnicity altogether, arguing that the level of economic development is a better predictor of civil war onset and risk of renewed conflict than ethnicity and other forms of identities. The two most widely discussed factors to assess the impact of economic development and civil war are: *income levels* (i.e., poverty) and *economic growth*.

Income levels: A first variant of this debate proposes a linear relationship between poverty and civil war. Here, "poverty" refers to low levels of income or consumption, usually measured by GDP per capita. Although there is strong empirical support for this argument, much remains to be understood. On the one hand, poverty was found to be significant in the studies of attitudes to rebellion (MacCullogh and Pezzini, 2007), in the analysis of participation (Justino, 2012; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008) and in the behaviour of groups (Jenne Saideman and Lowe, 2007)[16]. Indeed, cross-country empirical analyses of civil war point to poverty or low-per capita income as one of the most robust explanations for the outbreak, duration and recurrence of violent internal conflict (for an excellent review see Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Dixon, 2009; Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

This "stylized fact," that poverty breeds conflict and war as well as post-conflict relapse, is supported by three seminal papers. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that countries, which do not experience war, are "characterised by a *per capita* income that is more than five times higher than in countries in which wars broke out." Likewise, Fearon and

[16] See Anke Hoeffler (2012)

Laitin (2003) report that in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, "$1,000 less in income corresponds to 36 per cent greater odds of conflict outbreak." Fearon and Laitin (2003) further note that a higher income is associated with a more developed infrastructure, and therefore better control of the state and its people.

Similarly, the evidence gathered by Sambanis (2003) shows that "the mean per capita GDP in countries affected by civil war at any point from 1960-1999 is less than half that of countries with no civil war experience."[17] Interestingly, time series studies of conflict also find that low per capita income is more likely to result in conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Also, case study evidence suggests that a large number of countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa had low per capita income prior to the onset of their civil wars (e.g. Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique) (see Sambanis, 2004; 2005; Rice, Graff and Lewis, 2006).

On the other hand, while this is one of the most common and robust results in the literature there are concerns whether we can really interpret it as a causal relationship. Civil war may be contributing to low per capita income, or low income may be contributing to civil war. This means that the correlation between low per capita income and civil war onset may run in the opposite direction. Moreover, the observed correlation between low per capita income and large-scale violence could in principle support the two influential models in the literature, namely: (i) the "state-weakness hypothesis" (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) where low income spurs conflict by increasing state weakness, and the; (ii) "opportunity cost hypothesis" (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) where low income facilitates civil war by reducing the opportunity cost of rebellion.

Perhaps, more importantly the arguments focused on low per capita income have ignored the fact that despite persistent low income per capita some countries have avoided civil war while some that experience civil war such as Mozambique have been able to escape the "virus" of civil war recurrence. As Sambanis (2005: 307) forcefully argues: something that all quantitative studies miss is that low-level violence precedes civil war and this should reduce both income and economic growth by reducing investment and encouraging capital flight. Thus, the relationship between conflict and per capita income is not a straight line.

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[17] Rice, Graff and Lewis, 2006

Economic growth: A second variant of this debate holds that low economic growth is associated with higher incidence of war, whether onset, duration or recurrence. Typically scholars measure economic growth with proxies such as GDP, education (primary, secondary and post-secondary school enrolments, secondary male enrolment, schooling inequality, education spending), infant/birth mortality rates, road density, trade openness, trade regulations, level of economic liberalisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Dixon, 2009). However, the hypothesis that conflict risk rises as economic growth drops is murky and more contradictory than in the case of per capita income.

On the one hand, some scholars do indeed find that civil wars occur disproportionately in countries characterised by low economic growth rates (OECD, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Walter, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). On the other hand, however, other studies find economic growth to be insignificant in explaining civil war dynamics (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004a). In fact, case-study evidence reveals puzzling pictures. While many countries experienced low economic growth before the start of their civil wars (e.g. Mozambique, Sudan, Mali, Chad and Sierra Leone), there is also emerging evidence that fast economic growth may even increase the risk of violent conflict or post-conflict relapse (Sambanis, 2005). Taken together, the available empirical evidence between economic factors and civil war remains inconclusive.

2.1.3. Civil War and Inequality

Apart from ethnicity and economic arguments for civil war, there is a large body of literature analysing whether inequality makes countries more vulnerable to civil war and post-conflict relapse. There are two versions of 'inequality-civil war hypothesis'. The dominant and old version focuses on the impact of inter-personal or *"vertical" inequalities* (Kuznets, 1955), while the new version points to the significance of inter-group or *"horizontal" inequalities* (Stewart, 2000, 2008).

Vertical inequalities: A first school of thought assumes a direct causal relationship between "vertical inequalities" and large-scale violent conflict. Broadly speaking, vertical inequalities relate to the distribution of income or land across the whole population of individuals in a country from richest to poorest, typically measured through Gini coefficients. Indeed, several research studies, classic and contemporary,

ideological and theoretical, quantitative and qualitative, have been presented in support of the hypothesis that civil war is a function of inter-personal or economic inequality (Sigelman and Simpson, 1977). The central premise is that "a high level of income inequality radicalises the working class, enhances class polarisation, and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for political participation by the lower classes" (Muller, 1997). Muller (1997) cites his own (1988) cross-national study of 33 countries that showed a correlation between income inequality and the binary variable of stability versus instability of democracy between 1960 and 1980.

Similarly, Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) list high-income inequality along with stagnation and decline in real gross domestic product (GDP), a high ratio of military expenditures to national income, and a tradition of violent conflict as the main sources of humanitarian emergencies. "Large income inequality exacerbates the vulnerability of populations to humanitarian emergencies (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002)". In the words of Ted Gurr (1970), "a highly unequal, polarised distribution of resources is thought to produce relative deprivation and in that way being an important source of discontent". According to Plato (cited in Cowell, 1985) and Aristotle (cited in Linehan, 1980), social strife, revolutions and wars are not brought out by the conspiratorial or malignant nature of man, rather a high degree of economic inequality creates incentives to engage in violent protests, coups or other politically destabilising activities (also see Lichbach, 1989).

Indeed, Alesina and Perotti (1996), in their seminal work "Income distribution, political instability and investment" describe forcefully the causal relationship between violent conflict and economic inequality as follows: "A large group of impoverished citizens, facing a small and very rich group of well-off individuals is likely to become dissatisfied with the existing socio-economic status quo and demand radical changes, so that mass violence and illegal seizure of power are more likely than when income distribution is more equitable".

However, while in a general sense it seems plausible that economic inequality can provide the breeding ground for violent conflict, this finding has been challenged by several studies, which find that economic inequality does not affect the level of political instability and that in fact the relationship is negative (Mitchell, 1968; Muller and Weede, 1990; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Stewart, 2002, 2008).

As Collier (2000) succinctly puts it: "Economic inequality does not seem to affect the risk of conflict. Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor. … Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to create them." Like Collier, Cramer (2006) also finds that neither bivariate nor multivariate analysis produces significant and generally accepted findings between income inequality and civil war onset.

Moreover, it has been argued that the commonly used measures of inequality, for example the Gini coefficient, only capture "vertical" inequality, i.e. inequality between individuals. What might matter more is the inequality between groups, termed "horizontal" inequality (Stewart, 2005). Hence, Macculloch (2005) concludes that several decades of empirical research on the relationship between inequality and conflict have produced a diverse and contradictory array of findings, and thus that the impact of economic inequality on conflict is still being debated.

Horizontal inequalities: In contrast to vertical inequalities that assert that civil war is a function of inter-personal or economic inequality, a second school of thought claims that the link between inequality and war are linked by inter-group inequalities. Gurr (1970), for example, has argued that groups are more likely to rebel when they feel disadvantaged vis-à-vis other groups in society. According to Sen (1973), "the relation between group inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one." A more robust approach linking inter-group inequalities to violent conflict was championed by Oxford-based development economist, Frances Stewart (2002, 2008) – who coined the term "horizontal inequalities" (HIs). Horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities between socio-culturally defined groups with shared identities formed around religion, ethnic ties or racial or caste-based affiliations. It is distinguished from vertical inequality, which refers to inequality mostly between individuals within an otherwise homogenous population (Stewart 2004). Thus, whereas vertical inequalities focus on individuals, horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities between groups (Stewart, 2004).

Again, while vertical inequality concentrates exclusively on economic inequality (usually operationalised as income inequality or inequality in land distribution), horizontal inequalities are multidimensional and encompass economic, social, cultural and political dimensions as follows: the *economic* dimension includes inequalities in ownership of assets, income and employment opportunities; the *social* dimension covers inequalities in access to a range of services and in their human outcomes (including

education, health and nutrition); the *political* dimension consists of inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power across the groups at different levels, including political, bureaucratic and military power; and, the *cultural* dimension refers to differences in recognition and hierarchical status of the cultural norms, customs and practices of different groups (Stewart, 2002, 2004). The horizontal inequality argument states that inequalities coinciding with cultural cleavages may enhance group grievances, which in turn may facilitate mobilisation for conflict.

There is strong empirical support for this argument. For example: Ostby (2008) provides a sophisticated cross-country study on the subject. She finds evidence that horizontal economic and social inequality between ethnic, religious and regional groups in 55 developing countries has a strong positive effect on violent conflict. Likewise, Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann (2010) employ a large-N research design, and find that "groups with wealth levels far from the country average are indeed more likely to experience civil war." Similarly, Brown (2008) finds that the likelihood of a separatist conflict increases the richer or poorer a region is in terms of GDP per capita, compared with the national average[18]. In addition, evidence from case studies also show a positive and significant relationship between the level of HIs and the incidence (or intensity) of conflict (Stewart, 2008; Mancini, 2008).

However, notwithstanding the robust causal relationship between HIs and civil war, the HIs argument remains insufficient for at least two reasons. First, the categories of differentiation among social groups, such as political participation, economic assets and social services, while they are important, seem unnecessarily broad in that they include a large number of disparate elements (Stewart, 2000; Lindemann, 2008). Second, and more importantly, Stewart's approach largely focused on horizontal inequalities at the "mass level", while neglecting inequalities at the "elite level." Although Stewart recognises the influence of political elites on identity formation, but both her theoretical and empirical work focuses broadly on inequalities at the "mass level", and evidence on the impact of inter-elite inequalities remains unsubstantiated. However, horizontal inequalities at the "mass level" may in fact be endogenous to horizontal inequalities at

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[18] His finding was based on the determinants of separatist conflicts –covering 31 countries, from East and Western Europe, North and South America and South and East Asia.

the "elite level." Perhaps what is needed is a rigorous examination of the interactions of inequalities at both mass and elite levels.

2.1.4. Civil War and Natural Resources

Prior to the late 1980s, the conventional wisdom among academics and policymakers was that natural resources were beneficial for economic growth and development (see, for instance, Viner, 1952; Lewis, 1955). Norton Ginsburg, for example, argues that: "The possession of a sizable and diversified natural resource endowment is a major advantage to any country embarking upon a period of rapid economic growth" (as cited in Higgins, 1968). Similar views were expressed by Walter Rostow (1961), Bela Balassa (1980), and Anne Krueger (1980). Rostow (1961), in particular, argues that natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the transition from underdevelopment to industrial "take-off", just as they had done for countries such as Australia, the United States, and United Kingdom.

However, a number of radical scholars challenged these views, arguing that the structure of the global economy and the nature of international commodity markets put developing countries that were reliant on natural resource exports at a serious disadvantage (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1950). A more recent version of this argument states that natural resources, rather than being a blessing, increases the likelihood that countries will experience civil war. This argument has been widely accepted by researchers and officials at the major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Bannon and Collier, 2003). But while the highly influential "resource curse – civil war argument" comes in many different variants, the following three can be identified as predominant in the literature (see Ross, 2004, 2006).

(1) *The economic opportunities Variant:* A first variant of the resource curse – civil war argument states that the availability of natural resources, defined in terms of the ratio of primary exports to GDP, increases the likelihood of civil war by providing rebel groups with the opportunity to use the "looting" of natural resources as a means to finance the "start-up costs" of rebellion (Collier, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Ballantine, 2003). But while highly influential and being a powerful source of inspiration to policymaking, several critics have argued that there is no robust association between

primary commodities – a broad category that includes both mineral wealth and agricultural goods – and civil war. While Collier and Hoeffler find evidence that a country's dependence on primary commodities is significantly correlated with the risk of civil war (2002; 2004), other studies find no evidence for a strong relationship between oil exports and large-scale violent conflict (see Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2004; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007).

In fact, other studies argue that the civil war-resource hypothesis downplays the importance of various complex political and social processes at the grassroots level. Winslow and Woost (2004), for example, suggest that Collier and Hoeffler's *economic opportunities* hypothesis is highly reductionist because it only focuses on the economic considerations of belligerents: culture, ideology and power struggles disappear to be replaced by simple financial feasibility. Similarly, Cramer (2002) criticises rational choice theories of conflict such as Collier and Hoeffler's *economic opportunities* hypothesis for violating "the complexity of individual motivation" and for "razing the individual and groups down to monolithic maximising agents." The *economic opportunities* hypothesis assumes that all rebels share the same two characteristics: they are profit- maximising individuals, and they search for power. This is not necessary so.

Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler's measure of resource revenues available to the rebel group – primary product exports to GDP ratio – is not ideal. This is because the ratio does not distinguish between different types of resources. It includes many resources, such as agricultural products, oil and mineral, that are not easily lootable by rebel during civil war, and it excludes revenues from some of the most lootable resources such as diamonds, smuggled gemstones and drugs (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Humphreys, 2005, De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007). The bottom line here is that the links between conflict and natural resources are not always so clear-cut.

(2) *The "Political Dutch Disease" Argument***:** A second debate linking natural resource to civil war states that rents from fuel minerals (oil, gas, hard coal, lignite) are robustly associated with the onset of civil war (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Karl, 1997; Moore, 2004; Ross, 2006). Broadly defined, a rentier state is a state that generates a large proportion of its income from rents, or externally derived, unproductively earned payments. Put differently, rents are most commonly royalties or other payments for oil and gas exports - not from production (labour), investment (interest) or management of

risk (profit)-, but other income such as fees and foreign aid typically are considered rents as well (Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2000; Lam and Wantchekon, 2003). Unlike domestic taxation or other sources of revenue, which may require the development of a capable state bureaucracy and costly collection efforts, resource rents provide the state with an alternative source of public revenue that is similar to an externally-generated "windfall" (Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987). This encourages a phenomenon that Sachs and Warner (1997) call "political Dutch disease", which literally means: (1) autonomy from citizens and absence of developmental ambitions; (2) weak bureaucratic structures; and (3) vulnerability to political instability and violent conflict (Moore, 2004).

However, this argument receives only limited empirical support. While Fearon and Laitin (2003), Karl (1997), Kaldor, Karl, and Said (2007) and Ross (2006) come to the conclusions that 'rents from fuel minerals' (oil, gas, hard coal, lignite) are robustly associated with the onset of civil war, especially when located onshore, yet other scholars argue that there is little evidence that oil rents cause conflict. As Smith (2004) explains, the rentier state argument lacks empirical support and predictive power. Sambanis (2004) finds that oil rents are not robust to different civil war models, while Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conclude that oil rents are robustly associated with minor-scale conflict rather than civil war.

(3) *The "Separatist Incentive" Variant***:** A third variant of the resource curse – civil war argument' assumes a direct and specific relationship between natural resources and secessionist war. There is relatively good empirical support for this argument. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) find evidence that natural resources wealth increases the danger of civil war by providing populations in mineral-rich regions with an incentive to form a separate state. Ross (2006) also claims that both "fuel onshore rents" and "nonfuel rents" are correlated with the onset of separatist conflicts. A study by Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) provides further support for this argument. They find that conflicts are more likely to be located in the areas of a country in which natural resources are extracted. Likewise, Morelli and Rohner (2014) find in cross-national analysis that when oil is discovered in the territory of a poor group, the probability of civil war increases substantially. Furthermore, there are case-study examples linking oil and other minerals to secessionist wars. These include separatist conflicts in Nigeria (Niger Delta), Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga) and Angola (Cabinda).

Yet, despite the insight from the "resource wealth - separatist conflict nexus", the supporting results are mixed. Buhaug (2006), for example, found resource wealth to predict anti-government (revolutionary) conflicts but not separatist (territorial) conflicts. There is also a related literature arguing that resource scarcity and climate change cause separatist conflict rather than resource wealth. Homer-Dixon (1999), for example, suggests that environmental scarcity is a key factor in causing violent conflict. But De Soysa (2002a) finds no evidence for this. More research is needed to identify other possible intervening variables and to achieve a better understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the resource curse (Rosser, 2006; Rigterink, 2010).

2.1.5. Civil war and Political Institutions

Turning to the last body of work on the root causes of the initial conflict, a number of scholars have forcibly argued that there is a strong relationship between political institutions/regime types and civil war. The most commonly discussed regime types are: "democracies", "autocracies" and "anocracies". States' regime levels and their changes are measured using the Polity IV index of political regimes (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Polity IV is an index composed of five variables, which focus on (i) constraints on the chief executive, (ii) the competitiveness of executive recruitment, (iii) the openness of executive recruitment, (iv) the competitiveness of political participation, and; (v) the regulation of political participation[19].

Democracy and Civil War: A first line of argument suggests that the more democratic a country, the less likely it is to experience large-scale violent conflict[20]. Here, the underlying rationale is that only democratic institutions and processes permit the expression of opposition thereby facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflict (Popper, 1959). Moreover, democracy has been found to be important for the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita *et. al.*, 1999), for economic development (Knutsen, 2011) and

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[19] The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores are usually converted to regime categories, including 'autocracies' (-10 to -6), 'anocracies' (-5 to +5), and 'democracies' (+6 to +10) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).

[20] This argument, which was developed by Immanuel Kant (1796), within the context of international relations, states that: 1) democratic states rarely fight against each other; 2) democratic states tend to be more open to international trade than non-democratic ones creating interdependencies that preclude the outbreak of war between them; and 3) democracies tend to be more peaceful internally than other systems (Doyle 1983; Doyle 1986; Oneal *et. al.* 1996; Rosato 2003).

democracy is also thought to be critical for providing post-conflict governments the legitimacy needed for sustainable peace (Kumar, 1998). Taken together, these are all factors that should be important for rebuilding countries after civil war and thus provide ways of avoiding recurrent conflict (Walter, 2004).

Yet studies investigating the impact of democracies on civil war have found only limited empirical support as most large-N studies find the "level of democracy" measure to be flawed (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). However, recent studies suggest that the levels and forms of democracy matter: mature or full democracies are less likely to experience civil war, while "partial democracies" have higher risks of large-scale violent (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand, 2009; Cederman, Hug and Krebs, 2010).

Anocracies vs Autocracies and Civil War: Another school of thought holds that civil war risks are highest not among democracies or autocracies, but among regimes that are labelled as "anocracies", or "semi-democracies". The central argument here (as indicated above) is that full democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom avoid violent conflict by allowing political opposition, while highly authoritarian regimes such as China and North Korea are able to suppress protests and large-scale violent conflicts. On the other hand, "semi-democracies", such as Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo or Burundi, neither allow vibrant opposition group nor are they in a position to suppress dissidents appropriately – a situation that makes them vulnerable to conflict and uprising. Anocracies-civil war hypothesis receives strong empirical support in the literature. For example, Mansfield and Snyder (2002), Hegre *et al.* (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) do indeed find a significant association between "anocracies" and civil war.

However, Vreeland (2008) argues that the link between anocracies and civil war onset is undermined by endogeneity problems and the poor coding of the Polity democracy index. "If there is "factionalism" in a country with democratic institutions, such as intense inter-group conflicts that may or may not be violent, the Polity index will code the country as an imperfect democracy. Thus, the finding that imperfect democracies have more civil war may have a tautological element" (cited in Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand, 2009). Nevertheless, Goldstone *et al.* (2010) empirically show that the association

between anocracies and civil war persists even after accounting for the endogenous coding of the Polity IV data.

In sum, this section highlights a number of strengths and limitations with the literature on the causes of civil war in relation to post-conflict relapse. There is clearly a gap between the theoretical and empirical models as the results are difficult to interpret and do not allow us to distinguish between different theories. Many explanatory factors, for example GDP per capita income and economic growth, are endogenous to the risk of civil war and post-conflict relapse (Hoeffler, 2012). Yet, endogeneity issues are not systematically addressed in a large number of civil war studies. In this sense, it is appropriate to talk about correlates of war, rather than causes of war. Again, some explanatory variables, such as inequality and ethnic diversity and ethnic polarisation, receive a lot of attention in the academic literature and policy documents, but there is little evidence that they are robustly correlated with civil war onset or post-conflict relapse. Other explanatory variables are highly correlated with each other, for example there is a close relationship between income, ethnic discrimination, political institutions and natural resources. This makes it problematic to disentangle the transmission mechanisms of civil war and post-conflict relapse. The effect of some variables on civil war onset and post-conflict relapse seems to depend on their interaction. The bottom-line here is that -certain combinations of factors are likely be associated with conflict risk and post-conflict relapse while others are not. This leads us to the second set of literature.

3. 1 Risk Factors Associated with Civil War Recurrence

A second broad set of arguments focuses on the manner in which the original war was fought to determine the risk of conflict renewal or prospect of peace. Two factors in particular are purported to make war more or less likely: *"Conflict duration and intensity"* (i.e. the costs of a previous war) and the "*number of factions"* involved.

3.1.1 Conflict Duration and Intensity

A first line of argument holds that the longer and costlier a previous war, the more likely the war will convince protagonists to agree to a democratic post-civil war order (Gurses and Mason, 2008). However, the empirical evidence for this argument is mixed.

On the one hand, Smith and Stam (2003) and Walter (2004) have all found that conflicts of a longer duration with high casualties are less likely to recur. Physical and resource exhaustion and improved knowledge of an opponent's relative strength are put forward as explanatory factors for this phenomenon. This is also consistent with the "war weariness hypothesis" (Levy and Morgan, 1986) that a longer war, which would probably be characterised by higher costs, should experience longer spells of peace (Fortna, 2004). Sambanis (2000) empirically shows that longer and costlier wars lead to sustainable peace.

On the other hand, costly wars could have the opposite effect. Countries that have experienced intense and long-lasting wars may actually be more vulnerable to a second or third war because of the desire for retribution and animosity (Walter, 1997). Empirically, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) found that peace settlements are more likely to break down in conflicts of greater intensity. Both studies suggested that conflicts of a high intensity would be more likely to produce entrenched emotions such as resentment, fear and revenge, making the conflict particularly difficult to resolve. Additionally, in a preliminary study of violence in civil wars, Kalyvas (2000) also found that "personal vengeance was a recurrent motive" for participation in war. Thus, the literature on the costs of a previous war and civil war recurrence remains ambiguous.

3.1.2   Number of Factions

A second line of argument states that conflicts with multiple groups are longer in duration (Cunningham, 2006), more violent (Bloom, 2004; Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour, 2012), and are harder to settle (Oye, 1985). The literature points to a number of important reasons why a greater number of factions might make post-conflict stability difficult. First, an increased number of actors will make the identification of common interests more difficult. That is, there may be a greater risk of splintering within groups into factions of moderates and extremists, which will make the peace process more challenging. Second, anticipating the behaviour of other actors becomes increasingly difficult due to the increased number of factors influencing each party's behaviour. Third, deterrence is less effective as retaliation might destabilise the entire system. As a result, groups may be tempted to 'free-ride' and not genuinely cooperate, which could make a relapse more likely (Oye, 1985; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Cunningham, 2011).

However, this argument receives only limited empirical support. On the positive side, some scholars do find a negative and significant association. Cunningham (2006), for example, empirically shows that unless the number of factions is quite small, post-conflict stability will remain unlikely. Similarly, Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2012) suggested that all other things being equal, it would be easier to organise and maintain durable peace in divided societies of smaller number of factions than one with multiple factions. Likewise, Oye (1985) also concluded that durable peace is difficult to organise in a divided society with multiple factions.

However, even though conflicts with multiple rebel groups make settlement harder to reach for the conflict as a whole, this situation does not necessarily make it harder to reach partial settlements with specific rebel actors during conflict (Nilsson, 2008; Nilsson, 2010; Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011). Sambanis and Doyle (2000), for example, have tested the idea that a greater number of factions will make cooperation more difficult with relation to the success of peacebuilding initiatives in civil war. They found that there was a negative relationship between the number of factions involved in a conflict and the success of peacebuilding initiatives. However, they also found evidence to suggest that as very high numbers of factions emerge, peacebuilding prospects are improved. A possible explanation for these somewhat contradictory findings is that ending conflict in a multiple rebel setting may not be more difficult, but that implementation of sustainable peace may be more difficult to achieve (Kreutz, 2012).

Looking at the cases of post-conflict societies in general, it is important to note that the manner in which the original war was fought, which many authors consider as a critical determinant of the probability of war recurrence or the main driver behind sustainable peace in divided societies, is problematic and lacks explanatory power. It tended to ignore both structural conditions that prevailed prior to the war and at the end of the war, as well as the interests of actors. Of course, this is not to deny that heavy conflict casualties and long war duration may be important for maintaining peace as argued by war weariness hypothesis. Perhaps, what matters most in the end as argued by Adedokun (2016) is not how the war was fought but the extent to which relevant "key stakeholders" are involved in the post-conflict decision making process.

4.1   Factors Associated with the Durability of Post-conflict Peace

While much emphasis has been placed on identifying the risk factors that make a country initially susceptible to civil war and on the manner in which the original war was fought, as discussed above, other scholars focus attention on post-conflict strategies or settlement types to explain the sustainability of post-civil war peace or to predict whether civil war will start again. Here, one can broadly distinguish between three arguments, namely (i) civil war outcome, (ii) external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping, and (iii) post-war institutional design arrangements. Below, I explore these arguments one after the other.

4.1.1   Civil War Outcome – i.e. How the Original War Ended

Current research on the duration of post-conflict peace argues that the manner in which a civil war ends determines the distribution of power among the rival factions that had been involved in the civil war and this may predict the prospect of peace or the risk of civil war recurrence. In general, civil war ends through one of four possible outcomes[21]: (i) government victory, (ii) rebel victory, (iii) negotiated settlement, and (iv) a cease fire or truce (Mason and Fett, 1996; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). But the two most commonly discussed civil war outcomes in relation to peace are *negotiated settlement* and *military victory.*

Negotiated Settlement: A first school of thought states that post-conflict peace is more likely to follow a negotiated settlement than a decisive victory by either the government or the rebel faction. Negotiated settlement refers to a form of civil war termination in which neither the government nor the rebel side admits defeat and combatants agree to end the violence and accept common terms on how a post-war state should be governed. Negotiated settlement is characterised by power sharing, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, refugee repatriation, transitional justice, and issues of human rights. Of course, not all peace agreements contain all of these attributes. What they have in common is a joint-agreement to halt the war and an understanding that each party will participate in a future government. A party external to the war may help to halt the violence and arrange a settlement of

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[21] Although civil war ends through one of four possible outcomes, there is emerging evidence th   at some civil wars end in disappearance (Kreutz 2012).

conflict issues. The party may be another state such as the United States or United Kingdom, a regional organisation such as the African Union or the European Union or an international organisation such as the United Nations.

Findings on the negotiated settlement – peace link are mixed. On the positive side, some scholars find that ending civil wars via negotiated settlement makes for a more durable peace while ending civil war through military victory has no significant effect on the peace (Gurses and Mason, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Wantchekon and Neeman, 2002; Wood, 2001). The underlying argument by this school of thought is that negotiated settlement provides both government and rebel faction with a means of checks and balances. Negotiated settlement limits the amount of exclusionary policies that are argued to increase the probability of conflict (Cederman and Girardin, 2007). No single group dominates politics. In an ideal case all major groups have a real sense of participation in government (Stewart, 2010). The winner-take-all syndrome of electoral competition, which characterises post-conflict societies, is reduced via negotiated settlement (Horowitz, 2009). Negotiated settlement tends to reduce the human costs of civil war by ending them sooner (Hartzell, 1999). Negotiated settlements guarantee basic human rights. Negotiated settlements ensure political liberties and boost economic recovery and prosperity.

And, apart from the political compromise that they reflect, many negotiated settlements explicitly call for political liberalisation and national elections. For example, the settlement that ended Mozambique's 17 years of civil war involved the rebel group, Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), which gave up its fight in exchange for the Frelimo led government agreeing to multiparty elections in which Renamo could compete for power (See Joshi, 2010b). In this regard, a negotiated settlement helps to resolve the credible commitment problem to the extent that it involves a range of power sharing arrangements that address security concerns of former rivals and distribute political power and resources between them (also see Licklider, 1995; Hartzell, 1999; Hartzell *et al.,* 2001; Walter, 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). According to Przeworski (1991), democracy as well as peace can emerge from cooperation when contending forces reach an equilibrium situation – a situation in which political actors engaged in competition set aside the short-term outcome of democratic processes and look to the longer time horizon because they believe that no one can control the outcome of democratic processes.

On the downside, however, other scholars argue that there is no robust relationship between negotiated settlement and durable peace. Out of 43 cases of negotiated settlements of civil wars from 1946 to 2005 (Sambanis, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), only 28 cases (65 per cent) made the transition toward democracy. This suggests that all negotiated settlements are not alike, and a transition toward peace does not always follow negotiated settlement to a civil war. Inherent in a negotiated settlement is a credible commitment problem that leaves the signatories with fear of future uncertainties concerning their security (Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2004b; also see Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Josh and Mason, 2012). Moreover, no matter how much governments and rebels are committed to the status quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same path (Downes, 2010). According to Wagner (1993) and Luttwak (1999), ''victories are more stable than negotiated settlements because the loser's capacity to reignite the war should be low''.

Military Victories: In contrast to negotiated settlement, a second school of thought claims that military victories lead to greater post-civil war peace than do other war outcomes. Military victories mean a civil war termination in which one side explicitly and publicly acknowledges defeat and surrenders. Theoretically, there is no compromise. No negotiation. It is zero-sum game or winner-take-all. There is usually strong empirical support for this argument. A large number of studies both cross-country and cases studies have shown that military victories are significantly associated with durable peace (Wagner, 1993; Licklider, 1995; Toft, 2010a). Wagner (1993), for example, fiercely argues that negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to renewed violence than military outcomes (i.e., victory by the government or the rebels) because settlements allow both sides to retain the organisational capability to renew war in the future (Wagner, 1993). In contrast, wars that end in a decisive military victory are followed by some degree of compulsory disarming or dissolution of the defeated side's forces, thereby precluding the resumption of civil war.

Besides, wars that end in victory lead to stronger institutions because they leave resources consolidated in the hands of the winning side (Toft, 2010). Negotiated settlements are more likely to lead not only to renewed violence, but also to authoritarianism as governments crack down on efforts to avert a reversion to war (Toft, 2010 in Fortna and Huang, 2012). Licklider (1995) found empirical support for the proposition that negotiated settlements tend to break down into future violence more

often than military outcomes, suggesting that resuming war is more difficult when the original war ended in a military victory by one side or the other rather than a negotiated settlement. A decisive military victory provides the winning side with discretionary power to design the institutions of the post-war state in a way that protects its own political and economic interests. Therefore, outright military victory by one side or the other would make renewed conflict less likely because the defeated side will not be able to fight a new civil war when its organisation is destroyed.

Nevertheless, not all military victories are the same. There is a difference between military victory by the government and military victory by the rebel with huge consequences. Licklider (1995) finds that government victories are more likely to be followed by genocide, while Toft (2010) finds that military victories by rebel groups produce more durable peace than a government victory. With the rebel victory, the military organisation of the incumbent regime crumbles, and the elites of the incumbent government either go into exile or are captured and killed (Quinn *et al.*, 2007). Rebel victory usually leads to a new beginning in the political landscape of the country and a complete overhaul of the state's institutions and the redistribution of the state's resources to civilian supporters. For an example, after defeating the Kuomintang (National People's Party) in China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) redistributed land among peasants and subjected large landowners to "people's courts," where peasants could voice their long-standing grievances against landlords (Joshi, 2010b).

This view is not without criticism, however. Wallensteen (2015), Fortna (2009) and Lyall and Wilson (2009), have long argued that outrights victories have become increasingly rare in civil wars, and conclude that these outcomes have been replaced by negotiated compromises. Meanwhile, contrary to assumptions in the literature, emerging studies have shown that wars do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victories or negotiated settlements but more often end under unclear circumstances in which fighting simply ceases or disappears (Kreutz, 2012). Thus, current studies on civil war outcome have limited our ability to generalise across cases where civil wars ended not just in negotiated settlement or decisive military victory by either side (government vs. rebels) but also in a disappearance.

4.1.2   External Peacebuilding Operations and Peacekeeping

Apart from the arguments on civil war outcomes discussed above, there is a growing body of theoretical and empirical work that claims that the risk of conflict renewal or prospect of sustainable peace hinges on the nature and character of external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping in the conflict (see Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Fortna, 2002; Walter, 2002; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2003; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). For example, Walter (2002) sees external actors as playing a critical role in the termination of civil war, especially through the presence of peacekeeping troops. She notes that it is nearly impossible for parties to commit credibly to stop fighting without an international guarantee to enforce the peace. In the same vein, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that certain strategies used by international actors are more effective at reducing hostilities in a civil war environment and helping to build peace. Smith and Stam (2003) also show that third parties can be effective in ensuring a cessation of conflict by providing an artificial boundary between the belligerents.

Overall, there are at least four explanations that have been advanced in the literature for why external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping would make durable peace more likely. First, external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping can be instrumental in creating a stalemate and setting up incentives for warring parties to negotiate and stick to peace (Zartman, 1989).

Second, given that information problems often characterise transition from war to peace, external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping can help overcome potential information failures between combatants by facilitating communication, clarifying objectives, bringing transparency and legitimation to the proceedings, and changing perceptions of the likely outcome of war. In other words, the better the information, the more likely combatants are to reach a settlement, and the shorter the war and the higher the likelihood of durable peace (Zartman, 1989, 1995; Brown, 1996; Doyle, Johnston and Orr, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998).

Third, external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping can offer critical protection and enforcement during peace agreement implementation, thereby making cheating less likely and commitments to a settlement more credible (see also Brown, 1996; Hampson, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Walter, 1997).

The final mechanisms through which external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping influence peace after war have to do with a peacebuilder's ability to make side-payments and to pressure groups and allies to make the concessions necessary for agreement (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, 1997; Zartman, 1995) – that is, external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping increase the costs of renewed aggression. The 'bottom line' here is that: If an external actor is willing to step in to enforce or verify the terms of a peace agreement, negotiations almost always lead to peace. If an external actor does not enforce or verify the terms of peace agreement, negotiations almost always result in renewed war.

However, despite a significant research on the relationship between external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping and the durability of peace, empirical research has had mixed results. On the positive side, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) empirically show that two years after war termination, civil wars with any form of United Nations (UN) operation were nearly twice as likely to be successful in the form of participatory peacebuilding than conflicts without UN presence (13 out of 27, or 48 per cent, compared to 24 out of 94, or 26 per cent of conflicts). In particular, the UN has been found to be more effective and productive when compared to the United States (unilateral) efforts in post-conflict peacebuilding (Dobbins *et al.,* 2005; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2005).

On the negative side, some authors argue that external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping do not have any positive effect on post-conflict peacebuilding outcomes (Cockayne, Mikulaschek and Perry, 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006; Werner and Yuen, 2005). Three closely related problems of external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping in its efforts to implement and advance peace in civil-war affected countries have been highlighted. First, the limited engagement of local populations and non-elites with state and peacebuilding projects. (Mac Ginty, 2006; Autesserre, 2010) Second, the considerable tensions between international fixed standards of state legitimacy and 'good governance' on the one hand, and local experiences and perceptions of what constitutes efficient and legitimate governance on the other hand (see Moe, 2011; Debiel and Lambach, 2010; Richmond, 2010; Chandler, 2006). The third limitation of external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping, as noted by Chesterman (2002) and Reilly (2002), has been the rush to hold early elections and exit the war-torn country before implementing robust security policies or addressing the

root causes of the conflict. For example, Paris (2004) shows that only two out of 11 cases qualify as a success in terms of achieving a liberal peace, while for Sens (2004) the rate is just three out of 22. In short, others question the very notion that sustainable peace and durable democracy can be externally imposed on fragile and conflict-affected states (Chesterman, 2004; Marten, 2004). However, Adedokun (2016) in his study of post-conflict peacebuilding in Mozambique shows that while sustainable peacebuilding ultimately depends on the people living in the societies in which the peacebuilding is being undertaken, the United Nations and the broader international community have important roles to play. Yet, further empirical evidence is needed in this regard.

4.1.3   Post-war Institutional Design Arrangements

Beyond insights from (1) those who focus on civil war outcomes, and (2) those who emphasise external peacebuilding operations and peacekeeping as the best strategies for dealing with civil-affected societies, a central part of the post-conflict peacebuilding literature has argued that post-war institutional design arrangements have a strong effect on the durability of peace. The three most commonly discussed institutional set-ups or strategies aimed at preventing, managing, and settling internal conflicts in divided societies are: (i) *power-sharing* (often called consociationalism, see Lijphart, 1972); (ii) *power-dividing* (also called the multi-majorities approach, see Rothchild and Roeder, 2005), and; (iii) *centripetalism* (sometimes called integrative approach, see Reilly, 2012; Horowitz, 1985).

Power-sharing: A first school of thought on the relationship between post-war institutional set-up and the durability of peace suggests that power sharing is the most viable solution to create and maintain peace after civil war, violent conflict or other political crisis. Broadly defined, power sharing is a type of governing system designed to include both government and rebel faction in decision-making processes in order to prevent the opponent from dominating politics, from launching a surprise attack, from occupying a territory, and from monopolising welfare and resources (Norris, 2008; Horowitz, 2009). The introduction of power sharing arrangements as a strategy for managing peace in civil war affected societies is essentially based on the work of the Dutch political scientist, Arendt Lijphart (1969; 1977; 1982; 1999, 2002). Arend Lijphart and others argue that power-sharing institutional arrangements based on proportionality, inclusive government, cultural autonomy and possibly minority veto

do not only enhance the chances of democracy surviving in divided societies, but also make countries more peaceful (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Mukherjee, 2006; McGarry and O'Leary, 2006; Walter, 2002). Here, the central argument is that power sharing overcomes commitment problems and mitigates former combatants' security concerns (Walter, 2002). Power sharing provisions also have a demonstrated ability to provide a sense of security to former combatants facing the immediate prospect of working together peacefully after a severe conflict such as a civil war (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Hoodie and Hartzell, 2005). When inclusion is guaranteed (through power sharing), rebels do not need to fear being marginalised in the post-conflict state (Binningsbo, 2011).

Of course, not all power sharing is the same. Certain dimensions of power-sharing create stronger incentives than others for the protagonists to sustain the peace rather than resume armed conflict. Walter (2002), for instance, finds that protagonists are more likely to sign a peace agreement if it involves political and territorial power-sharing. Mattes and Savun (2009) find that only political power-sharing arrangements have a significant effect on the durability of the peace. Collier and Hoeffler (2008), Paris (2004), Stedman *et al.* (2002) show the importance of post-war economic power-sharing as a means of reducing the risk of peace failure. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) suggest that incorporating political, military, territorial and economic power-sharing in the terms of the peace agreement is required to resolve the security dilemma of the protagonists and ensure sustainable peace (see Birnnings, 2011). The conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that agreements by adversaries to share power can prolong the peace.

However, while there is strong empirical evidence to prove that power sharing makes peace more durable (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Lijphart, 1977; Mukherjee, 2006; Norris, 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Binningsbo, 2011), for example, power sharing ended the wars in Kenya, Nepal, Sierra Leone and South Africa. This view is not without critics.

On the one hand, power sharing has been criticised as undemocratic because it limits the transparency and competitiveness of the system (Gates and Strom, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007); including that it may invite spoiler-groups, foster radicalism, and lead to international dependence (Jarstad, 2008). On the other hand, the effect of power sharing on sustainable peace has been challenged on the ground that it is a 'quick fix' solution that gives issues that divide groups a central place in politics and thus tends to

harden the main conflict line (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Empirically, power sharing has failed repeatedly in countries such as Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia to name only a few (Joshi, 2010; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005; Horowitz, 1985).

Centripetalism[22]: A second school of thought on the relationship between post-war institutional set-up and the durability of peace holds that centripetal approaches are the best conflict management strategy for stabilising divided societies. Centripetalism emphasises that rather than designing rigid institutions in which government and rebel group have to work together after post-war elections, 'intergroup political accommodation' is achieved by 'electoral systems that provide incentives for parties to form coalitions across group lines or in other ways moderate their ethnocentric political behaviour' (Horowitz, 2004). This school of thought is most prominently associated with the works of Horowitz (1985, 2002, 2003, 2004), Sisk (1996), Rothchild and Roeder (2005), Bogaards (2000), Reilly (2001, 2005) and Wimmer (2003).

Horowitz, in particular, has long argued that some of Lijphart's power-sharing institutional prescriptions are more likely to deepen divisions in countries emerging from conflict rather than resolve them. Regarding the grand coalition prescription, for instance, Horowitz (2008) contends that grand coalitions are unlikely because the very act of forming a multi-ethnic coalition brings about flanking (intra-ethnic competition), if that does not already exist. Instead of forming such unstable inter-ethnic coalitions, Horowitz (1985; 1993; 2008), discusses a range of structural techniques and preferential policies to sustain peace after civil war. Among them, he emphasises that political actors should be provided with incentives, usually electoral incentives, [23] to cooperate during elections and there should be some form of territorial divisions of power (territorial self-governance) –i.e. federalism. Horowitz's alternative model is built on two main

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[22] Sisk (1996, 34-45) introduces the classification of main approaches to power-sharing into two categories as consociational and integrative. He uses the term "consociational" in reference to Lijphart's formulation, and employs the term "integrative" while referring to Horowitz's suggestions. However, both Horowitz and Reilly, two chief proponents of the latter approach, call it centripetalism in their works.

[23] Reilly, in his systematic discussion of centripetalist theory, advocates, among others, '(i) electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own…; (ii) arenas of bargaining, under which political actors from different groups have an incentive to come together to negotiate and bargain in the search for cross-partisan and crossethnic vote-pooling deals…; and (iii) centrist, aggregative political parties or coalitions which seek multi-ethnic support…' (Reilly, 2001: 11; emphasis in original)

premises. The first one is that political engineering in divided societies should seek to support moderates against extremists by engineering political institutions with incentives for moderation; hence there should be no grand coalition in which participation is based on ethnic quotas. And the second premise posits that the most important of those institutions to be engineered is electoral systems; Horowitz particularly makes a case for the alternative vote, which is a preference based voting system, that would encourage the exchange of preferences between different ethnic parties to achieve moderation.

However, this approach receives only limited empirical support. On the positive side, Gurr (1993) finds that, on balance, centripetal arrangements can be an effective means for managing regional conflicts. Wallensteen (2007) also points out that "since the end of the Cold War, centripetal approaches have been of increasing interest" and that "thus far, the territorial solutions negotiated since the end of the Cold War using autonomy or federation have not failed." Similarly, Saideman *et al.* (2002,) find that "federalism reduces the level of ethnic violence," Bermeo (2002) concludes that "federal institutions promote successful accommodation," in cases of ethnic conflict, while Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) offer statistical evidence that "designing a negotiated settlement or negotiated agreement to include territorial power sharing lowers the risk of a return to war."

On the downside, however, other studies find centripetalism to be insignificant in explaining the durability of peace after civil war (Lijphart, 2002). For example, in the Northern Ireland conflict where the nature and extent of divisions run deep and broad, McGarry and O'Leary (2006b) argue that the integrationist approach (centripetalism) is definitely more unrealistic than consociationalism. McGarry and O'Leary (2006b) point out that in Northern Ireland the Agreement (the 1998 Good Friday Agreement) was made possible by the inclusion of radical parties associated with paramilitary organisations in negotiations, namely Sinn Fein, the Ulster Democratic Party and Progressive Unionist Party, and it was completely unthinkable to expect the leaders of those parties to agree on an AV electoral system that would minimise their electoral strength. McGarry and O'Leary (2006b: 270) thus arrive at the conclusion that: "Horowitz's integrationist prescriptions are perhaps most pertinent at the formation of competitive party system, but thereafter are inapplicable."

Power-dividing: Unlike power-sharing and centripetalism, the power-dividing strategy argues that sustainable peace and stability in divided societies can only be realised through the design of institutions that rely on civil society rather than the state. In this regard, power-dividing strategy focuses on reducing the influence of cultural communities in policymaking, while encouraging civil society and private interests to provide for the needs of citizens (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Roeder, 2005). Power-dividing strategy is firmly placed within the liberal political philosophy of minimising government involvement, extending this vision to societies in conflict. In direct opposition to power sharing, the model is based on the belief that the cultural needs of citizens are constantly changing, and so institutions should facilitate a strong civil society and avoid entrenching structures which privilege one or another group.

The key institutional instruments by which power dividing is meant to be realised are, first, extensive human rights bills that are meant to leave "key decisions to the private sphere and civil society" (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005a). Second, separation of powers between the branches of government and a range of specialised agencies dealing with specific, and clearly delineated policy areas are to create multiple and changing majorities, thus "increasing the likelihood that members of ethnic minorities will be parts of political majorities on some issues and members of any ethnic majority will be members of political minorities on some issues" (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Third, checks and balances are needed "to keep each of these decision-making centres that represents a specific majority from overreaching its authority" (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Thus, the power dividing approach favours presidential over parliamentary systems, bicameral over unicameral legislatures, and independent judiciaries with powers of judicial review extending to acts of both legislative and executive branches. As a general rule, power dividing as a strategy to keep the peace in ethnically divided societies requires that "decisions that can threaten the stability of the constitutional order, such as amendments to peace settlements" be made by "concurrent approval by multiple organs empowering different majorities" (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005).

Although there are some very appealing aspects of power dividing, such as its potential for meeting various demands of different segments of the society, its applicability appears very limited. Its major cases (the United States and Switzerland) are products of long processes of gradual institutional development, which sought to address limited

demands of specific constituencies. For this reason, its adoption in deeply divided societies that have experienced deep and long running divisions seems rather unlikely.

Overall, while existing studies on post-war institutional design arrangements come to contradictory conclusions on whether power-sharing, power-dividing and centripetalism lead to lasting peace in the wake of violent conflict, on the whole, most theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that elite power-sharing is likely to favour peace and stability. But, while elite power-sharing is critical to sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, it is important to point out that a focus on leaders and their actions alone does not tell the whole story (Brubaker, 1998). As Adedokun (2016) argued, the pathways to sustainable peace in divided societies are a complex process that requires elite participation, local engagement/local ownership (i.e. inclusion of sub-national actors such as traditional and community leaders) as well as credible and impartial support from the international community. In this sense, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to sustainable peacebuilding.

5. Summary of Weaknesses and Gaps in the Literature

So far, my review of the literature reveals that while the existing studies on the transition from civil war to peace have yielded considerable insights, there are a number of weaknesses and gaps. Below, I highlight the most serious limitations, including several that have been discussed earlier -- covering the three strands of the literature discussed above, namely the literature on inherited risks associated with civil war onset; the literature on the manner in which the civil war was fought and the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding.

(i) Arguments focused on ethnicity have largely neglected the fact that it is not ethnicity per se that drives conflict onset or long conflict duration, but politicised ethnicity that makes sustainable peace more difficult to achieve. Although the EPR dataset developed by Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) has offered insights in this regard. It is important to keep in mind that the EPR dataset relies only on expert estimates of ethnic inclusiveness rather than on primary data detailing the nature, character and actual distribution of access to state power. This raises eyebrows about the validity of the EPR dataset. Moreover, due to the quantitative nature of the project, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) can neither distinguish between degrees of representativeness of leaders

who claim to speak for an ethnic group, nor identify the actual political actors that are at the roots of the collective action undertaken by ethnic groups. All this suggests that what is needed to understand the causes of civil war versus sustainable peace in divided societies is a more qualitative research that traces how social fragmentation was forged under different historical episodes.

(ii) Arguments focused on economic development have ignored the fact that per capita income and economic growth (two common proxies for economic development) are likely to be endogenous to the risk of civil war onset. Yet, though problems of endogeneity are increasingly recognised in civil war research (Blattman and Miguel 2010), they are hardly addressed as part of the research design in a large number of studies. This means that the correlation between economic development and civil war onset may run in the opposite direction. Moreover, the observed correlation could in fact support the two predominant models in the literature: (i) the 'state-weakness hypothesis' (Fearon and Laitin 2003) where low income encourages violent conflict by increasing state weakness, and the; (ii) 'opportunity cost hypothesis' (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) where low income encourages civil war by decreasing the opportunity cost of rebellion. Perhaps, more importantly the arguments focused on economic development have ignored the fact that despite persistent poor economic performance some countries have avoided civil war while some that experience civil war such as Mozambique have been able to escape the "virus" of civil war recurrence. This means that academics and policy analysts must develop a suitable strategy to overcome the problem of endogeneity so as to obtain unbiased estimates of causal effects.

(iii) Whereas arguments on "vertical" inequality have failed to recognise the discriminatory relationships between inter-group as a source of conflict, and arguments on "horizontal inequality" recognise this weakness, the role of inequalities at the 'elite level' as source of conflict has been largely underestimated. Yet, emerging studies have identified inequality at the elite level as arguably more important (CSRC, 2006). Perhaps what is therefore warranted is a more systematic consideration of the interactions of inequalities at both mass and elite levels as well as the strategy to tackle inequality in civil-war affected societies.

(iv) Arguments on natural resource scarcity or abundance have failed to pay attention to the fact that the relation between natural resources and conflict is complex; varies for

different types of resources; and is conditional on many other factors, especially the institutional context and political regimes of natural-resource scarce or rich countries (rather than their existence per se) (see Nillesen and Bulte, 2014)

(v) Arguments on political institutions or regime type have largely privileged superficial measures of democracy, thereby neglecting the actual inclusiveness of political organisation.

(vi)Arguments focused on the manner in which the original war was fought tended to ignore both structural conditions that prevailed both before and at the end of the war, as well as the interests and motives of actors. Maybe what matters most in the end is not how the war was fought but the extent to which relevant key stakeholders are involved in the post-conflict decision making process.

(vii) The arguments focused on the international community, while important, have largely ignored the critical role of the local actors. As Tschirgi (2004:ii) points out: "The basic premise of peacebuilding is that peace, security and stability cannot be imposed from the outside but need to be nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic political realities."

(viii) While arguments focused on civil war outcome (especially negotiated settlement) are important to understand the durability of peace after civil war, they remain largely unspecific and have limited our ability to generalise across cases where civil wars ended not just in negotiated settlement or decisive military victory by either side (government vs. rebels) but also in a disappearance.

(ix) Power-sharing arguments, by contrast, rightly focus on the appropriate strategies aimed at preventing, managing, and settling internal conflicts in divided societies, but they have so far neglected the roles and contributions of sub-national or local actors as well as the international community that are arguably more important.

(x) Perhaps more importantly, a large number of the literatures on civil war and peace studies have relied largely on quantitative approaches. Yet, explanations based primarily on large-N studies provide what are essentially flat conclusions that may not adequately capture local context and the character of post-conflict environments as well

as the micro-level dynamics of civil wars and peace processes. This suggests a need for mixed methods approaches that incorporate both quantitative and qualitative techniques.

6.   Conclusion and Future Directions

This paper has presented a detailed review of the literature on civil war onset, civil war recurrence, and post-conflict peacebuilding. It has challenged our understanding that despite the best efforts of theorists and peacebuilding practitioners, we still know little about the best ways to accomplish sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil war. In particular, the paper has shown that there is no consensus on the causes of war and the conditions of peace. There is also no agreement on the methodologies most appropriate for conducting peace and conflict research. Going forward, this final section briefly lays out important areas for future research if academics and policymakers want to reduce the incidence of civil war around the world and promote sustainable peace.

To begin with, much of our knowledge on the transition from civil war to peacebuilding is heavily drawn from post-conflict failure (for example, see: Autesserre, 2010; Call, 2012; Collier *et al.*, 2003; World Bank, 2011; Walter 2014). As a result, our knowledge is quite detailed on why peace processes fail. But there are far fewer case studies and far less large N studies on why peacebuilding sometimes succeeds. A few recent papers on 'why peace processes succeed' include Bieber (2005) work on Bosnian, Barron and Burke (2008) publication on Aceh in Indonesia, and Adedokun (2016) doctoral dissertation on Mozambique. Of course, this is not to underestimate the contributions of scholars who have written on why peace fails, but only to point out that a 'sharp' focus on cases where 'sustainable peace' has been achieved could further contribute to our understanding of peace process.

Second, while academics and practitioners working on conflict resolution and peacebuilding have lately and increasingly emphasised the 'role of local ownership' as a key pre-condition for sustainable post-conflict peace building, yet understanding what constitutes local ownership still remain a challenge. For example, there is no consensus among academics and policymakers on the definitions, norms and control of local ownership. In other words, we still do not know "who owns what?" who are the "locals"? Are they the national actors of the post-conflict country, the sub-national

actors or perhaps civil society organisations? We also do not know how broad local participation in, or local ownership of, the peace process needs to be to achieve success. Future research should attempt to unpack the conceptual issues and operational challenges of effectively putting local ownership principles into practice, as well as to identify specific local factors or conditions that are critical to sustainable peace in the aftermath of a civil war.

A third, but related area for future research would be to focus on developing the appropriate criteria for measuring, monitoring and evaluating what comprises 'success' or 'failure' in peacebuilding operations. The existing benchmarks, proxies and indicators used to measure the effects of peacebuilding are problematic[24]. Consider for example the three-set of standards for measuring and evaluating peacebuilding efforts popularised by Call and Cousens (2008) as follows: The *maximalist standard* refers to the most ambitious measures that expect success to be claimed only when peacebuilding efforts address the ''root causes'' of conflict and promote the adoption of core social and political goods such as the creation of legitimate, effective, and sustainable state institutions, the attainment of conditions compatible with "human security," the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence (UN Security Council, 2001). The maximalist approach is also known as "positive peace" (Galtung, 1964). However, while a maximalist standard of peacebuilding may be philosophically appealing, it is too ambitious and unrealistic in post-conflict societies.

At the other end of the spectrum is a *minimalist standard*, which expects success to be claimed only when there is cessation of violence or no renewed warfare. The minimalist approach is also known as "negative peace" (Galtung, 1964). Minimalist definitions of success include the fulfilment of peacekeeping mandates or implementation of peace agreements, and/or stabilisation. But, while the minimalist standard may provide a visible indicator of success, it is an insufficient indicator of peacebuilding because it focuses on limited, short-term, rather than long- term, peace operations.

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[24] There are more than eleven major databases on peacebuilding measurements, but they contradict each other (Schunemann and Lucey, 2015).

The *moderate standard* considers peacebuilding efforts to be successful when there is absence of large-scale violence coupled with progress toward basic democratic governance. While the moderate standard is pragmatic and analytically useful because in some post-conflict environments, even if security problems persist, significant improvements have followed periods of high insecurity and extreme violence (Valters, 2014). Yet, the proxies or indicators for determining the success of peacebuilding operations are underspecified. For instance, we do not know which aspect of democratic governance is necessary for peace to be achieved.

The 'bottom line' here is that while a number of different criteria exist for evaluating peacebuilding record, more work still needs to be done. In part because there is a tendency to select indicators that suggest progress towards the achievement of objectives stated in mandates and visions of development donors, but which neglect the aspirations and perceptions of 'local' – that is, people living in the affected post-conflict societies. This tendency might not be intentional, but instead it points to the urgency and importance of developing the right criteria for peacebuilding.

The fourth, and perhaps the most fundamental area for further research would be to focus on *'methodological pluralism'*. By this, I mean the integration of case study approach and survey research method in peace and conflict research. Why is this important? Current research on civil war and peacebuilding are largely dominated by quantitative approach. But while quantitative approach can help establish correlations between given variables and outcomes; and allows other scholars to validate original findings by independently replicating the analysis (Dudwick, Kuehnast, Jones and Woolcock, 2006). Yet, the findings of quantitative studies are largely sensitive to coding and measurement procedures (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006); they suffer from endogeneity (Miguel et al., 2004); and they lack clear micro-foundations (Cramer, 2007).

In response to the shortcomings of quantitative approach, qualitative-oriented studies have been suggested as an alternative methodological technique to understand the causes of war and conditions for peace. Qualitative (case study) approach provides a holistic view of the phenomena under investigation (Patton, 2001; Yin 2014); offers researchers the ability to empirically assess a range of features below the state level (Clayton, 2014); it generates contextually situated data and adaptable to capture the broader cultural and political context in natural settings (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Simons

and Zanker, 2012). And whereas quantitative studies involve the risk of 'conceptual stretching' by lumping together dissimilar cases, qualitative (case study) research strategy allows for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a limited number of cases. The methodological benefits of case study research do not come without caveats, however. Research that employs case study designs often lacks the following: controllability, deductibility, repeatability and generalisability (Lee, 1989).

The disputes between qualitative and quantitative approaches in peace and conflict research suggest the demand for methodological pluralism, especially through the integration of case study/ fieldwork and survey research methods. Through the use of multiple methods the robustness of results can be increased; findings can be strengthened when different kinds and sources of data converge and are found to be congruent or when explanation is developed to account for divergence (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). As Hartzell (2013), Autesserre (2014), Kalyvas (2009) and Taylor *et. al* (2006) have pointed out, fine-grained data collection at the level of individuals, households and communities through fieldwork and survey research methods can be successfully used to inform peacebuilding.

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