India's product patent protection regime: Less or more of "pills for the poor"?
Padmashree Gehl Sampath
#2006-019
The year 2005 marks the end of transition period for many developing
countries with competent pharmaceutical sectors that competed in
supplying generic versions of patented drugs to LDCs before, thereby
inducing price competition and enhancing access to medicines. In a
post-2005 scenario, the critical issue is whether LDCs without adequate
manufacturing capabilities can make use of compulsory licensing
expeditiously to induce price competition and secure lower prices. This
paper uses empirical evidence collected during a firm-level survey of
the Indian pharmaceutical sector to generate evidence on emerging
strategies of firms. It shows that the vigour of compulsory licensing as
a price-leveraging instrument post-2005 is incumbent mainly on its
economic feasibility. It shows that Indian firms view the market
potential (in terms of market size and profits involved in such supply,
especially if they have to make specific technological investments to
produce the drug) of the mechanism much more severely than before, and
may be less inclined to engage in such production if their commercial
expectations are grossly unmet. The analysis assesses implications of
emerging strategies of firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector for
access to medicines both domestically and internationally, and
highlights the challenges involved.
Key words: product patents, Indian pharmaceuticals, generics, access
UNU-MERIT Working Papers
ISSN 1871-9872